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The Commercial Real Estate Bubble By: Adam Levitin & Susan M. Wachter

The Commercial Real Estate Bubble By: Adam Levitin & Susan M. Wachter


The Commercial Real Estate Bubble

Adam J. Levitin

Georgetown University Law Center

Susan M. Wachter

University of Pennsylvania – The Wharton School – Real Estate Department

February 7, 2012

Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 1978264

Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 1978264

Abstract:     
Two parallel real estate bubbles emerged in the United States between 2004 and 2008, one in residential real estate, the other in commercial real estate. The residential real estate bubble has received a great deal of popular, scholarly, and policy attention. The commercial real estate bubble, in contrast, has largely been ignored.

This Article explores the causes of the commercial real estate bubble. It shows that the commercial real estate price bubble was accompanied by a change in the source of commercial real estate financing. Starting in 1998, securitization became an increasingly significant part of commercial real estate financing. The commercial mortgage securitization market underwent a major shift in 2004, however, as the traditional buyers of subordinated commercial real estate debt were outbid by collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Savvy, sophisticated, experienced commercial mortgage securitization investors were thus replaced by investors who merely wanted “product” to securitize. The result was a noticeable decline in underwriting standards in commercial mortgage backed securities that contributed to the commercial real estate price bubble.

The commercial real estate bubble holds important lessons for understanding the residential real estate bubble. Unlike the residential market, there is almost no government involvement in commercial real estate. The existence of the parallel commercial real estate bubble presents a strong challenge to explanations of the residential bubble that focus on government affordable housing policy, the Community Reinvestment Act, and the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Instead, the changes in commercial real estate financing closely mirror changes in the residential real estate financing, which shifted from regulated government-sponsored securitization to unregulated private securitization. This indicates that changes in the securitization market contributed to the problems in both the commercial and residential real estate markets.

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© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

5 reasons why California will face another lost decade in housing – 493,000 real estate agents and brokers for 219,000 homes listed on the MLS. 7 percent of 90+ day late loans in California have no foreclosure filed. State budget depended on real estate bubble jobs for revenues.

5 reasons why California will face another lost decade in housing – 493,000 real estate agents and brokers for 219,000 homes listed on the MLS. 7 percent of 90+ day late loans in California have no foreclosure filed. State budget depended on real estate bubble jobs for revenues.


Wish he can do both New York and Florida…would be interesting!

Source: www.doctorhousingbubble.com

How many real estate agents and brokers does it take to sell a California home?  2 ¼ if we look at current inventory levels and the amount of Californians with a real estate or broker’s license.  One of the early observations of the housing bubble was how much money was being spent in the economy because of high wage California housing bubble jobs.  Toxic loan after toxic loan provided wonderful commission checks but also provided the state with a nice chunk of tax revenue.  Year after year this went on.  Our fate has been intertwined with real estate and since real estate has busted so has ourstate economy.  I remember a few colleagues that were pulling in high six-figure incomes as mortgage brokers and real estate agents and were spending every dime as quickly as it came in.  Many have downsized drastically and don’t have a penny to their name.  Ironically many of these people drank their own Kool-Aid and bought million dollar homes with the same mortgage sewage they were passing onto their clients.  A few are now in bankruptcy and many have lost or will lose their homes.

California is likely to face a lost decade in housing.  Do I mean from 2000 to 2010?  In some areas we have already reached a lost decade.  Yet many areas will face their lost decade from 2010 to 2020.  Here are 5 reasons why California real estate will have a decade of slow or no growth ahead:

Reason #1 – High paying finance and real estate jobs are gone

I went ahead and compiled 14 years of license and broker data for California above.  From 1996 to 2002 we averaged approximately 300,000 active licensees in the state.  This was before the bubble ramped up.  We reached a peak in 2008 of 549,000 active licensees.  Today that number is down to 493,000 and is continuing to fall as many simply let their license expire.  Even with recent sales increases we are still close to half the volume of the bubble years.  Plus, home prices are half of what their peak values were.  So even basic math will tell you that at the very least, half of income in this industry is gone (for example the 5 to 6 percent agent cut is based on the sale price).  Then on the lending side you have 96.5% of loans being government backed and these don’t provide the nice kickbacks that the option ARMs did for example.  In other words, high income no GED required jobs are now gone.  Even those with industry specific degrees and training are finding it hard to get good jobs in today’s economy.

