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CA CLASS ACTION | Bakenie v. JPMorgan Chase “Bankruptcy Fraud, Creation of Fabricated and “Photo-Shopped” Documents, Endorsement”

CA CLASS ACTION | Bakenie v. JPMorgan Chase “Bankruptcy Fraud, Creation of Fabricated and “Photo-Shopped” Documents, Endorsement”


NOTE: This is the 2nd Class Action this month alleging “Photo-Shopped” docs.

See the 1st: AURORA Class Action: Photoshopped Assignments and systemic 131g TILA violations

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNEST MICHAEL BAKENIE, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarily situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

JPMORGAN CHASE, N.A.; and
DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants

Bakenie v JPMC w[1] by DinSFLA

 

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AURORA Class Action: Photoshopped Assignments and systemic 131g TILA violations

AURORA Class Action: Photoshopped Assignments and systemic 131g TILA violations


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARYOUSH M. JAHROMI,
FERNANDO A. MILLER, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarily situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC; and
DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants

Down Load PDF of This Case

 

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FULL DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF AURORA BANK JOANN “EDNA” REIN

FULL DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF AURORA BANK JOANN “EDNA” REIN


H/T Foreclosure Hamlet

EXCERPTS:

11 Q. Explain to me how LPS works.

 12 A. LPS works basically the same as LenStar.

 13 The attorney puts the request in there if they need

 14 an assignment.

 15 Q. Okay. And the attorney would put in who

 16 the assignment was to be from and who the assignment

 17 was to be to?

 18 A. Yes.

 19 Q. Do the attorneys put in — I’m talking now

 20 about the LPS system — do the attorneys put in what

 21 I would call the effective date of the assignment?

 22 A. We do not effective date our assignments.

 23 Q. You’ve never executed assignments with

 24 effective dates?

 25 A. Yes, I have.

 […]

Q. Did Aurora have a policy as to whether you

10 were allowed to execute assignments of mortgage

11 after the notary left?

12 A. Not that I’m aware of.

13 Q. But you never took an oath before you

14 signed the assignments of mortgage?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Did you have personal knowledge of the

17 contents of the assignments of mortgage?

18 MR. ELLISON: Object to the form.

19 You can answer.

20 THE WITNESS: No.

21 BY MS. LUNDERGAN:

22 Q. The assignment of mortgage that’s been

23 marked as Exhibit A, did you have personal knowledge

24 of the information in that assignment of mortgage?

25 A. No.

[…]

[ipaper docId=75472996 access_key=key-yokvodv333m0q2kgrys height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (0)

“The Wikipedia of Land Registration Systems” – Adam Levitin

“The Wikipedia of Land Registration Systems” – Adam Levitin


Read ruling here: KaBOOM! MA Federal District Court SLAMS MERS “Illegal Foreclosure”, “Need Note AND Mortgage To Foreclose” – CULHANE vs. AURORA LOAN SVCS of NEBRASKA


Credit Slips-

Pretty amazing opinion in Culhane v Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska byJudge Young of the US District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Judge Young breaks out a fresh can of whoop-ass on MERS, which wasn’t even a litigant. How are these choice lines:  “MERS is the Wikipedia of Land Registration Systems.”  Now I like Wikipedia, but property title isn’t do-it-yourself. Or this gem: “a MERS certifying officer is more akin to an Admiral in the Georgia navy or a Kentucky Colonel with benefits than he is to any genuine financial officer.” Well, at least he didn’t call them an “Admiral in the Great Navy of the State of Nebraska”.  You gotta love a landlocked navy. 

That said, for all of his misgivings about MERS supplying “the thinnest possible veneer of formality and legality to the wholesale marketing of home mortgages to large institutional investors,” Judge Young still says that it’s kosher, if unseemly.

[CREDIT SLIPS]

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KaBOOM! MA Federal District Court SLAMS MERS “Illegal Foreclosure”, “Need Note AND Mortgage To Foreclose”  – CULHANE vs. AURORA LOAN SVCS of NEBRASKA

KaBOOM! MA Federal District Court SLAMS MERS “Illegal Foreclosure”, “Need Note AND Mortgage To Foreclose” – CULHANE vs. AURORA LOAN SVCS of NEBRASKA


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

ORATAI CULHANE,

Plaintiff,

v.

AURORA LOAN SERVICES
OF NEBRASKA,

Defendant.

EXCERPT:

Nationwide, courts are grappling with challenges to MERS’s
power to assign mortgages as well as its practice of deputizing
employees of other companies to make assignments on its behalf.
The present case is distinct only in that it is this Court’s
first encounter with MERS and with the question whether its
involvement in the origination and assignment of a mortgage loan
clouds record title to the mortgaged property. The public has an
interest in ensuring the liquidity of the mortgage market. Thus,
even if Culhane is unable to exercise her equitable right of
redemption and foreclosure of her mortgage loan is inevitable,
title must pass free of cloud and not subject to challenge in any
future action for summary process or to try title on the ground
that the foreclosure process was conducted unlawfully. See
Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 460 Mass. 762, 772 (2011); Bank of N.Y.
v. Bailey, 460 Mass. 327, 333-34 (2011).

[…]

Indeed, a MERS certifying officer is more akin to an Admiral in the Georgia navy or a Kentucky Colonel with benefits than he is to any genuine financial officer. In its rush to cash in on the sale of mortgage-backed securities, the MERS system supplies the thinnest possible veneer of formality and legality to the wholesale marketing of home mortgages to large institutional investors.14

 

[ipaper docId=74158654 access_key=key-pqry20k43wmqfqy06dt height=600 width=600 /]

 

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Florida Homeowner Files A Massive Tsunami Lawsuit – KORMAN v. AURORA et al.

Florida Homeowner Files A Massive Tsunami Lawsuit – KORMAN v. AURORA et al.


CONTROL FRAUD | ‘If you don’t look; you don’t find, Wherever you look; you will find’ – William Black

This pretty much sums this up… But go ahead and read.

Excerpt:

705. DEFENDAN T et al., al. stand-by and know, Plaintiff’s foreclosure, and others similarly situated are fraudulent in their nature, supra, but stand silent in condolence, over a system in their care custody and control under the corporate veil of MERSCORP, which either created, support financially or employ thus making DEFENDANT co-conspirator, liable as a facilitator of said Fraudulent behavior facilitator of Larceny on a grand scale.

[…]

[ipaper docId=70114752 access_key=key-2308jy3fszbv2555ftg4 height=600 width=600 /]

 

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IN RE CRUZ | CA BK Court “2932.5, Foreclosure of the Property was wrongful due to MERS’ unauthorized substitution of trustee”

IN RE CRUZ | CA BK Court “2932.5, Foreclosure of the Property was wrongful due to MERS’ unauthorized substitution of trustee”


In re: CIRILO E. CRUZ JUANA CRUZ, Chapter 13, Debtors,

CIRILO E. CRUZ, Plaintiff,

v.

AURORA LOAN SERVICES LLC; SCME MORTGAGE BANKERS, INC.; ING BANK, F.S.B.; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.; and DOES 1 to 100, Defendants,

Bankruptcy No. 11-01133-MM13, AP: 11-90116-MM.

United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. California.

August 11, 2011.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

MARGARET M. MANN, Bankruptcy Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Court has considered the Motions (“Motions”) to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) of debtor and plaintiff Cirilo E. Cruz[1] (“Cruz”) brought pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012, incorporating by reference Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), by Defendants Aurora Loan Services (“Aurora”), Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), and ING Bank, F.S.B. (“ING”).[2] The Court grants the Motions in part and denies them in part for the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Decision.

All Truth-In-Lending-Act (“TILA”) related causes of action are dismissed with prejudice. The Court concludes that Cruz cannot state a cause of action under any theory challenging the TILA disclosure because his claims are either unripe or barred by the statute of limitations. The TILA allegations cannot be stated as state law claims because of federal preemption as an alternative ground for dismissal. The Motions are granted to the additional extent they assert the foreclosure of the Property was wrongful due to MERS’ unauthorized substitution of trustee.

