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NO. THERE’S NO LIFE AT MERS

NO. THERE’S NO LIFE AT MERS


NO. THERE’S NO LIFE AT MERS

By DinSFLA

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc (MERS) has a very long history. The beginning stages have remained a mystery until now.

In 1989, Brian Hershkowitz developed the “Whole Loan Book Entry” concept while serving as a director for the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA). In 1990, he first introduced this concept to seven different industry groups; Document Custodian, Originators, Servicers, Title Insurers, County Recorders, Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE’s) and Warehouse/Interim Lenders. The reception was very positive and it was viewed as a very useful recording system to be used for how equity and debt securities could be identified and managed.

In 1991, Mr. Hershkowtiz published Farming It Out in Mortgage Banking Magazine. His main discussion in this article is primarily about getting the opinion of the experts in the technology outsourcing service industry. In 1992, Mr. Hershkowitz published another article called Cutting Edge Solutions in Mortgage Banking Magazine. In this particular article he mentions the actual meeting that took place at the Mortgage Bankers Association of America (MBA) headquarters with many key players that are known today as some of MERSCORP’s shareholders, such as, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In this meeting they discussed a “System” that will bring changes in mortgage records.

Mr. Hershkowitz went on to become President and COO of LandSafe Credit, a leading settlement service provider that was a subsidiary of Countrywide. Mr. Hershkowitz also spent several years serving Countrywide in the areas of strategic planning and executive management.

In 2001, Mr. Hershkowitz became Executive Vice President at Fidelity National Information Services (FNIS) and President of its mortgage and information services division. His responsibilities included management of the Company’s data offerings, including public records information, credit reporting information, flood hazard compliance data, real estate tax information and collateral valuation services. He left FNIS in November of 2006 to become Chief Executive Officer of Maximum Value Group, a consulting firm focused on providing advice to private equity and other market participants in the area of banking and mortgages.

ENTER THE X-FILES

MERS has evolved into a totally different purpose today.

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of MERSCORP Inc., located at 1595 Spring Hill Rd Ste 310 Vienna, VA 22182.

MERS was founded by the mortgage industry. MERS tracks “changes” in the ownership of the beneficial and servicing interests of mortgage loans as they are bought and sold among MERS members or others. Simultaneously, MERS acts as the “mortgagee” of record in a “nominee” capacity (a form of agency) for the beneficial owners of these loans.

To ensure widespread acceptance within the industry, MERS sought to have security instruments modified to contain MERS as the original mortgagee (MOM) language. MERS began to change decades of business practices after the two biggest mortgage funders in the U.S. the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Ferderal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) modified their Uniform Security Instruments to include MOM language. Their approval opened the doors to incorporate MERS into loans at origination.

Soon after, U.S. government agencies like the Veterans Administration, Federal Housing administration and Government National Mortgage Association (Ginne Mae), and several state housing agencies followed both Fannie/Freddie to approve MERS.

More than 60 percent of all newly-originated mortgages are registered in MERS. Its mission is to register every mortgage loan in the United States on the MERS System. Since 1997, more than 65 million home mortgages have been assigned a Mortgage Identification Number (MIN) and have been registered on the MERS System.

The mortgage-backed security (MBS) sector tested the viability of MERS because a substantial number of mortgages are securitized in the secondary market. In February 1999, Lehman Brothers was the first company to include MERS registered loans in a MBS.

Moody’s Investor Service issued an independent Structured Finance special report  on MERS and it’s impact of MBS transactions and found that where the securitzer used MERS, new assignments of mortgages to the trustee of MBS transactions were not necessary.

Since MERS is a privately owned data system and not public, all mortgages and assignments must be recorded in order to perfect a lien. Since they failed to record assignments when these loans often traded ownership several times before any assignment was created, the legal issue is apparent. MERS may have destroyed the public land records by breaking the chain of title to millions of homes.

IN MERS CEO’S OWN WORDS

In or around the summer of 1997, MERSCORP President and CEO R.K. Arnold wrote, “Yes, There is life on MERS” Mr. Arnold stated, “Some county recorders have expressed concerns that MERS will eliminate their offices nationwide or destroy the public land records by breaking the chain of title. As implemented, MERS will not create a break in the chain of title, and, because MERS is premised on an assignment recorded in the public land records, MERS cannot work without county recorders.”

In this same article Mr. Arnold also states “The sheer volume of transfers between servicing companies and the resulting need to record assignments caused a heavy drag on the secondary market. Loan servicing can trade several times before even the first assignment in a chain is recorded, leaving the public land records clogged with unnecessary assignments. Sometimes these assignments are recorded in the wrong sequence, clouding title to the property”. Mr. Arnold never mentions the fact that the mortgage notes have been securitized, thereby becoming “negotiable securities” under the Uniform Commercial Code.

In an interview for The New York Times, Mr. Arnold said, “that his company had benefited not only banks, but also millions of borrowers who could not have obtained loans without the money-saving efficiencies MERS brought to the mortgage trade.”

Mr. Arnold went on to say that, ” far from posing a hurdle for homeowners, MERS had helped reduce mortgage fraud and imposed order on a sprawling industry where, in the past, lenders might have gone out of business and left no contact information for borrowers seeking assistance.”

“We’re not this big bad animal,” Mr. Arnold said. “This crisis that we’ve had in the mortgage business would have been a lot worse without MERS.”