And many other jobs tied to the FIRE side of California employment and construction took big hits:

These were good paying jobs that are now gone.  Many of these jobs depended on the perpetual growth of the housing bubble.  But even as we will see with inventory levels, do we still have a bubble in this industry?

Reason #2 – Too little inventory and sales for the amount of workers

I went ahead and took a major snapshot of how much MLS inventory is currently listed for public view in California.  Although inventory is spiking, you start seeing issues that are plaguing the industry:

Since February of this year California has added 64,500 homes to the MLS, an increase of 41 percent.  This is a massive jump.  Part of this jump aligns perfectly with the failure of HAMP and more banks pushing inventory onto the market.

But let us use that current inventory number and run a quick analysis:

493,576 real estate agents and brokers / 219,217 homes on the CA MLS = 2 ¼ agents and brokers for each home

I find the above fascinating.  We have close to 500,000 licensed agents and brokers for 219,000 homes on the market.  And you wonder why we have a problem?  This is like going to a used car lot with 20 cars and finding 50 sales representatives.  However like many things in life, I believe that the Pareto principle applies here as well.  That is, 80 percent of sales is likely to come from 20 percent of those with active licenses.

Although the shadow inventory is much larger than the 219,000 homes on the MLS, agents and brokers only make money when they sell.  And banks don’t seem in a big hurry to move the entire inventory out at once.  In other words, we have years of junk built up in the pipeline with wages slashed.

Reason #3 – California budget and revenues shattered

If you want to see a problem in the making look at this:

The state for the fiscal year of 2007-08 collected over $101 billion.  How do things look today?

For the fiscal year that is coming to an end, we are projected to bring in $81 billion.  We are short by $20 billion and this includes every kind of tax increase you can imagine.  This does little considering half of the state revenues come from personal income taxes and many of those high paying bubble jobs (see above) are now gone.  Yet the state kept spending more and more assuming that a Ponzi like income stream was going to come in forever.  That is not the case as we are now painfully finding out so we must adjust.

The Legislative Analyst Office (LAO) is projecting problems well into 2015.  Another issue that the state will have to contend with is high pension costs of soon to retire baby boomers.  Recently CalPERs announced that the state will need to pitch in $700 million to cover its poor bets.  They are pulling back for the moment:

“(LA Times) Facing political fire, the state’s largest public pension fund Wednesday retreated for a month from a plan to approve a $700-million increase in taxpayer contributions it gets from the state and about 1,000 school districts.

State Treasurer Bill Lockyer, a member of the California Public Employees’ Retirement System board, said the fund needs to assess the consequences of the huge hike on California at a time when the state faces an estimated $19-billion budget deficit.”

You can rest assured that there will be some serious battles on this front for years to come.

Reason #4 – Shadow inventory

The Wall Street Journal put together data regarding shadow inventory that we already knew about.  California ranks near the top of shady banks and home squatters that are simply staying put and not paying their mortgage:

Source:  WSJ

This is just nuts.  In California 7 percent of loans that are 90 days overdue are not in foreclosure!  What is even more stunning is the nationwide amount of people living in homes with no payment and foreclosure for 2 years!  This is a slap in the face of every prudent middle class American.  And the idea of poor homeowners is nonsense here in California.  You have folks living in prime locations not paying their mortgage who can easily afford a nice rental.  But they’ll sit it out while banks sit back and suck on thetaxpayer gravy train.  This data merely confirms what we already know.  The state is plagued with delinquent loans.  In fact, 15 percent of all California loans are 30+ days late or worse.

Reason #5 – Consumer psychology and jobs

The mantra that real estate prices never fall is completely shattered for an entire generation of Americans.  Those who lived through the Great Depression are largely absent from our current economy and can’t share their wisdom.  And given the preference of Americans to watch Dancing with the Stars instead of reading some history, many have forgotten that real estate can crash and crash hard.  But if history is any guide, we will have a generation of Americans who are more cautious and thus will put a lid on any mega jumps in appreciation for the next decade.

On Friday the California unemployment rate came out and we are still at a record high of 12.6 percent.  Adjusted for the underemployment rate we are closer to 23 percent.  Even the running average at the BLS shows us over 21 percent:

Keep in mind this is a one year rolling average so this will only move higher as we have been at peak levels for many months.  This also goes back to my earlier reasons for a lost decade in home prices.  Those high paying jobs are gone.  You can only purchase a home by what your income can support.  A large number of those depended on toxic mortgagesthat were easy to churn on a short notice.  After all, giving NINJA loans with no verification allowed seedy mortgage brokers to turn out loan after loan.  Now even with lax lending inFHA insured loans, at least they have to verify income.  As it turns out, there simply isn’t that many that can qualify in California.

