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Tag Archive | "breach of contract"

Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A. Files Suits Against MetLife and IBM LBPS

Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A. Files Suits Against MetLife and IBM LBPS


According to court records…

The Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A. v. IBM Lender Business Process Services, Inc.

Filed: April 14, 2011 as 0:2011cv60802 Updated: April 15, 2011 05:00:14

Presiding Judge: Judge Adalberto Jordan
Cause Of Action: Diversity-Contract Dispute
~

Law Office of David J. Stern ,P.A. v. MetLife Bank, N.A.

Filed: April 8, 2011 as 1:2011cv21240 Updated: April 15, 2011 05:00:24

Plaintiff: Law Office of David J. Stern ,P.A.
Defendant: MetLife Bank, N.A.
Presiding Judge: Patricia A. Seitz
Referring Judge: Andrea M. Simonton
Cause Of Action: Diversity-Notice of Removal
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CitiMortgage Answer & Counterclaims to Law Offices of David J. Stern Firm

CitiMortgage Answer & Counterclaims to Law Offices of David J. Stern Firm


Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A. v. CitiMortgage, Inc.

Plaintiff: Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A.
Defendant: CitiMortgage, Inc.
Counter_claimant: CitiMortgage, Inc.
Counter_defendant: Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A.
Case Number: 1:2011cv21223
Filed: April 7, 2011
Court: Florida Southern District Court
Office: Miami         Office
County: Miami-Dade
Presiding Judge: Paul C. Huck
Nature of Suit: Contract – Other Contract
Cause: 28:1332
Jurisdiction: Diversity
Jury Demanded By: None

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Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A. files lawsuit against CitiMortgage Inc.

Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A. files lawsuit against CitiMortgage Inc.


According to court records, David J. Stern Law firm has filed a lawsuit against CitiMortgage Inc. in the Florida Southern District of Court on April 7, 2011. The cause of action is contract, case number 1:2011cv21223.

Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A. v. CitiMortgage, Inc.

Plaintiff: Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A.
Defendant: CitiMortgage, Inc.
Counter_claimant: CitiMortgage, Inc.
Counter_defendant: Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A.
Case Number: 1:2011cv21223
Filed: April 7, 2011
Court: Florida Southern District Court
Office: Miami         Office
County: Miami-Dade
Presiding Judge: Paul C. Huck
Nature of Suit: Contract – Other Contract
Cause: 28:1332
Jurisdiction: Diversity
Jury Demanded By: None
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Congresswoman Herrera Beutler Seeks Answers from FDIC on Clark County Foreclosures

Congresswoman Herrera Beutler Seeks Answers from FDIC on Clark County Foreclosures


Congresswoman Jaime Herrera Beutler today sent a letter to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) seeking answers regarding a troubling pattern of Clark County foreclosures resulting from the failure of the Bank of Clark County.

What has been particularly troublesome to Congresswoman Herrera Beutler is what she learned from several Bank of Clark County borrowers: they made all of their scheduled payments on time, in full.  Why Rialto Capital has chosen to foreclose on borrowers who have honored their loan agreements remains unclear.
[…]
“I’m deeply concerned by what I’ve learned so far about FDIC’s deal with Rialto Capital,” said Herrera Beutler.  “If borrowers who have lived up to the terms of their original loans are facing foreclosure, I want to know why.  It certainly seems like the FDIC has a responsibility and moral obligation to ensure entities like Rialto act in a decent and ethical manner.
.
“The FDIC has not been completely forthright about its decision-making process, even after multiple requests for information by my office.  While Southwest Washington families and businesses suffer the consequences of its decisions, the FDIC may have made it possible for real estate investor Rialto to end up with large tracts of Clark County land at a bargain price by breaking contracts.  That doesn’t seem right.
“I am going to remain vigilant with FDIC and with Rialto until we get answers.”
The text of Congresswoman Herrera Beutler’s letter to the FDIC is below, and attached:

Chairman Sheila C. Bair

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
3501 N. Fairfax Dr.
Arlington, VA 22226

Chairman Bair,

In recent weeks I have been contacted by a number of my constituents with concerns about the closing of the Bank of Clark County in Vancouver, Washington. More specifically, the concern is with the FDIC’s decision to sell many of the bank’s outstanding loans to Rialto Capital Management LLC and the management of those loans by Rialto and the FDIC.

Since the closing of the Bank of Clark County a large number of construction properties have been forced into foreclosure. Many of these foreclosures are due to Rialto Capital’s refusal to work with builders in honoring the existing loan agreement, even when the builders are current in their loan payments. Instead, Rialto moves to simply collect on collateral.

In order to understand the FDIC’s role in these procedures I respectfully request that you answer the following questions:

To my knowledge when the FDIC sells a loan package it retains a certain percentage of the package in order to ensure a return on investment. What oversight does the FDIC perform on Rialto Capitol and its management of the loans?

Numerous builders with whom my office has spoken had not missed a single payment on their loans when Rialto Capital took over. What consideration, if any, is given to the lendee’s payment record when deciding to terminate loans?

