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Institutional Holders of Countrywide-Issued RMBS Issue Notice of Non-Performance Identifying Alleged Failures by Master Servicer to Perform Covenants and Agreements in More Than $47 Billion of Countrywide-Issued RMBS

Institutional Holders of Countrywide-Issued RMBS Issue Notice of Non-Performance Identifying Alleged Failures by Master Servicer to Perform Covenants and Agreements in More Than $47 Billion of Countrywide-Issued RMBS

PR Newswire

HOUSTON, Oct. 18 /PRNewswire/ –Today, the holders of over 25% of the Voting Rights in more than $47 billion of Countrywide-issued RMBS sent a Notice of Non-Performance (Notice) to Countrywide Home Loan Servicing, as Master Servicer (“Countrywide Servicing”), and to Bank of New York, as Trustee, identifying specific covenants in 115 Pooling and Servicing Agreements (PSAs) that the Holders allege Countrywide Servicing has failed to perform.

The Holders’ Notice alleges that each of these failures has materially affected the rights of the Certificateholders under the relevant PSAs. Under Section 7.01 of the PSAs, if any of the cited failures “continues unremedied for a period of 60 days after the date on which written notice of such failure has been given … to the Master Servicer and the Trustee by the Holders of Certificates evidencing not less than 25% of the Voting Rights evidenced by the Certificates,” that failure constitutes an Event of Default under the PSAs.

In a previous release, the Holders emphasized their intent to invoke all contractual remedies available to them to recover their losses and to protect their rights. Kathy Patrick of Gibbs & Bruns LLP, lead counsel for the Holders, emphasized that the Holders’ notice does not seek to halt loan modifications for troubled borrowers. Instead, it urges the Trustee to enforce Countrywide Servicing’s obligations to service loans prudently by maintaining accurate loan records, demanding the repurchase of loans that were originated in violation of underwriting guidelines, and compelling the sellers of ineligible or predatory mortgages to bear the costs of modifying them for homeowners or repurchasing them from the Trusts’ collateral pools.

Patrick also noted that the group of Holders that tendered today’s Notice of Non-Performance is larger, and encompasses more Countrywide-issued RMBS deals, than were included in the August 20 instruction letter. When asked why the group of holders was larger, Patrick replied, “Ours is a large, determined, and cohesive group of bondholders. We have a clearly defined strategy. We plan to vigorously pursue this initiative to enforce Holders’ rights.”

The Notice of Non-Performance, which is the first step in the process of declaring an Event of Default, was issued on behalf of Holders in the following Countrywide-issued RMBS:

Deal Name   .   .                 .       .
Deal Name    .       .      .                      .
Deal Name
CWALT 2004-32CB

CWHL 2004-22
CWL 2006-15
CWALT 2004-6CB

CWHL 2004-25
CWL 2006-16
CWALT 2004-J1
CWHL 2004-29
CWL 2006-19
CWALT 2005-14
CWHL 2004-HYB9
CWL 2006-2
CWALT 2005-21CB
CWHL 2005-11
CWL 2006-20
CWALT 2005-24
CWHL 2005-14
CWL 2006-22
CWALT 2005-32T1
CWHL 2005-18
CWL 2006-24
CWALT 2005-35CB
CWHL 2005-19
CWL 2006-25
CWALT 2005-36
CWHL 2005-2
CWL 2006-26
CWALT 2005-44
CWHL 2005-3
CWL 2006-3
CWALT 2005-45
CWHL 2005-30
CWL 2006-5
CWALT 2005-56
CWHL 2005-9
CWL 2006-7
CWALT 2005-57
CWL 2006-9
CWALT 2005-64
CWL 2006-BC2
CWALT 2005-72
CWHL 2005-R3
CWL 2006-BC3
CWALT 2005-73CB
CWHL 2006-9
CWL 2006-BC4
CWALT 2005-74T1
CWHL 2006-HYB2
CWL 2006-BC5
CWALT 2005-81
CWHL 2006-HYB5
CWL 2006-SD1
CWALT 2005-AR1
CWHL 2006-J2
CWL 2006-SD3
CWALT 2005-J5
CWHL 2006-OA5
CWL 2006-SD4
CWALT 2005-J9
CWHL 2006-R2
CWL 2006-SPS2
CWALT 2006-14CB
CWHL 2007-12
CWL 2007-2
CWALT 2006-20CB
CWHL 2007-16
CWL 2007-5
CWALT 2006-37R
CWHL 2008-3R
CWL 2007-6
CWALT 2006-41CB
CWL 2005-10
CWL 2007-7
CWALT 2006-HY12
CWL 2005-11
CWL 2007-9
CWALT 2006-OA11
CWL 2005-13
CWL 2007-BC1
CWALT 2006-OA16
CWL 2005-16
CWL 2007-BC2
CWALT 2006-OA17
CWL 2005-2
CWL 2007-BC3
CWALT 2006-OA6
CWL 2005-4
CWL 2007-QH1
CWALT 2006-OA9
CWL 2005-5
CWL 2007-S3
CWALT 2006-OC10
CWL 2005-6

CWALT 2006-OC2
CWL 2005-7

CWALT 2006-OC4
CWL 2005-8

CWALT 2006-OC5
CWL 2005-9

CWALT 2006-OC6
CWL 2005-AB2

CWALT 2006-OC7
CWL 2005-AB3

CWALT 2007-17CB
CWL 2005-AB4

CWALT 2007-23CB
CWL 2005-BC5

CWALT 2007-24
CWL 2005-IM1

CWALT 2007-OA7
CWL 2006-10

CWALT 2008-2R
CWL 2006-12


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© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bac home loans, bank of america, bank of new york, countrywide, pooling and servicing agreement1 Comment

Here’s That Devastating Report On Bank Of America That Everyone Is Talking About Today

Here’s That Devastating Report On Bank Of America That Everyone Is Talking About Today

Business Insider published this report yesterday:


Earlier, we wrote about Felix Salmon’s contention that there’s a new mortgage fraud scandal that has the potential to dwarf Goldman’s ABACUS dealings. In this fraud scenario, banks took advantage of their information advantage and sold CDOs with mortgages they knew to be bad without clear representation to investors.

In August, Manal Mehta and Branch Hill Capital put together a presentation targeting Bank of America’s potential exposure to this mortgage fraud, as well as other problems in the mortgage market.

The presentation comes to a pretty damning conclusion: Bank of America’s exposure could nearly halve its share price.

It’s all about what capital Bank of America has in reserve for the scenario of mortgages having to come back on its balance sheet.

Read more:



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Posted in bank of america, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, insider, insurance, investigation, mortgage, Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, stock, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, Wall Street1 Comment



Demands information from Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo and GMAC Mortgage/Ally ~Calls for suspension of foreclosures by mortgage servicers engaged in “robo-signing” in New York until accuracy of court documents and integrity of process are assured

NEW YORK, NY (October 12, 2010) – Attorney General Andrew M. Cuomo today announced that he is seeking information from four major mortgage servicers – Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo and GMAC Mortgage/Ally – concerning the filing of affidavits that falsely attest the signer has personal knowledge of the facts presented in home foreclosure proceedings, a practice known as “robo-signing.”

In view of the prevalence of this practice in the industry, Cuomo also called on mortgage servicers engaged in “robo-signing” in New York to immediately suspend all foreclosure actions in the state until they correct their procedures to comply with New York law and can assure the public and the courts that integrity has been restored.

“I will not allow New Yorkers to lose their homes due to mortgage goliaths that buck the system by submitting affidavits signed without knowledge of the facts,” said Attorney General Cuomo. “Such conduct is a fraud upon our courts and a slap in the face of New Yorkers struggling to get by in this economy. My office will continue to root out these practices so homeowners receive the full protections afforded by our judicial system.”

Recent reports indicate that employees of these mortgage servicers routinely signed affidavits submitted in foreclosure proceedings without personal knowledge of the underlying facts or verification of loan file information, and without even reading the documents they signed. This practice, known as “robo-signing,” has tainted the integrity of the foreclosure process by which homeowners in New York lose their homes. Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase and GMAC Mortgage announced that they were temporarily halting pending foreclosures, while Wells Fargo has not suspended foreclosures despite the deficiencies uncovered.

Attorney General Cuomo is calling on these mortgage servicers to submit documents and information to his office concerning how foreclosure documents are prepared, verified, attested to and notarized, and how required notices are provided to New York homeowners. The letters request that the mortgage servicers stop re-filing foreclosures that had been suspended (and in Wells Fargo’s case, cease proceeding with pending foreclosures) until the Attorney General’s Office is assured that reliable and fair procedures are in place and that accurate, trustworthy documentation will be submitted to the New York courts. The letters also request that the mortgage servicers refrain from filing any new foreclosures until they can provide assurances that their procedures comply with New York law and are neither tainted nor inaccurate.

Because of the gravity of these transgressions and the high volume of foreclosures, Attorney General Cuomo is calling on all mortgage servicers engaged in “robo-signing” in New York to immediately suspend all pending foreclosure actions in the state, including evictions and foreclosure sales. Cuomo is also requesting that the mortgage servicers not file any new foreclosures until the companies correct their procedures.

Tens of thousands of New Yorkers have been devastated by the foreclosure crisis. In fact, the foreclosure rates in Nassau and Suffolk Counties rank among the ten highest in the nation. More than 60,000 New York homes are currently in foreclosure, and 130,000 New York homeowners have received pre-foreclosure notices this year after falling behind on their mortgage payments.

In addition to his office’s review of Bank of America, Chase, Wells Fargo and GMAC Mortgage/Ally, Attorney General Cuomo is working with other state attorneys general, banking regulators and other interested parties to assess the veracity of servicers’ foreclosure filings and ensure the fairness and accuracy of their processes.

Attorney General Cuomo advises New York homeowners who are facing foreclosure proceedings to do the following:

  • Contact the court to find out the status of your foreclosure proceeding.
  • Seek representation or advice from a qualified attorney. If necessary, contact your local bar association or legal services office for a referral. If you are unable to retain counsel, carefully review any documents filed thus far with the court to ensure their accuracy.
  • If you have not done so already, immediately contact your lender or servicer to discuss available alternatives to foreclosure such as a loan modification.
  • For a general description of the foreclosure process, refer to
  • Consult with a government-approved housing counseling agency. To find counselors approved by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in your local area, call 800-569-4287 or visit A list of housing counselors also can be found via the NYS Banking Department at
  • Call HOPE NOW at 1-888-995-HOPE. HOPE NOW is an alliance of housing counselors, mortgage companies, investors and other mortgage market participants that provides free foreclosure prevention assistance.
  • If you live in New York City, call 311 to schedule free foreclosure counseling sessions at the Center for New York City Neighborhoods.

New York homeowners who believe their homes were foreclosed based upon false or inaccurate documents filed in court by their lender or servicer should seek representation from an attorney. They may also file a complaint with the New York Attorney General’s Bureau of Consumer Frauds & Protection by calling 800-771-7755 or visiting

The investigation, led by Special Deputy Attorney General for Consumer Frauds & Protection Joy Feigenbaum, is being handled by Special Counsel Mary Alestra, Assistant Attorney General Brian Montgomery and Deputy Bureau Chief Jeffrey Powell of the Bureau of Consumer Frauds & Protection under the direction of Executive Deputy Attorney General for Economic Justice Maria Vullo and Deputy Attorney General for Economic Justice Michael Berlin.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in assignment of mortgage, bank of america, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, forgery, GMAC, investigation, jpmorgan chase, MERS, MERSCORP, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., rmbs, robo signers, securitization, servicers, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, Supreme Court, Susan Chana Lask, Violations, washington mutual, wells fargo6 Comments








On April 15, 2008, at 4:56 a.m., Marti Noriega, acting as Vice President for “Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc as nominee in favor of Mortgage Lenders Network USA, Inc.” signed an assignment of the Deed of Trust to LaSalle Bank National Association, as trustee under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of August 1, 2006, GSAMP Trust 2006-HE5 (“LaSalle Bank National Association”). The assignment was recorded on April 29, 2008. On April 21, 2008, LaSalle Bank National Association, acting through Litton Loan Servicing LP as attorney in fact, appointed LSI Title Company of Oregon, LLC as successor trustee.