Unfortunately, even a simple search in the Florida Land Records proves the opposite to be the case. Researchers have  easily found affidavits of lost assignments actually stating, “the said mortgage was assigned to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., from “XXXXXXX”, the original of the said assignment to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., was lost, misplaced or destroyed before same could be placed of record with the Florida Land Records County Clerk’s office; That, “XXXXXXX”, it’s successors and/or assignee is no longer in business/or do not respond to our request for a duplicate assignment, and therefore, a duplicate original of said assignment cannot be obtained.”

According to affidavits such as these, not only have the borrowers lost contact with the lenders, but the same is true that MERS did as well.

On September 25, 2009, Mr. R.K. Arnold was deposed in Alabama. Mr. Arnold admitted MERS does not have a beneficial interest in any loan, does not loan money and does not suffer a default if monies are not paid. On November 11, 2009, William C. Hultman was deposed in Alabama and made the same admissions.

Yet again, researchers have easily located affidavits recorded in the Florida Land Records stating “That said Deed of Trust has not been assigned to any other party and that MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, Inc. is the current holder and owner of the Note and Deed of Trust in question.”

NO. THERE’S NO LIFE AT MERS

Aside from not recording assignments, Mr. Arnold failed to mention that the certifying officers given authority to execute sensitive loan documents would not be paid employees of MERS. This raises the critical legal question as to how one can act as a certified officer and execute any equitable interest on behalf of any security instruments without being an employee of MERS.

On April 7, 2010, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, MERS Treasurer and Secretary William C. Hultman gave an oral sworn video/telephone deposition in the case of Bank Of New York v. Ukpe.:

Q Do the assistant secretaries — first off, are
you a salaried employee of MERS?
A No.

Q Are you a salaried employee of MERS Corp,
Inc.?
A Yes.

Q Are any of the employees of MERS, Inc.
salaried employees?
A I don’t understand your question.

Q Does anyone get a paycheck, if they are an
employee of MERS, Inc., do they get a paycheck from
Mercer, Inc.?
A There is no MERS, Inc.

Q I thought, sir, there’s a company that was
formed January 1, 1999, Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. Does it have paid employees?
A No, it does not.

Q Does it have employees?
A No.

Q Does MERS have any employees?
A Did they ever have any? I couldn’t hear you.

Q Does MERS have any employees currently?
A No.

Q In the last five years has MERS had any
employees?
A No.

<SNIP>

Q How many assistant secretaries have you
appointed pursuant to the April 9, 1998 resolution; how
many assistant secretaries of MERS have you appointed?
A I don’t know that number.

Q Approximately?
A I wouldn’t even begin to be able to tell you
right now.

Q Is it in the thousands?
A Yes.

Q Have you been doing this all around the
country in every state in the country?
A Yes.

Q And all these officers I understand are unpaid
officers of MERS?
A Yes.

Q And there’s no live person who is an employee
of MERS that they report to, is that correct, who is an employee?
A There are no employees of MERS.

If so, how does anyone have any authority to sign security instruments encumbered by any loan documents, if these certifying officers are not paid employees and never attend corporate meetings in the capacity as Vice President, Assistant Secretary, etc. with Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc..

COURTS FIND ISSUES WITH MERS

Federal and state judges across America are realizing that the mortgage industry’s nominee is backfiring.

In Mr. Arnold’s own words, “For these servicing companies to perform their duties satisfactorily, the note and mortgage were bifurcated. The investor or its designee held the note and named the servicing company as mortgagee, a structure that became standard.” What has become a satisfactory standard structure for the mortgage industry has not been found by many courts to be legally sufficient to foreclose upon the property.

Again, MERS only acts as nominee for the mortgagee of record for any mortgage loan registered on the computer system MERS maintains, called the MERS System. MERS cannot negotiate a security instrument. Therefore, MERS certifying officers cannot have legal standing to assign what MERS does not own or hold.

The Supreme Court of New York Nassau County:
Bank of New York Mellon V. Juan Mojica Index No: 26203/09

Justice Thomas A. Adams stated, “Not only has plaintiff failed to establish MERS’ right as a nominee for purposes of recording to assign the mortgage, more importantly, no effort has been made to establish the authority of MERS, a non-party to the note, to transfer its ownership.”

The Supreme Court of Maine:
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Saunders, No. 09-640, 2010 WL 3168374,
(Me. August 12, 2010) The Court explains that the only rights conveyed to MERS in either the Saunders’ mortgage or the corresponding promissory note are bare legal title to the property for the sole purpose of recording the mortgage and the corresponding right to record the mortgage with the Registry of Deeds. This comports with the limited role of a nominee. A nominee is a “person designated to act in place of another, usu[ally] in a very limited way,” or a “party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives and distributes funds for the benefit of others.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1149 (9th ed. 2009).

In Hawkins, No. BK-S-07-13593-LBR, 2009 WL 901766
The Court found that the deed of trust “attempts to name MERS as both beneficiary and a nominee” but held that MERS was not the beneficiary, as it had “no rights whatsoever to any payments, to any servicing rights, or to any of the properties secured by the loans.”

In Re: Walker, Case No. 10-21656-E-11 Eastern District of CA Bankruptcy court rules MERS has NO actionable interest in title. “Any attempt to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed without ownership of the underlying note is void under California law.” “MERS could not, as a matter of law, have transferred the note to Citibank from the original lender, Bayrock Mortgage Corp.” The Court’s ruled that MERS and Citibank are not the real parties in interest.

In re Vargas, 396 B.R. at 517-19. Judge Bufford found that the witness called to testify as to debt and default was incompetent. All the witness could testify was that he had looked at the MERS computerized records. The witness was unable to satisfy the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 803, as applied to computerized records in the Ninth Circuit. See id. at 517-20. “The low level employee could really only testify that the MERS screen shot he reviewed reflected a default. That really is not much in the way of evidence, and not nearly enough to get around the hearsay rule.”