The Court denies the Motions to the extent that they assert ING was not required to record its assignment of beneficial interest before it foreclosed. The Motions request the Court reconsider its holding in U.S. Bank N.A. v. Skelton (In re Salazar), 448 B.R. 814, 822-24 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011), that California Civil Code § 2932.5[3] pertains to both mortgages and deeds of trust. For the additional reasons set forth in this Memorandum Decision, the Court reaffirms its analysis in Salazar and concludes that ING’s failure to record its beneficial interest rendered its foreclosure sale void.

II. FACTUAL ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

The Court assumes the allegations of the SAC are true for purposes of the Motions and construes them liberally in favor of Cruz. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). However, the Court must also find that the SAC pleads sufficient facts to state a claim of relief that is “plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly). The SAC allegations must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

B. Factual Summary

The SAC allegations relate to the 2004 financing of Cruz’s residence located at 3148 Toopal Drive, Oceanside, CA 92054 (” Property”), by a loan provided by SCME (“Loan”) documented by a variable interest rate note (“Note”) and deed of trust (” DOT”). Aurora was the servicer of the Loan and MERS was the initial nominal beneficiary of the Loan. Cruz claims the TILA disclosure provided to him when the Loan was made was misleading by understating its total cost through maturity, which caused him to forego less expensive financing alternatives.

After Cruz defaulted on the Loan, Defendants commenced the foreclosure process. ING had become the successor beneficiary under the DOT at some time before, but never recorded an assignment of beneficial interest. Cruz then entered into a forbearance agreement with Aurora. ING foreclosed on the Property on June 2, 2010 during the extended forbearance period agreed to by Aurora, even though Cruz was current on his payments at the time. ING’s interest, as assignee beneficiary, first appeared of record in the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale (“Trustee’s Deed”), recorded a few weeks after the foreclosure. The Trustee’s Deed identified ING as the foreclosing beneficiary.

C. Procedural History

Cruz and his wife filed their joint Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on January 25, 2011, and Cruz filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) about a month thereafter. Defendants responded to the FAC with motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012, incorporating by reference Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (“First Motions”). These were denied in part and granted in part in this Court’s order entered May 24, 2011 (” FAC Order”). The First Motions were denied to the extent they related to Aurora’s forbearance agreement. The Court also denied the First Motions pertaining to whether causes of action were stated under TULA and under California Business and Professions Code § 17200 (“Section 17200″). The Court granted the First Motions with leave to amend as to whether the TILA causes of action were barred by the statute of limitations; whether MERS had authority to substitute the trustee under the DOT; whether ING’s interest was required to be of record; and whether Cruz could allege facts to tender the Loan amount to set aside the foreclosure under TILA or to claim damages. The Court also granted leave to amend for Cruz to clarify which Defendants were named in the different causes of action.

In response to the FAC Order, Cruz filed his SAC,[4] to which Defendants responded with these Motions.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. The First Third and Tenth Causes of Action of the SAC are Preempted.

Cruz attempts in the first, third and tenth causes of action to allege his TILA claims indirectly under Section 17200, and as state law fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. Since these causes of action rely upon the TILA disclosures made to Cruz when the Loan was made, they must be dismissed with prejudice due to federal preemption. In Silvas v. E*Trade Mortg. Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2008), the Section 17200 claims were alleged based upon TILA disclosures. The Ninth Circuit dismissed these claims, finding Congress intended for TILA to preempt the field. Id. at 1004-06. Here as well, although the deceit and Section 17200 claims do not reference TILA, they are based solely upon the representations mandated by TILA. As in E*Trade Mortg. Corp., id., attempts to camouflage these claims from TILA scrutiny cannot save them from dismissal.

B. The First. Third and Tenth Causes of Action Relating to TILA Disclosures are Not Timely.

Even if the preemption bar did not apply, the Court concludes the first, third and tenth causes of action should still be dismissed. The FAC Order at ¶¶ 12-14 granted leave to amend the TILA causes of action to specify when Cruz discovered, or should have discovered, the harm of the alleged TILA inaccuracy. Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal. 3d 892, 897-98 (1985) (relevant discovery time is of the nature of the harm, not the existence of legal remedies). This is the date of discovery under state law for statute of limitations tolling purposes. See Grisham v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 623, 646 (2007) (personal injury claim for a tobacco company’s misrepresentation accrued at the time that “the physical ailments themselves were, or reasonably should have been, discovered”).

Rather than providing more detail on when the harm was discovered, as required by the FAC Order, the SAC hedges the issue. It alleges that Cruz could not have discovered the understatement of the cost of the 2004 Loan until the TILA disclosure was reviewed by an expert in 2010. Alternatively, the SAC alleges that the harm could not be discovered until 2015, when the interest rate will become variable. SAC ¶ 23. But under either discovery date, Cruz cannot state a cause of action.

If the alleged harm occurred when the Loan was made in 2004 by misleading Cruz into a bad financing choice, then the cause of action is barred by the three year statute of limitations for state law deceit claims. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 338(d). Even though a complicated analysis is required, it is possible to discern from the Loan documents attached to the SAC that the total cost of financing on the TILA disclosure differed from the stated interest rate. Although Cruz only alleges state law deceit claims, the Court finds persuasive Ninth Circuit authority that addressed when the harm of TILA misrepresentations should be discovered. Although these claims are alleged under state law, both federal and state courts have applied TILA to assess related state law claims. See e.g. Pacific Shore Funding v. Lozo, 138 Cal. App. 4th 1342, 1347 (2006); Rubio v. Capital OneBank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 2010). Under Meyer v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 342 F.3d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 2003), because the plaintiffs “were in full possession of all information relevant to the discovery of a TTLA violation and a § 1640(a) damages claim on the day the loan papers were signed,” they could not toll the statute of limitations.

Cruz was in full possession of the Loan documentation in 2004. Because there are no allegations of fraudulent concealment, or any other action on the part of any Defendant to cover up the misrepresentations, the deceit causes of action accrued when the Loan was made. Id. This was the date the harm to Cruz could have been determined from the face of the Loan documents.

The alternative explanation of the discovery of the harm is that it has not yet occurred and will not occur, if at all, until the interest rate on the Loan becomes variable in 2015. SAC ¶ 23-33. Whether the Loan will be more or less expensive than either the stated 5.85% initial contract rate, or the projected variable index rate of 4.85% starting in 2015, cannot be known until 2015. It is beyond the capabilities of this Court, or any expert or jury, to speculate about future interest rates. If interest rates drop below the index assumption used when the Loan was made, Cruz will receive a windfall. If they rise, Cruz will suffer loss assuming he is still paying on the Loan. This lack of a concrete impact on the parties renders these claims unripe for resolution. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prod. Co., 413 U.S. 568, 580 (1985) (ripeness doctrine prevents premature adjudication where the impact of a claim against the parties cannot be known); see also Exxon Corp. v. Heinze, 32 F.3d 1399, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994).

The first, third and tenth causes of action, to the extent they are related to the TTLA disclosures,[5] are accordingly dismissed with prejudice because they are either barred by the statute of limitations or are unripe.

C. The Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action for Wrongful Foreclosure and Quiet Title Cannot Be Based upon a Wrongful Substitution of Trustee. But Only upon Section 2932.5.

There are two separate factual scenarios alleged in the wrongful foreclosure causes of action: 1) that MERS lacked authority to substitute Quality as trustee of the DOT; and 2) that ING had no recorded beneficial interest at the time it foreclosed. The second scenario, but not the first, alleges a viable cause of action.

1. The Substitution of Trustee by MERS was Valid.

In the FAC Order, Cruz was directed to specifically allege why MERS, as the nominee of the Lender under the DOT and the beneficiary of record, lacked authority under § 2934a(a)(1)(A) to substitute the trustee. The Court earlier ruled in the FAC Order that if MERS was authorized by the Lender under the DOT to substitute the trustee, this substitution would be valid.

