Judge Murphy deserves an applause for the great job of questioning all facts and making no assumptions.
SUPREME COURT – STATE OF NEW YORK
TRIAL TERM. PART 17 NASSAU COUNTY
PRESENT:
Honorable Karen V. Murphv
Justice of the Supreme Court
ONEWEST BANK, FSB
155 North Lake Avenue
Pasadena, CA 91101,
Plaintiff(s),
-against-
ALEXADER ROTH, MORTGAGE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.
AS NOMINEE FOR E*TRADE WHOLESALE
LENDING CORP., ET AL.,
Defendant(s).
Excerpts:
In this matter Plaintiff failed to establish that it is entitled to the relief sought. It is well settled that a foreclosure of a mortgage may not be brought by one who has no title to it and absent transfer of the debt, the assignment of mortgage is a nullity. (Kluge v. Fugazy, 145 A. 2d 537 538536 N. 2d 92 (2d Dept. , 1988)). While Plaintiff alleges that it is the holder of both the note and mortgage, the record before the Court suggests otherwise and raises factual issues as well as issues of credibility that can not be determined herein. (see .J Capelin Assoc. v. Globe Mfg. Corp. 34 N. 2d 338 341 313 N. 2d 776 357 N. 2d 478 (1974)).
The Complaint filed September 4, 2009 stated that Plaintiff is “the owner and holder of a note and mortgage being foreclosed.” Bald assertions of possession of the original note without more, in light of the conflicting evidence, is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
Furtermore, the assignment recorded on October 1 , 2009 specifically states that it is an “assignment of mortgage ” and makes no reference to the note. Thus, a question of fact exists as to whether the note was ever assigned or delivered to Plaintiff. It may well be that the note was neither assigned nor delivered to Plaintiff prior to commencement of this action and Plaintiff would then be without authority to bring this action.
A stamp on the copy of the note provided by Plaintiff appears to be an indorsement of the note in blan, by the original lender, and is not dated (U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Collymore, 68 A.D.3d 752 890 N. 2d 578 (2d Dept. , 2009)). Additional issues regarding the timing of that indorsement on the note and whether MERS, at the time it executed the Assignment of Mortgage had authority, let alone the abilty, to assign the note and/or whether, in fact the note had already been assigned at the time of the purported assignment of the mortgage exist (id).
ORDERED that movant shall serve a copy of this Order upon all parties, or their attorneys if represented by counsel and shall there after file affidavits of service with the County Clerk and it is further,
ORDERED that a copy of this Order and proof of service of same be anexed as exhibits to any future applications regarding the subject mortgage and note.
The foregoing constitutes the Order of this Court.
Dated: September 1 , 2010
Mineola, N.
NASSAU COUNTY
COUNTY CLERK’S
LOXAHATCHEE, Fla.—Israel Machado’s foreclosure started out as a routine affair. In the summer of 2008, as the economy began to soften, Mr. Machado’s pool-cleaning business suffered and like millions of other Americans, he fell behind on his $400,000 mortgage.
But Mr. Machado’s response was unlike most other Americans’. Instead of handing his home over to the lender, IndyMac Bank FSB, he hired Ice Legal LP in nearby Royal Palm Beach to fight the foreclosure. The law firm researched the history of Mr. Machado’s loan and found two interesting facts.
First, the affidavits IndyMac used to file the foreclosure were signed by a so-called robo-signer named Erica A. Johnson-Seck, who routinely signed 6,000 documents a week related to foreclosures and bankruptcy. That volume, the court decided, meant Ms. Johnson-Seck couldn’t possibly have thoroughly reviewed the facts of Mr. Machado’s case, as required by law.
Secondly, IndyMac (now called OneWest Bank) no longer owned the loan—a group of investors in a securitized trust managed by Deutsche Bank did. Determining that IndyMac didn’t really have standing to foreclose, a judge threw out the case and ordered IndyMac to pay Mr. Machado’s $30,000 legal bill.
Mr. Machado and his lawyer, Tom Ice, say they now want to convince the owners of the mortgage to cut Mr. Machado’s loan balance to between $150,000 and $200,000—the current selling price for comparable homes in his community near West Palm Beach. “The whole intent was to get them to come to the negotiating table, to get me in a fixed-rate mortgage that worked,” Mr. Machado said.
Please welcome Ericka Johnson Seck to the ROBO-SIGNER Hall of Sham!
MERS & LPS once again the “Common Thread”
Here is a list of her many Corporate Hats:
Vice President of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. (MERS)
Vice President of Deutsch Bank National Trust
Vice President of Bank of New York
Attorney in Fact of IndyMac
Attorney in Fact of ONEWEST
Attorney in Fact of FDIC
I must confess, she was my first study because she signed two assignments for “one” of my properties using “two” different employers. 🙂 ‘<blush> I even created my very first youtube video in her honor (see below)!
Thanks to Judge Arthur Schack and Tom Ice from Ice Legal in Palm Beach County, we all became familiar with Erica for wearing too many corporate hats.
She is the “Robo-Signer” Judge Schack called out in three particular cases in NY and made her an instant foreclosure household name. I don’t think she ever emerged in NY soon after this. Also see the HSCB v. Yasmin case.
Excerpt of DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST v. HARRIS
The Court is perplexed as to why the assignment was not executed in Pasadena, California, at 46U Sierra Madre Villa, the alleged “principal place of business” for both the assignor and the assignee. In my January 3 1, 2008 decision (Deutsche Bank National Tr (1st Canpuny v Maraj, – Misc 3d – [A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50176 [U]), I noted that Erica Johnson-Seck, claimed that she was a Vice President of MERS in her July 3,2007 INDYMAC to DEUTSCHE BANK assignment, and then in her July 3 1,2007 affidavit claimed to be a DEUTSCHE BANK Vice President. Just as in Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v Maraj, at 2, the Court in the instant action, before granting itn application for an order of reference, requires an affidavit from Ms. Johnson-Seck, describing her employment history for the past three years.