FRAUD ON THE COURT

In US Bank v. Harpster the Law Offices Of David J. Stern committed fraud on the court by the evidence based on the Assignment of Mortgage that was created and notarized on December 5, 2007. However, that purported creation/notarization date was facially impossible: the stamp on the notary was dated May 19, 2012. Since Notary commissions only last four years in Florida (see F .S. Section 117.01 (l)), the notary stamp used on this instrument did not even exist until approximately five months after the purported date on the Assignment.

The Court specifically finds that the purported Assignment did not exist at the time of filing of this action; that the purported Assignment was subsequently created and the execution date and notarial date were fraudulently backdated, in a purposeful, intentional effort to mislead the Defendant and this Court. The Court rejects the Assignment and finds that is not entitled to introduction in evidence for any purpose. The Court finds that the Plaintiff does not have standing to bring its action.

The Court dismissed this case with prejudice.

In Duval County, Florida another foreclosure case was dismissed with prejudice for fraud on the court. In JPMorgan V. Pocopanni, the Court found that Fishman & Shapiro representing JPMorgan had actual knowledge at all times that the Complaint, the Assignment, and the Motion for Substitution were all false. The Court found that by clear and convincing evidence WAMU, Chase and Shapiro & Fishman committed fraud on this court.

Both these cases involved Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. assignments.

FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS

Two RICO Class Action lawsuits have commenced against Foreclosure Law Firms and MERSCORP for fabricating and forging documents that are entered into courts as evidence in order to have standing to foreclose. Unknown to judges and the borrowers, they accept these documents because they are executed under perjury of the law. These “tromp l’oeil” actions have finally surfaced and the courts has taking notice.

The lack of supervision and managing of MERS “Robo-Signers” has led to a national frenzy of fabrication, forgery and certifying officers wearing multiple corporate hats. Anyone who compares signatures of these certifying officers will see a major problem with forgery in hundreds of thousands affidavits and assignments which creates an enormous dark cloud of title defects to millions of homes across the US.

On August 10, 2010 Florida attorney general Bill McCollum announced that he is investigating three foreclosure law firms for allegedly providing fraudulent assignments and affidavits relating in foreclosure cases.

In a deposition taken in December 2009, GMAC employee Jeffrey Stephan said he signed 10,000 affidavits or similar documents a month without personally verifying who the mortgage holder was. That means many foreclosures could have taken place based on false documentation and many homes may have been unlawfully foreclosed on.

On September 20, 2010, GMAC halted foreclosures in 23 different states. Two of the three firms being investigated by the Florida attorney general, the Law Office of Marshall C. Watson and the Law Offices of David J. Stern PA, have represented GMAC in foreclosure proceedings.

This is not limited to only GMAC Mortgage. There are many hundreds of thousands of these same documents that are being created by many foreclosure law firms across the nation.

University of Utah law professor Christopher L. Peterson has raised the issue that MERS should be regarded as a debt collector. He argues that some of MERS’ methods are just the sort of deceptive practices that ought to be regulated under The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U. S. C. §1692(a),(j).

CONCLUSION

Finally in May, 2009, Mr. Arnold said in Mortgage Technology Magazine, “Every system in the mortgage industry can switch MERS registry on or off at will,” referencing that both the Obama administration and Congressional leaders are aware of this.

President Obama and Congressional leaders it is time to permanently switch MERS lifeless device off!

Not until MERS became the primary focus for challenges to legal standing in foreclosure courts as reported by the alternative media, have the main stream media and the mortgage industry have begun to realize that property records cross the United States have become totally unreliable.

It has taken more than a decade for the courts to recognize that MERS has become a mortgage backfire system leaving clouded titles in over 65 million loans since 1997.

Courts across the nation must comply with the law.  Any documents submitted to the courts regarding property ownership should be assumed to be nothing but smoke in a mirror.

No, Mr. Arnold, there’s no life at MERS.


DinSFLA, “nominee” of stopforeclosurefraud.com, a blog on Foreclosure Fraud.

© 2010 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved. www.StopForeclosureFraud.com

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in featured, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (33)

Could WAMU/ JPMorgan Chase Foreclosures be invalid?

Could WAMU/ JPMorgan Chase Foreclosures be invalid?


This is going to raise questions on how this has been able to proceed without the finalizing of the sale.

You cannot have an omelet if the chicken hasn’t laid the egg yet!

  • Were the shareholders made aware that JPMC never finalized the deal?
  • How does this effect those who filed for Bankruptcy?
  • Why hasn’t the FDIC stepped up when they knew that this was on going and never finalized the sale?
  • What happens to those who have an assignment of mortgage from WAMU to JPMC?
  • Is JPMC currently servicing any of WAMU’ loans?
  • All the chain in title that are in question?
  • Bailout? What Bailout?

Thanks to Foreclosure Hamlet and 4closurefraud for this alert!

Via: 4ClosureFraud

This is very intriguing… Check out the the excerpts from the report below…

Game Changer?

WaMu sale hasn’t closed, document suggests

Next month will mark two years since federal regulators seized Washington Mutual and sold it to JPMorgan Chase for $1.9 billion. Now a document that appears to be from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation suggests the deal still hasn’t closed.

“Everyone is saying the sale is finalized,” said the shareholder, Farokh Lam, of Woburn, Mass. “It is not.

Lam noticed that on pages 7 and 9, the original WaMu purchase and sale agreement allows the FDIC to extend the settlement date. He says he asked about it, and the FDIC confirmed in phone calls and emails that the settlement date was set for Aug. 30, 2010, and could be extended further.

