Arthur M. Schack | FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA - Part 2

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[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK Tears up WaMU’s Counsel For “Defective Verification, Phony NY House Counsel” WAMU v. PHILLIP

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK Tears up WaMU’s Counsel For “Defective Verification, Phony NY House Counsel” WAMU v. PHILLIP


Washington Mut. Bank v Phillip
2010 NY Slip Op 52034(U)
Decided on November 29, 2010
Supreme Court, Kings County
Schack, J.

Excerpts:

Further, the verification of the complaint was not executed by an officer of WAMU, but by Benita Taylor, a “Research Support Analyst of Washington Mutual Bank, the plaintiff in the within action” a resident of Jacksonville, Florida, on June 4, 2008. This is the same day that Ms. Maio claims to have communicated with “Mark Phelps, Esq., House Counsel.” I checked the Office of Court Administration’s Attorney Registry and found that Mark Phelps is not now nor has been an attorney registered in the State of New York. Moreover, the Court does not know what “House” employs Mr. Phelps. [*5]

Both Mr. Phelps and Ms. Maio should have discovered the defects in Ms. Taylor’s verification of the subject complaint. The jurat states that the verification was executed in the State of New York and the County of Suffolk [the home county of plaintiff’s counsel], but the notary public who took the signature is Deborah Yamaguichi, a Florida notary public, not a New York notary public. Thus, the verification lacks merit and is a nullity. Further, Ms. Yamaguchi’s notarization states that Ms. Taylor’s verification was “Sworn to and subscribed before me this 4th day of June 2008.” Even if the jurat properly stated that it was executed in the State of Florida and the County of Duval, where Jacksonville is located, the oath failed to have a certificate required by CPLR

<SNIP>

Ms. Maio should have consulted with a representative or representatives of plaintiff WAMU or is successors subsequent to receiving my November 9, 2010 order, not referring back to an alleged June 4, 2008 communication with “House Counsel.” Affirmations by plaintiff’s counsel in foreclosure actions, pursuant to Chief Administrative Judge Ann t. Pfau’s October 20, 2010 Administrative Order, mandates in foreclosure actions prospective communication by plaintiff’s counsel with plaintiff’s representative or representatives to prevent the widespread insufficiencies now found in foreclosure filings, such as: failure to review files to establish standing; filing of notarized affidavits that falsely attest to such review, and, “robosigning: of documents.

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[READ] LEE COUNTY, FL SHERIFF CANDIDATE FORECLOSURE FRAUD LETTER TO CHIEF JUDGE CARY

[READ] LEE COUNTY, FL SHERIFF CANDIDATE FORECLOSURE FRAUD LETTER TO CHIEF JUDGE CARY


Link to his site: Christian Meister

Just want to make it clear that no one from his office/party sent this to me.

Winner in my book!

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FIVE (5) NYSC CASES INVOLVING ROBO-SIGNER TAMARA PRICE

FIVE (5) NYSC CASES INVOLVING ROBO-SIGNER TAMARA PRICE


Excerpts:

#1 TP1_US BANK v. Ronnie Fishbein

The purported affidavit of Tamara Price, “Vice President of CITI RESIDENTIAL LENDING MORTGAGE, a
servicing agent who has power of attorney for the plaintiff,” does not contain a jurat, and there is
no language of oath or affirmation. The absence of a jurat renders the “affidavit” inadmissible as
there is no evidence that an oath or affirmation was taken (Pagano v Kingsbury, 182 AD2d 268
[ 2d Dept 19921; see also, People v Lieberman, 57 Misc 2d 1070 [Sup. Ct 19681). Moreover, the
purported power of attorney pursuant to which 1 he affidavit was assertedly prepared is not
annexed to the motion papers, and the submissions do not otherwise establish the authority of an
officer of plaintiffs servicer to execute the affidavit on behalf of plaintiff.

#2 TP2_ARGENT v. Olivera

The Affidavit of Merit and Amount Due was executed and notarized in San Bernadino, California
by Tamara Price and it is unaccompanied by a certificate of conformity and, therefore, cannot
provide evidence on this application. (see Daimler Chrysler Services North America LLC v,
Tammaro 14 Misc 34128 [A]; 2006 NY Slip OP 52506[U]* [App Term, 2Deptl; Bath Meaka1
Suppw, Inc. v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 13 Misc 3d142[A] 2006 NY Slip OP52273[U] *1-*2 [App
Term 2d Dept]).

#3 TP 3 DBNT v. Halverson

Moreover, the submissions do not reflect the authority of Tamara Price, a
self-described “authorized agent” of AMC Mortgage Services, hc., a
non-party to this mortgage foreclosure action, to represent plaintiff in this action, nor do the
submissions contain evidence that AMC Mortgage Services, Inc. is the attorney in fact for the
plaintiff in this action, as alleged in the affidavit of Ms. Price. Similarly, the assignment whereby
the mortgage was purportedly assigned to plaintiff was executed by Tamara Smith on behalf of
AMC Mortgage Services, Inc. as “authorized agent” for the assignor, without any evidence of
such agency. Accordingly, the motion is denied, with leave to renew upon proper submissions
that address the deficiencies identified herein.

#4 FROM JUDGE SCHACK

TP 4 JUDGE SCHACK_ DEUTSCHE v. Ezagui

According to plaintiffs application, defendant Ezaguis’ default began with the
nonpayment of principal and interest due on September 1,2006. Yet, more than five
months later, plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK was idling to take an assignment of a
nonperforming loan from AMERIQUEST. Further, both assignor AMC, as Attorney in
Fact for AMERIQUEST, and assignee, DEUTSCHE BANK, have the same address, 505
City Parkway West, Orange, CA 92868. Plaintiffs “affidavit of amount due,” submitted
in support of the instant application for a default order of reference was executed by
Tamara Price, on February 16, 2007. Ms. Price states that “I am the Vice President for
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE OF
AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC., ASSET-BACKED PASS
THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-R1( 1, UNDER THE POLING AND
SERVICING AGREEMENT DATED AS OF OCTOBER 1,2004, WITHOUT
RECOURSE (DEUTSCHE BANK.” However, i he February 7,2007 assignment from
AMERIQUEST, by AMC, its Attorney in Fact, is executed by Tamara Price, Vice
President of AMC. The Tamara Price signatures on both the February 7,2007 affidavit
and the February 16,2007 assignment are identical. Did Ms. Price change employers
from February 7,2007 to February 16,2007? The Court is concerned that there may be
fraud on the part of AMERIQUEST, or at least malfeasance. Before granting an
application for an order of reference, the Court requires an affidavit from Ms. Price,
describing her employment history for the past three years. Further, irrespective of her
employment history, Ms. Price must explain why DEUTSCHE BANK would purchase a
nonperforming loan from AMERIQUEST, and why DEUTSCHE BANK shares office

THE BIGGIE

#5 JUDGE SCHACK_DBNT v. CLOUDEN

In the instant action, Argent’s defective assignment to Deutsche Bank affects the
standing of Deutsche Bank to bring this action. The recorded assignment from Argent to
Deutsche Bank, made by “Tamara Price, as Authorized Agent” on behalf of “AMC
Mortgage Services Inc. as authorized agent,” lacks any power of attorney granted by
Argent to AMC Mortgage Services, Inc. and/or Tamara Price to act on its behalf. The
first mortgage assignment, from Grand Pacific Mortgage to Argent, was proper. It was
executed by the President of Grand Pacific Mortgage.

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[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: ONEWEST BANK v. DRAYTON (3)

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: ONEWEST BANK v. DRAYTON (3)


STRIKE 1, STRIKE 2,

STRIKE 3…below

.

2010 NY Slip Op 20429

ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., Plaintiff,
v.
COVAN DRAYTON, ET AL., Defendants.

15183/09.Supreme Court, Kings County.

Decided October 21, 2010.Gerald Roth, Esq., Stein Wiener and Roth, LLP, Carle Place NY, Defendant did not answer Plaintiff.

ARTHUR M. SCHACK, J.

In this foreclosure action, plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B. (ONEWEST), moved for an order of reference and related relief for the premises located at 962 Hemlock Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4529, Lot 116, County of Kings), upon the default of all defendants. The Kings County Supreme Court Foreclosure Department forwarded the motion papers to me on August 30, 2010. While drafting this decision and order, I received on October 14, 2010, in the midst of the present national media attention about “robo-signers,” an October 13, 2010-letter from plaintiff’s counsel, by which “[i]t is respectfully requested that plaintiff’s application be withdrawn at this time.” There was no explanation or reason given by plaintiff’s counsel for his request to withdraw the motion for an order of reference other than “[i]t is our intention that a new application containing updated information will be re-submitted shortly.”

The Court grants the request of plaintiff’s counsel to withdraw the instant motion for an order of reference. However, to prevent the waste of judicial resources, the instant foreclosure action is dismissed without prejudice, with leave to renew the instant motion for an order of reference within sixty (60) days of this decision and order, by providing the Court with necessary and additional documentation.

First, the Court requires proof of the grant of authority from the original mortgagee, CAMBRIDGE HOME CAPITAL, LLC (CAMBRIDGE), to its nominee, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. (MERS), to assign the subject mortgage and note on March 16, 2009 to INDYMAC FEDERAL BANK, FSB (INDYMAC). INDYMAC subsequently assigned the subject mortgage and note to its successor, ONEWEST, on May 14, 2009.

Second, the Court requires an affidavit from Erica A. Johnson-Seck, a conflicted “robo-signer,” explaining her employment status. A “robo-signer” is a person who quickly signs hundreds or thousands of foreclosure documents in a month, despite swearing that he or she has personally reviewed the mortgage documents and has not done so. Ms. Johnson-Seck, in a July 9, 2010 deposition taken in a Palm Beach County, Florida foreclosure case, admitted that she: is a “robo-signer” who executes about 750 mortgage documents a week, without a notary public present; does not spend more than 30 seconds signing each document; does not read the documents before signing them; and, did not provide me with affidavits about her employment in two prior cases. (See Stephanie Armour, “Mistakes Widespread on Foreclosures, Lawyers Say,” USA Today, Sept. 27, 2010; Ariana Eunjung Cha, “OneWest Bank Employee: Not More Than 30 Seconds’ to Sign Each Foreclosure Document,” Washington Post, Sept. 30, 2010).

In the instant action, Ms. Johnson-Seck claims to be: a Vice President of MERS in the March 16, 2009 MERS to INDYMAC assignment; a Vice President of INDYMAC in the May 14, 2009 INDYMAC to ONEWEST assignment; and, a Vice President of ONEWEST in her June 30, 2009-affidavit of merit. Ms. Johnson-Seck must explain to the Court, in her affidavit: her employment history for the past three years; and, why a conflict of interest does not exist in the instant action with her acting as a Vice President of assignor MERS, a Vice President of assignee/assignor INDYMAC, and a Vice President of assignee/plaintiff ONEWEST. Further, Ms. Johnson-Seck must explain: why she was a Vice President of both assignor MERS and assignee DEUTSCHE BANK in a second case before me, Deutsche Bank v Maraj, 18 Misc 3d 1123 (A) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2008); why she was a Vice President of both assignor MERS and assignee INDYMAC in a third case before me, Indymac Bank, FSB, v Bethley, 22 Misc 3d 1119 (A) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2009); and, why she executed an affidavit of merit as a Vice President of DEUTSCHE BANK in a fourth case before me, Deutsche Bank v Harris (Sup Ct, Kings County, Feb. 5, 2008, Index No. 35549/07).

Third, plaintiff’s counsel must comply with the new Court filing requirement, announced yesterday by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman, which was promulgated to preserve the integrity of the foreclosure process. Plaintiff’s counsel must submit an affirmation, using the new standard Court form, that he has personally reviewed plaintiff’s documents and records in the instant action and has confirmed the factual accuracy of the court filings and the notarizations in these documents. Counsel is reminded that the new standard Court affirmation form states that “[t]he wrongful filing and prosecution of foreclosure proceedings which are discovered to suffer from these defects may be cause for disciplinary and other sanctions upon participating counsel.”

Background

Defendant COVAN DRAYTON (DRAYTON) executed the subject

mortgage and note on January 12, 2007, borrowing $492,000.00 from CAMBRIDGE. MERS “acting solely as a nominee for Lender [CAMBRIDGE]” and “FOR PURPOSES OF RECORDING THIS MORTGAGE, MERS IS THE MORTGAGEE OF RECORD,” recorded the instant mortgage and note on March 19, 2007, in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, at City Register File Number (CRFN) XXXXXXXXXXXXX. Plaintiff DRAYTON allegedly defaulted in his mortgage loan payment on September 1, 2008. Then, MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, assigned the instant nonperforming mortgage and note to INDYMAC, on March 16, 2009. Erica A. Johnson-Seck executed the assignment as a Vice President of MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE. This assignment was recorded in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, on March 24, 2009, at CRFN XXXXXXXXXXXX. However, as will be discussed below, there is an issue whether MERS, as CAMBRIDGE’s nominee, was authorized by CAMBRIDGE, its principal, to assign the subject DRAYTON mortgage and note to plaintiff INDYMAC. Subsequently, almost two months later, Ms. Johnson-Seck, now as a Vice President of INDYMAC, on May 14, 2009, assigned the subject mortgage and note to ONEWEST. This assignment was recorded in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, on May 22, 2009, at CRFN XXXXXXXXXXXXX. Plaintiff ONEWEST commenced the instant foreclosure action on June 18, 2009 with the filing of the summons, complaint and notice of pendency. On August 6, 2009, plaintiff ONEWEST filed the instant motion for an order of reference. Attached to plaintiff ONEWEST’s moving papers is an affidavit of merit by Erica A. Johnson-Seck, dated June 30, 2009, in which she claims to be a Vice President of plaintiff ONEWEST. She states, in ¶ 1, that “[t]he facts recited herein are from my own knowledge and from review of the documents and records kept in the ordinary course of business with respect to the servicing of this mortgage.” There are outstanding questions about Ms. Johnson-Seck’s employment, whether she executed sworn documents without a notary public present and whether she actually read and personally reviewed the information in the documents that she executed.