Further, the Court requires an explanation from an officer of plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK as to why, in the middle of our national subprime mortgage financial crisis, DEUTSCHE BANK would purchase a non-perferforming loan from INDYMAC, and why DEUTSCHE BANK, INDYMAC and MERS all share office space at 460 Sierra Madre Villa, Pasadena, CA 91 107.
24,000 Monthly Documents executed by her team
Now Lets move on to this below… according to this deposition her office signs 24,000 mortgage related documents out of the this figure she signed about “750” a week making it approximately 3000 mortgage documents used in foreclosure cases. Anything from Affidavits of Debt, Lost Note Affidavits, Assignment of Mortgages, Declarations pretty much anything having to deal with Bankruptcy and Foreclosures.
This is what she signs without any notary present.
Below is a sale that happened in DC all in 1 single day! It appears she also puts properties in her name with her co-employees Roger Stotts and Eric Friedman.
ROGER STOTTS signs these as well and according to the depo above Indymac/Onewest is “NOT” the custodian as defined below. Why do they commit fraud?
FIRST VIDEO MADE OF DAVID J. STERN, ERICA JOHNSON-SECK BACK IN FEBRUARY 2010
Lets see how they produce the assignment from 2005! We bet we already know!
Plaintiff subsequently purchased the aforementioned mortgage and note from Defendant. However, an Assignment of Mortgage from Defendant to Plaintiff has been lost and was never recorded. Plaintiff, as the current holder of the note, desires to foreclose on the subject mortgage.
However, Plaintiff cannot do so because of the break in chain of title.
the Clerk of the County of Suffolk be directed to record an Order reflecting the assignment of mortgage as Lancaster Mortgage Bankers as original assignor to Indymac Bank, FSB, as the assignee with an effective date-of December 20,2005. The Plaintiff interests originates from a mortgage from Hem-Ur Nekhet to Lancaster Mortgage Bankers, in the principal amount of $608,000.00, dated December 20,2005 and recorded on February 9,2006 in CRFN: 2006000079624. Plaintiff subsequently purchased the aforementioned mortgage and note from Defendant.
She goes on and hand writes the following:
Insufficient proof of ownership of mortgage to make up for lost assignment of mortgage, service was pursuant to BCC 306 on a corporation that is alleged to no longer be in operation and the proposed judgment says that the summons & complaint were filed in Suffolk County
The agency accuses the managers of the defunct bank’s Homebuilder Division of acting negligently by granting loans to developers who were unlikely to repay the debts.
By E. Scott Reckard, Los Angeles Times
July 14, 2010
Launching a new offensive against leaders of failed financial institutions, federal regulators are accusing four former executives of Pasadena’s defunct IndyMac Bank of granting loans to developers and home builders who were unlikely to repay the debts.
The lawsuit by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. alleges that the IndyMac executives acted negligently and seeks $300 million in damages.
It is the first suit of its kind brought by the FDIC in connection with the spate of more than 250 bank failures that began in 2008. Regulators said it wouldn’t be the last.
“Clearly we’ll have more of these cases,” said Rick Osterman, the deputy general counsel who oversees litigation at the agency.
The FDIC has sent letters warning hundreds of top managers and directors at failed banks — and the insurers who provided them with liability coverage — of possible civil lawsuits, Osterman said. The letters go out early in investigations of failed banks, he added, to ensure that the insurers will later provide coverage even if the policy expires.
The four defendants in the FDIC lending negligence case, who operated the Homebuilder Division at IndyMac, collectively approved 64 loans that are described in the 309-page lawsuit.
They are:
•Scott Van Dellen, the division’s president and chief executive during six years ending in its seizure;
•Richard Koon, its chief lending officer for five years ending in July 2006;
•Kenneth Shellem, its chief credit officer for five years ending in November 2006;
•William Rothman, its chief lending officer during the two years before the seizure.
Through their attorneys, they vigorously denied the allegations.
“The FDIC has unfairly selected four hard-working executives of a small division of the bank … to blame for the failure of IndyMac,” said defense attorney Kirby Behre, who represents Shellem and Koon. “We intend to show that these loans were done at all times with a great deal of care and prudence.”
Defense attorney Michael Fitzgerald, who represents Van Dellen and Rothman, said no one at the company or its regulators foresaw the severity of the housing crash before it struck, and that IndyMac was one of the first construction lenders to pull back when trouble struck the industry in 2007.
Fitzgerald added that the FDIC thought Van Dellen trustworthy enough that it kept him on to run the division after the bank was seized.
The suit naming the IndyMac executives was filed this month in federal court in Los Angeles, two years after the July 2008 failure of the Pasadena savings and loan. The bank is now operated under new ownership as OneWest Bank.
IndyMac, principally a maker of adjustable-rate mortgages, was among a series of high-profile bank failures early in the financial crisis that were blamed on defaults on high-risk home loans and the securities linked to them.
But the majority of failures since then have been at banks hammered by losses on commercial real estate, particularly loans to residential developers and builders — and IndyMac had a sideline in that business as well through its Homebuilder Division.
The suit alleges that IndyMac’s compensation policies prompted the home-building division to increase lending to developers and builders with little regard for the quality of the loans.
“HBD’s management pushed to grow loan production despite their awareness that a significant downturn in the market was imminent and despite warnings from IndyMac’s upper management about the likelihood of a market decline,” the FDIC said in its complaint.
An investigation of IndyMac’s residential mortgage lending practices could lead to another civil suit, potentially naming higher-up executives, attorneys involved in the case said.
The judge waves you into his chambers in the State Supreme Court building in Brooklyn, past the caveat taped to his wall — “Be sure brain in gear before engaging mouth” — and into his inner office, where foreclosure motions are piled high enough to form a minor Alpine chain.