Instead of alleging specific facts that MERS was not authorized by the Lender to substitute the trustee, Cruz relies upon general allegations that two parties cannot both be the beneficiary. SAC ¶ 101. These allegations seem to leave the resolution of whether MERS was authorized to substitute the trustee to the outcome of the litigation. But California law does not provide a cause of action to determine whether or not a party has authority to institute foreclosure proceedings. Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, 192 Cal. App. 4th 1149, 1154-56 (2011).

Cruz separately alleges that ING was the beneficiary throughout the foreclosure process.[6] He argues in his opposition that the DOT follows the Note, and MERS could not have been the beneficiary once ING was assigned the Note. This argument ignores that once ING was entitled to enforce the Note, it became the Lender under the DOT, even if its interest was not yet of record. As such, ING could direct MERS, as the beneficiary of record and as the Lender’s nominee, to substitute Quality as the trustee of the DOT. Ferguson v. Avelo Mortgage LLC, 195 Cal. App. 4th 1618, 1628 (2011) (authorized beneficiary may substitute the trustee). Avelo relied upon § 2934a which specifically authorizes substitutions of trustees to be recorded after the substituted trustee takes action. Id.

Leave to amend the substitution of trustee claim will not be granted because Cruz’ allegations that ING was the beneficiary throughout the foreclosure process disprove this claim. Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Or. 2008) (leave to amend may be denied if the allegation of other facts, consistent with those plead, cannot cure the deficiency).

2. Section 2932.5 Applies to Deeds of Trust.

Although Cruz’s other causes of action are fatally defective, Cruz has properly stated claims for wrongful foreclosure and quiet title based upon ING’s non-judicial foreclosure of the DOT.[7] Section 2932.5 required that ING’s interest be of record at the time of the foreclosure sale, and it was not. MERS was the beneficiary of record when ING foreclosed, but ING was the actual foreclosing beneficiary.[8] The Trustee’s Deed identified ING as the foreclosing beneficiary, and that recital is a binding statement of fact. Bank of America v. La Jolla Group II, 129 Cal. App. 4th 706, 731-32 (2005). Because ING lacked an interest of record, it was not authorized to proceed with the foreclosure sale under § 2932.5, rendering the sale void. Dimock v. Emerald Properties, 81 Cal. App. 4th 868, 874 (2000) (sale under deed of trust by former trustee void, and tender of the amount due is unnecessary); Bank of America, 129 Cal. App. 4th at 712.[9]

To reevaluate whether § 2932.5 concerns both mortgages and deeds of trust, the Court has carefully considered the” intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and restatements as guidance . . .” to attempt to determine how the California Supreme Court would rule. Lewis v. Tel. Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1545 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court remains convinced that the highest court in this state would hold that § 2932.5 requires an assignee trust deed beneficiary to record its interest before it non-judicially forecloses.

a. The Plain Language of § 2932.5 Can Be Applied to Deeds of Trust.

Defendants first contend the plain language of § 2932.5[10] cannot accommodate deeds of trust within its ambit. Starting with a review of the statutory language, and considering its legislative history, see Conservatorship of Whitley, 50 Cal. 4th 1206, 1214 (2010), the Court finds the plain language of § 2932.5 easily pertains to deeds of trust:

Where a power to sell real property is given to a mortgagee, or other encumbrancer, in an instrument intended to secure the payment of money, the power is part of the security and vests in any person who by assignment becomes entitled to payment of the money secured by the instrument. The power of sale may be exercised by the assignee if the assignment is duly acknowledged and recorded.

(Emphasis added). The statute does not only apply to mortgagees but also to other encumbrancers. That a beneficiary under a deed of trust is an encumbrancer is confirmed by the California Supreme Court. “(M)ortgagees and trust deed beneficiaries alike hold security interests in property encumbered by mortgages and deeds of trust.” Monterey S. P. P’ship v. W. L. Bangham, 49 Cal. 3d 454, 461 (1989) (rejecting that a deed of trust conveyed true title to the trustee). Section 2932.5 further provides that the “power [of sale] is part of the security and vests in any person who by assignment becomes entitled to payment of the money secured by the instrument.” As the assignee of the Note, ING was the party entitled to the payment of money. It took title to the Property in satisfaction of the secured debt at the time of the foreclosure sale. Each of the clauses of § 2932.5 applies comfortably to deeds of trust.

The legislative history of § 2932.5 also supports its application to deeds of trust as well as mortgages. Section 2932.5 succeeded to § 858 verbatim as part of the 1986 technical revisions to California trust law. See Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law (Dec. 1985) 18 Cal. Law Revision Rep. (1985) p. 764; Selected 1986 Trust and Probate Legislation, (Sept. 1986) 18 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1986) p. 1483, available at http://www.clrc.ca.gov/Mreports-publications.html#V18. These technical revisions included two changes to California foreclosure law pertaining to deeds of trust-to renumber § 2932.5 as part of the non-judicial foreclosure statute, and to add § 2934b to apply Probate Code §§ 15643 (vacancy in the office of trustee) and 18102 (protections for third persons dealing with former trustee.) Had § 2932.5 been limited to mortgages, there would have been no need to revise it at the time of the other revisions to California trust law.

Strike v. Trans-West Discount Corp., 92 Cal. App. 3d 735, 742 (1979) cited the predecessor to § 2932.5; i.e., § 858 to validate the exercise of the power of sale by a trust deed beneficiary of record. Tamburri v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72202 * 12-13 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2011) recognized that whether § 2932.5 applies to deeds of trust raises a serious question sufficient to grant a preliminary injunction against the sale of foreclosed property. The two authoritative treatises that discuss § 2932.5 also agree that deeds of trust fall within its purview. 4 Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, California Real Estate, §§ 10.2, 10:38, 10:39[11] (3d ed. 2010); and Cal Jur 3d (Rev) Deeds of Trust § 112.[12]

Defendants do not discuss the interpretation of § 2932.5 by these persuasive treatises and other authorities. They point instead to the conveyance language of the DOT, which conveys title to the Property, “with power of sale,” to the trustee, to claim the beneficiary cannot be the “encumbrancer” in whom a power of sale is vested. Not only does this contention ignore that the power of sale in the DOT is controlled and must be invoked by the beneficiary, it seeks to revive the outdated title distinction between mortgages and deeds of trust rejected by the California Supreme Court.

b. Defendants’ Primary Authority is Out-Dated.

Defendants primarily[13] rely on Stockwell v. Barnum, 7 Cal. App. 413, 416-17 (1908), and the District Court cases[14] that follow it, to assert the power of sale in a deed of trust is held by the trustee, not the beneficiary. Stockwell is not a sound basis to determine how the California Supreme Court would apply § 2932.5 because it relies upon the archaic title theory of deeds of trust rather than the modern lien theory. 4 Witkin Sum. Cal. Law STRP § 6(2) (10th ed.) (“In most situations, the title theory has been disregarded, and the deed of trust has been deemed to create a mere lien on the property.”).

In Stockwell, id. at 415, an assignee of a note and deed of trust failed to record her interest before the property was sold at a foreclosure sale. Before the foreclosure sale, the borrower had conveyed the property to someone else. Stockwell held that the purchaser at the foreclosure sale had superior title over the successor owner because the predecessor statute to § 2932.5 only applied to mortgages. Id. Its reason for the distinction was that a deed of trust “instead of creating a lien only, as in the case of a mortgage, passes the legal title to the trustee, thus enabling him in executing the trust to transfer to the purchaser a marketable record title.” Id. at 417.[15]

This reasoning of Stockwell is now inapposite. Under Monterey, 49 Cal. 3d at 461, a deed of trust is no longer a conveyance of actual title to the Property, but merely a lien. The borrower now retains actual title to the property. Bank of Italy Nat. Trust & Sav. Assn. v. Bentley, 217 Cal. 644, 656 (1933). That this title theory is discredited by the Supreme Court is recognized by the Ninth Circuit. Olympic Federal Sav. & LoanAsso. v. Regan, 648 F.2d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 1981) (mortgages and deeds of trust are “legally identical,” so that the borrower retains actual title to the property that the Internal Revenue Service can redeem despite the presence of a junior deed of trust). See also Aviel v. Ng, 161 Cal. App. 4th 809, 816 (2008) (to interpret a subordination clause in a lease, the terms mortgages and deeds of trust were treated as synonymous based upon Bank of Italy, 217 Cal. at 656).