July 9, 2010 deposition of Erica A. Johnson-Seck in the Machado case

On July 9, 2010, nine days after executing the affidavit of merit in the instant action, Ms. Johnson-Seck was deposed in a Florida foreclosure action, Indymac Federal Bank, FSB, v Machado (Fifteenth Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, Case No. 50 2008 CA 037322XXXX MB AW), by defendant Machado’s counsel, Thomas E. Ice, Esq. Ms. Johnson-Seck admitted to being a “robo-signer,” executing sworn documents outside the presence of a notary public, not reading the documents before signing them and not complying with my prior orders in the Maraj and Bethley decisions. Ms. Johnson-Seck admitted in her Machado deposition testimony that she was not employed by INDYMAC on May 14, 2009, the day she assigned the subject mortgage and note to ONEWEST, even though she stated in the May 14, 2009 assignment that she was a Vice President of INDYMAC. According to her testimony she was employed on May 14, 2010 by assignee ONEWEST. The following questions were asked and then answered by Ms. Johnson Seck, at p. 4, line 11-p. 5, line 4:

Q. Could you state your full name for the record, please.

A. Erica Antoinette Johnson-Seck.

Q. And what is your business address?

A. 7700 West Parmer Lane, P-A-R-M-E-R, Building D, Austin, Texas 78729.

Q. And who is your employer?

A. OneWest Bank.

Q. How long have you been employed by OneWest Bank?

A. Since March 19th, 2009.

Q. Prior to that you were employed by IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB?

A. Yes.

Q. And prior to that you were employed by IndyMac Bank, FSB?

A. Yes.

Q. Your title with OneWest Bank is what?

A. Vice president, bankruptcy and foreclosure.

Despite executing, on March 16, 2009, the MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, assignment to INDYMAC, as Vice President of MERS, she admitted that she is not an officer of MERS. Further, she claimed to have “signing authority” from several major banking institutions and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The following questions were asked and then answered by Ms. Johnson-Seck, at p. 6, lines 5-21:

Q. Are you also an officer of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems?

A. No.

Q. You have signing authority to sign on behalf of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems as a vice president, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you an officer of any other corporation?

A. No.

Q. Do you have signing authority for any other corporation?

A. Yes.

Q. What corporations are those?

A. IndyMac Federal Bank, Indymac Bank, FSB, FDIC as receiver for Indymac Bank, FDIC as conservator for Indymac, Deutsche Bank, Bank of New York, U.S. Bank. And that’s all I can think of off the top of my head.

Then, she answered the following question about her “signing authority,” at page 7, lines 3-10:

Q. When you say you have signing authority, is your authority to sign as an officer of those corporations?

A. Some.

Deutsche Bank I have a POA [power of attorney] to sign as attorney-in-fact. Others I sign as an officer. The FDIC I sign as attorney-in-fact. IndyMac Bank and IndyMac Federal Bank I now sign as attorney-in-fact. I only sign as a vice president for OneWest. Ms. Johnson-Seck admitted that she is not an officer of MERS, has no idea how MERS is organized and does not know why she signs assignments as a MERS officer. Further, she admitted that the MERS assignments she executes are prepared by an outside vendor, Lender Processing Services, Inc. (LPS), which ships the documents to her Austin, Texas office from Minnesota. Moreover, she admitted executing MERS assignments without a notary public present. She also testified that after the MERS assignments are notarized they are shipped back to LPS in Minnesota. LPS, in its 2009 Form 10-K, filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, states that it is “a provider of integrated technology and services to the mortgage lending industry, with market leading positions in mortgage processing and default management services in the U.S. [p. 1]”; “we offer lenders, servicers and attorneys certain administrative and support services in connection with managing foreclosures [p. 4]”; “[a] significant focus of our marketing efforts is on the top 50 U.S. banks [p. 5]”; and, “our two largest customers, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., each accounted for more than 10% of our aggregate revenue [p. 5].”LPS is now the subject of a federal criminal investigation related to its foreclosure document preparation. (See Ariana Eunjung Cha. “Lender Processing Services Acknowledges Employees Allowed to Sign for Managers on Foreclosure Paperwork,” Washington Post, Oct. 5, 2010). Last week, on October 13, 2010, the Florida Attorney-General issued to LPS an “Economic Crimes Investigative Subpoena Duces Tecum,” seeking various foreclosure documents prepared by LPS and employment records for various “robo-signers.” The following answers to questions were given by Ms. Johnson-Seck in the Machado deposition, at p. 116, line 4-p. 119, line 16:

Q. Now, given our last exchange, I’m sure you will agree that you are not a vice president of MERS in any sense of the word other than being authorized to sign as one?

A. Yes.

Q. You are not —

A. Sorry.

Q. That’s all right. You are not paid by MERS?

A. No.

Q. You have no job duties as vice president of MERS?

A. No.

Q. You don’t attend any board meetings of MERS?

A. No.

Q. You don’t attend any meetings at all of MERS?

A. No.

Q. You don’t report to the president of MERS?

A. No.

Q. Who is the president of MERS?

A. I have no idea.

Q. You’re not involved in any governance of MERS?

A. No.

Q. The authority you have says that you can be an assistant secretary, right?

A. Yes.

Q. And yet you don’t report to the secretary —

A. No.

Q. — of MERS. You don’t have any MERS’ employees who report to you?

A. No.

Q. You don’t have any vote or say in any corporate decisions of MERS?

A. No.

Q. Do you know where the MERS’ offices are located?

A. No.

Q. Do you know how many offices they have?

A. No.

Q. Do you know where they are headquartered?

A. No.

Q. I take it then you’re never been to their headquarters?

A. No.

Q. Do you know how many employees they have?

A. No.

Q. But you know that you have counterparts all over the country signing as MERS’s vice-presidents and assistant secretaries?

A. Yes.

Q. Some of them are employees of third-party foreclosure service companies, like LPS?

A. Yes.

Q. Why does MERS appoint you as a vice president or assistant secretary as opposed to a manager or an authorized agent to sign in that capacity?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Why does MERS give you any kind of a title?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Take me through the procedure for drafting and — the drafting and execution of this Assignment of Mortgage which is Exhibit E.

A. It is drafted by our forms, uploaded into process management, downloaded by LPS staff in Minnesota, shipped to Austin where we sign and notarize it, and hand it back to an LPS employee, who then ships it back to Minnesota, up uploads a copy and mails the original to the firm.

Q. Very similar to all the other document, preparation of all the other documents.

A. (Nods head.)

Q. Was that a yes? You were shaking your head.

A. Yes.

Q. As with the other documents, you personally don’t review any of the information that’s on here —

A. No.

Q. — other than to make sure that you are authorized to sign as the person you’re signing for?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. As with the other documents, you signed these and took them to be notarized just to a Notary that’s outside your office?

A. Yes.

Q. And they will get notarized as soon as they can. It may or may not be the same day that you executed it?

A. That’s true. Further, with respect to MERS, Ms. Johnson-Seck testified in answering questions, at p. 138, line 2-p. 139, line 17:

Q. Do you have an understanding that MERS is a membership organization?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. And the members are —

A. Yes.

Q. — banking entities such as OneWest?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact, OneWest is a member of MERS?

A. Yes.

Q. Is Deutsche Bank National Trust Company a member of MERS?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Most of the major banking institutions in the Untied States, at least, are members of MERS, correct?

A. That sounds right.

Q. It’s owned and operated by banking institutions?

A. I’m not a big — I don’t, I don’t know that much about the ins and outs of MERS. I’m sorry. I understand what it’s for, but I don’t understand the nitty-gritty.

Q. What is it for?

A. To track the transfer of doc — of interest from one entity to another. I know that it was initially created so that a servicer did not have to record the assignments, or if they didn’t, there was still a system to keep track of the transfer of property.

Q. Does it also have a function to hold the mortgage separate and apart from the note so that note can be transferred from entity to entity to entity, bank to bank to bank —

A. That sounds right.

Q. — without ever having to rerecord the mortgage?

A. That sounds right.

Q. So it’s a savings device. It makes it more efficient to transfer notes?

A. Yes.

Q. And cheaper?

A. Yes. Moreover,

Ms. Johnson-Seck testified that one of her job duties was to sign documents, which at that time took her about ten minutes per day [p. 11]. Further, she admitted, at p. 13, line 11-p. 14, line 15, that she signs about 750 documents per week and doesn’t read each document.

Q. Okay. How many documents would you say that you sign on a week on average, in a week on average?

A. I could have given you that number if you had that question in there because I would brought the report. However, I’m going to guess, today I saw an e-mail that 1,073 docs are in the office for signing. So if we just — and there’s about that a day. So let’s say 6,000 a week and I do probably — let’s see. There’s eight of us signing documents, so what’s the math?

Q. Six thousand divided by eight, that gives me 750..

A. That sounds, that sounds about right.

Q. Okay. That would be a reasonable estimate of how many you sign, you personally sign per week?

A. Yes.

Q. And that would include Lost Note Affidavits, Affidavits of Debt?

A. Yes.

Q. What other kinds of documents would be included in that?

A. Assignments, declarations. I can sign anything related to a bankruptcy or a foreclosure.

Q. How long do you spend executing each document?

A. I have changed my signature considerably. It’s just an E now.

So not more than 30 seconds.

Q. Is it true that you don’t read each document before you sign it?

A. That’s true. [Emphasis added]

Ms. Johnson-Seck, in the instant action, signed her full name on the March 16, 2009 MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, assignment to INDYMAC. She switched to the letter E in signing the May 14, 2009 INDYMAC to ONEWEST assignment and the June 30, 2009 affidavit of merit on behalf of ONEWEST. Additionally. she testified about how LPS prepares the documents in Minnesota and ships them to her Austin office, with LPS personnel present in her Austin office [pp. 16-17]. Ms. Johnson-Seck described the document signing process, at p. 17, line 6-p. 18, line 18:

Q. Take me through the procedure for getting your actual signature on the documents once they’ve gone through this quality control process?

A. The documents are delivered to me for signature and I do a quick purview to make sure that I’m not signing for an entity that I cannot sign for. And I sign the document and I hand it to the Notary, who notarizes it, who then hands it back to LPS who uploads the document so that the firms know it’s available and they send an original.

Q. “They” being LPS?

A. Yes.

Q. Are all the documents physically, that you were supposed to sign, are they physically on your desk?

A. Yes.

Q. You don’t go somewhere else to sign documents?

A. No.

Q. When you sign them, there’s no one else in your office?

A. Sometimes.

Q. Well, the Notaries are not in your office, correct?

A. They don’t sit in my office, no.

Q. And the witnesses who, if you need witnesses on the document, are not sitting in your office?

A. That’s right.

Q. So you take your ten minutes and you sign them and then you give them to the supervisor of the Notaries, correct?

A. I supervise the Notaries, so I just give them to a Notary.

Q. You give all, you give the whole group that you just signed to one Notary?

A. Yes. [Emphasis added]

Ms. Johnson-Seck testified, at p. 20, line 1-p. 21, line 4 about notaries not witnessing her signature:

Q. I’m mostly interested in how long it takes for the Notary to notarize your signature.

A. I can’t say categorically because the Notary, that’s not the only job they do, so.

Q. In any event, it doesn’t have to be the same day?

A. No.

Q. When they notarize it and they put a date that they’re notarizing it, is it the date that you signed it or is it the date that they’re notarizing it?

A. I don’t know.

Q. When you execute a sworn document, do you make any kind of a verbal acknowledgment or oath to anyone?

A. I don’t know if I know what you’re talking about. What’s a sworn document?

Q. Well, an affidavit.

A. Oh. No.

Q. In any event, there’s no Notary in the room for you to

A. Right.

Q. — take an oath with you, correct?

A. No there is not.

Q. In fact, the Notaries can’t see you sign the documents; is that correct?

A. Not unless that made it their business to do so?

Q. To peek into your office?

A. Yes. [Emphasis added]

As noted above, I found Ms. Johnson-Seck engaged in “robo-signing” in Deutsche Bank v Maraj and Indymac Bank, FSB, v Bethley. In both foreclosure cases I denied plaintiffs’ motions for orders of reference without prejudice with leave to renew if, among other things, Ms. Johnson-Seck could explain in affidavits: her employment history for the past three years; why she was a Vice President of both assignor MERS and assignee Deutsche Bank National Trust Company in Maraj; and, Vice President of INDYMAC in Bethley. Mr. Ice questioned Ms. Johnson-Seck about my MarajMaraj decision as exhibit M in the Machado deposition. The following colloquy at the Maraj deposition took place at p. 153, line 15-p. 156, line 9. decision and showed her the

Q. Exhibit M is a document that you saw before in your last deposition, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. It’s an opinion from Judge Schack up in New York —

A. Yes.

Q. — correct? You’re familiar with that?

A. Yes.

Q. In it, he says that you signed an Assignment of Mortgage as the vice president of MERS, correct —

A. Yes.

Q. — just as you did in this case? Judge Schack also says that you executed an affidavit as an officer of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And is that true, you executed an affidavit for Deutsche Bank in that case?

A. That is not true.

Q. You never executed a document as an officer of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company in that case, Judge Schack’s case?

A. Let me just read it so I can — I have to refresh my memory completely.

Q. Okay.

A. I don’t remember. Most likely.

Q. That you did?

A. It sounds reasonable that I may have. I don’t remember, and since it’s not attached, I can’t say.

Q. And as a result, Judge Schack wanted to know if you were engaged in self-dealing by wearing two corporate hats?

A. Yes.

Q. And the court was concerned that there may be fraud on the part of the bank?

A. I guess.

Q. I mean he said that, right?

A. Oh, okay. I didn’t read the whole thing. Okay.

Q. Okay. The court ordered Deutsche Bank to produce an affidavit from you describing your employment history for the past three years, correct?

A. That’s what this says.

Q. Did you do that?

A. No, because we were never — no affidavit ever existed and no request ever came to produce such a document. The last time we spoke, I told you that in-house counsel was reviewing the whole issue and that’s kind of where — and we still haven’t received any communication to produce an affidavit.

Q. From your counsel?

A. From anywhere.

Q. Well, you’re reading Judge Schack’s opinion. He seems to want one. Isn’t that pretty clear on its face.

A. We didn’t get — we never even got a copy of this.

Q. Okay. But now you have it —

A. And —

Q. And you had it when we met at our deposition back in February 5th.

A. And our in-house counsel’s response to this is we were never — this was never requested of me and it was his recommendation not to comply.

Q. What has become of that case?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Was it settled?

A. I don’t know. After a break in the Machado deposition proceedings, Mr. Ice questioned Ms. Johnson-Seck about various documents that were subpoenaed for the July 9, 2010 deposition, including her employment affidavits that I required in both Maraj and Bethley. Ms. Johnson-Seck answered the following questions at p. 159, line 19-p. 161, line 9:

Q. So let’s start with the duces tecum part of you notice, which is the list of documents. No. 1 was: The affidavit of the last three years of deponent’s employment provided to Judge Schack in response to the order dated January 31st, 2008 in the case of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company vs. Maraj, Case No. 25981-07, Supreme Court of New York. We talked about that earlier. There is no such affidavit, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. By the way, why was IndyMac permitted to bring the case in Deutsche Bank’s name in that case?

A. I don’t — I don’t know. Now, errors have been made.

Q. No. 2: The affidavit of the deponent provided to Judge Schack in response to the order dated February 6th, 2009 in the case of IndyMac Bank, FSB vs, Bethley, New York Slip Opinion 50186, New York Supreme Court 2/5/09, “explaining,” and this is in quotes, “her employment history for the past three years; and, why a conflict of interest does not exist in how she acted as vice president of assignee IndyMac Bank, FSB in the instant action, and vice president of both Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. and Deutsche Bank in Deutsche Bank vs. Maraj,” and it gives the citation and that’s the case referred to in item 1 of our request. Do you have that affidavit with you here today?

