House Bill 87 | FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA

Search Results | house bill 87

S.1187: Mortgage Forgiveness Tax Relief Act and Very Big Deal | AFR Sign On Letter Tax Relief Act

S.1187: Mortgage Forgiveness Tax Relief Act and Very Big Deal | AFR Sign On Letter Tax Relief Act

Hi Damian

I’ve attached a pretty powerful letter that was sent to Congress last week by Americans for Financial Reform on behalf of just about everybody in the country, according to the multiple signature pages. It urges quick action by legislators to extend and expand the mortgage debt tax relief provisions that expired at 12/31/2013. I hope you can post it.

Also, in case you think your readers might want to weigh in themselves, here’s a link to a website where they can track bills and quickly send letters of support or opposition directly to their elected representatives.
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/s1187-113/show

Surfing this site and reading the personalized letters suggests there was deliberate delay by various lenders in processing all sorts of pipeline deals before year-end (short sales, mods, refis). Therefore it looks like a lot of borrowers got stuck in a very bad tax place for 2014 through no fault of their own.

Just FYI, right now, this mortgage debt relief provision is also included in the more comprehensive “tax extenders” bill, S 1859 (also tabled), with about 50 other tax provisions that expired at 12/31/2013. Those are the provisions that Ron Wyden wants to work on with Orrin Hatch (Senate Finance Committee) this “spring.” But even if they can get the House to go along (Paul Ryan et al), it’s not clear which of the 50+ “extenders” will survive in a version that might become law.

To make those decisions, legislators will be paying close attention to the letters they get from constituents and funders, starting right about now. That’s because everything on the Hill will pretty much grind to a halt mid-summer until after the mid-term elections. After that, what will happen is anyone’s guess.

By the way, there’s been a lot of misinformation about who will get hit with big tax bills if the relief doesn’t get extended for 2014. Folks who truly have nothing will likely NOT be in trouble because they are “insolvent” for both IRS and Chapter 7 Br purposes.

But here’s the danger – Anyone who is still hanging on is probably not destitute. These folks probably have wages and/or assets that are vulnerable at some level to either the IRS or the Bankruptcy Court. So there may be no way out for them unless Congress acts.

For example, older workers who have qualified retirement plan savings (IRAs 401s 457s, etc) could lose them because they are not off-limits to the IRS the same way as they would be for bankruptcy. They might even have to pay big early withdrawal penalties if those savings have to be used to pay the IRS.

The attached letter explains how younger families who took cash-out refis during the boom are also vulnerable.

Down Load PDF of This Case

© 2010-13 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD0 Comments

Onewest Bank, FSB v Dewer | NYSC – MERS Assignment/Note Fail, Charles Boyle Affidavit Fail, FDIC, as the receiver for IndyMac to OneWest Bill of Sale Fail

Onewest Bank, FSB v Dewer | NYSC – MERS Assignment/Note Fail, Charles Boyle Affidavit Fail, FDIC, as the receiver for IndyMac to OneWest Bill of Sale Fail

NEW YORK SUPREME COURT – QUEENS COUNTY

ONEWEST BANK, FSB,
Plaintiff,

-against-

YVONNE G. DEWER, ET AL.,
Defendants.

Plaintiff commenced this action on September 10, 2010 to reform and foreclose a
mortgage encumbering the real property known as 119-22 Inwood Street, Jamaica, New York
given by defendants Dewer as security for the payment of a note, evidencing an obligation
in the principal amount of $403,750.00 plus interest. The mortgage names IndyMac Bank,
F.S.B. (IndyMac), as the lender and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS),
as the nominee for the lender and the lender’s successors and assigns, and as the mortgagee
of record for the purpose of recording the mortgage. Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that
it is the holder of the note and subject mortgage, and that defendants Dewer defaulted under
the terms of the mortgage and note, and as a consequence, it elected to accelerate the entire
mortgage debt. It also alleged that, due to a clerical error, the mortgage was recorded without
a legal description included, and the legal description corresponding to the address of the
property should be incorporated into the mortgage nunc pro tunc.