Nicole Bengiveno/The New York Times
“I don’t want to put a family on the street unless it’s legitimate,” Justice Arthur M. Schack said.
Every week, the nation’s mightiest banks come to his court seeking to take the homes of New Yorkers who cannot pay their mortgages. And nearly as often, the judge says, they file foreclosure papers speckled with errors.
He plucks out one motion and leafs through: a Deutsche Bank representative signed an affidavit claiming to be the vice president of two different banks. His office was in Kansas City, Mo., but the signature was notarized in Texas. And the bank did not even own the mortgage when it began to foreclose on the homeowner.
The judge’s lips pucker as if he had inhaled a pickle; he rejected this one.
“I’m a little guy in Brooklyn who doesn’t belong to their country clubs, what can I tell you?” he says, adding a shrug for punctuation. “I won’t accept their comedy of errors.”
The judge, Arthur M. Schack, 64, fashions himself a judicial Don Quixote, tilting at the phalanxes of bankers, foreclosure facilitators and lawyers who file motions by the bale. While national debate focuses on bank bailouts and federal aid for homeowners that has been slow in coming, the hard reckonings of the foreclosure crisis are being made in courts like his, and Justice Schack’s sympathies are clear.
He has tossed out 46 of the 102 foreclosure motions that have come before him in the last two years. And his often scathing decisions, peppered with allusions to the Croesus-like wealth of bank presidents, have attracted the respectful attention of judges and lawyers from Florida to Ohio to California. At recent judicial conferences in Chicago and Arizona, several panelists praised his rulings as a possible national model.
His opinions, too, have been greeted by a cry of affront from a bank official or two, who say this judge stands in the way of what is rightfully theirs. HSBC bank appealed a recent ruling, saying he had set a “dangerous precedent” by acting as “both judge and jury,” throwing out cases even when homeowners had not responded to foreclosure motions.
Justice Schack, like a handful of state and federal judges, has taken a magnifying glass to the mortgage industry. In the gilded haste of the past decade, bankers handed out millions of mortgages — with terms good, bad and exotically ugly — then repackaged those loans for sale to investors from Connecticut to Singapore. Sloppiness reigned. So many papers have been lost, signatures misplaced and documents dated inaccurately that it is often not clear which bank owns the mortgage.
Justice Schack’s take is straightforward, and sends a tremor through some bank suites: If a bank cannot prove ownership, it cannot foreclose.
“If you are going to take away someone’s house, everything should be legal and correct,” he said. “I’m a strange guy — I don’t want to put a family on the street unless it’s legitimate.”
Justice Schack has small jowls and big black glasses, a thin mustache and not so many hairs combed across his scalp. He has the impish eyes of the high school social studies teacher he once was, aware that something untoward is probably going on at the back of his classroom.
He is Brooklyn born and bred, with a master’s degree in history and an office loaded with autographed baseballs and photographs of the Brooklyn Dodgers. His written decisions are a free-associative trip through popular, legal and literary culture, with a sideways glance at the business pages.
Confronted with a case in which Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs passed a defaulted mortgage back and forth and lost track of the documents, the judge made reference to the film classic “It’s a Wonderful Life” and the evil banker played by Lionel Barrymore.
“Lenders should not lose sight,” Justice Schack wrote in that 2007 case, “that they are dealing with humanity, not with Mr. Potter’s ‘rabble’ and ‘cattle.’ Multibillion-dollar corporations must follow the same rules in the foreclosure actions as the local banks,savings and loan associations or credit unions, or else they have become the Mr. Potters of the 21st century.”
Last year, he chastised Wells Fargo for filing error-filled papers. “The court,” the judge wrote, “reminds Wells Fargo of Cassius’s advice to Brutus in Act 1, Scene 2 of William Shakespeare’s ‘Julius Caesar’: ‘The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.’ ”
“The court wonders if the instant foreclosure action is a corporate ‘Kansas City Shuffle,’ a complex confidence game,” he reads. “In the 2006 film ‘Lucky Number Slevin,’ Mr. Goodkat, a hit man played by Bruce Willis, explains: ‘A Kansas City Shuffle is when everybody looks right, you go left.’ ”
The banks’ reaction? Justice Schack shrugs. “They probably curse at me,” he says, “but no one is interested in some little judge.”
Little drama attends the release of his decisions. Beaten-down homeowners rarely show up to contest foreclosure actions, and the judge scrutinizes the banks’ papers in his chambers. But at legal conferences, judges and lawyers have wondered aloud why more judges do not hold banks to tougher standards.
“To the extent that judges examine these papers, they find exactly the same errors that Judge Schack does,” said Katherine M. Porter, a visiting professor at the School of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a national expert in consumer credit law. “His rulings are hardly revolutionary; it’s unusual only because we so rarely hold large corporations to the rules.”
Banks and the cottage industry of mortgage service companies and foreclosure lawyers also pay rather close attention.
A spokeswoman for OneWest Bank acknowledged that an official, confronted with a ream of foreclosure papers, had mistakenly signed for two different banks — just as the Deutsche Bank official did. Deutsche Bank, which declined to let an attorney speak on the record about any of its cases before Justice Schack, e-mailed a PDF of a three-page pamphlet in which it claimed little responsibility for foreclosures, even though the bank’s name is affixed to tens of thousands of such motions. The bank described itself as simply a trustee for investors.
Justice Schack came to his recent prominence by a circuitous path, having worked for 14 years as public school teacher in Brooklyn. He was a union representative and once walked a picket line with his wife, Dilia, who was a teacher, too. All was well until the fiscal crisis of the 1970s.
“Why’d I go to law school?” he said. “Thank Mayor Abe Beame, who froze teacher salaries.”