The Court, however, is aware of contrary authority. In In re Allman, a case from the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon, the court described MERS as “more akin to that of a straw man than to a party possessing all the rights given a buyer.” Bankr. No. 08-31282-elp7, 2010 WL 3366405, at *10 (Bankr. D. Or. Aug. 24, 2010) (quoting Landmark Nat’l Bank, 289 Kan. at 539). The court considered the meaning of “beneficiary” under Oregon’s trust deed statute as “the person named or otherwise designated in a trust deed as the person for whose benefit the trust deed is given . . . .” ORS 86.705(1). The court then concluded, after examining language of the trust deed that is almost identical to the language contained in the Deed of Trust here, that MERS was not “in any real sense of the word, particularly as defined in ORS 86.705(1), the beneficiary of the trust deed.” Id. Instead, MERS was a nominee and the trust deed was for the benefit of the lender.

Additionally, other courts have held that MERS does not have authority to transfer the note,
even though it has authority to transfer the trust deed. Those courts have noted that when the note and deed of trust are split, the transfer of the deed of trust is ineffective. Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619, 623-24 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (in spite of deed language purporting to transfer the promissory note, MERS never held the note and the lender never gave

MERS the authority to transfer the note; thus MERS’ transfer of the deed of trust, separate from the note, was ineffective and the successor lender lacked a legally cognizable interest in the property); Saxon Mortg. Serv., Inc. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 EMC, 2008 WL 5170180, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2008) (same as Bellistri); In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (successor lender had no standing to seek relief from bankruptcy stay and move forward with foreclosure because MERS had no authority to transfer the note).

Oregon cases support the notion that the security, here the Deed of Trust, is “merely an incident to the debt.” West v. White, 307 Or. 296, 300, 766 P.2d 383 (1988); see also U.S. Nat’l Bank of Portland v. Holton, 99 Or. 419, 428, 195 P. 823 (1921) (“The assignment of a mortgage, independent of the debt which it is given to secure, is an unmeaning ceremony.”). Federal courts are bound by pronouncements of the state’s highest court on applicable state law. If the state’s highest court has not decided an issue, and there is no relevant precedent from an intermediate appellate court, the federal court is to predict how the state high court would resolve it. “In assessing how a state’s highest court would resolve a state law question– absent controlling state authority–federal courts look to existing state law without predicting potential changes in that law.” Ticknor v. Choice Hotels International, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Ryman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 505 F.3d 993, 994 (9th Cir. 2007).

Absent a decision from the Oregon Supreme Court or the Oregon Court of Appeals, and absent further briefing from the parties on this specific issue, I am at least initially persuaded that Rinegard-Guirma has a likelihood of success on the merits.

As for irreparable harm, loss of a home is a grievous injury.



For the foregoing reasons, Rinegard-Guirma’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (#18) is GRANTED. The defendants are enjoined from foreclosing Rinegard-Guirma’s property described as: Lot 2, Block 16, Highland Park, in the City of Portland,County of Multnomah and State of Oregon, Assessor’s Parcel Number R180361, commonly known as 5731 NE 10th Ave., Portland, OR 97211 until the claims against MERS are resolved.


Dated this 6th day of October, 2010.
/s/ Garr M. King
Garr M. King
United States District Judge


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Posted in assignment of mortgage, bank of america, deed of trust, Litton, MERS, MERSCORP, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., TRO6 Comments

BofA halts foreclosure sales in 50 states

BofA halts foreclosure sales in 50 states

By ALAN ZIBEL, Associated Press

Bank of America Corp., the nation’s largest bank, said Friday it would stop sales of foreclosed homes in all 50 states as it reviews potential flaws in foreclosure documents.

A week earlier, the company had said it would only stop such sales in the 23 states where foreclosures must be approved by a judge.

The move comes amid evidence that mortgage company employees or their lawyers signed documents in foreclosure cases without verifying the information in them.

“We will stop foreclosure sales until our assessment has been satisfactorily completed,” company spokesman Dan Frahm said in a statement. “Our ongoing assessment shows the basis for our past foreclosure decisions is accurate.”

Concern is growing that mortgage lenders have been evicting homeowners using flawed court papers. State and federal officials have been ramping up pressure on the mortgage industry over worries about potential legal violations.

On Thursday, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., urged five large mortgage lenders to suspend foreclosures in Nevada until they have set up systems to make sure homeowners aren’t “improperly directed into foreclosure proceedings.” Nevada is not among the states where banks had suspended foreclosures.

Also Friday, PNC Financial Services Group Inc. said it is halting most foreclosures and evictions in 23 states for a month so it can review whether documents it submitted to courts complied with state laws. An official at the Pittsburgh-based bank confirmed the decision on Friday, which was reported earlier by the New York Times. The official requested anonymity because the decision hasn’t been publicly announced.

Continue reading…ASSOCIATED PRESS

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in assignment of mortgage, bank of america, CONTROL FRAUD, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures1 Comment



Be sure to catch the Full Depo of Renee Hertzler below after AP Alan Zibel’s article

Bank of America delays foreclosures in 23 states

By ALAN ZIBEL, AP Real Estate Writer Alan Zibel, Fri Oct 1, 7:46 pm ET

WASHINGTON – Bank of America is delaying foreclosures in 23 states as it examines whether it rushed the foreclosure process for thousands of homeowners without reading the documents.

The move adds the nation’s largest bank to a growing list of mortgage companies whose employees signed documents in foreclosure cases without verifying the information in them.

Bank of America isn’t able to estimate how many homeowners’ cases will be affected, Dan Frahm, a spokesman for the Charlotte, N.C.-based bank, said Friday. He said the bank plans to resubmit corrected documents within several weeks.

Two other companies, Ally Financial Inc.’s GMAC Mortgage unit and JPMorgan Chase, have halted tens of thousands of foreclosure cases after similar problems became public.

The document problems could cause thousands of homeowners to contest foreclosures that are in the works or have been completed. If the problems turn up at other lenders, a foreclosure crisis that’s already likely to drag on for several more years could persist even longer. Analysts caution that most homeowners facing foreclosure are still likely to lose their homes.

State attorneys general, who enforce foreclosure laws, are stepping up pressure on the industry.

On Friday, Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal asked a state court to freeze all home foreclosures for 60 days. Doing so “should stop a foreclosure steamroller based on defective documents,” he said.

And California Attorney General Jerry Brown called on JPMorgan to suspend foreclosures unless it could show it complied with a state consumer protection law. The law requires lenders to contact borrowers at risk of foreclosure to determine whether they qualify for mortgage assistance.

In Florida, the state attorney general is investigating four law firms, two with ties to GMAC, for allegedly providing fraudulent documents in foreclosure cases .The Ohio attorney general this week asked judges to review GMAC foreclosure cases.

Mark Paustenbach, a Treasury Department spokesman, said the Treasury has asked federal regulators “to look into these troubling developments.”

A document obtained Friday by the Associated Press showed a Bank of America official acknowledging in a legal proceeding that she signed up to 8,000 foreclosure documents a month and typically didn’t read them.

The official, Renee Hertzler, said in a February deposition that she signed 7,000 to 8,000 foreclosure documents a month.

“I typically don’t read them because of the volume that we sign,” Hertzler said.

She also acknowledged identifying herself as a representative of a different bank, Bank of New York Mellon, that she didn’t work for. Bank of New York Mellon served as a trustee for the investors holding the homeowner’s loan.

Hertzler could not be reached for comment.




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Posted in assignment of mortgage, bank of america, bank of new york, bogus, chain in title, CONTROL FRAUD, deposition, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, investigation, robo signers, stopforeclosurefraud.com4 Comments

Bank of America Exits First Mortgage Wholesale Channel

Bank of America Exits First Mortgage Wholesale Channel

Strategic Move Will Build Upon Leadership Positions in Retail, Correspondent and Warehouse Lending

CALABASAS, Calif., Oct 05, 2010 (BUSINESS WIRE) —

Bank of America Home Loans will exit the first mortgage wholesale channel to focus more operational resources toward fulfillment capacity for its leading direct-to-consumer retail channel, helping existing and new customers obtain mortgage financing. Bank of America will also devote additional resources toward enhancing its leadership positions in correspondent and warehouse lending. The exit will be completed following an orderly transition of loans currently in process.

“By exiting the first mortgage wholesale channel, we can redirect critical operational resources to further enhance our capabilities in direct-to-consumer channels,” said Barbara Desoer, president of Bank of America Home Loans. “This is an investment in strengthening our competitive position by delivering on the services our mortgage customers expect from Bank of America.”

Bank of America holds a prominent share in retail mortgage originations, with 22 percent of the retail market in 2009, according to Inside Mortgage Finance (IMF). Bank of America’s share of the first mortgage wholesale channel was 8 percent in 2009. Conversely, Bank of America was the leading participant in the correspondent mortgage channel, with nearly 26 percent market share, according to IMF.

“Bank of America remains committed to purchasing and financing loans from Correspondent Lending clients, including those approved to originate loans from mortgage brokers,” said Doug Jones, president of Bank of America Institutional Mortgage Services. “We intend to build upon our leadership position in that market to provide enhanced liquidity to the smaller financial institutions and independent mortgage companies that supply mortgages as our correspondent clients.”

Associates impacted by the exit from the first mortgage wholesale channel will have the opportunity for redeployment to other Bank of America Home Loans units, including direct-to-consumer operational units that are helping Bank of America customers take advantage of historically low rates to purchase new homes or refinance existing homes. Associates will also have the opportunity to transfer to other Bank of America Home Loans units, including Correspondent and Warehouse Lending, Retail Sales and teams serving the needs of distressed borrowers.

Bank of America will work closely with its first mortgage wholesale clients to ensure that loans currently in the pipeline are fulfilled and processed for consumers.

Bank of America

Bank of America is one of the world’s largest financial institutions, serving individual consumers, small- and middle-market businesses and large corporations with a full range of banking, investing, asset management and other financial and risk management products and services. The company provides unmatched convenience in the United States, serving approximately 57 million consumer and small business relationships with 5,900 retail banking offices, more than 18,000 ATMs and award-winning online banking with 29 million active users. Bank of America is among the world’s leading wealth management companies and is a global leader in corporate and investment banking and trading across a broad range of asset classes, serving corporations, governments, institutions and individuals around the world. Bank of America offers industry-leading support to approximately 4 million small business owners through a suite of innovative, easy-to-use online products and services. The company serves clients through operations in more than 40 countries. Bank of America Corporation stock (NYSE: BAC) is a component of the Dow Jones Industrial Average and is listed on the New York Stock Exchange.

SOURCE: Bank of America

Reporters May Contact:
Dan Frahm, Jumana Bauwens or Rick Simon, 1.800.796.8448
© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bank of america, servicers2 Comments

Congress Needs To ZERO IN On A “Common Thread” To Fannie, Freddie Mortgage Crisis

Congress Needs To ZERO IN On A “Common Thread” To Fannie, Freddie Mortgage Crisis

Anyone can see the “Fiction” that was set into place from all the institutions in this article below. Each one of these named parties as a shareholder utilizes Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., yet Washington never mentions this MERS device.

All this talk of false and misleading loans blah blah blah …I mean grab the bull by it’s nuts and put these criminals behind bars. Not just seek refunds! This clean up should also seek Racketeering Indictments.

Congress Seeks Fannie, Freddie Exit as Banks Eat Soured Loans

By Dawn Kopecki – Sep 15, 2010 1:00 AM ET

U.S. lawmakers will grapple today with how to end the bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac after two years and almost $150 billion, and who pays the bill for bad loans made during the housing boom.

Regulators who seized control of the two mortgage lenders in 2008 are under pressure to stem losses for taxpayers and recoup money from banks that sold faulty loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac — all without hindering the housing market’s recovery. Assistant Treasury Secretary Michael Barr and Edward DeMarco, acting director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, are scheduled to testify today on their progress at the House Financial Services Committee.

