By now, most have read the Deposition of the Infamous Erica Johnson Seck. This is the homeowner Israel Machado speaking out about his foreclosure.

Thank you Ice Legal!

By ROBBIE WHELAN

LOXAHATCHEE, Fla.—Israel Machado’s foreclosure started out as a routine affair. In the summer of 2008, as the economy began to soften, Mr. Machado’s pool-cleaning business suffered and like millions of other Americans, he fell behind on his $400,000 mortgage.

But Mr. Machado’s response was unlike most other Americans’. Instead of handing his home over to the lender, IndyMac Bank FSB, he hired Ice Legal LP in nearby Royal Palm Beach to fight the foreclosure. The law firm researched the history of Mr. Machado’s loan and found two interesting facts.

First, the affidavits IndyMac used to file the foreclosure were signed by a so-called robo-signer named Erica A. Johnson-Seck, who routinely signed 6,000 documents a week related to foreclosures and bankruptcy. That volume, the court decided, meant Ms. Johnson-Seck couldn’t possibly have thoroughly reviewed the facts of Mr. Machado’s case, as required by law.

Secondly, IndyMac (now called OneWest Bank) no longer owned the loan—a group of investors in a securitized trust managed by Deutsche Bank did. Determining that IndyMac didn’t really have standing to foreclose, a judge threw out the case and ordered IndyMac to pay Mr. Machado’s $30,000 legal bill.

Mr. Machado and his lawyer, Tom Ice, say they now want to convince the owners of the mortgage to cut Mr. Machado’s loan balance to between $150,000 and $200,000—the current selling price for comparable homes in his community near West Palm Beach. “The whole intent was to get them to come to the negotiating table, to get me in a fixed-rate mortgage that worked,” Mr. Machado said.

Continue reading…WALL STREET JOURNAL

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The recent announcements by J.P. Morgan Chase and Ally Financial that they were freezing some foreclosures because of paperwork irregularities raises a key question: How many more mortgage companies employed “robo-signers?”

In a sworn deposition in July, Erica Johnson-Seck, an Austin, Tex.,-based vice president for bankruptcy and foreclosure for OneWest Bank, said she and her team of seven others sign 6,000 documents a week or about 24,000 a month without reading all of them.

Johnson-Seck estimated that she spent no more than 30 seconds to sign each document.

She explained that while she does not check everything, she does check some information, “which is why I said 30 seconds instead of two seconds.”

Continue reading…WASHINGTON POST

.

“If the people cannot trust their government to do the job for which it exists
- to protect them and to promote their common welfare – all else is lost.”
- BARACK OBAMA, speech, Aug. 28, 2006

Zach Carter

Economics Editor, AlterNet; Fellow, Campaign for America’s Future

Posted: September 12, 2010 02:52 PM

The Washington Post has published a very silly op-ed by Chrystia Freeland accusing President Barack Obama of unfairly “demonizing” Wall Street. Freeland wants to see Obama tone down his rhetoric and play nice with executives in pursuit of a harmonious economic recovery. The trouble is, Obama hasn’t actually deployed harsh words against Wall Street. What’s more, in order to avoid being characterized as “anti-business,” the Obama administration has refused to mete out serious punishment for outright financial fraud. Complaining about nouns and adjectives is a little ridiculous when handcuffs and prison sentences are in order.

Freeland is a long-time business editor at Reuters and the Financial Times, and the story she spins about the financial crisis comes across as very reasonable. It’s also completely inaccurate. Here’s the key line:

“Stricter regulation of financial services is necessary not because American bankers were bad, but because the rules governing them were.”

Bank regulations were lousy, of course. But Wall Street spent decades lobbying hard for those rules, and screamed bloody murder when Obama had the audacity to tweak them. More importantly, the financial crisis was not only the result of bad rules. It was the result of bad rules and rampant, straightforward fraud, something a seasoned business editor like Freeland ought to know. Seeking economic harmony with criminals seems like a pretty poor foundation for an economic recovery.