As a holder of a percentage of the loan package, does the FDIC require Rialto to honor the conditions of previous contracts made and carried out in good faith? What steps has the FDIC taken to ensure that any ensuing foreclosures are not directly attributable to changes in contract conditions made without the consent of the customer by Rialto?

How many construction loans did Rialto Capitol take over from the Bank of Clark County? Of those contracts how many have Rialto and the FDIC continued to honor?

Rialto Capitol calls itself a real estate investment management company. It is my understanding that typically other banks buy these loans. Why is the FDIC selling bank loans to non-banks?

I realize the FDIC closed the Bank of Clark County due to poor performance and bad loan approvals played a role in that. However, many of the people Rialto and the FDIC have decided to foreclose on made sound loan decisions, made their payments on time, and through no fault of their own still lost their loans. In some cases those loans were worth millions of dollars, and in many cases the loss of loans cost people their livelihood.

I do not know what Rialto ultimately intends to do with the large tracts of land it would hold as a result of these foreclosures, but it is clear the company purchased these loans with no intention of working with the citizens of Southwest Washington. Surely the FDIC did not close the Bank of Clark County in order to give real estate investors the opportunity to obtain land for pennies on the dollar by breaking contracts signed and honored by local builders.

The FDIC has a responsibility and moral obligation to ensure the companies that obtain loans as the result of a bank closure act in an ethical and decent manner toward their customers. I strongly urge you to take a hand in this matter and review with great diligence the actions of Rialto Capital.

I appreciate your attention to this matter and look forward to a response. Please contact Chad Ramey in my Washington, D.C. office at (202) 225-3536 for further detail or clarifications.

Sincerely,

Jaime Herrera Beutler

Member of Congress

Source: http://herrerabeutler.house.gov

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READ ORDER | JPMorgan loses court ruling over ‘loan putbacks’ Syncora Guarantee Inc v. EMC Mortgage Corp

READ ORDER | JPMorgan loses court ruling over ‘loan putbacks’ Syncora Guarantee Inc v. EMC Mortgage Corp


You can read about this from REUTERS

* Syncora can pursue claims based on entire loan pool

* Insurer need not show breaches of individual loans

NEW YORK, March 28 (Reuters) – JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM.N) could be forced to repurchase thousands of home equity loans, after a judge ruled in favor of a bond insurer that argued it could build its case based on a sampling of loans.

The ruling against EMC Mortgage Corp, once a unit of Bear Stearns Cos, comes amid many lawsuits seeking to force banks to buy back tens of billions of dollars of mortgage and other home loans that went sour. JPMorgan bought Bear Stearns in 2008.

You may read the court Order below:

SYNCORA GUARANTEE INC., f/k/a XL Capital Assurance Inc.,
v.
EMC MORTGAGE CORP.,

No. 09 Civ. 3106 (PAC).

USDC, S.D. New York.

March 25, 2011.

OPINION & ORDER


HONORABLE PAUL A. CROTTY, United States District Judge.

This breach of contract lawsuit arises out of a securitization transaction (“Transaction”), involving 9,871 Home Equity Line of Credit (“HELOC”) residential mortgage loans, which were purchased and used as collateral for the issuance of $666 million in publicly offered securities (“Notes”). (Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Am. 3). Defendant EMC Mortgage Corp. (“EMC”) aggregated the HELOCs, sold the loan pool to the entity that issued the Notes, and contracted with Plaintiff Syncora Guarantee Inc., formerly known as XL Capital Assurance Inc., (“Syncora”) to provide a financial-guaranty insurance policy protecting the investors in the Note. (Id.) Syncora claims that EMC breached its representations regarding 85% of the loan pool. It now moves for partial summary judgment or, alternatively, a ruling in limine, that it was not required to comply with a repurchase protocol as the exclusive remedy for all such claims. The Court GRANTS the motion for partial summary judgment on the grounds that, in light of the broad rights and remedies for which Syncora contracted, any such remedial limitation would have to be expressly stated.

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Freddie Mac sued by attorney David Stern over $1.3 million

Freddie Mac sued by attorney David Stern over $1.3 million


According to DBR:

The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. was sued by Florida attorney David Stern, who claims he is owed $1.3 million for legal services, according to a complaint filed today.

The government-run mortgage company breached its contract with Stern’s law firm by failing to pay, according to the complaint filed in federal court in Miami.

Recap of previous stunners [links]:

David Stern Sues Lenders That Once Hired Him

FORECLOSURE MILLS: SHAPIRO & FISHMAN V. LAW OFFICES OF DAVID J. STERN

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David Stern Sues Lenders That Once Hired Him

David Stern Sues Lenders That Once Hired Him


According to South Florida Business Journal:

The lenders are GMAC Mortgage LLC, U.S. Bank, MetLife Bank, Space Coast Credit Union, Chase Home Finance LLC, Ocwen Loan Servicing, Nationstar Mortgage LLC and PNC Bank.

This doesn’t add up because there are others missing. As soon as the rest of the parties such as Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Aurora, Fannie and Freddie come up (if they do) in a lawsuit, we’ll get to see a bit more of what is really going on.