The Obama administration and Congress are weighing the future of the two companies as part of an overhaul of the U.S. housing finance system. Fannie Mae, based in Washington, and Freddie Mac, based in McLean, Virginia, lost $166 billion on guarantees of single-family mortgages from the end of 2007 through the second quarter, according to the FHFA. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner has promised a comprehensive proposal by early next year.

“The biggest problem in the economy is that we have three or four million too many homes,” said Chris Kotowski, a banking analyst at Oppenheimer & Co. The solution “will take another two or three years to work out until we sop up the excess supply,” Kotowski said.

Loan Clean-Up

The clean-up includes seeking refunds from lenders who sold loans based on false or misleading information, and the two government-backed firms aren’t the only ones demanding buybacks. The Federal Reserve, private mortgage investors and mortgage insurers are combing through loan documents for faulty appraisals, inflated borrower incomes and missing documentation that would support a refund request.

As of the end of the second quarter 2010, Fannie Mae had $4.7 billion in outstanding repurchase requests, and Freddie Mac had $6.4 billion in outstanding repurchase requests. DeMarco said in his prepared testimony that outstanding repurchase requests continue to be “of concern.”

Continue reading…BLOOMBERG


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Posted in bank of america, chain in title, CitiGroup, concealment, congress, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, Credit Suisse, fannie mae, federal reserve board, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, investigation, MERS, MERSCORP, mortgage, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., RICO, scam, servicers, settlement,, sub-prime, trustee, Trusts, us bank, Wall Street2 Comments

Open Letter To California Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr.: Foreclosure Crisis

Open Letter To California Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr.: Foreclosure Crisis

2651 East Chapman Avenue, Suite 110
Fullerton, California 92831
Telephone (714) 738-4830
Facsimile (714)992-7916

September 9, 2010

Attorney General’s Office
California Department of Justice
Attn:  Edmund G. Brown Jr.
1300 “I” Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

Benjamin G. Diehl
Office of the California Attorney General
300 S. Spring Street,. Ste 1702
Los Angeles, CA  90013

Kathrin Sears
Office of the California Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Ave., Ste 1702
San Francisco, CA  94102

Re: Civil Code §§ 2923.52 and 2923.53
The People of The State of California vs. Countrywide et. al. LC093076
Petition for Writ of Mandamus

Dear Colleagues and Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr:

As you are aware, my office represents homeowners caught up in the foreclosure crisis currently occurring in the California housing market.

You may recall that my office sought your assistance in the matter of Mabry vs. Aurora Loan Services. Wherein the 4th Appellate District Division Three acknowledged a private right of action to prevent foreclosures on a citizen’s primary residence, when the bank and/or mortgage holder has not complied with Civil Code § 2923.5. However, your office opted not to participated in what I believe was a landmark decision for homeowners in the battle against foreclosure prevention here in California.

Notwithstanding the Stipulated Judgment and Injunction that your office had obtained against Countrywide/Bank of America in the above referenced case, Bank of America filed an Amicus Curia Brief in the Mabry action espousing no private right of action and no obligation to modify distressed loans.

I am fully aware, grateful and commend your office for its attempts to crackdown on loan modification schemes that have swindled millions of dollars out of frightened and frustrated homeowners. Some homeowners who were and still are willing to believe against all logic or reason that the companies, whom practiced such schemes, could actually get the mortgage holder to give them some sort of State or Federal assistance that could prevent the losing of their homes and becoming homeless.

I further commend your office for its 2008 lawsuit against then Countrywide Financial, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., and Spectrum Lending, Inc., who are now commonly referred to as Bank of America N.A. and BAC Home Loans (BAC).  An action which ultimately resulted in the successful acquiring of a Stipulated Judgment and Injunction against (BAC) on October 14, 2008.

The BAC lawsuit’s primary focus was on the predatory lending practices of the Defendants. The Stipulated Judgment and Injunction provides a remedy that creates yet another avenue for BAC borrowers to find relief and even the possibility of preventing the loss of their homes. The loss of a home is a threat that is ever too common, albeit avoidable with help from BAC, for numerous California BAC borrowers in this foreclosure crisis.

I wish this letter could end here or at least continue to praise your efforts and accomplishments as the present Attorney General of California. However, unfortunately, it must now turn to the present state of affairs and your lack of aggressiveness in the pursuit against the foe you identified and successfully prosecuted in the People vs. Countrywide, action.

I believe judgment obtained against BAC was merely the tip of the iceberg.  You may or may not be aware that IndyMac Bank, now OneWest Bank, has been sued by their investors for providing false and misleading appraisals along with committing many underwriting violations, which gave thousands of Californians their present unconscionable loans [a copy of the court’s opinion is attached for your edification].

There are presently hearings scheduled on September 21, 2010 and September 22, 2010, that involve issues that would substantially curtail the foreclosures in California:

  • September 22, 2010 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 68 of the Los Angeles Superior Court, Mabry vs. Preston Dufauchard, Commissioner For the California Dept of Corporations, Real Party in Interest Aurora Loan Services, LLC, Case No: BS 127903. Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
    • The issue: Whether possessing a HAMP program equates as compliance with California Civil Code § 2923.53.
  • September 21, 2010 at 9:00 a.m. at the California 4th Appellate Court Division Three Vuki vs. Superior Court of California, Orange County Case No: GO43533, Real Party in Interest HSBC. Oral Argument.
    • The issue: Whether a bad faith compliance with Civil Code § 2923.53 makes the foreclosing beneficiary (HSBC) a bona fide purchaser pursuant to Civil Code §2923.54.
  • September 21, 2010 at 9:00 a.m. at the California 4th Appellate Court Division Three Sanchez vs. Superior Court of California, Orange County Case No: G043300, Real Party in Interest Litton Loan Servicing LLC.. Oral Argument.
    • The issue: Whether a fully executed and performed loan modification is terminated by the lender’s inadvertent sale of the subject real property in lieu of Civil Code § 2923.54.

These decisions are being sought by my office to help clarify citizens’ rights under the present Foreclosure Prevention Statutes.

My office has been very instrumental in not only the prosecution of these issues, on behalf of my clients, but all citizens of the State of California.

Unfortunately, the BAC Stipulated Judgment and Injunction does not provide a component for a private right of enforcement.  Thus, with respect to possible violations by BAC, such Stipulated Judgment and Injunction can only be enforced by your office.

My office would love to step into your shoes and be granted permission and the rights to enforcement under the Stipulated Judgment and Injunctions. That way we may stop all the Countrywide loan foreclosures presently scheduled and being conducted in California until each

prior Countrywide and/or BAC California borrower is offered the benefits under the Stipulated Judgment and Injunction your office obtained.

I do not believe that you could or are able to assign such a right, but I make it as a gesture of sincerity as to my conviction and belief of the wrongdoings of BAC.

I ask that you immediately seek Court intervention enjoining all Countrywide and/or BAC foreclosures proceedings that fall within the auspices of the Stipulated Judgment/Injunction.

Alternatively, you leave my office no choice but to seek a Writ of Mandamus asking the Court to instruct you and your office on your obligations as Attorney General of our great State.  I realize your business and acknowledge that this may not be your primary priority, but if I do not receive a response indicating your intent by September 17, 2010, I will deem you have no intent to respond, investigate this matter, or take other appropriate action and at that time will seek the Writ of Mandamus.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned paragraph, I wish you well on your campaign to return to the position of Governor of our great State.

Moses S. Hall;



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© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bac home loans, bank of america, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, countrywide, deed of trust, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, injunction, investigation, mortgage, mortgage modification, Real Estate, securitization, servicers, TRO, trustee, trustee sale, Trusts, Violations2 Comments

10 bailed-out banks spent $16.3M lobbying in 1H

10 bailed-out banks spent $16.3M lobbying in 1H


Top 10 bailed-out banks spent over $16 million in 2010 first half lobbying on financial reform

Eileen Aj Connelly, AP Business Writer, On Tuesday August 31, 2010, 7:00 pm EDT

NEW YORK (AP) — The 10 banks that received the most bailout aid during the financial crisis spent over $16 million on lobbying efforts in the first half of 2010, as the debate over financial regulatory reform reached its height.

Disclosure reports show that the banks that got the most government help in late 2008 and early 2009 also invested the most to influence members of Congress, the White House, the Federal Reserve, Treasury Department and a long list of federal agencies as new rules were enacted governing Wall Street and the nation’s financial system.

“I’m not shocked that they spent that much money because I saw them every day,” said Ed Mierzwinski, consumer program director at U.S. Public Interest Research Group, who said more than 2,000 lobbyists worked on the financial reform bill.

The sweeping law signed by President Barack Obama in July topped 2,300 pages, and outlined broad rules for issues ranging from derivatives trading to the fees merchants are charged for processing credit and debit card transactions. It also covered the creation of a consumer financial protection bureau. Banks are continuing efforts to try to shape many of the new rules that are still being finalized.

The $16.32 million spent in the first half of 2010 was 26 percent higher than the combined $12.94 million they spent in the first half of 2009.

In prior years, the spending crept up at a much slower pace: 2009’s total was about 2 percent higher than the nearly $12.7 million spent in the first half of 2008. And that was only 3.7 percent above the $12.25 million spent in the first half of 2007.

Leading the pack this year was JPMorgan Chase & Co., which spent $1.52 million on lobbying in the second quarter, on top of $1.51 million in the first quarter of 2010, for a total of $3.03 million, according to disclosure reports filed with the House of Representatives clerk’s office.

Citigroup Inc., the largest bank recipient of government funds during the crisis in late 2008 and early 2009, was second. The New York-based bank spend $1.47 million on lobbyists in the second quarter, after spending $1.31 million in the first quarter for a total of $2.78 million.

And Wall Street titan Goldman Sachs Group Inc. was third, with $1.58 million spent in the second quarter, on top of $1.19 million in the first quarter of 2010.

All three banks declined to comment on their lobbying spending, which went toward hiring advocates to discuss the legislation with lawmakers and regulators. Lobbying figures do not include any campaign contributions that banks or their employees might also have made.

Mierzwinski said the big win for consumers was the financial protection bureau, which banks tried to remove from the law. The financial industry was in a weakened position during the debate, however, because of public anger over the economy’s collapse and publicity over issues like Wall Street bonuses. Nevertheless, banks were rewarded for their efforts, he said. “They did manage to make changes.”

Bank of America Corp. and Wells Fargo & Co. both also spent more than $2 million in the first half of the year. Spending far less were PNC Bank, US Bancorp, Capital One Financial Corp. and Regions Financial Corp. The American Bankers Association, the main trade group for the industry, also lobbied heavily, spending $4.2 million in the first half of 2010.

Consumer advocacy groups had their own lobbyists working the Capitol’s halls during the finance reform debate as well, but their spending was dwarfed by the banks — a total of $792,000 in the first half of the year for four of the top organizations. The Center for Responsible Lending topped the list, with $335,000 spent in the first six months of the year. U.S. PIRG tallied $227,000. The Consumers Union listed $150,000 and The Consumer Federation of America spent $80,000.

Melanie Sloan, executive director of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, said the heavy spending in part reflects the number of people needed to discuss issues with 535 members of Congress. One sentence in a law regulating the financial markets can have a big impact on a company’s profit, she noted, and the industry made sure they had experts on hand to discuss every aspect with lawmakers.

“We’re talking billions,” Sloan said. “So the lobbying money is the most effective money you’ll spend.”

“It’s not that I don’t think that many would have preferred a different outcome,” she added. “But I doubt that any of those banks didn’t think it was worth it to have those lobbyists.”

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bank of america, capital one, CitiGroup, concealment, conflict of interest, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, Economy, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, geithner, goldman sachs, MERS, MERSCORP, mortgage, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, scam, servicers, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, sub-prime0 Comments

Conflict of Interest? Federal Judges’ ties to Bank of America…Remember the UTAH CASE???

Conflict of Interest? Federal Judges’ ties to Bank of America…Remember the UTAH CASE???

If youl recall my post Notice of Appeal Filed – Stay of Court Order to Vacate Injunction Stopping Bank of America Foreclosures in Utah Requested

I stated There is something not right here and I think the outcome might surprise us!