Defendants Dewer served a combined answer, asserting various affirmative defenses,
including lack of standing, and interposing counterclaims. Plaintiff served a reply to the
counterclaims. Plaintiff did not cause defendants “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” to be served
with process because plaintiff determined that they are unnecessary party defendants.
That branch of the motion by plaintiff for leave to amend the caption deleting
reference to defendants “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” is granted.

It is ORDERED that the caption shall read as follows:

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
QUEENS COUNTY
—————————————————————
ONEWEST BANK, FSB, Index No. 23000 2010
Plaintiff,

-against-

YVONNE G. DEWER, BRIAN K. DEWER, and
ELIZABETH DEWER,
Defendants.
—————————————————————-

It is well established that the proponent of a summary judgment motion “must make
a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient
evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact” (Alvarez v
Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York,
49 NY2d 557 [1980]). To establish a prima facie case in an action to foreclose a mortgage,
the plaintiff must produce the mortgage, the unpaid note, bond or obligation and evidence
of default (see Baron Assoc., LLC v Garcia Group Enters., Inc., 96 AD3d 793 [2d Dept
2012]; Citibank, N.A. v Van Brunt Props., LLC, 95 AD3d 1158 [2d Dept 2012]). Where
standing is put into issue by the defendant, the plaintiff must prove its standing in order to
be entitled to relief (see Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v Haller, 100 AD3d 680 [2d Dept
2012]; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752, 753 [2d Dept 2009]; Wells Fargo Bank
Minn., N.A. v Mastropaolo, 42 AD3d 239, 242 [2d Dept 2007]). A plaintiff establishes its
standing in a mortgage foreclosure action by demonstrating that it is both the holder or
assignee of the subject mortgage and the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time
the action is commenced (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Rivas, 95 AD3d 1061,
1061-1062 [2d Dept 2012]; Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg, 86 AD3d 274, 279 [2d Dept 2011];
see Homecomings Fin., LLC v Guldi, 108 AD3d 506 [2d Dept 2013]; US Bank N.A. v Cange,
96 AD3d 825, 826 [2d Dept 2012]; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d at 753-754;
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Gress, 68 AD3d 709 [2d Dept 2009]). “Either a written
assignment of the underlying note or the physical delivery of the note prior to the
commencement of the foreclosure action is sufficient to transfer the obligation, and the
mortgage passes with the debt as an inseparable incident” (U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore,
68 AD3d at 754; see HSBC Bank USA v Hernandez, 92 AD3d 843 [2d Dept 2012]; see
Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Weisblum, 85 AD3d 95, 108 [2d Dept 2011]).

In support of that branch of the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff offers, among
other things, a copy of the pleadings, affidavits of service upon defendants Dewer, an
affirmation of regularity by its counsel, a copy of the subject mortgage, underlying note, an
assignment dated August 26, 2010, and the bill of sale providing for the sale of certain assets
of IndyMac by the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC), as the receiver for IndyMac
to plaintiff, and an affidavit dated June 21, 2013 of Charles Boyle, an officer of plaintiff. In
his affidavit, Mr. Boyle states plaintiff is the holder and in possession of the original note,
and that plaintiff is the assignee of the “security instrument” for the loan, and defendants
Dewer defaulted in paying the monthly mortgage installment due under the mortgage on
June 1, 2009 and thereafter. The copy of the note presented includes an undated endorsement
in blank, without recourse, by Vincent Dombrowski, as the vice president of IndyMac.

Defendants Dewer oppose the motion, asserting that plaintiff has failed to make a
prima facie showing of standing to commence this action.