He was counsel for the Major League Baseball Players Association in the 1980s and ’90s, when it was on a long winning streak against team owners. “It was the millionaires versus the billionaires,” he says. “After a while, I’m sitting there thinking, ‘He’s making $4 million, he’s making $5 million, and I’m worth about $1.98.’ ”
So he dived into a judicial race. He was elected to the Civil Court in 1998 and to the Supreme Court for Brooklyn and Staten Island in 2003. His wife is a Democratic district leader; their daughter, Elaine, is a lawyer and their son, Douglas, a police officer.
Justice Schack’s duels with the banks started in 2007 as foreclosures spiked sharply. He saw a plague falling on Brooklyn, particularly its working-class black precincts. “Banks had given out loans structured to fail,” he said.
The judge burrowed into property record databases. He found banks without clear title, and a giant foreclosure law firm, Steven J. Baum, representing two sides in a dispute. He noted that Wells Fargo’s chief executive, John G. Stumpf, made more than $11 million in 2007 while the company’s total returns fell 12 percent.
“Maybe,” he advised the bank, “counsel should wonder, like the court, if Mr. Stumpf was unjustly enriched at the expense of W.F.’s stockholders.”
He was, how to say it, mildly appalled.
“I’m a guy from the streets of Brooklyn who happens to become a judge,” he said. “I see a bank giving a $500,000 mortgage on a building worth $300,000 and the interest rate is 20 percent and I ask questions, what can I tell you?”
This is a bankruptcy case in which IndyMac Bank wanted relief of stay so they could proceed with a foreclosure. The judge ordered them to produce the original note and deed, which they did but ended up having to admit they didn’t own them. This judge Bufford goes into great detail about the issues of “party in interest” and “real party in interest” and who has the right to foreclose. Only a party with a real investment in the property has a right to collect on the debt.
This is moot however, this is the response most lenders will file for a foreclosure complaint. Well written and good law firm. The Demurrer was helpful for filing a nearly new Second Amended Complaint. This was not heard due to the filing of the second complaint prior to the hearing date. there are cases as addendum which will be filed separately.
Plaintiff is having difficulty in acquiring any documents with the discovery process. There is a Evidence Hearing on 4-26-10. Notice refers to attached letter from Defedants counsel.
“The Commission seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement of profits, prejudgment interest and civil penalties from both defendants.” Editor’s Note: Here is where the rubber meets the road. This same pool of illegal fraudulent profit is also subject to being defined as an undisclosed yield spread premium due to the borrowers. Some enterprising class action lawyer has some low hanging fruit here — the class is already defined for you by the SEC — all those homeowners subject to loan documents that were pledged or transferred into a pool which was received or incorporated by reference into this Abacus vehicle)
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Litigation Release No. 21489 / April 16, 2010
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Fabrice Tourre, 10 Civ. 3229 (BJ) (S.D.N.Y. filed April 16, 2010)
The SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud In Connection With The Structuring And Marketing of A Synthetic CDO
The Securities and Exchange Commission today filed securities fraud charges against Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“GS&Co”) and a GS&Co employee, Fabrice Tourre (“Tourre”), for making material misstatements and omissions in connection with a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) GS&Co structured and marketed to investors. This synthetic CDO, ABACUS 2007-AC1, was tied to the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) and was structured and marketed in early 2007 when the United States housing market and the securities referencing it were beginning to show signs of distress. Synthetic CDOs like ABACUS 2007-AC1 contributed to the recent financial crisis by magnifying losses associated with the downturn in the United States housing market.
According to the Commission’s complaint, themarketing materials for ABACUS 2007-AC1 — including the term sheet, flip book and offering memorandum for the CDO — all represented that the reference portfolio of RMBS underlying the CDO was selected by ACA Management LLC (“ACA”), a third party with expertise in analyzing credit risk in RMBS. Undisclosed in the marketing materials and unbeknownst to investors, a large hedge fund, Paulson & Co. Inc. (“Paulson”) [Editor’s Note: Brad Keiser in his forensic analyses has reported that Paulson may have been a principal in OneWest which took over Indymac and may have ties with former Secretary of Treasury Henry Paulson, former GS CEO], with economic interests directly adverse to investors in the ABACUS 2007-AC1 CDO played a significant role in the portfolio selection process.After participating in the selection of the reference portfolio, Paulson effectively shorted the RMBS portfolio it helped select by entering into credit default swaps (“CDS”) with GS&Co to buy protection on specific layers of the ABACUS 2007-AC1 capital structure. Given its financial short interest, Paulson had an economic incentive to choose RMBS that it expected to experience credit events in the near future. GS&Co did not disclose Paulson’s adverse economic interest or its role in the portfolio selection process in the term sheet, flip book, offering memorandum or other marketing materials. The Commission alleges that Tourre was principally responsible for ABACUS 2007-AC1. According to the Commission’s complaint, Tourre devised the transaction, prepared the marketing materials and communicated directly with investors. Tourre is alleged to have known of Paulson’s undisclosed short interest and its role in the collateral selection process. He is also alleged to have misled ACA into believing that Paulson invested approximately $200 million in the equity of ABACUS 2007-AC1 (a long position) and, accordingly, that Paulson’s interests in the collateral section process were aligned with ACA’s when in reality Paulson’s interests were sharply conflicting. The deal closed on April 26, 2007. Paulson paid GS&Co approximately $15 million for structuring and marketing ABACUS 2007-AC1. By October 24, 2007, 83% of the RMBS in the ABACUS 2007-AC1 portfolio had been downgraded and 17% was on negative watch. By January 29, 2008, 99% of the portfolio had allegedly been downgraded. Investors in the liabilities of ABACUS 2007-AC1 are alleged to have lost over $1 billion. Paulson’s opposite CDS positions yielded a profit of approximately $1 billion.
The Commission’s complaint, which was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, charges GS&Co and Tourre with violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77q(a), Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5.The Commission seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement of profits, prejudgment interest and civil penalties from both defendants.