Reported by: Kelli O’Hara
Last Update: 1:29 am

SALT LAKE CITY, Utah (ABC 4 News) – “They’re foreclosing illegally here in Utah,” those were the words of St. George Attorney John Christian Barlow spoken in early June. Barlow at the time had appeared before a Federal Judge arguing that the Banking Giant, Bank of America, was foreclosing illegally in the State of Utah. The Southern Utah Attorney believed that because B.O.A was not a registered business or corporation in the state, they lacked authority to do business here.

Barlow had succeeded in getting a 5th Circuit Court Judge to agree with him; as a result the judge imposed an injunction on all Bank of America foreclosures. Weeks later, the case went before a Federal Judge where B.O.A. argued that they were regulated by Federal Laws not State. Federal Judge Clark Waddoups heard case, and threw out the injunction therefore Bank of America’s foreclosure company: ReConTrust was allowed to foreclose once again.

After the decision, ABC4 got a tip about the case and started digging. Our tipster said that the Judge may have a conflict of interest in hearing the B.O.A. cases. Why? Because the Judge Waddoups old law firm represents Bank of America.

We checked into Waddoups background and the Federal Judge did work for Parr,Brown, Gee & Loveless for nearly 30 years. And Waddoups, as of 2008, drew a pension from the law firm. We placed a call to the firm, but they wouldn’t comment if the former firm Partner had ever handled B.O.A cases.

Continue reading …ABC4



What does DJSP, Enterprises Newly Appointed Counsel have in common with PBC Judge Meenu Sasser?

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bac home loans, bank of america, concealment, conflict of interest, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, djsp enterprises, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, investigation, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., MERS, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Recontrust, stopforeclosurefraud.com2 Comments



Could this deposition hold the key to take all of MERS V3 &  MERSCORP down!

There is not 1, 2 but 3 MERS, Inc. in the past.

Just like MERS et al signing documents dated years later from existence the Corporate employees do the same to their own corporate resolutions! Exists in 1998 and certifies it in 2002.

If this is not proof of a Ponzi Scheme then I don’t know what is… They hide the truth in many layers but as we keep pulling and peeling each layer back eventually we will come to the truth!

“A Subtle Stranger” Orchestrates a Paradigm Shift

MERS et al has absolutely no supervision of what is being done by it’s non-members certifying authority PERIOD!

DOCKET NO. F-10209-08

Counter claimants and
Third Party Plaintiffs,
Defendants on the Counterclaim,
Third Party Defendants

Deposition of William C. Hultman, Secretary and Treasurer of MERSCORP

[ipaper docId=36513502 access_key=key-1ltln0ondmrqe0v9156u height=600 width=600 /]

Does MERS have any salaried employees?
A No.
Q Does MERS have any employees?
A Did they ever have any? I couldn’t hear you.
Q Does MERS have any employees currently?
A No.
Q In the last five years has MERS had any
A No.
Q To whom do the officers of MERS report?
A The Board of Directors.
Q To your knowledge has Mr. Hallinan ever
reported to the Board?
A He would have reported through me if there was
something to report.
Q So if I understand your answer, at least the
MERS officers reflected on Hultman Exhibit 4, if they
had something to report would report to you even though
you’re not an employee of MERS, is that correct?
MR. BROCHIN: Object to the form of the
A That’s correct.
Q And in what capacity would they report to you?
A As a corporate officer. I’m the secretary.
Q As a corporate officer of what?
Q So you are the secretary of MERS, but are not
an employee of MERS?
A That’s correct.

How many assistant secretaries have you
appointed pursuant to the April 9, 1998 resolution; how
many assistant secretaries of MERS have you appointed?
A I don’t know that number.
Q Approximately?
A I wouldn’t even begin to be able to tell you
right now.
Q Is it in the thousands?
A Yes.
Q Have you been doing this all around the
country in every state in the country?
A Yes.
Q And all these officers I understand are unpaid
officers of MERS
A Yes.
Q And there’s no live person who is an employee
of MERS that they report to, is that correct, who is an
MR. BROCHIN: Object to the form of the
A There are no employees of MERS.



MERS 101


FULL DEPOSITION of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) PRESIDENT & CEO R.K. ARNOLD “MERSCORP”





© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bac home loans, bank of america, bank of new york, chain in title, concealment, conflict of interest, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, countrywide, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, insider, investigation, lawsuit, MERS, MERSCORP, mortgage, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., note, originator, R.K. Arnold, racketeering, Real Estate, sanctioned, scam, securitization, servicers,, sub-prime, TAXES, trustee, trustee sale, Trusts, truth in lending act, unemployed, Violations, Wall Street4 Comments

Banks’ Self-Dealing Super-Charged Financial Crisis

Banks’ Self-Dealing Super-Charged Financial Crisis


Over the last two years of the housing bubble, Wall Street bankers perpetrated one of the greatest episodes of self-dealing in financial history.

Faced with increasing difficulty in selling the mortgage-backed securities that had been among their most lucrative products, the banks hit on a solution that preserved their quarterly earnings and huge bonuses:

They created fake demand.

A ProPublica analysis shows for the first time the extent to which banks — primarily Merrill Lynch, but also Citigroup, UBS and others — bought their own products and cranked up an assembly line that otherwise should have flagged.

The products they were buying and selling were at the heart of the 2008 meltdown — collections of mortgage bonds known as collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs.

As the housing boom began to slow in mid-2006, investors became skittish about the riskier parts of those investments. So the banks created — and ultimately provided most of the money for — new CDOs. Those new CDOs bought the hard-to-sell pieces of the original CDOs. The result was a daisy chain [1] that solved one problem but created another: Each new CDO had its own risky pieces. Banks created yet other CDOs to buy those.

Individual instances of these questionable trades have been reported before, but ProPublica’s investigation shows that by late 2006 they became a common industry practice.

Source: Thetica SystemsSource: Thetica Systems

An analysis by research firm Thetica Systems, commissioned by ProPublica, shows that in the last years of the boom, CDOs had become the dominant purchaser of key, risky parts of other CDOs, largely replacing real investors like pension funds. By 2007, 67 percent of those slices were bought by other CDOs, up from 36 percent just three years earlier. The banks often orchestrated these purchases. In the last two years of the boom, nearly half of all CDOs sponsored by market leader Merrill Lynch bought significant portions of other Merrill CDOs [2].ProPublica also found 85 instances during 2006 and 2007 in which two CDOs bought pieces of each other’s unsold inventory. These trades, which involved $107 billion worth of CDOs, underscore the extent to which the market lacked real buyers. Often the CDOs that swapped purchases closed within days of each other, the analysis shows.

There were supposed to be protections against this sort of abuse. While banks provided the blueprint for the CDOs and marketed them, they typically selected independent managers who chose the specific bonds to go inside them. The managers had a legal obligation to do what was best for the CDO. They were paid by the CDO, not the bank, and were supposed to serve as a bulwark against self-dealing by the banks, which had the fullest understanding of the complex and lightly regulated mortgage bonds.

It rarely worked out that way. The managers were beholden to the banks that sent them the business. On a billion-dollar deal, managers could earn a million dollars in fees, with little risk. Some small firms did several billion dollars of CDOs in a matter of months.

“All these banks for years were spawning trading partners,” says a former executive from Financial Guaranty Insurance Company, a major insurer of the CDO market. “You don’t have a trading partner? Create one.”

The executive, like most of the dozens of people ProPublica spoke with about the inner workings of the market at the time, asked not to be named out of fear of being sucked into ongoing investigations or because they are involved in civil litigation.

Keeping the assembly line going had a wealth of short-term advantages for the banks. Fees rolled in. A typical CDO could net the bank that created it between $5 million and $10 million — about half of which usually ended up as employee bonuses. Indeed, Wall Street awarded record bonuses in 2006, a hefty chunk of which came from the CDO business.

The self-dealing super-charged the market for CDOs, enticing some less-savvy investors to try their luck. Crucially, such deals maintained the value of mortgage bonds at a time when the lack of buyers should have driven their prices down.

But the strategy of speeding up the assembly line had devastating consequences for homeowners, the banks themselves and, ultimately, the global economy. Because of Wall Street’s machinations, more mortgages had been granted to ever-shakier borrowers. The results can now be seen in foreclosed houses across America.

The incestuous trading also made the CDOs more intertwined and thus fragile, accelerating their decline in value that began in the fall of 2007 and deepened over the next year. Most are now worth pennies on the dollar. Nearly half of the nearly trillion dollars in losses to the global banking system came from CDOs, losses ultimately absorbed by taxpayers and investors around the world. The banks’ troubles sent the world’s economies into a tailspin from which they have yet to recover.

It remains unclear whether any of this violated laws. The SEC has said [4] that it is actively looking at as many as 50 CDO managers as part of its broad examination of the CDO business’ role in the financial crisis. In particular, the agency is focusing on the relationship between the banks and the managers. The SEC is exploring how deals were structured, if any quid pro quo arrangements existed, and whether banks pressured managers to take bad assets.

The banks declined to directly address ProPublica’s questions. Asked about its relationship with managers and the cross-ownership among its CDOs, Citibank responded with a one-sentence statement:

“It has been widely reported that there are ongoing industry-wide investigations into CDO-related matters and we do not comment on pending investigations.”

None of ProPublica’s questions had mentioned the SEC or pending investigations.

Posed a similar list of questions, Bank of America, which now owns Merrill Lynch, said:

“These are very specific questions regarding individuals who left Merrill Lynch several years ago and a CDO origination business that, due to market conditions, was discontinued by Merrill before Bank of America acquired the company.”

This is the second installment of a ProPublica series about the largely hidden history of the CDO boom and bust. Our first story [5] looked at how one hedge fund helped create at least $40 billion in CDOs as part of a strategy to bet against the market. This story turns the focus on the banks.

Merrill Lynch Pioneers Pervert the Market
By 2004, the housing market was in full swing, and Wall Street bankers flocked to the CDO frenzy. It seemed to be the perfect money machine, and for a time everyone was happy.

Homeowners got easy mortgages. Banks and mortgage companies felt secure lending the money because they could sell the mortgages almost immediately to Wall Street and get back all their cash plus a little extra for their trouble. The investment banks charged massive fees for repackaging the mortgages into fancy financial products. Investors all around the world got to play in the then-phenomenal American housing market.

The mortgages were bundled into bonds, which were in turn combined into CDOs offering varying interest rates and levels of risk.

Investors holding the top tier of a CDO were first in line to get money coming from mortgages. By 2006, some banks often kept this layer, which credit agencies blessed with their highest rating of Triple A.

Buyers of the lower tiers took on more risk and got higher returns. They would be the first to take the hit if homeowners funding the CDO stopped paying their mortgages. (Here’s a video explaining how CDOs worked [6].)

Over time, these risky slices became increasingly hard to sell, posing a problem for the banks. If they remained unsold, the sketchy assets stayed on their books, like rotting inventory. That would require the banks to set aside money to cover any losses. Banks hate doing that because it means the money can’t be loaned out or put to other uses.

Being stuck with the risky portions of CDOs would ultimately lower profits and endanger the whole assembly line.

The banks, notably Merrill and Citibank, solved this problem by greatly expanding what had been a common and accepted practice: CDOs buying small pieces of other CDOs.

Architects of CDOs typically included what they called a “bucket” — which held bits of other CDOs paying higher rates of interest. The idea was to boost overall returns of deals primarily composed of safer assets. In the early days, the bucket was a small portion of an overall CDO.

One pioneer of pushing CDOs to buy CDOs was Merrill Lynch’s Chris Ricciardi, who had been brought to the firm in 2003 to take Merrill to the top of the CDO business. According to former colleagues, Ricciardi’s team cultivated managers, especially smaller firms.

Merrill exercised its leverage over the managers. A strong relationship with Merrill could be the difference between a business that thrived and one that didn’t. The more deals the banks gave a manager, the more money the manager got paid.

As the head of Merrill’s CDO business, Ricciardi also wooed managers with golf outings and dinners. One Merrill executive summed up the overall arrangement: “I’m going to make you rich. You just have to be my bitch.”

But not all managers went for it.

