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Full Deposition of Residential Funding/GMAC JUDY FABER: US BANK v. Cook

Full Deposition of Residential Funding/GMAC JUDY FABER: US BANK v. Cook

Make sure you read this carefully…This is a transcript of an employee of Residential Funding Company who is in charge of record keeping of original documents. Don’t miss the full deposition down below.

Follow the assets, don’t get lost in the trail…

17 Q. Now, when you said you’re the Director of
18 Records Management for the Minnesota office?

19 A. Uh-huh.

20 Q. Are there other offices of Residential
21 Funding that maintain records that you are
22 not responsible for?

23 A. There are records services sites in Iowa and
24 in Pennsylvania. Those deal mostly with the
25 GMAC mortgage assets.


11 Q. And what, if anything, is your responsibility
12 with regard to those records?

13 A. To track the physical paper for those
14 assets — or that asset.

15 Q. Are you what you consider to be the keeper of
16 the records for those documents?

17 A. Sure, yep.

5 Q. Okay. And then when somebody wants to view
6 specific records from your system, is that
7 something that you’re responsible for
8 obtaining as part of your day-to-day
9 responsibilities?

10 A. The people that report to me, yes, or the
11 vendor that — that we have retained to do
12 those functions, yes. I don’t do that
13 myself.

14 Q. Who’s the vendor that you retain to do that?

15 A. A company called ACS.

16 Q. ACS?

17 A. Yep.

18 Q. And what does ACS do with regard to the
19 records?

20 A. They fulfill the request. So if somebody
21 needs a credit folder or a legal folder, they
22 research where those documents are, obtain
23 the documents and then provide that requestor
24 with either the paper documents or images.


21 Q. There’s a file folder that shows it came from
22 the outside vendor?

23 A. Yes. Their sticker is affixed to the front
24 of the folder, so I know it came from them.

25 Q. Okay. And then is there anything on the
1 documents themselves that show where they
2 came from?

3 A. No.

4 Q. And by the outside vendor, do you mean ACS?

5 A. No. Actually, the vendor that stores the
6 actual folder is Iron Mountain.

7 Q. So there’s a sticker on that file that shows
8 it came from Iron Mountain?

9 A. Correct, yes.

10 Q. Does Iron Mountain maintain your system or do
11 they just maintain hard copies of documents?

12 A. They maintain the hard copies of the
13 documents.

14 Q. Not any records on your computer system,
15 correct?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Is that correct?

18 A. Correct.


18 Q. What’s the relationship between Residential
19 Funding Company, LLC and U.S. Bank National
20 Association?

21 A. In — in this instance, U.S. Bank is the
22 trustee on the security that this loan is in.
23 And RFC was the issuer of the security that
24 was created.

25 Q. Who was the issuer of the security?

1 A. RFC was the issuer of the security.

2 Q. Oh, RFC is what you call Residential Funding
3 Company?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So RFC issued the security?

6 A. Right.

7 Q. Can you explain to me what that means?

8 A. No, I can’t.

9 Q. Okay. How do you know RFC issued the
10 security?

11 A. It’s the normal course of business as to how
12 our — our business works. RFC is in the
13 business of acquiring assets and putting them
14 together into securities to sell in the — in
15 the market.

16 MR. SHAW: I would like to
17 register a general objection to this line of
18 questioning. There’s not been a foundation
19 laid for Judy Faber being competent to reach
20 some of these conclusions that are being
21 stated on the record.

23 Q. So in this particular instance, do you have
24 any personal knowledge of the relationship
25 between RFC and U.S. Bank National
1 Association as trustee?

2 A. No.

3 Q. For whom is U.S. Bank National Association
4 acting as the trustee?

5 A. I believe it would be for the investors of
6 the — that have bought the securities.

7 Q. I’m sorry. Something happened with the phone
8 and I didn’t hear your answer. I’m sorry.

9 A. I believe it would be for the different
10 investors who have bought pieces of that
11 security that was issued.

12 Q. Are there different investors that have
13 purchased the Peter Cook note?

14 A. I don’t think I’m qualified to answer that.
15 You know, I can tell you from what my basic
16 understanding is from the process, but I’m
17 not an expert.

18 MR. SHAW: Once again, I’d like to
19 raise a continuing general objection that she
20 being — testifying with respect to what her
21 job is, and I believe you’re getting into
22 areas that is other than what her job is and
23 you’re asking for possibly even legal
24 conclusions here. So I would like to raise
25 that objection again.


[ipaper docId=39156662 access_key=key-hxfsobk1503f3iza8sn height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in assignment of mortgage, bifurcate, conspiracy, deposition, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, GMAC, mbs, securitization, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, trade secrets, trustee, Trusts, us bank2 Comments

YOU MUST READ! Federal Bankruptcy Trustee Joins Litigation Against Lender Processing Services (LPS)

YOU MUST READ! Federal Bankruptcy Trustee Joins Litigation Against Lender Processing Services (LPS)

WOW! Lender Processing Services is up against some BIG TIME players!

According to Naked Capitalism:

The standing Chapter 13 Trustee for the Northern District of Mississippi, Locke Barkley, has joined the case on behalf of herself and of all Chapter 13 Trustees in the US.

and also

The filings were amended to add counsel with class action expertise. On the Federal case, in Mississippi, CaseyGerry has joined the case. The head of the firm, David Casey, is a former president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. Cases his firm has handled include Exxon Valdez and the California tobacco case. In other words, this is a heavyweight player. On the Kentucky case, McGowan & Hood, a firm which has won major class actions lawsuits, including medical device cases, has signed up.

[ipaper docId=39154884 access_key=key-111rl37zha9oh040eqcs height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bankruptcy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, Lender Processing Services Inc., LPS, lps default solutions Inc., trade secrets0 Comments

FL Attorney General Files A Motion for Rehearing to Judge’s Ruling in Shapiro & Fishman Investigation

FL Attorney General Files A Motion for Rehearing to Judge’s Ruling in Shapiro & Fishman Investigation

Attorney General McCollum I applaud you for STANDING UP for Florida!

Assistant AG’s June M. Clarkson and Theresa B. Edwards what an amazing job! Thank you.

Investigate the law suit Shapiro and Stern had against each other…You might just find missing pieces there.

The facts are the facts…crystal clear. This glass is not half full but spilling out the rim of the glass!

Attorney General Bill McCollum today filed a Motion for Rehearing on last week’s ruling by Circuit Judge Jack Cox that the Attorney General could not investigate the Shapiro & Fishman law firm for the firm’s alleged involvement in presenting fabricated documents to the courts in foreclosure actions to obtain final judgments against homeowners. The Attorney General is currently investigating four law firms, The Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson, P.A.; Shapiro & Fishman, LLP, the Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A., and Florida Default Law Group, PL for allegedly engaging in these practices.

[ipaper docId=39125376 access_key=key-9hpgp1r3itfgcl5uvog height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, forgery, investigation, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., law offices of Marshall C. Watson pa, shapiro & fishman pa, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, trade secrets1 Comment

MAINE: Jeffrey Stephan “Deposition Transcript” Protective Order DENIED

MAINE: Jeffrey Stephan “Deposition Transcript” Protective Order DENIED


In addition to renewing it’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Entry of Protective Order pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 26 (c). This motion is likewise denied.

Rule 26(c) provides that “for good cause shown” a court may enter a protective order “which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense….” M.R.Civ. P. 26(c). Plaintiff seeks a protective order prohibiting the dissemination of discovery materials obtained in this case.” Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Protective Order at 7. As grounds for it’s motion, Plaintiff points to the embarrassment GMAC and it’s employees have suffered, and will continue to suffer, from the posting of excerpts from Stephan’s deposition transcript on an Internet blog. The court is not persuaded that the Plaintiff has shown the requisite “ good cause” to justify entry of a protective order in this case. See e.g. Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 789 (1st Cir. 1988) (agreeing with Second Circuit in noting that “the party seeking a protective order has burden of  showing that good cause is not shown, the discovery materials in question should not receive judicial protection and therefore would be open to the public for inspection”) (citation omitted).

Stephan’s deposition was taken in advance a legitimate purpose, and the testimony elicited has directed probative value to dispute. Attorney Cox did not himself take action other that to share the deposition transcript with an attorney in Florida. That the testimony reveals corporate practices that GMAC finds embarrassing in not enough to justify issuance of a protective order. Further, Plaintiff has failed to establish that GMAC has been harmed specifically as a result of the dissemination of the June 7, 2010 deposition transcript, given that similarly embarrassing deposition from December 10, 2009 Florida deposition also appears on the Internet, and will remain even were this Court to grant Plaintiff’s motion. Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy it’s burden of persuasion under Rule 26(c), it’s Motion for Entry of Protective Order is denied.

[ipaper docId=38686209 access_key=key-1r8729c9qjfdkt6gvvoi height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in assignment of mortgage, concealment, conspiracy, deed of trust, deposition, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, GMAC, jeffrey stephan, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., robo signers, servicers, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, trade secrets3 Comments

Fraud Factories, MERS, LPS, Forgeries: Rep. Alan Grayson Explains the Foreclosure Fraud Crisis

Fraud Factories, MERS, LPS, Forgeries: Rep. Alan Grayson Explains the Foreclosure Fraud Crisis

RepAlanGrayson | September 30, 2010

This is Rep. Alan Grayson explaining the crisis of foreclosure fraud and how it links to the entire securitization chain of Wall Street.


One of My First Videos 2/10/2010

This is what made plenty of noise!


This is the actual “BOGUS ASSIGNEE” that was found…then came many.




© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in assignment of mortgage, bogus, chain in title, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, dinsfla, DOCX, fannie mae, florida default law group, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, forgery, investigation, jeff carbiener, jeffrey stephan, Kristine Wilson, Law Office Of Steven J. Baum, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., law offices of Marshall C. Watson pa, Lender Processing Services Inc., linda green, LPS, mbs, MERS, MERSCORP, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, notary fraud, note, robo signers, securitization, shapiro & fishman pa, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD,, sub-prime, Supreme Court, trade secrets, Tywanna Thomas1 Comment

Is It Time to File Quiet Title Actions on Foreclosed Homes?

Is It Time to File Quiet Title Actions on Foreclosed Homes?


Is It Time to File Quiet Title Actions on Foreclosed Homes?

THIS IS NOT Intended to Be Construed or Relied upon as COMPETENT LEGAL ADVICE—it is an academic paper discussing various perceptions of evolving potential facts and law, which may differ state by state and within jurisdictions within states. Readers are urged to obtain competent legal representation to review their facts.

In the past, foreclosed homeowners and their attorneys have discussed the utility of filing quiet title actions where homes have been seized and deficiency judgments entered by various foreclosure claimants that purport to unknowingly rely on faulty documentation. There are dangers. A buyer that has acquired a foreclosed home—or the foreclosing entity itself—may bring an action against a dispossessed person seeking redress. A pro se plaintiff or an attorney that represents the wronged homeowner may be subject to sanctions for raising a spurious or improperly supported claim. Today facts appear to put a defense attorney at risk of malpractice if he does not preserve his clients’ interest—even post foreclosure—unless he apprises the client of the opportunity to regain title to the family home. Courts have notice of these defects by reason of withdrawals of support documents—beyond GMAC.

Recent disclosures and admissions by document creation groups, together with widespread newspaper reported facts open avenues to additional discovery and formulation of academic legal opinion. These will open the door for claims to set aside erroneous judgments and/or pursue damages against those servicers, Indenture Trustees and document preparers that either knowingly, negligently, or acted with willful disregard to perpetrate fraud on the courts and the hapless home-owners. Mortgage-backed securities investors may also find an interest in these activities. Failed documentation may disguise outright fraud. Attestations and sworn affidavits serve a fundamental purpose—prevention of fraud. These are not mere technicalities as propounded by some industry apologists.  Certainly, homeowners with continuing duties of enforced silence may have opportunity to re-open their settlements in light of these possible fraudulent impositions and inducements.

There are at least two sets of circumstances raised to date whereby potentially void or voidable documents have been used to push homeowners into the streets and into bankruptcy;

  • Complaints in foreclosure supported by assignments of mortgage from purported representatives of MERS to various entities
  • Motions for Summary Judgment supported by Affidavits of Claimants—most notably GMAC’s Jeffrey Stephan

On September 23, 2010 the Washington Post added to the furor surrounding the (majority) federal government owned [ALLY] GMAC’s revelations from earlier this week. GMAC used affidavits executed by an employee, Jeffrey Stephan, who admitted in deposition testimony in December 2009 and June 2010, that he did not actually verify the mortgage foreclosure information to which he was testifying in connection with the foreclosures of two families.

In addition, he admitted signing these “affidavits,” and passing them for later notarization in bulk, a violation of proper notary procedure. Mr. Stephan signed off on 10,000 mortgage documents per month according to his June deposition and the Post article. GMAC, in this instance, took the honest and safe course of “temporarily suspending” some foreclosure-related activities in 23 states – as reported by several large newspapers, including the New York Times, Bloomberg and The Washington Post. The “temporary suspension” allows for evaluation of the impacts of this admitted breakdown in the system, rather than blatantly defrauding foreclosure courts in judicial foreclosure states.  The New York Times on the 22nd speculated that: [GMAC] “actions suggest concern about potential liability in evicting families and selling houses to which it does not have clear title.” [Emphasis added]  The same article notes that; “The lender said it was also reviewing completed foreclosures where the same unnamed procedure might have been used.” [Emphasis Added]. The step referred to in these articles, preparation and filing of an affidavit in support of a Motion for Summary Judgment—along with the Motion itself –occur well into the foreclosure process.

However, there is another critical document created and filed by a claimant with the foreclosure court at the beginning of foreclosure. This document, the Assignment of Mortgage, is supposed to support the claimant’s right or legal “standing” to press the Complaint in Foreclosure. The Complaint is the basis for the foreclosure and creation of a “deficiency judgment” – the amount left owing by the homeowner after the claimant sells the house for less than the amount owed and includes added fees and charges. The claimant uses the deficiency judgment to seize the homeowner assets and future paychecks. In most instances the assignment is the only document before the court that associates the claimant with the borrower. The complaint and supporting assignment frequently surprise and confuse the homeowner by naming an entity or sham “trust” that the homeowner has never heard of before.