The Commission’s investigation is continuing into the practices of investment banks and others that purchased and securitized pools of subprime mortgages and the resecuritized CDO market with a focus on products structured and marketed in late 2006 and early 2007 as the U.S. housing market was beginning to show signs of distress.
SAME RESPONSES OBJECTIONS AND NO DOCUMENTS. IT IS THE GAME. HOPEFULLY WE CAN BREAK THIS GAME. WE ALL HAVE ERICA JOHNSON-SECKS DEPOSITION. JUST FOLLOW THE YELLOW BRICK ROAD.
Stop trying to get through the front door…use the back door…Get a Forensic Audit!
Not all Forensic Auditors are alike! FMI may locate exactly where the loan sits today.
This will make your lender WANT to communicate with you. Discover what they don’t want you to know. Go back in time and start from the minute you might have seen advertisements that got you hooked ” No Money Down” “100% Financing” “1% interest” “No income, No assetts” NO PROBLEM! Were you given proper disclosures on time, proper documents, was your loan broker providing you fiduciary guidance or did they hide undisclosed fees from you? Did they conceal illegal kickbacks? Did your broker tell you “Don’t worry before your new terms come due we will refinance you”? Did they inflate your appraisal? Did the developer coerce you to *USE* a certain “lender” and *USE* a certain title company?
If so you need a forensic audit. But keep in mind FMI:
DO NOT STOP FORECLOSURE
DO NOT NEGOTIATE ON YOUR BEHALF WITH YOUR BANK OR LENDER
DO NOT MODIFY YOUR LOAN
DO NOT TAKE CASES that is upto your attorney!
FMI does however, provide your Attorney with AMMO to bring your Lender into the negotiation table.
Most of us are trying to get the info from the banks, which they will not do unless forced. Well, now many of us can walk right in through the back door. FOIA requests! I fought for 7 months to get the bank to cough up the info and it only took 6 days by going through the FDIC. So now I’m in the drivers seat. This damned bank has been lying from day one claiming they are the sole beneficiary of my loan. Now they have committed the fraud and done the crime by illegally selling my home. They are now in deep, deep, trouble.
I’ve been fighting OneWest Bank since August of last year here in Colorado. In Colorado they have nonjudicial foreclosures and the laws as so totally banker-biased it’s insane. All the bank has to do is go to the public trustee with a note from an attorney who “certifies” that the bank is the owner of the loan. What they don’t tell you is the bank has to go before a judge and get an order for sale in a 120 hearing. Most only find out about it at the last minute and don’t even show up because the only issue discussed is whether a default has occurred or not.
I discovered however that if you raise the question of whether the foreclosing party is a true party in interest or not, the court has to hear that as well. I raised that issue and demanded the bank produce the original documents and endorsements or assignements. The judge only ordered them to produce originals, which they did.
Long story short, I managed to hold them off for seven months after hiring an attorney. I found a bankruptcy case from CA in 2008 in which IndyMac produced original documents and ended up having to admit they didn’t own them. I had a letter from OneWest that only stated they purchased servicing rights. I had admissions from the bank’s attorney that there were no endorsements. And at the last minute I discovered the FDIC issued a press release in response to a YouTube video that went viral over the sweetheart deal OneWest did with the FDIC. The FDIC stated in their press release that OneWest only owned 7% of the loans they service. I presented all this to the judge but he ended up ignoring it all and gave OneWest an order to sell my home, which they did on the 4th.
About a week before the sale I went directly to the FDIC and filed a FOIA request for any and all records indicating ownership rights and servicing rights related to my loans and gave them my loan numbers. I managed to get the info in about 6 days. I got PROOF from the FDIC that OneWest did not own my loan. Fredie Mac did. And the info came directly from OneWest systems. And just last Friday I got a letter from IndyMac Mortgage services, obviously in compliance with the FOIA request that Freddie Mac owned the loan. So I now have a confession from OneWest themselves that they have been lying all along! I have a motion in to have the sale set aside and once that’s done I’m going to sue the hell out of them and their attorneys in Federal court.
So I found a wonderful little back door to the proof most of us need. If the FDIC is involved, you can do a FOIA request for the info. I don’t know if it applies to all banks since they are all involved in the FDIC. You all should try it to see.
Most of us are trying to get the info from the banks, which they will not do unless forced. Well, now many of us can walk right in through the back door. FOIA requests! I fought for 7 months to get the bank to cough up the info and it only took 6 days by going through the FDIC. So now I’m in the drivers seat. This damned bank has been lying from day one claiming they are the sole beneficiary of my loan. Now they have committed the fraud and done the crime by illegally selling my home. They are now in deep, deep, trouble.
Michael Lewis’s new book, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine,is already #1 at Amazon. Tonight he had some very cool interviews on 60 Minutes discussing how a few Wall Street outsiders made billions shorting real estate, his thoughts on Wall Street bonuses, and more. These videos are highly recommended now that the NCAA brackets are out and the tournaments are over until Thursday:
It is not a secret to anyone who has been closely following the FDIC’s quasi criminal bank takeover practices over the past year, that acquirors of failed banks end up receiving a massive and risk-free gift in the form of taxpayer benefits via the FDIC when it comes to funding losses on a given bank acquisition. Should there be a short sale resulting in a loss to the full principal (not the cost basis mind you)? Not to worry, Sheila Bair is there to hand out taxpayer money to the hedge funds/banks owning the newly transferred assets. A recent example of this was the glaring insider trading which preceded the acquisition of failed AmTrust Bank by New York Community Bancorp, in which both NYB and those who bought calls in advance of information being made public, made massive illegal profits. And as the SEC continues to pretend like this episode never happened, we remind the intellectually subprime Mary Schapiro to finally pursue those involved, and will continue doing so for as long as it takes. But back to the FDIC: the folks at Think Big Work Small have compiled a terrific video detailing exactly how several hedge funds, currently owners of recently created shell holding company OneWest Bank, are picking apart the carcass of failed IndyMac, all the while encouraging short sales (instead of loan mods) as only that way do they get to benefit fully from the taxpayer funded FDIC loss-share arrangements which makes the IndyMac transaction an immediate slam dunk for everyone involved…except America’s taxpayers, and the FDIC’s ever depleting DIF reserve.