To the extent plaintiff contends it is the assignee of the mortgage and note by virtue
of an assignment executed by MERS, plaintiff has failed to show MERS had been the holder
of the note and mortgage, or that MERS had been given an interest in the underlying note by
the lender or specifically authorized to assign the subject note (see Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg,
86 AD3d at 283). In addition, although Mr. Boyle makes reference to the possession of the
note by plaintiff, his affidavit does not give any factual details of a physical delivery of the
note and when the note was endorsed in blank (see Homecomings Fin., LLC v Guldi,
108 AD3d 506 [2d Dept 2013]; HSBC Bank USA v Hernandez, 92 AD3d 843). The
affirmation of plaintiff’s counsel dated July 10, 2013, furthermore, does not indicate it is
based upon personal knowledge and lacks detail as to when the note was endorsed and
physically came into possession by plaintiff. That a copy of the note with the endorsement
was annexed as an exhibit to the complaint filed with the summons does not, without more,
establish that the original note with the endorsement was in physical possession of plaintiff
or its counsel at the time of the institution of the action. To the extent plaintiff additionally
relies upon the bill of sale to demonstrate it had standing to bring this action, the court
declines its invitation to search the internet to verify that the subject mortgage was part of the
assets sold by the FDIC to plaintiff. More importantly, the copy of the bill 1 of sale does not
itself establish that plaintiff was the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and note or
had physical possession of the note endorsed in blank at the time of the transfer of the assets
by the FDIC to plaintiff or the time of the commencement of this action (cf. JP Morgan
Chase Bank Nat. Assn. v Miodownik, 91 AD3d 546 [1st Dept 2012], lv to appeal dismissed
19 NY3d 1017 [2012]; JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Shapiro, 104 AD3d 411, 412
[1st Dept 2013]). Under such circumstances, plaintiff has failed to show how or when it
became the lawful holder of the note either by delivery or valid assignment of the note to it
(see Citimortgage, Inc. v Stosel, 89 AD3d 887, 888 [2d Dept 2011]; Bank of N.Y. v
Silverberg, 86 AD3d at 283). As such, that branch of the motion by plaintiff for summary
judgment against defendants Dewer is denied.

With respect to that branch of the motion by plaintiff to strike the affirmative defenses
asserted by defendants Dewer in their answer, plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating
that the defenses are without merit as a matter of law (see Butler v Catinella, 58 AD3d 145,
157-148 [2d Dept 2008]; Vita v New York Waste Servs., LLC, 34 AD3d 559, 559 [2d Dept
2006]).

With respect to the first affirmative defense and the first counterclaim asserted by
defendants Dewer in their answer, defendants Dewer assert they are entitled to rescind the
loan agreement pursuant the Federal Truth in Lending Act (15 USC § 1601 et seq.) (TILA),
and the TILA implementing regulations (found in Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z
[Regulation Z] at 12 CFR 226), and seek to recover actual and statutory damages for
violations of TILA, in addition to rescission. Defendants Dewer also seek as a second and
third counterclaim a judgment declaring the subject mortgage to be void. Plaintiff offers
evidence that the subject loan transaction was exempt from the requirements of TILA at the
time of the making of the loan because the non-exempt total points and fees charged in
relation to the loan did not exceed 8% of the entire principal loan amount (see
former 15 USC § 1602 [aa] [1] [B]; see also 15 USC § 1605 [e]; 12 CFR 226.4). In addition,
plaintiff offers evidence that it provided the required material disclosures to defendants
Dewer in compliance with TILA at the closing and, therefore, any right to rescind was not
extended to three years after the date of the consummation of the transaction
(see 15 USC § 1635 [f]). Defendants Dewer have failed to come forward with any proof to
show TILA was applicable to the subject loan at the time of its making, or that any material
written representations or disclosures made to them were in conflict with the terms of the
subject mortgage and note. Under such circumstances, that branch of the motion by plaintiff
to dismiss the first affirmative defense and the counterclaims asserted by defendants Dewer
is granted.

That branch of the motion by plaintiff to dismiss the second affirmative defense
asserted by defendants Dewer in their answer based upon failure to state a cause of action is
granted. On its face, the complaint states causes of action for foreclosure and reformation
of the mortgage.

