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KIMMICK vs U.S. BANK | FL 4DCA Reverses SJ, Atty Fees “Acceleration Letter, Affirmative Defenses, Trial Modification, Waivers”

KIMMICK vs U.S. BANK | FL 4DCA Reverses SJ, Atty Fees “Acceleration Letter, Affirmative Defenses, Trial Modification, Waivers”


BARBARA KIMMICK a/k/a BARBARA WALDON KIMMICK, Appellant,

v.

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee for the GSAA Home Equity Trust 2007-7 Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2007-7; UNKNOWN TENANT NO. 1; UNKNOWN TENANT NO. 2; and ALL UNKNOWN PARTIES CLAIMING INTERESTS BY, THROUGH, UNDER OR AGAINST A NAMED DEFENDANT TO THIS ACTION, OR HAVING OR CLAIMING TO HAVE ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY HEREIN DESCRIBED, Appellees.

No. 4D10-4158.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District. 
January 18, 2012.
Robert P. Bissonnette of Robert P. Bissonette, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.Roy A. Diaz and Diana B. Matson of Smith, Hiatt & Diaz, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee U.S. Bank National Association.HAZOURI, J.

Barbara Kimmick appeals from the granting of U.S. Bank’s amended motion for summary final judgment of foreclosure and attorneys’ fees, which was based upon the affidavit of indebtedness, the mortgage, and the promissory note. Kimmick asserts there were genuine issues of material fact precluding the granting of the summary judgment. We agree and reverse.

Kimmick filed an affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. She stated that she has resided at the subject property for twenty years and in February of 2009, she lost her job. She continued paying her mortgage from her savings through July of 2009. She then stated:

4. On or about August 6, 2009, I contacted my lender, Bank of America, and explained that I was experiencing financial hardship due to the loss of my job and that I had exhausted my personal savings thereafter in paying the subject note and mortgage from February 2009 to July 2009.

5. I requested assistance from Bank of America in paying my mortgage and, over the phone, Bank of America, by and through its representative, Bethany, calculated a new and reduced mortgage payment in the amount of $506.85 and that I was to start paying the new amount immediately.

6. Bank of America, by and through Bethany, further stated to me that after three (3) month’s payment of the $506.85, they would review my payment history and, if I had consistently met my payment obligations, that they would grant me a permanent mortgage modification at that amount.

7. In reliance on Bank of America’s representations above, I faithfully paid Bank of America the monthly sum of $506.85 for six (6) months from August 2009 through January 2010. A true copy of my Bank of American Payment Overview reflecting and evidencing the foregoing is attached hereto as Exhibit “A”.

8. Importantly, the Bank of America Payment Overview, on its face, clearly states that my six (6) months of reduced mortgage payments was for “mortgage remodification” [emphasis supplied].

9. Thereafter, on January 11, 2010, this foreclosure action was filed against me claiming that I defaulted in the subject mortgage of this action an failing to pay my mortgage payments due commencing September 1, 2009.

10. However, I could not possibly have been in default of the subject mortgage because, as evidenced an Exhibit “A” attached, Bank of America agreed to accept and was accepting monthly mortgage payments from me from August 2009 until January 2010 — when this foreclosure action was unilaterally filed. I have also paid for insurance and real estate taxes on the subject property.

11. Accordingly, Plaintiff is equitably stopped from maintaining this action not only an accepting monthly mortgage payments from me but also by bootstrapping and manufacturing the alleged basis for my mortgage default herein. Thus, Plaintiff has filed the instant action in bad faith without any investigation prior thereto.

Exhibit A is a printout from Kimmick’s online bank account showing the six payments to Bank of America Home Loans from her account.

U.S. Bank filed an affidavit of the assistant secretary of BAC Home Loans Servicing in which he states that the records show that the September 1, 2009, payment was not made. It further states:

7. There has been no payment after the date of October 16, 2009. The borrower has not qualified for a loan modification under the HAMP guidelines and the borrower is not paying on a loan modification currently.