An executive from Trainer Wortham, a CDO manager, recalls a 2005 conversation with Ricciardi. “I wasn’t going to buy other CDOs. Chris said: ‘You don’t get it. You have got to buy other guys’ CDOs to get your deal done. That’s how it works.'” When the manager refused, Ricciardi told him, “‘That’s it. You are not going to get another deal done.'” Trainer Wortham largely withdrew from the market, concerned about the practice and the overheated prices for CDOs.

Ricciardi declined multiple requests to comment.

Merrill CDOs often bought slices of other Merrill deals. This seems to have happened more in the second half of any given year, according to ProPublica’s analysis, though the purchases were still a small portion compared to what would come later. Annual bonuses are based on the deals bankers completed by yearend.

Ricciardi left Merrill Lynch in February 2006. But the machine he put into place not only survived his departure, it became a model for competitors.

As Housing Market Wanes, Self-Dealing Takes Off
By mid-2006, the housing market was on the wane. This was particularly true for subprime mortgages, which were given to borrowers with spotty credit at higher interest rates. Subprime lenders began to fold, in what would become a mass extinction. In the first half of the year, the percentage of subprime borrowers who didn’t even make the first month’s mortgage payment tripled from the previous year.

That made CDO investors like pension funds and insurance companies increasingly nervous. If homeowners couldn’t make their mortgage payments, then the stream of cash to CDOs would dry up. Real “buyers began to shrivel and shrivel,” says Fiachra O’Driscoll, who co-ran Credit Suisse’s CDO business from 2003 to 2008.

Faced with disappearing investor demand, bankers could have wound down the lucrative business and moved on. That’s the way a market is supposed to work. Demand disappears; supply follows. But bankers were making lots of money. And they had amassed warehouses full of CDOs and other mortgage-based assets whose value was going down.

Rather than stop, bankers at Merrill, Citi, UBS and elsewhere kept making CDOs.

The question was: Who would buy them?

The top 80 percent, the less risky layers or so-called “super senior,” were held by the banks themselves. The beauty of owning that supposedly safe top portion was that it required hardly any money be held in reserve.

That left 20 percent, which the banks did not want to keep because it was riskier and required them to set aside reserves to cover any losses. Banks often sold the bottom, riskiest part to hedge funds [5]. That left the middle layer, known on Wall Street as the “mezzanine,” which was sold to new CDOs whose top 80 percent was ultimately owned by … the banks.

“As we got further into 2006, the mezzanine was going into other CDOs,” says Credit Suisse’s O’Driscoll.

This was the daisy chain [1]. On paper, the risky stuff was gone, held by new independent CDOs. In reality, however, the banks were buying their own otherwise unsellable assets.

How could something so seemingly short-sighted have happened?

It’s one of the great mysteries of the crash. Banks have fleets of risk managers to defend against just such reckless behavior. Top executives have maintained that while they suspected that the housing market was cooling, they never imagined the crash. For those doing the deals, the payoff was immediate. The dangers seemed abstract and remote.

The CDO managers played a crucial role. CDOs were so complex that even buyers had a hard time seeing exactly what was in them — making a neutral third party that much more essential.

“When you’re investing in a CDO you are very much putting your faith in the manager,” says Peter Nowell, a former London-based investor for the Royal Bank of Scotland. “The manager is choosing all the bonds that go into the CDO.” (RBS suffered mightily in the global financial meltdown, posting the largest loss in United Kingdom history, and was de facto nationalized by the British government.)

Source: Asset-Backed AlertSource: Asset-Backed Alert

By persuading managers to pick the unsold slices of CDOs, the banks helped keep the market going. “It guaranteed distribution when, quite frankly, there was not a huge market for them,” says Nowell.The counterintuitive result was that even as investors began to vanish, the mortgage CDO market more than doubled from 2005 to 2006, reaching $226 billion, according to the trade publication Asset-Backed Alert.

Citi and Merrill Hand Out Sweetheart Deals
As the CDO market grew, so did the number of CDO management firms, including many small shops that relied on a single bank for most of their business. According to Fitch, the number of CDO managers it rated rose from 89 in July 2006 to 140 in September 2007.

One CDO manager epitomized the devolution of the business, according to numerous industry insiders: a Wall Street veteran named Wing Chau.

Earlier in the decade, Chau had run the CDO department for Maxim Group, a boutique investment firm in New York. Chau had built a profitable business for Maxim based largely on his relationship with Merrill Lynch. In just a few years, Maxim had corralled more than $4 billion worth of assets under management just from Merrill CDOs.

In August 2006, Chau bolted from Maxim to start his own CDO management business, taking several colleagues with him. Chau’s departure gave Merrill, the biggest CDO producer, one more avenue for unsold inventory.

Chau named the firm Harding, after the town in New Jersey where he lived. The CDO market was starting its most profitable stretch ever, and Harding would play a big part. In an eleven-month period, ending in August 2007, Harding managed $13 billion of CDOs, including more than $5 billion from Merrill, and another nearly $5 billion from Citigroup. (Chau would later earn a measure of notoriety for a cameo appearance in Michael Lewis’ bestseller “The Big Short [7],” where he is depicted as a cheerfully feckless “go-to buyer” for Merrill Lynch’s CDO machine.)

Chau had a long-standing friendship with Ken Margolis, who was Merrill’s top CDO salesman under Ricciardi. When Ricciardi left Merrill in 2006, Margolis became a co-head of Merrill’s CDO group. He carried a genial, let’s-just-get-the-deal-done demeanor into his new position. An avid poker player, Margolis told a friend that in a previous job he had stood down a casino owner during a foreclosure negotiation after the owner had threatened to put a fork through his eye.

Chau’s close relationship with Merrill continued. In late 2006, Merrill sublet office space to Chau’s startup in the Merrill tower in Lower Manhattan’s financial district. A Merrill banker, David Moffitt, scheduled visits to Harding for prospective investors in the bank’s CDOs. “It was a nice office,” overlooking New York Harbor, recalls a CDO buyer. “But it did feel a little weird that it was Merrill’s building,” he said.

Moffitt did not respond to requests for comment.

Under Margolis, other small managers with meager track records were also suddenly handling CDOs valued at as much as $2 billion. Margolis declined to answer any questions about his own involvement in these matters.

A Wall Street Journal article [8] ($) from late 2007, one of the first of its kind, described how Margolis worked with one inexperienced CDO manager called NIR on a CDO named Norma, in the spring of that year. The Long Island-based NIR made about $1.5 million a year for managing Norma, a CDO that imploded.

“NIR’s collateral management business had arisen from efforts by Merrill Lynch to assemble a stable of captive small firms to manage its CDOs that would be beholden to Merrill Lynch on account of the business it funneled to them,” alleged a lawsuit filed in New York state court against Merrill over Norma that was settled quietly after the plaintiffs received internal Merrill documents.

NIR declined to comment.

Banks had a variety of ways to influence managers’ behavior.

Some of the few outside investors remaining in the market believed that the manager would do a better job if he owned a small slice of the CDO he was managing. That way, the manager would have more incentive to manage the investment well, since he, too, was an investor. But small management firms rarely had money to invest. Some banks solved this problem by advancing money to managers such as Harding.

Chau’s group managed two Citigroup CDOs — 888 Tactical Fund and Jupiter High-Grade VII — in which the bank loaned Harding money to buy risky pieces of the deal. The loans would be paid back out of the fees the managers took from the CDO and its investors. The loans were disclosed to investors in a few sentences among the hundreds of pages of legalese accompanying the deals.

In response to ProPublica’s questions, Chau’s lawyer said, “Harding Advisory’s dealings with investment banks were proper and fully disclosed.”

Citigroup made similar deals with other managers. The bank lent money to a manager called Vanderbilt Capital Advisors for its Armitage CDO, completed in March 2007.

Vanderbilt declined to comment. It couldn’t be learned how much money Citigroup loaned or whether it was ever repaid.

Yet again banks had masked their true stakes in CDO. Banks were lending money to CDO managers so they could buy the banks’ dodgy assets. If the managers couldn’t pay the loans back — and most were thinly capitalized — the banks were on the hook for even more losses when the CDO business collapsed.

Goldman, Merrill and Others Get Tough
When the housing market deteriorated, banks took advantage of a little-used power they had over managers.

The way CDOs are put together, there is a brief period when the bonds picked by managers sit on the banks’ balance sheets. Because the value of such assets can fall, banks reserved the right to overrule managers’ selections.

According to numerous bankers, managers and investors, banks rarely wielded that veto until late 2006, after which it became common. Merrill was in the lead.

“I would go to Merrill and tell them that I wanted to buy, say, a Citi bond,” recalls a CDO manager. “They would say ‘no.’ I would suggest a UBS bond, they would say ‘no.’ Eventually, you got the joke.” Managers could choose assets to put into their CDOs but they had to come from Merrill CDOs. One rival investment banker says Merrill treated CDO managers the way Henry Ford treated his Model T customers: You can have any color you want, as long as it’s black.

Once, Merrill’s Ken Margolis pushed a manager to buy a CDO slice for a Merrill-produced CDO called Port Jackson that was completed in the beginning of 2007: “‘You don’t have to buy the deal but you are crazy if you don’t because of your business,'” an executive at the management firm recalls Margolis telling him. “‘We have a big pipeline and only so many more mandates to give you.’ You got the message.” In other words: Take our stuff and we’ll send you more business. If not, forget it.

Margolis declined to comment on the incident.

“All the managers complained about it,” recalls O’Driscoll, the former Credit Suisse banker who competed with other investment banks to put deals together and market them. But “they were indentured slaves.” O’Driscoll recalls managers grumbling that Merrill in particular told them “what to buy and when to buy it.”

Other big CDO-producing banks quickly adopted the practice.

A little-noticed document released this year during a congressional investigation into Goldman Sachs’ CDO business reveals that bank’s thinking. The firm wrote a November 2006 internal memorandum [9] about a CDO called Timberwolf, managed by Greywolf, a small manager headed by ex-Goldman bankers. In a section headed “Reasons To Pursue,” the authors touted that “Goldman is approving every asset” that will end up in the CDO. What the bank intended to do with that approval power is clear from the memo: “We expect that a significant portion of the portfolio by closing will come from Goldman’s offerings.”

When asked to comment whether Goldman’s memo demonstrates that it had effective control over the asset selection process and that Greywolf was not in fact an independent manager, the bank responded: “Greywolf was an experienced, independent manager and made its own decisions about what reference assets to include. The securities included in Timberwolf were fully disclosed to the professional investors who invested in the transaction.”

Greywolf declined to comment. One of the investors, Basis Capital of Australia, filed a civil lawsuit in federal court in Manhattan against Goldman over the deal. The bank maintains the lawsuit is without merit.

By March 2007, the housing market’s signals were flashing red. Existing home sales plunged at the fastest rate in almost 20 years. Foreclosures were on the rise. And yet, to CDO buyer Peter Nowell’s surprise, banks continued to churn out CDOs.

“We were pulling back. We couldn’t find anything safe enough,” says Nowell. “We were amazed that April through June they were still printing deals. We thought things were over.”

Instead, the CDO machine was in overdrive. Wall Street produced $70 billion in mortgage CDOs in the first quarter of the year.

Many shareholder lawsuits battling their way through the court system today focus on this period of the CDO market. They allege that the banks were using the sales of CDOs to other CDOs to prop up prices and hide their losses.

“Citi’s CDO operations during late 2006 and 2007 functioned largely to sell CDOs to yet newer CDOs created by Citi to house them,” charges a pending shareholder lawsuit against the bank that was filed in federal court in Manhattan in February 2009. “Citigroup concocted a scheme whereby it repackaged many of these investments into other freshly-baked vehicles to avoid incurring a loss.”

Citigroup described the allegations as “irrational,” saying the bank’s executives would never knowingly take actions that would lead to “catastrophic losses.”

In the Hall of Mirrors, Myopic Rating Agencies
The portion of CDOs owned by other CDOs grew right alongside the market. What had been 5 percent of CDOs (remember the “bucket”) now came to constitute as much as 30 or 40 percent of new CDOs. (Wall Street also rolled out CDOs that were almost entirely made up of CDOs, called CDO squareds [10].)

The ever-expanding bucket provided new opportunities for incestuous trades.