The FBI was warning about an “epidemic” of mortgage fraud as early as 2004. Mortgage fraud is typically perpetrated by lenders, not borrowers — 80 percent of the time, according to the FBI. Banks made a lot of quick bucks over the past decade by illegally conning borrowers. Then bankers who knew these loans were fraudulent still packaged them into securities and sold them to investors without disclosing that fraud. They lied to their own shareholders about how many bad loans were on their books, and lied to them about the bonuses that were derived from the entire scheme. When you do these things, you are stealing lots of money from innocent people, and you are, in fact, behaving badly (to put it mildly).

The fraud allegations that have emerged over the past year are not restricted to a few bad apples at shady companies– they involve some of the largest players in global finance. Washington Mutual executives knew their company was issuing fraudulent loans, and securitized them anyway without stopping the influx of fraud in the lending pipeline. Wachovia is settling charges that it illegally laundered $380 billion in drug money in order to maintain access to liquidity. Barclays is accused of illegally laundering money from Iran, Sudan and other nations, jumping through elaborate technical hoops to conceal the source of their funds. Goldman Sachs set up its own clients to fail and bragged about their “shitty deals.” Citibank executives deceived their shareholders about the extent of their subprime mortgage holdings. Bank of America executives concealed heavy losses from the Merrill Lynch merger, and then lied to their shareholders about the massive bonuses they were paying out. IndyMac Bank and at least five other banks cooked their books by backdating capital injections.

Continue reading…..The  Huffington Post

YOU AIN’T FOOLING THIS JUDGE! Dated 8/18/2010

Lets see how they produce the assignment from 2005!  We bet we already know!

Plaintiff subsequently purchased the aforementioned mortgage and note from Defendant. However, an Assignment of Mortgage from Defendant to Plaintiff has been lost and was never recorded. Plaintiff, as the current holder of the note, desires to foreclose on the subject mortgage.

However, Plaintiff cannot do so because of the break in chain of title.

the Clerk of the County of Suffolk be directed to record an Order reflecting the assignment of mortgage as Lancaster Mortgage Bankers as original assignor to Indymac Bank, FSB, as the assignee with an effective date-of December 20,2005. The Plaintiff interests originates from a mortgage from Hem-Ur Nekhet to Lancaster Mortgage Bankers, in the principal amount of $608,000.00, dated December 20,2005 and recorded on February 9,2006 in CRFN: 2006000079624. Plaintiff subsequently purchased the aforementioned mortgage and note from Defendant.

She goes on and hand writes the following:

Insufficient proof of ownership of mortgage to make up for lost assignment of mortgage, service was pursuant to BCC 306 on a corporation that is alleged to no longer be in operation and the proposed judgment says that the summons & complaint were filed in Suffolk County

Scribd

FDIC sues four former IndyMac executives

The agency accuses the managers of the defunct bank’s Homebuilder Division of acting negligently by granting loans to developers who were unlikely to repay the debts.

By E. Scott Reckard, Los Angeles Times
July 14, 2010

Launching a new offensive against leaders of failed financial institutions, federal regulators are accusing four former executives of Pasadena’s defunct IndyMac Bank of granting loans to developers and home builders who were unlikely to repay the debts.

The lawsuit by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. alleges that the IndyMac executives acted negligently and seeks $300 million in damages.

It is the first suit of its kind brought by the FDIC in connection with the spate of more than 250 bank failures that began in 2008. Regulators said it wouldn’t be the last.

“Clearly we’ll have more of these cases,” said Rick Osterman, the deputy general counsel who oversees litigation at the agency.

The FDIC has sent letters warning hundreds of top managers and directors at failed banks — and the insurers who provided them with liability coverage — of possible civil lawsuits, Osterman said. The letters go out early in investigations of failed banks, he added, to ensure that the insurers will later provide coverage even if the policy expires.

The four defendants in the FDIC lending negligence case, who operated the Homebuilder Division at IndyMac, collectively approved 64 loans that are described in the 309-page lawsuit.

They are:

•Scott Van Dellen, the division’s president and chief executive during six years ending in its seizure;

•Richard Koon, its chief lending officer for five years ending in July 2006;

•Kenneth Shellem, its chief credit officer for five years ending in November 2006;

•William Rothman, its chief lending officer during the two years before the seizure.

Through their attorneys, they vigorously denied the allegations.

