By Lorraine Woellert and John Gittelsohn

June 14 (Bloomberg) — The cost of fixing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage companies that last year bought or guaranteed three-quarters of all U.S. home loans, will be at least $160 billion and could grow to as much as $1 trillion after the biggest bailout in American history.

Fannie and Freddie, now 80 percent owned by U.S. taxpayers, already have drawn $145 billion from an unlimited line of government credit granted to ensure that home buyers can get loans while the private housing-finance industry is moribund. That surpasses the amount spent on rescues of American International Group Inc., General Motors Co. or Citigroup Inc., which have begun repaying their debts.

“It is the mother of all bailouts,” said Edward Pinto, a former chief credit officer at Fannie Mae, who is now a consultant to the mortgage-finance industry.

Fannie, based in Washington, and Freddie in McLean, Virginia, own or guarantee 53 percent of the nation’s $10.7 trillion in residential mortgages, according to a June 10 Federal Reserve report. Millions of bad loans issued during the housing bubble remain on their books, and delinquencies continue to rise. How deep in the hole Fannie and Freddie go depends on unemployment, interest rates and other drivers of home prices, according to the companies and economists who study them.

‘Worst-Case Scenario’

The Congressional Budget Office calculated in August 2009 that the companies would need $389 billion in federal subsidies through 2019, based on assumptions about delinquency rates of loans in their securities pools. The White House’s Office of Management and Budget estimated in February that aid could total as little as $160 billion if the economy strengthens.

If housing prices drop further, the companies may need more. Barclays Capital Inc. analysts put the price tag as high as $500 billion in a December report on mortgage-backed securities, assuming home prices decline another 20 percent and default rates triple.

Sean Egan, president of Egan-Jones Ratings Co. in Haverford, Pennsylvania, said that a 20 percent loss on the companies’ loans and guarantees, along the lines of other large market players such as Countrywide Financial Corp., now owned by Bank of America Corp., could cause even more damage.

“One trillion dollars is a reasonable worst-case scenario for the companies,” said Egan, whose firm warned customers away from municipal bond insurers in 2002 and downgraded Enron Corp. a month before its 2001 collapse.

Unfinished Business

A 20 percent decline in housing prices is possible, said David Rosenberg, chief economist for Gluskin Sheff & Associates Inc. in Toronto. Rosenberg, whose forecasts are more pessimistic than those of other economists, predicts a 15 percent drop.

“Worst case is probably 25 percent,” he said.

The median price of a home in the U.S. was $173,100 in April, down 25 percent from the July 2006 peak, according to the National Association of Realtors.

Fannie and Freddie are deeply wired into the U.S. and global financial systems. Figuring out how to stanch the losses and turn them into sustainable businesses is the biggest piece of unfinished business as Congress negotiates a Wall Street overhaul that could reach President Barack Obama’s desk by July.

Neither political party wants to risk damaging the mortgage market, said Douglas Holtz-Eakin, a former director of the Congressional Budget Office and White House economic adviser under President George W. Bush.

“Republicans and Democrats love putting Americans in houses, and there’s no getting around that,” Holtz-Eakin said.

‘Safest Place’

With no solution in sight, the companies may need billions of dollars from the Treasury Department each quarter. The alternative — cutting the federal lifeline and letting the companies default on their debts — would produce global economic tremors akin to the U.S. decision to go off the gold standard in the 1930s, said Robert J. Shiller, a professor of economics at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, who helped create the S&P/Case-Shiller indexes of property values.

“People all over the world think, ‘Where is the safest place I could possibly put my money?’ and that’s the U.S.,” Shiller said in an interview. “We can’t let Fannie and Freddie go. We have to stand up for them.”

Congress created the Federal National Mortgage Association, known as Fannie Mae, in 1938 to expand home ownership by buying mortgages from banks and other lenders and bundling them into bonds for investors. It set up the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., Freddie Mac, in 1970 to compete with Fannie.

Lower Standards

The companies’ liabilities stem in large part from loans and mortgage-backed securities issued between 2005 and 2007. Directed by Congress to encourage lending to minorities and low- income borrowers at the same time private companies were gaining market share by pushing into subprime loans, Fannie and Freddie lowered their standards to take on high-risk mortgages.

Many of those went to borrowers with poor credit or little equity in their homes, according to company filings. By early 2008, more than $500 billion of loans guaranteed or held by Fannie and Freddie, about 10 percent of the total, were in subprime mortgages, according to Fed reports.

Fannie and Freddie also raised billions of dollars by selling their own corporate debt to investors around the world. The bonds are seen as safe because of an implicit government guarantee against default. Foreign governments, including China’s and Japan’s, hold $908 billion of such bonds, according to Fed data.

‘Debt Trap’

“Do we really want to go to the central bank of China and say, ‘Tough luck, boys’? That’s part of the problem,” said Karen Petrou, managing partner of Federal Financial Analytics Inc., a Washington-based research firm.

The terms of the 2008 Treasury bailout create further complications. Fannie and Freddie are required to pay a 10 percent annual dividend on the shares owned by taxpayers. So far, they owe $14.5 billion, more than the companies reported in income in their most profitable years.

“It’s like a debt trap,” said Qumber Hassan, a mortgage strategist at Credit Suisse Group AG in New York. “The more they draw, the more they have to pay.”

Fannie and Freddie also benefited by selling $1.4 trillion in mortgage-backed securities to the Fed and the Treasury since September 2008, bonds that otherwise would have weighed on their balance sheets. While the government bought only the lowest-risk securities, it could incur additional losses.

‘Hard to Judge’

Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner has vowed to keep Fannie and Freddie operating.

“It’s very hard to judge what the scale of losses is,” Geithner told Congress in March.

One idea being weighed by the Obama administration involves reconstituting Fannie and Freddie into a “good bank” with performing loans and a “bad bank” to absorb the rest. That could cost taxpayers as much as $290 billion because of all the bad loans, according to a May estimate by Credit Suisse analysts.

At the end of March, borrowers were late making payments on $338.4 billion worth of Fannie and Freddie loans, up from $206.1 billion a year earlier, according to the companies’ first- quarter filings at the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The number of loans more than three months past due has risen every quarter for more than a year, hitting 5.5 percent at Fannie as of the end of March and 4.1 percent at Freddie, according to the filings.

Surge in Delinquencies

The composition of the $5.5 trillion of loans guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie suggests that the surge in delinquencies may continue. About $1.98 trillion of the loans were made in states with the nation’s highest foreclosure rates — California, Florida, Nevada and Arizona — and $1.13 trillion were issued in 2006 and 2007, when real estate values peaked. Mortgages on which borrowers owe more than 90 percent of a property’s value total $402 billion.

Fannie and Freddie may suffer additional losses as a result of the Treasury’s effort to prevent foreclosures. Under the program, banks with mortgages owned or guaranteed by the companies must rewrite loan terms to make them easier for borrowers to pay.

The Treasury program is budgeted to cost Fannie and Freddie $20 billion. The companies have already modified about 600,000 delinquent loans and refinanced almost 300,000 more, in some cases for an amount greater than the houses are worth.

The government is using Fannie and Freddie “for a public- policy purpose that may well increase the ultimate cost of the taxpayer rescue,” said Petrou of Federal Financial Analytics. “Treasury is rolling the dice.”

Republican Phase-Out

If the plan works and foreclosures fall, that could help stabilize Fannie’s and Freddie’s balance sheets and ultimately protect taxpayers.

“Avoiding foreclosures can be a route to reducing loss severity,” said Sarah Rosen Wartell, executive vice president of the Center for American Progress, a Washington research group with ties to the Obama administration.

Loans issued since 2008, when the companies raised standards for borrowers, should be profitable and help offset prior losses, Wartell said.

Republicans attempted to include a phase-out of the mortgage companies in the financial reform bill. Democratic lawmakers and the Obama administration opted for further study, and the Treasury began soliciting ideas in April.

Representative Scott Garrett, a New Jersey Republican and co-sponsor of the phase-out amendment, said eliminating Fannie and Freddie would force the government and the housing market to confront the issue.

“It’s somewhat impossible to predict the magnitude of their impact if they continue to be the primary source of lending,” Garrett said in an interview.

Caught in ‘Quandary’

Democrats dismissed the phase-out idea as simplistic.

“We need to have a housing-financing system in place,” Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd said last month. “If you pull that rug out at this particular juncture, I don’t know what the particular result would be. We’re caught in this quandary.”

By delaying action, the Obama administration keeps losses off the government’s books while building a floor under housing prices during a congressional election year.

Keeping Fannie and Freddie functioning could also support an overall economic recovery. Residential real estate — the money spent on rent, mortgage payments, construction, remodeling, utilities and brokers’ fees — accounted for about 17 percent of gross domestic product in 2009, according to the National Association of Home Builders.

‘Already Lost’

Allowing the companies to go under and hoping that private financing will fill the gap isn’t realistic, analysts say. It would require at least two years of rising property values for private companies to return to the mortgage-securitization market, said Robert Van Order, Freddie’s former chief international economist and a professor of finance at George Washington University in Washington.

The price tag of supporting Fannie and Freddie “needs to be evaluated against the cost of not having a mortgage market,” said Phyllis Caldwell, chief of the Treasury’s Homeownership Preservation Office.

Whatever the fix, the money spent will not be recovered, said Alex Pollock, a former president of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago who is now a fellow at the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute.

“It doesn’t matter what you do or don’t do, Fannie and Freddie will cost a lot of money,” Pollock said. “The money is already lost. There’s an attempt to try to avert your eyes.”

To contact the reporter on this story: Lorraine Woellert in Washington at lwoellert@bloomberg.net; John Gittelsohn in New York at johngitt@bloomberg.net.

Last Updated: June 13, 2010 19:00 EDT

2010 NY Slip Op 04868

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK BY ANDREW CUOMO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FIRST AMERICAN CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

406796/07, 1308.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department.

DLA Piper LLP (US), New York (Richard F. Hans, Patrick J. Smith, Kerry Ford Cunningham and Jeffrey D. Rotenberg of counsel), for appellants.

Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, New York (Richard Dearing, Benjamin N. Gutman and Nicole Gueron of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Gonzalez, P.J., Saxe, Catterson, Acosta, JJ.

GONZALEZ, P.J.

This appeal calls upon us to determine whether the regulations and guidelines implemented by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) pursuant to the Home Owner’s Lending Act of 1933 (HOLA) (12 USC § 1461 et seq.) and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) (Pub L 101-73, 103 STAT 183 [codified in scattered sections of 12 USC]), preempt state regulations in the field of real estate appraisal.

The Attorney General claims that defendants engaged in fraudulent, deceptive and illegal business practices by allegedly permitting eAppraiseIT residential real estate appraisers to be influenced by nonparty Washington Mutual, Inc. (WaMu) to increase real estate property values on appraisal reports in order to inflate home prices. We conclude that neither federal statutes, nor the regulations and guidelines implemented by the OTS, preclude the Attorney General of the State of New York from pursuing litigation against defendants First American Corporation and First American eAppraiseIT, LLC. We further conclude that the Attorney General has standing to pursue his claims pursuant to General Business Law § 349.

In a complaint dated November 1, 2007, plaintiff, the People of the State of New York, commenced this action against defendants asserting claims under Executive Law § 63(12) and General Business Law § 349, and for unjust enrichment. The complaint alleges that in Spring 2006, WaMu hired two appraisal management companies, defendant eAppraiseIT and nonparty Lender’s Service, Inc., to oversee the appraisal process and provide a structural buffer against potential conflicts of interest between WaMu and the individual appraisers. The gravamen of the Attorney General’s complaint asserts that defendants misled their customers and the public by stating that eAppraiseIT’s appraisals were independent evaluations of a property’s market value and that these appraisals were conducted in compliance with the Uniform Standards and Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP), when in fact defendants had implemented a system allowing WaMu’s loan origination staff to select appraisers who would improperly inflate a property’s market value to WaMu’s desired target loan amount.^[1]

Defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, asserting that the Attorney General is prohibited from litigating his claims because HOLA and FIERRA impliedly place the responsibility for oversight of appraisal management companies on the OTS, and asserting a failure to state a cause of action. Supreme Court denied defendants’ motion, finding that HOLA and FIRREA do not occupy the entire field with respect to real estate appraisal regulation and that the enforcement of USPAP standards under General Business Law § 349 neither conflicts with federal law, nor does it impair a bank’s ability to lend and extend credit. We affirm.

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that Federal laws “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding” (US Const, art VI, cl [2]), and it “vests in Congress the power to supersede not only State statutory or regulatory law but common law as well” (Guice v Charles Schwab & Co., 89 NY2d 31, 39 [1996], cert denied 520 US 1118 [1997]). Indeed, “[u]nder the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause (US Const, art VI, cl 2), the purpose of our preemption analysis is . . . to ascertain the intent of Congress” (Matter of People v Applied Card Sys., Inc., 11 NY3d 105, 113 [2008], cert denied ___ US ___, 129 S Ct 999 [2009]). Congressional intent to preempt state law may be established “by express provision, by implication, or by a conflict between federal and state law” (Balbuena v IDR Realty LLC, 6 NY3d 338, 356 [2006], quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v Travelers Ins. Co., 514 US 645, 654 [1995]). Express preemption occurs when Congress indicates its “pre-emptive intent through a statute’s express language or through its structure and purpose” (Altria Group, Inc. v Good, 555 US ___, ___, 129 S Ct 538, 543 [2008]). Absent explicit preemptive language, implied preemption occurs when “[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it . . . [o]r the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject” (Rice v Santa Fe El. Corp., 331 US 218, 230 [1947]). Further, when “[a] conflict occurs either because compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or because the State law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” the State law is preempted (City of New York v Job-Lot Pushcart, 213 AD2d 210, 210 [1995], affd 88 NY2d 163 [1996], cert denied 519 US 871 [1996] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

Here, defendants do not argue, nor have they directed this Court’s attention to any language within HOLA or FIRREA that establishes, that Congress expressly created these statutes to supersede state law governing the causes of actions asserted in the Attorney General’s complaint. Defendants also have not argued that there exists a conflict between federal and State laws or regulations. Rather, defendants assert that because Congress has legislated so comprehensively, and that federal law so completely occupies the home lending field, the Attorney General is precluded from bringing claims against them under the theory of field preemption. Thus, the necessary starting point is to determine whether HOLA and FIRREA so occupy the field that these two statutes preempt any and all state laws speaking to the manner in which appraisal management companies provide real estate appraisal services.

In 1933, Congress enacted HOLA “to provide emergency relief with respect to home mortgage indebtedness at a time when as many as half of all home loans in the country were in default” (Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v De la Cuesta, 458 US 141, 159 [1982] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). HOLA created a general framework to regulate federally chartered savings associations that left the regulatory details to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The FHLBB’s authority to regulate federal savings and loans is virtually unlimited and “[p]ursuant to this authorization, the [FHLBB] has promulgated regulations governing the powers and operations of every Federal savings and loan association from its cradle to its corporate grave” (id. at 145 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]).

When Congress passed FIRREA in 1989, it restructured the regulation of the savings association industry by abolishing the FHLBB and vested many of its functions into the newly-created OTS (see FIRREA § 301 [12 USCA § 1461 et seq.] [establishing OTS], § 401 [12 USCA § 1437] [abolishing the FHLBB]). According to FIRREA’s legislative history

“[t]he primary purposes of the [FIRREA] are to provide affordable housing mortgage finance and housing opportunities for low- and moderate-income individuals through enhanced management of federal housing credit programs and resources; establish organizations and procedures to obtain and administer the necessary funding to resolve failed thrift cases and to dispose of the assets of these institutions . . . and, enhance the regulatory enforcement powers of the depository institution regulatory agencies to protect against fraud, waste and insider abuse”

(HR Rep 101-54 [I], at 307-308, reprinted in 1989 US Code Cong to Admin News, at 103-104). FIRREA was also designed “to thwart real estate appraisal abuses, [by] establish[ing] a system of uniform national real estate appraisal standards.

It also requires the use of state certified or licensed appraisers for real estate related transactions with the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Fannie Mac), the RTC, or certain real estate transaction [sic] regulated by the federal financial institution regulatory agencies” (HR Rep 101-54 (I), at 311, reprinted in 1989 US Code Cong to Admin News, at 107).

Further, 12 USCS § 3331, which was enacted as part of FIRREA, states that the general purpose of this statute, is

“to provide that Federal financial and public policy interests in real estate related transactions will be protected by requiring that real estate appraisals utilized in connection with federally related transactions are performed in writing, in accordance with uniform standards, by individuals whose competency has been demonstrated and whose professional conduct will be subject to effective supervision.”