“Settlement Date” means the first Business Day immediately prior to the day which is one hundred eighty (180) days after Ban Closing, or such other date prior thereto as may be agreed upon by the Receiver and the Assuming Bank. The Receiver, in its discretion, may extend the Settlement Date.

It says: “The purpose of this amendment is to extend the time period for Final Settlement to August. 30, 2010.

WaMu’s final days were chronicled in depth by Puget Sound Business Journal Staff Writer Kirsten Grind in an award-winning series.

Does this mean that all the WAMU foreclosures being pushed through the courts by JPMorgan Chase using the FDIC Purchase and Sale Agreement are invalid?

Does it mean if they haven’t closed the deal THEY DO NOT OWN THE LOANS OR THEIR SERVICING RIGHTS?

Where are the windfall profits going after the foreclosure sale?

What if the agreement changes before it is finalized?

So many questions…

Pipe up in the comments and let me know what you think.

The way I see it is, if they haven’t finalized the deal, how can they foreclose on the homes?

[ipaper docId=36027673 access_key=key-5z7g1dy0c99oralt1p0 height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in discovery, fdic, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, investigation, jpmorgan chase, non disclosure, psa, securitization, servicers, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, wamu, washington mutualComments (4)

Conflict of Interest, Fraud on the Court, Motion to DQ Counsel

Conflict of Interest, Fraud on the Court, Motion to DQ Counsel


This is quite a fight! Listen this is exactly what is happening across the country. When and Who is going to pick up this mess when it all finally comes to reality?

In my Florida Bar Complaint I raised this same issue against my MILL and they saw nothing wrong??…Again, we are on our own to bring them down!

Via: StopaLawFirm

STUNNING ADMISSIONS:

(1)  Citimortgage admits its own employees signed an assignment of mortgage, conveying a mortgage to itself.

(2)  Foreclosure Mill Shapiro & Fishman, LLP admits its standard practice is to prepare these assignments for their own clients (not the original mortgagee) to execute and record in the public record.

(3)  Shapiro never runs conflict checks prior to filing new lawsuits, leaving it up to their other clients (who may or may not be named as Defendants) to assert a conflict after the case has been filed.

These admissions were made in the course of a 3.5 hour, evidentiary hearing on a Motion to Disqualify Counsel brought by Mark Stopa on June 18, 2010 before Judge Foster in Tampa.

I’ve attached the Transcript, DQ Motion, and the Exhibits introduced into evidence, but they’re not going to make sense without some background. (Bear with me, this is fascinating stuff.  To illustrate, even as he denied the motion (incorrectly, in my opinion), Judge Foster openly acknowledged the need for a written opinion from the Florida Supreme Court, comparing the issue to Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) and Miranda  v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).

Facts (as set forth in DQ Motion,Transcript, and Exhibits):  Shapiro & Fishman represents Citimortgage, Inc. in a foreclosure lawsuit against JPMorgan, MERS, and the homeowners.  The Complaint does not specify how Citimortgage acquired standing to foreclose.  The public records reflect an Assignment of Mortgage, prepared by Shapiro, purporting to assign the mortgage from MERS, as Nominee for First Security Mortgage Services, to Citimortgage.  The assignment was executed the same day Citimortgage filed suit.  Citimortgage’s own employee testified that Nate Blackstun and Jamie Hardcastle, the individuals who signed this assignment (purporting to transfer the mortgage from MERS to Citimortgage) are actually employees of Citimortgage.  Quoting the testimony of a Citimortgage employee:

Q:  Who is Jamie Hardcastle?
A:  She works at Citimortgage in the — well, I’m not quite sure which department she works in.
Q:  Do you know her?
A:  Yes.
Q:  Do you work with her?
A:  No, she works in my building.
Q:  She’s an employee of Citimortgage, Inc.?
A:  Yes.
Q:  How about Nate Blackstun?  Do you know him?
A:  Yes.
Q:  Who is he?
A:  He’s vice president of Citimortgage.
Q:  Does he work in your building as well?
A:  Yes.  …
Q:  Do you know whether Mr. Blackstun obtained the consent of MERS prior to signing an assignment of mortgage in this case?
A:  He’s an authorized signer for MERS.
Q:  Even though he’s also the Vice President of Citimortgage?
A:  Yes.
Q:  You see any sort of problem with that?
A:  No.
Q:  How do you allege that Citimortgage became the owner and holder of this note in this case?
A:  It was assigned to Citimortgage –
Q:  From whom?
A:  from MERS.
Q:  From whom?
A:  MERS.
Q:  On behalf of whom?
A:  I’m not sure.

In fact, Shapiro and Fishman’s office manager admitted that Shapiro’s standard practice is to prepare an Assignment of Mortgage, provide it to its own client to sign (on behalf of the original mortgage holder, typically MERS), have its client execute the assignment, and cause the assignment to be recorded.

Q:  Do you dispute that Jamie Hardcastle is an employee of Citimortgage, Inc.?
A:  Do I dispute that?  No.
Q:  Do you dispute that Nate Blackstun is an employee of Citimortgage, Inc.?
A:  No.
Q:  Yet they are the individuals who signed an assignment of mortgage on October 13, 2009, purporting to convey a mortgage from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for First Security Mortgage Services to Citimortgage?
A:  With authority from MERS to execute the document, yes they did. …
Q:  So all you basically do when you get a new client for a foreclosure case, you cause an assignment of mortgage to be prepared, send it to your client for signature, and knowing that your clients have it own employees signing it and then sending it back to you, true?
A:  Yes.  However, that assignment is not part of the foreclosure action itself.  It’s a chain of title document which is not part of the foreclosure.
Q:  You’ve never seen these assignments of mortgage be attached to a complaint?
A:  Sure.

