ATTORNEY GENERAL GEORGE JEPSEN
STATEMENT BY ATTORNEY GENERAL GEORGE JEPSEN
CONCERNING MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE INVESTIGATION
For immediate release ……………………………………..TUESDAY MAY 17, 2011
“The multistate investigation of the nation’s largest mortgage servicing companies confirms what my office has been told by thousands of Connecticut consumers, that these banks have done an incredibly poor job in dealing with the mortgage foreclosure mess they were instrumental in creating. As a result, millions of families have needlessly suffered, homeowners have lost billions of dollars in equity, and the real estate market continues to stagnate. Time is of the essence to fix this problem.
“Thus far, the national servicers have been unwilling to step up to the plate with the money necessary to address the full scope of the problems they themselves created. I believe they face substantial legal liability for their clearly illegal behavior should states be forced to sue. After being bailed out by American taxpayers, the banks owe those same taxpayers a real effort to partner with state and federal officials to clean up this mess.”
Attorney General Jepsen is a member of the National Association of Attorneys General multi-state task force seeking resolution of the mortgage foreclosure crisis
Mistakes happen, of course. And loan servicers like to contend that if errors occur, they are rare and honestly made. But after sifting through the data produced by this investigation, Mr. White disagreed that problems are rare. “In Senate testimony, an executive from Countrywide said its error rate was 1 percent,” Mr. White recalled. “The mortgage servicer industry error rate might be 10 times higher, based on the number of cases we are looking at.”
“There are continued flaws in the process, and they are not merely technical,” Mr. White continued. “Those flaws undermine the integrity of the bankruptcy system. Many homeowners have been harmed, including where the lender has come in and said ‘we want to lift the stay and go back into foreclosure proceedings,’ even though they lacked a sufficient basis to do it.”
The investigation conducted by the OCC and the Fed included a review of just 100 foreclosure files.
Housing Wire-
When mortgage servicers signed consent orders with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve, these companies were required to hire outside firms to conduct “look back” evaluations of questionable foreclosure practices.
But these reviews will not be made public, according to an OCC spokesman.
Warning: This is a long blog post. But if you follow mortgage servicing, I think you’ll find it worth reading. Despite lots and lots of media coverage of the servicing fraud settlement, nobody seems to understand the real story that’s going on. I think that this post will explain a lot.
Let’s start by recapping what we know. Back in March we started hearing media reports of a proposed penalty for servicers in the $20-$30B range. Then the American Banker published a 27-page term sheet from the AGs for servicing standards. Next, Huffington Post published a 7-page CFPB powerpoint presentation. Then came the draft C&D orders and then in April, the final C&D orders (which eliminated the ridiculous “single point of contact which need not be a single person” and replaced it with “single point of contact as hereinafter defined” and then failed—quite deliberately—to define it anywhere in the document).
Now there’s another round of activity and conflicting reporting. The American Banker reported that there was a new AG term sheet proposed and that principal reductions were off the table. That turns out to be incorrect, as Shahien Nasiripour reported in the Huffington Post. The new AG term sheet that the American Banker referenced deals only with servicing standards. The American Banker assumed that this mean that principal reductions were off the table because they weren’t referenced in the term sheet. In fact they are still very much in play. They’re just in a second, separate term sheet. So now there are two separate term sheets–one covering servicing standard and another covering monetary issues/principal reductions. (Recall that the original AG term sheet did not cover the monetary issues—that was clearly for a separate document.) We are also hearing news reports that the banks are offering to settle for $5B and won’t go above $10B.
For those of you that disagree, please read this post to understand why this makes perfect sense…
HuffPo-
The nation’s five largest mortgage firms may be forced to reduce loan balances for distressed homeowners as part of an agreement with state attorneys general and the Obama administration to settle claims of faulty mortgage practices, a top state official involved in the negotiations said Tuesday.
Certainly everyone knows to read the fine print by now…
ProPUBLICA-
A few months ago, Bank of America offered Sergio Cortez of Staten Island, N.Y., the help he desperately needed to stay in his home: a break on his mortgage. Like millions of others, he was facing foreclosure. But there was a catch buried in the fine print. Cortez had to waive any possibility of ever suing the bank for anything relating to the loan.
Cortez isn’t alone. While regulators have banned the practice, some banks and others who handle mortgages have still been forcing homeowners into a corner: You want a chance at saving your home? Then you’ll have to waive your rights.