The uniform standards described in 12 USCS § 3331, are defined in 12 USCS § 3339 which requires that the OTS, as a

“Federal financial institution[] regulatory agency . . . shall prescribe appropriate standards for the performance of real estate appraisals in connection with federally related transactions^[2] under the jurisdiction of each such agency or instrumentality. These rules shall require, at a minimum — (1) that real estate appraisals be performed in accordance with generally accepted appraisal standards as evidenced by the appraisal standards promulgated by the Appraisal Standards Board of the Appraisal Foundation; and (2) that such appraisals shall be written appraisals.”

The Appraisal Standards Board (ASB) of the Appraisal Foundation promulgates the appraisal standards mandated by 12 USC § 3339 and are called USPAP. The Appraisal Foundation is a private “not-for-profit organization dedicated to the advancement of professional valuation [and] was established by the appraisal profession in the United States in 1987? (Welcome to The Appraisal Foundation [The Appraisal Foundation], https://netforum.avectra.com/eWeb/StartPage.aspx?Site=TAF [accessed May 27, 2010]). The ASB is responsible for “develop[ing], interpret[ing] and amend[ing]” USPAP (Welcome to The Appraisal Foundation, https://netforum.avectra.com/eWeb/ DynamicPage.aspx?Site=TAF & WebCode=ASB [accessed May 27, 2010]). However, “[e]ach U.S. State or Territory has a State appraiser regulatory agency, which is responsible for certifying and licensing real estate appraisers and supervising their appraisal-related activities, as required by Federal law” (State Regulatory Information [The Appraisal Foundation], https://netforum.avectra.com/eWeb/DynamicPage.aspx?Site=taf & WebCode=RegulatoryInfo [accessed May 27, 2010]; see also State Appraiser Regulatory Programs > State Contact Information [Appraisal Subcommittee], https://www.asc.gov/State-Appraiser-Regulatory-Programs/StateContactInformation.aspx [accessed May 27, 2010] [listing each State appraiser regulatory agency’s website]). Further, the OTS itself has determined that

“[i]t does not appear that OTS is required by title XI of FIRREA to implement an appraisal regulation that reaches all the activities of savings and loan holding companies, at least to the extent that those activities are unrelated to the safety and soundness of savings associations or their subsidiaries. Neither the language of Title XI nor its legislative history indicate that Congress intended title XI to apply to the wide range of activities engaged in by savings and loan holding companies and their non-saving association subsidiaries” (55 Fed Reg 34532, 34534-34535 [1990], codified at 12 CFR 506, 545, 563, 564 and 571).

Indeed, the OTS encourages financial institutions

“to make referrals directly to state appraiser regulatory authorities when a State licensed or certified appraiser violates USPAP, applicable state law, or engages in other unethical or unprofessional conduct. Examiners finding evidence of unethical or unprofessional conduct by appraisers will forward their findings and recommendations to their supervisory office for appropriate disposition and referral to the state, as necessary” (OTS, Thrift Bulletin, Interagency Appraisal and Evaluation Guidelines at 10 [November 4, 1994], http://files.ots.treas. gov/84042.pdf [accessed May 27, 2010]).

In looking at the legislative history it becomes clear that Congress intended to establish

“a system of uniform real estate appraisal standards and requires the use of State certified and licensed appraisers for federally regulated transactions by July 1, 1991. . . The key . . . lies in the creation of State regulatory agencies and a Federal watchdog to monitor the standards and to oversee State enforcement. . . It is this combination of Federal and State action . . . that . . . assur[es] . . . good standards are properly enforced (135 Cong Rec S3993-01, at S4004 [April 17, 1989], 1989 WL 191505 [remarks of Senator Christopher J. Dodd]).

Thus, we conclude that neither HOLA or FIRREA preempts or precludes the Attorney General from pursuing his claims.

Having rejected defendants’ general arguments for preemption under HOLA and FIRREA, “[t]he Court’s task, then, is to decide which claims fall on the regulatory side of the ledger and which, for want of a better term, fall on the common law side” ( Cedeno v IndyMac Bancorp, Inc., 2008 WL 3992304, *7, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 65337, *22 [SD NY 2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Defendants assert that the Attorney General is preempted from pursuing his claims because subsequent to FIRREA’s passage, the OTS issued extensive regulations specifically addressing the composition and construction of appraisal programs undertaken by federal savings and loans.

It is well settled that “[a]gencies delegated rulemaking authority under a statute . . . are afforded generous leeway by the courts in interpreting the statute they are entrusted to administer” (Rapanos v United States, 547 US 715, 758 [2006]). Indeed, the OTS regulations “have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes” (Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 458 US at 153). 12 CFR 545.2, states that regulations promulgated by the OTS are “preemptive of any state law purporting to address the subject of the operations of a Federal saving association.” However, 12 CFR 560.2(a) limits the language of 12 CFR 545.2 by setting parameters to the OTS’ authority to promulgate regulations that

“preempt state laws affecting the operations of federal savings associations when deemed appropriate to facilitate the safe and sound operation of federal savings associations, to enable federal savings associations . . . to conduct their operations in accordance with the best practices of thrift institutions in the United States, or to further other purposes of the HOLA” (12 CFR 560.2[a]).

12 CFR 560.2(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of illustrative examples of the types of state laws preempted by 12 CFR 560.2(a). Further, 12 CFR 560.2(c) states that the following types of State law are not preempted

“to the extent that they only incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal savings associations . . . (1) Contract and commercial law; (2) Real property law; (3) Homestead laws specified in 12 U.S.C. 1462a(f); (4) Tort law; (5) Criminal law; and (6) Any other law that OTS, upon review, finds: (i) Furthers a vital state interest; and (ii) Either has only an incidental effect on lending operations or is not otherwise contrary to the purposes expressed in paragraph (a) of this section.”

The OTS advises that when a court is

“analyzing the status of state laws under § 560.2, the first step will be to determine whether the type of law in question is listed in paragraph (b). If so, the analysis will end there; the law is preempted. If the law is not covered by paragraph (b), the next question is whether the law affects lending. If it does, then, in accordance with paragraph (a), the presumption arises that the law is preempted. This presumption can be reversed only if the law can clearly be shown to fit within the confines of paragraph (c). For these purposes, paragraph (c) is intended to be interpreted narrowly. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of preemption” (61 Fed Reg 50951-01, 50966-50967 [1996]).

Defendants argue that the Attorney General’s challenges to defendants’ business practices are preempted because the conduct falls within 12 CFR 560.2(b)(5), which provides examples of loan-related fees “including without limitation, initial charges, late charges, prepayment penalties, servicing fees, and overlimit fees.” Defendants also assert that their alleged conduct is within 12 CFR 560.2(b)(9), which provides

“[d]isclosure and advertising, including laws requiring specific statements, information, or other content to be included in credit application forms, credit solicitations, billing statements, credit contracts, or other credit-related documents and laws requiring creditors to supply copies of credit reports to borrowers or applicants” (id.).

Lastly, defendants assert that their alleged conduct falls within 12 CFR 560.2(b)(10) which states that “[p]rocessing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages” is preempted.

The Attorney General’s complaint asserts that defendants engaged in conduct proscribed by Executive Law § 63(12)^[3] and General Business Law § 349^[4] . It further alleges that defendants unjustly enriched themselves by repeated use of fraudulent or illegal business practices, in that they allowed WaMu to pressure eAppraiseIT appraisers to compromise their USPAP-required independence and collude with WaMu to inflate residential appraisal values so that the appraisals would match the qualifying loan values WaMu desired.

Under the first prong of the preemption analysis, we find that this action brought pursuant to Executive Law § 63(12), General Business Law § 349(b) and on the theory of unjust enrichment is not preempted by 12 CFR 560.2(b)(5) because it involves no attempt to regulate bank-related fees. We also find, under the first prong of the preemption analysis, that there is no preemption pursuant to 12 CFR 560.2(b)(9) because these claims do not involve a state law seeking to impose or require any specific statements, information or other content to be disclosed. Although at least one case has held that claims similar to those asserted here were preempted (see Spears v Washington Mut., Inc., 2009 WL 605835 [ND Cal 2009]), we find under the first prong of the preemption analysis that 12 CFR 660.2(b)(10) does not preclude the Attorney General’s complaint because prosecution of the alleged conduct will not affect the operations of federal savings associations (FSA) in how they process, originate, service, sell or purchase, or invest or participate in, mortgages.

The question then becomes whether the Attorney General is nevertheless precluded from litigating his claims under the second prong of the preemption analysis. Because enjoining a real estate appraisal management company from abdicating its publicly advertised role of providing unbiased valuations is not within the confines of 12 CFR 560.2(c), we answer it in the negative.

Defendants argue the OTS’s authority under HOLA and FIRREA is not limited to oversight of a FSA and that its authority under these two statues extends over the activity regulated and includes the activities of third party agents of a FSA. Defendants assert that providing real estate appraisal services is a critical component of the processing and origination of mortgages and represents a core component of the controlling federal regime. Defendants cite 12 USC § 1464(d)(7)(D) and State Farm Bank, FSB v Reardon (539 F3d 336 [6th Cir 2008]) for support. 12 USC § 1464(d)(7) states, in pertinent part, that

“if a savings association . . . causes to be performed for itself, by contract or otherwise, any service authorized under [HOLA] such performance shall be subject to regulation and examination by the [OTS] Director to the same extent as if such services were being performed by the savings association on its own premises . . .”

Here, it is alleged eAppraiseIT and Lender’s Service, Inc., were hired by WaMu to provide appraisal services. However, defendants are incorrect in asserting that providing real estate appraisal services is an authorized banking activity under HOLA. In an opinion letter dated October 25, 2004, OTS concluded that it had the authority to regulate agents of an FSA under HOLA because

“[i]nherent in the authority of federal savings associations to exercise their deposit and lending powers and to conduct deposit, lending, and other banking activities is the authority to advertise, market, and solicit customers, and to make the public aware of the banking products and services associations offer. The authority to conduct deposit and lending activities, and to offer banking products and services, is accompanied by the power to advertise, market, and solicit customers for such products and services . . . A state may not put operational restraints on a federal savings association’s ability to offer an authorized product or service by restricting the association’s ability to market its products and services and reach potential customers . . . Thus, OTS has authority under the HOLA to regulate the Agents the Association uses to perform marketing, solicitation, and customer service activities” (2004 OTS Op No. P-2004-7, at 7, http://files.ots.treas.gov/560404.pdf, 2004 OTS LEXIS 6, at *15 [accessed May 27, 2010]).

State Farm Bank, FSB v Reardon (539 F3d 336 [6th Cir 2008]) follows this principle. In Reardon, the plaintiff, a FSA chartered by the OTS under HOLA, decided to offer, through its independent contractor agents, first and second mortgages and home equity loans in the State of Ohio. The Sixth Circuit concluded that although the statute at issue

“directly regulates [the plaintiff FSA’s] exclusive agents rather than [the FSA] itself . . . the activity being regulated is the solicitation and origination of mortgages, a power granted to [the FSA] by HOLA and the OTS. This is also a power over which the OTS has indicated that any state attempts to regulate will be met with preemption . . . [T]he practical effect of the [statute] is that [the FSA] must either change its structure or forgo mortgage lending in Ohio. Thus, enforcement of the [statute] against [the FSA’s] exclusive agents would frustrate the purpose of the HOLA and the OTS regulations because it indirectly prohibits [the FSA] from exercising the powers granted to it under the HOLA and the OTS regulations” (Reardon, 539 F3d at 349 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

Since appraisal services are not authorized banking products or services of a FSA, defendants have failed to show that the Attorney General is preempted from pursuing his claims under 12 USC § 1464(d)(7)(D). Consequently, under the second prong of the preemption analysis, the result of the Attorney General litigating his claims against a company that independently administers a FSA’s appraisal program would “only incidentally affect the lending operations of [the FSA]” (12 CFR 560.2[c]). Thus, defendants have failed to show that OTS’s regulations and guidelines preempt or preclude the Attorney General from pursuing his claims.

Defendants assert that Cedeno v IndyMac Bancorp, Inc. (2008 WL 3992304, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 65337 [SD NY 2008]) provides this Court with persuasive authority that the federal government and its regulators alone regulate the mortgage loan origination practices of FSAs including all aspects of the appraisal programs they utilize. In Cedeno, the Southern District found preemption precluded a private individual from maintaining a cause of action against a bank. It was alleged that the bank failed to disclose to the plaintiff that it selected appraisers, appraisal companies and/or appraisal management firms who would inflate the value of residential properties in order to allow the bank to complete more real estate transactions and obtain greater profits. This practice resulted in the plaintiff being misled as to the true equity in her home. The Southern District found that the conduct of the bank was

“directly regulated by the OTS: the processing and origination of mortgages, a loan-related fee, and the accompanying disclosure. The appraisals are a prerequisite to the lending process, and are inextricably bound to it. Because the plaintiff’s claim is not a simple breach of contract claim, but asks the Court to set substantive standards for the Associations’ lending operations and practices, it is preempted” (Cedeno, 2008 WL 3992304, *9, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 65337, at *28 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

Contrary to defendants’ assertions, we find that Cedeno is not applicable here because Cedeno does not reach the question as to whether HOLA, FIRREA or OTS’s regulations and guidelines are intended to regulate the conduct of real estate appraisal companies.

Annexed to the OTS’s October 25, 2004 opinion letter is a document entitled Appendix A — Conditions. In this document, OTS requires FSAs that wish to use agents to perform marketing, solicitation, customer service, or other activities related to the FSA’s authorized banking products or services to enter into written agreements that “(4) expressly set[] forth OTS’s statutory authority to regulate and examine and take an enforcement action against the agent with respect to the activities it performs for the association, and the agent’s acknowledgment of OTS’s authority” (2004 OTS Op No. P-2004-7, at 16, http://files.ots. treas.gov/560404.pdf, 2004 OTS LEXIS 6, at *37 [accessed May 27, 2010]). We note that defendants have neither asserted that such written agreements exist nor produced such documents.

Thus, we conclude that the Attorney General may proceed with his claims against defendants because his challenge to defendants’ allegedly fraudulent and deceptive business practices in providing appraisal services is not preempted by federal law and regulations that govern the operations of savings and loan associations and institution-affiliated parties.

Defendants assert that the Attorney General cannot rely upon a substantive violation of a federal law to support a claim under General Business Law § 349 because this is an improper attempt to convert alleged violations of federal law into a violation of New York law. Defendants claim that where a plaintiff seeks to rely upon a substantive violation of a federal law to support a claim under General Business Law § 349, the federal law relied upon must contain a private right of action.

However, the Attorney General is statutorily charged with the duty to “[p]rosecute and defend all actions and proceedings in which the state is interested, and have charge and control of all the legal business of the departments and bureaus of the state, or of any office thereof which requires the services of attorney or counsel, in order to protect the interest of the state” (Executive Law § 63[1]). Indeed, when the Attorney General becomes aware of allegations of persistent fraud or illegality of a business, he

“is authorized by statute to bring an enforcement action seeking an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, [and] directing restitution and damages’ (Executive Law § 63 [12]). He is also authorized, when informed of deceptive acts or practices affecting consumers in New York, to bring an action in the name and on behalf of the people of the state of New York to enjoin such unlawful acts or practices and to obtain restitution of any moneys or property obtained’ thereby (General Business Law § 349 [b])” (People v Coventry First LLC, 13 NY3d 108, 114 [2009]).

It is well settled that “[o]n a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’” (Wiesen v New York Univ., 304 AD2d 459, 460 [2003], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). The Attorney General’s complaint alleges that defendants publicly claimed on their eAppraiseIT website that eAppraiseIT provides a firewall between lenders and appraisers so that customers can be assured that USPAP and FIRREA guidelines are followed and that each appraisal is being audited for compliance. The Attorney General charges that defendants deceived borrowers and investors who relied on their proclaimed independence by allowing WaMu’s loan production staff to select the appraiser based upon whether they would provide high values.

We find defendants’ assertions that the Attorney General lacks standing under General Business Law § 349 and that his complaint fails to state a cause of action are without merit.

Indeed, the Attorney General’s complaint references misrepresentations and other deceptive conduct allegedly perpetrated on the consuming public within the State of New York, and “[a]s shown by its language and background, section 349 is directed at wrongs against the consuming public” (Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v Marine Midland Bank, 85 NY2d 20, 24 [1995]). Therefore, we find that the Attorney General’s complaint articulates a viable cause of action under General Business Law § 349, and that this statute provides him with standing.

Consequently, we conclude that defendants have failed to demonstrate that HOLA, FIRREA or the OTS’s regulations and guidelines preempt or preclude the Attorney General from pursuing the causes of action articulated in his complaint. We additionally find that the Attorney General has standing under General Business Law § 349. We have reviewed defendants’ remaining contentions and we find them without merit.