Shapiro represents JPMorgan and MERS in other, pending cases, including at least one case where MERS is adverse to Citimortgage.  Yet Shapiro continues to represent Citimortgage in this case, adverse to JPMorgan and MERS.  (If you don’t think there is anything wrong with that, call The Florida Bar and tell them you represent ABC Corp. against XYZ Corp. and ask The Bar if it’s ok for you to represent XYZ Corp. against ABC Corp. – see what they say.  See if the Bar gives its blessing, even if both entities waive the conflict.)  Shapiro did not perform a “conflict check” prior to representing Citimortgage in this case and, in fact, does not perform conflict checks when taking on new files.  Instead, Shapiro’s standard practice is to file the suit for whichever bank it is representing in that case and presume there is no conflict unless a different bank asserts such a conflict.

The issues:  (a) Whether Shapiro & Fishman have a conflict of interest under 4-1.7, R.Reg.Fla.Bar, precluding it from acting as counsel for Citimortgage, when it is simultaneously representing JPMorgan and MERS (in other, pending cases and, arguably, the instant case); and (b) whether Citimortgage has used Shapiro’s services to perpetrate a crime or fraud, without agreeing to disclose and rectify the crime or fraud, in violation of 4-1.16, R.Reg.Fla.Bar.

The law:  Rule 4-1.7(a) precludes a law firm from representing a client if the representation is (1) directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s representation will be “materially limited” by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, a third person, or a personal interest of the lawyer.  The only way around this prohibition is compliance with 4-1.7(b), which requires, among other things, that each client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing or clearly stated on the record at a hearing.  See Lincoln Associates & Constr., Inc. v. Wentworth Constr. Co., Inc., 26 So. 3d 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).  Additionally, Rule 4-1.16 precludes a lawyer from representing a client who has used the lawyer’s services to commit a crime or fraud unless the client agrees to disclose and rectify the crime or fraud.

Analysis:  In the face of the Motion to Disqualify Counsel, Shapiro presented a waiver of conflict, signed by an employee of Citimortgage, dated just one day before the hearing (the first time Shapiro discussed the issue of conflict with Citimortgage).  However, Shapiro presented no such waiver from MERS or JPMorgan, and no witness from MERS or JPMorgan testified or otherwise consented to waive the conflict.  In my opinion, the absence of consent from MERS and JPMorgan required Shapiro’s disqualification.  See Rule 4-1.7 and Wentworth.

Throughout the hearing, Judge Foster repeatedly ruled that he “did not see the conflict” and that Citimortgage was “not adverse” to MERS and JPMorgan.  Respectfully, when these entities are on opposite sides of a lawsuit, the adversity is presumed.  They are adverse by definition, one being the Plaintiff and the other the Defendant.   Although Shapiro contends, when these entities are named as Defendants, that it’s merely to ”clear title,” that does not change the adversarial nature of the relationship.  For instance, suppose MERS or JPMorgan or First Security later realized it was the owner and holder of the note and mortgage (or, at minimum, that it had a bona fide claim in that regard) – the judgment in this case would bar such a claim under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.  Similarly, suppose a ”junior” lien holder had a bona fide argument that its lien was superior.  Isn’t Shapiro throwing one client under the bus (the defendant) for the sake of another (the plaintiff) without checking if its own client, the defendant, takes the position that it owns and holds the note and mortgage?  Shapiro says the defendant was defaulted, so it isn’t contesting the plaintiff’s position and there is hence no conflict, but isn’t it the lawyer’s job to inquire about the conflict, before filing suit, and not merely to leave it up to the client to figure it out? Isn’t it Shapiro’s responsibility, under The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, before filing suit against its own client, to make sure that the client it is suing consents to the relief being requested?  How do we know the client isn’t relying on the law firm (as clients reasonably do)?  I can see the logic now – “Shapiro is filing suit against us for a different bank.  Shapiro represents us.  Shapiro must be right – we must not have an ownership interest in this Note and Mortgage.”  We’ve already established that Shapiro isn’t checking – Shapiro admitted as much at this hearing – so if the bank isn’t checking, either, then who is?

Suppose this were any other setting, not a foreclosure case, and you represent ABC Corp. against XYZ Corp.  Would you ever file suit for XYZ Corp. against ABC Corp., in a different suit, without asking ABC Corp. if it consented?  Without asking ABC Corp. if it agreed with XYZ Corp’s position in that case?  I highly doubt it.  So why it is okay for Shapiro to do that in these cases, over and over again?  Merely because they are foreclosure cases?

And what about all of the cases where Shapiro’s “other” client may claim ownership of the Note and Mortgage (e.g. because it is the record owner or prior record owner) but is not named as a defendant in the suit?  Why does Shapiro name these entities as Defendants in some cases but not in others?  If they need to “clear title” in some cases, why not in others?  Is Shapiro intentionally not naming its own client as a defendant to make it easier for its other client, the plaintiff, to win the foreclosure case, while leaving the door open for its other client (not named as a defendant) to file suit on the same Note and Mortgage? After all, if the bank isn’t named as a defendant, the foreclosure judgment is not binding on it, and nothing stops that bank from filing a different lawsuit for foreclosure.