I see a sideways moving decade for California real estate.  And for the next one or two years prices will start trending lower again as the Alt-A and option ARM waves hit and the gimmick parade starts running out.  You can only keep a lid on corruption for so long.  The “once in a century” problems now seem to be hitting every month.  A near 1,000 point drop in the Dow, the trillion dollar Euro bailout, and other mega events will come quicker as a reckoning day will hit.  All it takes is a failed Treasury auction and you can kiss cheap mortgage rates goodbye.

Posted in Real EstateComments (0)

Was There a Plan to Blow Up the Economy?  The Subprime Conspiracy: COUNTERPUNCH

Was There a Plan to Blow Up the Economy? The Subprime Conspiracy: COUNTERPUNCH


May 3, 2010

Was There a Plan to Blow Up the Economy?

The Subprime Conspiracy

By MIKE WHITNEY

Many people now believe that the financial crisis was not an accident. They think that the Bush administration and the Fed knew what Wall Street was up to and provided their support. This isn’t as far fetched as it sounds. As we will show, it’s clear that Bush, Greenspan and many other high-ranking officials understood the problem with subprime mortgages and knew that a huge asset bubble was emerging that threatened the economy. But while the housing bubble was more than just an innocent mistake, it doesn’t rise to the level of “conspiracy” which Webster defines as  “a secret agreement between two or more people to perform an unlawful act.”  It’s actually worse than that, because bubblemaking is the dominant policy, and it’s used to overcome structural problems in capitalism itself, mainly stagnation.

The whole idea of a conspiracy diverts attention from what really happened. It conjures up a comical vision of  top-hat business tycoons gathered in a smoke-filled room stealthily mapping out the country’s future. It ignores the fact, that the main stakeholders don’t need to convene a meeting to know what they want. They already know what they want; they want a process that helps them to maintain profitability even while the “real” economy remains stuck in the mud.  Historian Robert Brenner has written extensively on this topic and dispels the mistaken view that the economy is “fundamentally strong”. (in the words of former Treasury secretary Henry Paulson)  Here’s Brenner :

“The current crisis is more serious than the worst previous recession of the postwar period, between 1979 and 1982, and could conceivably come to rival the Great Depression, though there is no way of really knowing. Economic forecasters have underestimated how bad it is because they have over-estimated the strength of the real economy and failed to take into account the extent of its dependence upon a buildup of debt that relied on asset price bubbles.

“In the U.S., during the recent business cycle of the years 2001-2007, GDP growth was by far the slowest of the postwar epoch. There was no increase in private sector employment. The increase in plants and equipment was about a third of the previous, a postwar low. Real wages were basically flat. There was no increase in median family income for the first time since World War II. Economic growth was driven entirely by personal consumption and residential investment, made possible by easy credit and rising house prices. Economic performance was weak, even despite the enormous stimulus from the housing bubble and the Bush administration’s huge federal deficits. Housing by itself accounted for almost one-third of the growth of GDP and close to half of the increase in employment in the years 2001-2005. It was, therefore, to be expected that when the housing bubble burst, consumption and residential investment would fall, and the economy would plunge. ” (“Overproduction not Financial Collapse is the Heart of the Crisis”, Robert P. Brenner speaks with Jeong Seong-jin, Asia Pacific Journal)

What Brenner describes is an economy \that–despite unfunded tax cuts, massive military spending and gigantic asset bubbles–can barely produce positive growth.  The pervasive lethargy of mature capitalist economies poses huge challenges for industry bosses who are judged solely on their ability to boost quarterly profits. Goldman’s Lloyd Blankfein and JPM’s Jamie Dimon could care less about economic theory, what they’re interested in is making money; how to deploy their capital in a way that maximizes return on investment. “Profits”, that’s it.  And that’s much more difficult in a world that’s beset by overcapacity and flagging demand.  The world doesn’t need more widgets or widget-makers. The only way to ensure profitability is to invent an alternate system altogether, a new universe of financial exotica (CDOs, MBSs, CDSs) that operates independent of the sluggish real economy. Financialization provides that opportunity. It allows the main players to pump-up the leverage, minimize capital-outlay, inflate asset prices, and skim off record profits even while the real  economy endures severe stagnation.