It worked like this: A CDO would buy a piece of another CDO, which then returned the favor. The transactions moved both CDOs closer to completion, when bankers and managers would receive their fees.

Source: Thetica SystemsSource: Thetica Systems

ProPublica’s analysis shows that in the final two years of the business, CDOs with cross-ownership amounted to about one-fifth of the market, about $107 billion.Here’s an example from early May 2007:

  • A CDO called Jupiter VI bought a piece of a CDO called Tazlina II.
  • Tazlina II bought a piece of Jupiter VI.

Both Jupiter VI and Tazlina II were created by Merrill and were completed within a week of each other. Both were managed by small firms that did significant business with Merrill: Jupiter by Wing Chau’s Harding, and Tazlina by Terwin Advisors. Chau did not respond to questions about this deal. Terwin Advisors could not reached.

Just a few weeks earlier, CDO managers completed a comparable swap between Jupiter VI and another Merrill CDO called Forge 1.

Forge has its own intriguing history. It was the only deal done by a tiny manager of the same name based in Tampa, Fla. The firm was started less than a year earlier by several former Wall Street executives with mortgage experience. It received seed money from Bryan Zwan, who in 2001 settled an SEC civil lawsuit over his company’s accounting problems in a federal court in Florida. Zwan and Forge executives didn’t respond to requests for comment.

After seemingly coming out of nowhere, Forge won the right to manage a $1.5 billion Merrill CDO. That earned Forge a visit from the rating agency Moody’s.

“We just wanted to make sure that they actually existed,” says a former Moody’s executive. The rating agency saw that the group had an office near the airport and expertise to do the job.

Rating agencies regularly did such research on managers, but failed to ask more fundamental questions. The credit ratings agencies “did heavy, heavy due diligence on managers but they were looking for the wrong things: how you processed a ticket or how your surveillance systems worked,” says an executive at a CDO manager. “They didn’t check whether you were buying good bonds.”

One Forge employee recalled in a recent interview that he was amazed Merrill had been able to find buyers so quickly. “They were able to sell all the tranches” — slices of the CDO — “in a fairly rapid period of time,” said Rod Jensen, a former research analyst for Forge.

Forge achieved this feat because Merrill sold the slices to other CDOs, many linked to Merrill.

The ProPublica analysis shows that two Merrill CDOs, Maxim II and West Trade III, each bought pieces of Forge. Small managers oversaw both deals.

Forge, in turn, was filled with detritus from Merrill. Eighty-two percent of the CDO bonds owned by Forge came from other Merrill deals.

Citigroup did its own version of the shuffle, as these three CDOs demonstrate:

  • A CDO called Octonion bought some of Adams Square Funding II.
  • • Adams Square II bought a piece of Octonion.
  • • A third CDO, Class V Funding III, also bought some of Octonion.
  • • Octonion, in turn, bought a piece of Class V Funding III.

All of these Citi deals were completed within days of each other. Wing Chau was once again a central player. His firm managed Octonion. The other two were managed by a unit of Credit Suisse. Credit Suisse declined to comment.

Not all cross-ownership deals were consummated.

In spring 2007, Deutsche Bank was creating a CDO and found a manager that wanted to take a piece of it. The manager was overseeing a CDO that Merrill was assembling. Merrill blocked the manager from putting the Deutsche bonds into the Merrill CDO. A former Deutsche Bank banker says that when Deutsche Bank complained to Andy Phelps, a Merrill CDO executive, Phelps offered a quid pro quo: If Deutsche was willing to have the manager of its CDO buy some Merrill bonds, Merrill would stop blocking the purchase. Phelps declined to comment.

The Deutsche banker, who says its managers were independent, recalls being shocked: “We said we don’t control what people buy in their deals.” The swap didn’t happen.

The Missing Regulators and the Aftermath
In September 2007, as the market finally started to catch up with Merrill Lynch, Ken Margolis left the firm to join Wing Chau at Harding.

Chau and Margolis circulated a marketing plan for a new hedge fund to prospective investors touting their expertise in how CDOs were made and what was in them. The fund proposed to buy failed CDOs — at bargain basement prices. In the end, Margolis and Chau couldn’t make the business work and dropped the idea.

Why didn’t regulators intervene during the boom to stop the self-dealing that had permeated the CDO market?

No one agency had authority over the whole business. Since the business came and went in just a few years, it may have been too much to expect even assertive regulators to comprehend what was happening in time to stop it.

While the financial regulatory bill passed by Congress in July creates more oversight powers, it’s unclear whether regulators have sufficient tools to prevent a replay of the debacle.

In just two years, the CDO market had cut a swath of destruction. Partly because CDOs had bought so many pieces of each other, they collapsed in unison. Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, the biggest perpetrators of the self-dealing, were among the biggest losers. Merrill lost about $26 billion on mortgage CDOs and Citigroup about $34 billion.

Additional reporting by Kitty Bennett, Krista Kjellman Schmidt, Lisa Schwartz and Karen Weise.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bank of america, cdo, citi, CitiGroup, concealment, conspiracy, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, Credit Suisse, deutsche bank, Economy, goldman sachs, investigation, Merrill Lynch, racketeering, RICO, rmbs, stock, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, trade secrets, Wall Street0 Comments

CLASS ACTION AMENDED against MERSCORP to include Shareholders, DJSP

CLASS ACTION AMENDED against MERSCORP to include Shareholders, DJSP

Kenneth Eric Trent, P.A. of Broward County has amended the Class Action complaint Figueroa v. MERSCORP, Inc. et al filed on July 26, 2010 in the Southern District of Florida.

Included in the amended complaint is MERS shareholders HSBC, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Wells Fargo & Company, AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, WAMU, Countrywide, GMAC, Guaranty Bank, Merrill Lynch, Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), Norwest, Bank of America, Everhome, American Land Title, First American Title, Corinthian Mtg, MGIC Investor Svc, Nationwide Advantage, Stewart Title,  CRE Finance Council f/k/a Commercial Mortgage Securities Association, Suntrust Mortgage,  CCO Mortgage Corporation, PMI Mortgage Insurance Company, Wells Fargo and also DJS Processing which is owned by David J. Stern.

MERSCORP shareholders…HERE

[ipaper docId=36456183 access_key=key-26csq0mmgo6l8zsnw0is height=600 width=600 /]

Related article:


CLASS ACTION FILED| Figueroa v. Law Offices Of David J. Stern, P.A. and MERSCORP, Inc.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bank of america, chain in title, citimortgage, class action, concealment, CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, countrywide, djsp enterprises, fannie mae, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, forgery, Freddie Mac, HSBC, investigation, jpmorgan chase, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., lawsuit, mail fraud, mbs, Merrill Lynch, MERS, MERSCORP, mortgage, Mortgage Bankers Association, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud, non disclosure, notary fraud, note, racketeering, Real Estate, RICO, rmbs, securitization, stock, title company, trade secrets, trustee, Trusts, truth in lending act, wamu, washington mutual, wells fargo13 Comments

MERS comments on the Commission’s Proposed Rule for Asset-Backed w/ Referrals

MERS comments on the Commission’s Proposed Rule for Asset-Backed w/ Referrals


MERS was created in 1995 under the auspices of the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), as the mortgage industry’s utility, to streamline the mortgage process by using electronic commerce to eliminate paper. Our Board of Directors and shareholders are comprised of representatives from the MBA, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, large and small mortgage companies, the American Land Title Association (ALTA), the CRE Finance Council, title underwriters, and mortgage insurance companies.

Our initial focus was to eliminate the need to prepare and record assignments when trading mortgage loans. Our members make MERS the mortgagee and their nominee on the security instruments they record in the county land records. Then they register their loans on the MERS® System so they can electronically track changes in ownership over the life of the loans. This process eliminates the need to record assignments every time the loans are traded. Over 3000 MERS members have registered more than 65 million loans on the MERS® System, saving the mortgage industry hundreds of millions of dollars in the process. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA) approved MERS for government loans because they recognized the value to consumers. On table-funded loans, MERS eliminates the cost to the consumer of the mortgage assignment ($30 – $150). In addition, the MERS process ensures that lien releases are not delayed by eliminating potential breaks in the chain of title. Similar to the residential product, we also addressed the assignment problem in the commercial market with MERS® Commercial, on which is registered over $110 billion in Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) loans.

More than 60 percent of existing mortgages have an assigned MIN, making a total of 65,000,000 loans registered since the inception of the system in 1997. The corresponding data for these mortgages is tracked on the MERS® System from origination through sale and until payoff. MERS therefore offers a substantial base of historical data about existing loans that can be harnessed to bring transparency to existing MBS products. Attached are letters from the MBA, FHA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on this point.

[ipaper docId=35515524 access_key=key-vw36i36b7uiubwj5x8u height=600 width=600 /]


MERS May NOT Foreclose for Fannie Mae effective 5/1/2010


Fannie Mae’s Announcing Miscellaneous Servicing Policy Changes

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bank of america, chain in title, fannie mae, foreclosure, foreclosures, Freddie Mac, mbs, MERS, MERSCORP, Mortgage Bankers Association, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Notary, R.K. Arnold, Real Estate, robo signers, S.E.C., securitization, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, title company, Wall Street2 Comments

Bank of America’s error cost Cape Coral woman a house

Bank of America’s error cost Cape Coral woman a house

Melanie Payne • • July 22, 2010

1:10 A.M. — Nicole DePuy thought she was one of the lucky ones when she walked out of Harborside Event Center on Jan. 27 with a loan modification that would save her home from foreclosure.

After waiting hours to talk to her lender at the highly publicized event, the 40-year-old speech-language pathologist had been approved for a trial with the Home Affordable Modification Program.

Under the government-sponsored program called HAMP, DePuy’s mortgage payments were cut almost in half, dropping from $2,100 to $1,054.

And best of all, under the terms of the program, all foreclosure action would stop. The scheduled sale of DePuy’s Cape Coral home was prohibited under the terms of the agreement.

“I thought my problems were over,” DePuy said.

Nothing could be further from the truth. But DePuy didn’t know that until John Moffatt of Isla Blue Development LLC put a note on her door March 31 telling her to call about her property. Moffatt told DePuy the company he represented had purchased her home in a foreclosure sale at the courthouse.

DePuy called Bank of America to find out what happened and was told the bank had failed to notify the lawyer handling the foreclosure sale that DePuy was in the trial loan modification program.

Fort Myers attorney Robert D. Royston Jr. agreed to represent DePuy. He asked the court to set aside the sale “on the basis of the mistake by the plaintiff.”

Royston filed the contract showing the modification and the HAMP guidelines that read: “Foreclosure sales may not be conducted while the loan is being considered for a modification or during the trial period.”

The judge didn’t have an opportunity to read the pleadings.

“The judiciary is having difficulty given the volume to give the attention each case may require,” Royston said.

Because Isla Blue purchased the house fair and square, it belonged to it, the judge ruled.

Isla Blue could have kicked DePuy and her 11-year-old daughter out within days of the ruling, but she has been given until the end of the month to move.

Bank of America told me it would deal with this issue directly with DePuy. A customer advocate contacted her Tuesday, DePuy said, telling her she was looking into it.

DePuy’s story illustrates the pitfalls of homeowners going it alone when dealing with foreclosures. If DePuy had an attorney, the attorney would have seen the house was still on the foreclosure listings and taken action before the sale.

Martha Green, the executive assistant at the Home Ownership Resource Center, said that DePuy could have contacted the bank’s attorney herself and told the attorney she had worked out a modification. But going it alone, DePuy would not have known to do that.

The scary thing is that there are more than 1.2 million homeowners who have started a trial modification under the government’s “Making Home Affordable” plan. I hope it works better for them than it did for DePuy.

– For more columns and reader forums go to Write to Tell Mel at 2442 Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd., Fort Myers, 33901. Call her at 344-4772. E-mail her at tellmel@

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bank of america, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, hamp, mistake, mortgage, Mortgage Foreclosure Fraud1 Comment

FORECLOSURE GAME CHANGER? Mortgage Bond Holders Challenge Loan Servicers

FORECLOSURE GAME CHANGER? Mortgage Bond Holders Challenge Loan Servicers

Mortgage bond holders get legal edge; buybacks seen

Wed Jul 21, 2010 2:44pm EDT

By Al Yoon

NEW YORK July 21 (Reuters) – U.S. mortgage bond investors have quietly banded together to gain the long-sought power needed to challenge loan servicers over losses the investors claim resulted from violations in securities contracts.