This Court finds the California Supreme Court is likely to overrule Stockwell’s holding that the trustee of a deed of trust holds actual legal title, rather than a lien. It has done so before. Monterey, 49 Cal. 3d at 463 (overruling Johnson v. Curley 83 Cal. App. 627 (1927), which held that beneficiaries under a deed of trust were not necessary parties to an action to have that deed declared void for fraud).

c. The Beneficiary, Not the Trustee. Holds the Power of Sale.

A better predictor than Stockwell, 7 Cal. App. at 416-17, of whether the California Supreme Court would apply § 2932.5 to deeds of trust, is that Court’s analysis of the respective roles of trust deed trustees and beneficiaries found in Monterey, 49 Cal. 3d at 463. The trustee merely holds bare legal title to the extent necessary to reconvey the lien if the debt is paid, or to foreclose the security interest if it is not. Id. at 460. The trustee is bound by no fiduciary duties, and has no duty to defend the rights of the beneficiary, or authority to appear in the suit in its behalf. Id. at 462. The trustee of a deed of trust serves merely as a common agent of both parties. Vournas v. Fidelity Nat. Tit. Ins. Co. 73 Cal. App. 4th 668, 677 (1999). Because the beneficiary’s economic interests are threatened when the existence or priority of the deed of trust is challenged, it is the real party in interest under a deed of trust. Monterey, 49 Cal. 3d at 461 (trust deed beneficiary must be named in a mechanics lien foreclosure suit since trustee does not protect its interests). See also Diamond Heights Village Assn., Inc. v. Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corp., 196 Cal. App. 4th 290, 304 (2011) (beneficiary is the real party in interest in a fraudulent conveyance action to void the security).

To claim the trustee, rather than the beneficiary, is the party who holds the power of sale under the deed of trust, elevates form over substance. The beneficiary is the real party in interest and should comply with § 2932.5.

d. Section 2932.5 Protects Borrowers’ Rights.

The California Supreme Court is clear that the distinction between mortgages and deeds of trust is inapplicable where necessary to protect a borrower’s rights. Bank of Italy, 217 Cal. at 658. Even though other statutes address the notices required to be sent to the borrower,[16] who no longer has a right to redeem the property after any foreclosure,[17] the borrower still has a right to strict construction of all of the non-judicial foreclosure statutes, including § 2932.5, to prevent an improper sale of its property. See System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank, 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 153 (1971) (harshness of non-judicial foreclosure justifies strict compliance with statutes); Bank of America, 129 Cal. App. 4th at 712 (“Statutory provisions regarding the exercise of the power of sale provide substantive rights to the trustor and limit the power of sale for the protection of the trustor,” citing Miller & Starr, § 10:123 (3d ed. 2003)). Deeds of trust are “far more widely used in this state” than mortgages. 4 Witkin Sum. Cal. Law STRP § 4 (10th ed.) (Citations omitted). Application of § 2932.5 to deeds of trust advances California’s broader statutory scheme to protect borrowers, consumer and otherwise, from a wrongful foreclosure.

MERS argues that the assignee beneficiary need not record its interest to prevent a gap in title. It again confuses the title to the lien of the deed of trust with title to the Property. That MERS was the beneficiary of record even though ING was the foreclosing beneficiary created a gap in title to the lien. ING was a stranger to the record before the foreclosure giving rise to suspicion that the sale was not authorized. This is the very risk that § 2932.5 was intended to safeguard. Stockwell, 7 Cal. App. at 416-17 (“the record should correctly show the authority of a mortgagee or his assigns to sell” to ensure that the title so conveyed be free from suspicion).

D. MERS Remains a Party to the Eighth and Tenth Causes of Action.

MERS seeks to dismiss the only two causes of action against it in the SAC, the eighth (wrongful foreclosure) and the tenth (Section 17200). MERS remains a party to the wrongful foreclosure cause of action due to this Court’s ruling on § 2932.5, even though the substitution of trustee claims found in that cause of action are dismissed. Because MERS may be liable for wrongful foreclosure on that basis, Cruz has also stated a viable 17200 claim as well.

Section 17200 establishes a disjunctive three part definition prohibiting any “unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice.” “Each of these three adjectives captures a `separate and distinct theory of liability.'” Rubio, 613 F.3d at 1203, citing Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). As amended by Proposition 64, Section 17200 is applicable to protect consumers who have suffered an injury in fact as well as business competitors. Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyns’LLC, 39 Cal. 4th 223, 228 (2006).

Since MERS is not alleged to have participated in any fraudulent activity, the last prong is not at issue. Under its “unlawful” prong, Section 17200 borrows violations of other laws and makes them independently actionable. Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999). Although not a criminal statute, violation of other civil statutes can satisfy Section 17200. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 1103 (1996) (unlawful prong includes “anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law,” including antidiscrimination laws, antitrust laws, environmental protection laws, fish and game laws, housing laws, labor laws, vehicle laws, and criminal laws (citations omitted)); Rubio, 613 F.3d at 1204 (TILA violation). The “unfair” prong is measured by the alternative public policy test adopted by Rubio, 613 F.3d at 1205, citing Gregory v. Albertson’s, Inc., 104 Cal. App. 4th 845, 854 (2002). This test looks to whether the practice violates public policy as declared by “specific constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions.” Rubio, 613 F.3d at 1205. In Rubio, the Ninth Circuit simply noted that the statutory policy behind TILA would satisfy the “unfair” prong of the test. It in effect collapsed the two prongs where statutory violations are alleged. Id.

The allegations of the SAC support MERS’ involvement in the violation of § 2932.5. MERS was the beneficiary of record, even though ING was the foreclosing beneficiary. The “unlawful” prong is met; as is the “unfair prong” under these allegations, and MERS will not be dismissed from either the eighth or tenth causes of action.

IV. CONCLUSION

The distinction between mortgages and deeds of trust is more one of terminology than substance as Monterey, 49 Cal. 3d at 464 stated: “Regrettably, it appears to be too late in the development of our vocabulary to rename deeds of trust and the `trustees’ who act under those instruments.” Weighing the dubious continuing viability of the Stockwell case against the other authority cited in this Memorandum Decision, the Court concludes that ING as the foreclosing beneficiary under the DOT is as subject to the mandates of § 2932.5 as if it held a mortgage. The DOT gives the authority to exercise the power of sale to ING, who is the real party in interest by law for foreclosure matters. For the same reasons as a mortgagee must record its interest before it forecloses, so must a beneficiary of a deed of trust under § 2923.5. The ministerial role of the trustee does not justify any distinction between the two instruments for purposes of § 2932.5 because the trustee as agent simply acts at the direction of the beneficiary.

This Memorandum Decision will constitute the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052. Counsel for Cruz is directed to prepare an order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision within ten days of the date of entry.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

[1] The Court rules on the Motions despite the recent death of plaintiff Cruz. His demise does not abate this adversary proceeding, which pursues claims which now either belong to his estate or successor. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 applies to allow the substitution of the successor of the deceased party in this case. Hawkins v. Eads, 135 B.R. 380, 384 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991); see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7025. The Court will decide any motion of substitution by any party or by the successors of Cruz at a later time. Hawkins, 135 B.R. at 384. The Chapter 13 case remains pending as Cruz’s wife is a co-debtor, and its status will be addressed in the bankruptcy case in chief pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1016.

[2] Defendant SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (“SCME”) has been defunct since 2007 and has not responded in any way to the complaints filed by Cruz. Quality Loan Service Corporation (“Quality”) has been deleted as a Defendant in the SAC, likely due to its filing of a Declaration of Nonmonetary Status pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 29241 (“Status Declaration”) to which Cruz did not timely object. In the Status Declaration, Quality stated it did not hold title to the Property and only served as the parties’ agent. Quality also agreed to be bound by any nonmonetary order or judgment of this Court. The Court will thus address the SAC only as it pertains to the moving parties Aurora, ING and MERS (collectively “Defendants”).