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Mass. BK Judge Issues “Emergency Preliminary Injunction, Pending Loan Modification Request” CRUZ v. WELLS FARGO

Mass. BK Judge Issues “Emergency Preliminary Injunction, Pending Loan Modification Request” CRUZ v. WELLS FARGO


In re: JOSE D CRUZ, Chapter 13, Debtor.
JOSE D CRUZ, Plaintiff,
v.
HACIENDA ASSOCIATES, LLC and WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendants.

Case No. 10-43793-MSH, Adv. Pro. No. 11-04006.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts, Central Division.

January 26, 2011.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PLAINTIFF’S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

MELVIN S. HOFFMAN, Bankruptcy Judge

Before me is the emergency motion of the plaintiff, Jose D. Cruz, for a preliminary injunction barring defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. from foreclosing its mortgage on the plaintiff’s residence at 73 Bolton Street, Marlborough, Massachusetts. After a preliminary hearing on the motion on January 18, 2011, I entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the foreclosure sale, which had been scheduled for that day, but permitted Wells Fargo to postpone the sale by public proclamation to a date after January 25, 2011. On January 25th, I held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. After reviewing the complaint and the evidence submitted by the parties, and for the reasons stated below, I will grant the plaintiff’s motion and enter a preliminary injunction subject to certain conditions.

In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, made applicable to this proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7065, my decision whether or not to grant a preliminary injunction must be based on the evidence before me, including the verified complaint and affidavits submitted by the parties. I consider the plaintiff’s complaint to be a verified complaint because the plaintiff filed an affidavit dated January 13, 2011 in which he verified the facts alleged in the complaint. The plaintiff also filed the affidavit of Joseph Molina of GIM Services, Inc., who averred that his office submitted a loan modification application to Wells Fargo on behalf of the plaintiff on November 29, 2011. According to Mr. Molina’s affidavit, after several inquiries regarding the status of the loan modification application, his office was informed by telephone on January 19, 2011 (after the complaint had been filed) that the plaintiff’s loan modification application had been denied, and that the reason given for the denial was the approaching foreclosure sale. Mr. Molina also averred that Wells Fargo has not yet communicated this denial to the plaintiff in writing. Lastly, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of his attorney, Michael Shepsis, who averred that he had contacted Wells Fargo’s foreclosure counsel on several occasions regarding the status of the loan modification and as of January 18, 2011, he had not received any notice that the application had been denied.

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the requesting party must demonstrate that (i) there is a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim; (ii) that he will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (iii) that the harm to the requesting party if the injunction is not granted is greater than the harm to the opposing party if it is granted; and (iv) that the public interest would not be adversely affected by the issuance of the injunction. See Sunshine Development, Inc. v. F.D.I.C., 33 F.3d 106, 110-11 (1st Cir. 1994).

On the issue of irreparable harm, the plaintiff seeks in Counts I (breach of contract) and V of his complaint (breach of duty of good faith and reasonable diligence) judgment canceling the pending foreclosure sale of his home. Accordingly, I find that absent an injunction the plaintiff will be irreparably harmed because a foreclosure sale will effectively deprive him of the relief requested in those counts of his complaint.

The question of whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his complaint is really the critical factor to be determined here. See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1991). The plaintiff argues that Wells Fargo, which is a participant in the federal government’s Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”), breached its obligation under the program by scheduling a foreclosure sale of the plaintiff’s property while the plaintiff’s application for a loan modification was under consideration by it. HAMP arose out of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, and is administered by the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) as the agent of the Department of the Treasury. Speleos v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 2010 WL 5174510, *1 (D. Mass. 2010). The program requires that all mortgage loans owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac” and together with Fannie Mae, the government-sponsored agencies or “GSEs”) that meet certain requirements be evaluated by the loan servicers for loan modifications. If a borrower qualifies, then the servicer is obligated to modify the loan in accordance with a predefined formula that reduces the borrower’s monthly payment to 31% of his gross income for the first five years.[1] In addition, many servicers of mortgage loans not owned by the GSEs have executed so-called Servicer Participation Agreements (“SPAs”) with Fannie Mae, as agent for the Treasury Department, by which they agree to review and modify loans on similar terms. The Treasury Department, through Fannie Mae, has established guidelines that servicers must follow in evaluating and approving loan modification requests by borrowers. These guidelines are binding on each servicer by way of its servicing agreements with the GSEs or the SPA to which it was a party. I take judicial notice of the fact that Wells Fargo has executed an SPA, and is thus obligated to follow the HAMP requirements with respect to evaluating a loan modification application.[2]

The plaintiff points to Supplemental Directive 09-01, the first of the Treasury Department’s HAMP guidelines, to support his allegation that servicers such as Wells Fargo are prohibited from foreclosing on mortgages that are under review for loan modification. This directive also requires servicers to seek alternatives to foreclosure in the event that a loan modification is denied.[3] The plaintiff alleges that Wells Fargo scheduled the foreclosure sale of his property while his loan was being reviewed for a HAMP modification, and that this alleged violation of the HAMP guidelines constituted a breach of contract and of Wells Fargo’s duty to act in good faith and with reasonable diligence, justifying, among other things, cancellation of the foreclosure.