A group holding a third of the $1.5 trillion mortgage bond market has topped the key 25 percent threshold for voting rights on 2,300 “private-label” mortgage bonds, said Talcott Franklin, a Dallas-based lawyer who is shepherding the effort.

Reaching that threshold gives holders the means to identify misrepresentations in loans, and possibly force repurchases by banks, Franklin said.

Banks are already grappling with repurchase demands from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the U.S.-backed mortgage finance giants.

The investors, which include some of the largest in the nation, claim they have been unfairly taking losses as the housing market crumbled and defaulted loans hammered their bonds. Requests to servicers that collect and distribute payments — which include big banks — to investigate loans are often referred to clauses that prohibit action by individuals, investors have said.

Since loan servicers, lenders and loan sellers sometimes are affiliated, there are conflicts of interest when asking the companies to ferret out the loans that destined their private mortgage bonds for losses, Franklin said in a July 20 letter to trustees, who act on behalf of bondholders.

“There’s a lot of smoke out there about whether these loans were properly written, and about whether the servicing is appropriate and whether recoveries are maximized” for bondholders, Franklin said in an interview.

He wouldn’t disclose his clients, but said they represent more than $500 billion in securities managed for pension funds, 401(k) plans, endowments, and governments. The securities are private mortgage bonds issued by Wall Street firms that helped trigger the worst financial crisis since the 1930s.

Franklin’s effort, using a clearinghouse model to aggregate positions, is a milestone for investors who have been unable to organize. Some have wanted to fire servicers but couldn’t gather the necessary voting rights.

“Investors have finally reached a mechanism whereby they can act collectively to enforce their contractual rights,” said one portfolio manager involved in the effort, who declined to be named. “The trustees, the people that made representations and warranties to the trust, and the servicers have taken advantage of a very fractured asset management industry to perpetuate a circle of silence around these securities.”

Laurie Goodman, a senior managing director at Amherst Securities Group in New York, said at an industry conference last week, “Reps and warranties are not enforced.”

Increased pressure from bondholders comes as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been collecting billions of dollars from lender repurchases of loans in government-backed securities. With Fannie and Freddie also big buyers of Wall Street mortgage bonds, their regulator this month used its subpoena power to seek documents and see if it could recoup losses for the two companies, which have received tens of billions in taxpayer-funded bailouts.

Some U.S. Federal Home Loan banks and at least one hedge fund are looking to force repurchases or collect for losses.

Investors are eager to scrutinize loans against reps and warranties in ways haven’t been able to before. Where 50 percent voting rights are required for an action, the investors in the clearinghouse have power in more than 900 deals.

Franklin said the investors are hoping for a cooperative effort with servicers and trustees. While he did not disclose recipients of the letter, some of the biggest trustees include Bank of New York, US Bank and Deutsche Bank.

A Bank of New York spokesman declined to say if the firm received the trustee letter. US Bancorp and Deutsche Bank spokesmen did not immediately return calls.

“You have a trustee surrounded by smoke, steadfastly claiming there is no fire, and what the letter gets to is there is fire,” the portfolio manager said. “And we are now directing you … to take these steps to put out the fire and to do so by investigating and putting loans back to the seller.”

Servicers are most likely to spot a breach of a bond’s warranty, Franklin said in the letter.

Violations could be substantial, he said. In an Ambac Assurance Corp review of 695 defaulted subprime loans sold to a mortgage trust by a servicer, nearly 80 percent broke one or more warranties, he said in the letter, citing an Ambac lawsuit against EMC Mortgage Corp.

The investors are also now empowered to scrutinize how servicers decide on either modifying a loan for a troubled borrower, or proceed with foreclosure, Franklin said. Improper foreclosures may be done to save costs of creating a loan modification, he asserted. (Editing by Leslie Adler)

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bank of america, conflict of interest, deutsche bank, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, mortgage, note, servicers, Trusts, us bank, Wall Street1 Comment

Holding Bankers’ Feet to the Fire | GRETCHEN MORGENSON

Holding Bankers’ Feet to the Fire | GRETCHEN MORGENSON

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON Published: July 16, 2010

KUDOS to the Federal Housing Finance Agency, overseer of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the crippled mortgage finance giants. While some in Washington have continued to coddle the big banks even after they drove our economy into the ditch, this agency seems serious about recovering money for taxpayers by holding bad financial actors to account.

The agency announced last Monday that it had issued 64 subpoenas to a throng of unidentified financial services institutions, seeking documents related to mortgage securities that Fannie and Freddie bought from Wall Street during the boom years.

The subpoenas are designed to tell the agency what many of us want to know: How did Wall Street package and sell private-label mortgage securities to investors, even though the nature and quality of some of the loans crammed inside those tidy little packages were, at best, suspect?

Once that question has been answered, Fannie and Freddie can force the institutions that sold the securities to repurchase the improper loans, allowing taxpayers to recover some of the losses they’ve swallowed on Fannie’s and Freddie’s federal bailout.

Investigating this aspect of the mortgage mess seems a pretty logical step for a regulator. But in the topsy-turvy world of Washington, the housing finance agency’s move is unusually aggressive. Edward J. DeMarco, its acting director, seems to be that rarity — a regulator who not only talks about looking out for the taxpayer, but actually does something about it.

The subpoenas went to companies that act as trustees for mortgage pools or that service the loans in them. The housing finance agency wants to see loan files and transaction documents related to those pools, including mortgage applications and property appraisals. Recipients of the subpoenas have 30 days to produce the requested documents. Additional subpoenas may follow, it said.

The agency had to resort to subpoenas, it said, because when it asked the institutions for the records it got nowhere for many months. “Difficulty in obtaining the loan documents has presented a challenge to the enterprises’ efforts” to ascertain whether losses at the companies are the responsibility of others, its press release said.

Fannie and Freddie bought only the highest-rated pieces of these deals, but they bought buckets of them. During 2006-7, these entities bought $294 billion of so-called private-label securities. Not all of these purchases are under scrutiny, the agency said.

It is clearly turning up the heat on the major players in mortgage servicing and securitization. Among the bigger trustees in the business are Deutsche Bank and the Bank of New York, while loan servicers include Bank of America and many more. None of the banks would confirm if they had received subpoenas.

Continue reading…The New York Times

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bank of america, bank of new york, deutsche bank, fannie mae, Freddie Mac, mbs, mortgage, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD0 Comments

15 Texans File Class action suit against Bank of America

15 Texans File Class action suit against Bank of America

By Lani Rosales on July 15, 2010 |

Here at AG, we’ve written about how Bank of America has foreclosed on homes by continuing the foreclosure process even after the home was successfully sold to a new buyer who didn’t even have a loan through Bank of America and we’ve covered how they have foreclosed on addresses they never even had a loan on despite dispute and direct correspondence.

AG columnist, Russell Shaw has remained our most vocal advocate for homeowners and agents having to battle Bank of America. His “Bank of America retard division for short sales” article that outlines the unfair, irrational and possibly illegal behavior of Bank of America remains one of the most read articles here at AG on most days, almost a year after it was originally published.

In steps the Texans

We’ve awaited the day that someone stood up to the documented abuses in a fashion that would impact Bank of America’s bottom line, and today, a group of homeowners are no longer taking it lying down. In true Texas fashion, a class action complaint was just filed and a jury trial has been demanded. Today,
the Texas Housing Justice League joins the 15 homeowners in the suit against Bank of America and its subsidiary BAC Home Loans Servicing.

Interestingly, the claim is using RESPA (Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act) as grounds for the complaint. The other eight claims are as listed below:

  • Count Two: Breach of Contract – Loan Modification Agreement
  • Count Three: Breach of Contract – Forbearance Agreement
  • Count Four: Breach of Contract-Promissory Note and Deed of Trust
  • Count Five: Violation of the Texas Property Code
  • Count Six: Breach of Oral Contract-HAMP Trial Modification
  • Count Seven: Unreasonable Collection Efforts
  • Count Eight: Intentional Misrepresentation
  • Count Nine: Texas Debt Collection Act

About the plaintiffs:

According to the Texas Housing Justice League, “Plaintiffs are and represent people who purchased their first homes between 1994 and 2006, usually with loan assistance from the Federal Housing Administration and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. Their loans were all serviced by Defendant BAC, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant Bank of America, N.A.”

They continue, by noting that “The lawsuit complains not of poor customer service by BAC, but of a systematic home loan servicing scheme that includes hours of telephone runaround, misleading and inconsistent information, lost correspondence, verbal abuse, and extensive delay, all of which have documented costs not only in terms of money, but in health. The facts in this case reveal the harsh reality that underlies the loan servicer’s press statements about loan modifications and forbearance agreements following collapse of the U.S. housing market.”

A suitable summary of the suit:

Denver Realtor, Kristal Kraft says, “In the interest of time, I will now use only the keywords describing the gripes against Bank of America as accused by the Texas Homeowners.

Scheme, misleading, inconsistent, lost correspondence, verbal abuse, extensive delay, money, health, harsh, shuffled, no resolution, dysfunctional, barrage of misinformation, misdirection, deliberate inactivity, abuse, harassment, yo-yo. blocked at every turn, labyrinth of transfers, hundreds of hours on the telephone, transferred, never speak to same person again, contradictions, complaints meet with resistance, no supervisors available, unaccountable departments, asked to sign same documents three, four or even five times, negotiators who would not return telephone calls, not isolated incidents, pattern and practice by Bank of America.’

What will happen next?

One of the Plaintiff’s lawyers, Robert Doggett said on, “It would be hard to imagine that Bank of America and BAC will fight the facts of the case; the question will likely be whether they can get away with it. The servicer will likely claim that poor “customer service” is something that must be accepted like a slow waiter or a bad movie. The difference is of course that homeowners are not merely customers that should expect to be mistreated and lied to — homeowners have a contract with the holder of their home loan and these servicers are the agents for the holder — and moreover, servicing a home loan is not in the realm of someone forgetting your fries or being tricked into seeing Gigli.”

For the full claim, click here.

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© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bank of america, class action, respa, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, Violations6 Comments

CLASS ACTION Amended complaint against Countrywide et al Involving $350 Billion of Mortgage-Backed Securities

CLASS ACTION Amended complaint against Countrywide et al Involving $350 Billion of Mortgage-Backed Securities

Other defendants in the case, aside from Countrywide, several of its former top executives, and Bank of America, include 16 underwriters of more than $350 billion in Countrywide securities, among them J.P. Morgan, Deutsche Bank, Bear Stearns, UBS, Morgan Stanley, Edward Jones, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse.

July 15, 2010, 8:00 a.m.

False and Misleading Offering Documents Detailed in Class Action Lawsuit Against Countrywide Financial

Cohen Milstein Files Amended Consolidated Complaint in Case Involving $350 Billion of Mortgage-Backed Securities

WASHINGTON, July 15, 2010 /PRNewswire via COMTEX/ — Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC filed an Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint this week in its landmark litigation against Countrywide Financial Corporation and other underwriter defendants who were prominently involved in the failure of mortgage-backed securities over the last several years.

Countrywide, since acquired by Bank of America, was one of the largest and most controversial institutions involved in mortgage-backed securities. Other defendants in the case, aside from Countrywide, several of its former top executives, and Bank of America, include 16 underwriters of more than $350 billion in Countrywide securities, among them J.P. Morgan, Deutsche Bank, Bear Stearns, UBS, Morgan Stanley, Edward Jones, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse.

Cohen Milstein is Lead Counsel for the Class and Counsel for the Lead Plaintiff, the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System, as well as the Oregon Public Employees’ Retirement System and Orange County Employees’ Retirement System. The General Board of Pension and Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church is also named as a plaintiff in the litigation.