The Assignment of Mortgage is significantly more important than the affidavit in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, if for no other reason sheer numbers.  Typically most homeowners have undergone a psychological bruising and beating from the loan servicer by the time the actual Complaint in Foreclosure is filed. Often the family has lost the pay of one, if not both, wage earners and seeks some relief from one of the high cost, predatory loans created 2003-2007. Unfortunately the servicer typically refuses to discuss modification or any relief unless the homeowner has fallen behind in payments. The servicers may rely on terms limiting its authority within the securitization documents in respect of this hard-nose approach.

The hard-nose response gives the servicer cover for actions or abuses that often characterize its subsequent conduct. At that point, the servicer transfers the loan to the default department or outsources to a “default management” operation. This is an aggrandized term for collection agency. The “department” or collection agency often calls the family up to six or more times a day demanding money—rarely the same caller twice. Typically, this will throw the family into confusion and despair. Pleas for relief fall on deaf ears unless the family meets demands to “make up late payments and added fees.”  It’s just the beginning of a process that has the effect, if not the purpose, of destroying the family’s morale. The servicer may follow up with notices tacked on the homeowner’s door, a barrage of ominous if not outright threatening letters and other actions aimed at driving the homeowner to abandon the home and neglect a legal defense.

If the homeowner is either naïve enough to believe that the touted voluntary [for servicers] relief programs actually operate, or desperate to keep a roof over the family’s head, the loan modification dance begins. Under the guise of compliance with HAMP, the collection agency demands an array of homeowner financial and employment information. Irrespective of the use that the homeowner desires for that information, it will be of great help to the collection agency to locate assets and paychecks down the road to collect the looming deficiency. But today the information rarely satisfies the servicer in respect of moving towards a modification. The demanded documents are often purportedly “lost” by the servicer, or deemed inadequate—anything to drag out the nightmare and break the family’s spirits. After submitting and resubmitting documents, explanations, and hours on the telephone day after day, week after week, any false hopes that are raised are destroyed by a denial. Homeowners often will be told to try again-with the same results.

After about 3-4 months, perhaps even while the family thinks that a modification is soon to be forthcoming, the ax falls instead. An assignment is “created” and the Complaint is filed. Usually the family gives up without opposition at this point. The servicer may go so far as to place a note on the door offering to further discuss modification leaving a phone number. When the number is called by the confounded homeowner, the servicer representative may explain: “we didn’t really mean that; we just wanted to see if you have left yet!”

In some cases born of desperation, the struggling family may contact an attorney who demands $1000-$5000 just to open the case. The family has 30 days to raise the money to cause someone to simply look at the demands in the Complaint and the Assignment. In the vast majority of cases still remaining, the family gives up now, abandons the property, and no response is ever filed to the Complaint—a default judgment is entered in favor of the claimant. Most often, the family is not even aware that the demands seek more than just the home. That realization may take years to occur—when another collector knocks on the door demanding the long-forgotten deficiency. The process is aimed at breaking the family’s will, at winnowing out the homeowners. The servicer wants the home!

The articles printed prior to Sep 23, 2010 in connection with GMAC’s “unnamed procedure” did not focus upon the issue of potential forgery or related systemic fraud on the courts in connection with preparation of Assignments of Mortgage. By way of background, by reference to numerous anecdotes, it appears that often a claimant in possession of a list of homeowner loans in default provides superficial information to a default services company in respect of the borrower and property. One of the largest default service providers, by its own admission, is two-year old publicly traded Lender Processing Services (“LPS”), a spin-off from FINS. “Approximately 50 percent of all U.S. mortgages by dollar volume are serviced using LPS’ Mortgage Servicing Package (MSP)” The lender, a servicer or Indenture Trustee contracts with LPS for creation and delivery of an Assignment of Mortgage to the requesting entity. (see exhibit at end) This document is often sent directly by LPS through the mail to County Recorders to be file-stamped and recorded in the county property records.  These steps lend false authenticity to the piece of paper. By the time the targeted family sees the Complaint and attached Assignment, the assignment has been file-stamped by their local County Recorder, the Clerk of Courts and probably was attached to a subpoena “served” upon them by their County Sherriff. The family is thoroughly intimidated by the Assignment of Mortgage, which has been used to convert the family’s local authorities into apparent agents and enforcers of the distant claimant. The assignment is a powerful weapon in the war of intimidation.

The Washington Post, September 23, 2010, correlated the GMAC admitted breakdown in verification of loan files and notarization process with the assignment creation process operated by LPS. LPS’ document creation division in Alpharetta, Georgia operating under LPS’ DOCX trademark, churned out thousands of assignments. The Post identified one prolific signatory, Linda Green. The article set out in its body several examples of Ms. Green’s signature—which differ dramatically one to another. The Post stated the likely observation that the signatures were made by other LPS employees in addition to Ms Green.  She is but one example at one LPS office: there are others with similar handiwork including Tywanna Thomas and Korrel Harp at that office. Mr. Harp has the added dubious distinction of having been jailed for and plead guilty to “Knowingly Possessing False Identification” relating to an arrest in Oklahoma in 2008.   At the age of 24, Mr. Harp was signing as Vice-President of Mortgage Electronic Services Inc., aka MERS. MERS has been nominal owner of 65 million home mortgages—and receives mortgage title to 60% of all new mortgages.

As a VP of MERS the 24 year-old Harp, like Ms. Green and Thomas, purportedly possessed the power to transfer mortgages with questionable oversight to LPS’ clients—perhaps others?  Based on the signatures of Harp, Green, Thomas— and other varied, yet purportedly notarized signatures, Courts across the country have foreclosed on homes and granted deficiency judgments.  One of the in house LPS notaries was only 18 years old at the time she notarized signature for Harp, Thomas and others at DOCX. Michelle Kersch, a senior vice president for Lender Processing Services, made limited explanations by email in the Post article but did not elaborate “due to the pending criminal investigation”.

Like GMACs Stephan, LPS’ stamp and sign department was a high volume operation. Powers of attorney were not consistently attached to the crucial assignments—if at all.

In the case of Linda Green, there was no power of attorney to represent MERS on an original “assignment of mortgage dated October 17, 2008 and filed on October 13, 2009”. This technicality was disclosed in a corrective filing of assignment by Florida foreclosure firm Shapiro and Fishman dated August 11, 2010 in Lee County, Florida in support of a foreclosure by servicer AHMSI. The POA status of other prolific signers such as Harp seems equally uncertain—but as Harp has emphatically stated “I’m sure everything is legal.” There seems to be little observable difference between the conduct of GMAC’s Stephan and the LPS’ high volume signers—but for the possible failure of the LPS signers to have representative capacity to sign at all.

LPS has also made admissions that GMAC seems to echo in terms of problematic “processes”. In the company’s 2009 Annual Report on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission, published in March 2010, under “regulatory matters”Recently, during an internal review of the business processes used by our document solutions subsidiary, we identified a business process that caused an error in the notarization of certain documents, some of which were used in foreclosure proceedings in various jurisdictions around the country.”

Subsequently, April 3, 2010, the Wall St. Journal published an article regarding the issues with LPS and notary deficiencies; “US Probes Foreclosure-Data Provider”.  Foreclosure activists in Florida did not let the admission pass. These persons identified and brought to light signed and notarized Assignments that actually conveyed mortgages to named entities, “Bogus Assignee” and “Bad Bene”. These clearly established undeniable proof that LPS’ internal controls were compromised and virtually any name could be inserted as a claimant in a foreclosure action.

LPS’ CEO Jeffrey Carbiener authored a Letter to the Editor of the Florida Times-Union responding to an article published May 14, 2010 referring to “bad bene” and “bogus assignee”. In his open letter admissions in the press Carbiener asserted that the bogus names were “placeholders” put in the signed and notarized assignment documents “…until the missing information [claimant name] was provided…” Carbiener noted that the forms, as well as the data inserted, were based on instructions from clients with the “placeholders” used until more data is provided.  This amounts to a Nuremberg Defense.

The Carbiener comments attempt to place the onus of error in naming mortgage claimants on his clients—but for the obvious so-called placeholders. However, Carbiener’s comments have great significance beyond LPS role. This explanation is an admission that assignments were prepared in blank based on client information. According to Carbiener, it would appear that the named claimant was subsequently determined by the client and inserted. This process allows substantial opportunity for abuse, suggesting that a servicer determined that a loan was in default, and then someone engaged in a separate process to identify a claimant to whom the proceeds of foreclosure would be awarded.

The difficulties, or opportunities, for a servicer and his client Indenture Trustees to shift the benefits among potential investor beneficiaries are more apparent when one reviews the SEC filings of now bankrupt mortgage note originators such as American Home Mortgage group (“AHM”) and Option One.

Both originated loans that were supposedly stuffed into trusts. On paper the trusts supposedly issued mortgage-backed securities to trusting investors. However, purported trust-sponsors AHM and Option One and the Indenture Trustees were at best haphazard in meeting basic commitments and representations that were plainly stated in the securitization documents they themselves filed. The trust documents clearly state that the lists of loans included in the trusts were filed with the SEC and the appropriate Secretary of State (UCC). The securitization documents provided detailed descriptions of the information to be included in the filed list. This information was sufficient that a homeowner could determine if the trust owned his/her loan and was the proper party to receive his payments. Investors in the trust MBS could look to the list to determine the principal amount of the loans that “backed” the investment, as well as loan to value ratios and other relevant information that would indicate the value of the loans—and provide information adequate to determine if the same loan was placed in multiple trusts. However, for AHM, 7 of the 12 investment trusts filed with SEC lacked the lists.  The schedule stated, “manually filed”, but the manual filing was not made in many instances. The actual manual filings made are identified on the SEC dockets for the trusts as “SE” for “scanned exhibit.” Under the “SE” docket entry, the list would be found in specificity.  One such example of a trust with a proper loan list was American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-2.

In motion practice in connection with a homeowner’s motion to dismiss a naked claim by one of Korrel Harp’s or Linda Green’s appointed mortgage assignment beneficiary trusts, one could note that the trust lacked a loan list and ownership of the loan could not be independently verified by reference to government records as intended. In so doing, it was possible to refer the court to the properly filed loan lists to note the clear distinction and value of the list. It was possible to prove that the lists were not intentionally missing due to some overriding concern for homeowner privacy—a common speculation. It was also useful to prove that missing loan lists were not customary “industry practice”. The filed list was a government record freely accessible to the public online. That changed between July 21, 2010 and September 02, 2010. Loan lists that had been on file and available for investors and homeowners to view online on the SE site were unceremoniously deleted. The lists are no longer freely accessible. A demand is now necessary under Freedom of Information Act—the proper loan lists can no longer be referenced in motions to dismiss. The effect was equivalent to, if not the same as, intentional destruction of evidence by the SEC. It is of interest that on the same day as the Washington Post detailed the LPS similarity to GMAC in terms of uncertain document authenticity, the WSJ also ran a front-page article detailing questionable actions taken in recent months by SEC. Washington Post, September 22, 2010, SEC Blasted on Goldman.

In summary, SEC failed to require actual filing of loan lists by the trust sponsors and the Indenture Trustees. This failing has lead to LPS and GMAC transfers of claims to unverifiable beneficiaries. This the Times suggests, creates a cloud on the title of the new home buyers of foreclosed properties. Then to complete the injury and remove opportunity for homeowners to defend unsupported claims, SEC destroys evidence that could be useful to homeowners being foreclosed and investors seeking to prove fraud. The mortgage fiasco has roots in SEC failure to regulate and its continuation and concealment of potential fraud is an abuse of discretion by SEC, which is supposed to support disclosure of information—not hide it.

Excerpted from: DOCX eAssignTM brochure (no longer found online)

eAssign utilizes the industry’s most robust property records database and data capture capabilities to significantly reduce timelines and costs for lienholders when creating (emphasis added) and recording lien assignment documents.

This article was contributed by an anonymous supporter of

© 2010 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Creative Commons License

Related links:

LPS 101

MERS 101


© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bogus, conflict of interest, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, deed of trust, DOCX, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, forgery, GMAC, investigation, jeff carbiener, jeffrey stephan, Korrel Harp, Lender Processing Services Inc., linda green, MERS, MERSCORP, michelle kersch, mortgage, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., notary fraud, note, quiet title, robo signers, S.E.C., securitization, servicers, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD,, trade secrets, Tywanna Thomas8 Comments

Illinois Joins U.S. State Officials On GMAC Investigation

Illinois Joins U.S. State Officials On GMAC Investigation

U.S. State Officials Investigate After GMAC Halts Evictions

September 25, 2010, 12:01 AM EDT

By Dakin Campbell

Sept. 25 (Bloomberg) — Attorneys general in three U.S. states are investigating foreclosures at Ally Financial Inc.’s GMAC Mortgage unit after the lender said it would halt some evictions following a discovery of faulty documentation.

Texas, Iowa and Illinois have started investigations into mortgage practices at Ally, while California, which isn’t affected by GMAC’s action, ordered the company to stop foreclosures unless it can prove compliance with state law, according to statements. Ally said it has issued a “more robust policy” on processing foreclosures, increased staff to handle documents and instituted more training for employees.

“Preserving the integrity of the foreclosure process is of the utmost importance,” Ally said yesterday in a statement. “While we are exercising an abundance of caution in the review process, we are confident that the processing errors did not result in any inappropriate foreclosures.”

Continue reading…BUSINESS WEEK


September 24, 2010


GMAC Suspected of Submitting False Documents in Foreclosure Cases

Chicago ­ Attorney General Lisa Madigan today issued a letter to the mortgage lender Ally (formerly GMAC) demanding a meeting to address concerns that the company has violated the state’s Consumer Fraud Act in its pursuit of Illinois homeowners in foreclosure. Madigan’s letter responds to reports raising serious questions about the accuracy of documents the lender files in foreclosure lawsuits.

An Ally employee testified in a Florida court case that he routinely signed affidavits for foreclosure lawsuits and submitted them to Ally’s attorneys without reviewing the homeowners’ loan documents. These affidavits were then filed with the court as evidence of Ally’s right to foreclose on the homes. The employee testified that he signed at least 10,000 affidavits a month without reviewing the underlying paperwork, and thus had no way of knowing whether the information in the affidavits was actually true.

“Families’ homes are at stake here,” Madigan said. “If I determine that Ally is rubber-stamping affidavits and filing them with our courts as evidence, I will take appropriate action. The law demands that lenders prove their case in foreclosure actions, and Illinois homeowners demand the same.”

Following these revelations, Ally announced this week that it is suspending foreclosure lawsuits in 23 states, including Illinois.