As the authors appropriately title the video, this is indeed a slap in our face. And this goes on every single bailout Friday when the FDIC continues handing out billions of dollars under the guise of “loss sharing” arrangements, which is simply a guaranteed profit from the acquirors’ cost basis to 90% of the original loan value: an instantaneous 30% risk free IRR.
Full must watch video after the link (click on the icon below).
In the past ten years, hundreds of thousands of residential mortgages were bundled together (often in groups of about 5,000 mortgages), and investors were offered the opportunity to buy shares of each bundle. This process is called securitization.
Each such bundle of residential mortgages was given a name, such as “Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006 OPT-2.” The name indicates information about the particular trust such as the year it was created (2006) and its contents (with OPT indicating that the loans in that particular trust were originally made by Option One Mortgage). Each such bundle/trust has a Cut Off Date identified in the trust documents (specifically, in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement). The Cut Off Date is the date on which all mortgage loans in the trust must be identified. In short, a final list of all of the mortgages in the bundle is set out. Each trust also has a Closing Date which is the date that the individual mortgages are transferred to the Trust Custodian, who must certify that for each mortgage, the custodian has a mortgage note endorsed in blank and proof that the ownership of the note has been transferred. This proof is most often an Assignment of Mortgage. Most trusts included the following or equivalent language regarding the Assignments: “Assignments of the Mortgage Loans to the Trustee (or its nominee) will not be recorded in any jurisdiction, but will be delivered to the Trustee in recordable form, so that they can be recorded in the event recordation is necessary in connection with the servicing of a Mortgage Loan.”
Title insurance companies issued policies guaranteeing that the trust had clear title to the mortgages.
When widespread defaults occurred, Trustees discovered that the laws regarding Mortgage Assignments varied significantly from state to state. Many issues regarding such Assignments were simply unresolved. One of the most significant issues was whether Mortgage Assignments could be back-dated or have retroactive effective dates. This issue arose because Trustees and their lawyers discovered in the foreclosure process that the Assignments could not actually be located, or that certain states did not allow blank Assignments.
To solve the problem of the missing Assignments, new Assignments were made and recorded. Because the question of retroactive Assignments had not been 2 resolved, most of these Assignments did not set forth the actual date that the Assignment took place. The Assignments were signed and notarized as if the transfer took place many years after the actual transfer date.
The Assignments were prepared by specially selected law firms and companies that specialized in providing “mortgage default services” to banks and mortgage companies. In jurisdictions with a high rate of mortgage defaults, over 80% of the filed Mortgage Assignments in the last three years were prepared and filed by the same five or six law firms and default processing companies.
In many states, two such Assignments were prepared and filed. The first was prepared in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems as “nominee” for the particular bank or mortgage company. When MERS authority to file foreclosures and Assignments was challenged in most jurisdictions, with varying results, a non-MERS Assignment was prepared as well.
In all of these cases, the Assignment was prepared to conceal the actual date that the property was acquired by the Trust. An examination of the Assignments filed showing the grantee as the Trust – such as “Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006 – OPT 2” – shows that most of these Assignments were prepared and filed in 2008 and 2009, when, in reality, the mortgages and notes were actually assigned – albeit defectively – prior to the closing date of the Trust. While the exact closing date can only be determined by looking at the trust documents, any Trust that includes the year in 2006 in its title most likely closed in 2006.
If a Mortgage Assignment is dated, notarized and filed in a year after the year set forth in the name of the grantee trust on the Assignment, it is actually an Assignment specially, and in many cases, fraudulently, made to facilitate foreclosures.
These Specially-Made Assignments have created havoc in the courts. In many cases, the Specially-made Assignments are dated After the foreclosure action has been initiated, making it appear that the Trust somehow magically knew prior to the assignment that it would acquire the defaulting property several months after the foreclosure action was initiated.
Repeatedly, courts have asked Trustees to explain why they were acquiring nonperforming loans and whether such acquisition was a violation of the trustee’s fiduciary duty to the Trust. No Trustee has ever come forth and explained that the Trust actually acquired the loan years before the Assignment. As a result, there are many decisions with observations similar to this observation made by Judge Arthur M. Schack of Kings County, New York, in HSBC Bank v. Valentin, 21Misc. 3d 1124 [A]:
Further, according to plaintiff’s application, the default of defendants Valentin and Ruiz began with the nonpayment of principal and interest due on January 1, 2007. Yet, four months later, plaintiff HSBC was willing to take an assignment of the instant nonperforming loan. The Court wonders why HSBC would purchase a nonperforming loan, four months in arrears?
And in Deautsche Bank National Trust Co. V. Harris, Judge ARTHUR M. SCHACK Kings, New York, Index No. 39192/2007 (05 FEB 2008):
Further, the Court requires an explanation from an officer of plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK as to why, in the middle of our national sub-prime mortgage financial crisis, DEUTSCHE BANK would purchase a non-performing loan from INDYMAC…
In Massachusetts in October, 2009, Land Court Judge Keith Long reaffirmed a March, 2009, ruling that a lender cannot begin foreclosure proceedings before the lender has filed and recorded the Assignment, stating:
The blank mortgage assignments they possessed transferred nothing…in Massachusetts, a mortgage is a conveyance of land. Nothing is conveyed unless and until it is various agreements between the securitization entities stating that each had a right to an an assignment and they are certainly not in recordable form. U.S. Bank National Association v. Ibanez, Massachusetts Land Court Misc. Case No. 384283, consolidated with two other cases.
Many authors expect the Massachusetts Supreme Court to reverse the Ibanez decision, but the uncertainty itself, as in the case of the MERS challenges, caused lenders to flood recording offices with new Assignments.