The plaintiff’s breach of contract claim in Count I of the complaint is premised on the proposition that he is a third party beneficiary of the Wells Fargo’s SPA or its servicing agreements with the GSEs. While the HAMP program was intended to benefit homeowners by helping them avoid foreclosure, the majority of courts considering the issue have held that consumers have no private cause of action as third party beneficiaries to enforce HAMP violations by their servicers. See McKensi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2010 WL 3781841, *5-6 (D. Mass. 2010) (“the existing case law weighs decisively in favor of defendant: numerous district courts have interpreted identical HAMP agreements and have come to the conclusion that a borrower is not a third party beneficiary.”) (quoting Hoffman v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2010 WL 2635773 (N.D. Cal.) and citing additional cases); but see Reyes v. Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc., 2009 WL 3738177, *2 (S.D. Cal.) (plaintiff’s complaint alleging a third party beneficiary status with respect to a HAMP violation was “sufficient to state a plausible claim for breach of contract under a third party beneficiary theory”). Very recently, Judge Gorton of the U.S. District Court in Massachusetts cited the proposition in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 311(b) that one must look to a contract itself to determine whether the parties intended to give rights to third party beneficiaries. Speleos, 2010 WL 5174510 at *5. He held that although the various SPAs and servicing agreements related to HAMP serve to benefit borrowers, nothing in the contracts themselves indicate an intent to create a private right of action in favor of borrowers. I agree with the majority view that the plaintiff is not a third party beneficiary of Wells Fargo’s SPA or other relevant HAMP servicing agreements and, therefore, I find that the plaintiff is not likely to succeed on Count I of the complaint.

In Count V of his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that Wells Fargo breached its duty to act in good faith and with reasonable diligence by attempting to foreclose its mortgage on the plaintiff’s property. Massachusetts courts have consistently held that in addition to complying with the statutory requirements governing mortgage foreclosure set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, a mortgagee must act in good faith and must use reasonable diligence to protect the interests of the mortgagor. Williams v. Resolution GGF OY, 417 Mass. 377, 382-83 (1994). In Snowden v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 2003 WL 22519518 (Mass. Super.), the court held that a lender breached this duty by foreclosing a mortgage the day after receiving notice that the borrower had negotiated an agreement to sell the property at a price beneficial to the lender. The court noted that mortgagees in Massachusetts must act as a “trustee for the benefit of all persons interested.” Id. at *2 (quoting Taylor v. Weingartner, 233 Mass. 243, 247 (1916)).

The plaintiff argues that by scheduling a foreclosure sale while the plaintiff’s loan modification request was pending, Wells Fargo breached its duty to act in good faith and with reasonable diligence to protect the plaintiff’s interests. The plaintiff’s argument finds support in Speleos, which concluded that even though the borrowers had failed to state a claim for relief under third party beneficiary theory, they could state a claim for negligence on the theory that the defendants had a duty under the HAMP guidelines not to proceed with a foreclosure sale while evaluating the borrowers for a loan modification. Speleos, 2010 WL 5174510 at *6. The plaintiff’s allegation in Count V of the complaint that Wells Fargo breached its duty of good faith and reasonable diligence is comparable to the negligence claim in Speleos.

The evidence thus far indicates that Wells Fargo scheduled and intended to conduct a foreclosure sale of the plaintiff’s property while the plaintiff’s request for a loan modification was pending before it. Even if the modification was denied on January 19, 2011, eight days prior to the rescheduled foreclosure sale, the plaintiff was not given written notice of the denial nor was he offered other foreclosure mitigation options as required under HAMP guidelines. I find, therefore, that there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on Count V of his complaint.

In addition, I find that the plaintiff has satisfied the remaining requirements for injunctive relief. While it is possible that the value of the plaintiff’s property may depreciate as this case proceeds (although Wells Fargo offered no evidence on this point), I find that any potential detriment to Wells Fargo from depreciation is outweighed by the enormity of the harm to the plaintiff from a foreclosure sale. Further, my order that the plaintiff make payments to the Chapter 13 trustee will protect Wells Fargo from depreciation and unpaid real estate taxes in the event it ultimately prevails in this action. Finally, I find that it is in the public interest to ensure that lenders foreclose on properties only when they are entitled to do so. Also, the neighbors surrounding the plaintiff’s property will likely benefit if foreclosure can be avoided.

Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7065 the court may require a party who benefits from a preliminary injunction to post security to protect the enjoined party in the event that the injunction turns out to have been wrongly issued. Here, the plaintiff’s first and second amended Chapter 13 plans filed in the main case, dated September 24 and October 11, 2010 respectively, each contained provisions in which the plaintiff agreed to make monthly payments to Wells Fargo while his loan modification application was under review. At the evidentiary hearing on the plaintiff’s motion, the plaintiff’s counsel conceded that these payments have not been made to date. The Chapter 13 trustee noted that the plaintiff’s amended Schedule J accompanying his bankruptcy petition lists a total of $1800 in expenses to be dedicated to home mortgage and real estate tax payments. In his memorandum of law in support of his motion for injunctive relief, the plaintiff indicates that his current monthly income is $5829, plus $1,200 in rental income from a tenant. Based on these amounts, a hypothetical HAMP loan modification would involve an initial monthly payment of $1806.99, equal to 31% of total income, after subtracting 25% of the rental income to account for vacancy risk. Accordingly, the preliminary injunction will be conditioned on the plaintiff’s making monthly payments of $1800 to the Chapter 13 trustee. This payment requirement shall be retroactive to October 1, 2010 (the first month after the plaintiff proposed to make these payments in his September 24, 2010 amended Chapter 13 plan). Payments shall be held by the trustee for the benefit of Wells Fargo and paid to Wells Fargo in the event it prevails in this action.