Financialization provides a  path to wealth creation, which is why the sector’s portion of total corporate profits is now nearly 40 per cent. It’s a way to bypass the pervasive inertia of the production-oriented economy. The Fed’s role in this new paradigm is to create a hospitable environment (low interest rates) for bubble-making so the upward transfer of wealth can continue without interruption. Bubblemaking is policy.

As we’ve pointed out in earlier articles, scores of people knew what was going on during the subprime fiasco. But it’s worth a quick review, because Robert Rubin, Alan Greenspan, Timothy Geithner, and others have been defending themselves saying, “Who could have known?”.

The FBI knew (“In September 2004, the FBI began publicly warning that there was an “epidemic” of mortgage fraud, and it predicted that it would produce an economic crisis, if it were not dealt with.”) The FDIC knew. ( In testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, FDIC chairman Sheila Bair confirmed that she not only warned the Fed of what was going on in 2001, but cited particular regulations (HOEPA) under which the Fed could stop the “unfair, abusive and deceptive practices” by the banks.) Also Fitch ratings knew, and even Alan Greenspan’s good friend and former Fed governor Ed Gramlich knew. (Gramlich personally warned Greenspan of the surge in predatory lending that was apparent as early as 2000. Here’s a bit of what Gramlich said in the Wall Street Journal:

“I would have liked the Fed to be a leader” in cracking down on predatory lending, Mr. Gramlich, now a scholar at the Urban Institute, said in an interview this past week. Knowing it would be controversial with Mr. Greenspan, whose deregulatory philosophy is well known, Mr. Gramlich broached it to him personally rather than take it to the full board. “He was opposed to it, so I didn’t really pursue it,” says Mr. Gramlich. (Wall Street Journal)

So, Greenspan knew, too. And, according to Elizabeth MacDonald  in an article titled “Housing Red flags Ignored”:

“One of the nation’s biggest mortgage industry players repeatedly warned the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and other bank regulators during the housing bubble that the U.S. faced an imminent housing crash….But bank regulators not only ignored the group’s warnings, top Fed officials also went on the airwaves to say the economy was “building on a sturdy foundation” and a housing crash was “unlikely.”

So, the Mortgage Insurance Companies of America [MICA] also knew. And, here’s a clip from the Washington Post by former New York governor Eliot Spitzer who accused Bush of being a ‘partner in crime’ in the subprime fiasco. Spitzer says that the OCC launched “an unprecedented assault on state legislatures, as well as on state attorneys general just to make sure the looting would continue without interruption. Here’s an except from Spitzer’s article:

“In 2003, during the height of the predatory lending crisis….the OCC promulgated new rules that prevented states from enforcing any of their own consumer protection laws against national banks. The federal government’s actions were so egregious and so unprecedented that all 50 state attorneys general, and all 50 state banking superintendents, actively fought the new rules. (Washington Post)

So, the Fed knew, the Treasury knew, the FBI knew, the OCC knew, the FDIC knew, Bush knew, the Mortgage Insurance Companies of America knew, Fitch ratings knew, all the states Attorneys General knew, and thousands, of traders, lenders, ratings agency executives, bankers, hedge fund managers, private equity bosses, regulators knew. Everyone knew, except the unlucky people who were victimized in the biggest looting operation of all time.

Once again, looking for conspiracy, just diverts attention from the nature of the crime itself. Here’s a statement from former regulator and white collar criminologist William K. Black which helps to clarify the point:

“Fraudulent lenders produce exceptional short-term ‘profits’ through a four-part strategy: extreme growth (Ponzi), lending to uncreditworthy borrowers, extreme leverage, and minimal loss reserves. These exceptional ‘profits’ defeat regulatory restrictions and turn private market discipline perverse. The profits also allow the CEO to convert firm assets for personal benefit through seemingly normal compensation mechanisms. The short-term profits cause stock options to appreciate. Fraudulent CEOs following this strategy are guaranteed extraordinary income while minimizing risks of detection and prosecution.” (William K. Black,“Epidemics of’Control Fraud’ Lead to Recurrent, Intensifying Bubbles andCrises”, University of Missouri at Kansas City – School of Law)

Black’s definition of “control fraud” comes very close to describing what really took place during the subprime mortgage frenzy. The investment banks and other financial institutions bulked up on garbage loans and complex securities backed by dodgy mortgages so they could increase leverage and rake off large bonuses for themselves. Clearly, they knew the underlying collateral was junk, just as they knew that eventually the market would crash and millions of people would suffer.