Accordingly, the order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Charles Edward Ramos, J.), entered April 8, 2009, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of federal preemption, should be affirmed, without costs.

All concur.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

[1] USPAP is incorporated into New York law and it prohibits a State-certified or State licensed appraiser from accepting a fee for an appraisal assignment “that is contingent upon the appraiser reporting a predetermined estimate, analysis, or opinion or is contingent upon the opinion, conclusion or valuation reached, or upon the consequences resulting from the appraisal assignment” (NY Exec Law § 160-y; 19 NYCRR 1106.1).

[2] 12 USC § 3350(4) states that “[t]he term federally related transaction’ means any real estate-related financial transaction which—(A) a federal financial institutions regulatory agency or the Resolution Trust Corporation engages in, contracts for, or regulates; and (B) requires the services of an appraiser.”

[3] Executive Law § 63(12) states, in pertinent part, that “[w]henever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business, the attorney general may apply, in the name of the people of the state of New York . . . for an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, directing restitution and damages. . .”

[4] General Business Law § 349(b) states, in pertinent part, that “[w]henever the attorney general shall believe from evidence satisfactory to him that any person, firm, corporation or association or agent or employee thereof has engaged in or is about to engage in any of the acts or practices stated to be unlawful he may bring an action in the name and on behalf of the people of the state of New York to enjoin such unlawful acts or practices and to obtain restitution of any moneys or property obtained directly or indirectly by any such unlawful acts or practices.”

Coming from one of my favorite blogs!

Thursday, June 10, 2010 The Real Estalker

Another Housewife Bites the Real Estate Dust

Posted by Your Mama at 7:33 AM

BY: CARRIE BAY DSNEWS 4/29/2010

APRIL 22, 2010 The Wall Street Journal

By CARRICK MOLLENKAMP , MARK WHITEHOUSE And ANTON TROIANOVSKI

ABERDEEN TOWNSHIP, N.J.—The government’s civil-fraud allegation against Goldman Sachs Group Inc. centers on a deal the firm crafted so that hedge-fund king John Paulson could bet on a collapse in U.S. housing prices.

It was a dizzyingly complex transaction, involving 90 bonds and a 65-page deal sheet. But it all boiled down to whether people like Stella Onyeukwu, Gheorghe Bledea and Jack Booket could pay their mortgages.

They couldn’t, and Mr. Paulson made $1 billion as a result.

Mr. Booket, a 44-year-old heating and air-conditioning repairman, owed $300,000 on his three-bedroom home in Aberdeen Township. His house was one of thousands that wound up in a pool of mortgages that were referenced in the so-called collateralized debt obligation, or CDO, which Goldman created for Mr. Paulson. The hedge-fund manager invested heavily in a form of insurance that could yield huge gains if the borrowers grew unable to pay.

In 2006, Mr. Booket got hit by a car while riding a motorcycle from a late-night party, was unable to find much work and couldn’t pay the bank. In October 2008, he lost the house to foreclosure and plans to move out by next week. He says he bears no grudge against Mr. Paulson and Goldman.

“The man came up with a scheme to get rich, and he did it,” says Mr. Booket, who had refinanced his mortgage just months before the accident. “So more power to him.”

More than half of the 500,000 mortgages from 48 states contained in the Goldman deal—known as Abacus 2007-AC1—are now in default or foreclosed.

Mr. Paulson didn’t have any direct involvement in the mortgages contained in the Goldman deal under scrutiny by the Securities and Exchange Commission. And the bets that Mr. Paulson placed on Abacus didn’t affect whether or not homeowners defaulted. Rather, he used Wall Street to help structure hugely lucrative side bets that homeowners such as Mr. Booket couldn’t make their monthly mortgage payments.

One loser in the deal, German bank IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, saw most of its $150 million Abacus investment evaporate. It had believed that borrowers broadly could afford the loans. The bank says it is cooperating with the SEC’s inquiry.

“There’s no question we made money in these transactions,” said a Paulson spokesman in a statement. “However, all our dealings were through arms-length transactions with experienced counterparties who had opposing views based on all available information at the time. We were straightforward in our dislike of these securities but the vast majority of people in the market thought we were dead wrong and openly and aggressively purchased the securities we were selling.”

Some of the people whose mortgages underpinned Mr. Paulson’s wager were themselves taking a gamble—that U.S. housing prices would continue to march upward, making it possible for them to eventually pay off loans they couldn’t afford.

The Wall Street Journal identified homeowners in the Abacus portfolio by taking the 90 bonds listed in a February 2007 Abacus pitchbook and matching them with court records, foreclosure listings, title records and loan servicing reports. The bonds contained nearly 500,000 mortgage loans.

One mortgage in the Abacus pool was held by Ms. Onyeukwu, a 43-year-old nursing-home assistant in Pittsburg, Calif. Ms. Onyeukwu already was under financial strain in 2006, when she applied to Fremont Investment & Loan for a new mortgage on her two-story, six-bedroom house in a subdivision called Highlands Ranch. With pre-tax income of about $9,000 a month from a child-care business, she says she was having a hard time making the $5,000 monthly payments on her existing $688,000 mortgage, which carried an initial interest rate of 9.05%.

Nonetheless, she took out an even bigger loan from Fremont, which lent her $786,250 at an initial interest rate of 7.55%—but that would begin to float as high as 13.55% two years later. She says the monthly payment on the new loan came to a bit more than $5,000.

She defaulted in early 2008 and was evicted from the house in early 2009.

Fremont didn’t respond to requests for comment.

In early 2007, Paulson was identifying different bonds from across the country that it wanted to place bets against. Paolo Pellegrini, Mr. Paulson’s right-hand man, began working with Goldman trader Fabrice Tourre to choose bonds for the Abacus portfolio, say people familiar with the deal.

Abacus was a “synthetic” CDO, meaning that it didn’t contain any actual bonds. Rather, it allowed Paulson’s firm to buy insurance on bonds it didn’t own. If the bonds performed well, Paulson would make a steady stream of small payments—much like insurance premiums. If they performed poorly, Paulson would receive potentially large payouts.

According to the SEC complaint, Mr. Paulson especially wanted to find risky subprime adjustable-rate mortgages that had been given to borrowers with low credit scores who lived in California, Arizona, Florida, and Nevada—states with big spikes in home prices that he reckoned would crash.

Mr. Pellegrini and a colleague had purchased an enormous database capable of tracking the characteristics of more than six million mortgages in various parts of the country. They spent long hours scouring it all, according to people familiar with the matter.

The home mortgage of Gheorghe Bledea was among those that wound up in the Abacus portfolio.

In May of 2006, a broker had approached Mr. Bledea, a Romanian immigrant, to pitch him a deal on a loan to refinance the existing mortgage on his Folsom, Calif., home.

Mr. Bledea, who is suing his lender in Superior Court of California in Sacramento on allegations that he was defrauded, wanted a 30-year fixed-rate loan, according to his complaint. His broker told him the only one available was an adjustable-rate mortgage carrying an 8% interest rate, according his court filing.

Mr. Bledea, who says he has limited English-speaking skills, was told that he’d be able to exit the risky loan in six months and refinance into yet another one carrying a lower 1% rate. Mr. Bledea agreed to take out the $531,000 loan on July 21, 2006.

The new loan never materialized. Within months, Mr. Bledea and his family were struggling under the weight of a $5,800 monthly note, says his son, Joe Bledea.

“We were putting ourselves in a lot of debt,” Joe Bledea says. By spring of 2009, the loan was in default. The elder Mr. Bledea is now appealing to the court to avoid eviction from his ranch-style house, says family attorney Will Ramey.

The loan, underwritten by Washington Mutual, itself had moved through the U.S. mortgage machine.

It was put into a debt pool, or residential-mortgage backed security, with the arcane name of Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-8.

A spokesman for J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., which acquired WaMu in September of 2008, said the bank was unable to comment on the loan.

By mid-October of 2007, just seven months after Abacus was formed, 83% of the bonds in its portfolio had been downgraded. By then, sheriff departments across the U.S. were seizing homes and putting them up for sale at public auction as souring Abacus-related loans metastasized.

In Dayton, Ohio, a two-story home that served as collateral for Abacus now stands empty. The house was purchased for $75,000 in 2006 by a borrower who used a subprime loan from a California-based mortgage bank. That $67,500 loan was placed into a pool called Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2006-4, which underpinned Abacus.

After the borrower defaulted, the trust acquired the home through foreclosure in October 2007 and resold it to an investor in April 2008 for $7,500, a tenth of the price paid two years before.

Neighbor Lonnie Ross, sitting on the porch Tuesday morning while enjoying a cigarette, says most homes on the block are vacant or occupied by squatters.

Inside the unoccupied house, which is missing its front door knob, hardwood floors are strewn with old bills. A fake Christmas tree is still decorated with candy canes. Instant pudding and other discarded food litters the kitchen. Dirty dishes are soaking in a sink.

A few blocks away, a homemade sign reads: “This community is dead already. We need leadership to rebuild this community. Too many run down houses need to be torn down.”

 

News Hub: John Paulson Bullish on Housing

4:15John Paulson, the hedge-fund manager famous for betting against mortgage securities, is now bullish on the U.S. housing market and the economy. MarketWatch reporter Alistair Barr has details.

But not all homes have gone south.

In a wealthy Denver neighborhood, neighbors are thrilled that Joel Champagne rescued a house on East Alameda Circle, where a previous mortgage was contained in the Abacus deal via a pool called First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF9.

Mr. Champagne bought the home last year for $370,000. The prior owner, according to title records, had paid $1.2 million, borrowing the entire amount from First Franklin. The owner had started on a renovation and then vanished, says Mr. Champagne and neighbors, leaving the home with no plumbing, wiring or roof shingles.

Today, kids’ chalk drawings are scrawled across the drive and hyacinths are starting to peep through the flower beds.

“I’m very fortunate. We capitalized on the market and we were very fortunate to be in a position to do that,” says the 45-year- old. “I don’t know enough details to say if I’m upset with Goldman Sachs or whoever. The problem’s bigger than that. Everyone made a lot of mistakes back then.”

—Stephanie Simon, James R. Hagerty, Serena Ng, Cari Tuna contributed to this article.

Write to Carrick Mollenkamp at carrick.mollenkamp@wsj.com, Mark Whitehouseat mark.whitehouse @wsj.com and Anton Troianovski at anton.troianovski@wsj.com

Miami Herald-

House Bill 87 and Senate Bill 1666 — which backers say will clear the backlog of foreclosure cases in Florida actually will create more problems by putting speed ahead of justice.

The backlog is blamed on homeowners allegedly dragging their feet. In reality, banks have been the cause because of federal directives to pursue loss-mitigation alternatives or by voluntarily slowing down the process to explore settlement options in the interests of both parties and the market.

However long it takes to conclude a foreclosure in Florida, given the unprecedented magnitude of the fraud, forgery and abuses to which banks have admitted, we should exempt this category of civil court cases from “time to complete” requirements.

We should not make public policy decisions based on unverified, incorrect and misleading information, particularly when the data are provided by the same industry that admitted wrongdoing.

The next problem behind any push for foreclosure reform is that the real-estate market is improving. Prices have rebounded in Florida because, in part, inventories of foreclosed homes are being managed by the banks and homeowners.

[MIAMI HERALD]

Tenants rights organizers are pushing back on a New Hampshire bill that would allow landlords to more easily evict people at the end of a lease.

Under current state law, landlords have to give a legally justified reason for an eviction, which could include failure to pay rent, or a “good” cause related to financial or business purposes. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld that interpretation in a tenant-landlord case in 2005.

But Rep. Robert Lynn, a Windham Republican who is sponsoring the bill that would loosen the state’s eviction rules, said it’s needed to protect landlords’ contractual and property rights in a lease agreement. The legislation, HB 117, passed earlier this month in a House vote and is now under consideration in the Senate.

To continue reading the rest of the article, please click on the source link below:

https://www.fosters.com/story/news/state/2023/03/24/nh-bill-easier-landlords-evict-tenants/70037629007/

Nearly 10 million emergency rental-assistance payments have reached households at risk of eviction during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Biden administration announced Wednesday.

The federal government’s emergency rental-assistance effort — described by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen Tuesday as “the first nationwide infrastructure for eviction prevention” — doled out billions of dollars in aid to state and local governments across two programs: one under a COVID-19 spending bill passed in December 2020, and another under the American Rescue Plan passed in 2021.

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/u-s-families-at-risk-of-eviction-during-pandemic-got-nearly-10-million-rent-relief-payments-treasury-department-says-7e6087ab

As the mid-term elections loom, housing remains the rock that many American dreams are wrecked on. That’s especially true of New York City (NYC), where the cost of living is effectively the cost of housing. But as it attempts to navigate a route out of COVID-19, the “Housing Question” is as pressing an issue for global capitalism, as it was for Frederick Engels when he addressed it in 1872.

Optimism, even if misplaced, is one of the great American characteristics. In 2021, New York’s housing justice movement was buoyed with hope that, from the bad times of COVID-19, a better future was possible. Things were happening that once seemed impossible. During the worst of the pandemic, homeless people were housed in expensive hotels. Relentless campaigning made the city and state virtually eviction-free. Attention was turning to winning permanent protection from eviction without “good cause”. Nationally, the fledgling Biden administration’s “Build Back Better” agenda contained major commitments on housing, including an unprecedented $80 billion investment in public housing.

To continue reading the rest of the article, please click on the source link below:

https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2022/06/15/new-york-city-shows-that-the-housing-question-remains-one-about-global-capitalism/

Governor Kate Brown announced today that she has extended Oregon’s residential mortgage foreclosure moratorium until December 31, 2021. This moratorium prevents Oregonians who own their homes from losing their homes to foreclosure if they have lost income and been unable to pay their mortgage during the COVID-19 pandemic. House Bill 2009 authorized the governor to extend the mortgage foreclosure moratorium period for two successive three-month periods beyond June 30. The Governor previously issued Executive Order 21-14, extending the moratorium until September 30, 2021. The extension until December 31 is the last extension allowed under House Bill 2009.

“As we continue to see record high numbers of COVID-19 hospitalizations driven by the Delta surge, I am committed to ensuring that Oregonians have a warm, dry, safe place to live during this pandemic,” said Governor Brown. “Extending the temporary residential foreclosure moratorium another three months will prevent removal of Oregonians from their homes by foreclosure, which would result in serious health, safety, welfare, and financial consequences, and which would undermine key efforts to prevent spread of COVID-19.”

To continue reading the rest of the article, please click on the source link below:

https://z100portland.iheart.com/featured/portland-local-news/content/2021-08-16-oregon-foreclosure-moratorium-extended/

COLUMBUS, Ohio, Dec. 23, 2020 /PRNewswire/ — Recent actions at the federal level to extend foreclosure and eviction moratoriums on certain sections of the housing market through January will allow the incoming administration of President-elect Biden to revisit the issue after Inauguration Day, according to Columbus distressed assets manager and auctioneer Rich Kruse.

But the Gryphon USA Ltd. principal said adopting that strategy for too long could create risks for the housing market as many landlords and mortgage holders begin to assess the impact on their businesses.

Congress supported the extension of mortgage foreclosures and eviction protections to certain properties through Jan. 31 as part of a second round of support for those facing job loss and other economic stress as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. A number of federal agencies had already extended the moratorium that were due to expire on Dec. 31.

Kruse said the National Low-Income Housing Coalition has estimated the amounts of back rent owed to be between $30 billion and $70 billion, although a report from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank in early December had put the number at $7.2 billion from the start of the moratoria in March through Dec.1, 2020.

The $600 payments Congress just approved for adults earning less than $75,000 per year, however, will have little impact for the 12 million renters the Low-Income Housing Coalition estimates have accumulated deferred rent since January.

“It’s a finger in the dike that continues to crumble in front of our eyes,” Kruse said.

“Tenants are not likely to use the funds to make rental payments because the government essentially just said the free ride is open for another 2 months,” Kruse said. “There’s nothing here for the housing providers and barely anything for the tenants.”

Mortgage lenders also face an uncertainty on when payments on FHA, VA and other loans backed by the federal agencies will come due. The Visual Capitalist website estimates 17 million adults are behind on the house payments nationally. More than a third of Ohioans are behind on their mortgages or their rent, with 192,000 people poised to face foreclosure or eviction.

“This congressional action, while necessary at the moment, just kicks the can down the road,” Kruse said.

“The Biden administration should look to refocus any future support of the housing industry toward landlords and mortgage holders and quickly allow the marketplace to sort out the economic damage the moratoria have caused,” Kruse said. “Too long of a delay will cause untold harm to the rental properties without a stream of income to pay for general maintenance and create a backlog of distressed owner-occupied homes that could result in damaging the broader home market.”