[3] All references to a statutory section are references to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.

[4] The SAC alleges ten causes of action: 1) intentional misrepresentation as to SCME and ING; 2) intentional misrepresentation as to Aurora and ING; 3) negligent misrepresentation as to SCME and ING; 4) negligent misrepresentation as to Aurora and ING; 5) breach of contract as to Aurora and ING; 6) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as to ING and Aurora; 7) promissory estoppel as to ING and Aurora; 8) wrongful foreclosure as to ING, Aurora and MERS; 9) quiet title as to ING; and 10) violation of Section 17200 as to all Defendants.

[5] Cruz argued that since the Court denied the First Motions to dismiss the Section 17200 cause of action, MERS is precluded from challenging it again. But the Court’s analysis of the ripeness of this dispute is based upon new allegations of the SAC found in paragraph 23-that Cruz “would have discovered the interest rate discrepancy in the year 2015 when his payments would have deviated significantly from what the TILA disclosure statement reflected.”

[6] In SAC ¶ 100, Cruz alleges that “ING claims that they are and were the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust throughout the foreclosure process.” Cruz also alleges in SAC ¶ 61 that “Aurora was acting as agent for ING,” including when Aurora entered into the “Forbearance Contract” in October 2009. SAC ¶ 83.

[7] Although not the focus of his SAC, which is instead on the substitution of trustee under the DOT, Cruz alleges sufficient facts to assert this claim in SAC ¶ 106.

[8] Defendants do not contest that § 2932.5, if applicable, was not complied with by ING’s foreclosure without its interest being of record. They merely contest whether the statute applies to deeds of trust, or only to mortgages.

[9] Avelo, 195 Cal. App. 4th at 1628, on which Aurora relies for the broad statement that tender is required in any case seeking to set aside a completed sale, is not to the contrary. Avelo recognized that an unauthorized foreclose sale was void, but did not find the sale at issue was unauthorized. There, the substitution of trustee was signed by a lender before it was assigned any interest in the deed of trust. Because § 2934a retroactively validates a substitution of trustee by an unauthorized beneficiary, the substitution of trustee was deemed valid as of the time the deed of trust was assigned. Id., citing Dimock, 81 Cal. App. 4th at 876-78.

[10] Aurora and ING also direct the Court to a portion of § 2920(b) asserting that mortgages and deeds of trust are mutually exclusive under the foreclosure statute. This assertion ignores that § 2920(b) by its express terms only applies “(f)or purposes of Sections 2924 to 2924h, inclusive . . .” This limited exclusion of a deed of trust from the definition of a mortgage is patently inapplicable to § 2932.5.

[11] MERS incorrectly cites 4 Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, California Real Estate, §§ 10:2, 10:38, 10:39 (3d ed. 2010) (“Miller & Starr”) despite it being cited by MERS as an authoritative source on real estate. MERS quotes Miller & Starr to state that (“An assignment of the note and deed of trust need not be recorded to be effective. . . .”). The text quoted by MERS pertains only to the effectiveness of assignments between the assignee and assignor, but not to § 2932.5. Miller & Starr in the same section, § 10:39, proceed to specifically apply § 2932.5 to deeds of trust as well as mortgages: “In the case of a deed of trust or mortgage with a power of sale, an assignee can only enforce the power of sale if the assignment is recorded, because the assignee’s authority to conduct the sale must appear in the public records.”

[12] Cal Jur 3d (Rev) Deeds of Trust § 112 cites § 2932.5 and other authority for the following:

The assignment of a note and trust deed ordinarily vests in the assignee all the rights and interest of the beneficiary. The assignee becomes the equitable owner of the security and is entitled, as successor to the beneficiary, to all that is equitably due on the trust deed including interest on the amount secured to the date of payment or tender. The assignee has a right to bring a foreclosure action and may exercise the power of sale in a security instrument if the assignment is duly acknowledged and recorded.

[13] Defendants also cite two cases, neither of which supports that a deed of trust grants the power of sale to the trustee, rather than the beneficiary. Garretson v. Post, 156 Cal. App. 4th 1508, 1516 (2007) was actually a SLAPP case against the beneficiary arising from a claim of wrongful foreclosure, which summarily described the non-judicial foreclosure process. Py v. Pleitner, 70 Cal. App. 2d 576, 579 (1945) involved an obsolete difference between the right of redemption between mortgages and deeds of trust, rather than whether the trustee or beneficiary held the power of sale. Since Code of Civil Procedure § 729.010 now provides for a right of redemption following a judicial sale under either a mortgage or a deed of trust, Civ. Proc. § 729.010 (Deering 2011), it is particularly inapposite here.

[14] This Court respectfully is not bound by these District Court decisions. See State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Zamora (In re Silverman), 616 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (reserving whether bankruptcy courts are bound by district court decisions within the district where the bankruptcy court sits, but recognizing problems with a non-uniform body of law might result).

[15] Stockwell, 7 Cal. App. at 417, secondarily based its holding on its conclusion that “[i]t is immaterial who holds the note,” a conclusion recognized by Defendants as erroneous. In fact, they assert who holds the Note is dispositive, rather than “immaterial.” Defendants claim that because ING was the holder of the Note at the time of the foreclosure, it was unnecessary for it to record the assignment, because when the Note was transferred to ING, the beneficial interest in the DOT automatically transferred with it. Polhemus v. Trainer, 30 Cal. 686, 688 (1866) (interest in the collateral subject to the mortgage “does not pass unless the debt itself [is] assigned”). That ING is entitled to enforce the Note does not alone obviate compliance with § 2932.5, which also requires the assignment be recorded before the power of sale is exercised by the beneficiary.

[16] MERS correctly points out that notice requirement for borrowers are also addressed by other statutes. See §§ 2924b(b)(1) (trustor and mortgagee must receive copy of recorded notice of default via mail), 2924b(b)(2) (trustor and mortgagee must receive copy of recorded notice of sale via mail) and 2937 (trustor and mortgagee of residential property must receive notice of assignment of servicing of mortgage of trust deed via mail). This does not change the Court’s view addressed in Salazar, 448 B.R. at 821, that § 2932.5 helps ensure borrowers know who actually owns the loan and is the real party in interest during the foreclosure process. Id. at 818.

[17] See footnote 13, infra.

[ipaper docId=62868137 access_key=key-14hilinr40qsr0v9kurz height=600 width=600 /]

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In RE: PHILLIPS | Alabama BK Court Denies Aurora, U.S. Bank Motion to Dismiss Fraud Claims

In RE: PHILLIPS | Alabama BK Court Denies Aurora, U.S. Bank Motion to Dismiss Fraud Claims


UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

IN RE PHILLIPS

In re: RICK ALLEN PHILLIPS and REBECCA RUTLAND PHILLIPS, Debtors.
RICK ALLEN PHILLIPS
, Plaintiff,

v.

AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC and U.S. BANK, AS TRUSTEE FOR STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-10.

Case No. 08-11442-MAM-7, Adv. Proc. No. 11-00027.

United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Alabama.

May 9, 2011.

Mindi C. Robinson, Adams and Reese, LLP, Birmingham, Alabama, Attorneys for Defendants.
Scott Hetrick and Nicholas F. Morisani, Adams and Reese, LLP, Mobile, Alabama, Attorneys for Defendants.

Nick Wooten, Auburn, Alabama, Attorney for Plaintiff.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ADVERSARY CASE

MARGARET A. MAHONEY, Bankruptcy Judge

This case is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss this adversary case on various grounds. The Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and the Order of Reference of the District Court. The Court has the authority to enter a final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). For the reasons indicated below, the Court is granting the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss all grounds for relief, except for the fraud on the court grounds.

FACTS

The Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the documentation of the Phillips’ mortgage and transfer of it were flawed such that the mortgage is avoidable as a preference or fraudulent transfer. The complaint also asserts that the defendants violated the Phillips’ automatic stay and committed a fraud on the Court. The facts that are relevant to this motion are a limited set of the facts alleged in the complaint.