A. No.

Q. Were you aware of that second opinion where Judge Schack asks for a second affidavit?

A. Nope. Where is Judge Schack sending these?

Q. Presumably to your counsel.

A. I wonder if he has the right address. Maybe that’s what we should do, send Judge Schack the most recent, and I will gladly show up in his court and provide him everything he wants.

Q. Okay. Well, I sent you this back in March. Have your or your counsel or in-house counsel at IndyMac pursued that?

A. No. [Emphasis added] Counsel for plaintiff ONEWEST has leave to produce Ms. Johnson-Seck in my courtroom to “gladly show up . . . and provide [me] . . . everything he wants.”

Discussion

Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) § 1321 allows the Court in a foreclosure action, upon the default of the defendant or defendant’s admission of mortgage payment arrears, to appoint a referee “to compute the amount due to the plaintiff.” In the instant action, plaintiff ONEWEST’s application for an order of reference is a preliminary step to obtaining a default judgment of foreclosure and sale against defendant DRAYTON. (Home Sav. of Am., F.A. v Gkanios, 230 AD2d 770 [2d Dept 1996]). Plaintiff’s request to withdraw its application for an order of reference is granted. However, to allow this action to continue without seeking the ultimate purpose of a foreclosure action, to obtain a judgment of foreclosure and sale, makes a mockery of and wastes the resources of the judicial system. Continuing the instant action without moving for an order of reference is the judicial equivalent of a “timeout.” Granting a “timeout” to plaintiff ONEWEST to allow it to re-submit “a new application containing new information . . . shortly” is a waste of judicial resources. Therefore, the instant action is dismissed without prejudice, with leave granted to plaintiff ONEWEST to renew its motion for an order of reference within sixty (60) days of this decision and order, if plaintiff ONEWEST and plaintiff ONEWEST’s counsel can satisfactorily address the various issues previously enumerated. Further, the dismissal of the instant foreclosure action requires the cancellation of the notice of pendency. CPLR § 6501 provides that the filing of a notice of pendency against a property is to give constructive notice to any purchaser of real property or encumbrancer against real property of an action that “would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of real property, except in a summary proceeding brought to recover the possession of real property.” The Court of Appeals, in 5308 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp. (64 NY2d 313, 319 [1984]), commented that “[t]he purpose of the doctrine was to assure that a court retained its ability to effect justice by preserving its power over the property, regardless of whether a purchaser had any notice of the pending suit,” and, at 320, that “the statutory scheme permits a party to effectively retard the alienability of real property without any prior judicial review.” CPLR § 6514 (a) provides for the mandatory cancellation of a notice of pendency by:

The Court, upon motion of any person aggrieved and upon such notice as it may require, shall direct any county clerk to cancel a notice of pendency, if service of a summons has not been completed within the time limited by section 6512; or if the action has been settled, discontinued or abated; or if the time to appeal from a final judgment against the plaintiff has expired; or if enforcement of a final judgment against the plaintiff has not been stayed pursuant to section 551. [emphasis added] The plain meaning of the word “abated,” as used in CPLR § 6514 (a) is the ending of an action. “Abatement” is defined as “the act of eliminating or nullifying.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 3 [7th ed 1999]). “An action which has been abated is dead, and any further enforcement of the cause of action requires the bringing of a new action, provided that a cause of action remains (2A Carmody-Wait 2d § 11.1).” (Nastasi v Nastasi, 26 AD3d 32, 40 [2d Dept 2005]). Further, Nastasi at 36, held that the “[c]ancellation of a notice of pendency can be granted in the exercise of the inherent power of the court where its filing fails to comply with CPLR § 6501 (see 5303 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp., supra at 320-321; Rose v Montt Assets, 250 AD2d 451, 451-452 [1d Dept 1998]; Siegel, NY Prac § 336 [4th ed]).” Thus, the dismissal of the instant complaint must result in the mandatory cancellation of plaintiff ONEWEST’s notice of pendency against the subject property “in the exercise of the inherent power of the court.”

Moreover, “[t]o have a proper assignment of a mortgage by an authorized agent, a power of attorney is necessary to demonstrate how the agent is vested with the authority to assign the mortgage.” (HSBC Bank, USA v Yeasmin, 27 Misc 3d 1227 [A], *3 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2010]). “No special form or language is necessary to effect an assignment as long as the language shows the intention of the owner of a right to transfer it [Emphasis added].” (Tawil v Finkelstein Bruckman Wohl Most & Rothman, 223 AD2d 52, 55 [1d Dept 1996]). (See Suraleb, Inc. v International Trade Club, Inc., 13 AD3d 612 [2d Dept 2004]). MERS, as described above, recorded the subject mortgage as “nominee” for CAMBRIDGE. The word “nominee” is defined as “[a] person designated to act in place of another, usu. in a very limited way” or “[a] party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 1076 [8th ed 2004]). “This definition suggests that a nominee possesses few or no legally enforceable rights beyond those of a principal whom the nominee serves.” (Landmark National Bank v Kesler, 289 Kan 528, 538 [2009]). The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Landmark National Bank, 289 Kan at 539, observed that: The legal status of a nominee, then, depends on the context of the relationship of the nominee to its principal. Various courts have interpreted the relationship of MERS and the lender as an agency relationship. See In re Sheridan, 2009 WL631355, at *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho, March 12, 2009) (MERS “acts not on its own account. Its capacity is representative.”); Mortgage Elec. Registrations Systems, Inc. v Southwest,La Salle Nat. Bank v Lamy, 12 Misc 3d 1191 [A], at *2 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2006]) . . . (“A nominee of the owner of a note and mortgage may not effectively assign the note and mortgage to another for want of an ownership interest in said note and mortgage by the nominee.”) The New York Court of Appeals in MERSCORP, Inc. v Romaine (8 NY3d 90 [2006]), explained how MERS acts as the agent of mortgagees, holding at 96: In 1993, the MERS system was created by several large participants in the real estate mortgage industry to track ownership interests in residential mortgages. Mortgage lenders and other entities, known as MERS members, subscribe to the MERS system and pay annual fees for the electronic processing and tracking of ownership and transfers of mortgages. Members contractually agree to appoint MERS to act as their common agent on all mortgages they register in the MERS system. [Emphasis added] 2009 Ark. 152 ___, ___SW3d___, 2009 WL 723182 (March 19, 2009) (“MERS, by the terms of the deed of trust, and its own stated purposes, was the lender’s agent”);

Thus, it is clear that MERS’s relationship with its member lenders is that of agent with principal. This is a fiduciary relationship, resulting from the manifestation of consent by one person to another, allowing the other to act on his behalf, subject to his control and consent. The principal is the one for whom action is to be taken, and the agent is the one who acts.It has been held that the agent, who has a fiduciary relationship with the principal, “is a party who acts on behalf of the principal with the latter’s express, implied, or apparent authority.” (Maurillo v Park Slope U-Haul, 194 AD2d 142, 146 [2d Dept 1992]). “Agents are bound at all times to exercise the utmost good faith toward their principals. They must act in accordance with the highest and truest principles of morality.” (Elco Shoe Mfrs. v Sisk, 260 NY 100, 103 [1932]). (See Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Development Corp., 96 NY 409 [2001]); Wechsler v Bowman, 285 NY 284 [1941]; Lamdin v Broadway Surface Advertising Corp., 272 NY 133 [1936]). An agent “is prohibited from acting in any manner inconsistent with his agency or trust and is at all times bound to exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty in the performance of his duties.” (Lamdin, at 136). Therefore, in the instant action, MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, is an agent of CAMBRIDGE for limited purposes. It can only have those powers given to it and authorized by its principal, CAMBRIDGE. Plaintiff ONEWEST has not submitted any documents demonstrating how CAMBRIDGE authorized MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, to assign the subject DRAYTON mortgage and note to INDYMAC, which subsequently assigned the subject mortgage and note to plaintiff ONEWEST. Recently, in Bank of New York v Alderazi,Lippincott v East River Mill & Lumber Co., 79 Misc 559 [1913]) and “[t]he declarations of an alleged agent may not be shown for the purpose of proving the fact of agency.” (Lexow & Jenkins, P.C. v Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 122 AD2d 25 [2d Dept 1986]; see also Siegel v Kentucky Fried Chicken of Long Is. 108 AD2d 218 [2d Dept 1985]; Moore v Leaseway Transp/ Corp., 65 AD2d 697 [1st Dept 1978].) “[T]he acts of a person assuming to be the representative of another are not competent to prove the agency in the absence of evidence tending to show the principal’s knowledge of such acts or assent to them.” (Lexow & Jenkins, P.C. v Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 122 AD2d at 26, quoting 2 NY Jur 2d, Agency and Independent Contractors § 26). Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to demonstrate that the original lender, the mortgagee America’s Wholesale Lender, authorized MERS to assign the secured debt to plaintiff. Therefore, in the instant action, plaintiff ONEWEST failed to demonstrate how MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, had authority from CAMBRIDGE to assign the DRAYTON mortgage to INDYMAC. The Court grants plaintiff ONEWEST leave to renew its motion for an order of reference, if plaintiff ONEWEST can demonstrate how MERS had authority from CAMBRIDGE to assign the DRAYTON mortgage and note to INDYMAC. Then, plaintiff ONEWEST must address the tangled employment situation of “robo-signer” Erica A. Johnson-Seck. She admitted in her July 9, 2010 deposition in the Machado case that she never provided me with affidavits of her employment for the prior three years and an explanation of why she wore so-many corporate hats in Maraj and Bethley. Further, in Deutsche Bank v Harris, Ms. Johnson-Seck executed an affidavit of merit as Vice President of Deutsche Bank. If plaintiff renews its motion for an order of reference, the Court must get to the bottom of Ms. Johnson-Seck’s employment status and her “robo-signing.” The Court reminds plaintiff ONEWEST’s counsel that Ms. Johnson-Seck, at p. 161 of the Machado deposition, volunteered, at lines 4-5 to “gladly show up in his court and provide him everything he wants.” Lastly, if plaintiff ONEWEST’S counsel moves to renew its application for an order of reference, plaintiff’s counsel must comply with the new filing requirement to submit, under penalties of perjury, an affirmation that he has taken reasonable steps, including inquiring of plaintiff ONEWEST, the lender, and reviewing all papers, to verify the accuracy of the submitted documents in support of the instant foreclosure action. According to yesterday’s Office of Court Administration press release, Chief Judge Lippman said: We cannot allow the courts in New York State to stand by idly and be party to what we now know is a deeply flawed process, especially when that process involves basic human needs — such as a family home — during this period of economic crisis. This new filing requirement will play a vital role in ensuring that the documents judges rely on will be thoroughly examined, accurate, and error-free before any judge is asked to take the drastic step of foreclosure. 28 Misc 3d at 379-380, my learned colleague, Kings County Supreme Court Justice Wayne Saitta explained that: A party who claims to be the agent of another bears the burden of proving the agency relationship by a preponderance of the evidence (

(See Gretchen Morgenson and Andrew Martin, Big Legal Clash on Foreclosure is Taking Shape, New York Times, Oct. 21, 2010; Andrew Keshner, New Court Rules Says Attorneys Must Verify Foreclosure Papers, NYLJ, Oct. 21, 2010).

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that the request of plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., to withdraw its motion for an order of reference, for the premises located at 962 Hemlock Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4529, Lot 116, County of Kings), is granted; and it is further

ORDERED, that the instant action, Index Number 15183/09, is dismissed without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED, that the notice of pendency in the instant action, filed with the Kings County Clerk on June 18, 2009, by plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., to foreclose a mortgage for real property located at 962 Hemlock Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4529, Lot 116, County of Kings), is cancelled; and it is further

ORDERED, that leave is granted to plaintiff, ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., to renew, within sixty (60) days of this decision and order, its motion for an order of reference for the premises located at 962 Hemlock Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4529, Lot 116, County of Kings), provided that plaintiff, ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., submits to the Court: (1) proof of the grant of authority from the original mortgagee, CAMBRIDGE CAPITAL, LLC, to its nominee, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., to assign the subject mortgage and note to INDYMAC FEDERAL BANK, FSB; and (2) an affidavit by Erica A. Johnson-Seck, Vice President of plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B., explaining: her employment history for the past three years; why a conflict of interest does not exist in how she acted as a Vice President of assignor MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a Vice President of assignee/assignor INDYMAC FEDERAL BANK, FSB, and a Vice President of assignee/plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B. in this action; why she was a Vice President of both assignor MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. and assignee DEUTSCHE BANK in Deutsche Bank v Maraj, 18 Misc 3d 1123 (A) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2008); why she was a Vice President of both assignor MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. and assignee INDYMAC BANK, FSB in Indymac Bank, FSB, v Bethley, 22 Misc 3d 1119 (A) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2009); and, why she executed an affidavit of merit as a Vice President of DEUTSCHE BANK in Deutsche Bank v Harris (Sup Ct, Kings County, Feb. 5, 2008, Index No. 35549/07); and (3) counsel for plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B. must comply with the new Court filing requirement, announced by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman on October 20, 2010, by submitting an affirmation, using the new standard Court form, pursuant to CPLR Rule 2106 and under the penalties of perjury, that counsel for plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B. has personally reviewed plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B.’s documents and records in the instant action and counsel for plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B. confirms the factual accuracy of plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B.’s court filings and the accuracy of the notarizations in plaintiff ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B.’s documents.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

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VICTOR PARISI ROBO-SIGNER CALLED OUT BY [NBKDC] JUDGE LINDA B. RIEGLE: MITCHELL v. MERS 2009 (4)

VICTOR PARISI ROBO-SIGNER CALLED OUT BY [NBKDC] JUDGE LINDA B. RIEGLE: MITCHELL v. MERS 2009 (4)


UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

In re JOSHUA & STEPHANIE MITCHELL)

Case No. BK-S-07-16226-LBR ) Chapter 7 )
Debtor(s).)

Excerpt:

In Hawkins the motion was brought by MERS “solely as nominee for Fremont Investment
& Loan, its successors and/or assigns.
” However, in his affidavit at ¶ 6, Victor Parisi states 45 46
that the beneficial ownership interest in the Hawkins note was sold by Fremont Investment &
Loan and ownership was transferred by endorsement and delivery. While the affidavit goes on to
the say that MERS was a holder at the time the motion was filed, it is obvious that MERS has no
rights to bring the motion as nominee of Fremont given that Fremont no longer had any interest
in the note.