Kruse serves as managing partner of Gryphon USA Ltd., and oversees the affiliated Gryphon Realty real estate brokerage and the Gryphon Asset Management receivership and asset management practice. His engagements primarily focus on complex state and federal legal matters, Private Selling Officer transactions and business insolvency.

More reading here from recent articles on the eviction and foreclosure situation:
*

• https://dsnews.com/daily-dose/12-21-2020/fha-extends-foreclosure-moratorium-expands-forbearance-options
• https://www.housingwire.com/articles/the-next-coronavirus-front-evictions-and-foreclosures/
• https://www.visualcapitalist.com/mapped-the-risk-of-eviction-and-foreclosure-in-u-s-states/
• https://nlihc.org/news/new-research-released-costs-covid-19-evictions

Gryphon provides these links for background only and does not claim ownership of the articles or extend permission to reproduce for publication.

SOURCE Gryphon USA

Related Links

www.gryphonusa.com

Source link

https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/gryphon-usa-extension-of-eviction-foreclosure-moratorium-no-long-term-solution-301198257.html

Almost 18 million Americans are behind on rent or mortgage payments.

Roughly one-third of them, or 5.8 million Americans, said in a survey by the US Census Bureau in November that they expected to face eviction or foreclosure in the coming months. That’s about the size of the population in Singapore.

The survey found that a staggering 50% of households behind on rent or mortgage payments in Arkansas, Florida, and Nevada thought there was a “strong chance” of eviction by early January, when certain moratoriums end.

The CARES Act, which was signed into law in March, allowed homeowners to pause mortgage payments for up to a year because of the pandemic. But they could face foreclosure if they can’t pay when the law expires.

Renters could be evicted even sooner. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s moratorium on evictions is set to end on December 31. Mark Zandi, the chief economist for Moody’s Analytics, told The Washington Post in August that tenants nationwide could owe a total of $70 billion in back rent by the year’s end.

Making matters worse is that many of those who are expected to pay that back rent are also likely receiving unemployment benefits set to expire by the end of the year. A recent report found that about 12 million Americans could lose those benefits on December 26.

The abrupt end to these unemployment benefits could slash income by about $19 billion a month, Nancy Vanden Houten, an economist at Oxford Economics, said in a recent research note cited by CBS News.

“If renters are required to quickly repay past due rent or face eviction, the hardship will fall predominantly on lower-income families who have already been disproportionately affected by the coronavirus crisis,” Vanden Houten said.

To continue reading please go do the source of the article below.

https://www.businessinsider.com/millions-of-americans-face-eviction-foreclosure-in-early-2021-2020-12

Tanglewood Fort Worth is a neighborhood in Texas, located southwest of the city. It is close to the branch of the Trinity. Fort Worth is known as Tanglewood as a safe and comfortable place for families. The area has bicycle paths, many parks and many tall trees.

Tanglewood is located at the bottom of the Trinity River Branch, about 8 miles southwest of Fort Fort’s main business district. The Tanglewood area is listed in two surveys. The additional western part is part of Felix G. Basley’s work in 1854, and the eastern part of the river is James Howard’s work in 1876. The first access to the Tanglewood area today consisted of a two-lane dirt road leading to southern Belarus. For growing children, the bridge is now floating on a river in a deep hole in a heating unit near Trinity Commons Mall.

Description of the environment

Inheritance is found on farms and is usually found in tangled trees or other animal species. Most homes have one but two stories. In recent years, however, housing construction has changed dramatically and many new homes are larger than old ones. The streets usually run with tall trees on the banks of the river. It has a nice bottom and very fertile. During heavy rains, the area was flooded, and measures were taken against Moldil Shanishki and tributaries of the Trinity River that crossed the area. Tanglewood bicycles are well used and entertained because of the shade and garden. This represents the tranquil atmosphere of the area. The bike path was originally built by Fort Worth in the early 1970s, and soon after a famous lady in Fort Worth Town Hall, Margaret Rimmer, a resident of Tanglewood (Margaret Rimmer) extended under the guidance of Ms.

At Tanglewood Elementary School, children learn a lot near Tanglewood at Fort Worth ISD Elementary School. Tanglewood Elementary School is located in a public park and allows many families in Tanglewood to walk and go to school with their children.

More information

Nearby fire station: South Hills Ave. 3501, 817-871-6800, Emergency 911. Nearby Health Center: Baylor All Saints Medical Center, 1400 8th Avenue, 817-927-6102. Nearby offices: Trinity River Station, 4450 Oak Park Lane, 817-926-3497 Nearby stores: Trinity Commons Mall: Hulen Shopping Center Nearby: Overton Park City Council 9th ??School District 5th District: 4182

East

Chase memory

East hill

Eastwood

High echo

Edderville

It is located near Haltom City, Texas, Watauga Road to the north, and Beach Street to the west, Highway 377 to the east and Bernap to the south. The postal code is 76117.

Easy to handle

Meadow Brook

Meadowbrook is an area 1.6 km wide and 8 km long, east of Fort Worth. Nearby, the west side is divided into Meadowbrook and central Meadowbrook, while the east side is generally called Meadowbrook. Central Minibrock is a community of amazing, attractive and friendly people. Like the eastern part of Fort Worth, the trees are thick and the mountains are soft.

A few blocks from Fort Worth may not be as different as Ivan Brooks. The first houses have been built since 1910, and the traditional style includes Bengal and mansions, some of which have historical significance. After World War II and in the middle of this century, many houses were built. New housing was being built in the last decades of the 20th century, and some new homes are still being built on existing facilities.

One of Fort Worth’s three urban golf courses is located in central Madhya Pradesh. The Meadowbrook Golf Course is an 18-hole regulatory institution that is one of the 25 municipal golf courses in Texas. The course runs all year round, but mainly in spring and autumn. The mountainous terrain and mature trees make the trip fun and challenging.

Large sites within a walking distance or drive to downtown Meadowbrook include Oakland Lake Park and Gateway Park, one of the largest national parks in the country. The proximity to Quanah Parker Park gives access to Trinity Road, which features one of the most popular trails on the Trinity River in the city.

Central Meadowbrook has a working border organization that meets monthly on Thursday. It was a great opportunity to learn about the different programs running our town and learn about the local police, obedience rules and large borders.

Central Meadowbrook is represented by three of the nine counties – an application that no other church area can support. This makes us an excellent representative at City Hall.

Meadowbrook Central Public Schools are East Handley Elementary School, West Handley Elementary School, Midbrook High School, Jan Maclong High School, and Hill High School. This area is also used by many private schools. There is also Texas Wesleyan University, which trains 10% of anesthesiologists in the country.

Central Meadowbrook also has good access to the public library system. There are 6 bookstores within 4 miles of downtown Meadowbrook. The new Children’s Library is due to open in 2020. One of Fortworth’s two regional libraries is 5 minutes’ drive away.

Perhaps the best kept secret in Meadowbrook is good access to other areas. Transportation permitting, DFW Airport is approximately 22 minutes away. In less than 10 minutes, you can park your car in downtown Fortworth and call TEX Rail and Trinity Railway Express. The AT&T Stadium and the Arlington Entertainment District are 15 minutes away. Downtown Dallas is 30 minutes away.

North

Mountain

North

Oaks River

The Oaks River is a unique city.

Solid rock

Sansom Park

Sansom Park is a unique city.

A cow is coming

Fort Worth Screening Company is a historic site in the northern part of the city. Warehouses are the largest livestock industry in the United States and have played a key role in early urban development. Today, people are in many places, restaurants and important national record companies like Billy Bob. In Fort Worth, American Love Club hosts several community restaurants in the fringe and high ff masters.

Northeast

Rivers of the river

Riverside County is located east of the I-35W and north of Highway 121 Airport and is divided into four sections.

Bonnie Bree

Ochoa

Springdale

United Riverside

Northbrook

The American Home Mortgage Investment Corporation became the 10th retail mortgage lender in the United States and was organized as a Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT). In 2007, it went bankrupt and was liquidated. The company aims to generate net interest income through the issuance and servicing of personal loans and mortgage-backed securities and taxable subsidiaries, mortgage loans to institutional investors. Mortgage was formed with the company, also through a mortgage broker, purchased by creditors and operated at the Irving Business Management Center in Texas.

The Society for the Protection of Topography, Part 11, filed a lawsuit on August 6, 2007, in Wilmington Federal Court, Delaware. A week before the application, the company said many of its creditors demanded repayment and AHM was unable to collect the money at once. $ 800 million in housing loans and 90 percent of the 7,000 employees. The company has made a number of acquisitions since 1999, including Irvine Marina Mortgage, California, the first parent group of M. Prospect, IL. In office in December 2003, the company moved from the NASDAQ to the NYSE under a new subscriber token, AHM. U.S. housing reports show that concerns about the quality of mortgages and non-payment of homeowners extend to lenders who offer better loans, as well as temporary lenders who provide loans with weaker loans. It is presented. With this news, stock prices fell 90% that day to $ 1.04 on the New York stock exchange. “The company is very likely to go bankrupt or restructure effectively and have little value for its shareholders. The American house specializes in basic and semi-premier loans, but the lender earns them. It offers a number of loans that allow it to lend most documents and funds. About 2.5% of the U.S. mortgage market.

On July 31, 2007, the Company announced that it would not be able to finance excessive housing loans and liquidate the property, which would jeopardize its existence. The Melville, New York State Real Estate Investors Foundation has maintained important advisors and responsibilities with the help of trust and expertise and provided advice on liquidity payments for its assets, including liquidity.

Founded in New York in 1987, the company went public on NASDAQ in September 1999. The company moved its headquarters to Melville, New York in 2000. USA Home Buyers, Holdings Inc. repeatedly leading to loan history and care. Following the acquisition of Apex Mortgage Capital in December 2003, the company changed its name to REIT, American Mortgage Lender, New American Mortgage Holders, and NASDAQ for NYSE. On August 2, 2007, Michael Strauss sent an email to all media companies that reported financial issues.

Following Strauss’s e-mail, at least one AHM employee stated that AHM’s western branch had been purchased by IndyMac’s Bank, retaining the jobs of those employees. [Mandatory link] IndyMac also went bankrupt in 2008, one of the biggest bank failures in US history. Bank IndyMac was arrested by FDIC on July 11, 2008 and released on August 6, 2008. The bank had appealed for protection against the violation of Chapter 11. Wilbur was sold as a stake in Ross & Co. in November 2007. Bankruptcy Agreement.

Bank of America was forced to close. Unfortunately, secondary market transactions with the local real estate market made our economy unprofitable. What does this mean for most of our employees? Friday, August 3, 2007 will be your last working day. Detailed information on fees, benefits and other related services will be provided to the office on Friday morning. I want to thank all the employees of the company for their hard work. She led me to join this amazing group. In the course of bankruptcy liquidation, the company was transferred to the American Housing Mortgage Investment Corporation and the American Housing Mortgage Corporation. The American Mortgage Corporation acquired the service business of WL Ross & Co. in November 2007. A branch of LLC was established. American Mortgage Corporation changed its name to Homeward Residential Holdings, Inc. in February 2012. [10] In October 2012, Ocwen announced plans to acquire Homeward Residential Holdings, Inc., owned by WL Ross & Co. 750 million. The acquisition was completed on December 4th. December 27, 2012.

On August 8, 2007, Outten & Golden LLP was founded by the U.S. Grants and Grants Company, the U.S. Grants Consent Group, the U.S. Grants Service and the American Mortgage Corporation. They were fired on August 3, 2007 on charges of attempting to restore a 60-day pay rise and the benefits to former employees of U.S. credit units for violating the “Employee Protection Act and Notice.” (Warning Act). On December 14, 2009, the court approved a $ 6.5 million final settlement agreement for former U.S. creditors. From 5 May 2013, “the manager will continue to work to resolve the outstanding balances and lawsuits awaiting those who will be affected when AHM lenders (including the WARN group) are issued”. Warning behavior solutions were distributed in 2014.

US Service Protection Act (ESPA, PLL 107-206, topic 2, H.R. 4775, 116 Stat. 820, passed August 2, 2002) aimed at the United States federal law protecting U.S. military personnel. Is to be. And other officials appointed and appointed by the United States Government in the International Criminal Courts for which the United States does not participate. “US Senator Jesse Helms (RNC) and US Representative Tom Daley (RTT) introduce the 2002 Act (HR 4775) to allocate more funds for the further recovery and response to terrorist attacks in the United States. The bill was signed on August 2, 2002 by W. Bush. ASPA has given the President of the United States “the power to release all or all American employees or to release them or release them at the request of the International Criminal Court, the United States and the United States.” Use it well. He is responsible for the licensing process called the Hague Innovation Act. The law prohibits federal, state, and local governments, and institutions (including courts and law enforcement) from assisting the courts. For example, everyone is prohibited from being a judge in the United States. The classification is limited to non-national security information and is passed on to law enforcement agencies. The law also prohibits US military assistance to states from joining the court. However, NATO members, not the main NATO allies, and the Taiwanese signatories to Article 98, have the right to immunity from agreeing not to persecute US citizens.

Tanglewood Fort Worth is a neighborhood in Texas, located southwest of the city. It is close to the branch of the Trinity. Fort Worth is known as Tanglewood as a safe and comfortable place for families. The area has bicycle paths, many parks and many tall trees.

Tanglewood is located at the bottom of the Trinity River Branch, about 8 miles southwest of Fort Fort’s main business district. The Tanglewood area is listed in two surveys. The additional western part is part of Felix G. Basley’s work in 1854, and the eastern part of the river is James Howard’s work in 1876. The first access to the Tanglewood area today consisted of a two-lane dirt road leading to southern Belarus. For growing children, the bridge is now floating on a river in a deep hole in a heating unit near Trinity Commons Mall.

Description of the environment

Inheritance is found on farms and is usually found in tangled trees or other animal species. Most homes have one but two stories. In recent years, however, housing construction has changed dramatically and many new homes are larger than old ones. The streets usually run with tall trees on the banks of the river. It has a nice bottom and very fertile. During heavy rains, the area was flooded, and measures were taken against Moldil Shanishki and tributaries of the Trinity River that crossed the area. Tanglewood bicycles are well used and entertained because of the shade and garden. This represents the tranquil atmosphere of the area. The bike path was originally built by Fort Worth in the early 1970s, and soon after a famous lady in Fort Worth Town Hall, Margaret Rimmer, a resident of Tanglewood (Margaret Rimmer) extended under the guidance of Ms.

At Tanglewood Elementary School, children learn a lot near Tanglewood at Fort Worth ISD Elementary School. Tanglewood Elementary School is located in a public park and allows many families in Tanglewood to walk and go to school with their children.

More information

Nearby fire station: South Hills Ave. 3501, 817-871-6800, Emergency 911. Nearby Health Center: Baylor All Saints Medical Center, 1400 8th Avenue, 817-927-6102. Nearby offices: Trinity River Station, 4450 Oak Park Lane, 817-926-3497 Nearby stores: Trinity Commons Mall: Hulen Shopping Center Nearby: Overton Park City Council 9th ??School District 5th District: 4182

East

Chase memory

East hill

Eastwood

High echo

Edderville

It is located near Haltom City, Texas, Watauga Road to the north, Beach Street to the west, Highway 377 to the east and Bernap to the south. The postal code is 76117.

Easy to handle

Meadow Brook

Meadowbrook is an area 1.6 km wide and 8 km long, east of Fort Worth. Nearby, the west side is divided into Meadowbrook and central Meadowbrook, while the east side is generally called Meadowbrook. Central Minibrock is a community of amazing, attractive and friendly people. Like the eastern part of Fort Worth, the trees are thick and the mountains are soft.

A few blocks from Fort Worth may not be as different as Ivan Brooks. The first houses have been built since 1910, and the traditional style includes bengal and mansions, some of which have historical significance. After World War II and in the middle of this century, many houses were built. New housing was being built in the last decades of the 20th century, and some new homes are still being built on existing facilities.

One of Fort Worth’s three urban golf courses is located in central Madhya Pradesh. The Meadowbrook Golf Course is an 18-hole regulatory institution that is one of the 25 municipal golf courses in Texas. The course runs all year round, but mainly in spring and autumn. The mountainous terrain and mature trees make the trip fun and challenging.

Large sites within a walking distance or drive to downtown Meadowbrook include Oakland Lake Park and Gateway Park, one of the largest national parks in the country. The proximity to Quanah Parker Park gives access to Trinity Road, which features one of the most popular trails on the Trinity River in the city.

Central Meadowbrook has a working border organization that meets monthly on Thursday. It was a great opportunity to learn about the different programs running our town and learn about the local police, obedience rules and large borders.

Central Meadowbrook is represented by three of the nine counties – an application that no other church area can support. This makes us an excellent representative at City Hall.