At the summary judgment hearing, Kimmick’s counsel presented the facts from her affidavit to the court. He asserted equitable estoppel. He also argued that where an affirmative defense is pleaded, and the plaintiff does not negate it, the plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment.

In response to Kimmick’s affidavit U.S. Bank referred the court to the pre-acceleration letter sent to the borrower in September and October which counsel stated they said: “The default will not be considered cured unless BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP receives good funds in the amount of $3,153.77 on or before November 18, 2009. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP reserves the right to accept or reject a partial payment of the total amount due without waiving any of its rights herein or otherwise. For example, if less than the full amount that is due is sent to us, we can keep the payment and apply it to the debt but still proceed to the foreclosure since the default would not have been cured.” Kimmick’s counsel did not deny that Kimmick received the letter but that they had told her to pay a reduced amount and which the bank accepted. U.S. Bank acknowledged that it received five of six of Kimmick’s payments.

The trial court entered its Summary Final Judgment of Foreclosure which did not address any of Kimmick’s affirmative defenses.

“Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000). The “party moving for summary judgment must factually refute or disprove the affirmative defenses raised, or establish that the defenses are insufficient as a matter of law.” Leal v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 21 So. 3d 907, 909 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (citing Kendall Coffey, Foreclosures in Florida 493 (2008) (citing Stop & Shoppe Mart, Inc. v. Mehdi, 854 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Manassas Inv., Inc. v. O’Hanrahan, 817 So. 2d 1080 (Fla 2d DCA 2002))). See also Knight Energy Servs., Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 660 So. 2d 786, 788 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“Before a plaintiff is entitled to a summary judgment of foreclosure, the plaintiff must either factually refute the alleged affirmative defenses or establish that they are legally insufficient to defeat summary judgment.”).

Kimmick argues that U.S. Bank waived its right to foreclose based upon the representations made to her by the agent she spoke to at Bank of America. The affirmative defense was stated as follows:

24. For her Twelfth Affirmative Defense, KIMMICK states that Plaintiff has waived its rights to foreclosure by the actions of Plaintiff’s agent and loan servicer for the subject mortgage, to-wit: Bank of America, agreeing to and actually accepting reduced mortgage payments from KIMMICK for at least six consecutive months.

In Destin Savings Bank v. Summerhouse of FWB, Inc., 579 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), the court set forth the following principles:

Waiver is defined as an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, or conduct that warrants an inference of the intentional relinquishment of a known right. In order to establish a valid waiver, the following elements must be satisfied: (1) the existence at the time of the waiver of a right, privilege, advantage, or benefit that may be waived; (2) the actual or constructive knowledge thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish that right, privilege, advantage or benefit.

Id. at 235 (citations omitted). In Barnes v. Resolution Trust Corp., 664 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), this court held:

An acceleration clause in a mortgage confers upon the mortgagee a contract right of constitutional dimensions. Courts are obligated to protect the validity of such contracts and may impair the mortgagee’s right to foreclose only in limited situations. Specifically, courts will bar acceleration and foreclosure as follows:

Foreclosure on an accelerated basis may be denied when the right to accelerate has been waived or the mortgagee estopped to assert it, because of conduct of the mortgagee from which the mortgagor (or owner holding subject to a mortgage) reasonably could assume that the mortgagee, for or upon a certain default, would not elect to declare the full mortgage indebtedness to be due and payable or foreclose therefore; or where the mortgagee failed to perform some duty upon which the exercise of his right to accelerate was conditioned; or where the mortgagor tenders payment of defaulted items, after the default but before notice of the mortgagee’s election to accelerate has been given (by actual notice or by filing suit to foreclose for the full amount of the mortgage indebtedness) or where there was intent to make timely payment, and it was attempted, or steps taken to accomplish it, but nevertheless the payment was not made due to a misunderstanding or excusable neglect, coupled with some conduct of the mortgagee which in a measure contributed to the failure to pay when due or within the grace period.

Id. at 1172-73 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).