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VICTOR PARISI ROBO-SIGNER CALLED OUT BY [NYSC] JUDGE JEFFREY ARLEN SPINNER: JPMORGAN v. MUNOZ 2009 (3)

VICTOR PARISI ROBO-SIGNER CALLED OUT BY [NYSC] JUDGE JEFFREY ARLEN SPINNER: JPMORGAN v. MUNOZ 2009 (3)


SUPREME COURT – STATE OF NEW YORK I.A.S. PART 21 – SUFFOLK COUNTY

JPMORGAN CHASE as Trustee of Equity One

against

ALBA MUNOZ

EXCERPTS:

the affidavit of its Vice President, Victor Parisi, who alleges that Premium, its
signor. paid valuable consideration for the mortgage. Mr. Parisi points to a copy of the HUD
Settlement Statement from the Premium closing, which indicates that
out of the $315,000.00 loan
proceeds~ $222.S62.63 was paid to Washington Mutual to satisfy a prior mortgage, $237.00 was paid to
satisfy an obligation to CBUSASears, and $71,228.07 was disbursed to Munoz. Additionally, Mr. Parisi
asserts that Premium did not know or have reason to know about O’Connor’s claim. He argues that at
the time of the mortgage, O’Connor’s judgment had not yet been docketed and there was nothing in the
property records that disclosed Zambrano’s liability to O’Connor. Thus, alleges Mr. Parisi, having
paid valuable consideration and having taken without knowledge or notice of O’Connor’s claims,
Premium and Chase are bona fide mortgagees ofthe premises and are entitled to protection under Real
Property Law 266 and Debtor and Creditor Law $278(1).
In addition, Mr. Parisi alleges that even if
O’Connor was able to show that Premium was on notice of Zambrano’s liability or alleged fraudulent
conveyance. pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law $278(2), Chase would be entitled to retain and enforce

<SNIP>

Chase has failed to make such a prima facie showing. The affidavit of Victor Parisi is not in
admissible form because it was signed and notarized in the State of New Jersey, and is not accompanied by the required certificate of conformity with the laws of the State of New Jersey.
For an out-of-state affidavit to be admissible, it must comply with CPLR 2309 [c] which requires that an out-of-state
affidavit accompanied by a certificate of Conformity (see Real Property Law $ 299-a [l]; PRA ZU,
b , L ( ’ 1 4 CoitialeZ. 54 AD3d 917, 864 NYS2d 140 [2008]). In the absence ofa certificate of conformity,
the affidavit, is, effect, unsworn (see Worldwide Asset Purchasing, LLC v Simpson, 17 MiscSd
’ ISA. 851 YYS2d 75 [ 20071). Consequently, Mr. Parisi’s affidavit cannot be considered by the Court.

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VICTOR PARISI ROBO-SIGNER CALLED OUT BY [NYSC] JUDGE ARTHUR SCHACK: HSBC Bank USA v. Perboo 2008 (2)

VICTOR PARISI ROBO-SIGNER CALLED OUT BY [NYSC] JUDGE ARTHUR SCHACK: HSBC Bank USA v. Perboo 2008 (2)


New York Supreme Court, Kings County

HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS INDENTURE TRUSTEE FOR PEOPLE’S CHOICE HOME LOAN SECURITIES TRUST SERIES 2006-1, PLAINTIFF,
v.
MARCIE PERBOO ET. AL., DEFENDANTS.

Excerpt:

Plaintiff’s moving papers for an order of reference fails to present an “affidavit made by the party,” pursuant to CPLR § 3215 (f). The application contains an “affidavit of merit and amount due,” by Victor F. Parisi, who states that he is “the Vice-President of, EQUITY ONE, INC. [EQUITY ONE] AS AUTHORIZED SERVICER FOR HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS INDENTURE TRUSTEE FOR PEOPLE’S CHOICE HOME LOAN SECURITIES TRUST SERIES 2006-1, Plaintiff.” For reasons unknown to the Court, plaintiff HSBC has failed to provide any power of attorney authorizing EQUITY ONE to proceed on HSBC’s behalf with the instant foreclosure action. Therefore, the proposed order of reference must be denied without prejudice. Leave is granted to plaintiff HSBC to comply with CPLR § 3215 (f) by providing an “affidavit made by the party,” whether by an officer of HSBC or someone with a valid power of attorney from HSBC.

Further, plaintiff must address a second matter if it renews its application for an order of reference upon compliance with CPLR § 3215 (f). In the instant action, as noted above, Victor F. Parisi, in his affidavit, dated December 14, 2007, states he is Vice President of EQUITY ONE. Yet, the September 28, 2007 assignment from MERS as nominee for PEOPLE’S CHOICE to HSBC is signed by the same Victor F. Parisi, as Vice President of MERS. In my November 20, 2007 decision and order in HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE FOR NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN, INC. ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES SERIES 2006-FM2 v SANDOVAL, Index Number 8758/07, the same Victor F. Parisi assigned the underlying mortgage and note as Vice President of MERS to HSBC on March 13, 2007, and then signed the affidavit of merit as Vice President of EQUITY ONE, authorized servicer for HSBC, the next day, March 14, 2007. Did Mr. Parisi change his employment from March 13, 2007 to March 14, 2007, and again from September 28, 2007 to December 14, 2007? The Court is concerned that Mr. Parisi might be engaged in a subterfuge, wearing various corporate hats. Before granting an application for an order of reference, the Court requires an affidavit from Mr. Parisi describing his employment history for the past three years.

Also, while MERS served as nominee for PEOPLE’S CHOICE, the mortgage servicer for the PERBOO mortgage was POPULAR MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC. [POPULAR], [exhibit B of application – July 24 default letter to PERBOO], whose address is 121 Woodcrest Road, Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003. The MERS as nominee for PEOPLE’S CHOICE to HSBC assignment lists HSBC’s address as 121 Woodcrest Road, Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003. The instant verified complaint [part of exhibit B of application] states that EQUITY ONE’S address is 121 Woodcrest Road, Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003. How convenient to have the assignor’s servicer, the assignee’s servicer and the assignee all at the same address. This makes for one-stop shopping! The Court needs to know what corporate chicanery is being played at 121 Woodcrest Road, Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003. Is the building large enough to house POPULAR, EQUITY ONE, MERS and HSBC under the same roof? Is there enough closet space to store Mr. Parisi’s various corporate hats?

Last, the verified complaint notes, in ¶ 6, that defendant PERBOO defaulted with her February 1, 2007 principal and interest payment. The first sentence in the July 24, 2007-POPULAR default letter to defendant PERBOO states “[p]lease be advised that your account is presently in default.” On September 28, 2007, 240 days after the instant mortgage loan ceased to perform, and 72 days subsequent to the POPULAR default letter to PERBOO, plaintiff HSBC accepted the assignment of the instant non-performing loan from MERS as nominee for PEOPLE’S CHOICE. The Court needs a satisfactory explanation of why HSBC, whose directors have a fiduciary responsibility to HSBC’s shareholders, purchased a non-performing loan from MERS as nominee for PEOPLE’S CHOICE, in an affidavit by an officer of HSBC.

<SNIP>

Plaintiff has failed to submit “proof of the facts” in “an affidavit made by the party.” The “affidavit of facts” is submitted by Victor F. Parisi, “Vice-President of, EQUITY ONE, INC. AS AUTHORIZED SERVICER FOR HSBC.” Mr. Parisi, must have, as plaintiff’s agent, a valid power of attorney from HSBC to EQUITY ONE for that express purpose. Additionally, if a power of attorney is presented to this Court and it refers to pooling and servicing agreements, the Court needs a properly offered copy of the pooling and servicing agreements, to determine if the servicing agent may proceed on behalf of plaintiff. (EMC Mortg. Corp. v Batista, 15 Misc 3d 1143 (A) [Sup Ct, Kings County 2007]; Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v Lewis, 14 Misc 3d 1201 (A) [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2006]).

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VICTOR PARISI ROBO-SIGNER CALLED OUT BY [NYSC] JUDGE LAURA JACOBSON: Equity One v. James 2006 (1)

VICTOR PARISI ROBO-SIGNER CALLED OUT BY [NYSC] JUDGE LAURA JACOBSON: Equity One v. James 2006 (1)


At an I AS Term, Part 2 1 of the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, held in and
for the County of Kings, at the Courthouse,
at the Oivic Center, Brooklyn, New York on
the 4th (Lay of December, 2006
1 —-X Index No.: 16705/2006

PRESENT:

HON. LAURA L. JACOBSON
Justice
—————-L————————————-
EQUITY ONE AS SERVICER FOR NOMURA
HOME EQUITY LOAN INC. HOME EQUIl’Y
LOAN TRUST SERIES 2006-FM1, ASSET
BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATE S,
SERIES 2006-FM1
,
,
-against-

JANICE JAMES, MERS, INC. AS NOMINEE FOR
FREMONT INVESTMENT & LOAN
; PEOPLE OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK; NEW YORK CITY
PARKING VIOLATIONS BUREAU; NEW YORK
CITY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL BOARD;
TRANSIT ADJUDICATION BUREAU, “JOHN DOE 1
to JOHN DOE 25”, said names being fictitiouh, the
persons or parties, corporations or entities, if any,
having or claiming an interest in or lien upon the
mortgaged premises described in the complaint,

excerpt:

The Affidavit of Merit submitted by the plaintiff appears to have been prepared by one Victor F. Parisi. The signor or the assignment of the mortgage, on behalf of MERS, Inc. as nominee for Fremont Investment & Loan, is also named Victor F. Parisi. Are these two signators the same people? If so, movant must submit an affidavit/affirmation advising the Court as to whether the assignment is a valid transfer or simply a paper one.

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NEW YORK STATE COURT FORECLOSURE FRAUD CASES

NEW YORK STATE COURT FORECLOSURE FRAUD CASES


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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUDComments (4)

JUDGE SCHACK BLOWS ‘MERS’ & Bank Of New York (BNY) OUT THE DOOR!

JUDGE SCHACK BLOWS ‘MERS’ & Bank Of New York (BNY) OUT THE DOOR!


MERS is an artifice and they are going to blow up!

Read this carefully…Judge Schack knows exactly where this is going and where he is taking it!

Decided on August 25, 2010

Supreme Court, Kings County

The Bank of New York, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWALT, INC. ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-OC1 MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-OC1, Plaintiff,

against

Denise Mulligan, BEVERLY BRANCHE, et. al., Defendants.

Plaintiff:
McCabe Weisberg Conway PC
Jason E. Brooks, Esq.
New Rochelle NY

Defendant:
No Appearances.

Arthur M. Schack, J.

Plaintiff’s renewed application, upon the default of all defendants, for an order of reference for the premises located at 1591 East 48th Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 7846, Lot 14, County of Kings) is denied with prejudice. The complaint is dismissed. The notice of pendency filed against the above-named real property is cancelled.

In my June 3, 2008 decision and order in this matter, I granted leave to plaintiff, THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWALT, INC. ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-OC1 MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, [*2]SERIES 2006-OC1 (BNY), to renew its application for an order of reference within forty-five (45) days, until July 18, 2008, if it complied with three conditions. However, plaintiff did not make the instant motion until May 4, 2009, 335 days after June 3, 2008, and failed to offer any excuse for its lateness. Therefore, the instant motion is 290 days, almost ten months, late. Further, the instant renewed motion failed to present the three affidavits that this Court ordered plaintiff BNY to present with its renewed motion for an order of reference: (1) an affidavit of facts either by an officer of plaintiff BNY or someone with a valid power of attorney from plaintiff BNY and personal knowledge of the facts; (2) an affidavit from Ely Harless describing his employment history for the past three years, because Mr. Harless assigned the instant mortgage as Vice President of MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. (MERS) and then executed an affidavit of merit for assignee BNY as Vice President of BNY’s alleged attorney-in-fact without any power of attorney; and, (3) an affidavit from an officer of plaintiff BNY explaining why it purchased the instant nonperforming loan from MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE MORTGAGE COMPANY, LLC (DECISION ONE).

Moreover, after I reviewed the papers filed with this renewed motion for an order of reference and searched the Automated City Register Information System (ACRIS) website of the Office of the City Register, New York City Department of Finance, I discovered that plaintiff BNY lacked standing to pursue the instant action for numerous reasons. Therefore, the instant action is dismissed with prejudice.

Background

Defendant DENISE MULLIGAN (MULLIGAN) borrowed $392,000.00 from

DECISION ONE on October 28, 2005. The mortgage to secure the note was recorded by MERS, “acting solely as a nominee for Lender [DECISION ONE]” and “FOR PURPOSES OF RECORDING THIS MORTGAGE, MERS IS THE MORTGAGEE OF RECORD,” in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, New York City Department of Finance, on February 6, 2006, at City Register File Number (CRFN) 2006000069253.

Defendant MULLIGAN allegedly defaulted in her mortgage loan payments with her May 1, 2007 payment. Subsequently, plaintiff BNY commenced the instant action, on August 9, 2007, alleging in ¶ 8 of the complaint, and again in ¶ 8 of the August 16, 2007 amended complaint, that “Plaintiff [BNY] is the holder of said note and mortgage. said mortgage was assigned to Plaintiff, by Assignment of Mortgage to be recorded in the Office of the County Clerk of Kings County [sic].” As an aside, plaintiff’s counsel needs to learn that mortgages in New York City are not recorded in the Office of the County Clerk, but in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York. However, the instant mortgage and note were not assigned to plaintiff BNY until October 9, 2007, 61 days subsequent to the commencement of the instant action, by MERS, “as nominee for Decision One,” and executed by Ely Harless, Vice President of MERS. This assignment was recorded on October 24, 2007, in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, at CRFN 2007000537531.

I denied the original application for an order of reference, on June 3, 2008, with leave to renew, because assignor Ely Harless also executed the March 20, 2008-affidavit of merit as Vice President and “an employee of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., attorney-in-fact for Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.” The original application for an order of reference did not present any power of attorney from plaintiff BNY to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. Also, the Court pondered how [*3]Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. could be its own an attorney-fact?

In my June 3, 2008 decision and order I noted that Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) § 1321 allows the Court in a foreclosure action, upon the default of defendant or defendant’s admission of mortgage payment arrears, to appoint a referee “to compute the amount due to the plaintiff” and plaintiff BNY’s application for an order of reference was a preliminary step to obtaining a default judgment of foreclosure and sale. (Home Sav. Of Am., F.A. v Gkanios, 230 AD2d 770 [2d Dept 1996]). However, plaintiff BNY failed to meet the clear requirements of CPLR § 3215 (f) for a default judgment, which states:

On any application for judgment by default, the applicant shall file proof of service of the summons and the complaint, or a summons and notice served pursuant to subdivision (b) of rule 305 or subdivision (a) of rule 316 of this chapter, and proof of the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount due by affidavit made by the party . . . Where a verified complaint has been served, it may be used as the affidavit of the facts constituting the claim and the amount due; in such case, an affidavit as to the default shall be made by the party or the party’s attorney. [Emphasisadded].

Plaintiff BNY failed to submit “proof of the facts” in “an affidavit made by the party.” (Blam v Netcher, 17 AD3d 495, 496 [2d Dept 2005]; Goodman v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. 2 AD3d 581[2d Dept 2003]; Drake v Drake, 296 AD2d 566 [2d Dept 2002]; Parratta v McAllister, 283 AD2d 625 [2d Dept 2001]; Finnegan v Sheahan, 269 AD2d 491 [2d Dept 2000]; Hazim v Winter, 234 AD2d 422 [2d Dept 1996]). Instead, plaintiff BNY submitted an affidavit of merit and amount due by Ely Harless, “an employee of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.” and failed to submit a valid power of attorney for that express purpose. Also, I required that if plaintiff renewed its application for an order of reference and provided to the Court a valid power of attorney, that if the power of attorney refers to a servicing agreement, the Court needs a properly offered copy of the servicing agreement to determine if the servicing agent may proceed on behalf of plaintiff. (EMC Mortg. Corp. v Batista, 15 Misc 3d 1143 (A), [Sup Ct, Kings County 2007]; Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v Lewis, 14 Misc 3d 1201 (A) [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2006]).

