1. In mid-2006, Bear Stearns induced investors to purchase, and Ambac as a financial guarantor to insure, securities that were backed by a pool of mortgage loans that – in the words of the Bear Stearns deal manager – was a “SACK OF SHIT.”1 Within the walls of its sparkling new office tower, Bear Stearns executives knew this derogatory and distasteful characterization aptly described the transaction. Indeed, Bear Stearns had deliberately and secretly altered its policies and neglected its controls to increase the volume of mortgage loans available for its “securitizations” made in patent disregard for the borrowers’ ability to repay those loans. After the market collapse exposed its scheme to sell defective loans to investors through these transactions, JP Morgan executives assumed control over Bear Stearns and implemented an across-the-board strategy to improperly bar EMC from honoring its contractual promises to disclose and repurchase defective loans through a series of deceptive practices. In what amounts to accounting fraud, JP Morgan’s bad-faith strategy was designed to avoid and has avoided recognition of the vast off-balance sheet exposure relating to its contractual repurchase obligations – thereby enabling JPMorgan Chase & Co. to manipulate its accounting reserves and allowing its senior executives to continue to reap tens of millions of dollars in compensation
following the taxpayer-financed acquisition of Bear Stearns.
Now that these venerable institutions have turned into ankle biter’s, their claims to compel production and other forms of discovery are being heard by the same judges that turn down similar claims from borrowers. In this case AMBAC is suing one of the mortgage aggregators alleging that the aggregator caused loans to be originated without regard to the ability of of the borrower to repay the loan. They allege that despite the claim that the mortgage “pools” were sampled, many of the loans consisted of transactions in which the borrower was known not to have the capability of even making the first payment. In other cases, as we know, the loans were “qualified” simply on the ability of the borrower to make the first payment, which was substantially reduced by allowing the borrower to pay less than the accrued interest and not of the principal. AMBAC is therefore making the same claims as borrowers and investors.
It is clear from this case and other recent decisions at the trial court level that the defensive stonewalling tactics which were used successfully against borrowers are not working when the litigants are both institutions. This particular case was submitted to me by Max Gardner, who recognizes the significance of this development. It may seem like technical procedure to most people but the fact remains that these “pretender lenders” simply do not have a factual defense. The only thing they have our lawyers who are skilled in using civil procedure to avoid any possibility that the case will be heard on the merits. This tactic, while successful against borrowers, is obviously going down the tubes in connection with litigation between institutions.
This will have an obvious and palpable effect on litigation with borrowers. Borrowers or their attorneys that represent them will merely cite rulings in the same or nearby jurisdiction wherein discovery was allowed to proceed. Our experience in monitoring thousands of cases indicates that in the relatively few cases where judges allow discovery to proceed the matter was quickly settled or the party seeking foreclosure simply vanished, allowing the borrower to either get a judgment for quiet title by default or to sit in limbo with no party seeking payments or foreclosure.
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