“The FDIC has unfairly selected four hard-working executives of a small division of the bank … to blame for the failure of IndyMac,” said defense attorney Kirby Behre, who represents Shellem and Koon. “We intend to show that these loans were done at all times with a great deal of care and prudence.”

Defense attorney Michael Fitzgerald, who represents Van Dellen and Rothman, said no one at the company or its regulators foresaw the severity of the housing crash before it struck, and that IndyMac was one of the first construction lenders to pull back when trouble struck the industry in 2007.

Fitzgerald added that the FDIC thought Van Dellen trustworthy enough that it kept him on to run the division after the bank was seized.

The suit naming the IndyMac executives was filed this month in federal court in Los Angeles, two years after the July 2008 failure of the Pasadena savings and loan. The bank is now operated under new ownership as OneWest Bank.

IndyMac, principally a maker of adjustable-rate mortgages, was among a series of high-profile bank failures early in the financial crisis that were blamed on defaults on high-risk home loans and the securities linked to them.

But the majority of failures since then have been at banks hammered by losses on commercial real estate, particularly loans to residential developers and builders — and IndyMac had a sideline in that business as well through its Homebuilder Division.

The suit alleges that IndyMac’s compensation policies prompted the home-building division to increase lending to developers and builders with little regard for the quality of the loans.

“HBD’s management pushed to grow loan production despite their awareness that a significant downturn in the market was imminent and despite warnings from IndyMac’s upper management about the likelihood of a market decline,” the FDIC said in its complaint.

An investigation of IndyMac’s residential mortgage lending practices could lead to another civil suit, potentially naming higher-up executives, attorneys involved in the case said.

Continue reading… LA TIMES

Don’t we love New York!

This is another case for you all to learn from…Now again, shouldn’t their be a conflict of any documents where MERS is the nominee for any of these banks?

I think we are going to see lenders, servicers et al slowly begin to turn on MERS!

2010 NY Slip Op 51127(U)

IndyMAC BANK F.S.B., Plaintiff(s),
v.
LUDDY BRITO GARCIA, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., ACTING SOLELY AS A NOMINEE FOR STERLING NATIONAL MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC., SUBSIDIARY OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED BANK, ITS SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS, AND “JOHN DOE # 1″ THROUGH “JOHN DOE # 10″, THE LAST TEN NAMES BEING FICTITIOUS AND UNKNOWN TO plaintiff, THE PERSONS OR PARTIES INTENDED BEING THE PERSONS OR PARTIES, IF ANY, HAVING OR CLAIMING AN INTEREST IN OR LIEN UPON THE MORTGAGED PREMISES DESCRIBED IN THE COMPLAINT, Defendant(s).

7282-2008

Supreme Court, Suffolk County.

Eschen, Frenkel & Weisman, LLP, 20 West Main Street, Bay Shore, New York 11706, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Luddy Brito Garcia, 124 East 13th Street, Huntington Station, New York 11746, Defendant Pro Se.

PETER H. MAYER, J.

Upon the reading and filing of the following papers in this matter: (1) Notice of Motion by the plaintiff, dated June 2, 2009, and supporting papers; and now

UPON DUE DELIBERATION AND CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT of the foregoing papers, the motion is decided as follows: it is

ORDERED that plaintiff’s application (seq. # 002) for an order of reference in this foreclosure action is considered under 2009 NY Laws, Ch. 507, enacted December 15, 2009, and 2008 NY Laws, Ch. 472, enacted August 5, 2008, as well as the related statutes and case law, and is hereby denied without prejudice and with leave to resubmit upon proper papers, for failure to submit proper evidentiary proof, including an affidavit from one with personal knowledge, of a valid indorsement of the note or assignment of the mortgage, sufficient to establish the plaintiff’s ownership of the note and mortgage at the time the action was commenced; and it is further

ORDERED that the plaintiff shall promptly serve a copy of this Order upon the defendant-homeowner(s) at all known addresses and upon all other answering defendants, via first class mail, and shall promptly file the affidavit(s) of such service with the County Clerk and annex a copy of this Order and the affidavit(s) of service as exhibits to any motion resubmitted pursuant to this Order; and it is further

ORDERED that with regard to any scheduled court conferences or future applications by the plaintiff, if the Court determines that such conferences have been attended, or such applications have been submitted, without proper regard for the applicable statutory and case law, or without regard for the required proofs delineated herein, the Court may, in its discretion, dismiss this case or deny such applications with prejudice and/or impose sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-1, and may deny those costs and attorneys fees attendant with the filing of such future applications.