I granted plaintiff BNY leave to renew its application for an order of reference within forty-five (45) days of June 3, 2008, which would be July 18, 2008. For reasons unknown to the Court, plaintiff BNY made the instant motion to renew its application for an order of reference on May 4, 2009, 290 days late. Plaintiff’s counsel, in his affirmation in support of the renewed motion, offers no explanation for his lateness and totally ignores this issue.

Further, despite the assignment by MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE, to plaintiff BNY occurring 61 days subsequent to the commencement of the instant action, plaintiff’s counsel claims, in ¶ 17 of his affirmation in support, that “[s]aid assignment of mortgage [by MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE to BNT] was drafted for the convenience of the court in establishing the chain of ownership, but the actual assignment and transfer had previously occurred by delivery.” The alleged proof presented of physical delivery of the subject MULLIGAN mortgage is a computer printout [exhibit G of motion], dated April 30, 2009, from [*4]Countrywide Financial, which plaintiff’s counsel calls a “Closing Loan Schedule,” and claims, in ¶ 21 of his affirmation in support, that this “closing loan schedule is the mortgage loan schedule displaying every loan held by such trust at the close date for said trust at the end of January 2006. The closing loan schedule is of public record and demonstrates that the Plaintiff was in possession of the note and mortgage about nineteen (19) months prior to the commencement of this action.” There is an entry on line 2591 of the second to last page of the printout showing account number 1232268089, which plaintiff’s counsel, in ¶ 22 of his affirmation in support, alleges is the subject mortgage. Plaintiff’s counsel asserts, in ¶ 23 of his affirmation in support, that “[t]he annexed closing loan schedule suffices to proceed in granting Plaintiff’s Order of Reference in this matter proving possession prior to any default.” This claim is ludicrous. The computer printout, printed on April 30, 2009, just prior to the making of the instant motion, has no probative value with respect to whether physical delivery of the subject mortgage was made to plaintiff BNY prior to the August 9, 2007 commencement of the instant action.

Further, even if the mortgage was delivered to BNY prior to the August 9, 2007 commencement of the instant action, this claim is in direct contradiction to plaintiff’s claim previously mentioned in ¶ 8 of both the complaint and the amended complaint, that “Plaintiff [BNY] is the holder of said note and mortgage. said mortgage was assigned to Plaintiff, by Assignment of Mortgage to be recorded in the Office of the County Clerk of Kings County [sic].” Both ¶’s 8 allege that the assignment of the subject mortgage took place prior to August 9, 2007 and the recording would subsequently take place. The only reality for the Court is that the assignment of the subject mortgage took place 61 days subsequent to the commencement of the action on October 9, 2007 and the assignment was recorded on October 24, 2007.

Moreover, plaintiff’s counsel alleges, in ¶ 18 of his affirmation in support, that “[p]ursuant to a charter between Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. ( MERS’) and Decision One Mortgage Company, LLC, all officers of Decision One Mortgage Company, LLC, a member of MERS, are appointed as assistant secretaries and vice presidents of MERS, and as such are authorized” to assign mortgage loans registered on the MERS System and execute documents related to foreclosures. ¶ 18 concludes with “See Exhibit F.” None of this appears in exhibit F. Exhibit F is a one page power of attorney from “THE BANK OF NEW YORK, as Trustee” pursuant to unknown pooling and servicing agreements appointing “Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP and its authorized officers (collectively CHL Servicing’)” as its “attorneys-in-fact and authorized agents” for foreclosures “in connection with the transactions contemplated in those certain Pooling and Servicing Agreements.” The so-called “charter” between MERS and DECISION ONE was not presented to the Court in any exhibits attached to the instant motion.

Further, attached to the instant renewed motion [exhibit D] is an affidavit of merit

by Keri Selman, dated August 23, 2007 [47 days before the assignment to BNY], in which Ms. Selman claims to be “a foreclosure specialist of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. Servicing agent for BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWALT, INC. ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-OC1 MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-OC1 . . . I make this afidavit upon personal knowledge based on books and records of Bank of New York in my possession or subject to my control [sic]” Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. is not Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, referred to in the power of attorney attached to the renewed motion [exhibit F]. Moreover, plaintiff failed to [*5]present to the Court any power of attorney authorizing Ms. Selman to execute for Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. her affidavit on behalf of plaintiff BNY. Also, Ms. Selman has a history of executing documents presented to this Court while wearing different corporate hats. In Bank of New York as Trustee for Certificateholders CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-22 v Myers (22 Misc 3d 1117 [A] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2009], in which I issued a decision and order on February 3, 2009, Ms. Selman assigned the subject mortgage on June 28, 2008 as Assistant Vice President of MERS, nominee for Homebridge Mortgage Bankers Corp., and then five days later executed an affidavit of merit as Assistant Vice President of plaintiff BNY. I observed, in this decision and order, at 1-2, that:

Ms. Selman is a milliner’s delight by virtue of the number of hats she wears. In my November 19, 2007 decision and order (BANK OF NEW YORK A TRUSTEE FOR THE NOTEHOLDERS OF CWABS, INC. ASSET-BACKED NOTES, SERIES 2006-SD2 v SANDRA OROSCONUNEZ, et. al. [Index No., 32052/07]),

I observed that:

Plaintiff’s application is the third application for an order of reference received by me in the past several days that contain an affidavit from Keri Selman. In the instant action, she alleges to be an Assistant Vice President of the Bank of New York. On November 16, 2007, I denied an application for an order of reference (BANK OF NEW YORK A TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF CWABS, INC. ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-8 v JOSE NUNEZ, et. al., Index No. 10457/07), in which Keri Selman, in her affidavit of merit claims to be “Vice President of  COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, Attorney in fact for BANK OF NEW YORK.” The Court is concerned that Ms. Selman might be engaged in a subterfuge, wearing various corporate hats. Before granting an application for an order of reference, the Court requires an affidavit from Ms. Selman describing her employment history for the past three years. This Court has not yet received any affidavit from Ms. Selman describing her employment history, whether it is with MERS, BNY, COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, or any other entity. [*6]

Further, the Court needs to address the conflict of interest in the June 20, 2008 assignment by Ms. Selman to her alleged employer, BNY.

I am still waiting for Ms. Selman’s affidavit to explain her tangled employment relationships. Interestingly, Ms. Selman, as “Assistant Vice President of MERS,” nominee for “America’s Wholesale Lender,” is the assignor of another mortgage to plaintiff BNY in Bank of New York v Alderazi (28 Misc 3d 376 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2010]), which I further cite below.

It is clear that plaintiff BNY failed to provide the Court with: an affidavit of merit by an officer of plaintiff BNY or someone with a valid power of attorney from BNY; an affidavit from Ely Harless, explaining his employment history; and, an explanation from BNY of why it purchased a nonperforming loan from MERS, as nominee of DECISION ONE. Moreover, plaintiff BNY did not own the subject mortgage and note when the instant case commenced. Even if plaintiff BNY owned the subject mortgage and note when the case commenced, MERS lacked the authority to assign the subject MULLIGAN mortgage to BNY, as will be explained further. Plaintiff’s counsel offers a lame and feeble excuse for not complying with my June 3, 2008 decision and order, in ¶ 23 of his affirmation in support, claiming that “[t]he affidavits requested in Honorable Arthur M. Schack’s Decision and Order should not be required, given the annexed closing loan schedule.”

Plaintiff BNY lacked standing

The instant action must be dismissed because plaintiff BNY lacked standing to bring this action on August 9, 2007, the day the action commenced. “Standing to sue is critical to the proper functioning of the judicial system. It is a threshold issue. If standing is denied, the pathway to the courthouse is blocked. The plaintiff who has standing, however, may cross the threshold and seek judicial redress.” (Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801 812 [2003], cert denied 540 US 1017 [2003]). Professor Siegel (NY Prac, § 136, at 232 [4d ed]), instructs that:

[i]t is the law’s policy to allow only an aggrieved person to bring a lawsuit . . . A want of “standing to sue,” in other words, is just another way of saying that this particular plaintiff is not involved in a genuine controversy, and a simple syllogism takes us from there to a “jurisdictional”

dismissal: (1) the courts have jurisdiction only over controversies; (2) a plaintiff found to lack “standing”is not involved in a controversy; and (3) the courts therefore have no jurisdiction of the case when such a plaintiff purports to bring it.

“Standing to sue requires an interest in the claim at issue in the lawsuit that the law will recognize as a sufficient predicate for determining the issue at the litigant’s request.” (Caprer v Nussbaum (36 AD3d 176, 181 [2d Dept 2006]). If a plaintiff lacks standing to sue, the plaintiff may not proceed in the action. (Stark v Goldberg, 297 AD2d 203 [1st Dept 2002]). [*7]

Plaintiff BNY lacked standing to foreclose on the instant mortgage and note when this action commenced on August 7, 2007, the day that BNY filed the summons, complaint and notice of pendency with the Kings County Clerk, because it did not own the mortgage and note that day. The instant mortgage and note were assigned to BNY, 61 days later, on October 7, 2007. The Court, in Campaign v Barba (23 AD3d 327 [2d Dept 2005]), instructed that “[t]o establish a prima facie case in an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff must establish the existence of the mortgage and the mortgage note, ownership of the mortgage, and the defendant’s default in payment [Emphasis added].” (See Witelson v Jamaica Estates Holding Corp. I, 40 AD3d 284 [1st Dept 2007]; Household Finance Realty Corp. of New York v Wynn, 19 AD3d 545 [2d Dept 2005]; Sears Mortgage Corp. v Yahhobi, 19 AD3d 402 [2d Dept 2005]; Ocwen Federal Bank FSB v Miller, 18 AD3d 527 [2d Dept 2005]; U.S. Bank Trust Nat. Ass’n Trustee v Butti, 16 AD3d 408 [2d Dept 2005]; First Union Mortgage Corp. v Fern, 298 AD2d 490 [2d Dept 2002]; Village Bank v Wild Oaks, Holding, Inc., 196 AD2d 812 [2d Dept 1993]).

Assignments of mortgages and notes are made by either written instrument or the assignor physically delivering the mortgage and note to the assignee.

“Our courts have repeatedly held that a bond and mortgage may be transferred by delivery without a written instrument of assignment.” (Flyer v Sullivan, 284 AD 697, 699 [1d Dept 1954]). The written October 7, 2007 assignment by MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE, to BNY is clearly 61 days after the commencement of the action. Plaintiff’s BNY’s claim that the gobblygook computer printout it offered in exhibit G is evidence of physical delivery of the mortgage and note prior to commencement of the action is not only nonsensical, but flies in the face of the complaint and amended complaint, which both clearly state in ¶ 8 that “Plaintiff [BNY] is the holder of said note and mortgage. said mortgage was assigned to Plaintiff, by Assignment of Mortgage to be recorded in the Office of the County Clerk of Kings County [sic].” Plaintiff BNY did not own the mortgage and note when the instant action commenced on August 7, 2007.

[A] retroactive assignment cannot be used to confer standing upon the assignee in a foreclosure action commenced prior to the execution of an assignment.

(Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Marchione, 69 AD3d 204, 210 [2d Dept 2009]). The Marchione Court relied upon LaSalle Bank Natl. Assoc. v Ahearn (59 AD3d 911 [3d Dept 2009], which instructed, at 912, “[n]otably, foreclosure of a mortgage may not be brought by one who has no title to it’ (Kluge v Fugazy, 145 AD2d 537 [2d Dept 1988]) and an assignee of such a mortgage does not have standing unless the assignment is complete at the time the action is commenced).” (See U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752 [2d Dept 2009]; Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Gress, 68 AD3d 709 [2d Dept 2009]; Citgroup Global Mkts. Realty Corp. v Randolph Bowling, 25 Misc 3d 1244 [A] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2009]; Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Company v Abbate, 25 Misc 3d 1216 [A] [Sup Ct, Richmond County 2009]; Indymac Bank FSB v Boyd, 22 Misc 3d 1119 [A] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2009]; Credit-Based Asset Management and Securitization, LLC v Akitoye,22 Misc 3d 1110 [A] [Sup Ct, Kings County Jan. 20, 2009]; Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v Peabody, 20 Misc 3d 1108 [A][Sup Ct, Saratoga County 2008]).

The Appellate Division, First Department, citing Kluge v Fugazy, in Katz v East-Ville Realty Co., (249 AD2d 243 [1d Dept 1998]), instructed that “[p]laintiff’s attempt to foreclose upon a mortgage in which he had no legal or equitable interest was without foundation in law or [*8]fact.” Therefore, with plaintiff BNY not having standing, the Court lacks jurisdiction in this foreclosure action and the instant action is dismissed with prejudice.

MERS had no authority to assign the subject mortgage and note

Moreover, MERS lacked authority to assign the subject mortgage. The subject DECISION ONE mortgage, executed on October 28, 2005 by defendant MULLIGAN, clearly states on page 1 that “MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender [DECISION ONE] and LENDER’s successors and assigns . . . FOR PURPOSES OF RECORDING THIS MORTGAGE, MERS IS THE MORTGAGEE OF RECORD.”

The word “nominee” is defined as “[a] person designated to act in place of another, usu. in a very limited way” or “[a] party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 1076 [8th ed 2004]). “This definition suggests that a nominee possesses few or no legally enforceable rights beyond those of a principal whom the nominee serves.” (Landmark National Bank v Kesler, 289 Kan 528, 538 [2009]). The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Landmark National Bank, 289 Kan at 539, observed that:

The legal status of a nominee, then, depends on the context of the relationship of the nominee to its principal. Various courts have interpreted the relationship of MERS and the lender as an agency relationship. See In re Sheridan, 2009 WL631355, at *4 (Bankr. D.

Idaho, March 12, 2009) (MERS “acts not on its own account. Its capacity is representative.”); Mortgage Elec. Registrations Systems, Inc. v Southwest, 2009 Ark. 152 ___, ___SW3d___, 2009 WL 723182 (March 19, 2009) (“MERS, by the terms of the deed of trust, and its own stated purposes, was the lender’s agent”); La Salle Nat. Bank v Lamy, 12 Misc 3d 1191 [A], at *2 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2006]) . . .

(“A nominee of the owner of a note and mortgage may not effectively assign the note and mortgage to another for want of an ownership interest in said note and mortgage by the nominee.”)