Meadowbrook Central Public Schools are East Handley Elementary School, West Handley Elementary School, Midbrook High School, Jan Maclong High School, and Hill High School. This area is also used by many private schools. There is also Texas Wesleyan University, which trains 10% of anesthesiologists in the country.

Central Meadowbrook also has good access to the public library system. There are 6 bookstores within 4 miles of downtown Meadowbrook. The new Children’s Library is due to open in 2020. One of Fortworth’s two regional libraries is 5 minutes’ drive away.

Perhaps the best kept secret in Meadowbrook is good access to other areas. Transportation permitting, DFW Airport is approximately 22 minutes away. In less than 10 minutes, you can park your car in downtown Fortworth and call TEX Rail and Trinity Railway Express. The AT&T Stadium and the Arlington Entertainment District are 15 minutes away. Downtown Dallas is 30 minutes away.

North

Mountain

North

Oaks River

The Oaks River is a unique city.

Solid rock

Sansom Park

Sansom Park is a unique city.

A cow is coming

Fort Worth Screening Company is a historic site in the northern part of the city. Warehouses are the largest livestock industry in the United States and have played a key role in early urban development. Today, people are in many places, restaurants and important national record companies like Billy Bob. In Fort Worth, American Love Club hosts several community restaurants in the fringe and high ff masters.

Northeast

Rivers of the river

Riverside County is located east of the I-35W and north of Highway 121 Airport and is divided into four sections.

Bonnie Bree

Ochoj

Springdale

United Riverside

Northbrook

Does your job give you at least temporary, meaning you need help with rent? As the state tries to prevent the corona virus from entering the city or home, paying rent becomes more difficult. Even after several states failed to evacuate, the owners wondered what they could do to pay the rent or survive the eviction. There are federal, state, local and private donor programs that prevent tariffs and loans or provide home-purchased loans. Many programs also provide criminal assistance. Here’s how to get the most out of it. Important points to be noted as follows

• Federal protection against deportation according to CARES has expired.
• However, some federal, state, and local actions still protect some tenants from deportation in August 2020.
• Wage tolerance is available through several similar programs that delay layoffs.
• Several social service agencies, states, and local governments provide additional help with rent.
• The law provides indirect assistance to many U.S. adults through a $ 1,200 check and more money will be available.

Eviction Protection and Care Act

Linn the ‘Care’ Act, which came into force on March 27, 2020, provides 120 days eviction assistance to protected government homeowners, expiring. In particular, the eviction notice will not be issued until July 25, 2020. The notice also gives you 30 days to leave the house (August 24, 2020). The landlord was unable to pay the fine, penalty or other fee because you paid for the rent for 120 years. It is important to note that eviction does not release anyone from the obligation to pay rent. At this time the host did not allow him to be late Voice of the Republic of Somalia

House for rent

• Suspension of eviction registration applies to all leased facilities that are one of the following.
• Included in section 41411 of the 1994 Act on Violence against Women (34 USC. 12491 (a)).
• Paid for a house action against an apartment under section 542 of the Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S. 1490s).
• Bond of the federation or bond to many families

Support to CARE Act tenants

In terms of direct rental assistance, CARES gave another $ 17.4 billion to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). This included assistance with rent, referrals, public housing and senior housing. Contact HUD Rental Support for assistance.

Other grants

The $ 2.2 trillion car laws and other programs also provide funding that can cover the cost of housing, explaining how the money is not used.

Good payment

$ 1,200 per adult ($ 2,200 aside) and $ 500 for the child must be sent by April 16 and then automatically after April 2020. $ 1,200 ($ 2,400), the average income can go up in 2019 or 2018, to $ 75,000 (up to $ 150,000) or less. If your income exceeds this limit and you lose the amount of 000 99 000 (, 000 198 000), the amount received will be reduced. There was a strong feeling among politicians that the second round of harassment needed to be strengthened. However, disagreements over other issues prevented the new law on direct payments in August 2020.

Expansion of unemployment benefit

By removing the extensive provisions on unemployment benefits in the “Care Act”, additional rules on support came into force. By law, the federal government must pay $ 300 a week to receive another 400 unemployment benefits each week, with the remainder paid by the state government. However, legal and practical issues are still delaying the implementation of this Regulation from August 2020. Under CARE law, your eligibility for unemployment insurance is increased if you lose your job due to a coronavirus epidemic. After the end of the state’s regular benefits, the unemployed person receives benefits for 13 weeks. He received an extra 600 600 a week.

The government generally uses these benefits for the unemployed as well as entrepreneurs, part-time workers or participants in large-scale economic activities.

Fannie Mae Disaster Response Network

Fannie Mae Disaster Response Network has published a guide for coronavirus-infected residents (COVID-19). Via the network, HUD Certified Housing Consultants offers:

• Assessment of personal recovery and action plan
• Help deal with your housing situation
• Financial education and budgeting
• Access Clearpoint Porch
• light project tools and resources online
• Routine examinations to ensure a successful recovery
• Call 877-542-9723 to access the disaster network.

CDC suspended during temporary removal

In order to prevent the further spread of the coronavirus, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) ordered a temporary ban on the eviction of tenants for crimes rule. To qualify for protection, you must meet certain eligibility requirements. If your CDC account is not renewed, not renewed or not terminated, if you meet the conditions and submit an affidavit, your application will be barred from residence until December 31, 2020.

Here’s what you need to know

• The order is valid on September 4, 2020.
• You must complete a statement stating that you meet certain requirements.
• “This statement is a false witness, which means that if you lie, cheat or lose important information, you can be prosecuted, arrested or punished,” the statement said.
• All adults listed in rental, rental or housing contracts must complete this form.
• You still have to pay the rent and comply with all terms of the contract.
• You may be evicted for other reasons, such as stealing a mortgage or following the law.
• The decision does not include safety measures when buying a house. Learn more about establishing boundaries around your house.
• If you need a lawyer, you can get help from a local organization, legal services department, or if you are a lawyer, you can get help from a legal aid office. Internal law.

In order to prevent eviction from the house, all parents listed in the lease, lease or real estate agreement must notify the landlord, the owner of your property or any other person who has the right to evict you from the house. You must submit this statement because the fine is wrong. This is similar to reporting to the court, because if you lie, are misrepresented, or are misrepresented, you may be prosecuted, imprisoned, or punished.

It is a challenging economic situation for all of us. However, if your financial problems do not pay off with the mortgage, harassment can occur. If this happens, not only are you more likely to lose your home, but you may also be followed by short shit due to lack of funds. Blocking and deficit decisions can affect your ability to earn in the future. Here are some tips to avoid closure.

1. Take action quickly

The problem must not be ignored. The more you come back, the fewer solutions are available. Refinancing or changing a loan can be inconvenient and your home is more likely to grow

2. Call a attorney

Lenders don’t usually want your home. They want to make money from the interest you pay on your mortgage. It usually provides the option to assist borrowers in difficult financial times, given their good financial condition.

3. Open the email

It can be difficult to see the correspondence when you know you have limited bills and money to pay. However, the notification you receive from the lender will provide you with sufficient information about the foreclosure options available. It is usually important to open them right away, as they are time sensitive.

4. Learn about the process

Make sure you understand the enforcement process in detail, including tax enforcement and out-of-court enforcement. There are several stages in the process: default notification, official sales notification, and auction date.

5. Understand the options for menstrual prevention

Valuable information on debt prevention options (also known as cost reduction) can be found on the Internet

6. Contact an HUD-certified home advisor

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) funds free or inexpensive consultations nationwide. A home advisor will help you understand your laws and options, manage your finances and negotiate with your moneylender if you need this help. Find a HUD-certified housing consultant in your area or call (800) 569-4287 or TTY (800) 877-8339.

7. First spending

The most important account is health. Things can get worse if you don’t have physical and mental health. Home payments should be your second priority. Prioritize these two payments and hold your payments on credit cards and other unsecured debts until you update them. Also, do everything possible to reduce costs. Remove cables, assemblies, dinner, entertainment, etc. Until there is a chance to get up again.

8. Asset and revenue review

Find items that you can sell (jewelry, cars, furniture, etc.). You will be amazed at what you can turn into money. Also check the potential for increased revenue. Could someone in your family do extra work to increase your income? Do you have more rooms to rent?

9. Avoid future bills

It does not help to pay off unpaid debt. It’s the law against it. Many advantageous companies contact their lenders for discussion, but it’s a great deal to pay for!

10. Do not register

Do not enter your first and last name. Someone or a company that claims to sign up for a home campaign makes it illegal. Read and understand all terms and documents registered with your key or HUD approved real estate agent without professional advice from a professional company.

11. Mortgage for sale.

 If your loan maintains the network but your buyer offers it before the offer, the lender should keep this in mind. If they take your land, the lender will activate it and try to resell it. If you offer them at a low price, they think it will be difficult to find a suitable buyer for a weak market. Therefore, if your home is on the market, lenders will continue to aggressively seek out a buyer for them even after the loan process has begun. Predictable Weaving Machine Read our guide on how to get rid of a home quickly, how to sell a home quickly, then follow the best steps to understand why your lender needs to be satisfied short sales.

12. Bankruptcy.

The bankruptcy stopped with enforcement. After registering for bankruptcy, federal law prohibits all recipients, including mortgage lenders, from continuing to collect payments. Enforcement is considered a fundraising activity, so the foreclosure process takes place on the same day that your lender realizes that you have claimed a loss. That’s the problem. When you go to court, the sole responsibility of your debt manager is to mediate between you and your lender. It is useless. The law requires that your lender and other lenders work with you to develop an appropriate repayment plan to help you get back to work. Talk to a bankruptcy attorney to find out if filing for bankruptcy is appropriate.

13. Deed-in-lieu:

In place of the death penalty, a law will arise. The landlord signs again before the death sentence. This may sound like a good choice, but it also affects homeowners’ debt, as well as foreknowledge. For various reasons, donors are reluctant to return to the country by filling out paperwork instead of guessing. They fear that the landlord will sue later if they do not understand what happened. Try to make the borrower’s concerns a reality. Allowing the forecasting process to continue is one way to prevent the debtor from falling into debt. Therefore, the verb does not appear in place of the independent variable. The purchase is imminent. The owner has displayed the house on the market for several months and cannot be sold. The loan must be repaid to the lender with or without a small loan. The seller can record financial difficulties. The seller initiates the process and asks to document its voluntary procedures. Despite all these factors, many lenders disagree with the law, but it’s worth a try!

14. Budget / Mortgage Options.

 Almost every loan o again. Currently, average mortgage rates have a “sell” line and lenders are willing to pay the full amount after the house has moved and the property has been transferred. However, if you are living a vintage, you can allow the payer to change your loan, remove this message and allow someone else to take your loan. Lenders may want to evaluate the eligibility of new buyers, but for everyone this may be a win-win option. You can negotiate a lower payment with the buyer to pay a better mortgage. With a lease option, the purchaser becomes your tenant and will continue to own the property until the buyer pays the full amount, pays off the full loan, or sells the other property. In other cases, the buyer pays the option immediately and pays you the option to buy a home. You can make an optional payment for the loan immediately. The buyer then pays the monthly rent and applies it to the lender. To stop the vision process by getting services, you need to pay mortgage payments, property taxes, and rental rates that cover most of your insurance liability. The cow was gone. Enough for life.

Help to stop foreclosure

 A house is regularly a family’s most important belonging. Forestalling avoidable foreclosures helps keep families in their homes, jelly networks, and forestalls avoidable misfortune. The “Making Home Affordable” plan gives capable mortgage holders backing to get reasonable renegotiating or advance alterations to assist them with remaining in their homes.

Contact a genuine lodging or budgetary instructor to assist you with working through your issues.

To discover a guide, contact the U.S. Branch of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) at (800) 569-4287 or (877) 483-1515, or visit their site.

Call (888) 995-HOPE, the Homeowner’s HOPE Hotline, to arrive at a charitable, HUD-endorsed instructor through HOPE NOW, an agreeable exertion of home loan advisors and moneylenders to help mortgage holders.

Visit neighbour work’s America’s site.

Visit the “Making Home Affordable” program site for more data about the organisation’s program to help disturbed property holders with renegotiating or advance adjustments.

Stay away from Foreclosure Prevention Scams . On the off chance that somebody offers to arrange an advance change for you or to stop or postpone foreclosure for an expense, cautiously check their accreditations, notoriety, and experience; keep an eye out for notice indications of a trick; and consistently keep in touch with your moneylender and home loan servicer. Your home loan bank can assist you with discovering genuine alternatives to maintain a strategic distance from foreclosure. It is essential to contact your home loan bank right on time to save every one of your alternatives. There are authentic shopper budgetary directing offices that can assist you with working with your loan specialist.

Home loan foreclosure filings and truly deficient home loans proceed at generally raised levels. This outcomes in significant levels of monetary worry for contract services, financial specialists and borrowers, too undermining the dependability of the areas where foreclosures happen. This asset catalog is planned essentially as an asset for contract services attempting to decrease the rate of foreclosures in their overhauling portfolios, which will likewise profit financial specialists, borrowers and influenced networks.

On the off chance that the foreclosure deal is booked to happen in the following day or something like that, the most ideal approach to stop the deal quickly is by declaring financial insolvency.

The programmed stay will leave the foreclosure speechless. When you declare financial insolvency, something many refer to as a “programmed remain” promptly becomes effective. The stay capacities as a directive restricting the bank from dispossessing your home or in any case attempting to gather its obligation. Thus, any foreclosure movement must be ended during the chapter 11 procedure.

The bank may document a movement for help from the remain. The bank will most likely endeavour to have the stay lifted by recording a movement looking for authorisation from the court to proceed with the foreclosure. Regardless of whether the liquidation court concedes this movement and permits the foreclosure to continue, the foreclosure will be deferred at any rate a month or two. This ought to furnish you with time to investigate options in contrast to foreclosure with your bank. (Peruse increasingly about how liquidation can help with foreclosure).

Numerous individuals need to stay in their home and will do whatever they can to remain in their home for the uncertain future. In the event that that depicts you, and you’re behind on your home loan instalments with no possible method to get current before foreclosure, the best way to keep your house is to document a Chapter 13 liquidation.

How Chapter 13 functions. Part 13 insolvency lets you pay off the “arrearage” (late unpaid instalments) over the length of a Chapter 13 reimbursement plan you propose—five years as a rule. Be that as it may, you’ll need enough pay to meet your present home loan instalment notwithstanding paying off the arrearage. Expecting you make all the necessary instalments up to the furthest limit of the reimbursement plan, you’ll maintain a strategic distance from foreclosure and keep your home.

A Chapter 13 insolvency can assist you with keeping your home by rebuilding your obligations. You will reimburse obligations—some to some extent and some in full—over a time of three to five years as a feature of a reimbursement plan. You may have the option to maintain a strategic distance from foreclosure and stay in your home with this sort of liquidation since you can reimburse any deficient home loan instalments through the arrangement.

Likewise, you will probably pay a division (or in some cases, none) of your uncollateralised debts during the arrangement time frame and potentially take out certain different obligations—like submerged second and third home loans since they’re viewed as unstable advances—totally when you complete your arrangement, opening up cash for your first home loan. Regardless of whether you can’t finish the arrangement, petitioning for Chapter 13 liquidation will give you at any rate a while before a foreclosure can be finished.

On the off chance that your bank is utilising a nonjudicial procedure to dispossess—where the foreclosure is finished outside of the court framework—at that point you may have the option to defer or stop the foreclosure by recording a claim against the bank to challenge the foreclosure. This strategy regularly won’t work if the foreclosure is legal on the grounds that when of a foreclosure deal, you’ve just had your chance to be heard in court.

To win, you’ll have to demonstrate as per the general inclination of the court that the foreclosure ought not occur on the grounds that, for instance, the dispossessing bank:

can’t demonstrate it claims the promissory note

didn’t act in consistence with state intercession necessities

abused a state law, similar to a Homeowner-Bill-of-Rights law

didn’t follow the entirety of the necessary strides in the foreclosure procedure (as controlled by state law), or

made some different intolerable mistake.

The drawback to suing your bank is that in case you can’t demonstrate your case, you’ll just defer the foreclosure procedure, maybe quickly. Claims can be costly and, in the event that you have no sensible reason for your cases, you could stall out paying the bank’s court expenses and lawyers’ charges.

Please visit the two companies below for foreclosure defense services, mortgage audit reports, and securitization audit reports with affidavits of expert witness.

http://www.securitizationauditpro.com/

http://www.mortgageauditsonline.com/

Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 365 P. 3d 845 – Cal: Supreme Court 2016

62 Cal.4th 919 (2016)
199 Cal.Rptr.3d 66
365 P.3d 845
TSVETANA YVANOVA, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
NEW CENTURY MORTGAGE CORPORATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.
No. S218973.