Madigan also requested that Ally immediately provide her office with details on the impact of Ally’s conduct on Illinois homeowners, including the number of Illinois homeowners affected by the suspension of foreclosures; the names of the Illinois law firms that Ally retains to pursue foreclosure actions; information about how these firms will implement and monitor the suspension of foreclosure lawsuits in Illinois; and the length of the suspension.

GMAC ranked fourth among U.S. home mortgage lenders in the first six months of this year, according to Inside Mortgage Finance, an industry newsletter.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in assignment of mortgage, bloomberg, Bryan Bly, chain in title, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, deed of trust, fannie mae, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, forgery, GMAC, investigation, jeffrey stephan, MERS, MERSCORP, Moratorium, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., robo signers, trade secrets2 Comments

‘SHITTY BANK BANKS’ Might Go Belly UP After Foreclosure Mess Hit The Fan- Secrets Of Traders

‘SHITTY BANK BANKS’ Might Go Belly UP After Foreclosure Mess Hit The Fan- Secrets Of Traders

I can tell you there is MAJOR, MAJOR panic happening “behind the scenes” since I have started this site I have not seen this kind of activity! All I can say is don’t stop what ever you are doing GMAC or not…

Foreclosure Mess

By: Secrets Of Traders Wednesday, September 22, 2010 11:56 AM

I haven’t seen the following story get much national press (Ok, none. After all, isn’t Lindsey Lohan still in the news?) but if it continues to escalate, we will. The short & sweet of the matter is that it appears most banks do not have clear title to the homes they are foreclosing. In their mad rush to capitalize on the housing bubble, bankers skipped many of the legal steps necessary to have a clear title if things went badly, which is now, and the mortgages that were bundled then securitized as MBSs (mortgage backed securities) may actually belong to the homeowners.If this plays out as described below some banks will go belly-up, which should have happened a long time ago. Since the Treasury & the Federal Reserve will not let their buddies down, however, I am certain that it is already being sorted out in back room deals. “To hell with the LAW” they will say, Shitibank is on the brink of failure.

A member of Congress has already sent a letter to the Florida Supreme Court requesting it make an order to abate all foreclosure procedures until Florida can complete investigations into the matter. A portion of Representative Grayson’s letter is below.

I respectfully request that you abate all foreclosures involving these firms until the Attorney General of the state of Florida has finished his investigations of those firms for document fraud.

I have included a court order, in which Chase, WAMU, and Shapiro and Fishman are excoriated by a judge for document fraud on the court. In this case, Chase attempted to foreclose on a home, when the mortgage note was actually owned by Fannie Mae.

Taking someone’s home should not be done lightly. And it should certainly be done in accordance with the law.

This original post can be found here

Ok, we now appear to have a pattern of conduct here where organizations trying to foreclose on homeowners are in fact submitting forged (that is, willfully known to be false) affidavits to courts around the nation.

First we had GMAC, now it appears we have JPM/Chase. Everyone’s scrambling on this, of course.

But as I pointed out, the real panic is likely still to come, because I have reason to believe (but cannot yet prove) that many if not most of the non-agency securitizations were defective at the outset.

Worse, they’re now trying to cover it up. I am amassing more and more information on the mess, and what I’m seeing is increasingly looking like a pattern of conduct that may well go far beyond “innocent mistakes” or “accidents.”

So let’s take a close look at this problem, and how we can fix it.

There’s a real visceral outrage at letting people have a “free house.” But is it really a perversity of justice if that’s what happens in point of fact – or effect? Maybe not.

Look, if I want to write you a signature loan for $200,000, I have every right to do it. If you don’t pay I’m screwed in such a case, because I have no security interest.

Continue reading …iSTOCKANALYST


© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in assignment of mortgage, bifurcate, chain in title, conflict of interest, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, deed of trust, Economy, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, forgery, jeffrey stephan, jpmorgan chase, MERS, MERSCORP, Moratorium, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., note, rmbs, robo signers, securitization,, sub-prime, trade secrets, trustee, Trusts3 Comments



September 20, 2010

Chief Justice Charles T. Canady
Florida Supreme Court
500 South Duval Street
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1900

Dear Chief Justice Canady,

I am disturbed by the increasing reports of predatory ‘foreclosure mills’ in Florida. The New York Times and Mother Jones have both recently reported on the rampant and widespread practices of document fraud and forgery involved in mortgage assignments. My staff has spoken with multiple foreclosure specialists and attorneys in Florida who confirm these reports.

Three foreclosure mills – the Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson, Shapiro & Fishman, and the Law Offices of David J. Stern – constitute roughly 80% of all foreclosure proceedings in the state of Florida. All are under investigation by Attorney General Bill McCollum. If the reports I am hearing are true, the illegal foreclosures taking place represent the largest seizure of private property ever attempted by banks and government entities. This is lawlessness.

I respectfully request that you abate all foreclosures involving these firms until the Attorney General of the state of Florida has finished his investigations of those firms for document fraud.

I have included a court order, in which Chase, WAMU, and Shapiro and Fishman are excoriated by a judge for document fraud on the court. In this case, Chase attempted to foreclose on a home, when the mortgage note was actually owned by Fannie Mae.

Taking someone’s home should not be done lightly. And it should certainly be done in accordance with the law.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.


Alan Grayson
Member of Congress

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in assignment of mortgage, bogus, chain in title, chase, conflict of interest, congress, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, forgery, investigation, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., law offices of Marshall C. Watson pa, MERS, MERSCORP, Moratorium, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, notary fraud, title company, trade secrets, Trusts, Wall Street, wamu, washington mutual1 Comment

Countrywide’s Angelo Mozilo Must Face Trial in SEC Suit, U.S. Judge Rules

Countrywide’s Angelo Mozilo Must Face Trial in SEC Suit, U.S. Judge Rules

I’m really waiting to see who else will join Madoff with “Racketeering”?

By Edvard Pettersson – Sep 17, 2010 12:01 AM ET

Countrywide Financial Corp. former Chief Executive Officer Angelo Mozilo must face trial on regulators’ claims he misled investors about risks tied to subprime lending, a judge ruled.

U.S. District Judge John F. Walter in Los Angeles yesterday denied requests by Mozilo and two other former senior Countrywide executives, David Sambol and Eric Sieracki, for a ruling that there were no genuine issues to be tried. The case is now set for a jury trial in October.

“It remains to be seen whether the Securities and Exchange Commission will be able to convince a jury that defendants’ statements were indeed misleading and material,” Walter said in his decision. “At the summary judgment stage, the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter.”

The SEC sued Mozilo, 71, in June 2009, saying he publicly reassured investors about the quality of Countrywide’s loans while he issued “dire” internal warnings and sold about $140 million of his own shares.

Mozilo is the most prominent executive targeted by U.S. regulators examining the subprime mortgage crisis. He co-founded Countrywide in 1969 and built it into the nation’s biggest mortgage lender, helping trigger the subprime bubble by offering loans to customers with below-average credit scores.

‘Flying Blind’

He wrote in an e-mail that Countrywide was “flying blind” and had “no way” to determine the risks of some adjustable- rate mortgages, according to the SEC complaint.

Continue reading…. BLOOMBERG

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bloomberg, concealment, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, countrywide, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, investigation, mbs, mozillo, rmbs,, sub-prime, trade secrets, Violations, Wall Street0 Comments



I was wondering why this site blew up with hits today!

THIS INVOLVES 65 MILLION LOANS…it was ’62’ !!! I have a source that confirmed this.

“The Curse Of The MERS”




© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in chain in title, class action, concealment, conflict of interest, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, deed of trust, Economy, fannie mae, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, investigation, mbs, MERS, MERSCORP, mortgage, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, Notary, notary fraud, note, quiet title, R.K. Arnold, racketeering, Real Estate, repossession, RICO, rmbs, robo signers,, sub-prime, trade secrets, trustee, Trusts, Wall Street4 Comments



The Time To Act Is NOW!

I am working on a special project & need your help to gather as many MERS Assignments as we can possibly get.

What is especially needed are the Certifying Officers signing these assignments for MERS. I don’t care if it’s old, new, signed, undated, unmarked, lender has gone bankrupt ages ago…I just want them ALL!

Click the Envelope to load up your MERS Assignment(s).

Or Info at

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in Bank Owned, bankruptcy, chain in title, concealment, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, forgery, investigation, mbs, MERS, MERSCORP, mortgage, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, Notary, notary fraud, note, quiet title, racketeering, Real Estate, REO, RICO, rmbs, robo signers, securitization, servicers, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD,, Supreme Court, trade secrets, trustee, Trusts, Wall Street1 Comment



Our friend in California Brian Davies recently got a “Golden Ticket” in the mail. Below are certified copies of the Pooling & Servicing Agreement of his loan including the Prospectus for RAST 2007-A5, pass thru 2007E, psa 03-01-07.

Via: Brian Davies


How you can get these:

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in chain in title, deed of trust, foreclosure, foreclosures, insider, investigation, mbs, originator, pooling and servicing agreement, psa, rmbs, S.E.C., servicers,, trade secrets, trustee, Trusts, truth in lending act, Wall Street6 Comments



Michael Burry, the former head of Scion Capital LLC who predicted the housing market’s plunge, talks with Bloomberg’s Jon Erlichman about his investments in agricultural land, real estate and gold.

Michael Lewis made him famous in his book “The Big Short”.

(This is an excerpt. Source: Bloomberg)

“I believe that agricultural land, productive agricultural land with water on site, will be very valuable in the future. And I’ve put a good amount of money into that. So I’m investing in alternative investments as well as stocks.”

“I think there is some value in real estate. You have to buy it right. It’s not in general, that’s the problem. I think that there are an awful lot of people out there looking to buy these distressed properties out there and so you need to find special situations. That is how I’ve invested from the beginning. I’m looking for these special situations, these unique ideas and that’s true in real estate too.”

“In my situation I’d rather go long on housing itself, real estate itself. Depending on how you structure it, in the real market, in the physical market, you can get some pretty good deals and I’ve done some of that too.”

“Paulson is big in gold and that is something is interesting to me and given how I see the world playing out. Other than that, I’m just saying, other than gold I haven’t really bought into the other…

Source: Bloomberg TV

Photographer: Tony Avelar/Bloomberg

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in Bank Owned, bogus, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, fannie mae, FED FRAUD, federal reserve board, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, goldman sachs, heloc, insider, investigation, mbs, mortgage, naked short selling, Real Estate, rmbs, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD,, sub-prime, trade secrets, Wall Street1 Comment

HSBC’s Irregularities: Mortgage Documentation and Corporate Relationships with Ocwen, MERS, and Delta

HSBC’s Irregularities: Mortgage Documentation and Corporate Relationships with Ocwen, MERS, and Delta


2010 Ohio 4158

HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as Indenture Trustee for the Registered Noteholders of Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-1, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Jamie W. Thompson, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Appellate No. 23761.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, Montgomery County.

Rendered on September 3, 2010.

Benjamin D. Carnahan, Atty. Reg. #0079737, Shapiro, Van Ess, Phillips & Barragate, LLP, 4805 Montgomery Road, Norwood, OH 45212 and Brian P. Brooks, (pro hac vice), O’Melveny & Myers LLP, 1625 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20006-4001, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, HSBC Bank.

Amy Kaufman, Atty. Reg. #0073837, 150 East Gay Street, 21st Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215, Attorney for Appellee, Department of Taxation.

Andrew D. Neuhauser, Atty. Reg. #0082799, and Stanley A. Hirtle, Atty. Reg. #0025205, 525 Jefferson Avenue, Suite 300, Toledo, OH 43604, Attorneys for Amici Curiae, Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, et al.

Richard Cordray, Atty. Reg. #0038034, by Susan A. Choe, Atty. Reg. #0067032, Mark N. Wiseman, Atty. Reg. #0059637, and Jeffrey R. Loeser, Atty. Reg. #0082144, Attorney General’s Office, 30 E. Broad Street, 14th Floor, Columbus, OH 43215, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray.

Andrew M. Engel, Atty. Reg. #0047371, 3077 Kettering Boulevard, Suite 108, Moraine, Ohio 45439, Attorney for Defendant-Appellee Jamie W. Thompson.

Colette Carr, Atty. Reg. #00705097, 301 W. Third Street, Fifth Floor, Dayton, OH 45422, Attorney for Appellee, Montgomery County Treasurer.



{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as Indenture Trustee for the Registered Noteholders of Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-1 (HSBC), appeals from a judgment of the trial court, which rendered summary judgment and dismissed HSBC’s complaint for foreclosure, without prejudice. HSBC contends that the trial court improperly treated the date the assignment of mortgage was executed as dispositive of the claims before it. HSBC further contends that the trial court’s decision is erroneous, because it is premised on the court’s having improperly struck the affidavit of Chomie Neil, and having failed to consider Neil’s restated affidavit.

{¶ 2} Two briefs of amicus curiae have been filed in support of the position of defendants-appellees Jamie W. Thompson, Administratrix of the Estate of the Estate of Howard W. Turner, and Jamie W. Thompson (collectively Thompson). One brief was filed by the Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray (Cordray). The other brief was filed by the following groups: Advocates for Basic Legal Equality; Equal Justice Foundation; Legal Aid Society of Southwest Ohio; Northeast Ohio Legal Aid Services; Ohio Poverty Law Center; and Pro Seniors, Inc. (collectively Legal Advocates). We have considered those briefs, all of which have been helpful, in deciding this appeal.

{¶ 3} We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking Neil’s affidavit, because of defects in the affidavit. We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to consider Neil’s restated affidavit, in the course of deciding objections to the magistrate’s decision, because HSBC failed to indicate why it could not have properly submitted the evidence, with reasonable diligence, before the magistrate had rendered a decision in the matter. Finally, we conclude that the trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment against HSBC, and dismissing the foreclosure action for lack of standing. HSBC failed to establish that it was the holder of a promissory note secured by a mortgage. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.


{¶ 4} On January 27, 2007, Howard Turner borrowed $85,000 from Fidelity Mortgage, a division of Delta Funding Corporation (respectively, Fidelity and Delta). Turner signed a note promising to repay Fidelity in monthly payments of $786.44 for a period of thirty years. The loan number on the note is 0103303640, and the property listed on the note is 417 Cushing Avenue, Dayton, Ohio, 45429.

{¶ 5} In order to secure the loan, Turner signed a mortgage agreement, which names Fidelity as the “Lender,” and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as a nominee for Fidelity and Fidelity’s successors and assigns. The mortgage states that Turner, as borrower, “does hereby mortgage, grant and convey to MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) and to the successors and assigns of MERS, the following described property in the County of Montgomery, * * * which currently has the address of 417 Cushing Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45429.” The mortgage was recorded with the Montgomery County Recorder on February 20, 2007, as MORT-07-014366.