This Special Foreclosure Edition describes lessons learned from an interagency review of foreclosure practices at the 14 largest residential mortgage servicers and includes examples of effective mortgage servicing practices derived from these lessons.
First of all, the problems we found were extensive. Our reviews found significant weaknesses in foreclosure governance and document preparation: improper affidavits were submitted and documents were notarized improperly. Servicers devoted insufficient financial, staffing and managerial resources to foreclosure processing. Third party providers of foreclosure-related services, including outside law firms, were not adequately supervised, and, in a limited number of cases, servicers failed to ensure proper endorsement of promissory notes or mortgage documents.
“We’re not happy” with the time it takes to give borrowers an answer, said Christine Larsen, head of operations for retail financial services at J.P. Morgan, who is responsible for implementing the consent orders. The bank is trying to speed response times by setting new customer-communication deadlines.
Regulatory agencies exist to protect the public, not the corporations they regulate. The head of the Office of Comptroller of the Currency doesn’t seem to understand that. But that’s not why John Walsh needs to resign.
The OCC was created to stabilize the economy, make it easier to conduct trade, and protect people’s savings. It didn’t do that. In fact, it ignored the warnings raised by others. But that’s not why John Walsh needs to resign.
Judging by last week’s performance, it sure looks as though the country’s top bank regulator is back to its old tricks.
Though, to be honest, calling the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency a “regulator” is almost laughable. The Environmental Protection Agency is a regulator. The O.C.C. is a coddler, a protector, an outright enabler of the institutions it oversees.
It may take at least two months to reach a final agreement, said the person, who declined to be identified because the talks are private. An accord remains out of reach because states want principal reductions for borrowers, which is more than banks agreed to in deals reached with U.S. regulators last week, said Allison Schoenthal, a lawyer at Hogan Lovells in New York.
“Principal reductions I don’t think are going to be agreed to by banks, and I don’t think the banks see a need for a penalty when, in their view, they haven’t done anything wrong,” said Schoenthal, who represents lenders and servicers and isn’t involved in the talks.
Take this home for example. It was originally sold for $289,000.
Prior to Final Judgment, property had two (2) assignments of mortgage for two entities same robo-signer for both via MERS.
At auction it was sold for a MAJOR discount at approx. 75% off. to Indymac via LPS Minnesota address in 2010. We know Indymac has been shut down way before this time.
Why couldn’t they work a deal like this when this person whom I personally know tried over and over to get a modification AT THE TIME?
They had a good job then and still have a good job today.
So why do they not want to work with the borrowers and reduce the principal to reflect today’s REAL and TRUE appraisal of the property?
Make sure you follow the transactions to understand what happened and why it makes no sense where this goes.
Now Here comes more funny business:
Still following?
Property was Quit Claimed/Transferred To Freddie Mac for $100.00 (prepared by David Stern) but consideration shows only $10.00.
Property then sold for $3900.00 more 13 days later $78,000
SAME day flipped for $150,000
Previous records are all gone [compare both images]
Dylan Ratigan with special guest New York Times’ Louise Story, discussing the 600+ page report uncovering Goldman Sachs scheme to defraud investors. According to Bloomberg, The U.S. Justice Department and regulators will have to determine whether employees and executives of Goldman Sachs Group Inc. violated any laws when they traded securities tied to the housing market and testified to Congress about the transactions, Senator Carl Levin said.
While the attorneys general proposed many similar terms last month, banking regulators didn’t include any requirements for lowering mortgage debt. That may hinder Iowa Attorney General Thomas J. Miller as he leads a group of state officials working with the administration to require lenders to evaluate loan cuts for some borrowers whose homes are worth less than their mortgages.
“I have always been pretty skeptical about the ability of principal reductions to get you much,” said Mark A. Calabria, director of financial-regulation studies at the Cato Institute, a public-policy research group in Washington. “I think we will look back and say this was the death knell.”
Question: Wonder what the regulators thought of when they watched 60 Minutes broadcast of LPS, DOCX and Servicer fraud on national tv with over 12 million viewers?
Just see what the number one popular post has been on this site since the airing of it or do a simple google search like 60 Minutes Docx or 60 Minutes LPS and you’ll see SFF is the first site that comes up. We’re no fools and believe me the entire globe has tuned in, including the regulators.