By Order dated November 24, 2009, this Court scheduled a foreclosure settlement conference for December 23, 2009, which was adjourned to February 24, 2010. The defendant-homeowner, Luddy Brito Garcia, failed to appear at both. The plaintiff now seeks a default order of reference and requests amendment of the caption to substitute a tenant in the place and stead of the “Doe” defendants. For the reasons set forth herein, the plaintiff’s application is denied.

In this foreclosure action, the plaintiff filed a summons and complaint on January 3, 2008, which essentially alleges that Ms. Garcia defaulted in her payments of a mortgage, dated August 15, 2006, in the principal amount of $411,500.00, for the premises located at 124 East 13th Street, Huntington, New York. The original lender, Sterling National Mortgage Company, Inc., purportedly indorsed the promissory note to the plaintiff prior to the commencement of this action. According to the plaintiff, this indorsement made the plaintiff the lawful holder of the note and mortgage with standing to commence the action. Although the plaintiff’s affidavit in support indicates that the “original note with a proper indorsement is [now] in the plaintiff’s possession,” the plaintiff does not prove — or even assert — that the plaintiff actually possessed the note and mortgage at the time the action was filed.

Instead, citing Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v Coakley, 41 AD3d 674, 838 NYS2d 622 (2d Dept 2007), the plaintiff summarily argues that because the promissory note was indorsed to the plaintiff, the mortgage passed as an incident to the note. Under the circumstances presented herein, however, the plaintiff’s reliance on Coakley is misguided. In Coakley, the record showed that the promissory note had been indorsed by the original lender to another bank, who then indorsed it in blank and ultimately transferred and tendered it to the foreclosing plaintiff. On that particular record, the court found that at the time the action was commenced, the plaintiff was the lawful holder of the promissory note and of the mortgage, which had passed as an incident to the promissory note. In this case, however, the alleged “indorsement” appears to be on a separate page from the promissory note and, in any event, is clearly undated.

New York UCC §3-202 (1) states, in pertinent part, that “[i]f the instrument is payable to order it is negotiated by delivery with any necessary indorsement” (emphasis added). In addition, UCC §3-202(2) requires that “[a]n indorsement must be written by or on behalf of the holder and on the instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof (emphasis added). Here, the purported indorsement is payable to order, but there is no evidence of delivery of the note prior to the action’s commencement. Furthermore, the alleged indorsement appears to be on a separate page, makes no specific reference to the subject note, and is, in any event, undated. As such, the so-called “indorsement” is, at best, unreliable and fails to support plaintiff’s claim that the “note and mortgage were assigned by a properly indorsed note prior to the commencement of this action” (see, Slutsky v Blooming Grove Inn, Inc., 147 AD2d 208, 542 NYS2d 721 [2d Dept 1989]). This is particularly true where, as here, the plaintiff’s affidavit in support of the motion fails to affirmatively state that the plaintiff did, in fact, possess the note and mortgage at the time the action was commenced. Without either proof of a proper written assignment of the underlying note or proper proof of the physical delivery of the note prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action, the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently show either the proper transfer of the obligation, or that the mortgage passed as an inseparable incident to the debt (see, U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752, 890 NYS2d 578 [2d Dept 2009]).

A plaintiff has no foundation in law or fact to foreclose upon a mortgage, unless the plaintiff has shown it has legal or equitable interest in such mortgage (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Marchione, 69 AD3d 204, 887 NYS2d 615 [2d Dept 2009]; Katz v East-Ville Realty Co., 249 AD2d 243, 672 NYS2d 308 [1st Dept 1998]). A written assignment of the underlying note or the physical delivery of the note prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action would be sufficient to transfer the obligation, and have the mortgage pass as an inseparable incident to the debt (U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752, 890 NYS2d 578 [2d Dept 2009]). With regard to a written assignment, the execution date is generally controlling and a written assignment claiming an earlier effective date is deficient, unless it is accompanied by proof that the physical delivery of the note and mortgage was, in fact, previously effectuated (see, Bankers Trust Co. v Hoovis, 263 AD2d 937, 938, 694 NYS2d 245 [1999]). A retroactive assignment cannot be used to confer standing upon the assignee in a foreclosure action commenced prior to the execution of the assignment (Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Gress, 68 AD3d 709, 888 NYS2d 914 [2d Dept 2009]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Marchione, 69 AD3d 204, 887 NYS2d 615 [2d Dept 2009]).