{¶ 6} The entire amount of the loan proceeds was not disbursed. Fidelity placed $5,000 in escrow after closing, until certain repairs (roofing and heating) were made to the house. The required deposit agreement indicated that Turner had three months to make the repairs, and that if the items were not satisfactorily cleared, Fidelity had the option of satisfying the items from the funds held, of extending the time to cure, or of taking any other steps Fidelity felt necessary to protect the mortgage property, including but not limited to, paying down the principal of the loan with the deposit.

{¶ 7} Turner made timely payments through June 2007. However, he died in late July 2007, and no further payments were made. HSBC filed a foreclosure action on November 8, 2007, alleging that it was the owner and holder of Turner’s promissory note and mortgage deed and that default had occurred. HBSC sued Thompson, as administratrix of her father’s estate, and individually, based on her interest in the estate.

{¶ 8} HSBC attached purported copies of the note and mortgage agreement to the complaint. The note attached to the complaint is also accompanied by two documents that are each entitled “Allonge.” The first allonge states “Pay to the Order of _________ without recourse,” and is signed on behalf of Delta Funding Corporation by Carol Hollman, Vice-President. The second allonge states “Pay to the Order of Delta Funding Corporation” and is signed by Darryl King, as “authorized signatory” for Fidelity Mortgage.

{¶ 9} In January 2008, Thompson filed an answer, raising, among other defenses, the fact that the action was not being prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. HSBC subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment in February 2007, supported by the affidavit of an officer of Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (Ocwen), which was a servicing agent for HSBC.

{¶ 10} Thompson filed a response to the summary judgment motion, pointing out various deficiencies in the affidavit and documents. Thompson further contended that HSBC was not the holder of the mortgage and note, and was not the real party in interest. In addition, Thompson filed an amended answer and counterclaim, contending that HSBC was not the real party in interest, and that HSBC had made false, deceptive, and misleading representations in connection with collecting a debt, in violation of Section 1692, Title 15, U.S. Code (the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, or FDCPA).

{¶ 11} HSBC withdrew its motion for summary judgment in March 2008. In November 2008, the trial court vacated the trial date and referred the matter to a magistrate. HSBC then filed another motion for summary judgment in January 2009. This motion was supported by the affidavit of Chomie Neil, who was employed by Ocwen as a manager of trial preparation and discovery. Neil averred in the affidavit that he had executed it in Palm Beach, Florida. However, the notation at the top of the first page of the affidavit and the jurat both state that the affidavit was sworn to and subscribed to in New Jersey, before a notary public.

{¶ 12} Thompson moved to strike the affidavit, contending that it was filled with inadmissible hearsay, contained legal conclusions, and purported to authenticate documents, when no proper documentation had been offered. Thompson also questioned when the affidavit was executed, and whether it had been properly acknowledged, due to the irregularities in execution and acknowledgment. In addition, Thompson responded to the summary judgment motion, contending that HSBC was not the real party in interest and was not the holder of the note, because HSBC’s name was not on the note, and HSBC had failed to provide evidence that it was in possession of the note. In responding to the motion to strike, HSBC contended that the defects in the affidavit were the result of a scrivener’s error. HSBC did not attempt to correct the affidavit.

{¶ 13} In late March 2009, Thompson filed a motion for partial summary judgment against HSBC. The motion was based on the fact that under the allonges, Delta Funding Corporation was the payee of the note. Thompson also noted that MERS failed to assign the mortgage note to HSBC before the action was commenced. Thompson contended that HSBC was not the real party in interest when it filed the lawsuit, and lacked standing to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.

{¶ 14} In May 2009, the magistrate granted Thompson’s motion to strike the affidavit, because the affidavit stated that it had been sworn to in New Jersey, and the affiant declared that the affidavit was executed in Florida. The magistrate also overruled HSBC’s motion for summary judgment, and granted Thompson’s partial motion for summary judgment. The magistrate concluded that HSBC lacked standing because it was not a mortgagee when the suit was filed and could not cure its lack of standing by subsequently obtaining an interest in the mortgage. The magistrate further concluded that there was no evidence properly before the court that would indicate that HSBC was the holder of the promissory note originally executed by Turner. Accordingly, the magistrate held that HSBC’s foreclosure claim should be dismissed without prejudice. Due to factual issues regarding Thompson’s FDCPA counterclaim, HSBC’s motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim was denied.

{¶ 15} HSBC filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, and attached the “restated” affidavit of Neil. The affidavit was identical to what was previously submitted, except that the first page indicated that the affidavit was being signed in Palm Beach County, Florida. The jurat is signed by a notary who appears to be from Florida, although the notary seals on the original and copy that were submitted are not very clear. HSBC did not offer any explanation for the mistake in the original affidavit.

{¶ 16} In November 2009, the trial court overruled HSBC’s objections to the magistrate’s report. The court concluded that the errors in the affidavit were more than format errors. The court further noted that the document became an unsworn statement and could not be used for summary judgment purposes, because the statements were sworn to a notary in a state outside the notary’s jurisdiction. The court also held that, absent Neil’s affidavit, HSBC had failed to provide support for its summary judgment motion. Finally, the court concluded that HSBC failed to provide evidence that it was in possession of the note prior to the filing of the lawsuit, because the Neil affidavit had been struck, and a prior affidavit only verified the mortgage and note as true copies; it did not verify the undated allonges. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed HSBC’s action with prejudice, and entered a Civ. R. 54(B) determination of no just cause for delay.

{¶ 17} HSBC appeals from the judgment dismissing its action without prejudice.


{¶ 18} We will address HSBC’s assignments of error in reverse order. HSBC’s Second Assignment of Error is as follows:


{¶ 20} Under this assignment of error, HSBC contends that the errors in Neil’s affidavit were scrivener’s errors that have no bearing on the content of the affidavit. HSBC contends, therefore, that the trial court erred in refusing to consider the affidavit.

{¶ 21} The error, as noted, is that Neil averred that he signed the affidavit in Florida, while the first page and the jurat indicate that the affidavit was executed before a notary public in New Jersey.

{¶ 22} Thompson, Cordray, and Legal Advocates argue that the defect is not merely one of form, because the errors transform the affidavit into an unsworn statement that cannot be used to support summary judgment. The trial court agreed with this argument.

{¶ 23} Legal Advocates also stresses that HSBC was notified of problems with Neil’s affidavit, but made no attempt to cure the defect until after the magistrate had issued an unfavorable ruling. In addition, Cordray notes that the integrity of evidence in foreclosure cases is critical, due to the imbalance between access to legal representation of banks and homeowners. Thompson, Cordray, and Legal Advocates further contend that even if Neil’s affidavit could be considered, it is replete with inadmissible hearsay and legal conclusions, and is devoid of evidentiary value.

{¶ 24} Concerning the form of affidavits, Civ. R. 56(E) provides that:

{¶ 25} “Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts of papers referred to in an affidavit shall be attached to or served with the affidavit. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions or by further affidavits. * * *”

{¶ 26} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “An affidavit must appear, on its face, to have been taken before the proper officer and in compliance with all legal requisites. A paper purporting to be an affidavit, but not to have been sworn to before an officer, is not an affidavit.” In re Disqualification of Pokorny (1992), 74 Ohio St.3d 1238 (citation omitted). Accord, Pollock v. Brigano (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 505, 509.

{¶ 27} The affidavit submitted to the magistrate contains irreconcilable conflicts, because the affiant, Neil, states that he executed the affidavit in Florida. In contrast, the jurat, as well as the first page of the affidavit, indicate that the affidavit was signed in New Jersey.

{¶ 28} In Stern v. Board of Elections of Cuyahoga Cty. (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 175, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted that in common use, a jurat “is employed to designate the certificate of a competent administering officer that a writing was sworn to by the person who signed it. It is no part of the oath, but is merely evidence of the fact that the oath was properly taken before the duly authorized officer.” Id. at 181 (citations omitted).

{¶ 29} In light of the inconsistencies, Neil’s oath could not have been properly taken before a duly authorized officer. Under New Jersey law, a notary public commissioned in New Jersey may perform duties only throughout the state of New Jersey. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:7-15. Therefore, a New Jersey notary public could not properly have administered the oath in Florida. A New Jersey notary public also could not properly have certified that the writing was sworn to, when the person signed it in another jurisdiction.

{¶ 30} As support for admission of Neil’s affidavit, HSBC cites various cases that have overlooked technical defects in affidavits. See, e.g., State v. Johnson (Oct. 24, 1997), Darke App. No. 96CA1427 (holding that a “scrivener’s error” was inconsequential and did not invalidate an affidavit), and Chase Manhattan Mtg. Corp. v. Locker, Montgomery App. No. 19904, 2003-Ohio-6665, ¶ 26 (holding that omission of specific date of month on which affidavit was signed was “scrivener’s error” and did not invalidate affidavit, because notary public did include the month and year).

{¶ 31} In Johnson, the error involved a discrepancy between the preamble and the jurat.

{¶ 32} The preamble said the site of the oath was in a particular county, but the notary swore in the jurat that the affidavit had been signed in a different county. The trial court concluded that this was a typographical error, and we agreed. This is consistent with the fact that in Ohio, a notary public may administer oaths throughout the state. See R.C. 147.07. Therefore, even if a discrepancy exists between the location listed in the preamble and the notary’s location, the official status of the affidavit is not affected. In contrast, the affiant in the case before us stated that he signed the affidavit in a different state, where the notary did not have the power to administer oaths. The difference is not simply one of form.

{¶ 33} HSBC contends that the trial court should have accepted the “restated” affidavit that it attached to HSBC’s objections to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court did not specifically discuss the restated affidavit when it overruled HSBC’s objections. We assume, therefore, that the court rejected the affidavit. See, e.g., Maguire v. Natl. City Bank, Montgomery App. No. 23140, 2009-Ohio-4405, ¶ 16, and Takacs v. Baldwin (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 196, 209 (holding that where a trial court fails to rule on a motion, an appellate court assumes that the matter was overruled or rejected).

{¶ 34} The trial court was not required to consider the restated affidavit, because HSBC failed to explain why the affidavit could not have been properly produced for the magistrate. In this regard, Civ. R. Rule 53(D)(4)(d) provides that:

{¶ 35} “If one or more objections to a magistrate’s decision are timely filed, the court shall rule on those objections. In ruling on objections, the court shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law. Before so ruling, the court may hear additional evidence but may refuse to do so unless the objecting party demonstrates that the party could not, with reasonable diligence, have produced that evidence for consideration by the magistrate.”

{¶ 36} Well before the magistrate ruled, HSBC was aware that objections had been raised to the affidavit. HSBC made no attempt to submit a corrected document to the magistrate, nor did it provide the trial court with an explanation for the cause of the problem. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the original or restated affidavit. See Hillstreet Fund III, L.P. v. Bloom, Montgomery App. No. 23394, 2010-Ohio-2267, ¶ 49 [noting that trial courts have discretion to accept or refuse additional evidence under Civ. R. 53(D)(4)(d).]

{¶ 37} Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the Neil affidavits, we need not consider whether the contents of the affidavits are inadmissible.

{¶ 38} HSBC’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled.


{¶ 39} HSBC’s First Assignment of Error is as follows:


{¶ 41} Under this assignment of error, HSBC contends that the trial court committed reversible error by disregarding the ruling in State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 1998-Ohio-275, that defects in standing may be cured at any time before judgment is entered. According to HSBC, an assignment of mortgage recorded with the Montgomery County Recorder establishes that HSBC is the current holder of the mortgage interest, because the interest was transferred about one week after the action against Thomson was filed. HSBC further contends that the trial court improperly disregarded evidence that HSBC legally owned the note before its complaint was filed. Before addressing the standing issue, we note that the case before us was resolved by way of summary judgment. “A trial court may grant a moving party summary judgment pursuant to Civ. R. 56 if there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining to be litigated, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.” Smith v. Five Rivers MetroParks (1999), 134 Ohio App.3d 754, 760. “We review summary judgment decisions de novo, which means that we apply the same standards as the trial court.” GNFH, Inc. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 172 Ohio App.3d 127, 2007-Ohio-2722, ¶ 16.

{¶ 42} To decide the real-party-in-interest issue, we first turn to Civ. R. Rule 17(A), which states that:

{¶ 43} “Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. * * * * No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest. Such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.”

{¶ 44} “Standing is a threshold question for the court to decide in order for it to proceed to adjudicate the action.” Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d at 77. The issue of lack of standing “challenges the capacity of a party to bring an action, not the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.” Id. To decide whether the requirement has been satisfied that an action be brought by the real party in interest, “courts must look to the substantive law creating the right being sued upon to see if the action has been instituted by the party possessing the substantive right to relief.” Shealy v. Campbell (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 23, 25.

{¶ 45}In foreclosure actions, the real party in interest is the current holder of the note and mortgage.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sessley, Franklin App. No. 09AP-178, 2010-Ohio-2902, ¶ 11 (citation omitted). Promissory notes are negotiable, and may be transferred to someone other than the issuer. That person then becomes the holder of the instrument. R.C. 1303.21(A). R.C. 1303.21(B) provides, however, that:

{¶ 46} “Except for negotiation by a remitter, if an instrument is payable to an identified person, negotiation requires transfer of possession of the instrument and its indorsement by the holder. If an instrument is payable to bearer, it may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone.”

{¶ 47} R.C, 1301.01(T)(1) also states that a holder with regard to a negotiable instrument means either of the following:

{¶ 48} “(a) If the instrument is payable to bearer, a person who is in possession of the instrument;

{¶ 49} “(b) If the instrument is payable to an identified person, the identified person when in possession of the instrument.”

{¶ 50} In the case before us, the promissory note identifies Fidelity as the holder. The note, therefore, could have been negotiated only by Fidelity, through transfer of possession, and by either endorsing the note to a specific person, or endorsing the note to “bearer.”

{¶ 51} HSBC contends that it is the legal holder of the promissory note, and is entitled to enforce it, because it obtained the note as a bearer. A “bearer” is “the person in possession of an instrument, document of title, or certificated security payable to bearer or endorsed in blank.” R.C. 1301.01(E). HSBC’s claim that it is the bearer of the note is based on the “allonges” that were included as part of the exhibits to the complaint.