That branch of the motion by plaintiff to dismiss the third, fourth, fifth, twelfth,
thirteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth affirmative defenses based upon unjust enrichment,
estoppel, “condonation and ratification,” the doctrine of unclean hands, waiver, “consent to
Defendants’ conduct,” and participation in wrongdoing, respectively, is granted. They have
failed to allege or prove any facts supporting these conclusions of law (see Moran
Enterprises, Inc. v Hurst, 96 AD3d 914 [2d Dept 2012]; Glenesk v Guidance Realty Corp.,
36 AD2d 852 [2d Dept 1971], abrogated on other grounds by Butler v Catinella,
58 AD3d 145; MacIver v George Braziller, Inc., 32 Misc 2d 477 [Sup Ct, NY County 1961];
CPLR 3018 [b]).

That branch of the motion by plaintiff to dismiss the seventh, eighth, ninth and
eighteenth affirmative defenses of defendants Dewer based upon negligence and assumption
of risk, culpable conduct of third parties and plaintiff, and lack of proximate cause,
respectively, is granted. The concepts of negligence, assumption of risk, culpable conduct
and proximate cause are related to tort. The claims asserted by plaintiff herein relate to a
default under the mortgage and reformation of the mortgage, as opposed to tortious conduct
and thus, any affirmative defense based upon a notion of culpable or tortious conduct
is unavailable herein (see CPLR 1401; Pilweski v Solymosy, 266 AD2d 83 [1st Dept 1999];
Nastro Contracting Inc. v Agusta, 217 AD2d 874 [3d Dept 1995]; Schmidt’s Wholesale, Inc.
v Miller & Lehman Const., Inc., 173 AD2d 1004 [3d Dept 1991]; Castleton Holding Corp.
v Forde, 15 Misc 3d 1111[A] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2007]).

The branch of the motion by plaintiff to dismiss the sixth, fifteenth, sixteenth and
seventeenth affirmative defenses asserted by defendants Dewer is granted. These defenses
are based upon allegations that plaintiff failed to exercise good business judgment,
unjustifiably relied on representations and misrepresentations, and failed to perform due
diligence and make proper inquiry. Such allegations, without more, do not constitute a
defense to a foreclosure action. The legal relationship between a borrower and a lending
bank is normally one of debtor and creditor (see Trustco Bank, Nat. Assn. v Cannon Bldg.
of Troy Assocs., 246 AD2d 797 [3d Dept 1998]), and defendants Dewer have failed to allege
any facts which would demonstrate that a duty of care was owed to them by the lender in the
origination of the loan.

That branch of the motion by plaintiff to dismiss the tenth and fourteenth affirmative
defenses asserted by defendants Dewer based upon failure to mitigate damages and lack of
damages is granted. Mitigation of damages is not an affirmative defense to an action to
foreclose a mortgage. Any dispute as to the exact amount owed plaintiff pursuant to the
mortgage and note, may be resolved after a reference pursuant to RPAPL § 1321 (see
Crest/Good Mfg. Co, v Baumann, 160 AD2d 831 [2d Dept 1990]).

Defendants Dewer assert as an eleventh affirmative defense that plaintiff is guilty of
laches in bringing this action. Laches is not a defense to a mortgage foreclosure proceeding
where, as here, the action was commenced within the statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [4];
see New York State Mtge. Loan Enforcement & Admin. Corp. v North Town Phase II Houses,
Inc., 191 AD2d 151 [1st Dept 1993]; Schmidt’s Wholesale, Inc. v Miller & Lehman Const.,
Inc., 173 AD2d 1004 [3d Dept 1991]). Even if the defense was available here, defendants
Dewer have not shown that they changed their position, or failed to take some action to their
prejudice as a result of the alleged delay.