In cases where the Trust failed to get a valid Assignment, the problem is complicated by the bankruptcy of the major loan originators, including American Home Mortgage, Option One Mortgage, and Countrywide Home Loans.
When these big mortgage companies filed for bankruptcy, they did not disclose the mortgages already sold to the trusts as assets, because the transfers occurred months and years prior to the bankruptcy filing. Years later, when the Assignments were required for foreclosures, a bankruptcy court’s permission was needed to Assign billions of dollars in mortgages. Most likely in fear that a Bankruptcy Judge would not rubber stamp such a request, no such permission has ever been sought.
In lieu of valid Assignments, Trusts continue to rely on Assignments specially made by their own law firms and mortgage default service companies. Eventually, these fraudulent Assignments are being discovered by Courts, and the foreclosing trusts required to prove that they own the Mortgage and Note in the foreclosure action without reliance on Assignments that misrepresent the date of the actual transfer to the Trust the authority of the signers of the bankrupt original lenders. For thousands of homeowners, this realization has come too late.
I warned these banks in 2007, “give the People a loan modification before they discover that you defrauded them, because woe be onto you when they find out”. Anyway, I figured out that was on to something so to buy time to think strategy, I demanded that my mortgage go from the $3,833.54 to $1,200 per month. The judge agreed and ordered that the mortgage payments was going to be $1,200 a month, and he also wiped out the $20,000 plus mortgage in arrears. This was too easy, they were willing to cater to me just to keep my brethren from feasting. The judge then ordered that I was to begin mortgage payments of $1,200 a month, but not to pay it to the lender, but to the court’s registry. My claims were still pending, even though I was paying the mortgage, I could still pursue my claims of mortgage fraud against the banks. But I saw the trap! The day I sign any papers accepting this payment modification, I the day that the case is SETTLED, and the banks would get away with robbery. The judge also gave me a stern warning, “Mr. Muckle, I am going to tell you this and please listen to me carefully”.. then he looked me into my dark brown cold eyes with is tender and sincere big blue ones, and said, ever so sincerely and meaningfully, “Mr. Muckle, do not win the battle and lose the war”. He really was looking out for mines and my children’s best interest. But as his mouth opened up and uttered those words, all I could really hear him saying to me was, “ Mr. Muckle, why settle for a battle when you can win the war?” Fight them my brother, I have your back!”.( Lol, I swear, that’s what heard). But to secure the order and bind me, the judge ordered in writing, “If the plaintiff do not begin to pay the money into the court’s registry as ordered, the defendant SHALL foreclose on the Plaintiff’s property and sell it” Huh! …continue HERE
Attached here is the latest example of a Pinellas County Circuit Court judge applying the law and sticking up for the rights of homeowners and consumers. The pattern in Pinellas County, Florida is becoming clear…..the judges here “get it” and are not afraid to issue correct legal decisions–despite the fact that the consequences for banks and their bad behavior is going to be significant.
Read the decision and contact me with questions….these favorable decisions should be cited early and often!
Washington, D.C., February 24, 2010: Although only bankers are aware of it, there is a second wave of economic disaster starting to build up that will make the earlier one pale into insignificance. Let us start out with MERS, shall we?
MERS = Mortgage Electronic Registration Inc.holds approximately 60 million American mortgages and is a Delaware corporation whose sole shareholder is Mers Corp. MersCorp and its specified members have agreed to include the MERS corporate name on any mortgage that was executed in conjunction with any mortgage loan made by any member of MersCorp. Thus in place of the original lender being named as the mortgagee on the mortgage that is supposed to secure their loan, MERS is named as the “nominee” for the lender who actually loaned the money to the borrower. In other words MERS is really nothing more than a name that is used on the mortgage instrument in place of the actual lender. MERS’ primary function, therefore, is to act as a document custodian. MERS was created solely to simplify the process of transferring mortgages by avoiding the need to re-record liens – and pay county recorder filing fees – each time a loan is assigned. Instead, servicers record loans only once and MERS’ electronic system monitors transfers and facilitates the trading of notes. It has very conservatively estimated that as of February, 2010, over half of all new residential mortgage loans in the United States are registered with MERS and recorded in county recording offices in MERS’ name
MersCorp was created in the early 1990’s by the former C.E.O.’s of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Indy Mac, Countrywide, Stewart Title Insurance and the American Land Title Association. The executives of these companies lined their pockets with billions of dollars of unearned bonuses and free stock by creating so-called mortgage backed securities using bogus mortgage loans to unqualified borrowers thereby creating a huge false demand for residential homes and thereby falsely inflating the value of those homes. MERS marketing claims that its “paperless systems fit within the legal framework of the laws of all fifty states” are now being vetted by courts and legal commentators throughout the country.
The MERS paperless system is the type of crooked rip-off scheme that is has been seen for generations past in the crooked financial world. In this present case, MERS was created in the boardrooms of the most powerful and controlling members of the American financial institutions. This gigantic scheme completely ignored long standing law of commerce relating to mortgage lending and did so for its own personal gain. That the inevitable collapse of the crooked mortgage swindles would lead to terrible national repercussions was a matter of little or no interest to the upper levels of America’s banking and financial world because the only interest of these entities was to grab the money of suckers, keep it in the form of ficticious bonuses, real estate and very large accounts in foreign banks. The effect of this system has led to catastrophic meltdown on both the American and global economy.
MERS, as has clearly been proven in many civil cases, does not hold any promissory notes of any kind. A party must have possession of a promissory note in order to have standing to enforce and/or otherwise collect a debt that is owed to another party. Given this clear-cut legal definition, MERS does not have legal standing to enforce or collect on the over 60 million mortgages it controls and no member of MERS has any standing in an American civil court.