Supreme Court of California.
February 18, 2016.

922
*922 Appeal from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. No. LC097218, Russell S. Kussman, Judge. Ct.App. 2/1 B247188.

Review Granted 226 Cal.App.4th 495.

Tsvetana Yvanova, in pro. per.; Law Offices of Richard L. Antognini and Richard L. Antognini for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Office of Mark F. Didak and Mark F. Didak as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Nicklas A. Akers, Assistant Attorney General, Michele Van Gelderen and Sanna R. Singer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Attorney General of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Lisa R. Jaskol; Kent Qian; and Hunter Landerholm for Public Counsel, National Housing Law Project and Neighborhood Legal Services of Los Angeles County as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

The Sturdevant Law Firm and James C. Sturdevant for National Association of Consumer Advocates and National Consumer Law Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

923
*923 The Arkin Law Firm, Sharon J. Arkin; Arbogast Law and David M. Arbogast for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Houser & Allison, Eric D. Houser, Robert W. Norman, Jr., Patrick S. Ludeman; Bryan Cave, Kenneth Lee Marshall, Nafiz Cekirge, Andrea N. Winternitz and Sarah Samuelson for Defendants and Respondents.

Pfeifer & De La Mora and Michael R. Pfeifer for California Mortgage Bankers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Denton US and Sonia Martin for Structured Finance Industry Group, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Goodwin Proctor, Steven A. Ellis and Nicole S. Tate-Naghi for California Bankers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Wright, Finlay & Zak and Jonathan D. Fink for American Legal & Financial Network and United Trustees Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

OPINION

WERDEGAR, J. —

The collapse in 2008 of the housing bubble and its accompanying system of home loan securitization led, among other consequences, to a great national wave of loan defaults and foreclosures. One key legal issue arising out of the collapse was whether and how defaulting homeowners could challenge the validity of the chain of assignments involved in securitization of their loans. We granted review in this case to decide one aspect of that question: Whether the borrower on a home loan secured by a deed of trust may base an action for wrongful foreclosure on allegations a purported assignment of the note and deed of trust to the foreclosing party bore defects rendering the assignment void.

The Court of Appeal held plaintiff Tsvetana Yvanova could not state a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure based on an allegedly void assignment because she lacked standing to assert defects in the assignment, to which she was not a party. We conclude, to the contrary, that because in a nonjudicial foreclosure only the original beneficiary of a deed of trust or its assignee or agent may direct the trustee to sell the property, an allegation that the assignment was void, and not merely voidable at the behest of the parties to the assignment, will support an action for wrongful foreclosure.

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*924 Our ruling in this case is a narrow one. We hold only that a borrower who has suffered a nonjudicial foreclosure does not lack standing to sue for wrongful foreclosure based on an allegedly void assignment merely because he or she was in default on the loan and was not a party to the challenged assignment. We do not hold or suggest that a borrower may attempt to preempt a threatened nonjudicial foreclosure by a suit questioning the foreclosing party’s right to proceed. Nor do we hold or suggest that plaintiff in this case has alleged facts showing the assignment is void or that, to the extent she has, she will be able to prove those facts. Nor, finally, in rejecting defendants’ arguments on standing do we address any of the substantive elements of the wrongful foreclosure tort or the factual showing necessary to meet those elements.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case comes to us on appeal from the trial court’s sustaining of a demurrer. For purposes of reviewing a demurrer, we accept the truth of material facts properly pleaded in the operative complaint, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 205, 129 P.3d 394].)[1] To determine whether the trial court should, in sustaining the demurrer, have granted plaintiff leave to amend, we consider whether on the pleaded and noticeable facts there is a reasonable possibility of an amendment that would cure the complaint’s legal defect or defects. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 457, 79 P.3d 569].)

In 2006, plaintiff executed a deed of trust securing a note for $483,000 on a residential property in Woodland Hills, Los Angeles County. The lender, and beneficiary of the trust deed, was defendant New Century Mortgage Corporation (New Century). New Century filed for bankruptcy on April 2, 2007, and on August 1, 2008, it was liquidated and its assets were transferred to a liquidation trust.

On December 19, 2011, according to the operative complaint, New Century (despite its earlier dissolution) executed a purported assignment of the deed
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*925 of trust to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee of an investment loan trust the complaint identifies as “Msac-2007 Trust-He-1 Pass Thru Certificates.” We take notice of the recorded assignment, which is in the appellate record. (See fn. 1, ante.) As assignor the recorded document lists New Century; as assignee it lists Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank) “as trustee for the registered holder of Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE1 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-HE1” (the Morgan Stanley investment trust). The assignment states it was prepared by Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, which is also listed as the contact for both assignor and assignee and as the attorney in fact for New Century. The assignment is dated December 19, 2011, and bears a notation that it was recorded December 30, 2011.

According to the complaint, the Morgan Stanley investment trust to which the deed of trust on plaintiff’s property was purportedly assigned on December 19, 2011, had a closing date (the date by which all loans and mortgages or trust deeds must be transferred to the investment pool) of January 27, 2007.

On August 20, 2012, according to the complaint, Western Progressive, LLC, recorded two documents: one substituting itself for Deutsche Bank as trustee, the other giving notice of a trustee’s sale. We take notice of a substitution of trustee, dated February 28, 2012, and recorded August 20, 2012, replacing Deutsche Bank with Western Progressive, LLC, as trustee on the deed of trust, and of a notice of trustee’s sale dated August 16, 2012, and recorded August 20, 2012.

A recorded trustee’s deed upon sale dated December 24, 2012, states that plaintiff’s Woodland Hills property was sold at public auction on September 14, 2012. The deed conveys the property from Western Progressive, LLC, as trustee, to the purchaser at auction, THR California LLC, a Delaware limited liability company.

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, to which defendants demurred, pleaded a single count for quiet title against numerous defendants including New Century, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Western Progressive, LLC, Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital, Inc., and the Morgan Stanley investment trust. Plaintiff alleged the December 19, 2011, assignment of the deed of trust from New Century to the Morgan Stanley investment trust was void for two reasons: New Century’s assets had previously, in 2008, been transferred to a bankruptcy trustee; and the Morgan Stanley investment trust had closed to new loans in 2007. (The demurrer, of course, does not admit the truth of this legal conclusion; we recite it here only to help explain how the substantive issues in this case were framed.) The superior court
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*926 sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, concluding on several grounds that plaintiff could not state a cause of action for quiet title.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment for defendants on their demurrer. The pleaded cause of action for quiet title failed fatally, the court held, because plaintiff did not allege she had tendered payment of her debt. The court went on to discuss the question, on which it had sought and received briefing, of whether plaintiff could, on the facts alleged, amend her complaint to plead a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure.

On the wrongful foreclosure question, the Court of Appeal concluded leave to amend was not warranted. Relying on Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497 [156 Cal.Rptr.3d 912] (Jenkins), the court held plaintiff’s allegations of improprieties in the assignment of her deed of trust to Deutsche Bank were of no avail because, as an unrelated third party to that assignment, she was unaffected by such deficiencies and had no standing to enforce the terms of the agreements allegedly violated. The court acknowledged that plaintiff’s authority, Glaski v. Bank of America, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th 1079 (Glaski), conflicted with Jenkins on the standing issue, but the court agreed with the reasoning of Jenkins and declined to follow Glaski.

We granted plaintiff’s petition for review, limiting the issue to be briefed and argued to the following: “In an action for wrongful foreclosure on a deed of trust securing a home loan, does the borrower have standing to challenge an assignment of the note and deed of trust on the basis of defects allegedly rendering the assignment void?”

DISCUSSION

I. Deeds of Trust and Nonjudicial Foreclosure

(1) A deed of trust to real property acting as security for a loan typically has three parties: the trustor (borrower), the beneficiary (lender), and the trustee. “The trustee holds a power of sale. If the debtor defaults on the loan, the beneficiary may demand that the trustee conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.” (Biancalana v. T.D. Service Co. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 807, 813 [156 Cal.Rptr.3d 437, 300 P.3d 518].) The nonjudicial foreclosure system is designed to provide the lender-beneficiary with an inexpensive and efficient remedy against a defaulting borrower, while protecting the borrower from wrongful loss of the property and ensuring that a properly conducted sale is final between the parties and conclusive as to a bona fide purchaser. (Moeller v. Lien (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 830 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 777].)

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*927 The trustee starts the nonjudicial foreclosure process by recording a notice of default and election to sell. (Civ. Code, § 2924, subd. (a)(1).)[2] After a three-month waiting period, and at least 20 days before the scheduled sale, the trustee may publish, post, and record a notice of sale. (§§ 2924, subd. (a)(2), 2924f, subd. (b).) If the sale is not postponed and the borrower does not exercise his or her rights of reinstatement or redemption, the property is sold at auction to the highest bidder. (§ 2924g, subd. (a); Jenkins, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 509; Moeller v. Lien, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at pp. 830-831.) Generally speaking, the foreclosure sale extinguishes the borrower’s debt; the lender may recover no deficiency. (Code Civ. Proc., § 580d; Dreyfuss v. Union Bank of California (2000) 24 Cal.4th 400, 411 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 29, 11 P.3d 383].)

The trustee of a deed of trust is not a true trustee with fiduciary obligations, but acts merely as an agent for the borrower-trustor and lender-beneficiary. (Biancalana v. T.D. Service Co., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 819; Vournas v. Fidelity Nat. Tit. Ins. Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 668, 677 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 490].) While it is the trustee who formally initiates the nonjudicial foreclosure, by recording first a notice of default and then a notice of sale, the trustee may take these steps only at the direction of the person or entity that currently holds the note and the beneficial interest under the deed of trust — the original beneficiary or its assignee — or that entity’s agent. (§ 2924, subd. (a)(1) [notice of default may be filed for record only by “[t]he trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary”]; Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316, 334 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 532] [when borrower defaults on the debt, “the beneficiary may declare a default and make a demand on the trustee to commence foreclosure”]; Santens v. Los Angeles Finance Co. (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 197, 202 [204 P.2d 619] [only a person entitled to enforce the note can foreclose on the deed of trust].)

Defendants emphasize, correctly, that a borrower can generally raise no objection to assignment of the note and deed of trust. A promissory note is a negotiable instrument the lender may sell without notice to the borrower. (Creative Ventures, LLC v. Jim Ward & Associates (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1445-1446 [126 Cal.Rptr.3d 564].) The deed of trust, moreover, is inseparable from the note it secures, and follows it even without a separate assignment. (§ 2936; Cockerell v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 284, 291 [267 P.2d 16]; U.S. v. Thornburg (9th Cir. 1996) 82 F.3d 886, 892.) In accordance with this general law, the note and deed of trust in this case provided for their possible assignment.

A deed of trust may thus be assigned one or multiple times over the life of the loan it secures. But if the borrower defaults on the loan, only the current
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*928 beneficiary may direct the trustee to undertake the nonjudicial foreclosure process. “[O]nly the `true owner’ or `beneficial holder’ of a Deed of Trust can bring to completion a nonjudicial foreclosure under California law.” (Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank, N.A. (N.D.Cal. 2012) 885 F.Supp.2d 964, 972; see Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1378 [127 Cal.Rptr.3d 362] [bank and reconveyance company failed to establish they were current beneficiary and trustee, respectively, and therefore failed to show they “had authority to conduct the foreclosure sale”]; cf. U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Ibanez (2011) 458 Mass. 637 [941 N.E.2d 40, 51] [under Mass. law, only the original mortgagee or its assignee may conduct nonjudicial foreclosure sale].)

In itself, the principle that only the entity currently entitled to enforce a debt may foreclose on the mortgage or deed of trust securing that debt is not, or at least should not be, controversial. It is a “straightforward application[] of well-established commercial and real-property law: a party cannot foreclose on a mortgage unless it is the mortgagee (or its agent).” (Levitin, The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title (2013) 63 Duke L.J. 637, 640.) Describing the copious litigation arising out of the recent foreclosure crisis, a pair of commentators explained: “While plenty of uncertainty existed, one concept clearly emerged from litigation during the 2008-2012 period: in order to foreclose a mortgage by judicial action, one had to have the right to enforce the debt that the mortgage secured. It is hard to imagine how this notion could be controversial.” (Whitman & Milner, Foreclosing on Nothing: The Curious Problem of the Deed of Trust Foreclosure Without Entitlement to Enforce the Note (2013) 66 Ark. L.Rev. 21, 23, fn. omitted.)

More subject to dispute is the question presented here: Under what circumstances, if any, may the borrower challenge a nonjudicial foreclosure on the ground that the foreclosing party is not a valid assignee of the original lender? Put another way, does the borrower have standing to challenge the validity of an assignment to which he or she was not a party?[3] We proceed to that issue.

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*929 II. Borrower Standing to Challenge an Assignment as Void

(2) A beneficiary or trustee under a deed of trust who conducts an illegal, fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of property may be liable to the borrower for wrongful foreclosure. (Chavez v. Indymac Mortgage Services (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1062 [162 Cal.Rptr.3d 382]; Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1, 7 [89 Cal.Rptr. 323].)[4] A foreclosure initiated by one with no authority to do so is wrongful for purposes of such an action. (Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank, N.A., supra, 885 F.Supp.2d at pp. 973-974; Ohlendorf v. American Home Mortgage Servicing (E.D.Cal. 2010) 279 F.R.D. 575, 582-583.) As explained in part I, ante, only the original beneficiary, its assignee or an agent of one of these has the authority to instruct the trustee to initiate and complete a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. The question is whether and when a wrongful foreclosure plaintiff may challenge the authority of one who claims it by assignment.

In Glaski, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1094-1095, the court held a borrower may base a wrongful foreclosure claim on allegations that the foreclosing party acted without authority because the assignment by which it purportedly became beneficiary under the deed of trust was not merely voidable but void. Before discussing Glaski’s holdings and rationale, we review the distinction between void and voidable transactions.

(3) A void contract is without legal effect. (Rest.2d Contracts, § 7, com. a, p. 20.) “It binds no one and is a mere nullity.” (Little v. CFS Service Corp. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1354, 1362 [233 Cal.Rptr. 923].) “Such a contract has no existence whatever. It has no legal entity for any purpose and neither action nor inaction of a party to it can validate it….” (Colby v. Title Ins. and Trust Co. (1911) 160 Cal. 632, 644 [117 P. 913].) As we said of a fraudulent real property transfer in First Nat. Bank of L. A. v. Maxwell (1899) 123 Cal. 360, 371 [55 P. 980], “`A void thing is as no thing.'”

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*930 A voidable transaction, in contrast, “is one where one or more parties have the power, by a manifestation of election to do so, to avoid the legal relations created by the contract, or by ratification of the contract to extinguish the power of avoidance.” (Rest.2d Contracts, § 7, p. 20.) It may be declared void but is not void in itself. (Little v. CFS Service Corp., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1358.) Despite its defects, a voidable transaction, unlike a void one, is subject to ratification by the parties. (Rest.2d Contracts, § 7; Aronoff v. Albanese (N.Y.App.Div. 1982) 85 A.D.2d 3 [446 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370].)

In Glaski, the foreclosing entity purportedly acted for the current beneficiary, the trustee of a securitized mortgage investment trust.[5] The plaintiff, seeking relief from the allegedly wrongful foreclosure, claimed his note and deed of trust had never been validly assigned to the securitized trust because the purported assignments were made after the trust’s closing date. (Glaski, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1082-1087.)

The Glaski court began its analysis of wrongful foreclosure by agreeing with a federal district court that such a cause of action could be made out “`where a party alleged not to be the true beneficiary instructs the trustee to file a Notice of Default and initiate nonjudicial foreclosure.'” (Glaski, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1094, quoting Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank, N.A., supra, 885 F.Supp.2d at p. 973.) But the wrongful foreclosure plaintiff, Glaski cautioned, must do more than assert a lack of authority to foreclose; the plaintiff must allege facts “show[ing] the defendant who invoked the power of sale was not the true beneficiary.” (Glaski, at p. 1094.)

Acknowledging that a borrower’s assertion that an assignment of the note and deed of trust is invalid raises the question of the borrower’s standing to challenge an assignment to which the borrower is not a party, the Glaski court cited several federal court decisions for the proposition that a borrower has standing to challenge such an assignment as void, though not as voidable. (Glaski, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1094-1095.) Two of these decisions, Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska (1st Cir. 2013) 708 F.3d 282 (Culhane) and Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (5th Cir. 2013)
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*931 735 F.3d 220 (Reinagel),[6] discussed standing at some length; we will examine them in detail in a moment.