The New York Court of Appeals in MERSCORP, Inc. v Romaine (8 NY3d 90 [2006]), explained how MERS acts as the agent of mortgagees, holding at 96:

In 1993, the MERS system was created by several large participants in the real estate mortgage industry to track ownership interests in residential mortgages. Mortgage lenders and other entities, known as MERS members, subscribe to the MERS system and pay annual fees for the electronic processing and tracking of ownership and transfers of mortgages. Members contractually agree to appoint [*9] MERS to act as their common agent on all mortgages they register in the MERS system. [Emphasis added]

Thus, it is clear that MERS’s relationship with its member lenders is that of agent with the lender-principal. This is a fiduciary relationship, resulting from the manifestation of consent by one person to another, allowing the other to act on his behalf, subject to his control and consent. The principal is the one for whom action is to be taken, and the agent is the one who acts.It has been held that the agent, who has a fiduciary relationship with the principal, “is a party who acts on behalf of the principal with the latter’s express, implied, or apparent authority.” (Maurillo v Park Slope U-Haul, 194 AD2d 142, 146 [2d Dept 1992]). “Agents are bound at all times to exercise the utmost good faith toward their principals. They must act in accordance with the highest and truest principles of morality.” (Elco Shoe Mfrs. v Sisk, 260 NY 100, 103 [1932]). (See Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Development Corp., 96 NY 409 [2001]); Wechsler v Bowman, 285 NY 284 [1941]; Lamdin v Broadway Surface Advertising Corp., 272 NY 133 [1936]). An agent “is prohibited from acting in any manner inconsistent with his agency or trust and is at all times bound to exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty in the performance of his duties.” (Lamdin, at 136).

Thus, in the instant action, MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE, is an agent of DECISION ONE for limited purposes. It only has those powers given to it and authorized by its principal, DECISION ONE. Plaintiff BNY failed to submit documents authorizing MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE, to assign the subject mortgage to plaintiff BNY. Therefore, even if the assignment by MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE, to BNY was timely, and it was not, MERS lacked authority to assign the MULLIGAN mortgage, making the assignment defective. Recently, in Bank of New York v Alderazi, 28 Misc 3d at 379-380, my learned Kings County Supreme Court colleague, Justice Wayne Saitta explained that:

A party who claims to be the agent of another bears the burden of proving the agency relationship by a preponderance of the evidence (Lippincott v East River Mill & Lumber Co., 79 Misc 559 [1913]) and “[t]he declarations of an alleged agent may not be shown for the purpose of proving the fact of agency.” (Lexow & Jenkins, P.C. v Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 122 AD2d 25 [2d Dept 1986]; see also Siegel v Kentucky Fried Chicken of Long Is. 108 AD2d 218 [2d Dept 1985]; Moore v Leaseway Transp/ Corp., 65 AD2d 697 [1st Dept 1978].) “[T]he acts of a person assuming to be the representative of another are not competent to prove the agency in the absence of evidence tending to show the principal’s knowledge of such acts or assent to them.” (Lexow & Jenkins, P.C. v Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 122 AD2d at 26, quoting 2 NY Jur 2d, Agency and Independent Contractors § 26). [*10]

Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to demonstrate that the original lender, the mortgagee America’s Wholesale Lender, authorized MERS to assign the secured debt to plaintiff [the assignment, as noted above, executed by the multi-hatted Keri Selman].

In the instant action, MERS, as nominee for DECISION ONE, not only had no authority to assign the MULLIGAN mortgage, but no evidence was presented to the Court to demonstrate DECISION ONE’s knowledge or assent to the assignment by MERS to plaintiff BNY.

Cancellation of subject notice of pendency

The dismissal with prejudice of the instant foreclosure action requires the cancellation of the notice of pendency. CPLR § 6501 provides that the filing of a notice of pendency against a property is to give constructive notice to any purchaser of real property or encumbrancer against real property of an action that “would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of real property, except in a summary proceeding brought to recover the possession of real property.” The Court of Appeals, in 5308 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp. (64 NY2d 313, 319 [1984]), commented that “[t]he purpose of the doctrine was to assure that a court retained its ability to effect justice by preserving its power over the property, regardless of whether a purchaser had any notice of the pending suit,” and, at 320, that “the statutory scheme permits a party to effectively retard the alienability of real property without any prior judicial review.”

CPLR § 6514 (a) provides for the mandatory cancellation of a notice of pendency by:

The Court, upon motion of any person aggrieved and upon such notice as it may require, shall direct any county clerk to cancel a notice of pendency, if service of a summons has not been completed within the time limited by section 6512; or if the action has been settled, discontinued or abated; or if the time to appeal from a final judgment against the plaintiff has expired; or if enforcement of a final judgment against the plaintiff has not been stayed pursuant to section 551. [emphasis added]

The plain meaning of the word “abated,” as used in CPLR § 6514 (a) is the ending of an action. “Abatement” is defined as “the act of eliminating or nullifying.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 3 [7th ed 1999]). “An action which has been abated is dead, and any further enforcement of the cause of action requires the bringing of a new action, provided that a cause of action remains (2A Carmody-Wait 2d § 11.1).” (Nastasi v Natassi, 26 AD3d 32, 40 [2d Dept 2005]). Further, Nastasi at 36, held that the “[c]ancellation of a notice of pendency can be granted in the exercise of the inherent power of the court where its filing fails to comply with CPLR § 6501 (see 5303 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp., supra at 320-321; Rose v Montt Assets, 250 AD2d 451, 451-452 [1d Dept 1998]; Siegel, NY Prac § 336 [4th ed]).” Thus, the [*11]dismissal of the instant complaint must result in the mandatory cancellation of plaintiff BNY’s notice of pendency against the property “in the exercise of the inherent power of the court.”

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is ORDERED, that the renewed motion of plaintiff, THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWALT, INC. ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-OC1 MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-OC1, for an order of reference, for the premises located at 1591 East 48th Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 7846, Lot 14, County of Kings), is denied with prejudice; and it is further ORDERED, that the instant action, Index Number 29399/07, is dismissed with prejudice; and it is further ORDERED that the Notice of Pendency in this action, filed with the Kings County Clerk on August 9, 2007, by plaintiff, THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS CWALT, INC. ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-OC1 MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-OC1, to foreclose a mortgage for real property located at 1591 East 48th Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 7846, Lot 14, County of Kings), is cancelled.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

ENTER

________________________________HON. ARTHUR M. SCHACK

J. S. C.

~

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in bank of new york, chain in title, concealment, conflict of interest, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, dismissed, Economy, Ely Harless, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, forgery, judge arthur schack, lawsuit, MERS, MERSCORP, mortgage, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., note, Real Estate, robo signers, securitization, servicers, stopforeclosurefraud.com, Wall StreetComments (3)

JUDGE SCHACK DOES IT AGAIN! TOSSES OUT US BANK FORECLOSURE!

JUDGE SCHACK DOES IT AGAIN! TOSSES OUT US BANK FORECLOSURE!


Hasn’t this law firm learned their lesson…time and time again??

Homeowners’ hero judge slaps US Bank

Post staff for NYPOST
Last Updated: 4:42 AM, July 5, 2010
Posted: 12:44 AM, July 5, 2010

Brooklyn’s battling Judge Arthur M. Schack has struck again, giving a Brooklyn homeowner an Independence Day gift — freedom from foreclosure.

The judge, who has steadfastly pressed banks in foreclosure cases to prove they own the troubled mortgage and has tossed cases when banks have failed to do so, has again dismissed a foreclosure case — this time because the lawyer on the case, Steven J. Baum, represented the mortgage broker, the bank that bought the loan and the industry registration service serving as the nominee of the loan.

But Baum’s conflict of interest wasn’t the case’s only problem.

Judge Schack, in his decision, also found that the bank, US Bank, never should have filed the foreclosure action because of an “ineffective assignment of the subject mortgage and note to it.” In other words, it sold the mortgage, and the mortgage was securitized, leaving the company simply as the servicer — but it decided to try and take back the Crown Heights home anyway.

The Post has reported that the actions of the Baum firm in foreclosure cases has caught the eye of the US Trustee, the arm of the Justice Department responsible for monitoring the Bankruptcy Court.

Baum, a Buffalo-based foreclosure mill that filed 12,551 foreclosure actions in New York last year, has been scolded by judges for bringing foreclosure cases without proper documentation.

In this case, a Baum lawyer, Elpiniki Bechakas, signed papers claiming to be an executive of Mortgage Electronic Registration System, or MERS, which was given certain rights to the mortgages by the broker, Fremont Investment and Loan, while simultaneously representing Fremont and US Bank, which filed the foreclosure in July 2009.

“The Court is concerned that the concurrent representation by [the Baum firm] of both assignor MERS, as nominee for Fremont, and assignee plaintiff US Bank is a conflict of interest,” Schack wrote.

Photo Credit: CBS

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Posted in case, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, judge arthur schack, MERS, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, robo signer, Steven J Baum, us bankComments (2)

Judge ARTHUR SCHACK’s COLASSAL Steven J. BAUM “MiLL” SMACK DOWN!! MERS TWILIGHT ZONE!

Judge ARTHUR SCHACK’s COLASSAL Steven J. BAUM “MiLL” SMACK DOWN!! MERS TWILIGHT ZONE!


2010 NY Slip Op 50927(U)

HSBC BANK USA, N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR NOMURA ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATE SERIES

2006-AF1,, Plaintiff,
v.
LOVELY YEASMIN, ET. AL., Defendants.

34142/07

Supreme Court, Kings County.

Decided May 24, 2010.

Steven J Baum, PC, Amherst NY, Plaintiff — US Bank.

ARTHUR M. SCHACK, J.

Plaintiff’s renewed motion for an order of reference, for the premises located at 22 Jefferson Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 3170, Lot 20, County of Kings), is denied with prejudice. The instant action is dismissed and the notice of pendency for the subject property is cancelled. Plaintiff HSBC BANK USA, N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR NOMURA ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATE SERIES 2006-AF1 (HSBC) failed to comply with my May 2, 2008 decision and order in the instant matter (19 Misc 3d 1127 [A]), which granted plaintiff HSBC leave:

to renew its application for an order of reference for the premises located at 22 Jefferson Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 3170, Lot 20, County of Kings), upon presentation to the Court, within forty-five (45) days of this decision and order of:

(1) a valid assignment of the instant mortgage and note to plaintiff, HSBC . . .;

(2) an affirmation from Steven J. Baum, Esq., the principal of Steven J. Baum, P.C., explaining if both MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. [MERS], the assignor of the instant mortgage and note, and HSBC . . . the assignee of the instant mortgage and note, pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 1200.24, consented to simultaneous representation in the instant action, with “full disclosure of the implications of the simultaneous representation and the advantages and risks involved” explained to them;

(3) compliance with the statutory requirements of CPLR § 3215 (f), by an affidavit of facts executed by someone with authority to execute such an affidavit, and if the affidavit of facts is executed by a loan servicer, a copy of a valid power of attorney to the loan servicer, and the servicing agreement authorizing the affiant to act in the instant foreclosure action; and

(4) an affidavit from an officer of plaintiff HSBC . . . explaining why plaintiff HSBC . . . purchased a nonperforming loan from MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE HOME CAPITAL, LLC [CAMBRIDGE].

[Emphasis added]

Plaintiff made the instant motion on January 6, 2009, 249 days subsequent to the May 2, 2008 decision and order. Thus, the instant motion is 204 days late. Plaintiff’s unavailing lateness explanation, in ¶ 16 of plaintiff’s counsel’s January 6, 2009 affirmation of regularity, states:

A previous application has been made for this or like relief but was subsequently denied without prejudice with leave to renew upon proper papers. By Decision and Order of this court dated the 2nd day of May 2008, plaintiff had 45 days to renew its application.

However on June 29, 2008 the Plaintiff permitted the mortgagor to enter into a foreclosure forbearance agreement. Said agreement was entered into with the hope that the Defendant would be able to keep her home. The agreement was not kept by the mortgagor and Plaintiff has since resumed the foreclosure action. The defects of the original application are addressed in the Affirmation attached hereto at Tab F [sic].

June 29, 2008 was 58 days subsequent to May 2, 2008. This was 13 days subsequent to the Court ordered deadline for plaintiff to make a renewed motion for an order of reference. While it’s laudatory for plaintiff HSBC to have granted defendant a forbearance agreement, plaintiff HSBC never notified the Court about this or sought Court approval of extending the 45-day deadline to make the instant motion. However, even if the instant motion was timely, the documents plaintiff’s counsel refers to at Tab F [exhibit F of motion] do not cure the defects the Court found with the original motion and articulated in the May 2, 2008 decision and order.

Background

Defendant LOVELY YEASMIN borrowed $624,800.00 from CAMBRIDGE on May 10, 2006. The note and mortgage were recorded by MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, for purposes of recording the mortgage, in the Office of the City Register, New York City Department of Finance, on May 23, 2006, at City Register File Number (CRFN) XXXXXXXXXXXXX. Then, MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, assigned the mortgage to plaintiff HSBC on September 10, 2007, with the assignment recorded in the Office of the City Register, on September 20, 2007, at CRFN XXXXXXXXXXXXX. The assignment was executed by “Nicole Gazzo, Esq., on behalf of MERS, by Corporate Resolution dated 7/19/07.” Neither a corporate resolution nor a power of attorney to Ms. Gazzo were recorded with the September 10, 2007 assignment. Therefore, the Court found the assignment invalid and plaintiff HSBC lacked standing to bring the instant foreclosure action. Ms. Gazzo, the assignor, according to the Office of Court Administration’s Attorney Registration, has as her business address, “Steven J. Baum, P.C., 220 Northpointe Pkwy Ste G, Buffalo, NY 14228-1894.” On September 10, 2008, the same day that Ms. Gazzo executed the invalid assignment for MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, plaintiff’s counsel, Steven J. Baum, P.C., commenced the instant action on behalf of purported assignee HSBC by filing the notice of pendency, summons and complaint in the instant action with the Kings County Clerk’s Office. The Court, in the May 2, 2008 decision and order, was concerned that the simultaneous representation by Steven J. Baum, P.C. of both MERS and HSBC was a conflict of interest in violation of 22 NYCRR § 1200.24, the Disciplinary Rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility entitled “Conflict of Interest; Simultaneous Representation,” then in effect. Further, plaintiff’s moving papers for an order of reference and related relief failed to present an “affidavit made by the party,” pursuant to CPLR § 3215 (f). The instant application contained an “affidavit of merit and amount due,” dated November 16, 2007, by Cathy Menchise, “Senior Vice President of WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. D/B/A AMERICA’S SERVICING COMPANY, Attorney in Fact for HSBC BANK USA, N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR NOMURA ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATE SERIES 2006-AF1.” Ms. Menchise stated “[t]hat a true copy of the Power of Attorney is attached hereto.” Actually attached was a photocopy of a “Limited Power of Attorney,” dated July 19, 2004, from HSBC, appointing WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. as its attorney-in-fact to perform various enumerated services, by executing documents “if such documents are required or permitted under the terms of the related servicing agreements . . . in connection with Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.[‘s] . . . responsibilities to service certain mortgage loans . . . held by HSBC . . . as Trustee of various trusts.” The “Limited Power of Attorney” failed to list any of these “certain mortgage loans.” The Court was unable to determine if plaintiff HSBC’s subject mortgage loan was covered by this “Limited Power of Attorney.” The original motion stated that defendant YEASMIN defaulted on her mortgage payments by failing to make her May 1, 2007 and subsequent monthly loan payments. Yet, on September 10, 2007, 133 days subsequent to defendant YEASMIN’S alleged May 1, 2007 payment default, plaintiff HSBC took the ssignment of the instant nonperforming loan from MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE. Thus, the Court required, upon renewal of the motion for an order of reference, a satisfactory explanation of why HSBC purchased a nonperforming loan from MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE.