Kimmick also asserts that U.S. Bank waived acceleration when its agent told Kimmick that she could make the lower payments for several months, possibly get a modification, and then U.S. Bank would not proceed with an acceleration.

U.S. Bank asserts that this court can affirm the judgment with respect to the affirmative defense of waiver for a different reason. In both the note and the mortgage, there is the same provision which states:

Borrower not released; Forbearance an Lender Not a Waiver. Extension of the time for payment or modification of amortization of the sums secured an this Security Instrument granted by Lender to Borrower or any Successor in Interest of Borrower shall not operate to release the liability of Borrower or any Successors in Interest of Borrower. Lender shall not be required to commence proceedings against any Successor in Interest of Borrower or to refuse to extend time for payment or otherwise modify amortization of the sums secured an this Security Instrument by reason of any demand made by the original Borrower or any Successors in Interest of Borrower. Any forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy including, without limitation, Lender’s acceptance of payments from third persons, entities or Successors in Interest of Borrower or in amounts less than the amount then due, shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any right or remedy.

U.S. Bank argues that this “No Waiver” provision allows it to accept prior late or reduced payments without losing its right to enforce its rights and remedies. Kimmick, however, is asserting that U.S. Bank waived this provision by representing to her that she could make reduced payments, which were timely, and meet the requirements for a permanent mortgage modification.

Therefore, there remain genuine issues of material fact as to the issues raised by the affirmative defense of the loan modification. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

MAY, C.J., and DAMOORGIAN, J., concur.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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Taylor v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC | FL 2DCA “Genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the Taylors’ affirmative defense of lack of notice”

Taylor v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC | FL 2DCA “Genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the Taylors’ affirmative defense of lack of notice”


JOYCE TAYLOR and LANKFORD TAYLOR, Appellants,
v.
BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, Appellee.

 

Case No. 2D10-1493.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District. 

Opinion filed November 9, 2011.
Enrique Nieves III of Ice Legal, P.A., Royal Palm Beach, for Appellants.J. Joseph Givner, Esther S. Meisels, and Randon Loeb of Higer Lichter & Givner, LLP, Aventura, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Joyce and Lankford Taylor appeal a final judgment of foreclosure entered after the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC. Because genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the Taylors’ affirmative defense of lack of notice, we reverse the final judgment and remand for further proceedings.

On January 4, 2006, the Taylors signed a mortgage securing an indebtedness in the principal amount of $194,350, evidenced by a note Joyce Taylor signed on the same date. The mortgage names the lender as USMoney Source, Inc., d/b/a Soluna First (USMoney) and the mortgagee as Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), acting as a nominee for USMoney. Attached to the note is an allonge signed by the president of USMoney and dated January 4, 2006, that endorses the note without recourse to Bayview.

On August 1, 2007, Bayview filed an unsworn two-count complaint against the Taylors. Count one sought to establish and enforce the note, and count two sought to foreclose the mortgage. Bayview alleged that it “owns and holds said note by virtue of the endorsement/allonge and said mortgage by virtue of the assignment of mortgage, copies of both of which are attached hereto.” No copy of the assignment of mortgage was attached to the complaint. Although Bayview alleged that it holds the note, Bayview further alleged that the original note was lost or destroyed after Bayview acquired it and that the exact time and manner of the loss or destruction was unknown to Bayview. Copies of the note, allonge, and mortgage were attached to the complaint. The complaint also contained the general allegation that “[a]ll conditions precedent to the filing of this action have been performed or have occurred.”

The Taylors filed an answer and affirmative defenses. Among their affirmative defenses the Taylors asserted that Bayview “is not the proper holder of the mortgage and therefore lacks standing to bring a foreclosure action.” The Taylors also asserted that Bayview “failed to give proper notice of the default in the payments on the note and mortgage” and thus was “estopped from accelerating said debt.”

On November 21, 2007, Bayview filed its motion for summary judgment and affidavit of indebtedness. Later, amended affidavits of indebtedness were filed. None of the affidavits mentioned an assignment of mortgage, and no documents were attached to the affidavits.