But, while it’s true that Greenspan and Wall Street knew how the bubble-game was played; they had no intention of blowing up the whole system. They simply wanted to inflate the bubble, make their profits, and get out before the inevitable crash.  But, then something went wrong. When Lehman collapsed, the entire financial system suffered a major heart attack. All of the so-called “experts” models turned out to be wrong.

Here’s what happened: Before to the meltdown, the depository “regulated” banks got their funding through the repo market by exchanging collateral (mainly mortgage-backed securities) for short-term loans with the so-called “shadow banks” (investment banks, hedge funds, insurers) But after Lehman defaulted, the funding stream was severely impaired because the prices on mortgage-backed securities kept falling. When the bank-funding system went on the fritz,  stocks went into a nosedive sending panicky investors fleeing for the exits. As unbelievable as it sounds, no one saw this coming.

The reason that no one anticipated a run on the shadow banking system is because the basic architecture of the financial markets has changed dramatically in the last decade due to deregulation. The fundamental structure is different and the traditional stopgaps have been removed. That’s why no one knew what to do during the panic. The general assumption was that there would be a one-to-one relationship between defaulting subprime mortgages and defaulting mortgage-backed securities (MBS). That turned out to be a grave miscalculation. The subprimes were only failing at roughly 8 percent rate when the whole secondary market collapsed. Former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill explained it best using a clever analogy. He said, “It’s like you have 8 bottles of water and just one of them has arsenic in it. It becomes impossible to sell any of the other bottles because no one knows which one contains the poison.”

And that’s exactly what happened. The market for structured debt crashed, stocks began to plummet, and the Fed had to step in to save the system. Unfortunately, that same deeply-flawed system is being rebuilt brick by brick without any substantive changes.. The Fed and Treasury support this effort, because–as agents of the banks–they are willing to sacrifice their own credibility to defend the primary profit-generating instruments of the industry leaders. (Goldman, JPM, etc) That means that Bernanke and Geithner will go to the mat to oppose any additional regulation on derivatives, securitization and off-balance sheet operations, the same lethal devices that triggered the financial crisis.

So, there was no conspiracy to blow up the financial system, but there is an implicit understanding that the Fed will serve the interests of Wall Street by facilitating asset bubbles through “accommodative” monetary policy and by opposing regulation. It’s just “business as usual”, but it’s far more damaging than any conspiracy, because it ensures that the economy will continue to stagnate, that inequality will continue to grow, and that the gigantic upward transfer of wealth will continue without pause.

Mike Whitney lives in Washington state. He can be reached atfergiewhitney@msn.com

Posted in concealment, conspiracy, corruption, fdic, FED FRAUD, federal reserve board, foreclosure fraud, geithner, hank paulson, S.E.C., securitizationComments (0)

GMAC v Visicaro Case No 07013084CI: florida judge reverses himself: applies basic rules of evidence and overturns his own order granting motion for summary judgment

GMAC v Visicaro Case No 07013084CI: florida judge reverses himself: applies basic rules of evidence and overturns his own order granting motion for summary judgment


THIS IS WORTH REPEATING OVER AND OVER!!!!

From: Neil Garfield Livinglies

RIGHT ON POINT ABOUT WHAT WE WERE JUST TALKING ABOUT IN HEARING YESTERDAY!!

I appeared as expert witness in a case yesterday where the Judge had trouble getting off the idea that it was an accepted fact that the note was in default and that ANY of the participants in the securitization chain should be considered collectively “creditors” or a creditor. Despite the fact that the only witness was a person who admitted she had no knowledge except what was on the documents given to her, the Judge let them in as evidence.

The witness was and is incompetent because she lacked personal knowledge and could not provide any foundation for any records or document. This is the predominant error of Judges today in most cases. Thus the prima facie case is considered “assumed” and the burden to prove a negative falls unfairly on the homeowner.

The Judge, in a familiar refrain, had trouble with the idea of giving the homeowner a free house when the only issue before him was whether the motion to lift stay should be granted. Besides the fact that the effect of granting the motion to lift stay was the gift of a free house to ASC who admits in their promotional website that they have in interest nor involvement in the origination of the loans, and despite the obviously fabricated assignment a few days before the hearing which violated the terms of the securitization document cutoff date, the Judge seems to completely missed the point of the issue before him: whether there was a reason to believe that the movant lacked standing or that the foreclosure would prejudice the debtor or other creditors (since the house would become an important asset of the bankruptcy estate if it was unencumbered).