Meanwhile, in the face of an assignment of mortgage that appears fraudulent (unless you think self-dealing or dual agency is okay), Shapiro asserts Citimortgage’s standing is based on transfer of the note, not the assignment of mortgage.  Of course, Shapiro did not take this position until after the Motion to Disqualify Counsel was filed, which raises the question – why is Shapiro so willing to concede one ground for standing in this case when it asserts that basis for standing in other, similar cases?  We all know there are many cases in which Shapiro has used an assignment of mortgage as a basis for standing; in fact,often the assignment is attached to the Complaint.  Why, then, would it be giving up this argument in this case?  In my opinion, the answer is clear – Shapiro wants to take the spotlight off of itself and its own conduct, even if it means giving up an argument for a client.  “Let’s argue the assignment is irrelevant for purposes of standing, that way our conduct vis a vis the assignment becomes irrelevant, too.”  Maybe standing is, in any given case, based on transfer of the Note.  Respectfully, though, wouldn’t a conflict-free attorney want to argue every possible basis for standing, including the assignment, and not forego an argument for standing because it highlighted that attorney’s own conduct?  In other words, isn’t Shapiro’s representation of Citimortgage “materially limited” by its own self-interest?  See Rule 4-1.7(a)(2).  Notably, upon inquiry from Mr. Stopa, the Citimortgage employee made it clear Shapiro never advised her that it was giving up one basis for standing in the case.  Respectfully, how can a waiver be “informed’ when Citimortgage does not understand the ramifications of its waiver in the pending case?

Unfortunately, Judge Foster did not seem to get (for lack of a better term) this latter argument, as he sustained an objection that Shapiro’s reliance on an assignment in other cases was irrelevant.  (That’s one purpose of a blog like this – to make judges think about these issues and understand them.  To wit, by no means am I trying to criticize Judge Foster here – I respect and appreciate that he gave me the opportunity to flesh out this evidence.  I just think the issues merit consideration from all of us.)  But Shapiro’s reliance on the assignments in other cases – and refusal to do so in this case – is precisely the point.  If Shapiro is relying on assignments in other cases, but not in this case, merely to take the spotlight off of itself so as to defeat a motion to disqualify, it’s representation is materially limited by its own self-interest, in violation of 4-1.7.  Remember, the rule requires “informed” consent, and if Citimortgage is consenting to the representation without understanding that Shapiro is waiving an argument that a conflict-free attorney would assert, the consent is not “informed.”   Also, how many hundreds or thousands of times has Shapiro relied on these assignments in other foreclosure cases (in which I, or another defense attorney, am not involved)?

Meanwhile, Judge Foster seemed to accept that a fraud was not being committed upon the Court (given how Shapiro distanced itself from the assignment of mortgage), but Rule 4-1.16 doesn’t require that the fraud be committed in that case.  The Rule requires that a lawyer withdraw from representation if “the client has used the lawyer’s services to perpetrate a crime or fraud, unless the client agrees to disclose and rectify the crime or fraud.”  Here, isn’t an assignment of mortgage, filed in the public records, purporting to convey an assignment from MERS to Citimortgage, but which is actually signed by employees of Citimortgage, a fraud?  As I’ve presented this argument, judges seem to be taking the position that it’s OK for an employee of Citimortgage to execute an assignment from MERS to itself as long as MERS consents, but how is that not self-dealing?  And why is it ok?  I know I’m not the only person who thinks it’s wrong.  See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Vazquez, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51814 (N.Y. 2009); Bank of New York v. Mulligan, 2008 N.Y. Slip. Op 31501 (N.Y. 2008) (“The Court is concerned that Mr. Harless might be engaged in a subterfuge, wearing various corporate hats.  Before granting an application for an order of reference, the Court requires an affidavit from Mr. Harless describing his employment history for the past three years.”); Bank of New York v. Orosco, 2007 N.Y. Slip Op 33818 (N.Y. 2007); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Castellanos, 2008 N.Y. Slip. Op. 50033 (N.Y. 2008) (“Did Mr. Rivas somehow change employers on July 21, 2006 or is he concurrently a Vice President of both assignor Argent Mortgage Company, LLC and assignee Deutsche Bank?  If he is a Vice President of both the assignor and the assignee, this would create a conflict of interest and render the July 21, 2006 assignment void. … The court is concerned that there may be fraud on the part of Deutsche Bank, Argent Mortgage Company, LLC, and/or MTGLQ Investors, L.P., or at least malfeasance.”).

In comments made as the hearing began (which are unfortunately not in the transcript), Judge Foster made it clear that he didn’t want to require disqualification and upset the entire banking industry.  In a way, that’s exactly what this motion is doing – arguing that the manner in which these assignments have been completed (and, in essence, the entire MERS system) is a fraud.  Respectfully, though, why should the fact that the fraud is pervasive – and would upset the way banks litigate foreclosure cases – make this problem less worthy of attention?  Shouldn’t the fact that these assignments are being prepared fraudulently in virtually every case make judges more likely to fix the problem, not less?

Shapiro argued extensively that my clients lack standing to argue this issue.  However, the Comment to 4-1.7 provides: “Where the conflict is such as clearly to call into question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the question.”  This is where we need to educate judges about the widespread ramifications of “pushing through” foreclosure cases.  For instance, in these cases where the wrong Plaintiff is suing, what will happen when the actual owner of the Note and Mortgage emerges, after the foreclosure is granted?  What will happen to the homeowner, who has already been foreclosed upon by the wrong bank (but faces another lawsuit by the correct one)?  What will happen to the then-owner of the property, who purchased the property either at the courthouse auction or from such a purchaser?  What about the title company that issued title insurance based on that sale?  Particularly in lawsuits where the Note is lost, or where the original mortgage holder went into bankruptcy (and subsequent transfers or assignments were unauthorized as a matter of law) we must safeguard against these problems.  That’s why addressing these conflict issues is so important – it forces banks and their lawyers to take a hard look at the interests of all parties involved before a foreclosure case gets “pushed through.”