{¶ 52} The rejected affidavits of Neil do not refer to the allonges, nor were any allonges included with the promissory note that was attached to Neil’s affidavit. During oral argument, HSBC referred frequently to the Jiminez-Reyes affidavit, which was attached to a February 2008 summary judgment motion filed by HSBC. Jiminez-Reyes identified the exhibits attached to the complaint, but did not refer to the allonges. HSBC withdrew the summary judgment motion in March 2008, after Thompson had identified various deficiencies in the affidavit, including the fact that Jiminez-Reyes had incorrectly identified Thompson as the account holder. Since the motion was withdrawn, it is questionable whether the attached affidavit of Jiminez-Reyes was properly before the trial court. Byers v. Robinson, Franklin App. No. 08AP-204, 2008-Ohio-4833, ¶ 16 (effect of withdrawing motion is to leave the record as it stood before the motion was filed).

{¶ 53} Nonetheless, shortly after the complaint was filed, and prior to its first summary judgment motion, HSBC filed an affidavit of Jessica Dybas, who is identified in the affidavit as an “agent” of HSBC. The exact status of Dybas’s agency or connection to HSBC is not explained in the affidavit.

{¶ 54} Dybas states in the affidavit that she has personal knowledge of the history of the loan, that she is the custodian of records pertaining to the loan and mortgage, and that the records have been maintained in the ordinary course of business. See “Exhibit A attached to Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing of Loan Status, Military, Minor and Incompetent Affidavit and Loan History,” which was filed with the trial court in February 2008. Dybas’s affidavit also identifies Exhibits A and B of the complaint as true and accurate copies of the originals. Exhibit A to the complaint includes a copy of the promissory note of the decedent, Howard Turner, made payable to Fidelity, and a copy of two documents entitled “Allonge,” that are placed at the end of the promissory note. Exhibit B is a copy of the mortgage agreement, which names Fidelity as the “Lender” and MERS as “nominee” for Fidelity and its assigns. Dybas’s affidavit does not specifically mention the allonges. Like the affidavit of Jiminez-Reyes, Dybas’s affidavit incorrectly identifies Thompson as the borrower on the note. Thompson was not the borrower; she is the administratrix of the estate of the borrower, Howard Turner.

{¶ 55} Assuming for the sake of argument that Dybas’s affidavit is sufficient, or that the affidavit of Jiminez-Reyes was properly before the court, we note that Ohio requires endorsements to be “on” an instrument, or in papers affixed to the instrument. See R.C. 1303.24(A)(1) and (2), which state that “For the purpose of determining whether a signature is made on an instrument, a paper affixed to the instrument is a part of the instrument.”

{¶ 56} “The use of an allonge to add indorsements to an instrument when there is no room for them on the instrument itself dates from early common law.” Southwestern Resolution Corp. v. Watson (Tex. 1997), 964 S.W.2d 262, 263. “An allonge is defined as `[a] slip of paper sometimes attached to a negotiable instrument for the purpose of receiving further indorsements when the original paper is filled with indorsements.'” Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Fequiere (2010), 119 Conn.App. 570, 577, 989 A.2d 606, quoting from Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009).

{¶ 57} In Watson, a note and allonge produced at trial were taped together and had several staple holes. The president of the noteholder testified that when his company received the note, “the allonge was stapled to it and may also have been clipped and taped, but that the note and allonge had been separated and reattached five or six times for photocopying.” 964 S.W.2d at 263. The lower courts agreed with a jury that the allonge was not so firmly affixed as to be part of the note. But the Supreme Court of Texas disagreed.

{¶ 58} The Supreme Court of Texas recounted the history of allonges throughout various versions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The court noted that an early provision had provided that an endorsement must be written on the note or on a paper attached thereto. Id., citing Section 31 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. Under this law, an allonge could be attached by a staple. Id (citation omitted). The Supreme Court of Texas also noted that:

{¶ 59} “When the UCC changed the requirement from `attached thereto’ to `so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof’, * * * the drafters of the new provision specifically contemplated that an allonge could be attached to a note by staples. American Law Institute, Comments & Notes to Tentative Draft No. 1-Article III 114 (1946), reprinted in 2 Elizabeth Slusser Kelly, Uniform Commercial Code Drafts 311, 424 (1984) (`The indorsement must be written on the instrument itself or on an allonge, which, as defined in Section ___, is a strip of paper so firmly pasted, stapled or otherwise affixed to the instrument as to become part of it.’).” Id. at 263-64 (citation omitted).

{¶ 60} The Supreme Court of Texas further observed that:

{¶ 61} “The attachment requirement has been said to serve two purposes: preventing fraud and preserving the chain of title to an instrument. * * * * Still, the requirement has been relaxed in the current code from `firmly affixed’ to simply `affixed’. Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 3.204(a). As the Commercial Code Committee of the Section of Business Law of the State Bar of Texas concluded in recommending adoption of the provision, `the efficiencies and benefits achieved by permitting indorsements by allonge outweigh[] the possible problems raised by easily detachable allonges.'” Id. at 264 (citations omitted).

{¶ 62} The Supreme Court of Texas, therefore, concluded that a stapled allonge is “firmly affixed” to an instrument, and that the allonge in the case before it was properly affixed. In this regard, the court relied on the following evidence:

{¶ 63} “In the present case, Southwestern’s president testified that the allonge was stapled, taped, and clipped to the note when Southwestern received it. There was no evidence to the contrary. The fact that the documents had been detached for photocopying does not raise a fact issue for the jury about whether the documents were firmly affixed. If it did, the validity of an allonge would always be a question of the finder of fact, since no allonge can be affixed so firmly that it cannot be detached. One simply cannot infer that two documents were never attached from the fact that they can be, and have been, detached. Nor could the jury infer from the staple holes in the two papers, as the court of appeals suggested, that the two documents had not been attached. This would be pure conjecture.” Id. at 264.

{¶ 64} Like Texas, Ohio has adopted the pertinent revisions to the UCC. In All American Finance Co. v. Pugh Shows, Inc. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 130, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted that under UCC 3-302, “a purported indorsement on a mortgage or other separate paper pinned or clipped to an instrument is not sufficient for negotiation.” Id. at 132, n. 3. At that time, R.C. 1303.23 was the analogous Ohio statute to UCC 3-202, which required endorsements to be firmly affixed.

{¶ 65} Ohio subsequently adopted the revisions to the UCC. R.C. 1303.24(A)(2) now requires that a paper be affixed to an instrument in order for a signature to be considered part of the instrument. R.C. 1303.24 is the analogous Ohio statute to UCC. 3-204. The 1990 official comments for UCC 3-204 state that this requirement is “based on subsection (2) of former Section 3-202. An indorsement on an allonge is valid even though there is sufficient space on the instrument for an indorsement.” This latter comment addresses the fact that prior to the 1990 changes to the UCC, the majority view was that allonges could be used only if the note itself contained insufficient space for further endorsements. See, e.g., Pribus v. Bush (1981), 118 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1008, 173 Cal.Rptr. 747. See, also, All American Finance, 30 Ohio St.3d at 132, n.3 (indicating that while the court did not need to reach the issue for purposes of deciding the case, several jurisdictions “hold that indorsement by allonge is permitted only where there is no longer room on the instrument itself due to previous indorsements.”)

{¶ 66} The current version of the UCC, codified as R.C. 1303.24(A)(2), allows allonges even where room exists on the note for further endorsements. However, the paper must be affixed to the instrument in order for the signature to be considered part of the instrument. As the Supreme Court of Texas noted in Watson, the requirement has changed from being “firmly affixed” to “affixed.” However, even the earlier version, which specified that the allonge be “attached thereto,” was interpreted as requiring that the allonge be stapled. Watson, 964 S.W.2d at 263.

{¶ 67} In contrast to Watson, no evidence was presented in the case before us to indicate that the allonges were ever attached or affixed to the promissory note. Instead, the allonges have been presented as separate, loose sheets of paper, with no explanation as to how they may have been attached. Compare In re Weisband, (Bkrtcy. D. Ariz., 2010), 427 B.R. 13, 19 (concluding that GMAC was not a “holder” and did not have ability to enforce a note, where GMAC failed to demonstrate that an allonge endorsement to GMAC was affixed to a note. The bankruptcy court noted that the endorsement in question “is on a separate sheet of paper; there was no evidence that it was stapled or otherwise attached to the rest of the Note.”)

{¶ 68} It is possible that the allonges in the case before us were stapled to the note at one time and were separated for photocopying. But unlike the alleged creditor in Watson, HSBC offered no evidence to that effect. Furthermore, assuming for the sake of argument that the allonges were properly “affixed,” the order of the allonges does not permit HSBC to claim that it is the possessor of a note made payable to bearer or endorsed in blank.

{¶ 69} The first allonge is endorsed from Delta to “blank,” and the second allonge is endorsed from Fidelity to Delta. If the endorsement in blank were intended to be effective, the endorsement from Fidelity to Delta should have preceded the endorsement from Delta to “blank,” because the original promissory note is made payable to Fidelity, not to Delta. Delta would have had no power to endorse the note before receiving the note and an endorsement from Fidelity.

{¶ 70} HSBC contends that the order of the allonges is immaterial, while Thompson claims that the order is critical. At the oral argument of this appeal, HSBC appeared to be arguing that the order of allonges would never be material. This is easily refuted by the example of two allonges, one containing an assignment from the original holder of the note to A, and the other containing an assignment from the original holder of the note to B. Whichever allonge was first would determine whether the note had been effectively assigned to A, or to B.

{¶ 71} Thompson contends that because the last-named endorsement is made to Delta, Delta was the proper holder of the note when this action was filed, since the prior, first-named endorsement was from an entity other than the current holder of the note. In Adams v. Madison Realty & Development, Inc. (C.A.3, 1988), 853 F.2d 163, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stressed that from the maker’s standpoint:

{¶ 72} “it becomes essential to establish that the person who demands payment of a negotiable note, or to whom payment is made, is the duly qualified holder. Otherwise, the obligor is exposed to the risk of double payment, or at least to the expense of litigation incurred to prevent duplicative satisfaction of the instrument. These risks provide makers with a recognizable interest in demanding proof of the chain of title.” Id. At 168.

{¶ 73} The Third Circuit Court of Appeals further observed that:

{¶ 74} “Financial institutions, noted for insisting on their customers’ compliance with numerous ritualistic formalities, are not sympathetic petitioners in urging relaxation of an elementary business practice. It is a tenet of commercial law that `[h]oldership and the potential for becoming holders in due course should only be accorded to transferees that observe the historic protocol.'” 853 F.2d at 169 (citation omitted).

{¶ 75} Consistent with this observation, recent decisions in the State of New York have noted numerous irregularities in HSBC’s mortgage documentation and corporate relationships with Ocwen, MERS, and Delta. See, e.g., HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Cherry (2007), 18 Misc.3d 1102(A), 856 N.Y.S.2d 24 (Table), 2007 WL 4374284, and HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Yeasmin (2010), 27 Misc.3d 1227(A), 2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 50927(U)(Table), 2010 WL 2080273 (dismissing HSBC’s requests for orders of reference in mortgage foreclosure actions, due to HSBC’s failure to provide proper affidavits). See, also, e.g., HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Charlevagne (2008), 20 Misc.3d 1128(A), 872 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Table), 2008 WL 2954767, and HSBC Bank USA, Nat. Assn. v. Antrobus (2008), 20 Misc.3d 1127(A), 872 N.Y.S.2d 691,(Table), 2008 WL 2928553 (describing “possible incestuous relationship” between HSBC Bank, Ocwen Loan Servicing, Delta Funding Corporation, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., due to the fact that the entities all share the same office space at 1661 Worthington Road, Suite 100, West Palm Beach, Florida. HSBC also supplied affidavits in support of foreclosure from individuals who claimed simultaneously to be officers of more than one of these corporations.).

{¶ 76} Because the last allonge endorses the note to Delta, and no further endorsement to HSBC was provided, the trial court did not err in concluding that HSBC was not the holder of the note when the litigation was commenced against Thompson.

{¶ 77} As an alternative position, HSBC contended at oral argument that it had standing to prosecute the action, because assignment of the mortgage alone is sufficient. In this regard, HSBC notes that the mortgage was transferred to HSBC by MERS on November 14, 2007. This was about one week after HSBC commenced the mortgage foreclosure action.

{¶ 78} HSBC did not argue this position in its briefs, and did not provide supporting authority for its position at oral argument. In fact, HSBC relied in its brief on the contrary position that HSBC “was the legal holder of the note and, accordingly, entitled to enforce the mortgage loan regardless of the date the Mortgage was assigned, and under Marcino, even if the Mortgage had never been separately assigned to HSBC.” Brief of Appellant HSBC Bank USA, N.A., pp. 15-16 (bolding in original).

{¶ 79} The Marcino case referred to by HSBC states as follows:

{¶ 80} “For nearly a century, Ohio courts have held that whenever a promissory note is secured by a mortgage, the note constitutes the evidence of the debt and the mortgage is a mere incident to the obligation. Edgar v. Haines (1923), 109 Ohio St. 159, 164, 141 N.E. 837. Therefore, the negotiation of a note operates as an equitable assignment of the mortgage, even though the mortgage is not assigned or delivered.” U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Marcino, 181 Ohio App.3d 328, 2009-Ohio-1178, ¶ 52.

{¶ 81} Even if HSBC had provided support for the proposition that ownership of the note is not required, the evidence about the assignment is not properly before us. The alleged mortgage assignment is attached to the rejected affidavits of Neil. Furthermore, even if we were to consider this “evidence,” the mortgage assignment from MERS to HSBC indicates that the assignment was prepared by Ocwen for MERS, and that Ocwen is located at the same Palm Beach, Florida address mentioned in Charlevagne and Antrobus. See Exhibit 3 attached to the affidavit of Chomie Neil. In addition, Scott Anderson, who signed the assignment, as Vice-President of MERS, appears to be the same individual who claimed to be both Vice-President of MERS and Vice-President of Ocwen. See Antrobus, 2008 WL 2928553, * 4, and Charlevagne, 2008 WL 2954767, * 1.

{¶ 82} In support of its argument that a subsequent mortgage assignment can confer standing on a noteholder, HSBC cites some Ohio cases in which “courts have rejected claims that the execution of an assignment subsequent to the filing of a complaint necessarily precludes a party from prosecuting a foreclosure action as the real party in interest.” Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Cassens, Franklin App. No. 09-AP-865, 2010-Ohio-2851, ¶ 17. Accordingly, at least in the view of some districts in Ohio, if the note had been properly negotiated to HSBC, HSBC may have been able to claim standing, based on equitable assignment of the mortgage, supplemented by the actual transfer of the mortgage after the complaint was filed.