The allegation that plaintiff suffered no damage because it was insolvent does not
constitute an affirmative defense to a foreclosure action. That branch of the motion by
plaintiff to dismiss the twenty-first affirmative defense asserted by defendants Dewer is
granted.

That branch of the motion by plaintiff to dismiss the twenty-second affirmative
defense asserted by defendants Dewer based upon lack of standing is denied (supra at 3-4).

Accordingly, the branch of plaintiff’s motion for an order amending the caption is
granted, as ordered, supra. The branch of the motion for an order granting plaintiff summary
judgment is denied. Those branches of the motion for an order dismissing the first, second,
third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth,
fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, and twentyfirst
affirmative defenses, and all counterclaims are granted.

Dated: February 6, 2014
J.S.C.

Down Load PDF of This Case

© 2010-13 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

This is the Story of a botch Mello Roos Offering, the first for the City of Indio

This is the Story of a botch Mello Roos Offering, the first for the City of Indio

CROSS POSTED w/ PERMISSION Of Terralago Mello Roos -

Indio CFD 2004-3


This is the Story of a botch Mello Roos Offering, the first for the City of Indio.

Indio Community Facilities District (CFD) 2004-3 is a Mello Roos Tax District issued by The City of Indio California, and it was their very first.  An Intro to Mello Roos Tax Districts


Mello Roos Tax is an extra tax that a City may place on new development and the City gets say $26.3 million and splits it with the Developer.

Here they took $26.3 million, and used it for things that did not help the development.

It was 98% completed.

It was used to help another undeveloped area.

It was used to help the Indio Water Authority build its own infrastructure.

But should the undeveloped area pay it back?  


The City says no.

That does not pass the smell test.  Why would the City do that?  

Rooftops, yes they want homes in Indio.

They now have a new developer and have worked out a secret deal which uses Area 1 money as credits for the new developer to build.

The builder will have no Mello Roos Tax.  
The houses will sell for $70,000 more without the Mello Roos Tax.  

Won’t that hurt Area 1 home sales?  

Yes, that is why the fight.

 

by K. Hovnanian’s® Four Seasons at Terra Lago
New homes coming soon
 

K. Hovnanian’s Four Seasons at Terra Lago in Indio is our newest upcoming community for those 55 and better! This brand new collection of homes at Terra Lago will feature single family homes up to approximately 2,747 square feet and up to 4 bedrooms. These open home designs feature spacious living areas perfect for functional living. K. Hovnanian’s Four Seasons is known for its resort-style living, and that’s just what you’ll find at The Lodge clubhouse. Here you will experience incredible amenities such as a state-of-the-art fitness center with an aerobics/yoga studio, ballroom, beauty salon with massage room, and an indoor pool. Outdoors, you will find a resort-style pool with spa and cabanas, a bocce ball court, tennis courts, and so much more! This active adult community features fun activities, clubs and events for all of your interests including crafting, games, and more. Join our VIP Interest list to be among the first to receive updates on this exciting new community and start planning your move now! Call 888-408-6590! less

How is that possible?

The City issues a bond for the money and future residents or homeowners, who move in pay back the money over 30 years.

It is not easy to understand.

If there is a missed payment then the City can sell their house.

I forgot to mention, the Developer/landowner votes for the tax before they meet you.

It is hard to understand.  When questioned by Area 1 home owners the City says.  You signed the paper. Desert Sun February 4, 2014 by Tatiana Sanchez

I guess investors signed Bernie Madoff’s papers acknowledging they may loose money, but is it legal?

Why did this confusing tax happen in the first place?

It was created because California Proposition 13 limited property tax to 1%.  Proposition 13 and Mello Roos Taxes

So California Cities needed money, and the California Government passed the Mello Roos Act in 1986.  The Mello Roos Code CA Government Code 53311 – 53368

This allows Developers and a City uses their tax exempt status to help issue bonds and every deal is done behind closed doors, and there is no oversight.  

None? 

No None!  