Bayview did not file its reply to the Taylors’ affirmative defenses until June 17, 2008. In its reply, Bayview alleged that it met the notice requirements. Bayview also alleged that it was entitled to maintain the foreclosure action without a written assignment of mortgage because the transfer of the note was sufficient. Bayview subsequently filed the original note, allonge, and mortgage.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment on February 22, 2010. The record contains a notice of filing copy of assignment of mortgage dated February 10, 2010, but the notice was not filed until February 23, 2010. The assignment of mortgage reflects that it was executed on August 7, 2007, after the complaint was filed. The trial court granted summary judgment and rendered the final judgment of foreclosure.

The standard of review on a summary judgment is de novo. Estate of Githens ex rel. Seaman v. Bon Secours-Maria Manor Nursing Care Ctr., 928 So. 2d 1272, 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). “A movant is entitled to summary judgment `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and other materials as would be admissible in evidence on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'” Id. (quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)). The movant has the burden to prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and “this court must view `every possible inference in favor of the party against whom summary judgment has been entered.'” Id. (quoting Maynard v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 861 So. 2d 1204, 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)). And, “if the record raises even the slightest doubt that an issue might exist, that doubt must be resolved against the moving party and summary judgment must be denied.” Nard, Inc. v. DeVito Contracting & Supply, Inc., 769 So. 2d 1138, 1140 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Furthermore, to be entitled to summary judgment, the movant must not only establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the parties’ claims, but also the movant “must either factually refute the affirmative defenses or establish that they are legally insufficient.” Konsulian v. Busey Bank, N.A., 61 So. 3d 1283, 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

We reject the Taylors’ argument that Bayview lacked standing to foreclose the mortgage. The Taylors’ affirmative defense asserted, and they argue on appeal, that the assignment of mortgage did not occur until after the complaint was filed. See Country Place Cmty. Ass’n v. J.P. Morgan Mortg. Acquisition Corp., 51 So. 3d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (stating that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the foreclosure action when it did not own or possess the note and mortgage when it filed the lawsuit); Jeff-Ray Corp. v. Jacobson, 566 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (determining that a complaint to foreclose a mortgage did not state a cause of action when it was filed because the assignment of mortgage to the plaintiff was dated four months after the lawsuit was filed).

But Bayview contends that its standing to foreclose derives from the allonge to the note because the mortgage follows the note. Bayview argues that when USMoney transferred to Bayview the note which the mortgage secured, Bayview received equitable standing to foreclose the mortgage, even without a written assignment. We agree.

Bayview alleged in its complaint that it “owns and holds said note by virtue of the endorsement/allonge.” Bayview attached copies of the note and allonge to its complaint. The note and the allonge reflect that on the same day that Joyce Taylor executed the note in favor of USMoney, USMoney in turn endorsed the note without recourse to Bayview. Before the summary judgment hearing, Bayview filed the original note and the allonge. Thus Bayview established its status as holder of the note and its right to enforce the note. See § 671.201(20), Fla. Stat. (2005) (“`Holder,’ with respect to a negotiable instrument, means the person in possession if the instrument is payable to bearer or, in the case of an instrument payable to an identified person, if the identified person is in possession.”); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Azize, 965 So. 2d 151, 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (“The holder of a note has standing to seek enforcement of the note.”); Kaminik v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 64 So. 3d 195, 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (affirming in part a summary final judgment of foreclosure where the plaintiff “tendered the original promissory note to the trial court, which contained a special indorsement in its favor”); Riggs v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 36 So. 3d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“Aurora’s possession of the original note, indorsed in blank, was sufficient under Florida’s Uniform Commercial Code to establish that it was the lawful holder of the note, entitled to enforce its terms.”), review denied, 53 So. 3d 1022 (Fla. 2011).