Plaintiff HSBC needed “standing” to proceed in the instant action. The Court of Appeals (Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801, 912 [2003]), cert denied 540 US 1017 [2003]), held that “[s]tanding to sue is critical to the proper functioning of the judicial system. It is a threshold issue. If standing is denied, the pathway to the courthouse is blocked. The plaintiff who has standing, however, may cross the threshold and seek judicial redress.” In Carper v Nussbaum, 36 AD3d 176, 181 (2d Dept 2006), the Court held that “[s]tanding to sue requires an interest in the claim at issue in the lawsuit that the law will recognize as a sufficient predicate for determining the issue at the litigant’s request.” If a plaintiff lacks standing to sue, the plaintiff may not proceed in the action. (Stark v Goldberg,297 AD2d 203 [1d Dept 2002]). “Since standing is jurisdictional and goes to a court’s authority to resolve litigation [the court] can raise this matter sua sponte.” (Axelrod v New York State Teachers’ Retirement System, 154 AD2d 827, 828 [3d Dept 1989]).

In the instant action, the September 10, 2007 assignment from MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, to HSBC was defective. Therefore, HSBC had no standing to bring this action. The recorded assignment by “Nicole Gazzo, Esq. on behalf of MERS, by Corporate Resolution dated 7/19/07,” had neither the corporate resolution nor a power of attorney attached. Real Property Law (RPL) § 254 (9) states: Power of attorney to assignee. The word “assign” or other words of assignment, when contained in an assignment of a mortgage and bond or mortgage and note, must be construed as having included in their meaning that the assignor does thereby make, constitute and appoint the assignee the true and lawful attorney, irrevocable, of the assignor, in the name of the assignor, or otherwise, but at the proper costs and charges of the assignee, to have, use and take all lawful ways and means for the recovery of the money and interest secured by the said mortgage and bond or mortgage and note, and in case of payment to discharge the same as fully as the assignor might or could do if the assignment were not made. [Emphasis added]

To have a proper assignment of a mortgage by an authorized agent, a power of attorney is necessary to demonstrate how the agent is vested with the authority to assign the mortgage. “No special form or language is necessary to effect an assignment as long as the language shows the intention of the owner of a right to transfer it [Emphasis added].” (Tawil v Finkelstein Bruckman Wohl Most & Rothman, 223 AD2d 52, 55 [1d Dept 1996]). (See Suraleb, Inc. v International Trade Club, Inc., 13 AD3d 612 [2d Dept 2004]). To foreclose on a mortgage, a party must have title to the mortgage. The instant assignment was a nullity. The Appellate Division, Second Department (Kluge v Fugazy, 145 AD2d 537, 538 [2d Dept 1988]), held that a “foreclosure of a mortgage may not be brought by one who has no title to it and absent transfer of the debt, the assignment of the mortgage is a nullity.” Citing Kluge v Fugazy, the Court inKatz v East-Ville Realty Co. (249 AD2d 243 [1d Dept 1998]), held that “[p]laintiff’s attempt to foreclose upon a mortgage in which he had no legal or equitable interest was without foundation in law or fact.” Plaintiff HSBC, with the invalid assignment of the instant mortgage and note from MERS, lacked standing to foreclose on the instant mortgage. The Court, in Campaign v Barba (23 AD3d 327 [2d Dept 2005]), held that “[t]o establish a prima facie case in an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff must establish the existence of the mortgage and the mortgage note, ownership of the mortgage, and the defendant’s default in payment [Emphasis added].” (See Household Finance Realty Corp. of New York v Wynn, 19 AD3d 545 [2d Dept 2005]; Sears Mortgage Corp. v Yahhobi, 19 AD3d 402 [2d Dept 2005]; Ocwen Federal Bank FSB v Miller, 18 AD3d 527 [2d Dept 2005]; U.S. Bank Trust Nat. Ass’n v Butti, 16 AD3d 408 [2d Dept 2005]; First Union Mortgage Corp. v Fern, 298 AD2d 490 [2d Dept 2002]; Village Bank v Wild Oaks Holding, Inc., 196 AD2d 812 [2d Dept 1993]). Even if plaintiff HSBC can cure the assignment defect, plaintiff’s counsel has to address his conflict of interest in the representation of both assignor MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, and assignee HSBC. 22 NYCRR § 1200.24, of the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility, entitled “Conflict of Interest; Simultaneous Representation,” states in relevant part: (a) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve the lawyer in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under subdivision (c) of this section. (b) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the lawyer’s representation of another client, or if it would be likely to involve the lawyer in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under subdivision (c) of this section. (c) in the situations covered by subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section, a lawyer may represent multiple clients if a disinterested lawyer would believe that the lawyer can competently represent the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the implications of the simultaneous representation and the advantages and risks involved. [Emphasis added]

The Court, upon renewal of the instant motion for an order of reference wanted to know if both MERS and HSBC were aware of the simultaneous representation by plaintiff’s counsel, Steven J. Baum, P.C., and whether both MERS and HSBC consented. Upon plaintiff’s renewed motion for an order of reference, the Court required an affirmation by Steven J. Baum, Esq., the principal of Steven J. Baum, P.C., explaining if both MERS and HSBC consented to simultaneous representation in the instant action with “full disclosure of the implications of the simultaneous representation and the advantages and risks involved.” The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, the Department, in which both Ms. Gazzo and Mr. Baum are registered (In re Rogoff, 31 AD3d 111 [2006]), censured an attorney for, inter alia, violating 22 NYCRR § 1200.24, by representing both a buyer and sellers in the sale of a motel. The Court, at 112, found that the attorney “failed to make appropriate disclosures to either the sellers or the buyer concerning dual representation.” Further, the Rogoff Court, at 113, censured the attorney, after it considered the matters submitted by respondent in mitigation, including: that respondent undertook the dual representation at the insistence of the buyer, had no financial interest in the transaction and charged the sellers and the buyer one half of his usual fee. Additionally, we note that respondent cooperated with the Grievance Committee and has expressed remorse for his misconduct. Then, if counsel for plaintiff HSBC cures the assignment defect and explains his simultaneous representation, plaintiff HSBC needs to address the “affidavit of merit” issue. The May 2, 2008 decision and order required that plaintiff comply with CPLR § 3215 (f) by providing an “affidavit made by the party,” whether by an officer of HSBC, or someone with a valid power of attorney from HSBC, to execute foreclosure documents for plaintiff HSBC. If plaintiff HSBC presents a power of attorney and it refers to a servicing agreement, the Court needs to inspect the servicing agreement. (Finnegan v Sheahan, 269 AD2d 491 [2d Dept 2000];Hazim v Winter, 234 AD2d 422 [2d Dept 1996]; EMC Mortg. Corp. v Batista, 15 Misc 3d 1143 [A] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2007]; Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v Lewis, 4 Misc 3d 1201 [A] [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2006]).

Last, the Court required an affidavit from an officer of HSBC, explaining why, in the middle of our national mortgage financial crisis, plaintiff HSBC purchased from MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, the subject nonperforming loan. It appears that HSBC violated its corporate fiduciary duty to its stockholders by purchasing the instant mortgage loan, which became nonperforming on May 1, 2007, 133 days prior to its assignment from MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, to HSBC, rather than keep the subject mortgage loan on CAMBRIDGE’s books.

Discussion

The instant renewed motion is dismissed for untimeliness. Plaintiff made its renewed motion for an order of reference 204 days late, in violation of the Court’s May 2, 2008 decision and order. Moreover, even if the instant motion was timely, the explanations offered by plaintiff’s counsel, in his affirmation in support of the instant motion and various documents attached to exhibit F of the instant motion, attempting to cure the four defects explained by the Court in the prior May 2, 2008 decision and order, are so incredible, outrageous, ludicrous and disingenuous that they should have been authored by the late Rod Serling, creator of the famous science-fiction televison series, The Twilight Zone. Plaintiff’s counsel, Steven J. Baum, P.C., appears to be operating in a parallel mortgage universe, unrelated to the real universe. Rod Serling’s opening narration, to episodes in the 1961-1962 season of The Twilight Zone (found at www.imdb.com/title/tt005250/quotes), could have been an introduction to the arguments presented in support of the instant motion by plaintiff’s counsel, Steven J. Baum, P.C. — “You are traveling through another dimension, a dimension not only of sight and sound but of mind. A journey into a wondrous land of imagination. Next stop, the Twilight Zone.” With respect to the first issue for the renewed motion for an order of reference, the validity of the September 10, 2007 assignment of the subject mortgage and note by MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, to plaintiff HSBC by “Nicole Gazzo, Esq., on behalf of MERS, by Corporate Resolution dated 7/19/07,” plaintiff’s counsel claims that the assignment is valid because Ms. Gazzo is an officer of MERS, not an agent of MERS. Putting aside Ms. Gazzo’s conflicted status as both assignor attorney and employee of assignee’s counsel, Steven J. Baum, P.C., how would the Court have known from the plain language of the September 10, 2007 assignment that the assignor, Ms. Gazzo, is an officer of MERS? She does not state in the assignment that she is an officer of MERS and the corporate resolution is not attached. Thus, counsel’s claim of a valid assignment takes the Court into “another dimension” with a “journey into a wondrous land of imagination,” the mortgage twilight zone. Next, plaintiff’s counsel attached to exhibit F the July 17, 2007 “Agreement for Signing Authority” between MERS, Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, a Division of Wells Fargo Bank NA (WELLS FARGO), a MERS “Member” and Steven J. Baum, P.C., as WELLS FARGO’s “Vendor.” The parties agreed, in ¶ 3, that “in order for Vendor [Baum] to perform its contractual duties to Member [WELLS FARGO], MERS, by corporate resolution, will grant employees of Vendor [Baum] the limited authority to act on behalf of MERS to perform certain duties. Such authority is set forth in the Resolution, which is made a part of this Agreement.” Also attached to exhibit F is the MERS corporate resolution, certified by William C. Hultman, Corporate Secretary of MERS, that MERS’ Board of Directors adopted this resolution, effective July 19, 2007, resolving:

that the attached list of candidates are employee(s) of Steven J. Baum, P.C. and are hereby appointed as assistant secretaries and vice presidents of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., and as such are authorized to: Execute any and all documents necessary to foreclose upon the property securing any mortgage loan registered on the MERS System that is shown to be registered to the Member . . . Take any and all actions and execute all documents necessary to protect the interest of the Member, the beneficial owner of such mortgage loan, or MERS in any bankruptcy proceedings . . . Assign the lien of any mortgage loan registered on the MERS System that is shown to be registered to Wells Fargo.

Then, the resolution certifies five Steven J. Baum, P.C. employees [all currently admitted to practice in New York and listing Steven J. Baum, P.C. as their employer in the Office of Court Administration Attorney Registry] as MERS officers. The five are Brian Kumiega, Nicole Gazzo, Ron Zackem, Elpiniki Bechakas, and Darleen Karaszewski. The language of the MERS corporate resolution flies in the face of documents recorded with the City Register of the City of New York. The filed recordings with the City Register show that the subject mortgage was owned first by MERS, as nominee for CAMBRIDGE, and then by HSBC as Trustee for a Nomura collateralized debt obligation. However, if the Court follows the MERS’corporate resolution and enters into a new dimension of the mind, the mortgage twilight zone, the real owner of the subject mortgage is WELLS FARGO, the MERS Member and loan servicer of the subject mortgage, because the corporate resolution states that the Member is “the beneficial owner of such mortgage loan.” The MERS mortgage twilight zone was created in 1993 by several large “participants in the real estate mortgage industry to track ownership interests in residential mortgages. Mortgage lenders and other entities, known as MERS members, subscribe to the MERS system and pay annual fees for the electronic processing and tracking of ownership and transfers of mortgages. Members contractually agree to appoint MERS to act as their common agent on all mortgages they register in the MERS system.” (MERSCORP, Inc. v Romaine, 8 NY3d 90, 96 [2006]). Next, with respect to Ms. Gazzo’s employer, Steven J. Baum, P.C, and its representation of MERS, through Ms. Gazzo, the Court continues to journey through the mortgage twilight zone. Also, attached to exhibit F of the instant motion is the August 11, 2008 affirmation of Steven J. Baum, Esq., affirmed “under the penalties of perjury.” Mr. Baum states, in ¶ 3, that “My firm does not represent HSBC . . . and MERS simultaneously in the instant action.” Then, apparently overlooking that the subject notice of pendency, summons, complaint and instant motion, which all clearly state that Steven J. Baum, P.C. is the attorney for plaintiff HSBC, Mr. Baum states, in ¶ 4 of his affirmation, that “My firm is the attorney of record for Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., d/b/a America’s Servicing Company, attorney in fact for HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as Trustee for Nomura Asset-Backed Certificate Series 2006-AF1. My firm does not represent . . . [MERS] as an attorney in this action.” In the mortgage world according to Steven J. Baum, Esq., there is a fine line between acting as an attorney for MERS and as a vendor for a MERS member. If Mr. Baum is not HSBC’s attorney, but the attorney for WELLS FARGO, why did he mislead the Court and defendants by stating on all the documents filed and served in the instant action that he is plaintiff’s attorney for HSBC? Further, in ¶ 6 of his affirmation, he states “Nowhere does the Resolution indicate that Ms. Gazzo, or my firm, or any attorney or employee of my firm, shall act as an attorney for MERS. As such I am unaware of any conflict of interest of Steven J. Baum, P.C. or any of its employees, in this action.” While Mr. Baum claims to be unaware of the inherent conflict of interest, the Court is aware of the conflict. ¶ 3 of the MERS “Agreement for Signing Authority,” cited above, states that “in order for Vendor [Baum] to perform its contractual duties to Member [WELLS FARGO], MERS, by corporate resolution, will grant employees of Vendor [Baum] the limited authority to act on behalf of MERS to perform certain duties. Such authority is set forth in the Resolution, which is made a part of this Agreement.” As the Court continues through the MERS mortgage twilight zone, attached to exhibit F is the June 30, 2009-affidavit of MERS’ Secretary, William C. Hultman. Mr. Hultman claims, in ¶ 3, that Steven J. Baum, P.C. is not acting in the instant action as attorney for MERS and, in ¶ 4, Ms. Gazzo in her capacity as an officer of MERS executed the September 10, 2007 subject assignment “to foreclose on a mortgage loan registered on the MERS System that is being serviced by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.” Thus, Mr. Hultman perceives that mortgages registered on the MERS system exist in a parallel universe to those recorded with the City Register of the City of New York. While Mr. Hultman waives, in ¶ 9, any conflict that might exist by Steven J. Baum, P.C. in the instant action, neither he nor Mr. Baum address whether MERS, pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 1200.24, consented to simultaneous representation in the instant action, with “full disclosure of the implications of the simultaneous representation and the advantages and risks involved” explained to MERS. Then, attached to exhibit F, there is the June 11, 2008-affidavit of China Brown, Vice President Loan Documentation of WELLS FARGO. This document continues the Court’s trip into “a wondrous land of imagination.” Despite the affidavit’s caption stating that HSBC is the plaintiff, Mr. or Ms. Brown (the notary public’s jurat refers several times to China Brown as “he/she”), states, in ¶ 4, that “Steven J. Baum, P.C. represents us as an attorney of record in this action.” The Court infers that “us” is WELLS FARGO. Moving to the third issue that plaintiff was required to address in the instant motion, compliance with the statutory requirements of CPLR § 3215 (f) with an affidavit of facts executed by someone with authority to execute such an affidavit, plaintiff’s instant motion contains an affidavit of merit, attached as exhibit C, by Kim Miller, “Vice President of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Attorney in Fact for HSBC,” executed on December 8, 2008, 220 days after my May 2, 2008 decision and order. The affidavit of merit is almost six months late. Again, plaintiff attached a photocopy of the July 19, 2004 “Limited Power of Attorney” from HSBC [exhibit D], which appointed WELLS FARGO as its attorney-in-fact to perform various enumerated services, by executing documents “if such documents are required or permitted under the terms of the related servicing agreements . . . in connection with Wells Fargo[‘s] . . . responsibilities to service certain mortgage loans . . . held by HSBC . . . as Trustee of various trusts.” Further, the “Limited Power of Attorney” fails to list any of these “certain mortgage loans.” Therefore, the Court is unable to determine if the subject mortgage loan is one of the mortgage loans that WELLS FARGO services for HSBC. The “Limited Power of attorney” gives WELLS FARGO the right to execute foreclosure documents “if such documents are required or permitted under the terms of the related servicing agreements.” Instead of presenting the Court with the “related servicing agreement” for review, plaintiff’s counsel submits copies of the cover page and redacted pages 102, 104 and 105 of the October 1, 2006 Pooling and Servicing Agreement between WELLS FARGO, as Master Servicer, HSBC, as Trustee, and other entities. This is in direct contravention of the Court’s May 2, 2008-directive to plaintiff HSBC that it provides the Court with the entire pooling and servicing agreement upon renewal of the instant motion. Thomas Westmoreland, Vice President Loan Documentation of HSBC, in ¶ 10 of his attached June 13, 2008-affidavit, also in exhibit F, claims that the snippets of the pooling and servicing agreement provided to the Court are “a copy of the non-proprietary portions of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement that was entered into when the pool of loans that contained the subject mortgage was purchased.” The Court cannot believe that there is any proprietary or trade secret information in a boilerplate pooling and servicing agreement. If plaintiff HSBC utilizes an affidavit of facts by a loan servicer, not an HSBC officer, to secure a judgment on default, pursuant to CPLR § 3215 (f), then the Court needs to examine the entire pooling and servicing agreement, whether proprietary or non-p