MERS has been taken to civil courts across the country and charged with a lack of standing in reposession issues. When the mortgage debacle initially, and inevitably, began, MERS always routinely brought actions against defaulting mortgage holders purporting to represent the owners of the defaulted mortgages but once the courts discovered that MERS was only a front organization that did not hold any deed nor was aware of who or what agencies might hold a deed, they have routinely been denied in their attempts to force foreclosure. In the past, persons alleging they were officials of MERS in foreclosure motions, purported to be the holders of the mortgage, when, in fact, they not only were not the holder of the mortgage but, under a court order, could not produce the identity of the actual holder. These so-called MERS officers have usually been just employees of entities who are servicing the loan for the actual lender. MERS, it is now widely acknowledged by the courts, has no legal right to foreclose or otherwise collect debt which are evidenced by promissory notes held by someone else.
The American media routinely identifies MERS as a mortgage lender, creditor, and mortgage company, when in point of fact MERS has never loaned so much as a dollar to anyone, is not a creditor and is not a mortgage company. MERS is merely a name that is printed on mortgages, purporting to give MERS some sort of legal status, in the matter of a loan made by a completely different and almost always,a totally unknown entity.
The infamous collapse of the American housing bubble originated, in the main, with one Angelo Mozilo, CEO of the later failed Countrywide Mortgage.
Mozilo started working in his father’s butcher shop, in the Bronx, when he was ten years old. He graduated from Fordham in 1960, and that year he met David Loeb. In 1968, Mozilo and Loeb created a new mortgage company, Countrywide, together. Mozilo believed the company should make special efforts to lower the barrier for minorities and others who had been excluded from homeownership. Loeb died in 2003
In 1996, Countrywide created a new subsidiary for subprime loans.
Countrywide Financial’s former management
Angelo R. Mozilo, cofounder, chairman of the board, chief executive officer
David S. Loeb, cofounder, President and Chairman from 1969 to 2000
David Sambol, president, chief operating officer, director
Eric P. Sieracki, chief financial officer, executive managing director
Jack Schakett, executive managing director, chief operating officer
Kevin Bartlett, executive managing director, chief investment officer
Andrew Gissinger, executive managing director, chief production officer, Countrywide Home Loans[14]
Sandor E. Samuels, executive managing director, chief legal officer and assistant secretary
Ranjit Kripalani, executive managing director and president, Capital Markets
Laura K. Milleman, senior managing director, chief accounting officer
Timothy H. Wennes, senior managing director, president and chief operating officer, Countrywide Bank FSB
Anne D. McCallion, senior managing director, chief of financial operations and planning
Steve Bailey, senior managing director of loan administration, Countrywide Home Loans
The standard Countrywide procedure was to openly solicit persons who either had no credit or could not obtain it, and, by the use of false credit reports drawn up in their offices, arrange mortgages. The new home owners were barely able to meet the minimum interest only payments and when, as always happens, the mortgage payments are increased to far, far more than could be paid, defaults and repossessions were inevitable. Countrywide sold these mortgages to lower-tier banks which in turn, put them together in packages and sold them to the large American banks. These so-called “bundled mortgages” were quickly sold these major banking houses to many foreign investors with the comments that when the payments increased, so also would the income from the original mortgage. In 1996, Countrywide created a new subsidiary for subprime loans.
At one point in time, Countrywide Financial Corporation was regarded with awe in the business world. In 2003, Fortune observed that Countrywide was expected to write $400 billion in home loans and earn $1.9 billion. Countrywide’s chairman and C.E.O., Angelo Mozilo, did rather well himself. In 2003, he received nearly $33 million in compensation. By that same year, Wall Street had become addicted to home loans, which bankers used to create immensely lucrative mortgage-backed securities and, later, collateralized debt obligations, or C.D.O.s—and Countrywide was their biggest supplier. Under Mozilo’s leadership, Countrywide’s growth had been astonishing.
He was aiming to achieve a market share—thirty to forty per cent—that was far greater than anyone in the financial-services industry had ever attained. For several years, Countrywide continued to thrive. Then, inevitably, in 2007, subprime defaults began to rocket upwards , forcing the top American bankers to abandoned the mortgage-backed securities they had previously prized. It was obvious to them that the fraudulent mortgages engendered by Countrywide had been highly suceessful as a marketing program but it was obvious to eveyone concerned, at all levels, that the mortgages based entirely on false and misleading credit information were bound to eventually default. In August of 2007, the top American bankers cut off. Countrywide’s short-term funding, which seriously hindered its ability to operate, and in just a few months following this abandonment, Mozilo was forced to choose between bankruptcy or selling out to the best bidder.
In January, 2008, Bank of America announced that it would buy the company for a fraction of what Countrywide was worth at its peak. Mozilo was subsequently named a defendant in more than a hundred civil lawsuits and a target of a criminal investigation. On June 4th, 2007 the S.E.C., in a civil suit, charged Mozilo, David Sambol, and Eric Sieracki with securities fraud; Mozilo was also charged with insider trading. The complaint formalized a public indictment of Mozilo as an icon of corporate malfeasance and greed.
In essence, not only bad credit risks were used to create and sell mortgages on American homes that were essentially worthless. By grouping all of these together and selling them abroad, the banks all made huge profits. When the kissing had to stop, there were two major groups holding the financial bag. The first were the investors and the second were, not those with weak credit, but those who had excellent credit and who were able, and willing to pay off their mortgages.
Unfortunately, just as no one knows who owns the title to any home in order to foreclose, when the legitimate mortgage holder finally pays off his mortgage, or tries to sell his house, a clear title to said house or property cannot ever be found so, in essence, the innocent mortgage payer can never own or sell his house. This is a terrible economic time bomb quietly ticking away under the feet of the Bank of America and if, and when, it explodes, another bank is but a fond memory.
Readers wishing to find out if their title is secure should write to www.ChinkintheArmor.net, leave a comment on any article and ask for contact information for legal advice.
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