Many Florida cases on the issue of disqualification talk about the appearance of impropriety and the public’s perception of our conduct as lawyers.  See Wentworth, Campbell v. American Pioneer Savings Bank, 565 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Andrews v. Allstate Ins. Co., 366 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).   For the life of me, I can’t see how anyone can dispute the unseemliness of these events.  Perhaps that’s why at least one judge has questioned the conflict of interest in these situations.  See HSBC Bank USA, N.C. v. Vazquez, 2009 N.Y. Slip. Op 51814 (N.Y. 2009) (“Even if Plaintiff HSBC is able to cure the assignment defect, plaintiff’s counsel then has to adderess the conflict of interest that exists with his representation of both the assignor of the instant mortgage, MERS as Nominee for HSCB Mortgage, and the assignee of the instant mortgage, HSBC.”).  I urge more attorneys and judges in our great state to give careful consideration to these issues.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in citimortgage, conflict of interest, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, shapiro & fishman paComments (3)

DEUTSCHE BANK Gets the BOOT (Broken Chain of Title): DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY v. GAUPP

DEUTSCHE BANK Gets the BOOT (Broken Chain of Title): DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY v. GAUPP


Most of us can make the assumption that instead of Mr. Gaupp place we might as well enter MERS in his place right?

The real issue with the case as stated is that DBNT magically appears!  Where is the assignment from Ameriquest to *them*??  (I’d like to see the signatures on the note!)

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, As Trustee of Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass Through Certificates, Series 2004-X3, Under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement Dated as of September 1, 2004, Without Recourse, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DAVID J. GAUPP, ALEXANDRA C. GAUPP, NATHAN PARTON and SPOUSE OF NATHAN PARTON, REBEKAH J. BARTON and SPOUSE OF REBEKAH J. BARTON, WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., and PARTIES IN POSSESSION,, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 0-272/09-0700.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Filed June 30, 2010.

Matthew E. Laughlin and Sarah K. Franklin of Davis Brown Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.

Charles R. Hannan, IV, Council Bluffs, for appellees David J. Gaupp and Alexandra C. Gaupp.

Aaron W. Rodenburg, Council Bluffs, for appellees G&G Properties and Troy Granger.

Brian D. Nolan of Nolan, Olson & Stryker, P.C., L.L.O., Omaha, Nebraska, for appellees Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Nathan Parton, Spouse of Nathan Parton, Rebekah J. Barton, and Spouse of Rebekah J. Barton.

Alexandra Gaupp, Council Bluffs, appellee pro se.

David Gaupp, Council Avenue, appellee pro se.

Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Danilson, JJ.

VOGEL, P.J.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In 2002, David Gaupp and Troy Granger formed a partnership, G & G Properties. On March 23, 2002, Gaupp and Granger purchased a duplex to use as a rental home for their partnership. Charles and Betty Bowes conveyed the property to “David J. Gaupp and Troy Granger” by warranty deed, which was recorded on April 9, 2002. On July 3, 2002, Gaupp, his wife, Alexandra Gaupp, and Granger conveyed the property to “G & G Properties” by warranty deed, which was recorded on September 24, 2002.

On December 8, 2003, Gaupp borrowed $162,000 from Ameriquest Mortgage Company (Ameriquest), which was evidenced by a promissory note and signed by Gaupp individually. In spite of the fact that Gaupp was not the titleholder of the property, the note purported to be secured by a mortgage on the property showing the borrower/mortgagor as “David J. Gaupp, married,” and bearing the signatures of “David J. Gaupp” and “Alexandra C. Gaupp,”[ 1 ] but the acknowledgment is only as to “David J. Gaupp” and was notarized by a Nebraska notary public. The mortgage instrument was recorded on January 8, 2004. Ameriquest subsequently sold and assigned the mortgage to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank).

Although G & G Properties was the record titleholder of the property, the Gaupps and Granger subsequently executed two deeds regarding the property. On December 31, 2003, a “Corrected Warranty Deed” attempted to convey the property from “David J. Gaupp and Alexandra C. Gaupp” and “Troy S. Granger” to “David J. Gaupp and Alexandra C. Gaupp,” which was then recorded on January 8, 2004. On February 2, 2005, the Gaupps attempted to convey the real estate from “David J. Gaupp and Alexandra C. Gaupp” to “G & G Properties” by a quitclaim deed, which was recorded on July 28, 2005. In David Gaupp’s deposition testimony, he explained that these conveyances were done so that Granger’s name would not appear in the title, in an effort to keep Granger’s child support obligations from being a lien against the real estate.

In April 2006, G & G Properties agreed to sell the real estate. On May 5, 2006, “G & G Properties” conveyed the property to “Nathan D. Parton, a single person and Rebekah J. Barton, a single person” by warranty deed, which was recorded on May 19, 2006.[ 2 ] In order to purchase the property, the Partons obtained a loan from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) that was secured by a mortgage on the real estate, which was recorded on May 19, 2006. G & G Properties received proceeds in the amount of $188,273.02 from the sale of the real estate.

At some point, Gaupp defaulted on the note held by Deutsche Bank. On January 30, 2007, Deutsche Bank filed a petition to foreclose its mortgage, seeking judgment in rem against the real estate in the amount of $154,147.19, plus attorney’s fees, costs, and interest, naming the Gaupps as defendants, parties in possession. On March 16, 2007, Deutsche Bank amended its petition to add the Partons and Wells Fargo as additional defendants. On November 1, 2007, the Partons filed a third-party complaint against G & G properties and Granger.