Phillips entered into a note and mortgage with Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB on September 7, 2007, in the amount of $840,000 when he purchased real estate located at 26200 Perdido Beach Boulevard, Condo Unit 1505, Orange Beach, Alabama. The mortgage indicated that the lender was Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB. The mortgage also indicated that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) was “the mortgagee under this Security Agreement.” The document also stated that MERS was “acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns.” The note was in the name of Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB as well. The mortgage was recorded in the Baldwin County, Alabama Probate Court records on October 10, 2007. There was no new filing in the Baldwin County Probate Court until July 28, 2009, when an assignment of the mortgage was filed. MERS, “as nominee for Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB,” assigned the mortgage to Aurora Loan Services.

On April 25, 2008, Rick Phillips and his wife filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. On December 30, 2008, Aurora filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay. The motion stated that Aurora was the “holder of the mortgage” and was a “creditor” of Phillips. The motion had a copy of the note and mortgage attached to it. The note stated that Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB was the note holder. The note was not endorsed to any other party or in blank. The mortgage stated that Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, was the lender with MERS being the “mortgagee under this Security Instrument” and stating that MERS was “acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns.” Neither the Debtor nor the Trustee objected to the standing of Aurora to seek relief from the stay. In fact, an order to which the Debtor and Trustee consented was entered on February 12, 2009.

There are other facts asserted in the complaint about the mortgage. U.S. Bank had purchased the note and mortgage of Phillips on or about October 30, 2007, and placed the mortgage in a securitized trust of which U.S. Bank was trustee. Aurora was named servicer for U.S. Bank about the same date. The complaint also states that the mortgage was assigned to U.S. Bank in the MERS system of recordation on about October 1, 2007. These facts support Phillips’ claims in the complaint.

LAW

The complaint asserts that Phillips is entitled to: have the mortgage declared null and void as a fraudulent transfer due to 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3); have the transfer of funds to U.S. Bank at foreclosure declared a preference under 11 U.S.C. § 547 and have the funds turned over to the trustee; have the foreclosure and transfer of funds to U.S. Bank declared a violation of the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362; have the actions of Aurora and U.S. Bank declared a fraud on the court; and have this court quiet title to the property, declaring title to be in the bankruptcy estate of Phillips. The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss prior to answering the complaint as is their right pursuant to Fed. R. Bank. P. 7012.

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations such that it raises a right to relief above the speculative level. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In assessing the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must assume that all factual allegations set forth in the complaint are true. See, e.g. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002). Because all factual allegations are taken as true, the failure to state a claim for relief presents a purely legal question. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1269 n.19 (11th Cir. 2009).

The defendants assert four grounds upon which the complaint should be dismissed. The grounds are res judicata, judicial estoppel, the fact that Aurora was a creditor, and the fact that the defendants could not have violated the stay. The court concludes that res judicata eliminates all grounds except fraud on the court and therefore Counts One, Two, Three and Five are due to be dismissed.

“Application of res judicata is central to the fundamental purpose of the judiciary — the conclusive resolution of disputes.” Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1310 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)). “Finality `relieve[s] parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage[s] reliance on adjudication.'” Id. (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). “Under res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits bars the parties to a prior action from re-litigating a cause of action that was or could have been raised in that action.” In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001). Claim preclusion bars subsequent litigation when the following conditions are met: (1) the prior decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) both cases involve the same parties or their privies; and (4) both cases involve the same causes of action. Id. “In general, cases involve the same cause of action for purposes of res judicata if the present case `arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact, or is based upon the same factual predicate, as a former action.” Israel Discount Bank, Ltd. v. Entin, 951 F.2d 311, 315 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir. 1990)).

With regards to the Relief from Stay Order that was entered on February 12, 2008, this Court’s jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and the Order of Reference of the District Court. The order was entered by consent of the parties and, following entry of that order, no party filed a motion to reconsider. The Consent Order Granting Relief from Stay was a final order. The Motion for Relief from Stay lists the Phillips as debtors and Ms. Littleton as the Trustee. All parties received notice of the motion and the mortgage and note were attached to the motion. Neither the Phillips nor the Trustee raised any objection, rather, the stay was lifted by agreement of the parties. The Plaintiff now brings a complaint seeking to avoid the mortgage, quiet title, and turnover the funds liquidated. Permitting such a challenge to go forward would violate the doctrine of res judicata because each of the elements of claim preclusion have been met in this case. The proper time for the Plaintiff to question the mortgage and note was when the Relief from Stay Motion was filed. However, no one challenged or questioned the mortgage and note at that time. It would be improper to permit them to relitigate those issues now.

With regards to Count Four of the Plaintiff’s complaint alleging Fraud on the Court, that issue has not been previously litigated. The complaint alleges that the Defendants filed false pleadings concealing the true mortgage creditor’s identity, thereby violating the bankruptcy rules and perpetrating a fraud on the court. Inappropriate behavior, including litigation abuse and fraud, can be dealt with by a bankruptcy court pursuant to § 105 of the Code as an “abuse of the bankruptcy process.” Under § 105, sanctions may be warranted against parties who willfully abuse the judicial process. In re Gorshtein, 285 B.R. 118 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002). This power is broad enough to empower a court to impose sanctions for “filings [in a case] as well as commencement or continuation of an action in bad faith.” Id. (citing In re Spectee Group, Inc., 185 B.R. 146, 155 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995). Taking the Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, Aurora claimed in the motion for relief from stay to be a creditor and the holder of the mortgage. There is no document that supports those assertions other than a statement in a Pooling and Servicing Agreement filed with the SEC. This allegation of filing a false pleading is sufficient to raise a right to relief above a speculative level in that the Plaintiff has stated a claim for fraud on the court. The motion for dismissal is due to be denied with regards to Count Four of the complaint.

Therefore it is ORDERED:

1. The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to counts one, two, three, and five is GRANTED;
2. The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to count four is DENIED.

Copy courtesy of LEAGLE

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The Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A. v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC

The Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A. v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC


Case Number: 0:2011cv60989
Filed: May 4, 2011
Court: Florida Southern District Court
Office: Fort Lauderdale Office
Presiding Judge: Judge William J. Zloch
Referring Judge: Magistrate Judge Robin S. Rosenbaum
Nature of Suit: Contract – Other Contract
Cause: 28:1441 Notice of Removal-Contract Dispute
Jury Demanded By: None
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Keller Rohrback L.L.P. Announces Investigation of Bank of America Corp. and JPMorgan Chase & Co. Regarding Force-Placed Insurance

Keller Rohrback L.L.P. Announces Investigation of Bank of America Corp. and JPMorgan Chase & Co. Regarding Force-Placed Insurance


Keller Rohrback’s investigation focuses on alleged abuses by Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase, among others, such as: failing to pay for hazard insurance out of the borrower’s escrow funds, charging homeowners for unnecessary insurance, backdating policies providing coverage retroactively, utilizing their own subsidiaries to provide the hazard insurance, and purchasing policies from companies who share fees or profits with the servicers—often without disclosing this information to the borrower. Keller Rohrback is also investigating the force-placed insurance practices of the following mortgage loan servicers:

Aurora Loan Services IndyMac Mortgage Services
Downey Savings & Loan Litton Loan Servicing LP
EMC Mortgage Corp. Nationstar Mortgage LLC
Financial Freedom PennyMac
GMAC Mortgage, Inc. Saxon
HSBC SunTrust Mortgage, Inc.

Source: Keller Rohrback L.L.P.

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Hagens Berman Files Class-Action Suit Against Aurora Loan Services LLC

Hagens Berman Files Class-Action Suit Against Aurora Loan Services LLC



SAN JOSE, Calif., Aug. 20 /PRNewswire/ — A group of homeowners today filed a class-action lawsuit against Aurora Loan Services LLC, claiming the mortgage company duped them into paying tens of thousands of dollars each to have troubled mortgages reviewed by the company with promises of loan modifications, only to have their property foreclosed with little or no notice.

The suit states that Aurora reaped more than $100 million in what the court documents call “illicit profits” from the alleged scheme.

Filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in San Jose, the suit seeks to represent homeowners who paid the Littleton, Colo.-based company money in exchange for the company’s help in ‘curing’ delinquent home mortgages.

In exchange for between three and six large monthly payments, Aurora said it would halt the foreclosure process and work with homeowners to restructure, modify or resell the loan, allowing homeowners a chance to keep their homes, the suit states.

“We intend to prove that Aurora’s workout plan was nothing more than a cynical ploy to take advantage of homeowners desperate to hold on to their homes,” said Steve Berman, managing partner of Seattle-based Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP and the attorney representing the proposed class.

The suit contends that, after a period of months, Aurora foreclosed on the homes without giving the borrowers any notice that their requests for loan modification were denied and without allowing borrowers access to any method for ending their loan deficiency, despite the provisions of the workout agreements.

The suit states that the workout agreements provided for four methods for ending loan deficiency: bringing the loan current, refinancing with another lender, modification of the terms of the loan at the discretion of Aurora and another workout option at the company’s discretion.

“The past three years have been tough enough on homeowners without them having to worry about being preyed upon by unscrupulous loan services,” Berman said.

The complaint outlines the stories of two married couples who engaged Aurora in an attempt to forestall foreclosure. The first couple, from San Jose, refinanced their home with a mortgage company in early 2006. Two years later, the couple suffered economic setbacks in the form of poorly performing investments and a temporary loss of work. In late 2009, the couple contacted Aurora and signed one of the so-called workout agreements.

Over the next several months, the couple paid a total of $33,500 in return for Aurora’s promise to work on modifying the terms of the loan, among other possible outcomes. In May 2010, the family was served with a Notice to Vacate, indicating their home had been sold in foreclosure. The family had received no prior notice that the foreclosure process had been completed. In addition, Aurora did not notify the family that it had been denied a loan modification, according to the complaint.

In another instance, a second San Jose couple refinanced their home in mid-2007. Two years later, the couple suffered financial hardship as a result of an illness and the death of a parent, which led to increased expenses and loss of income. In early 2009, the couple contacted Aurora and signed one of the company’s workout agreements, the complaint alleges.

Over the next several months, the family paid a total of $23,700 in return for Aurora’s promise to work on modifying the terms of their loan. Like the first couple, the family was served with a Notice to Vacate in late June 2010, signaling their home had been sold in foreclosure. The family was not told prior to receiving the notice that the foreclosure process on their home had begun, according to the complaint.

“We’ve heard of cases like this a lot over the last few years,” Berman said. “We’d like to bring struggling homeowners some sense of relief.”

The complaint, which can be found at www.hbsslaw.com/cases-and-investigations/aurora, accuses Aurora of negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of the California Unfair Business Practices Act and other violations of California law.

Hagens Berman believes the workout agreements were fraudulent in nature and seeks to have the agreements declared void. The firm also seeks an injunction against Aurora forbidding the company from continued offering of its deceptive workout agreements, restitution to be determined at trial, damages to be determined at trial and trial and attorneys’ fees.

If you entered into a so-called workout agreement with Aurora, you are encouraged to join this case.

About Hagens Berman

Seattle-based Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP is a consumer-rights class-action law firm with offices in San Francisco, Chicago, Boston, Los Angeles, Phoenix and Washington, D.C. Founded in 1993, HBSS continues to successfully fight for consumer rights in large, complex litigation. More about the law firm and its successes can be found at www.hbsslaw.com.

Contact: Mark Firmani, Firmani + Associates Inc., 206.443.9357 or mark@firmani.com

SOURCE Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP

Back to top RELATED LINKS
http://www.hbsslaw.com

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NEVADA is on a ROLL! ALOUA v. AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC, Dist. Court, D. Nevada 2010

NEVADA is on a ROLL! ALOUA v. AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC, Dist. Court, D. Nevada 2010


PIA MARIE T. CORDERO ALOUA, Plaintiff,
v.
AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC; LEHMAN BROTHERS BANK, FSB; QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORPORATION; Does I-X, inclusive, Defendants.

Case No. 2:09-CV-00207-KJD-RJJ.

United States District Court, D. Nevada.

June 23, 2010.

ORDER

KENT J. DAWSON, District Judge. Currently before the Court is Defendants Aurora Loan Services, LLC, and Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB’s Motion to Dismiss (#15).[1] Plaintiff Pia Marie T. Cordero Aloua filed a Response and Opposition (#18) to Defendants’ Motion on October 5, 2009, to which Defendants filed a Reply (#19) on October 20, 2009.

I. Background

Plaintiff financed the real property located at 116 Peachy Court in Las Vegas, Nevada (“subject property”) on or about the 5th day of July, 2007. At that time, Plaintiff executed an adjustable rate loan (“first loan”) in the principal amount of $768,987.00 and a fixed-rate balloon loan (“second loan”) in the principal amount of $144,185.00. Lehman Brothers, which changed its name to Aurora Bank on April 24, 2009, was the original lender, and Aurora Loan Services (“ALS”) was appointed as the loan servicer on August 16, 2007. Plaintiff’s first loan, which was placed in the sub-prime category, was financed based upon a yearly adjustable interest rate of 9.375% and was to be paid to Lehman Brothers by monthly payments beginning in September 2007. Plaintiff avers that the sub-prime designation of her loan, which led to higher fees and interest, was in error because Plaintiff had verifiable income and a credit score sufficient to qualify for the traditional prime rate. Defendants aver that Plaintiff defaulted on her loans in December 2007, leading to foreclosure proceedings which were ultimately completed on July 14, 2008 through Quality Loan Service Corporation (“QLS”), the appointed substitute trustee. ALS claims to have acquired title to the subject property through said foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff avers, however, that she did not default on her loans and that the foreclosure sale was carried out without serving the required notices and without giving Plaintiff the appropriate opportunity to avert the sale. On January 7, 2009, Plaintiff commenced this action in the District Court for Clark County, Nevada. The action was removed to this Court on February 2, 2009 on the basis of federal question and diversity jurisdiction. (See #1.) On September 2, 2009, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against all Defendants, alleging the following causes of action: (1) intentional misrepresentation; (2) negligence per se under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) and the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”); (3) negligence; (4) rescission under TILA; (5) wrongful foreclosure; and (6) quiet title. On September 21, 2009, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (#15). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss in part and denies it in part.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss

A court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citation omitted). In Iqbal, the Supreme Court recently clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, the Court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 1950. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. at 1949. Second, the Court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 1949. Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has “alleged—but not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

III. Analysis

A. Intentional Misrepresentation

Plaintiff alleges Defendants knowingly made false misrepresentations to Plaintiff, upon which Plaintiff justifiably relied to her detriment. To state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation in Nevada, a plaintiff must allege that (1) defendant made a false representation; (2) defendant knew or believed the representation to be false; (3) defendant intended to induce plaintiff to rely on the misrepresentation; and (4) plaintiff suffered damages as a result of his reliance. Bartmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 956 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Nev. 1998). Misrepresentation is a form of fraud where a false representation is relied on in fact. See Pacific Maxon, Inc. v. Wilson, 96 Nev. 867, 871 (Nev. 1980). Fraud has a stricter pleading standard under Rule 9, which requires a party to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). Pleading fraud with particularity requires “an account of the time, place, and specific content of the false representations, as well as the identities of the parties of the misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Morris v. Bank of Nev., 886 P.2d 454, 456 n.1 (Nev. 1994). The Ninth Circuit has held, however, that the stricter pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) “may be relaxed with respect to matters within the opposing party’s knowledge,” reasoning that “[i]n such situations, plaintiffs can not (sic) be expected to have personal knowledge of the relevant facts.” Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987); Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989). Even under this relaxed version of Rule 9(b), however, “a plaintiff who makes allegations on information and belief must state the factual basis for the belief.” Id. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knowingly concealed the true nature of her credit score and defrauded her by placing her loan in the sub-prime category to charge higher commissions. Plaintiff also alleges, among other things, that Defendants misrepresented the fees charged and paid in association with her loan, as well as her eligibility to participate in a loan modification program. Taking these assertions as true, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for fraud: Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intentionally misrepresented information to her, that she relied on these representations, and that she was damaged as a result.