“Amidst all this high finance, it’s too easy to lose sight of the fact that pension funds invested heavily in these mortgage-backed securities and so retirees are the real victims here,” commented Steve Toll, Managing Partner at Cohen Milstein and co-chair of its Securities Fraud/Investor Protection practice group.

In the amended complaint, the Plaintiffs further buttress their allegation that the defendants published false and misleading offering documents, including registration statements, prospectuses, and prospectus supplements. Specifically, these documents misrepresented or failed to disclose that underwriting guidelines for the mortgages backing the securities had been systematically disregarded.

According to the lawsuit, from 2005 through 2007 Countrywide was the nation’s largest residential mortgage lender, originating in excess of $850 billion in home loans throughout the United States in 2005 and 2006 alone. Countrywide’s ability to originate residential mortgages on such a massive scale was facilitated, in large part, by its ability to rapidly package or securitize those loans and then, through the activities of the underwriter defendants, sell them to investors as purportedly investment grade mortgage-backed securities.

In order to generate a steady flow of mortgage loans to sustain this mass production of mortgage-backed securities, Countrywide routinely issued loans to borrowers who otherwise would never have qualified for them – and indeed, did not qualify for the loans they received — through, for example, “low doc” and “no doc” loan programs, often with adjustable interest rates that had been designed for borrowers with higher incomes and better credit.

Upon pooling these mortgages and issuing them as MBS certificates, over 92% received the very highest, investment-grade ratings from rating agencies; ultimately, however, 87% were downgraded to junk. Tellingly, one year after the date of the certificate offerings, delinquency and default rates on the underlying mortgages had increased 2,525% from issuance. In explaining such an unprecedented collapse in ratings on these certificates in 2008 and 2009, the rating agencies noted that they were forced to change their models because of previously undisclosed and systematic “aggressive underwriting” practices used to originate the mortgage loan collateral. Along with the exponential increases in delinquency and default rates of the underlying mortgages and the collapse of the certificates’ ratings, the value of the certificates plummeted.

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that the Defendants’ actions violated Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, legislation, still on the books, originally enacted in response to similar abuses that led to the Great Depression.

The Countrywide case is pending before Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.

Cohen Milstein has been named lead or co-lead counsel by courts in eight of the most significant mortgage-backed securities cases currently being litigated, including Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual as well as Countrywide.

Docket No. 2:10-CV-00302

SOURCE Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC

Copyright (C) 2010 PR Newswire. All rights reserved

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bank of america, CitiGroup, class action, lawsuit, mbs, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

Could New Filing Persuade Judge Waddoups to Set Aside Restraining Order on Bank of America Utah Foreclosures and Remand Case to State Court?

Could New Filing Persuade Judge Waddoups to Set Aside Restraining Order on Bank of America Utah Foreclosures and Remand Case to State Court?

My friends with the latest articles I posted…take note momentum is starting to build!

(Salt Lake City, UT) – The Bank of America’s motion for dismissal filed July 2, 2010 in US District Court of Utah may have opened the way for Judge Clark Waddoups to set aside his order halting foreclosures in Utah by ReconTrust Company and remand the case to state court. Attorneys John Christian Barlow and E. Craig Smay, in their plaintiff’s response filed Friday, July 8, 2010 say “the defendant’s motion to dismiss re-opens the issue of preemption of State law which previously arose in the analysis of the courts jurisdiction. There, the court analyzed and relied upon the wrong statute, producing an erroneous conclusion of preemption. That conclusion should now be corrected,” the attorneys said.

“The defendant’s motion to dismiss is based upon claims the plaintiff lacked a cause of action under Utah Code §16-10a-1501 and 57-1-21 addresses an issue not in dispute,” Barlow said. “ReconTrust Company is permitted to serve as trustee in Utah, but the company is still required to register and have offices in the state along with its competitor state banks, and may not foreclose non-judicially,” according to Barlow and Smay. “Bank of America’s motion to dismiss serves to more clearly show the federal court lacks jurisdiction to set aside the restraining order previously issued by the state court,” Barlow said. The Plaintiff filing cites the federal court’s own decision denying federal jurisdiction. (Jensen-ReconTrust)

The attorneys conclude “the motion by the defendant to dismiss must be denied and the prior order setting aside the state court injunction should be withdrawn and the matter remanded to the state court.”

While, the judge ponders his response to the filing, the plaintiff has moved the case to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver (Appeal) The Bank of America has become the symbol of what’s wrong in America where homeowners (taxpayers) want less federal control and more accountability. The plaintiff Peni Cox has become a symbol of homeowners everywhere caught in the financial meltdown fighting faceless – paperless financial giants of Wall Street and their legal brain trusts.

Shareholders and mortgage investment portfolio managers are beginning to quietly caution banks about their foreclosure policies. Most of the financial institutions with foreclosures have received TARP TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) was designed to get so-called toxic assets off the books of major banks. These assets included mortgage-backed securities deemed impossible to value. Because banks could not buy and sell these securities, they were becoming increasingly illiquid, and a credit crunch began to emerge as lending between banks ground to a halt. TARP funds were utilized to purchase these assets, injecting banks with liquidity.

Barlow continues to champion his client’s rights contending remedies were taken away from her by faceless lenders who continue to overwhelm homeowners and the judicial system with motions and petitions as remedies instead of actually making a good-faith effort in face-to-face negotiations to help homeowners. “Mortgage lenders are required by law to be registered and have offices in the State of Utah to do business, that is unless you’re the Bank of America or one of their subsidiary companies which apparently are above the law in Utah,” Barlow said. “The Bank of America and other financial institutions, under the guise of mortgage lenders are trampling the rights of citizens,” he said.

Bank of America acquired the bankrupt Countrywide Home Loan portfolio in a stock deal June 3, 2009. And, according to the ReconTrust, the bank has over 1162 Utah homeowners in foreclosure as of July 10, 2010.

Next week KCSG News will report on Utah court cases in which the plaintiffs (homeowners) claim neither the lender, MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration System), nor the Bank of America, nor any other defendant in the case, has any remaining interest in the mortgage promissory note bundled with other notes and sold as mortgage-backed securities or otherwise assigned and split from the Trust Deed. Last month the Florida Supreme Court issued a ruling protecting homeowners from losing their homes to foreclosure mills hired by the lenders to foreclose using bogus documents created for lenders in which the lender had no secured interest. Similar cases are now making there way through Utah courts.

[ipaper docId=34223163 access_key=key-2d2jn90yuahi4thp408k height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bank of america, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosure mills, foreclosures, MERS, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., Real Estate, Recontrust, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, tarp funds, TRO0 Comments

Contact 13 investigates Bank of America customer’s frustrations with short sales

Contact 13 investigates Bank of America customer’s frustrations with short sales

Nothing has changed…

“And they’re trying to keep folks from walking away” Listen to this interview and his answers…Like he makes any sense…blame the fax system for lost documents and negotiators…and welcome EQUATOR.

THE TRUTH is while they were developing this “EQUATION” you were put on the burner. Simple as 123.

Who trusts loading up very personal information into a system to where it ends up?? eg: social security numbers?

Posted: Jul 01, 2010 4:32 PM EDT Updated: Jul 02, 2010 5:14 AM EDT

Las Vegas, NV (KTNV) – Weeks after our Contact 13 investigation into Bank of America we have uncovered a new wave of problems hitting Valley homeowners.

“It’s just frustrating and I don’t think they’re doing anything,” says homeowner Todd Lanquist.

“And when they would get rude with me I’d say, look, put yourself in my shoes. I said don’t think for one minute because you’re on the other end of the phone that it can’t happen to you,” adds homeowner Sherry Eggler. “I want it over with! And I want us to be left alone and get on with our lives.”

Todd and Sherry are both Bank of America homeowners who’ve tried to short sell their homes.

For Todd, “It’s probably the most stressful thing that I’ve dealt with in my lifetime.”

A short sale is when your home is worth less than the remaining value of your mortgage. It’s what you do to avoid foreclosure when even a loan modification won’t keep you in your home.

“Short sales are probably 70% of the listings out there right now,” explains realtor James Allen.

And with Bank of America holding one in three Nevada mortgages, the servicing giant is at the center of a firestorm of criticism over the short sale process.

We read some of your e-mails to Bank of America’s senior vice president in charge of short sales.

“And this person says “Bank of America acts with reckless abandon and extraordinary incompetence when it comes to short sales.” What do you say to that customer,” asked Contact 13 Chief Investigator Darcy Spears.

“I would refute that to the degree that we’re very proud of the work that our team does on behalf of Bank of America and our customers and ultimately the investors,” answered Bank of America’s Matt Vernon. “Certainly there have been some challenges in the past. But with that said, we’re very focused on an efficient process.”

Sherry Eggler says the process is anything but efficient. She and her husband, Freddie, moved here from Georgia to build the home they intended to retire in. But when the economy tanked and their retirement savings went with it, they knew they’d have to give up their dream.

“It hurt. It hurt,” says Sherry, trying hard to hold back tears.

When the loan modification Bank of America offered wouldn’t save them enough money, Sherry says the bank advised a short sale.

But all that did, she says, was put their lives on hold.

“The realtor would call and say, oh Sherry, they need copies of your W-2s again, they need bank copies again, they need this again. I must have done that 10 times and finally I said you know what? No more!”

So what is the root of the problem?

“There’s too many hands in the pot,” says Sherry. “Too many chefs in the kitchen.”

Bogging down the process for so long that she says they lost a buyer willing to pay the set price.

“They must have waited three-four months, five months, and they kept assigning new negotiators. And that is so stupid because they shot their own self in the foot.”

And through it all, there was the constant threat of foreclosure.

“They keep telling me, making threats that our house is gonna be sold on the court doorstep.”

We took her concerns to Bank of America.

“There is a mountain of frustration among our Las Vegas viewing population with what’s going on with B of A short sales,” Spears told Matt Vernon.

And when we asked why there are so many hands in the cookie jar, he said there were too many homes in the short sale process.

“And because of that growth in the business, it often required multiple hand-offs. We recognize that that’s not beneficial to the transaction and are committed to limiting those hand-offs so there is continuity throughout the process.”

All of it too late for Sherry Eggler.

“One time I think I did say that well, if this keeps up I think we just need to get an attorney.”

That’s what Todd Lanquist did after he says the bank’s foot-dragging cost him several potential buyers.

“It’s my fear. Losing my house.”

He says he’s having to sue for the right to sell.

“And that’s just absurd. Absolutely absurd. If it’s a fair sale at a fair price, the bank should be held to it,” says Matthew Callister, Todd’s lawyer.

Realtor James Allen calls B of A the worst of corporate America coming to the surface.

“It’s a red flag. Some agents will not write an offer on a B of A short sale, which is basically hurting us all across the board.”

“And if they don’t learn from this,” Sherry says, “then I don’t know what it would take. They just have some serious, serious inside issues.”

“In no way shape or form are we in that optimal state, but we have vastly improved and we expect to continue to improve,” Vernon says.

We’ll be watching to see if Bank of America does improve. Remember, if you have a problem with a short sale, loan modification or any housing-related matter, Bank of America has opened two resource centers: one in Las Vegas and one in Henderson.

Bank of America resource centers
Henderson resource center
2285 Corporate Circle Suite 100
Call 1 – 877 – 345 – 6416

Las Vegas resource center
6900 Westcliff
Second floor
10 am – 7pm M – F
10am – 2pm Sat
Here is what you need to bring to the appointment:
-Copy of most recently filed tax return for each borrower.
– Copy of two most recent pay stubs covering 30 days or documentation of other income (e.g., Social Security, Disability, Unemployment, public assistance).
– Copy of most recent profit/loss statement (if self-employed).
– Alimony, child support or separation maintenance supporting documentation.
– For rental income, most recent two years’ filed federal tax returns, including schedule E.
– Copy of homeowner’s insurance bill and most recent property tax bill (if not paid through Bank of America).

We should also note that Bank of America says they completed 10,000 short sales nationwide in the month of June the most in their history.

They remind homeowners that the short sale process is primarily investor driven and Bank of America approves a short sale subject to investor approval.

Source: C13 News Las Vegas

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Posted in bank of america, foreclosure, foreclosures, short sale, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD2 Comments

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