On October 21, 2008, the Partons and Wells Fargo filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that (1) the mortgage held by Deutsche Bank was invalid; and (2) the mortgage held by Deutsche Bank could not be foreclosed because the Partons were bona fide purchasers for value. On February 12, 2009, the district court issued its ruling finding that the Gaupps and Granger conveyed their interest in the property to G & G Properties on July 3, 2002, and when G & G Properties recorded the deed on September 24, 2002, it became the record titleholder. Gaupp did not have any interest in the property when he executed the mortgage in favor of Ameriquest/Deutsche Bank and after the mortgage was executed, Gaupp never obtained title to the property. G & G Properties did not convey the property to anyone prior to May 19, 2006, when the Partons purchased the property. As a result, the mortgage held by Deutsche Bank was “null and void.” The district court granted the Partons’ and Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the petition for foreclosure. Deutsche Bank appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; City of Johnston v. Christenson, 718 N.W.2d 290, 296 (Iowa 2006). Summary judgment should be granted when the entire record demonstrates there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3).

Thus, on review, we examine the record before the district court to decide whether any material fact is in dispute, and if not, whether the district court correctly applied the law. In considering the record, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment.

Shriver v. City of Okoboji, 567 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Iowa 1997) (internal citations and quotation omitted).

III. Analysis.

Deutsche Bank asserts that the district court erred in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The parties do not dispute that at the time Gaupp executed the promissory note and mortgage, he did not hold title to the property and that G & G Properties was the record titleholder. Deutsche Bank cannot avoid the fundamental principal that a party that has no interest in a particular piece of real property cannot validly mortgage that property. See, e.g., Lee v. Lee, 207 Iowa 882, 885, 223 N.W. 888, 890 (Iowa 1929) (holding a mortgage invalid because the mortgagor had no interest in the property at the time the mortgage was given); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 111, at 102-03 (2009) (discussing that “[o]ne who has no ownership interest in property has no right to mortgage it” and if one does so, the mortgage creates no interest in the property). At the time Gaupp obtained the loan from Ameriquest, he did not have any interest in the property and therefore, the mortgage instrument attempting to secure the promissory note was invalid.

Deutsche Bank argues that Gaupp acquired title to the property on December 31, 2003, when the Gaupps and Granger executed the “Corrected Warranty Deed,” which Deutsche Bank further argues resulted in the mortgage becoming valid.[ 3 ] However, this argument fails because Gaupp did not acquire an interest in the property when the “Corrected Warranty Deed” was executed on December 31, 2003. On July 3, 2002, the Gaupps and Granger conveyed the property to G & G Properties. After this conveyance, Gaupp had no interest in the property and could not convey the property to anyone. See Iowa Code § 557.3 (2007) (“Every conveyance of real estate passes all the interest of the grantor therein, unless a contrary intent can be reasonably inferred from the terms used.”). After the July 3, 2002 conveyance, only G & G Properties was able to convey title to the property. Any such attempt by Gaupp to do so would be and was invalid as he was no longer the titleholder. Therefore, the attempts by the Gaupps and Granger to convey the property on December 31, 2003, and February 2, 2005, were not valid conveyances.[ 4 ] Additionally, because the invalid conveyances were outside the chain of title, they were stray deeds when recorded. See William Stoebuck and Dale Whitman, The Law of Property § 11.11 (3rd ed. 2000) (“The term `chain of title’ is a shorthand way of describing the collection of documents which one can find by the use of the ordinary techniques of title search.”); 1 C.J.S. Abstracts of Title § 15, at 320 n.8 (2009) (“Instrument executed by owner [that] is recorded before acquisition or after relinquishment of title by owner is outside chain of title . . . .”).[ 5 ] Title remained with G & G Properties from July 3, 2002 until May 5, 2006, when G & G Properties conveyed its solely held interest in the property to the Partons. Therefore the chain of title went from G & G Properties to the Partons. Gaupp did not have title to the property when he executed the mortgage instrument now held by Deutsche Bank nor did he subsequently obtain title. We affirm the district court’s findings and ruling.

AFFIRMED.

1. Alexandra denies she signed the mortgage.
2. Nathan and Rebekah subsequently married and are referred to herein as “the Partons.”
3. Deutsche Bank cites to Iowa Code section 577.4 (codifying the common-law doctrine of estoppel by deed); Sorenson v. Wright, 268 N.W.2d 203, 205 (Iowa 1978) (discussing the doctrine of estoppel by deed); Bisby v. Walker, 185 Iowa 743, 169 N.W. 467 (1918) (same). However, this authority is not on point. The doctrine of estoppel by deed relies upon a factual scenario where one purports to give a mortgage on property although not in title, but subsequently obtains an interest in the property. As we discuss above, Gaupp did not have an interest in the property when he attempted to mortgage the property and subsequently never obtained an interest in the property. As the district court noted, Deutsche Bank does not cite any authority that someone without any interest in property may utilize a “Corrected Warranty Deed” to convey property that the grantor has no interest in and is titled in another person or entity.
4. These transfers were made by the Gaupps and Granger individually and not on behalf of the partnership. See Iowa Code § 486A.302 (stating that “partnership property held in the name of the partnership may be transferred by an instrument of transfer executed by a partner in the partnership name”).
5. See also Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Title Standards, Iowa Land Title Standards ch. 4, standard 4.5 at 18-19 (8 ed. 2010) (discussing the showing necessary regarding stray deeds between persons who have no apparent interest in record title).

This copy provided by Leagle, Inc.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in chain in title, deutsche bank, lawsuit, wells fargoComments (0)

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