B. Negligence per se

To state a claim for negligence per se, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he or she belongs to a class of persons that a statute was intended to protect; (2) defendant violated the relevant statute; (3) plaintiff’s injuries are the type against which the statute was intended to protect; (4) the violation was the legal cause of plaintiff’s injury; and (5) plaintiff suffered damages. See Anderson v. Baltrusaitus, 944 P.2d 797, 799 (Nev. 1997). Whether a particular statute establishes a standard of care in a negligence action is a question of law. Vega v. E. Courtyard Assocs., 24 P.3d 219, 221 (Nev. 2001). Plaintiff claims Defendants violated provisions of TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq., and RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., dealing with a lender’s disclosure duties. Defendants argue that the TILA claim is time barred because the statute of limitations has run. Section 1640(e) of TILA requires that claims be brought within one year of the date of the loan transaction. Interpreting this provision, the Ninth Circuit has held that while as a general rule the limitations period runs from the date the transaction is consummated, the doctrine of equitable tolling may, when appropriate, toll the limitations period until the borrower has had a reasonable opportunity to discover the facts giving rise to a TILA claim. King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit has also held that the equitable tolling analysis is a factual one: the finder of fact must determine whether equitable tolling will prevent unjust results or maintain the integrity of the relevant statute. Id. Because these factual questions are yet to be resolved, the Court is unable to say at this stage in the litigation whether the statute of limitations has run. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s TILA claim on statute of limitations grounds is denied. Moreover, after reviewing the Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff has adequately stated a TILA claim against Defendants. Plaintiff alleges Defendants (1) failed to disclose the identity of persons and entities who share the service fees and other charges for her loans; (2) failed to disclose the percentage of the loan amount paid to the nominal lender; and (3) failed to disclose relevant credit terms to enable Plaintiff to compare market rates and prevent unfair credit practices. (Dkt. #14, Compl. ¶ 26-28.) Taking these assertions as true, Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief under TILA. Plaintiff has failed, however, to sufficiently state a claim for negligence per se under RESPA. 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. As a general rule, RESPA does not create an express or implied private right of action. Collins v. FMHA-USDA, 105 F.3d 1366, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1997); Bamba v. Resource Bank, 568 F. Supp. 2d 32, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2008); Morrison v. Brookstone, 415 F. Supp. 2d 801, 806 (S.D. Ohio 2005); McWhorter v. Ford Consumer Fin. Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1064 (N.D. Ga. 1997). A limited exception to this rule exists: a private right of action exists under RESPA when a specific statutory provision mentions such a right. See Bloom v. Martin, 865 F. Supp. 1377, 1384-85 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Although Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated several provisions of RESPA, the only section she references with any specificity is § 2605. Accordingly, because this section of the statute does not provide a private right of action, Plaintiff’s claim for negligence per se under RESPA fails.

C. Rescission

Plaintiff also alleges she is entitled to a rescission of the mortgage contract under TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1635. Plaintiff is incorrect. Section 1635 of TILA establishes that lenders must notify borrowers of their right to rescind and outlines the penalties for failure to comply with this requirement. Nonetheless, § 1635 expressly states that these provisions do not apply to “residential mortgage transactions.” A residential mortgage transaction is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) as a “transaction in which a mortgage . . . interest is created or retained against the consumer’s principal dwelling.” See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(24). This is precisely what Plaintiff’s mortgage contract entailed: the parties entered into a transaction in which Plaintiff attained financing from Defendants to acquire residential property. Because Plaintiff is not entitled to rescind the mortgage contract, her rescission claim under § 1635 fails as a matter of law and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff’s rescission claims.

D. Wrongful Foreclosure

Plaintiff also alleges wrongful foreclosure. “An action for the tort of wrongful foreclosure will lie if the trustor or mortgagor can establish that at the time the power of sale was exercised or the foreclosure occurred, no breach of condition or failure of performance existed on the mortgagor’s or trustor’s part which would have authorized the foreclosure or exercise of the power of sale.” Collins v. Union Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 662 P.2d 610, 623 (Nev. 1983). “The material issue of fact in a wrongful foreclosure claim is whether the trustor was in default when the power of sale was exercised.” Id. Here, Plaintiff affirmatively alleges that she was not in default of payment to the lender at the time the foreclosure occurred, and therefore, the representations as stated on the Notice of Default were false.[2] Taking these assertions as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure against Defendants. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claim.

E. Negligence against QLS

To bring a negligence claim in Nevada, a plaintiff must show that (1) defendant owed a duty of care to plaintiff; (2) defendant breached that duty; (3) defendant’s breach was the actual and proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) plaintiff was injured. Scialabba v. Brandise Constr., 921 P.2d 928, 930 (Nev. 1996). Liability based on negligence does not exist without a breach of duty. Bradshaw v. Blystone Equip. Co. of Nev., 386 P.2d 396, 397 (Nev. 1963). Plaintiff claims that Defendant QLS, “as trustee under the deed of trust, had a duty to Plaintiff to ensure that any party instructing it to conduct a foreclosure sale of the property actually owned and had rights under the note and deed of trust.” (See #14, Compl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant QLS’s failure to take the appropriate steps to comply with this duty was the actual and proximate cause of damages to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 33-39.) At this point, because Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful foreclosure remains, the Court also finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a claim for negligence.

F. Quiet Title

Finally, Plaintiff brings a claim of quiet title, arguing that because foreclosure was wrongful, Plaintiff remains the rightful owner of the subject property. Taking these assertions as true, Plaintiff has stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure against Defendants. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff’s quiet title claim.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (#15) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for intentional misrepresentation is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for negligence per se under TILA is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for negligence per se under RESPA is GRANTED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for negligence against QLS is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for rescission under TILA is GRANTED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful foreclosure is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for quiet title in DENIED.

[1] Defendant Quality Loan Service Corporation filed a Joinder (#22) to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss that is considered together with Defendant’s Motion herein. [2] If matters outside of the pleadings are submitted in conjunction with a motion to dismiss, Rule 12(b) grants courts discretion to either accept and consider, or to disregard such materials. See Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 193 n.3 (5th Cir.1988). A court exercises this discretion by examining whether the submitted material, and the resulting conversion from the Rule 12(b)(6) to the Rule 56 procedure, may facilitate disposing of the action. Id. at 193 n.3. If the court elects to convert the motion, “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Here, Defendants have attempted to provide evidence refuting Plaintiff’s no default claim, Plaintiff however, has not had an adequate opportunity to fully brief this issue. Accordingly, without opining whether Plaintiff’s claims may survive a summary judgment motion, the Court elects not to convert Defendants’ immediate Motion into one for summary judgment.

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Posted in aurora loan servicing, breach of contract, concealment, conspiracy, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, lehman brothers, respa, tila, truth in lending act, ViolationsComments (0)

MASSIVE RULING TO PROTECT CALIFORNIA HOMEOWNERS FROM NON JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE: MABRY v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY CODE 2923.5

MASSIVE RULING TO PROTECT CALIFORNIA HOMEOWNERS FROM NON JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE: MABRY v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY CODE 2923.5


From: b.daviesmd6605

PUBLISHED OPINION AT THE APPEALS LEVEL FOR CC 2923.5. IT IS THE LAW. THERE IS A FACT SPECIFIC CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THIS CALIFORNIA CODE. THIS IS A MASSIVE PROTECTION IN CALIFORNIA FOR THE DEVIL DEEDS OF CC2924, NON JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE. MASSIVE POSITIVE FINALLY FOR HOMEOWNERS IN CALIFORNIA.

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Posted in aurora loan servicing, bac home loans, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (2)

ExPLOSIVE! BIGGEST POSSIBLE NEWS: 4th DCA 4-21-10 Riggs v Aurora

ExPLOSIVE! BIGGEST POSSIBLE NEWS: 4th DCA 4-21-10 Riggs v Aurora


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Posted in foreclosure fraudComments (0)


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