Applying this analysis to the case before this Court, a statement by the plaintiff merely indicating that the original note is in plaintiff’s possession as of the making of a motion for an order of reference is insufficient to show that the plaintiff had standing to bring the action in the first instance (Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Gress, 68 AD3d 709, 888 NYS2d 914 [2d Dept 2009]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Marchione, 69 AD3d 204, 887 NYS2d 615 [2d Dept 2009]). Plaintiff’s failure to submit proper proof of a valid indorsement or assignment, and failure to otherwise prove that the plaintiff was the holder of the note and mortgage at the time the action was commenced, requires denial of the plaintiff’s motion for an order of reference.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Ryan Carter
Posted: 05/27/2010 04:23:20 PM PDT

Local lawmakers Thursday introduced an amendment to financial reform that would allow depositors at failed Pasadena-based Indymac Bank to recoup a collective $233 million in lost savings.

The amendment, called the Indy Act, would make a federal deposit insurance cap of $250,000 retroactive to the time IndyMac failed in July of 2008. At the time, deposit insurance was set for deposits up to $100,000. But as the financial crisis grew Congress only a few months later approved the heightened cap.

But the cap did not extend to institutions that failed before October 2008.

“The whole thing is about fairness,” said Rep. David Dreier, R-San Dimas, who along with Rep. Jane Harman, D-Venice, introduced the bill Thursday.

Source: www.pasadenastarnews.com

Someone did something very, very naughty!

This involves

MY PROPERTY!

From BMcDonald

This is a bankruptcy case in which IndyMac Bank wanted relief of stay so they could proceed with a foreclosure. The judge ordered them to produce the original note and deed, which they did but ended up having to admit they didn’t own them. This judge Bufford goes into great detail about the issues of “party in interest” and “real party in interest” and who has the right to foreclose. Only a party with a real investment in the property has a right to collect on the debt.

[scribd id=28524908 key=key-15d3p0a4ew0xlkthl48k mode=list]

What a disaster! This ruling is absolutely hideous!

• Ask these “VP’s” where MERS is located?
• Who do they answer to?
• Who is their superior in MERS?
• How many meetings do they attend?
• Are they paid employees?
• What MERS branch do they work out of?

COMPLETE AND UTTER BULL SHIT!

Under the contract with MERS, they were appointed…

“CORRECTION “SELF” APPOINTED”

The instant motion for summary judgment concerns only one Defendant: Lender Processing Services (“LPS”). LPS “process[es] the necessary paperwork to pursue non-judicial foreclosure on behalf of its servicer and lender clients.” (Allen Decl. (Dkt. No. 74 at 1).) LPS had contracts with Defendants IndyMac Bank (now IndyMac Federal Bank) and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”). Under the contract with MERS, LPS^[3] employees were “appointed as assistant secretaries and vice presidents of [MERS] and, as such, are authorized to . . . execute any and all documents necessary to foreclose upon the property securing any mortgage loan registered on the MERS system

Scribd

How about Christina’s many signatures and positions in 1-5 banks below? So not only does she sign for MERS????

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3tL8mNL4bYw]

Hypothetically…even *if* they had authority…they are FORGING these documents!!!

Ok folks…here we have Eric & Erica.

We all know some of the many hats Erica Johnson-Seck wears…so whats a few more. Just like her,  Eric Friedman joins her with some signings and also gives Law Offices of David J. Stern Power Of Attorney via IndyMac.

N0tice how it may be the same person signing for all on the POA? Eric also signs documents for Florida Default Group now would this be a conflict? What makes of this POA since Eric’s signatures aren’t consistent and is an officer of other banks too?

Oh and they didn’t want notary Mai Thao to feel left out so they let ”Mai”  in on it too.