Glaski adopted from the federal decisions and a California treatise the view that “a borrower can challenge an assignment of his or her note and deed of trust if the defect asserted would void the assignment” not merely render it voidable. (Glaski, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1095.) Cases holding that a borrower may never challenge an assignment because the borrower was neither a party to nor a third party beneficiary of the assignment agreement “`paint with too broad a brush'” by failing to distinguish between void and voidable agreements. (Ibid., quoting Culhane, supra, 708 F.3d at p. 290.)

The Glaski court went on to resolve the question of whether the plaintiff had pled a defect in the chain of assignments leading to the foreclosing party that would, if true, render one of the necessary assignments void rather than voidable. (Glaski, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1095.) On this point, Glaski held allegations that the plaintiff’s note and deed of trust were purportedly transferred into the trust after the trust’s closing date were sufficient to plead a void assignment and hence to establish standing. (Glaski, at pp. 1096-1098.) This last holding of Glaski is not before us. On granting plaintiff’s petition for review, we limited the scope of our review to whether “the borrower [has] standing to challenge an assignment of the note and deed of trust on the basis of defects allegedly rendering the assignment void.” We did not include in our order the question of whether a postclosing date transfer into a New York securitized trust is void or merely voidable, and though the parties’ briefs address it, we express no opinion on the question here.

Returning to the question that is before us, we consider in more detail the authority Glaski relied on for its standing holding. In Culhane, a Massachusetts home loan borrower sought relief from her nonjudicial foreclosure on the ground that the assignment by which Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska (Aurora) claimed authority to foreclose — a transfer of the mortgage from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS),[7] to Aurora — was void because MERS never properly held the mortgage. (Culhane, supra, 708 F.3d at pp. 286-288, 291.)

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*932 Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff’s allegations, the Culhane court considered Aurora’s contention the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the assignment of her mortgage from MERS to Aurora. On this question, the court first concluded the plaintiff had a sufficient personal stake in the outcome, having shown a concrete and personalized injury resulting from the challenged assignment: “The action challenged here relates to Aurora’s right to foreclose by virtue of the assignment from MERS. The identified harm — the foreclosure — can be traced directly to Aurora’s exercise of the authority purportedly delegated by the assignment.” (Culhane, supra, 708 F.3d at pp. 289-290.)

Culhane next considered whether the prudential principle that a litigant should not be permitted to assert the rights and interest of another dictates that borrowers lack standing to challenge mortgage assignments as to which they are neither parties nor third party beneficiaries. (Culhane, supra, 708 F.3d at p. 290.) Two aspects of Massachusetts law on nonjudicial foreclosure persuaded the court such a broad rule is unwarranted. First, only the mortgagee (that is, the original lender or its assignee) may exercise the power of sale,[8] and the borrower is entitled to relief from foreclosure by an unauthorized party. (Culhane, at p. 290.) Second, in a nonjudicial foreclosure the borrower has no direct opportunity to challenge the foreclosing entity’s authority in court. Without standing to sue for relief from a wrongful foreclosure, “a Massachusetts mortgagor would be deprived of a means to assert her legal protections.” (Ibid.) These considerations led the Culhane court to conclude “a mortgagor has standing to challenge the assignment of a mortgage on her home to the extent that such a challenge is necessary to contest a foreclosing entity’s status qua mortgagee.” (Id. at p. 291.)

The court immediately cautioned that its holding was limited to allegations of a void transfer. If, for example, the assignor had no interest to assign or had no authority to make the particular assignment, “a challenge of this sort would be sufficient to refute an assignee’s status qua mortgagee.” (Culhane, supra, 708 F.3d at p. 291.) But where the alleged defect in an assignment would “render it merely voidable at the election of one party but otherwise effective to pass legal title,” the borrower has no standing to challenge the assignment on that basis. (Ibid.)[9]

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*933 In Reinagel, upon which the Glaski court also relied, the federal court held that under Texas law borrowers defending against a judicial foreclosure have standing to “`challenge the chain of assignments by which a party claims a right to foreclose.'” (Reinagel, supra, 735 F.3d at p. 224.) Though Texas law does not allow a nonparty to a contract to enforce the contract unless he or she is an intended third party beneficiary, the borrowers in this situation “are not attempting to enforce the terms of the instruments of assignment; to the contrary, they urge that the assignments are void ab initio.” (Id. at p. 225.)

Like Culhane, Reinagel distinguished between defects that render a transaction void and those that merely make it voidable at a party’s behest. “Though `the law is settled’ in Texas that an obligor cannot defend against an assignee’s efforts to enforce the obligation on a ground that merely renders the assignment voidable at the election of the assignor, Texas courts follow the majority rule that the obligor may defend `on any ground which renders the assignment void.'” (Reinagel, supra, 735 F.3d at p. 225.) The contrary rule would allow an institution to foreclose on a borrower’s property “though it is not a valid party to the deed of trust or promissory note.” (Ibid.)[10]

Jenkins, on which the Court of Appeal below relied, was decided close in time to Glaski (neither decision discusses the other) but reaches the opposite conclusion on standing. In Jenkins, the plaintiff sued to prevent a foreclosure sale that had not yet occurred, alleging the purported beneficiary who sought the sale held no security interest because a purported transfer of the loan into a securitized trust was made in violation of the pooling and servicing agreement that governed the investment trust. (Jenkins, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 504-505.)

The appellate court held a demurrer to the plaintiff’s cause of action for declaratory relief was properly sustained for two reasons. First, Jenkins held California law did not permit a “preemptive judicial action[] to challenge the right, power, and authority of a foreclosing `beneficiary’ or beneficiary’s `agent’ to initiate and pursue foreclosure.” (Jenkins, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 511.) Relying primarily on Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1149 [121 Cal.Rptr.3d 819], Jenkins reasoned that such preemptive suits are inconsistent with California’s comprehensive statutory scheme for nonjudicial foreclosure; allowing such a lawsuit “`would fundamentally undermine the nonjudicial nature of the process and introduce the
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*934 possibility of lawsuits filed solely for the purpose of delaying valid foreclosures.'” (Jenkins, at p. 513, quoting Gomes at p. 1155.)

This aspect of Jenkins, disallowing the use of a lawsuit to preempt a nonjudicial foreclosure, is not within the scope of our review, which is limited to a borrower’s standing to challenge an assignment in an action seeking remedies for wrongful foreclosure. As framed by the proceedings below, the concrete question in the present case is whether plaintiff should be permitted to amend her complaint to seek redress, in a wrongful foreclosure count, for the trustee’s sale that has already taken place. We do not address the distinct question of whether, or under what circumstances, a borrower may bring an action for injunctive or declaratory relief to prevent a foreclosure sale from going forward.

Second, as an alternative ground, Jenkins held a demurrer to the declaratory relief claim was proper because the plaintiff had failed to allege an actual controversy as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1060. (Jenkins, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 513.) The plaintiff did not dispute that her loan could be assigned or that she had defaulted on it and remained in arrears. (Id. at p. 514.) Even if one of the assignments of the note and deed of trust was improper in some respect, the appellate court reasoned, “Jenkins is not the victim of such invalid transfer[] because her obligations under the note remained unchanged. Instead, the true victim may be an individual or entity that believes it has a present beneficial interest in the promissory note and may suffer the unauthorized loss of its interest in the note.” (Id. at p. 515.) In particular, the plaintiff could not complain about violations of the securitized trust’s transfer rules: “As an unrelated third party to the alleged securitization, and any other subsequent transfers of the beneficial interest under the promissory note, Jenkins lacks standing to enforce any agreements, including the investment trust’s pooling and servicing agreement, relating to such transactions.” (Ibid.)

For its conclusion on standing, Jenkins cited Correia v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (Bankr. 1st Cir. 2011) 452 B.R. 319. The borrowers in that case challenged a foreclosure on the ground that the assignment of their mortgage into a securitized trust had not been made in accordance with the trust’s pooling and servicing agreement (PSA). (Id. at pp. 321-322.) The appellate court held the borrowers “lacked standing to challenge the mortgage’s chain of title under the PSA.” (Id. at p. 324.) Being neither parties nor third party beneficiaries of the pooling agreement, they could not complain of a failure to abide by its terms. (Ibid.)

Jenkins also cited Herrera v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1495 [141 Cal.Rptr.3d 326], which primarily addressed the
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*935 merits of a foreclosure challenge, concluding the borrowers had adduced no facts on which they could allege an assignment from MERS to another beneficiary was invalid. (Id. at pp. 1502-1506.) In reaching the merits, the court did not explicitly discuss the plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the assignment. In a passage cited in Jenkins, however, the court observed that the plaintiffs, in order to state a wrongful foreclosure claim, needed to show prejudice, and they could not do so because the challenged assignment did not change their obligations under the note. (Herrera, at pp. 1507-1508.) Even if MERS lacked the authority to assign the deed of trust, “the true victims were not plaintiffs but the lender.” (Id. at p. 1508.)

On the narrow question before us — whether a wrongful foreclosure plaintiff may challenge an assignment to the foreclosing entity as void — we conclude Glaski provides a more logical answer than Jenkins. As explained in part I, ante, only the entity holding the beneficial interest under the deed of trust — the original lender, its assignee, or an agent of one of these — may instruct the trustee to commence and complete a nonjudicial foreclosure. (§ 2924, subd. (a)(1); Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank, N.A., supra, 885 F.Supp.2d at p. 972.) If a purported assignment necessary to the chain by which the foreclosing entity claims that power is absolutely void, meaning of no legal force or effect whatsoever (Colby v. Title Ins. and Trust Co., supra, 160 Cal. at p. 644; Rest.2d Contracts, § 7, com. a, p. 20), the foreclosing entity has acted without legal authority by pursuing a trustee’s sale, and such an unauthorized sale constitutes a wrongful foreclosure. (Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank, N.A., at pp. 973-974.)

(4) Like the Massachusetts borrowers considered in Culhane, whose mortgages contained a power of sale allowing for nonjudicial foreclosure, California borrowers whose loans are secured by a deed of trust with a power of sale may suffer foreclosure without judicial process and thus “would be deprived of a means to assert [their] legal protections” if not permitted to challenge the foreclosing entity’s authority through an action for wrongful foreclosure. (Culhane, supra, 708 F.3d at p. 290.) A borrower therefore “has standing to challenge the assignment of a mortgage on her home to the extent that such a challenge is necessary to contest a foreclosing entity’s status qua mortgagee” (id. at p. 291) — that is, as the current holder of the beneficial interest under the deed of trust. (Accord, Wilson v. HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. (1st Cir. 2014) 744 F.3d 1, 9 [“A homeowner in Massachusetts — even when not a party to or third party beneficiary of a mortgage assignment — has standing to challenge that assignment as void because success on the merits
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*936 would prove the purported assignee is not, in fact, the mortgagee and therefore lacks any right to foreclose on the mortgage.”].)[11]

(5) Jenkins and other courts denying standing have done so partly out of concern with allowing a borrower to enforce terms of a transfer agreement to which the borrower was not a party. In general, California law does not give a party personal standing to assert rights or interests belonging solely to others.[12] (See Code Civ. Proc., § 367 [action must be brought by or on behalf of the real party in interest]; Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 980, 992 [103 Cal.Rptr.3d 426].) When an assignment is merely voidable, the power to ratify or avoid the transaction lies solely with the parties to the assignment; the transaction is not void unless and until one of the parties takes steps to make it so. A borrower who challenges a foreclosure on the ground that an assignment to the foreclosing party bore defects rendering it voidable could thus be said to assert an interest belonging solely to the parties to the assignment rather than to herself.

When the plaintiff alleges a void assignment, however, the Jenkins court’s concern with enforcement of a third party’s interests is misplaced. Borrowers who challenge the foreclosing party’s authority on the grounds of a void assignment “are not attempting to enforce the terms of the instruments of assignment; to the contrary, they urge that the assignments are void ab initio.” (Reinagel, supra, 735 F.3d at p. 225; accord, Mruk v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (R.I. 2013) 82 A.3d 527, 536 [borrowers challenging an assignment as void “are not attempting to assert the rights of one of the contracting parties; instead, the homeowners are asserting their own rights not to have their homes unlawfully foreclosed upon”].)

Unlike a voidable transaction, a void one cannot be ratified or validated by the parties to it even if they so desire. (Colby v. Title Ins. and Trust Co., supra, 160 Cal. at p. 644; Aronoff v. Albanese, supra, 446 N.Y.S.2d at p. 370.) Parties to a securitization or other transfer agreement may well wish to ratify the transfer agreement despite any defects, but no ratification is possible if the assignment is void ab initio. In seeking a finding that an assignment agreement was void, therefore, a plaintiff in Yvanova’s position is not
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*937 asserting the interests of parties to the assignment; she is asserting her own interest in limiting foreclosure on her property to those with legal authority to order a foreclosure sale. This, then, is not a situation in which standing to sue is lacking because its “sole object … is to settle rights of third persons who are not parties.” (Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. v. Felt (1931) 214 Cal. 308, 316 [5 P.2d 585].)

Defendants argue a borrower who is in default on his or her loan suffers no prejudice from foreclosure by an unauthorized party, since the actual holder of the beneficial interest on the deed of trust could equally well have foreclosed on the property. As the Jenkins court put it, when an invalid transfer of a note and deed of trust leads to foreclosure by an unauthorized party, the “victim” is not the borrower, whose obligations under the note are unaffected by the transfer, but “an individual or entity that believes it has a present beneficial interest in the promissory note and may suffer the unauthorized loss of its interest in the note.” (Jenkins, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 515; see also Siliga v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 75, 85 [161 Cal.Rptr.3d 500] [borrowers had no standing to challenge assignment by MERS where they do not dispute they are in default and “there is no reason to believe … the original lender would have refrained from foreclosure in these circumstances”]; Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 272 [wrongful foreclosure plaintiff could not show prejudice from allegedly invalid assignment by MERS as the assignment “merely substituted one creditor for another, without changing her obligations under the note”].)

(6) In deciding the limited question on review, we are concerned only with prejudice in the sense of an injury sufficiently concrete and personal to provide standing, not with prejudice as a possible element of the wrongful foreclosure tort. (See fn. 4, ante.) As it relates to standing, we disagree with defendants’ analysis of prejudice from an illegal foreclosure. A foreclosed-upon borrower clearly meets the general standard for standing to sue by showing an invasion of his or her legally protected interests (Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 175 [59 Cal.Rptr.3d 142, 158 P.3d 718]) — the borrower has lost ownership to the home in an allegedly illegal trustee’s sale. (See Culhane, supra, 708 F.3d at p. 289 [foreclosed-upon borrower has sufficient personal stake in action against foreclosing entity to meet federal standing requirement].) Moreover, the bank or other entity that ordered the foreclosure would not have done so absent the allegedly void assignment. Thus “[t]he identified harm — the foreclosure — can be traced directly to [the foreclosing entity’s] exercise of the authority purportedly delegated by the assignment.” (Id. at p. 290.)

Nor is it correct that the borrower has no cognizable interest in the identity of the party enforcing his or her debt. Though the borrower is not entitled to
938
*938 object to an assignment of the promissory note, he or she is obligated to pay the debt, or suffer loss of the security, only to a person or entity that has actually been assigned the debt. (See Cockerell v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., supra, 42 Cal.2d at p. 292 [party claiming under an assignment must prove fact of assignment].) The borrower owes money not to the world at large but to a particular person or institution, and only the person or institution entitled to payment may enforce the debt by foreclosing on the security.

(7) It is no mere “procedural nicety,” from a contractual point of view, to insist that only those with authority to foreclose on a borrower be permitted to do so. (Levitin, The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title, supra, 63 Duke L.J. at p. 650.) “Such a view fundamentally misunderstands the mortgage contract. The mortgage contract is not simply an agreement that the home may be sold upon a default on the loan. Instead, it is an agreement that if the homeowner defaults on the loan, the mortgagee may sell the property pursuant to the requisite legal procedure.” (Ibid., italics added & omitted.)

The logic of defendants’ no-prejudice argument implies that anyone, even a stranger to the debt, could declare a default and order a trustee’s sale — and the borrower would be left with no recourse because, after all, he or she owed the debt to someone, though not to the foreclosing entity. This would be an “odd result” indeed. (Reinagel, supra, 735 F.3d at p. 225.) As a district court observed in rejecting the no-prejudice argument, “[b]anks are neither private attorneys general nor bounty hunters, armed with a roving commission to seek out defaulting homeowners and take away their homes in satisfaction of some other bank’s deed of trust.” (Miller v. Homecomings Financial, LLC (S.D.Tex. 2012) 881 F.Supp.2d 825, 832.)

Defendants note correctly that a plaintiff in Yvanova’s position, having suffered an allegedly unauthorized nonjudicial foreclosure of her home, need not now fear another creditor coming forward to collect the debt. The home can only be foreclosed once, and the trustee’s sale extinguishes the debt. (Code Civ. Proc., § 580d; Dreyfuss v. Union Bank of California, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 411.) But as the Attorney General points out in her amicus curiae brief, a holding that anyone may foreclose on a defaulting home loan borrower would multiply the risk for homeowners that they might face a foreclosure at some point in the life of their loans. The possibility that multiple parties could each foreclose at some time, that is, increases the borrower’s overall risk of foreclosure.