The plaintiff shall make payments of $1800 per month to the Chapter 13 trustee on the first day of each month beginning on February 1, 2011, with a ten day grace period for late payment. In order to catch up on payments due for October through January, the plaintiff shall make a double payment of $3600 on the first day of March, April, May and June. The failure of the plaintiff to make any payment when due will be grounds for vacating the injunction.

A separate order shall enter.

[1] See, e.g., Making Home Affordable Program Handbook for Servicers of Non-GSE Mortgages, Version 3.0 (hereinafter “HAMP Handbook”) at 65, available at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/mhahandbook_30.pdf.

[2] See Wells Fargo Servicer Participation Agreement, available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/housing-programs/mha/Documents_Contracts_Agreements/093010wellsfargobanknaSPA(incltransmittal)-r.pdf; see also HAMP Handbook, supra note 1 at 17 (explaining the role of the SPA).

[3] Each of the GSEs has its own version of this directive, but all contain the prohibition against foreclosure while loans are under review for modification.

Opinion Below…

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Illinois 7th Circuit Appeals Reverses “RESPA, BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS” Catalan v. GMAC

Illinois 7th Circuit Appeals Reverses “RESPA, BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS” Catalan v. GMAC


In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-2182

SAUL H. CATALAN and MIA MORRIS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
GMAC MORTGAGE CORP.,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 05 C 6920—George W. Lindberg, Judge.
ARGUED FEBRUARY 12, 2010—DECIDED JANUARY 10, 2011

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, HAMILTON, Circuit
Judge, and SPRINGMANN, District Judge..

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Saul H. Catalan and Mia Morris sued defendants RBC Mortgage Company and GMAC Mortgage Company under the federal RealEstate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., and under Illinois law for gross negligence, breach of contract, and willful and wanton negligence. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ gross negligence claim as merely duplicating the willful and wanton negligence claim. The court granted summary judgment to GMAC Mortgage on the plaintiffs’ RESPA, breach of contract, and remaining negligence claims. The plaintiffs appeal those decisions. We reverse the grant of summary judgment for GMAC Mortgage on the plaintiffs’ RESPA and breach of contract claims, and we affirm summary judgment on their negligence claims.1

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Wells Fargo Loses Bid to Dismiss Fraud Claims: GUSTAVO REYES, ET AL., v. WELLS FARGO

Wells Fargo Loses Bid to Dismiss Fraud Claims: GUSTAVO REYES, ET AL., v. WELLS FARGO


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUSTAVO REYES, ET AL., Plaintiffs,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendant

[…]

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part
as follows: 1) the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract/breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Because the Court concludes that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim by amending their complaint, this
claim is dismissed without leave to amend; 2) the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ claim for
restitution/rescission except as to Plaintiffs’ March payment, as to which Plaintiffs state a claim.
Otherwise, the claim is dismissed without leave to amend; 3) the Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs’
claim under the Rosenthal Act; and 4) the Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs’ unfair competition
claim under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2011

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[MUST READ] NOTICE OF RECORDED MERS et al REMOVAL

[MUST READ] NOTICE OF RECORDED MERS et al REMOVAL


Will leave the comments for you all if you wish on these recorded documents from public records.

NOTE: It appears these were done by pro se individuals.

YOU MUST CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY.

REPEAT:

DO NOT try this without consulting an attorney.

Excerpt:

WHEREAS TRUSTOR/GRANTOR STATES AND DECLARES that, in recognition of certain pertinent facts not limited to the fact that the Mortgage contained NO SIGNATURES showing an acceptance of the document by any other party, the above-described Mortgage is, at best, an unconscionable contract and, for that reason alone, said, Mortgage is not an enforceable instrument; and since no other party signed th document, no party would have standing to assert that said party has been damaged in any way, or that a “default” occurred, or that a “breach” occurred; AND…

AND ANOTHER


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IL 7th Circuit Appeals Court: “WHERE’S THE NOTE” COGSWELL v. CITIFINANCIAL MORTGAGE

IL 7th Circuit Appeals Court: “WHERE’S THE NOTE” COGSWELL v. CITIFINANCIAL MORTGAGE


PATRICK L. COGSWELL and PATRICK M. O’FLAHERTY, doing business as THE PATRICK GROUP, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITIFINANCIAL MORTGAGE COMPANY, INCORPORATED, successor by merger to Associates Finance, Incorporated, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 08-2153.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 15, 2009. Decided October 5, 2010.

Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge.

CitiFinancial Mortgage assigned its interest in a mortgage to two investors—doing business as “The Patrick Group”—but never delivered the original or a copy of the underlying note. When The Patrick Group tried to foreclose on the mortgage in Illinois state court, its action was dismissed because it could not produce the note. After an unsuccessful appeal, The Patrick Group filed this breach-of-contract lawsuit against CitiFinancial. The suit was removed to federal court, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of CitiFinancial.