• Notice original banks ceased operations before these were assigned.
• They ”fabricated” these assignments to back date and record months after.
• Notice no addresses because their is none.
• IndyMac itself was ceased by the FDIC in 7/11/2008 and sold to OneWest 3/19/2009.

Scribd

via b.daviesmd6605

SAME RESPONSES OBJECTIONS AND NO DOCUMENTS. IT IS THE GAME. HOPEFULLY WE CAN BREAK THIS GAME. WE ALL HAVE ERICA JOHNSON-SECKS DEPOSITION. JUST FOLLOW THE YELLOW BRICK ROAD.

Scribd

William Black, author of “Best way to rob a bank is to own one” talks about deliberate fraud on Wall St. courtesy of TheRealNews

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sA_MkJB84VA]

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ISsR7ZiWlsk]

Stop trying to get through the front door…use the back door…Get a Forensic Audit!

Not all Forensic Auditors are alike! FMI may locate exactly where the loan sits today.

This will make your lender WANT to communicate with you. Discover what they don’t want you to know. Go back in time and start from the minute you might have seen advertisements that got you hooked ” No Money Down” “100% Financing” “1% interest” “No income, No assetts” NO PROBLEM! Were you given proper disclosures on time, proper documents, was your loan broker providing you fiduciary guidance or did they hide undisclosed fees from you? Did they conceal illegal kickbacks? Did your broker tell you “Don’t worry before your new terms come due we will refinance you”? Did they inflate your appraisal? Did the developer coerce you to *USE* a certain “lender” and *USE* a certain title company?

If so you need a forensic audit. But keep in mind FMI:

DO NOT STOP FORECLOSURE

DO NOT NEGOTIATE ON YOUR BEHALF WITH YOUR BANK OR LENDER

DO NOT MODIFY YOUR LOAN

DO NOT TAKE CASES that is upto your attorney!

FMI does however, provide your Attorney with AMMO to bring your Lender into the negotiation table.

Indymac Federal Bank Fsb Vs. Israel a. Machado :

In this depo you will see exactly how this Illegal FORECLOSURE FRAUD is fabricated, conspired, concealed, manipulated and fraud upon the courts.

Deposition_of_Erica_Johnson-Seck_Part_I

Scribd

When will ALL this Bull Shit come to an END? Everything is a stage and all these “Non-Bank’s” are characters!

 Freedom of Information Act Requests Show OneWest Bank Misrepresentation

This in combination with A.K. Barnett-Hart’s Thesis make’s one hell of a Discovery.

 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN
SUBPRIME LITIGATION

Jennifer E. Bethel*
Allen Ferrell**
Gang Hu***

Discussion Paper No. 612

03/2008

Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138

This paper explores the economic and legal causes and consequences of recent difficulties in the subprime mortgage market. We provide basic descriptive statistics and institutional details on the mortgage origination process, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). We examine a number of aspects of these markets, including the identity of MBS and CDO sponsors, CDO trustees, CDO liquidations, MBS insured and registered amounts, the evolution of MBS tranche structure over time, mortgage originations, underwriting quality of mortgage originations, and write-downs of investment banks. In light of this discussion, the paper then addresses questions as to how these difficulties might have not been foreseen, and some of the main legal issues that will play an important role in the extensive subprime litigation (summarized in the paper) that is underway, including the Rule 10b-5 class actions that have already been filed against the investment banks, pending ERISA litigation, the causes-of-action available to MBS and CDO purchasers, and litigation against the rating agencies. In the course of this discussion, the paper highlights three distinctions that will likely prove central in the resolution of this litigation: The distinction between reasonable ex ante expectations and the occurrence of ex post losses; the distinction between the transparency of the quality of the underlying assets being securitized and the transparency as to which market participants are exposed to subprime losses; and, finally, the distinction between what investors and market participants knew versus what individual entities in the structured finance process knew, particularly as to macroeconomic issues such as the state of the national housing market. ex ante expectations and the occurrence of ex post losses; the distinction between the transparency of the quality of the underlying assets being securitized and the transparency as to which market participants are exposed to subprime losses; and, finally, the distinction between what investors and market participants knew versus what individual entities in the structured finance process knew, particularly as to macroeconomic issues such as the state of the national housing market.