Defendants suggest that to establish prejudice the plaintiff must allege and prove that the true beneficiary under the deed of trust would have refrained from foreclosing on the plaintiff’s property. Whatever merit this rule would
939
*939 have as to prejudice as an element of the wrongful foreclosure tort, it misstates the type of injury required for standing. A homeowner who has been foreclosed on by one with no right to do so has suffered an injurious invasion of his or her legal rights at the foreclosing entity’s hands. No more is required for standing to sue. (Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 175.)

Neither Caulfield v. Sanders (1861) 17 Cal. 569 nor Seidell v. Tuxedo Land Co. (1932) 216 Cal. 165 [13 P.2d 686], upon which defendants rely, holds or implies a home loan borrower may not challenge a foreclosure by alleging a void assignment. In the first of these cases, we held a debtor on a contract for printing and advertising could not defend against collection of the debt on the ground it had been assigned without proper consultation among the assigning partners and for nominal consideration: “It is of no consequence to the defendant, as it in no respect affects his liability, whether the transfer was made at one time or another, or with or without consideration, or by one or by all the members of the firm.” (Caulfield v. Sanders, at p. 572.) In the second, we held landowners seeking to enjoin a foreclosure on a deed of trust to their land could not do so by challenging the validity of an assignment of the promissory note the deed of trust secured. (Seidell v. Tuxedo Land Co., at pp. 166, 169-170.) We explained that the assignment was made by an agent of the beneficiary, and that despite the landowner’s claim the agent lacked authority for the assignment, the beneficiary “is not now complaining.” (Id. at p. 170.) Neither decision discusses the distinction between allegedly void and merely voidable, and neither negates a borrower’s ability to challenge an assignment of his or her debt as void.

(8) For these reasons, we conclude Glaski, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, was correct to hold a wrongful foreclosure plaintiff has standing to claim the foreclosing entity’s purported authority to order a trustee’s sale was based on a void assignment of the note and deed of trust. Jenkins, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th 497, spoke too broadly in holding a borrower lacks standing to challenge an assignment of the note and deed of trust to which the borrower was neither a party nor a third party beneficiary. Jenkins’s rule may hold as to claimed defects that would make the assignment merely voidable, but not as to alleged defects rendering the assignment absolutely void.[13]

In embracing Glaski’s rule that borrowers have standing to challenge assignments as void, but not as voidable, we join several courts around the
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*940 nation. (Wilson v. HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc., supra, 744 F.3d at p. 9; Reinagel, supra, 735 F.3d at pp. 224-225; Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (1st Cir. 2013) 733 F.3d 349, 354; Culhane, supra, 708 F.3d at pp. 289-291; Miller v. Homecomings Financial, LLC, supra, 881 F.Supp.2d at pp. 831-832; Bank of America National Assn. v. Bassman FBT, LLC, supra, 981 N.E.2d at pp. 7-8; Pike v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (N.H. 2015) 121 A.3d 279, 281; Mruk v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., supra, 82 A.3d at pp. 534-536; Dernier v. Mortgage Network, Inc. (2013) 195 Vt. 113 [87 A.3d 465, 473].) Indeed, as commentators on the issue have stated: “[C]ourts generally permit challenges to assignments if such challenges would prove that the assignments were void as opposed to voidable.” (Zacks & Zacks, Not a Party: Challenging Mortgage Assignments (2014) 59 St. Louis U. L.J. 175, 180.)

That several federal courts applying California law have, largely in unreported decisions, agreed with Jenkins and declined to follow Glaski does not alter our conclusion. Neither Khan v. Recontrust Co. (N.D.Cal. 2015) 81 F.Supp.3d 867 nor Flores v. EMC Mortgage Co. (E.D.Cal. 2014) 997 F.Supp.2d 1088 adds much to the discussion. In Khan, the district court found the borrower, as a nonparty to the PSA, lacked standing to challenge a foreclosure on the basis of an unspecified flaw in the loan’s securitization; the court’s opinion does not discuss the distinction between a void assignment and a merely voidable one. (Khan v. Recontrust Co., supra, 81 F.Supp.3d at pp. 872-873.) In Flores, the district court, considering a wrongful foreclosure complaint that lacked sufficient clarity in its allegations including identification of the assignment or assignments challenged, the district court quoted and followed Jenkins’s reasoning on the borrower’s lack of standing to enforce an agreement to which he or she is not a party, without addressing the application of this reasoning to allegedly void assignments. (Flores v. EMC Mortgage Co., supra, at pp. 1103-1105.)

Similarly, the unreported federal decisions applying California law largely fail to grapple with Glaski’s distinction between void and voidable assignments and tend merely to repeat Jenkins’s arguments that a borrower, as a nonparty to an assignment, may not enforce its terms and cannot show prejudice when in default on the loan, arguments we have found insufficient with regard to allegations of void assignments. While unreported federal court decisions may be cited in California as persuasive authority (Kan v. Guild Mortgage Co. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 736, 744, fn. 3 [178 Cal.Rptr.3d 745]), in this instance they lack persuasive value.

Defendants cite the decision in Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2nd Cir. 2014) 757 F.3d 79 (Rajamin), as a “rebuke” of Glaski. Rajamin’s expressed disagreement with Glaski, however, was on the question
941
*941 whether, under New York law, an assignment to a securitized trust made after the trust’s closing date is void or merely voidable. (Rajamin, at p. 90.) As explained earlier, that question is outside the scope of our review and we express no opinion as to Glaski’s correctness on the point.

The Rajamin court did, in an earlier discussion, state generally that borrowers lack standing to challenge an assignment as violative of the securitized trust’s PSA (Rajamin, supra, 757 F.3d at pp. 85-86), but the court in that portion of its analysis did not distinguish between void and voidable assignments. In a later portion of its analysis, the court “assum[ed] that `standing exists for challenges that contend that the assigning party never possessed legal title,'” a defect the plaintiffs claimed made the assignments void (id. at p. 90), but concluded the plaintiffs had not properly alleged facts to support their voidness theory (id. at pp. 90-91).

Nor do Kan v. Guild Mortgage Co., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th 736, and Siliga v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., supra, 219 Cal.App.4th 75 (Siliga), which defendants also cite, persuade us Glaski erred in finding borrower standing to challenge an assignment as void. The Kan court distinguished Glaski as involving a postsale wrongful foreclosure claim, as opposed to the preemptive suits involved in Jenkins and Kan itself. (Kan, at pp. 743-744.) On standing, the Kan court noted the federal criticism of Glaski and our grant of review in the present case, but found “no reason to wade into the issue of whether Glaski was correctly decided, because the opinion has no direct applicability to this preforeclosure action.” (Kan, at p. 745.)

Siliga, similarly, followed Jenkins in disapproving a preemptive lawsuit. (Siliga, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 82.) Without discussing Glaski, the Siliga court also held the borrower plaintiffs failed to show any prejudice from, and therefore lacked standing to challenge, the assignment of their deed of trust to the foreclosing entity. (Siliga, at p. 85.) As already explained, this prejudice analysis misses the mark in the wrongful foreclosure context. When a property has been sold at a trustee’s sale at the direction of an entity with no legal authority to do so, the borrower has suffered a cognizable injury.

In further support of a borrower’s standing to challenge the foreclosing party’s authority, plaintiff points to provisions of the recent legislation known as the California Homeowner Bill of Rights, enacted in 2012 and effective only after the trustee’s sale in this case. (See Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49, 86, fn. 14 [163 Cal.Rptr.3d 804].)[14]
942
*942 Having concluded without reference to this legislation that borrowers do have standing to challenge an assignment as void, we need not decide whether the new provisions provide additional support for that holding.

Plaintiff has alleged that her deed of trust was assigned to the Morgan Stanley investment trust in December 2011, several years after both the securitized trust’s closing date and New Century’s liquidation in bankruptcy, a defect plaintiff claims renders the assignment void. Beyond their general claim a borrower has no standing to challenge an assignment of the deed of trust, defendants make several arguments against allowing plaintiff to plead a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure based on this allegedly void assignment.

Principally, defendants argue the December 2011 assignment of the deed of trust to Deutsche Bank, as trustee for the investment trust, was merely “confirmatory” of a 2007 assignment that had been executed in blank (i.e., without designation of assignee) when the loan was added to the trust’s investment pool. The purpose of the 2011 recorded assignment, defendants assert, was merely to comply with a requirement in the trust’s PSA that documents be recorded before foreclosures are initiated. An amicus curiae supporting defendants’ position asserts that the general practice in home loan securitization is to initially execute assignments of loans and mortgages or deeds of trust to the trustee in blank and not to record them; the mortgage or deed of trust is subsequently endorsed by the trustee and recorded if and when state law requires. (See Rajamin, supra, 757 F.3d at p. 91.) This claim, which goes not to the legal issue of a borrower’s standing to sue for wrongful foreclosure based on a void assignment, but rather to the factual question of when the assignment in this case was actually made, is outside the limited scope of our review. The same is true of defendants’ remaining factual claims, including that the text of the investment trust’s PSA demonstrates plaintiff’s deed of trust was assigned to the trust before it closed.

CONCLUSION

We conclude a home loan borrower has standing to claim a nonjudicial foreclosure was wrongful because an assignment by which the foreclosing
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*943 party purportedly took a beneficial interest in the deed of trust was not merely voidable but void, depriving the foreclosing party of any legitimate authority to order a trustee’s sale. The Court of Appeal took the opposite view and, solely on that basis, concluded plaintiff could not amend her operative complaint to plead a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure. We must therefore reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment and allow that court to reconsider the question of an amendment to plead wrongful foreclosure. We express no opinion on whether plaintiff has alleged facts showing a void assignment, or on any other issue relevant to her ability to state a claim for wrongful foreclosure.

DISPOSITION

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.

Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., Corrigan, J., Liu, J., Cuéllar, J., Kruger, J., and Huffman, J.,[*] concurred.

[1] The superior court granted defendants’ request for judicial notice of the recorded deed of trust, assignment of the deed of trust, substitution of trustee, notices of default and of trustee’s sale, and trustee’s deed upon sale. The existence and facial contents of these recorded documents were properly noticed in the trial court under Evidence Code sections 452, subdivisions (c) and (h), and 453. (See Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264-266 [129 Cal.Rptr.3d 467].) Under Evidence Code section 459, subdivision (a), notice by this court is therefore mandatory. We therefore take notice of their existence and contents, though not of disputed or disputable facts stated therein. (See Glaski v. Bank of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1102 [160 Cal.Rptr.3d 449].)

[2] All further unspecified statutory references are to the Civil Code.

[3] Somewhat confusingly, both the purported assignee’s authority to foreclose and the borrower’s ability to challenge that authority have been framed as questions of “standing.” (See, e.g., Levitin, The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title, supra, 63 Duke L.J. at p. 644 [discussing purported assignee’s “standing to foreclose”]; Jenkins, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 515 [borrower lacks “standing to enforce [assignment] agreements” to which he or she is not a party]; Bank of America National Assn. v. Bassman FBT, LLC (2012) 2012 Ill. App. 2d 110729 [366 Ill.Dec. 936, 981 N.E.2d 1, 7] [“Each party contends that the other lacks standing.”].) We use the term here in the latter sense of a borrower’s legal authority to challenge the validity of an assignment.

[4] It has been held that, at least when seeking to set aside the foreclosure sale, the plaintiff must also show prejudice and a tender of the amount of the secured indebtedness, or an excuse of tender. (Chavez v. Indymac Mortgage Services, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1062.) Tender has been excused when, among other circumstances, the plaintiff alleges the foreclosure deed is facially void, as arguably is the case when the entity that initiated the sale lacked authority to do so. (Ibid.; In re Cedano (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2012) 470 B.R. 522, 529-530; Lester v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (N.D.Cal. 2013) 926 F.Supp.2d 1081, 1093; Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank, N.A., supra, 885 F.Supp.2d 964, 969-970.) Our review being limited to the standing question, we express no opinion as to whether plaintiff Yvanova must allege tender to state a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure under the circumstances of this case. Nor do we discuss potential remedies for a plaintiff in Yvanova’s circumstances; at oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel conceded she seeks only damages. As to prejudice, we do not address it as an element of wrongful foreclosure. We do, however, discuss whether plaintiff has suffered a cognizable injury for standing purposes.

[5] The mortgage securitization process has been concisely described as follows: “To raise funds for new mortgages, a mortgage lender sells pools of mortgages into trusts created to receive the stream of interest and principal payments from the mortgage borrowers. The right to receive trust income is parceled into certificates and sold to investors, called certificateholders. The trustee hires a mortgage servicer to administer the mortgages by enforcing the mortgage terms and administering the payments. The terms of the securitization trusts as well as the rights, duties, and obligations of the trustee, seller, and servicer are set forth in a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (`PSA’).” (BlackRock Financial Management v. Ambac Assurance Corp. (2d Cir. 2012) 673 F.3d 169, 173.)

[6] The version of Reinagel cited in Glaski, published at 722 F.3d 700, was amended on rehearing and superseded by Reinagel, supra, 735 F.3d 220.

[7] As the Culhane court explained, MERS was formed by a consortium of residential mortgage lenders and investors to streamline the transfer of mortgage loans and thereby facilitate their securitization. A member lender may name MERS as mortgagee on a loan the member originates or owns; MERS acts solely as the lender’s “nominee,” having legal title but no beneficial interest in the loan. When a loan is assigned to another MERS member, MERS can execute the transfer by amending its electronic database. When the loan is assigned to a nonmember, MERS executes the assignment and ends its involvement. (Culhane, supra, 708 F.3d at p. 287.)

[8] Massachusetts General Laws chapter 183, section 21, similarly to our Civil Code section 2924, provides that the power of sale in a mortgage may be exercised by “the mortgagee or his executors, administrators, successors or assigns.”

[9] On the merits, the Culhane court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that MERS never properly held her mortgage, giving her standing to challenge the assignment from MERS to Aurora as void (Culhane, supra, 708 F.3d at p. 291); the court held MERS’s role as the lender’s nominee allowed it to hold and assign the mortgage under Massachusetts law. (Id. at pp. 291-293.)

[10] The Reinagel court nonetheless rejected the plaintiffs’ claim of an invalid assignment after the closing date of a securitized trust, observing they could not enforce the terms of trust because they were not intended third party beneficiaries. The court’s holding appears, however, to rest at least in part on its conclusion that a violation of the closing date “would not render the assignments void” but merely allow them to be avoided at the behest of a party or third party beneficiary. (Reinagel, supra, 735 F.3d at p. 228.) As discussed above in relation to Glaski, that question is not within the scope of our review.

[11] We cite decisions on federal court standing only for their persuasive value in determining what California standing law should be, without any assumption that standing in the two systems is identical. The California Constitution does not impose the same “`case-or-controversy'” limit on state courts’ jurisdiction as article III of the United States Constitution does on federal courts. (Grosset v. Wenaas (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1100, 1117, fn. 13 [72 Cal.Rptr.3d 129, 175 P.3d 1184].)

[12] In speaking of personal standing to sue, we set aside such doctrines as taxpayer standing to seek injunctive relief (see Code Civ. Proc., § 526a) and “`”public right/public duty”‘” standing to seek a writ of mandate (see Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011) 52 Cal.4th 155, 166 [127 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 254 P.3d 1005]).

[13] We disapprove Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., supra, 216 Cal.App.4th 497, Siliga v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., supra, 219 Cal.App.4th 75, Herrera v. Federal National Mortgage Assn., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th 1495, and Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., supra, 198 Cal.App.4th 256, to the extent they held borrowers lack standing to challenge an assignment of the deed of trust as void.

[14] Plaintiff cites newly added provisions that prohibit any entity from initiating a foreclosure process “unless it is the holder of the beneficial interest under the mortgage or deed of trust, the original trustee or the substituted trustee under the deed of trust, or the designated agent of the holder of the beneficial interest” (§ 2924, subd. (a)(6)); require the loan servicer to inform the borrower, before a notice of default is filed, of the borrower’s right to request copies of any assignments of the deed of trust “required to demonstrate the right of the mortgage servicer to foreclose” (§ 2923.55, subd. (b)(1)(B)(iii)); and require the servicer to ensure the documentation substantiates the right to foreclose (§ 2924.17, subd. (b)). The legislative history indicates the addition of these provisions was prompted in part by reports that nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings were being initiated on behalf of companies with no authority to foreclose. (See Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Conf. Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 900 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 27, 2012, p. 26.)

[*] Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.