We reverse. The district court based its summary-judgment decision primarily on a determination that CitiFinancial never agreed to deliver the note as part of the parties’ agreement to transfer the mortgage. But whether they agreed on this term is a question of fact, and The Patrick Group presented enough evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that it was a part of the parties’ agreement. The district court’s alternative basis for summary judgment—that CitiFinancial’s alleged breach did not cause The Patrick Group’s damages—was also erroneous. Under the circumstances of this case, the causation question should have been resolved in The Patrick Group’s favor as a matter of law; the state trial and appellate courts rejected The Patrick Group’s foreclosure action because without a copy of the note, it could not prove it was the holder of the debt the mortgage secured.

<SNIP>

In short, as a matter of law, The Patrick Group’s damages were caused by CitiFinancial’s failure to deliver an original or a copy of the note secured by the mortgage.[5] The open factual question is whether the parties’ agreement required CitiFinancial to do so, and on this the evidence is disputed. We therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Continue reading below…

COGSWELL v. CITIFINACIAL

[ipaper docId=44166834 access_key=key-260e6bvt95alp1yb56zb height=600 width=600 /]

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Assured Guaranty Sues Deutsche Bank Over Mortgages

Assured Guaranty Sues Deutsche Bank Over Mortgages


By Shannon D. Harrington and Karen Freifeld – Oct 25, 2010 6:55 PM ET
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A unit of Assured Guaranty Ltd. sued affiliates of Deutsche Bank AG over $312 million of mortgage- backed securities that the bond insurer guaranteed and says were “plagued by rampant fraud and misrepresentations.”

Assured Guaranty Corp. is asking a judge to force the bank to repurchase the loans, on which the insurer has already paid almost $60 million in loss claims and sees the potential for tens of millions of dollars more, according to a complaint filed today in New York state Supreme Court against DB Structured Products Inc. and ACE Securities Corp. The bond insurer, backed by billionaire Wilbur Ross, is also seeking reimbursement for the claims paid and for future losses.

“The entire pools of loans that Deutsche Bank securitized (and to a large degree originated) in the transactions are plagued by rampant fraud and misrepresentations and an abdication of sound origination and underwriting practices,” Assured said in the complaint.

Repurchases of home loans from buyers and insurers of mortgage securities originated before U.S. housing prices began to tumble in 2007 have already cost the four biggest U.S. lenders $9.8 billion, according to Credit Suisse Group AG.

Assured said more than 83 percent of 1,306 defaulted loans examined in one of the transactions, ACE’s Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-SL2, breached Deutsche Bank’s representations and warranties. In the second deal, Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-SL3, 86 percent of the 1,774 loans breached the agreements, Assured said.

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THIS LAWSUIT YOU GOTTA READ!!! LONG v. JPM Chase, BOA, LPS, SHAPIRO & SWERTFEGER, LLP et al

THIS LAWSUIT YOU GOTTA READ!!! LONG v. JPM Chase, BOA, LPS, SHAPIRO & SWERTFEGER, LLP et al


Thanks to WamuLoanFraud.com for this tip

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

TAMMY JO LONG, CASTLE HOME §
BUILDERS, INC., AND WILLIAM KEITH §
DAVIDSON

v.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A., BANK
OF AMERICA N.A., BANK OF AMERICA,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS
SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO LASALLE
BANK NA AS TRUSTEE FOR WAMU
MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH
CERTIFICATES SERIES 2006-AR19
TRUST, LENDER PROCESSING
SERVICES, INC., NEW ORLEANS
EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
MARTA/ATU LOCAL 732 EMPLOYERS
RETIREMENT PLAN, WASHINGTON
MUTUAL BANK, F.A., FIRST AMERICAN
EAPPRAISEIT, FIRST AMERICAN, INC.,
WAMU ASSET ACCEPTANCE CORP.,
SHAPIRO & SWERTFEGER, LLP, DOE(S)
ROE(S) AND WASHINGTON MUTUAL
INC.

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EMERGENCY TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, DECLARATORY RELIEF & JUDGMENT, FRAUD IN THE FACTUM & INDUCEMENT, FRAUD, ASSIGNMENT & TITLE FRAUD/ SLANDER OF TITLE, VIOLATIONS OF THE GEORGIA RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE ACT & MORTGAGE FRAUD, VIOLATION OF FAIR DEBT COLLECTION ACT, NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT AND BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS, VIOLATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, VIOLATION OF DUTY OF GOOD FAITH & FAIR DEALING, VIOLATION OF GEORGIA’S RACKETEERING STATUTES (RICO), COUNT XIII RESCISSION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES & LITIGATION EXPENSES PURSUANT TO O.C.G.A. §§ 13-6-11 & 13-1-11, BREACH OF CONTRACT, VIOLATIONS OF REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT, VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT, VIOLATION OF FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT, FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION, & USURY & FRAUD

[ipaper docId=39953852 access_key=key-1lw7fm32kpcbjjpebb4p height=600 width=600 /]

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Trespassing, Breach of Contract Claim: DIXON v. MIDLAND MORTGAGE CO.