If you carry over the arguments here, the motion for lift stay is the equivalent motion for summary judgment.

This transcript, citing cases, shows that the prima facie burden of the Movant is even higher than beyond a reasonable doubt. It also shows that the way the movants are using business records violates all standards of hearsay evidence and due process. Read the transcript carefully. You might want to use it for a motion for rehearing or motion for reconsideration to get your arguments on record, clear up the issue of whether you objected on the basis of competence of the witness, and then take it up on appeal with a cleaned up record.

[ipaper docId=29901870 access_key=key-2igblc29w7y5gelivtak height=600 width=600 /]

RELATED ARTICLE:

Judge reversed his own ruling that had granted summary judgment to GMAC Mortgage (DAVID J. STERN)


© 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A.Comments (1)

Freedom of Information Act Requests Show OneWest Bank Misrepresentation

Freedom of Information Act Requests Show OneWest Bank Misrepresentation


When will ALL this Bull Shit come to an END? Everything is a stage and all these “Non-Bank’s” are characters!

 Freedom of Information Act Requests Show OneWest Bank Misrepresentation
Posted on March 17, 2010 by Neil Garfield

Submitted by BMcDonald

Most of us are trying to get the info from the banks, which they will not do unless forced. Well, now many of us can walk right in through the back door. FOIA requests! I fought for 7 months to get the bank to cough up the info and it only took 6 days by going through the FDIC. So now I’m in the drivers seat. This damned bank has been lying from day one claiming they are the sole beneficiary of my loan. Now they have committed the fraud and done the crime by illegally selling my home. They are now in deep, deep, trouble.

I’ve been fighting OneWest Bank since August of last year here in Colorado. In Colorado they have nonjudicial foreclosures and the laws as so totally banker-biased it’s insane. All the bank has to do is go to the public trustee with a note from an attorney who “certifies” that the bank is the owner of the loan. What they don’t tell you is the bank has to go before a judge and get an order for sale in a 120 hearing. Most only find out about it at the last minute and don’t even show up because the only issue discussed is whether a default has occurred or not.

I discovered however that if you raise the question of whether the foreclosing party is a true party in interest or not, the court has to hear that as well. I raised that issue and demanded the bank produce the original documents and endorsements or assignements. The judge only ordered them to produce originals, which they did.

Long story short, I managed to hold them off for seven months after hiring an attorney. I found a bankruptcy case from CA in 2008 in which IndyMac produced original documents and ended up having to admit they didn’t own them. I had a letter from OneWest that only stated they purchased servicing rights. I had admissions from the bank’s attorney that there were no endorsements. And at the last minute I discovered the FDIC issued a press release in response to a YouTube video that went viral over the sweetheart deal OneWest did with the FDIC. The FDIC stated in their press release that OneWest only owned 7% of the loans they service. I presented all this to the judge but he ended up ignoring it all and gave OneWest an order to sell my home, which they did on the 4th.

About a week before the sale I went directly to the FDIC and filed a FOIA request for any and all records indicating ownership rights and servicing rights related to my loans and gave them my loan numbers. I managed to get the info in about 6 days. I got PROOF from the FDIC that OneWest did not own my loan. Fredie Mac did. And the info came directly from OneWest systems. And just last Friday I got a letter from IndyMac Mortgage services, obviously in compliance with the FOIA request that Freddie Mac owned the loan. So I now have a confession from OneWest themselves that they have been lying all along! I have a motion in to have the sale set aside and once that’s done I’m going to sue the hell out of them and their attorneys in Federal court.

So I found a wonderful little back door to the proof most of us need. If the FDIC is involved, you can do a FOIA request for the info. I don’t know if it applies to all banks since they are all involved in the FDIC. You all should try it to see.

Most of us are trying to get the info from the banks, which they will not do unless forced. Well, now many of us can walk right in through the back door. FOIA requests! I fought for 7 months to get the bank to cough up the info and it only took 6 days by going through the FDIC. So now I’m in the drivers seat. This damned bank has been lying from day one claiming they are the sole beneficiary of my loan. Now they have committed the fraud and done the crime by illegally selling my home. They are now in deep, deep, trouble.


  

Posted in concealment, conspiracy, corruption, fdic, FOIA, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, freedom of information act, indymac, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., Lender Processing Services Inc., livinglies, LPS, MERS, neil garfield, note, onewest, respa, scamComments (2)


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