Bayview also became the equitable owner of the mortgage when USMoney endorsed the note to Bayview because the ownership of the mortgage followed the note. In Johns v. Gillian, 184 So. 140, 143 (Fla. 1938), the Supreme Court of Florida summarized the law pertinent to the issue under review as follows:

[I]t has frequently been held that a mortgage is but an incident to the debt, the payment of which it secures, and its ownership follows the assignment of the debt. If the note or other debt secured by a mortgage be transferred without any formal assignment of the mortgage, or even a delivery of it, the mortgage in equity passes as an incident to the debt, unless there be some plain and clear agreement to the contrary, if that be the intention of the parties.

Johns stands for the proposition that a mortgage—as a mere incident to the debt it secures—follows the note unless the parties have clearly expressed a contrary intent. The First District Court of Appeal has cited Johns and other cases in support of the following proposition: “Because the lien follows the debt, there was no requirement of attachment of a written and recorded assignment of the mortgage in order for the appellant to maintain the foreclosure action.” Chem. Residential Mortg. v. Rector, 742 So. 2d 300, 300-01 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (footnote omitted). Because ownership of the mortgage followed the note in the absence of a contrary intention and Bayview owned and held the note when it filed its lawsuit, Bayview has standing to maintain the underlying foreclosure action. See Mazine v. M & I Bank, 67 So. 3d 1129, 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“The party seeking foreclosure must present evidence that it owns and holds the note and mortgage to establish standing to proceed with a foreclosure action.”).

Notably, the Taylors did not assert that the parties did not intend for the mortgage to follow the note, and they did not present any evidence in support of that proposition after Bayview filed with the trial court the original note, allonge, and mortgage. The mortgage itself reflects the parties’ intent that the mortgage would follow the note in the event of a sale. In addressing the subject of a sale or partial sale of the note in paragraph 20, the mortgage contemplates a sale of the note “together with this Security Instrument.” The note and the allonge reflect that USMoney sold the note to Bayview on the same day that the note and the mortgage were executed. The allonge also lists the “secured property address.” Thus the attachments to the complaint establish that Bayview acquired all of USMoney’s rights under both the note and the mortgage on January 4, 2006, before it filed the underlying action. Therefore, we conclude that Bayview refuted the Taylors’ affirmative defense and established its standing to foreclose the note and mortgage.

With respect to the affirmative defense of lack of notice, Bayview failed to refute this affirmative defense; it therefore prevents summary judgment in this case. Bayview made a general allegation that all conditions precedent had been performed, but the motion for summary judgment and affidavits do not negate the affirmative defense that Bayview failed to give proper notice of the default in the payments on the note and mortgage. Paragraph 22 of the mortgage, attached to the complaint, requires the lender to give the borrower notice prior to acceleration of the debt. In fact, the notice provision is the same as the one in Konsulian. See Konsulian, 61 So. 3d at 1284. There, the lender failed to establish that it met the condition precedent of providing the requisite notice when the borrower raised the issue as an affirmative defense; therefore, the lender was not entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 1285; see also Goncharuk v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc., 62 So. 3d 680, 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (reversing summary judgment for plaintiff’s failure to address in its motion for summary judgment and affidavits the affirmative defense of lack of notice); Lazuran v. Citimortgage, Inc., 35 So. 3d 189, 189-90 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (reversing summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to refute the affirmative defense of lack of notice). For this reason, summary judgment was premature. Therefore, we reverse the final judgment of foreclosure and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

SILBERMAN, C.J., and NORTHCUTT and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.

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WOODRUM v. WELLS FARGO | FL 4DCA Reverses “1.510(c) allows the court to consider affidavits when determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists”

WOODRUM v. WELLS FARGO | FL 4DCA Reverses “1.510(c) allows the court to consider affidavits when determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists”


DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

July Term 2011

FAYTHE P. WOODRUM, TIMOTHY P. WOODRUM and DAWN M.
WOODRUM,
Appellants,

v.

WELLS FARGO MORTGAGE BANK, N.A., as successor by merger to
WACHOVIA BANK, N.A.,
Appellee.

No. 4D10-3538

[November 9, 2011]

PER CURIAM.