Trespassing, Breach of Contract Claim: DIXON v. MIDLAND MORTGAGE CO.


RON DIXON, As Conservator for Beatrice Jiggetts, Plaintiff,
v.
MIDLAND MORTGAGE CO., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 09-1789 (RWR).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

June 29, 2010.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RICHARD W. ROBERTS, District Judge.

Plaintiff Beatrice Jiggetts brings this action against the defendant, Midland Mortgage Company (“Midland”), alleging claims of trespass, conversion, and breach of contract arising out of Midland changing the locks and foreclosing on her home. Midland moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that its home entry was authorized because Jiggetts defaulted on her mortgage and abandoned her home, that the law of conversion applies to personal property and not real property, and that the complaint fails to allege the elements of a contract. Because conversion applies only to chattel, Midland’s motion to dismiss Jiggetts’s conversion claim will be granted. However, because the complaint amply states a cause of action for both trespass and breach of contract and Midland does not show it was authorized to enter Jiggetts’s home, Midland’s motion to dismiss Jiggetts’s trespass and breach of contract claims will be denied.

BACKGROUND

Jiggetts co-owned with Charles L. Chesley a single-family home located in Washington, D.C. (Compl. ¶ 4.) For the past several years, however, Jiggetts has lived in a nursing home because she suffers from dementia. While Jiggetts was in the nursing home, Chesley was to make the monthly mortgage payments on the property, but failed to do so. (Id. ¶ 5.) Thus, Midland chose to foreclose. (Id. ¶ 6.)

Jiggetts alleges that, on approximately July 16, 2009, her conservator, Ron Dixon, came to an agreement with Midland to postpone the foreclosure sale until August 19, 2009 in order to give Dixon an opportunity to secure a buyer for the house and avoid foreclosure. (Id. ¶ 10.) Midland then scheduled a foreclosure sale for August 19, 2009. (Id. ¶ 7.) During the last week of July, Dixon found a potential buyer and asked Chesley to prepare the property for the potential buyer’s visit. (Id. ¶ 11.) When Chesley arrived, he discovered that the locks on the property had been changed. (Id.) Chesley and Dixon contacted Midland, and Midland’s attorney told them that the deed of trust authorized Midland’s entry into the property. (Id.) Midland ultimately gave Dixon the combination to unlock the house. (Id. ¶ 12.)

Jiggetts brought suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia alleging that Midland’s entry into the property and alteration of the locks constituted trespass and conversion (id. ¶¶ 14-19) and a breach of contract. (Id. ¶¶ 21-24.) Midland removed this action to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and now moves to dismiss, arguing that it cannot be held liable for trespass because it had a superior possessory interest in the property, that the law of conversion applies to personal property only, and that Jiggetts has failed to state a claim for breach of contract.[ 1 ]

DISCUSSION

“`To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, acceptable as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”‘” Anderson v. Holder, 691 F. Supp. 2d 57, 61 (D.D.C. 2010) (brackets omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007))). A court considering a 12(b)(6) motion takes all factual assertions within the complaint as true and gives a plaintiff “`the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.'” Id. (quoting Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). Those inferences, however, must be supported by the facts alleged, and merely asserting legal conclusions as facts will not suffice. Id. “[A] court `may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [a court] must take judicial notice.'” U.S. ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 2d 129, 133 (D.D.C. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). A document outside the complaint may be considered on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) if it is “referred to in the complaint and [is] integral to” the plaintiff’s claim. Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

I. TRESPASS CLAIM

Under District of Columbia law, “`[a] trespass is an unauthorized entry onto property that results in interference with the property owner’s possessory interest therein.'” Sarete, Inc. v. 1344 U St. Ltd. P’ship, 871 A.2d 480, 490 (D.C. 2005) (quoting Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 64A.02[1] at 64A-16 (Michael A. Wolf ed., 2000)). Jiggetts contends that Midland trespassed on her property when it entered her property and changed the locks. Midland does not dispute that it entered the property and changed the locks. Its sole argument against Jiggetts’s trespass claim is that its entry was lawful because Jiggetts abandoned the property. (Def.’s Mem. at 3-4.)

Midland’s argument is misguided, however. In the District of Columbia, abandonment is defined as an anticipatory breach wherein a tenant “`leaves the premises vacant with the avowed intention not to be bound by [the] lease.'” Jones v. Cain, 804 A.2d 322, 331 (D.C. 2001) (quoting Simpson v. Lee, 499 A.2d 889, 894 (D.C. 1985)). The complaint does not allege or concede facts reflecting that Jiggetts intended to abandon her property. Instead, the complaint reflects that Jiggetts had every intention of maintaining the monthly mortgage payments. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 5 (“While [Jiggetts was] in the nursing home, Chesley was supposed to be making the monthly mortgage payments on the subject property.”).) Moreover, while Midland claimed that the deed of trust authorized Midland to enter the property upon default (see id. ¶ 11), Midland has not presented any copy of the deed of trust mentioned in the complaint or any other agreement granting it the right to enter the property upon Jiggetts’s failure to make the mortgage payments. Because Jiggetts has pled that Midland entered her property without consent and changed the locks, preventing entry by the owners, and Midland has failed to show it was otherwise authorized to take that action, Midland’s motion to dismiss Jiggetts’s trespass claim will be denied.