{¶ 83} In contrast to the Seventh District, other districts take a more rigid view. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Jordan, Cuyahoga App. No. 91675, 2009-Ohio-1092 (holding that Civ. R. 17(A) does not apply unless a plaintiff has standing in the first place to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Accordingly, a bank that is not a mortgagee when suit is filed is not the real party in interest on the date the complaint is filed, and cannot cure its lack of standing by subsequently obtaining an interest in the mortgage). Accord Bank of New York v. Gindele, Hamilton App. No. C-090251, 2010-Ohio-542.

{¶ 84} In Gindele, the First District Court of Appeals commented as follows:

{¶ 85} “We likewise reject Bank of New York’s argument that the real party in interest when the lawsuit was filed was later joined by the Gindeles. We are convinced that the later joinder of the real party in interest could not have cured the Bank of New York’s lack of standing when it filed its foreclosure complaint. This narrow reading of Civ.R. 17 comports with the intent of the rule. As other state and federal courts have noted, Civ.R. 17 generally allows ratification, joinder, and substitution of parties `to avoid forfeiture and injustice when an understandable mistake has been made in selecting the parties in whose name the action should be brought.’ * * * * `While a literal interpretation of * * * Rule 17(a) would make it applicable to every case in which an inappropriate plaintiff was named, the Advisory Committee’s Notes make it clear that this provision is intended to prevent forfeiture when determination of the proper party to sue is difficult or when an understandable mistake has been made. When determination of the correct party to bring the action was not difficult and when no excusable mistake was made, the last sentence of Rule 17(a) is inapplicable and the action should be dismissed.'” Id. at ¶ 4 (footnotes omitted).

{¶ 86} We need not decide which approach is correct, because the alleged assignment of mortgage is attached to Neil’s rejected affidavits. Since the trial court’s disregard of the affidavits was not an abuse of discretion, there is currently no evidence of a mortgage “assignment” to consider. Moreover, we would reject HSBC’s position even if we considered the alleged assignment, because HSBC failed to establish that it was the holder of the note. Therefore, no “equitable assignment” of the mortgage would have arisen. All that HSBC might have established is that the mortgage was assigned to it after the action was filed. However, as we noted, the matters pertaining to that fact were submitted with an affidavit that the trial court rejected, within its discretion.

{¶ 87} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing the action without prejudice, based on HSBC’s failure to prove that it had standing to sue.

{¶ 88} HSBC’s First Assignment of Error is overruled.


{¶ 89} The final matter to be addressed is Thompson’s motion to dismiss the part of HSBC’s appeal which assigns error in the trial court’s denial of HSBC’s motion for summary judgment. HSBC filed a motion for summary judgment on Thompson’s counterclaim, which alleged violations of the Fair Debt Practices Collection Act. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and filed a Civ. R. 54(B) certification regarding the summary judgment that had been rendered in Thompson’s favor.

{¶ 90} Thompson contends that denial of summary judgment is not a final appealable order, and that HSBC’s argument regarding the FDCPA should not be considered on appeal. In response, HSBC maintains that it is not appealing the denial of its motion for summary judgment. HSBC argues instead, that if we reverse the trial court order granting Thompson’s motion to strike the affidavit of Neil, or if we reverse the order dismissing HSBC’s foreclosure complaint, we would then be entitled under App. R. 12(B) to enter a judgment dismissing the FDCPA claims.

{¶ 91} App. R. 12(B) provides that:

{¶ 92} “When the court of appeals determines that the trial court committed no error prejudicial to the appellant in any of the particulars assigned and argued in appellant’s brief and that the appellee is entitled to have the judgment or final order of the trial court affirmed as a matter of law, the court of appeals shall enter judgment accordingly. When the court of appeals determines that the trial court committed error prejudicial to the appellant and that the appellant is entitled to have judgment or final order rendered in his favor as a matter of law, the court of appeals shall reverse the judgment or final order of the trial court and render the judgment or final order that the trial court should have rendered, or remand the cause to the court with instructions to render such judgment or final order. In all other cases where the court of appeals determines that the judgment or final order of the trial court should be modified as a matter of law it shall enter its judgment accordingly.”

{¶ 93} App. R. 12(B) does not apply, because the trial court did not commit error prejudicial to HSBC. Furthermore, HSBC admits that it is not appealing the denial of its summary judgment motion. Accordingly, Thompson’s motion to dismiss is without merit and is overruled.


{¶ 94} All of HSBC’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed. Thompson’s motion to dismiss part of HSBC’s appeal is overruled.

Brogan and Froelich, JJ., concur.

This copy provided by Leagle, Inc.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bogus, chain in title, conflict of interest, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, fdcpa, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, HSBC, MERS, mortgage, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Notary, notary fraud, note, robo signers,, trade secrets, trustee, Trusts0 Comments

It All goes Back in the Box

It All goes Back in the Box

We can learn a thing or two about a simple game called Monopoly!

In the end .. it all goes back in the box …

Editing done by me.

“What we do for ourselves dies with us. What we do for others and the world remains and is immortal.” -Albert Pine

Speech is by John Ortberg

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in chain in title, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, deed of trust, Eviction, FED FRAUD, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, mbs, mortgage, scam, securitization, stock,, sub-prime, svp, tarp funds, TAXES, trade secrets, Trusts, Wall Street0 Comments

Global Collapse of the Fiat Money System: Too Big To Fail Global Banks Will Collapse Between Now and First Quarter 2011

Global Collapse of the Fiat Money System: Too Big To Fail Global Banks Will Collapse Between Now and First Quarter 2011

When Quantitative Easing Has Run Its Course and Fails

By Matthias Chang

Global Research, August 31, 2010

Readers of my articles will recall that I have warned as far back as December 2006, that the global banks will collapse when the Financial Tsunami hits the global economy in 2007. And as they say, the rest is history.

Quantitative Easing (QE I) spearheaded by the Chairman of  delayed the inevitable demise of the fiat shadow money banking system slightly over 18 months.

That is why in November of 2009, I was so confident to warn my readers that by the end of the first quarter of 2010 at the earliest or by the second quarter of 2010 at the latest, the global economy will go into a tailspin. The recent alarm that the US economy has slowed down and in the words of Bernanke “the recent pace of growth is less vigorous than we expected” has all but vindicated my analysis. He warned that the outlook is uncertain and the economy “remains vulnerable to unexpected developments”.

Obviously, Bernanke’s words do not reveal the full extent of the fear that has gripped central bankers and the financial elites that assembled at the annual gathering at Jackson Hole, Wyoming. But, you can take it from me that they are very afraid.


Let me be plain and blunt. The “unexpected developments” Bernanke referred to is the collapse of the global banks. This is FED speak and to those in the loop, this is the dire warning.

So many renowned economists have misdiagnosed the objective and consequences of quantitative easing. Central bankers’ scribes and the global mass media hoodwinked the people by saying that QE will enable the banks to lend monies to cash-starved companies and jump start the economy. The low interest rate regime would encourage all and sundry to borrow, consume and invest.

This was the fairy tale.

Then, there were some economists who were worried that as a result of the FED’s printing press (electronic or otherwise) working overtime, hyper-inflation would set in soon after.

But nothing happened. The multiplier effect of fractional reserve banking did not take off. Bank lending in fact stalled.


What happened?

Let me explain in simple terms step by step.

1) All the global banks were up to their eye-balls in toxic assets. All the AAA mortgage-backed securities etc. were in fact JUNK. But in the balance sheets of the banks and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs), they were stated to be worth US$ TRILLIONS.

2) The collapse of Lehman Bros and AIG exposed this ugly truth. All the global banks had liabilities in the US$ Trillions. They were all INSOLVENT. The central banks the world over conspired and agreed not to reveal the total liabilities of the global banks as that would cause a run on these banks, as happened in the case of Northern Rock in the U.K.

3) A devious scheme was devised by the FED, led by Bernanke to assist the global banks to unload systematically and in tranches the toxic assets so as to allow the banks to comply with RESERVE REQUIREMENTS under the fractional reserve banking system, and to continue their banking business. This is the essence of the bailout of the global banks by central bankers.

4) This devious scheme was effected by the FED’s quantitative easing (QE) – the purchase of toxic assets from the banks. The FED created “money out of thin air” and used that “money” to buy the toxic assets at face or book value from the banks, notwithstanding they were all junks and at the most, worth maybe ten cents to the dollar. Now, the FED is “loaded” with toxic assets once owned by the global banks. But these banks cannot declare and or admit to this state of affairs. Hence, this financial charade.

5) If we are to follow simple logic, the exercise would result in the global banks flushed with cash to enable them to lend to desperate consumers and cash-starved businesses. But the money did not go out as loans. Where did the money go?

6) It went back to the FED as reserves, and since the FED bought US$ trillions worth of toxic wastes, the “money” (it was merely book entries in the Fed’s books) that these global banks had were treated as “Excess Reserves”. This is a misnomer because it gave the ILLUSION that the banks are cash-rich and under the fractional reserve system would be able to lend out trillions worth of loans. But they did not. Why?

7) Because the global banks still have US$ trillions worth of toxic wastes in their balance sheets. They are still insolvent under the fractional reserve banking laws. The public must not be aware of this as otherwise, it would trigger a massive run on all the global banks!

8) Bernanke, the US Treasury and the global central bankers were all praying and hoping that given time (their estimation was 12 to 18 months) the housing market would recover and asset prices would resume to the levels before the crisis. .

Let me explain: A House was sold for say US$500,000. Borrower has a mortgage of US$450,000 or more. The house is now worth US$200,000 or less. Multiply this by the millions of houses sold between 2000 and 2008 and you will appreciate the extent of the financial black-hole. There is no way that any of the global banks can get out of this gigantic mess. And there is also no way that the FED and the global central bankers through QE can continue to buy such toxic wastes without showing their hands and exposing the lie that these banks are solvent.

It is my estimation that they have to QE up to US$20 trillion at the minimum. The FED and no central banker would dare “create such an amount of money out of thin air” without arousing the suspicions and or panic of sovereign creditors, investors and depositors. It is as good as declaring officially that all the banks are BANKRUPT.

9) But there is no other solution in the short and middle term except another bout of quantitative easing, QE II. Given the above caveat, QE II cannot exceed the amount of the previous QE without opening the proverbial Pandora Box.

10) But it is also a given that the FED will embark on QE II, as under the fractional reserve banking system, if the FED does not purchase additional toxic wastes, the global banks (faced with mounting foreclosures, etc.) will fall short of their reserve requirements.

11) You will also recall that the FED at the height of the crisis announced that interest will be paid on the so-called “excess reserves” of the global banks, thus enabling these banks to “earn” interest. So what we have is a merry-go-round of monies moving from the right pocket to the left pocket at the click of the computer mouse. The FED creates money, uses it to buy toxic assets, and the same money is then returned to the FED by the global banks to earn interest. By this fiction of QE, banks are flushed with cash which enable them to earn interest. Is it any wonder that these banks have declared record profits?

12) The global banks get rid of some of their toxic wastes at full value and at no costs, and get paid for unloading the toxic wastes via interest payments. Additionally, some of the “monies” are used by these banks to purchase US Treasuries (which also pay interests) which in turn allows the US Treasury to continue its deficit spending. THIS IS THE BAILOUT RIP OFF of the century.

Now that you fully understand this SCAM, it is left to be seen how the FED will get away with the next round of quantitative easing – QE II.

Obviously, the FED and the other central banks are hoping that in time, asset prices will recover and resume their previous values before the crisis. This is a fantasy. QE II will fail just as QE I failed to save the banks.

The patient is in intensive care and is for all intent and purposes brain dead, although the heart is still pumping albeit faintly. The Too Big To Fail Banks cannot be rescued and must be allowed to be liquidated. It will be painful, but it is necessary before there is recovery. This is a given.


When the ball hits the ceiling fan, sometime early 2011 at the earliest, there will be massive bank runs.

I expect that the FED and other central banks will pre-empt such a run and will do the following:

1) Disallow cash withdrawals from banks beyond a certain amount, say US$1,000 per day; 2) Disallow cash transactions up to a certain amount, say US$10,000 for certain transactions; 3) Transactions (investments) for metals (gold and silver) will be restricted; 4) Worst-case scenario – the confiscation of gold AS HAPPENED IN WORLD WAR II. 5) Imposition of capital controls etc.; 6) Legislations that will compel most daily commercial transactions to be conducted through Debit and or Credit Cards; 7) Legislations to make it a criminal offence for any contraventions of the above.


Maintain a bank balance sufficient to enable you to comply with the above potential impositions.

Start diversifying your assets away from dollar assets. Have foreign currencies in sufficient quantities in those jurisdictions where the above anticipated impositions are least likely to be implemented.


There will be a financial tsunami (round two) the likes of which the world has never seen.

Global banks will collapse!

Be ready.

© Copyright Matthias Chang, Future Fast Forward, 2010

The url address of this article is:

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bernanke, cdo, chain in title, conflict of interest, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, FED FRAUD, federal reserve board, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, geithner, securitization, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, sub-prime, trade secrets, Wall Street2 Comments




Just like the Lis Pendens arriving before the Assignment from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. with 1st Vice President Mark Bishop (who also signs for CityWide Mortgage Corp and America’s Wholesale Lender,etc.). There is no Assignment “created” from MERS to BAC Home Loan Servicing LP.

In this Affidavit we have Suzanne M. Haumesser signing as SR. Vice President of BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP. For Owner and Holder of Mortgage and Note, Bank of New York as Trustee for the Certificate Holders CWALT inc Alternative Loan Trust 2006-oa10 mortgage pass through certificates, series 2006-oa10

The Notary is Dolores V. Bald from Erie County, New York.

The day of service August 26. 2010

Date showing for the amount due “FEBRUARY 17, 2010”

Signed in California but notarized in New York!

Did Suzanne make a special trip just to sign this in NY?

NOW, Take a look at when this was NOTARIZED DECEMBER 30, 2009 (?08) months before the February 17, 2010 tally of the amounts due! It also looks like an 08 instead of a 09. Last the date of service was August 26, 2010. C’mon get real! Why does it take all these months?