The Appellants, the Woodrums, appeal the trial court’s entry of a final
summary judgment of foreclosure in favor of Wells Fargo Mortgage Bank,
N.A. They argue that entry of summary judgment was error where the
record did not refute affirmative defenses raised by one of the Appellants
in an affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. We
agree and reverse.

The bank filed a mortgage foreclosure complaint, to which the
Woodrums failed to file an answer. Instead of moving for entry of a
default, the bank filed a motion for summary judgment. In response, one
of the Appellants, Faythe P. Woodrum, filed an affidavit in opposition to
the motion, which raised numerous affirmative defenses.

The standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is de
novo. E. Qualcom Corp. v. Global Commerce Ctr. Ass’n, 59 So. 3d 347,
350 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citation omitted). “[I]f a plaintiff moves for
summary judgment prior to the defendant’s filing an answer, she must
conclusively demonstrate that the defendant cannot assert a genuine
issue of material fact.” Miles v. Robinson ex. rel. Estate of Kight, 803 So.
2d 864, 865 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citation omitted).

The bank argues o n appeal that where a n answer is overdue,
affirmative defenses raised in a n affidavit opposing the motion for
summary judgment cannot be considered by the trial court. The bank
offers no case law supporting its position. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.510(c) allows the court to consider affidavits when determining whether
a genuine issue of material fact exists. Additionally, a party may plead or
defend at any time before a default is entered. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.500(c).
Because the bank failed to refute the affirmative defenses or show
they were legally insufficient, it was error for the trial court to grant
summary judgment. See Frost v. Regions Bank, 15 So.3d 905 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2009).

Reversed and remanded.

TAYLOR, HAZOURI and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
* * *
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Victor Tobin, Judge; L.T. Case No. 09-43276 CACE 18.

Philippe Symonovicz of Law Offices of Philippe Symonovicz, Fort
Lauderdale, for appellants.

Todd A. Armbruster of Moskowitz, Mandell, Salim & Simowitz, P.A.,
Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing

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1st Annual Mortgage Foreclosure Defense Symposium (FL) 8/27

1st Annual Mortgage Foreclosure Defense Symposium (FL) 8/27


Friday, August 27th   Pricing & Registration

8.5 General credits or 8.5 Real Estate credits – Florida Bar Approved Course: 7687-0

Friday, August 27th, 2010   8:30 am – 5:30 pm     (8:30 check-in, 9:00 start)
PGA National Resort & Spa, Palm Beach Gardens, FL
Map and Directions

Co-sponsored by the Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County

This seminar is designed to update mortgage foreclosure practitioners with the latest case law and practice pointers on how to defend a home secured mortgage foreclosure, and give them some insight into their local court’s practice and procedure for foreclosure cases.

A $100 refund will be given to any attorney who signs up for a pro bono case while at the seminar or before the seminar with evidence that they have taken a case.

Special Offer – Escape & Play from $139! Learn more
A special package for symposium participants is available at the PGA National Resort & Spa, including:

  • unlimited golf for 2
  • Spa access for 2
  • breakfast for 2
  • 2 for 1 drinks, plus more…Learn more about this great package!
  • ___________________________

    COURSE HIGHLIGHTS

    · Foreclosure Defense from Initial Client Interview, Preparing for Litigation, the Summons Complaint, Motion Practice, Pleading Answers, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims, Discovery, Motions to Strike, Summary Judgment and Trial – James A. Bonfiglio, Esq.
    · Mortgage Foreclosure & Mediation Issues – Hon. Walter N. Colbath (Ret.)
    · Local Practice and Procedure – Circuit Court Judge (Tentative)
    · Mortgage Foreclosure Defense in a Bankruptcy Context – Tom Abrams, Esq.
    · Foreclosure Defense Mortgage Assignments & Fraud Issues – Lynn E. Szymoniak, Esq.
    · Litigating Mortgage Securitization issues – Lynn E. Szymoniak, Esq.
    © 2010-15 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



    Posted in foreclosure, foreclosures, Lynn Szymoniak ESQComments (1)


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