The nation’s 14 largest mortgage firms must compensate wronged homeowners after federal bank regulators determined the companies broke federal and state laws by improperly foreclosing on an incalculable number of distressed borrowers. The agencies announced such penalties Wednesday, the first in what is likely to be a series of enforcement actions targeting the country’s biggest banks and costing them billions.
Lenders like Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Citigroup and Ally Financial systematically broke rules and took shortcuts when foreclosing on homeowners last year, the regulators said. Their three-month review launched after documents and videos of so-called robo-signers — people who signed thousands of foreclosure documents a day without reading them or knowing what was in them — surfaced, leading the biggest banks to halt home seizures.
Bank examiners found the firms employed practices that “failed to conform to state legal requirements.” In other words, they broke the law.
The 14 largest U.S. mortgage servicers must pay back homeowners for losses from foreclosures or loans that were mishandled in the wake of the housing collapse, according to a consent decree released today.
The agreement between the servicers and U.S. regulators imposes more substantial penalties than early reports of the deal indicated. It could also help the U.S. Justice Department determine the size and scope of any future fines for the flawed practices, regulators said.
The banks didn’t admit or deny regulators’ findings, according to the orders.
From Fed Press Release:
The Federal Reserve will closely monitor progress at the firms in addressing these matters and will take additional enforcement actions as needed.
In addition to the actions against the banking organizations, the Federal Reserve on Wednesday announced formal enforcement actions against Lender Processing Services, Inc. (LPS), a domestic provider of default-management services and other services related to foreclosures, and against MERSCORP, Inc. (MERS), which provides services related to tracking and registering residential mortgage ownership and servicing, acts as mortgagee of record on behalf of lenders and servicers, and initiates foreclosure actions. These actions address significant compliance failures and unsafe and unsound practices at LPS and its subsidiaries, and at MERS and its subsidiary. The action requires LPS to address deficient practices related primarily to the document execution services that LPS, through its subsidiaries DocX, LLC, and LPS Default Solutions, Inc., provided to servicers in connection with foreclosures. MERS is required to address significant weaknesses in, among other things, oversight, management supervision, and corporate governance. The LPS action is being taken jointly with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, while the MERS action is being taken jointly with those agencies and the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
The Federal Reserve Board based its enforcement actions on the findings of the interagency reviews of the major mortgage servicers, LPS, and MERS. A summary of the findings from the reviews of the mortgage servicers is available in the Interagency Review of Foreclosure Policies and Practices,which is simultaneously being released by the Federal Reserve Board and the other agencies.
The rule of law is not even worth 20 basis points. That’s the ultimate message in a recent paper by Charles Calomiris, Eric Higgins, and Joseph Mason evaluating the proposed AG mortgage servicing settlement. Calomiris et al. estimate that the settlement will raise mortgage costs at least 20bps, and they think that’s too much.
Recognize what they’re really saying: that 20-45bps is too high a price to pay for the rule of law. They value the rule of law at less than 20bps. At present conversion rates, that’s about 30 shekels of silver.
The whole Calomiris et al. document is rather strange, as it’s hard to do any serious evaluation of the settlement without knowing the terms. We’ve seen a proposed servicing standards term sheet from the AGs and we’ve seen a CFPB analysis of disgorgement of wrongful profits and the costs of potential principal reductions, but it’s way premature to attempt any sort of real evaluation of a settlement. Unless, of course, the goal is not a serious evaluation of a settlement, but an attempt to forestall a settlement. Which is what this paper is.
Reading between the lines of settlement proposals, the states attorneys general aren’t speaking the same language as the big banks. And struggling homeowners are paying the price.
By Abigail Field, contributor
FORTUNE — Over the past several months regulators have finally noticed what consumer attorneys have been saying for years: the big banks have routinely committed fraud in their foreclosure filings and their records of how much people owe are too often wrong. And the mortgage modification process, which was meant to help homeowners, has been exposed as an abject failure.
Many state attorneys general, federal law enforcers and regulators say they want big banks to pay for their fraudulent foreclosures and abusive mortgage servicing practices by reducing what borrowers owe them by some $20 billion. That’s theamount the banks allegedly savedby doing a lousy job servicing troubled mortgages. (That math is questionable at best,Yves Smith noted when that figure began making the rounds.)
But the solution to this problem is not a settlement with the banks that mandates principal write-downs. Principals on these loans should be reduced, but it should be done in the most efficient, effective way: Congress should give bankruptcy judges back a power they once had — the right to reduce the principal on a mortgage to the home’s current market value. In other words: Bring back the cram down.
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