roprietary, to determine if the pooling and servicing agreement grants authority, pursuant to a power of attorney, to the affiant to execute the affidavit of facts.

Further, there is hope that Mr. Westmoreland, unlike Steven J. Baum, Esq., is not in another dimension. Mr. Westmoreland, in ¶ 1 of his affidavit, admits that HSBC is the plaintiff in this action. However, with respect to why plaintiff HSBC purchased the subject nonperforming loan, Mr. Westmoreland admits to a lack of due diligence by plaintiff HSBC. His admissions are straight from the mortgage twilight zone. He states in his affidavit, in ¶’s 4-7 and part of ¶ 10: 4. The secondary mortgage market is, essentially, the buying and selling of “pools” of mortgages. 5. A mortgage pools is the packaging of numerous mortgage loans together so that an investor may purchase a significant number of loans in one transaction. 6. An investigation of each and every loan included in a particular mortgage pool, however, is not conducted, nor is it feasible. 7. Rather, the fact that a particular mortgage pool may include loans that are already in default is an ordinary risk of participating in the secondary market . . . 10. . . . Indeed, the performance of the mortgage pool is the measure of success, not any one individual loan contained therein. [Emphasis added] The Court can only wonder if this journey through the mortgage twilight zone and the dissemination of this decision will result in Mr. Westmoreland’s affidavit used as evidence in future stockholder derivative actions against plaintiff HSBC. It can’t be comforting to investors to know that an officer of a financial behemoth such as plaintiff HSBC admits that “[a]n investigation of each and every loan included in a particular mortgage pool, however, is not conducted, nor is it feasible” and that “the fact that a particular mortgage pool may include loans that are already in default is an ordinary risk of participating in the secondary market.”

Cancelling of notice of pendency

The dismissal with prejudice of the instant foreclosure action requires the cancellation of the notice of pendency. CPLR § 6501 provides that the filing of a notice of pendency against a property is to give constructive notice to any purchaser of real property or encumbrancer against real property of an action that “would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of real property, except in a summary proceeding brought to recover the possession of real property.” The Court of Appeals, in 5308 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp. (64 NY2d 313, 319 [1984]), commented that “[t]he purpose of the doctrine was to assure that a court retained its ability to effect justice by preserving its power over the property, regardless of whether a purchaser had any notice of the pending suit,” and, at 320, that “the statutory scheme permits a party to effectively retard the alienability of real property without any prior judicial review.” CPLR § 6514 (a) provides for the mandatory cancellation of a notice of pendency by: The Court, upon motion of any person aggrieved and upon such notice as it may require, shall direct any county clerk to cancel a notice of pendency, if service of a summons has not been completed within the time limited by section 6512; or if the action has beensettled, discontinued or abated; or if the time to appeal from a final judgment against the plaintiff has expired; or if enforcement of a final judgment against the plaintiff has not been stayed pursuant to section 551. [emphasis added] The plain meaning of the word “abated,” as used in CPLR § 6514 (a) is the ending of an action. “Abatement” is defined (Black’s Law Dictionary 3 [7th ed 1999]) as “the act of eliminating or nullifying.” “An action which has been abated is dead, and any further enforcement of the cause of action requires the bringing of a new action, provided that a cause of action remains (2A Carmody-Wait 2d § 11.1).” (Nastasi v Natassi, 26 AD3d 32, 40 [2d Dept 2005]). Further, Nastasi at 36, held that the “[c]ancellation of a notice of pendency can be granted in the exercise of the inherent power of the court where its filing fails to comply with CPLR § 6501 (see 5303 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp., supra at 320-321; Rose v Montt Assets, 250 AD2d 451, 451-452 [1d Dept 1998]; Siegel, NY Prac § 336 [4th ed]).” Thus, the dismissal of the instant complaint must result in the mandatory cancellation of plaintiff HSBC’s notice of pendency against the property “in the exercise of the inherent power of the court.”

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is ORDERED, that the renewed motion of plaintiff, HSBC BANK USA, N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR NOMURA ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATE SERIES 2006-AF1, for an order of reference, for the premises located at 22 Jefferson Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 3170, Lot 20, County of Kings), is denied with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED, that the instant action, Index Number 34142/07, is dismissed with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that the Notice of Pendency in this action, filed with the Kings County Clerk on September 10, 2007, by plaintiff, HSBC BANK USA, N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR NOMURA ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATE SERIES 2006-AF1, to foreclose a mortgage for real property located at 22 Jefferson Street, Brooklyn New York (Block 3170, Lot 20, County of Kings), is cancelled.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

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Posted in case, cdo, concealment, conspiracy, corruption, dismissed, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, forensic mortgage investigation audit, HSBC, investigation, judge arthur schack, MERS, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, note, reversed court decision, robo signer, robo signers, securitization, Supreme CourtComments (1)

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: DEUTSCHE BANK v. HARRIS (2)

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: DEUTSCHE BANK v. HARRIS (2)


Excerpt:

Plaintiffs affidavit, submitted in support of the instant application for a default judgment, was executed by Erica Johnson-Seck, who claims to be a Vice President of plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK. The affidavit was executed in the State of Texas, County of Williamson (Williamson County, Texas is located in the Austin metropolitan area, and its county seat is Georgetown, Texas). The COURT is perplexed as to why the assignment was not executed in Pasadena, California, at 46U Sierra Madre Villa, the alleged “principal place of business” for both the assign1,)r and the assignee. In my January 3 1, 2008 decision (Deutsche Bank National Trust company v Maraj, – Misc 3d – [A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50176 [U]), I noted that Erica Johnson-Seck, claimed that she was a Vice President of MERS in her July 3,2007 INDYMAC to DEUTSCHE BANK assignment, and then in her July 3 1,2007 affidavit claimed to be a DEUTSCHE BANK Vice President. Just as in Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v Maraj, at 2, the Court in the instant action, before granting itn application for an order of reference, requires an affidavit from Ms. Johnson-Seck, describing her employment history for the past three years.

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[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: DEUTSCHE BANK v. MARAJ (1)

[NYSC] JUDGE SCHACK TAKES ON ROBO-SIGNER ERICA JOHNSON SECK: DEUTSCHE BANK v. MARAJ (1)


2008 NY Slip Op 50176(U)
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY As Trustee under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement Series Index 2006-AR6, Plaintiff,
v.
RAMASH MARAJ A/K/A RAMISH MARAJ, ET AL., Defendants.
25981/07.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County.
Decided January 31, 2008.

Plaintiff: Kevin M. Butler, Esq., Eschen Frenkel Weisman & Gordon, De Rose & Surico, Bayside NY.

Defendant: No Opposition submitted by defendants to plaintiff’s Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale.

ARTHUR M. SCHACK, J.

Plaintiff’s application, upon the default of all defendants, for an order of reference for the premises located at 255 Lincoln Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4150, Lot 19, County of Kings) is denied without prejudice, with leave to renew upon providing the Court with a satisfactory explanation to various questions with respect to the July 3, 2007 assignment of the instant mortgage to plaintiff, DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT SERIES INDEX 2006-AR6 (DEUTSCHE BANK). The questions deal with: the employment history of one Erica Johnson-Seck, who assigned the mortgage to plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK, and then subsequently executed the affidavit of facts in the instant application as an officer of DEUTSCHE BANK; plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK’s purchase of the instant non-performing loan; and, why INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B., (INDYMAC), Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), and DEUTSCHE BANK all share office space at Building B, 901 East 104th Street, Suite 400/500, Kansas City, MO 64131 (Suite 400/500).

Defendant RAMASH MARAJ borrowed $440,000.00 from INDYMAC on March 7, 2006. The note and mortgage were recorded in the Office of the City Register, New York City Department of Finance on March 22, 2006 at City Register File Number (CRFN) XXXXXXXXXXXXX. INDYMAC, by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), its nominee for the purpose of recording the mortgage, assigned the note and mortgage to plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK, on July 3, 2007, with the assignment recorded on September 5, 2007 at CRFN XXXXXXXXXXXXX.

According to plaintiff’s application, defendant MARAJ’s default began with the nonpayment of principal and interest due on March 1, 2007. Yet on July 3, 2007, more than four months later, plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK accepted the assignment of the instant non-performing loan from INDYMAC. Further, both assignor MERS, as nominee of INDYMAC, and assignee DEUTSCHE BANK list Suite 400/500 on the July 3, 2007 Assignment as their “principal place of business.” To compound corporate togetherness, page 2 of the recorded Assignment, lists the same Suite 400/500 as the address of INDYMAC.

The Assignment by MERS, on behalf of INDYMAC, was executed by Erica Johnson-Seck, Vice President of MERS. The notary public, Mai La Thao, stated in the jurat that the assignment was executed in the State of Texas, County of Williamson (Williamson County is located in the Austin metropolitan area, and its county seat is Georgetown, Texas). The Court is perplexed as to why the assignment was not executed in Kansas City, the alleged “principal place of business” for both the assignor and the assignee.

Twenty-eight days later, on July 31, 2007, the same Erica Johnson-Seck executed plaintiff’s affidavit submitted in support of the instant application for a default judgment. Ms. Johnson-Seck, in her affidavit, states that she is “an officer of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement Series INDX 2006-AR6, the plaintiff herein.” At the end of the affidavit she states that she is a Vice President of DEUTSCHE BANK. Again, Mai La Thao is the notary public and the affidavit is executed in the State of Texas, County of Williamson. The Erica Johnson-Seck signatures on both the July 3, 2007 assignment and the July 31, 2007 affidavit are identical. Did Ms. Johnson-Seck change employers from July 3, 2007 to July 31, 2007, or does she engage in self-dealing by wearing two corporate hats? The Court is concerned that there may be fraud on the part of plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK, or at least malfeasance. Before granting an application for an order of reference, the Court requires an affidavit from Ms. Johnson-Seck, describing her employment history for the past three years.

Further, the Court requires an explanation from an officer of plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK as to why, in the middle of our national subprime mortgage financial crisis, DEUTSCHE BANK would purchase a non-performing loan from INDYMAC, and why DEUTSCHE BANK, INDYMAC and MERS all share office space in Suite 400/500.

With the assignor MERS and assignee DEUTSCHE BANK appearing to be engaged in possible fraudulent activity by: having the same person execute the assignment and then the affidavit of facts in support of the instant application; DEUTSCHE BANK’s purchase of a non-performing loan from INDYMAC; and, the sharing of office space in Suite 400/500 in Kansas City, the Court wonders if the instant foreclosure action is a corporate “Kansas City Shuffle,” a complex confidence game. In the 2006 film, Lucky Number Slevin, Mr. Goodkat, (a hitman played by Bruce Willis), explains (in memorable quotes from Lucky Number Slevin, at www.imdb.com/title/tt425210/quotes).

A Kansas City Shuffle is when everybody looks right, you go left . . .

It’s not something people hear about. Falls on deaf ears mostly . . .

No small matter. Requires a lot of planning. Involves a lot of people. People connected by the slightest of events. Like whispers in the night, in that place that never forgets, even when those people do.

In this foreclosure action is plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK, with its “principal place of business” in Kansas City attempting to make the Court look right while it goes left?

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that the application of plaintiff, DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT SERIES INDEX 2006-AR6, for an order of reference for the premises located at 255 Lincoln Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4150, Lot 19, County of Kings), is denied without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED, that leave is granted to plaintiff, DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT SERIES INDEX 2006-AR6, to renew its application for an order of reference for the premises located at 255 Lincoln Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4150, Lot 19, County of Kings), upon presentation to the Court, within forty-five (45) days of this decision and order, of: an affidavit from Erica Johnson-Seck describing her employment history for the past three years; and, an affidavit from an officer of plaintiff

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT SERIES INDEX 2006-AR6, explaining why (1) plaintiff purchased a nonperforming loan from INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B., (2) shares office space at Building B, 901 East 104th Street, Suite 400/500, Kansas City, MO 64131 with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B., and (3), claims Building B, 901 East 104th Street, Suite 400/500, Kansas City, MO 64131 as its principal place of business in the Assignment of the instant mortgage and yet executed the Assignment and affidavit of facts in this action in Williamson County, Texas.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

[ipaper docId=40494321 access_key=key-18trq6o8869pcgoq0lxh height=600 width=600 /]

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