If this was done in 2008 New York Notary Commissions are good for 4 years.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bac home loans, bank of new york, chain in title, conflict of interest, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, countrywide, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, MERS, mortgage, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Notary, notary fraud, note, securitization, servicers, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, trade secrets, trustee, Trusts, Wall Street5 Comments

MUST WATCH | ‘INSIDE JOB’ The Global Financial Meltdown

MUST WATCH | ‘INSIDE JOB’ The Global Financial Meltdown

From Academy Award® nominated filmmaker, Charles Ferguson (“No End In Sight”), comes INSIDE JOB, the first film to expose the shocking truth behind the economic crisis of 2008. The global financial meltdown, at a cost of over $20 trillion, resulted in millions of people losing their homes and jobs. Through extensive research and interviews with major financial insiders, politicians and journalists, INSIDE JOB traces the rise of a rogue industry and unveils the corrosive relationships which have corrupted politics, regulation and academia.

Narrated by Academy Award® winner Matt Damon, INSIDE JOB was made on location in the United States, Iceland, England, France, Singapore, and China.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bear stearns, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, fannie mae, FED FRAUD, federal reserve board, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, geithner, goldman sachs, insider, investigation, jobless, lehman brothers, mbs, mortgage, Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, note, racketeering, Real Estate, repossession, RICO, securitization, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, sub-prime, trade secrets, Trusts, Wall Street0 Comments

WHISTLE BLOWER | Report On Fraudulent & Forged Assignments Of Mortgages & Deeds In U.S. Foreclosures

WHISTLE BLOWER | Report On Fraudulent & Forged Assignments Of Mortgages & Deeds In U.S. Foreclosures

Pew family trusts which I am a beneficiary and/or remainderman have maintained
investments in various banks, mutual funds, and other entities that maintain
interests in various shares, mortgage backed securities and/or debt issuances and I
have been a shareholder in many mortgage companies including Fannie Mae,
Bear Stearns, JPMorganChase, Washington Mutual, MGIC, Ocwen and Radian,
many of which are members, owners and shareholders in Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. [MERS].

© 2010 Nye Lavalle, Pew Mortgage Institute
•10675 Pebble Cove Lane • Boca Raton, FL 33498
561/860-7632 •

[ipaper docId=36753239 access_key=key-1xwnf3x33iwj6zod9965 height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bear stearns, bogus, chain in title, concealment, conflict of interest, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, forensic document examiner, forensic mortgage investigation audit, forgery, insider, investigation, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., Lender Processing Services Inc., LPS, Max Gardner, MERS, MERSCORP, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, neil garfield, notary fraud, note, OCC, R.K. Arnold, racketeering, RICO, robo signers, shapiro & fishman pa, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD,, trade secrets, Trusts, Violations, Wall Street0 Comments

Banks’ Self-Dealing Super-Charged Financial Crisis

Banks’ Self-Dealing Super-Charged Financial Crisis


Over the last two years of the housing bubble, Wall Street bankers perpetrated one of the greatest episodes of self-dealing in financial history.

Faced with increasing difficulty in selling the mortgage-backed securities that had been among their most lucrative products, the banks hit on a solution that preserved their quarterly earnings and huge bonuses:

They created fake demand.

A ProPublica analysis shows for the first time the extent to which banks — primarily Merrill Lynch, but also Citigroup, UBS and others — bought their own products and cranked up an assembly line that otherwise should have flagged.

The products they were buying and selling were at the heart of the 2008 meltdown — collections of mortgage bonds known as collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs.

As the housing boom began to slow in mid-2006, investors became skittish about the riskier parts of those investments. So the banks created — and ultimately provided most of the money for — new CDOs. Those new CDOs bought the hard-to-sell pieces of the original CDOs. The result was a daisy chain [1] that solved one problem but created another: Each new CDO had its own risky pieces. Banks created yet other CDOs to buy those.

Individual instances of these questionable trades have been reported before, but ProPublica’s investigation shows that by late 2006 they became a common industry practice.

Source: Thetica SystemsSource: Thetica Systems

An analysis by research firm Thetica Systems, commissioned by ProPublica, shows that in the last years of the boom, CDOs had become the dominant purchaser of key, risky parts of other CDOs, largely replacing real investors like pension funds. By 2007, 67 percent of those slices were bought by other CDOs, up from 36 percent just three years earlier. The banks often orchestrated these purchases. In the last two years of the boom, nearly half of all CDOs sponsored by market leader Merrill Lynch bought significant portions of other Merrill CDOs [2].ProPublica also found 85 instances during 2006 and 2007 in which two CDOs bought pieces of each other’s unsold inventory. These trades, which involved $107 billion worth of CDOs, underscore the extent to which the market lacked real buyers. Often the CDOs that swapped purchases closed within days of each other, the analysis shows.

There were supposed to be protections against this sort of abuse. While banks provided the blueprint for the CDOs and marketed them, they typically selected independent managers who chose the specific bonds to go inside them. The managers had a legal obligation to do what was best for the CDO. They were paid by the CDO, not the bank, and were supposed to serve as a bulwark against self-dealing by the banks, which had the fullest understanding of the complex and lightly regulated mortgage bonds.

It rarely worked out that way. The managers were beholden to the banks that sent them the business. On a billion-dollar deal, managers could earn a million dollars in fees, with little risk. Some small firms did several billion dollars of CDOs in a matter of months.

“All these banks for years were spawning trading partners,” says a former executive from Financial Guaranty Insurance Company, a major insurer of the CDO market. “You don’t have a trading partner? Create one.”

The executive, like most of the dozens of people ProPublica spoke with about the inner workings of the market at the time, asked not to be named out of fear of being sucked into ongoing investigations or because they are involved in civil litigation.

Keeping the assembly line going had a wealth of short-term advantages for the banks. Fees rolled in. A typical CDO could net the bank that created it between $5 million and $10 million — about half of which usually ended up as employee bonuses. Indeed, Wall Street awarded record bonuses in 2006, a hefty chunk of which came from the CDO business.

The self-dealing super-charged the market for CDOs, enticing some less-savvy investors to try their luck. Crucially, such deals maintained the value of mortgage bonds at a time when the lack of buyers should have driven their prices down.

But the strategy of speeding up the assembly line had devastating consequences for homeowners, the banks themselves and, ultimately, the global economy. Because of Wall Street’s machinations, more mortgages had been granted to ever-shakier borrowers. The results can now be seen in foreclosed houses across America.

The incestuous trading also made the CDOs more intertwined and thus fragile, accelerating their decline in value that began in the fall of 2007 and deepened over the next year. Most are now worth pennies on the dollar. Nearly half of the nearly trillion dollars in losses to the global banking system came from CDOs, losses ultimately absorbed by taxpayers and investors around the world. The banks’ troubles sent the world’s economies into a tailspin from which they have yet to recover.

It remains unclear whether any of this violated laws. The SEC has said [4] that it is actively looking at as many as 50 CDO managers as part of its broad examination of the CDO business’ role in the financial crisis. In particular, the agency is focusing on the relationship between the banks and the managers. The SEC is exploring how deals were structured, if any quid pro quo arrangements existed, and whether banks pressured managers to take bad assets.

The banks declined to directly address ProPublica’s questions. Asked about its relationship with managers and the cross-ownership among its CDOs, Citibank responded with a one-sentence statement:

“It has been widely reported that there are ongoing industry-wide investigations into CDO-related matters and we do not comment on pending investigations.”

None of ProPublica’s questions had mentioned the SEC or pending investigations.

Posed a similar list of questions, Bank of America, which now owns Merrill Lynch, said:

“These are very specific questions regarding individuals who left Merrill Lynch several years ago and a CDO origination business that, due to market conditions, was discontinued by Merrill before Bank of America acquired the company.”

This is the second installment of a ProPublica series about the largely hidden history of the CDO boom and bust. Our first story [5] looked at how one hedge fund helped create at least $40 billion in CDOs as part of a strategy to bet against the market. This story turns the focus on the banks.

Merrill Lynch Pioneers Pervert the Market
By 2004, the housing market was in full swing, and Wall Street bankers flocked to the CDO frenzy. It seemed to be the perfect money machine, and for a time everyone was happy.

Homeowners got easy mortgages. Banks and mortgage companies felt secure lending the money because they could sell the mortgages almost immediately to Wall Street and get back all their cash plus a little extra for their trouble. The investment banks charged massive fees for repackaging the mortgages into fancy financial products. Investors all around the world got to play in the then-phenomenal American housing market.

The mortgages were bundled into bonds, which were in turn combined into CDOs offering varying interest rates and levels of risk.

Investors holding the top tier of a CDO were first in line to get money coming from mortgages. By 2006, some banks often kept this layer, which credit agencies blessed with their highest rating of Triple A.

Buyers of the lower tiers took on more risk and got higher returns. They would be the first to take the hit if homeowners funding the CDO stopped paying their mortgages. (Here’s a video explaining how CDOs worked [6].)

Over time, these risky slices became increasingly hard to sell, posing a problem for the banks. If they remained unsold, the sketchy assets stayed on their books, like rotting inventory. That would require the banks to set aside money to cover any losses. Banks hate doing that because it means the money can’t be loaned out or put to other uses.

Being stuck with the risky portions of CDOs would ultimately lower profits and endanger the whole assembly line.

The banks, notably Merrill and Citibank, solved this problem by greatly expanding what had been a common and accepted practice: CDOs buying small pieces of other CDOs.

Architects of CDOs typically included what they called a “bucket” — which held bits of other CDOs paying higher rates of interest. The idea was to boost overall returns of deals primarily composed of safer assets. In the early days, the bucket was a small portion of an overall CDO.

One pioneer of pushing CDOs to buy CDOs was Merrill Lynch’s Chris Ricciardi, who had been brought to the firm in 2003 to take Merrill to the top of the CDO business. According to former colleagues, Ricciardi’s team cultivated managers, especially smaller firms.

Merrill exercised its leverage over the managers. A strong relationship with Merrill could be the difference between a business that thrived and one that didn’t. The more deals the banks gave a manager, the more money the manager got paid.

As the head of Merrill’s CDO business, Ricciardi also wooed managers with golf outings and dinners. One Merrill executive summed up the overall arrangement: “I’m going to make you rich. You just have to be my bitch.”

But not all managers went for it.

An executive from Trainer Wortham, a CDO manager, recalls a 2005 conversation with Ricciardi. “I wasn’t going to buy other CDOs. Chris said: ‘You don’t get it. You have got to buy other guys’ CDOs to get your deal done. That’s how it works.'” When the manager refused, Ricciardi told him, “‘That’s it. You are not going to get another deal done.'” Trainer Wortham largely withdrew from the market, concerned about the practice and the overheated prices for CDOs.

Ricciardi declined multiple requests to comment.

Merrill CDOs often bought slices of other Merrill deals. This seems to have happened more in the second half of any given year, according to ProPublica’s analysis, though the purchases were still a small portion compared to what would come later. Annual bonuses are based on the deals bankers completed by yearend.

Ricciardi left Merrill Lynch in February 2006. But the machine he put into place not only survived his departure, it became a model for competitors.

As Housing Market Wanes, Self-Dealing Takes Off
By mid-2006, the housing market was on the wane. This was particularly true for subprime mortgages, which were given to borrowers with spotty credit at higher interest rates. Subprime lenders began to fold, in what would become a mass extinction. In the first half of the year, the percentage of subprime borrowers who didn’t even make the first month’s mortgage payment tripled from the previous year.

That made CDO investors like pension funds and insurance companies increasingly nervous. If homeowners couldn’t make their mortgage payments, then the stream of cash to CDOs would dry up. Real “buyers began to shrivel and shrivel,” says Fiachra O’Driscoll, who co-ran Credit Suisse’s CDO business from 2003 to 2008.

Faced with disappearing investor demand, bankers could have wound down the lucrative business and moved on. That’s the way a market is supposed to work. Demand disappears; supply follows. But bankers were making lots of money. And they had amassed warehouses full of CDOs and other mortgage-based assets whose value was going down.

Rather than stop, bankers at Merrill, Citi, UBS and elsewhere kept making CDOs.

The question was: Who would buy them?

The top 80 percent, the less risky layers or so-called “super senior,” were held by the banks themselves. The beauty of owning that supposedly safe top portion was that it required hardly any money be held in reserve.

That left 20 percent, which the banks did not want to keep because it was riskier and required them to set aside reserves to cover any losses. Banks often sold the bottom, riskiest part to hedge funds [5]. That left the middle layer, known on Wall Street as the “mezzanine,” which was sold to new CDOs whose top 80 percent was ultimately owned by … the banks.

“As we got further into 2006, the mezzanine was going into other CDOs,” says Credit Suisse’s O’Driscoll.

This was the daisy chain [1]. On paper, the risky stuff was gone, held by new independent CDOs. In reality, however, the banks were buying their own otherwise unsellable assets.

How could something so seemingly short-sighted have happened?

It’s one of the great mysteries of the crash. Banks have fleets of risk managers to defend against just such reckless behavior. Top executives have maintained that while they suspected that the housing market was cooling, they never imagined the crash. For those doing the deals, the payoff was immediate. The dangers seemed abstract and remote.

The CDO managers played a crucial role. CDOs were so complex that even buyers had a hard time seeing exactly what was in them — making a neutral third party that much more essential.

“When you’re investing in a CDO you are very much putting your faith in the manager,” says Peter Nowell, a former London-based investor for the Royal Bank of Scotland. “The manager is choosing all the bonds that go into the CDO.” (RBS suffered mightily in the global financial meltdown, posting the largest loss in United Kingdom history, and was de facto nationalized by the British government.)

Source: Asset-Backed AlertSource: Asset-Backed Alert

By persuading managers to pick the unsold slices of CDOs, the banks helped keep the market going. “It guaranteed distribution when, quite frankly, there was not a huge market for them,” says Nowell.The counterintuitive result was that even as investors began to vanish, the mortgage CDO market more than doubled from 2005 to 2006, reaching $226 billion, according to the trade publication Asset-Backed Alert.

Citi and Merrill Hand Out Sweetheart Deals
As the CDO market grew, so did the number of CDO management firms, including many small shops that relied on a single bank for most of their business. According to Fitch, the number of CDO managers it rated rose from 89 in July 2006 to 140 in September 2007.

One CDO manager epitomized the devolution of the business, according to numerous industry insiders: a Wall Street veteran named Wing Chau.

Earlier in the decade, Chau had run the CDO department for Maxim Group, a boutique investment firm in New York. Chau had built a profitable business for Maxim based largely on his relationship with Merrill Lynch. In just a few years, Maxim had corralled more than $4 billion worth of assets under management just from Merrill CDOs.

In August 2006, Chau bolted from Maxim to start his own CDO management business, taking several colleagues with him. Chau’s departure gave Merrill, the biggest CDO producer, one more avenue for unsold inventory.