II. CONVERSION CLAIM

Under District of Columbia law, conversion is defined as the “`intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.'” Edmonds v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 2d 196, 202 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Fed. Fire Protection Corp. v. J.A. Jones/Tompkins Builders, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 87, 92 n.3 (D.D.C. 2003)). A chattel is defined as “`[m]ovable or transferable property; personal property; . . . [or] a physical object . . . not the subject matter of real property.'” Doe ex rel. Doe v. Fed. Express Corp., 571 F. Supp. 2d 330, 333 (D. Conn. 2008) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)) (first alteration in original). Jiggetts argues that the defendant “converted [her] leasehold interest, in the subject property, to [its] own interest” by entering the property and changing the locks. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.) However, the leasehold interest in her home is the subject matter of real property and is not chattel, see District Of Columbia v. Place, 892 A.2d 1108, 1112 (D.C. 2006), and the law of conversion does not apply to real property. Midland’s motion to dismiss Jiggetts’s conversion claim will be granted.

III. BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM

A contract is formed when there is an offer, an acceptance, and valuable consideration, see Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 311 (D.C. 2000), and a contract can be made orally or in writing. See Ames v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., Civil Action No. 06-2039 (RMC), 2007 WL 1404443, at *2 (D.D.C. May 11, 2007). The complaint alleges that Midland “agreed to postpone the foreclosure until August 19, 2009, in order to allow [Dixon] to attempt to sell the property to avoid the foreclosure” and that the defendant breached an agreement when it entered the property and changed the locks. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 22.) Midland contends that the breach of contract claim must be dismissed because “plaintiff attaches no proof of such an agreement to the Complaint.” (Def.’s Mem. at 6.)

On a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff is not required to prove each element of her claim. Instead, she is merely required to plead facts that, if proven, would establish the elements of her claim. Moreover, while Jiggetts fails to plead facts reflecting that Midland breached an agreement to postpone the foreclosure sale because she does not allege that a foreclosure sale took place before August 19, 2009, Jiggetts’s complaint can be read to state a claim that Midland breached the parties’ mortgage agreement. The complaint refers generally to a contract and states that Midland breached an agreement by breaking into and changing the locks on the doors. (Compl. ¶ 22.) Further, Jiggetts’s opposition states that “[w]hen the Defendant changed the locks . . . without an order of the court to do so, it was a breach of their mortgage contract[.]” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 4.) Because a court is to grant the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences derived from the facts alleged, and the complaint — read in the light most favorable to Jiggetts — contains sufficient factual matter to state a claim for breach of the parties’ mortgage agreement, Midland’s motion to dismiss Jiggetts’s breach of contract claim will be denied.[ 2 ]

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Because conversion applies only to chattel, Midland’s motion to dismiss Jiggetts’s conversion claim will be granted. However, the complaint alleges a trespass and, read in the light most favorable to Jiggetts, a breach of contract claim. Thus, Midland’s motion to dismiss Jiggetts’s trespass and breach of contract claims will be denied. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Midland’s motion [5] to dismiss be, and hereby is, GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Jiggetts’s conversion claim is dismissed, but Midland’s motion is denied in all other respects.

1. Midland also argues that its motion should be granted because Jiggetts’s opposition brief was not timely filed. (Def. Midland Mortgage Co.’s Reply to Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) Although Jiggetts’s opposition was filed beyond the time prescribed by the local civil rules, the circumstances here support abiding by the general judicial preference for resolving disputes on their merits rather than dismissing them based on technicalities. See, e.g., Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2001).
2. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages on each of her claims (Compl. ¶¶ 16, 19, 24), which the defendant opposes. In the District of Columbia, “punitive damages are not available [w]here the basis of a complaint is . . . breach of contract[,]” Caston v. Butler, Civil Action No. 08-1656 (JDB), 2010 WL 2505591, at *1 (D.D.C. June 22, 2010) (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), unless the plaintiff alleges that the breach of contract “`merges with, and assumes the character of a willful tort[.]'” Cambridge Holdings Group, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 357 F. Supp. 2d 89, 97 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1958)). Further, in order to recover punitive damages, “[plaintiff] must `prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the [defendant] committed a tortious act, and by clear and convincing evidence that the act was accompanied by conduct and a state of mind evincing malice or its equivalent.'” Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929, 938 (D.C. 1995)). The tortious act must be accompanied by “fraud, ill will, recklessness, wantonness, oppressiveness, wilful disregard of the plaintiff’s right, or other circumstances tending to aggravate the injury.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Jiggetts alleges that the defendant’s trespass was “willful, wanton, intentional, [and] malicious” (Compl. ¶ 15), and that her breach of contract claim “merges with and assumes the character of a willful tort.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Such allegations, if proven, could entitle her to punitive damages. Thus, defendant’s motion to dismiss Jiggetts’s punitive damages claim will be denied.

This copy provided by Leagle, Inc.

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