Chau named the firm Harding, after the town in New Jersey where he lived. The CDO market was starting its most profitable stretch ever, and Harding would play a big part. In an eleven-month period, ending in August 2007, Harding managed $13 billion of CDOs, including more than $5 billion from Merrill, and another nearly $5 billion from Citigroup. (Chau would later earn a measure of notoriety for a cameo appearance in Michael Lewis’ bestseller “The Big Short [7],” where he is depicted as a cheerfully feckless “go-to buyer” for Merrill Lynch’s CDO machine.)

Chau had a long-standing friendship with Ken Margolis, who was Merrill’s top CDO salesman under Ricciardi. When Ricciardi left Merrill in 2006, Margolis became a co-head of Merrill’s CDO group. He carried a genial, let’s-just-get-the-deal-done demeanor into his new position. An avid poker player, Margolis told a friend that in a previous job he had stood down a casino owner during a foreclosure negotiation after the owner had threatened to put a fork through his eye.

Chau’s close relationship with Merrill continued. In late 2006, Merrill sublet office space to Chau’s startup in the Merrill tower in Lower Manhattan’s financial district. A Merrill banker, David Moffitt, scheduled visits to Harding for prospective investors in the bank’s CDOs. “It was a nice office,” overlooking New York Harbor, recalls a CDO buyer. “But it did feel a little weird that it was Merrill’s building,” he said.

Moffitt did not respond to requests for comment.

Under Margolis, other small managers with meager track records were also suddenly handling CDOs valued at as much as $2 billion. Margolis declined to answer any questions about his own involvement in these matters.

A Wall Street Journal article [8] ($) from late 2007, one of the first of its kind, described how Margolis worked with one inexperienced CDO manager called NIR on a CDO named Norma, in the spring of that year. The Long Island-based NIR made about $1.5 million a year for managing Norma, a CDO that imploded.

“NIR’s collateral management business had arisen from efforts by Merrill Lynch to assemble a stable of captive small firms to manage its CDOs that would be beholden to Merrill Lynch on account of the business it funneled to them,” alleged a lawsuit filed in New York state court against Merrill over Norma that was settled quietly after the plaintiffs received internal Merrill documents.

NIR declined to comment.

Banks had a variety of ways to influence managers’ behavior.

Some of the few outside investors remaining in the market believed that the manager would do a better job if he owned a small slice of the CDO he was managing. That way, the manager would have more incentive to manage the investment well, since he, too, was an investor. But small management firms rarely had money to invest. Some banks solved this problem by advancing money to managers such as Harding.

Chau’s group managed two Citigroup CDOs — 888 Tactical Fund and Jupiter High-Grade VII — in which the bank loaned Harding money to buy risky pieces of the deal. The loans would be paid back out of the fees the managers took from the CDO and its investors. The loans were disclosed to investors in a few sentences among the hundreds of pages of legalese accompanying the deals.

In response to ProPublica’s questions, Chau’s lawyer said, “Harding Advisory’s dealings with investment banks were proper and fully disclosed.”

Citigroup made similar deals with other managers. The bank lent money to a manager called Vanderbilt Capital Advisors for its Armitage CDO, completed in March 2007.

Vanderbilt declined to comment. It couldn’t be learned how much money Citigroup loaned or whether it was ever repaid.

Yet again banks had masked their true stakes in CDO. Banks were lending money to CDO managers so they could buy the banks’ dodgy assets. If the managers couldn’t pay the loans back — and most were thinly capitalized — the banks were on the hook for even more losses when the CDO business collapsed.

Goldman, Merrill and Others Get Tough
When the housing market deteriorated, banks took advantage of a little-used power they had over managers.

The way CDOs are put together, there is a brief period when the bonds picked by managers sit on the banks’ balance sheets. Because the value of such assets can fall, banks reserved the right to overrule managers’ selections.

According to numerous bankers, managers and investors, banks rarely wielded that veto until late 2006, after which it became common. Merrill was in the lead.

“I would go to Merrill and tell them that I wanted to buy, say, a Citi bond,” recalls a CDO manager. “They would say ‘no.’ I would suggest a UBS bond, they would say ‘no.’ Eventually, you got the joke.” Managers could choose assets to put into their CDOs but they had to come from Merrill CDOs. One rival investment banker says Merrill treated CDO managers the way Henry Ford treated his Model T customers: You can have any color you want, as long as it’s black.

Once, Merrill’s Ken Margolis pushed a manager to buy a CDO slice for a Merrill-produced CDO called Port Jackson that was completed in the beginning of 2007: “‘You don’t have to buy the deal but you are crazy if you don’t because of your business,'” an executive at the management firm recalls Margolis telling him. “‘We have a big pipeline and only so many more mandates to give you.’ You got the message.” In other words: Take our stuff and we’ll send you more business. If not, forget it.

Margolis declined to comment on the incident.

“All the managers complained about it,” recalls O’Driscoll, the former Credit Suisse banker who competed with other investment banks to put deals together and market them. But “they were indentured slaves.” O’Driscoll recalls managers grumbling that Merrill in particular told them “what to buy and when to buy it.”

Other big CDO-producing banks quickly adopted the practice.

A little-noticed document released this year during a congressional investigation into Goldman Sachs’ CDO business reveals that bank’s thinking. The firm wrote a November 2006 internal memorandum [9] about a CDO called Timberwolf, managed by Greywolf, a small manager headed by ex-Goldman bankers. In a section headed “Reasons To Pursue,” the authors touted that “Goldman is approving every asset” that will end up in the CDO. What the bank intended to do with that approval power is clear from the memo: “We expect that a significant portion of the portfolio by closing will come from Goldman’s offerings.”

When asked to comment whether Goldman’s memo demonstrates that it had effective control over the asset selection process and that Greywolf was not in fact an independent manager, the bank responded: “Greywolf was an experienced, independent manager and made its own decisions about what reference assets to include. The securities included in Timberwolf were fully disclosed to the professional investors who invested in the transaction.”

Greywolf declined to comment. One of the investors, Basis Capital of Australia, filed a civil lawsuit in federal court in Manhattan against Goldman over the deal. The bank maintains the lawsuit is without merit.

By March 2007, the housing market’s signals were flashing red. Existing home sales plunged at the fastest rate in almost 20 years. Foreclosures were on the rise. And yet, to CDO buyer Peter Nowell’s surprise, banks continued to churn out CDOs.

“We were pulling back. We couldn’t find anything safe enough,” says Nowell. “We were amazed that April through June they were still printing deals. We thought things were over.”

Instead, the CDO machine was in overdrive. Wall Street produced $70 billion in mortgage CDOs in the first quarter of the year.

Many shareholder lawsuits battling their way through the court system today focus on this period of the CDO market. They allege that the banks were using the sales of CDOs to other CDOs to prop up prices and hide their losses.

“Citi’s CDO operations during late 2006 and 2007 functioned largely to sell CDOs to yet newer CDOs created by Citi to house them,” charges a pending shareholder lawsuit against the bank that was filed in federal court in Manhattan in February 2009. “Citigroup concocted a scheme whereby it repackaged many of these investments into other freshly-baked vehicles to avoid incurring a loss.”

Citigroup described the allegations as “irrational,” saying the bank’s executives would never knowingly take actions that would lead to “catastrophic losses.”

In the Hall of Mirrors, Myopic Rating Agencies
The portion of CDOs owned by other CDOs grew right alongside the market. What had been 5 percent of CDOs (remember the “bucket”) now came to constitute as much as 30 or 40 percent of new CDOs. (Wall Street also rolled out CDOs that were almost entirely made up of CDOs, called CDO squareds [10].)

The ever-expanding bucket provided new opportunities for incestuous trades.

It worked like this: A CDO would buy a piece of another CDO, which then returned the favor. The transactions moved both CDOs closer to completion, when bankers and managers would receive their fees.

Source: Thetica SystemsSource: Thetica Systems

ProPublica’s analysis shows that in the final two years of the business, CDOs with cross-ownership amounted to about one-fifth of the market, about $107 billion.Here’s an example from early May 2007:

  • A CDO called Jupiter VI bought a piece of a CDO called Tazlina II.
  • Tazlina II bought a piece of Jupiter VI.

Both Jupiter VI and Tazlina II were created by Merrill and were completed within a week of each other. Both were managed by small firms that did significant business with Merrill: Jupiter by Wing Chau’s Harding, and Tazlina by Terwin Advisors. Chau did not respond to questions about this deal. Terwin Advisors could not reached.

Just a few weeks earlier, CDO managers completed a comparable swap between Jupiter VI and another Merrill CDO called Forge 1.

Forge has its own intriguing history. It was the only deal done by a tiny manager of the same name based in Tampa, Fla. The firm was started less than a year earlier by several former Wall Street executives with mortgage experience. It received seed money from Bryan Zwan, who in 2001 settled an SEC civil lawsuit over his company’s accounting problems in a federal court in Florida. Zwan and Forge executives didn’t respond to requests for comment.

After seemingly coming out of nowhere, Forge won the right to manage a $1.5 billion Merrill CDO. That earned Forge a visit from the rating agency Moody’s.

“We just wanted to make sure that they actually existed,” says a former Moody’s executive. The rating agency saw that the group had an office near the airport and expertise to do the job.

Rating agencies regularly did such research on managers, but failed to ask more fundamental questions. The credit ratings agencies “did heavy, heavy due diligence on managers but they were looking for the wrong things: how you processed a ticket or how your surveillance systems worked,” says an executive at a CDO manager. “They didn’t check whether you were buying good bonds.”

One Forge employee recalled in a recent interview that he was amazed Merrill had been able to find buyers so quickly. “They were able to sell all the tranches” — slices of the CDO — “in a fairly rapid period of time,” said Rod Jensen, a former research analyst for Forge.

Forge achieved this feat because Merrill sold the slices to other CDOs, many linked to Merrill.

The ProPublica analysis shows that two Merrill CDOs, Maxim II and West Trade III, each bought pieces of Forge. Small managers oversaw both deals.

Forge, in turn, was filled with detritus from Merrill. Eighty-two percent of the CDO bonds owned by Forge came from other Merrill deals.

Citigroup did its own version of the shuffle, as these three CDOs demonstrate:

  • A CDO called Octonion bought some of Adams Square Funding II.
  • • Adams Square II bought a piece of Octonion.
  • • A third CDO, Class V Funding III, also bought some of Octonion.
  • • Octonion, in turn, bought a piece of Class V Funding III.

All of these Citi deals were completed within days of each other. Wing Chau was once again a central player. His firm managed Octonion. The other two were managed by a unit of Credit Suisse. Credit Suisse declined to comment.

Not all cross-ownership deals were consummated.

In spring 2007, Deutsche Bank was creating a CDO and found a manager that wanted to take a piece of it. The manager was overseeing a CDO that Merrill was assembling. Merrill blocked the manager from putting the Deutsche bonds into the Merrill CDO. A former Deutsche Bank banker says that when Deutsche Bank complained to Andy Phelps, a Merrill CDO executive, Phelps offered a quid pro quo: If Deutsche was willing to have the manager of its CDO buy some Merrill bonds, Merrill would stop blocking the purchase. Phelps declined to comment.

The Deutsche banker, who says its managers were independent, recalls being shocked: “We said we don’t control what people buy in their deals.” The swap didn’t happen.

The Missing Regulators and the Aftermath
In September 2007, as the market finally started to catch up with Merrill Lynch, Ken Margolis left the firm to join Wing Chau at Harding.

Chau and Margolis circulated a marketing plan for a new hedge fund to prospective investors touting their expertise in how CDOs were made and what was in them. The fund proposed to buy failed CDOs — at bargain basement prices. In the end, Margolis and Chau couldn’t make the business work and dropped the idea.

Why didn’t regulators intervene during the boom to stop the self-dealing that had permeated the CDO market?

No one agency had authority over the whole business. Since the business came and went in just a few years, it may have been too much to expect even assertive regulators to comprehend what was happening in time to stop it.

While the financial regulatory bill passed by Congress in July creates more oversight powers, it’s unclear whether regulators have sufficient tools to prevent a replay of the debacle.

In just two years, the CDO market had cut a swath of destruction. Partly because CDOs had bought so many pieces of each other, they collapsed in unison. Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, the biggest perpetrators of the self-dealing, were among the biggest losers. Merrill lost about $26 billion on mortgage CDOs and Citigroup about $34 billion.

Additional reporting by Kitty Bennett, Krista Kjellman Schmidt, Lisa Schwartz and Karen Weise.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bank of america, cdo, citi, CitiGroup, concealment, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, Credit Suisse, deutsche bank, Economy, goldman sachs, investigation, Merrill Lynch, racketeering, RICO, rmbs, stock, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, trade secrets, Wall Street0 Comments

CLASS ACTION AMENDED against MERSCORP to include Shareholders, DJSP

CLASS ACTION AMENDED against MERSCORP to include Shareholders, DJSP

Kenneth Eric Trent, P.A. of Broward County has amended the Class Action complaint Figueroa v. MERSCORP, Inc. et al filed on July 26, 2010 in the Southern District of Florida.

Included in the amended complaint is MERS shareholders HSBC, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Wells Fargo & Company, AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, WAMU, Countrywide, GMAC, Guaranty Bank, Merrill Lynch, Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), Norwest, Bank of America, Everhome, American Land Title, First American Title, Corinthian Mtg, MGIC Investor Svc, Nationwide Advantage, Stewart Title,  CRE Finance Council f/k/a Commercial Mortgage Securities Association, Suntrust Mortgage,  CCO Mortgage Corporation, PMI Mortgage Insurance Company, Wells Fargo and also DJS Processing which is owned by David J. Stern.

MERSCORP shareholders…HERE

[ipaper docId=36456183 access_key=key-26csq0mmgo6l8zsnw0is height=600 width=600 /]

Related article:


CLASS ACTION FILED| Figueroa v. Law Offices Of David J. Stern, P.A. and MERSCORP, Inc.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bank of america, chain in title, citimortgage, class action, concealment, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, countrywide, djsp enterprises, fannie mae, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, forgery, Freddie Mac, HSBC, investigation, jpmorgan chase, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., lawsuit, mail fraud, mbs, Merrill Lynch, MERS, MERSCORP, mortgage, Mortgage Bankers Association, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, non disclosure, notary fraud, note, racketeering, Real Estate, RICO, rmbs, securitization, stock, title company, trade secrets, trustee, Trusts, truth in lending act, wamu, washington mutual, wells fargo13 Comments

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