Is there a Mello Roos Police?  No and believe you me I have begged for help to expose the problem.

No one other than the lawyers who make money from it who understand it.  

Sounds like that should change.  

I am trying, but I need help.  All work done for free because it is right to do it.     THE PETITION TO CHANGE THE RATE AND METHOD OF THE TAX


The Idea for the City (“ME”) to have instant money in their pockets and have future residents pay the bill over 30 years is appealing.  To the City and Developer.

So what happened here?

It is really bad, and it would take a long to explain it.

So read this:  The Petition to Amend CFD 2004-3 Rate Method and Apportionment (“RMA”)

If that interests you there is much more.

What happened here is really unfair, and the City appears to have mismanaged $26.3 million. 

 You mean they did not follow the rules?  

YesCFD 2004-3 Formation Issues.

 

 

Luckily the property owners woke up in time before there was another shady dealing, and the City says “Trust Me”.  Letters to City for to help Area 1 homeowners

If you look at the map of Indio below, only 1 community pays $360.00 per month for 30 years.  Or for that matter any Mello Roos Tax.

It paid for Wyndham Resorts Water problems and $9 million for others.  

Certainly someone wants to pay them back.  Don’t They?  I mean it is only fair.

But who owns the properties?

 Rabobank Na.A. in one of their various Limited Liability Companies
RB Indio Holdings, LLC or RB Terra Lago or even another with the builder K-Hovanian.

But they should be able to afford to pay more than the homeowners, shouldn’t they as they are a Bank and a major developer.

I guess we will see.
Area 1 Red – Area 2 Green -Wyndham Top

 

 


AREA 1 HOMEOWNERS PAY $360.00 PER MONTH FOR 30 YEARS AND ALL THE STREETS ARE PRIVATE.


98% of the infrastructures were in by the September 2005 $26.3 million funding.

And whats worse, there are also 110 lots owned by Rabobank, N.A. around the lake – &- they don’t pay either.

The City has made us fight to get anything.


Why would the City of Indio be afraid if they did all of this correctly and the money spent as they say?


Why would they not do a Forensic Audit?


Why not get a Bond Counsel Involved instead of the City Attorney?


Those are good questions and the City just ignores those questions.

If you just watch the recent council meeting on February 4, 2014, you would see what I believe are lies that the City Attorney is spouting or pontificating.


But what are you going to do?

Keep Fighting.

I bet you are getting paid alot to do this aren’t you?

No I am sorry to say but someone must do it so other will be protected, the Mello Roos Laws certainly don’t do it.

We  must fight again.

WHO GOT THE MONEY – - -THE CITY OF INDIO.

AREA 1 LEFT EMPTY 110 LOTS AROUND THE LAKE.  THEY DO NOT PAY ANYTHING.  AREA 2 AND WYNDHAM RESORT PAY NOTHING AND BENEFIT.

CROSS POSTED w/ PERMISSION Of Terralago Mello Roos -

© 2010-13 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD0 Comments

Lainey Hashorva: Stealing Home

Lainey Hashorva: Stealing Home

Well at this point it’s pretty common knowledge that all the bloated banksters in the cartel are literally sucking the soul out of us, homeowner by homeowner, house by house, city by city, state by state. Puffing themselves up like the Pillsbury Doughboy that ate Godzilla and Manhattan. Picking their teeth with our land records.

So where are the Attorneys General? Where is that, oh geez, what was it called again? Oh yeah, The Mortgage Fraud Task Force. What ever happened to that? Maybe Jamie Dimon bought it for his daughter and commemorated it into a nice little holiday snow globe for his 2013 holiday party give away bags.

In California we have the oh so special California Homeowner Bill of Rights. AG Kamala Harris beamed, eyes glistening at the signing of that photo op behind Gov Jerry Brown, as if she’d just handed over the mega lottery loot to a homeless family of twelve. Kamala Harris is always camera ready, always ready for her next sound bite on CNN or PR release in front of the state flag. Her career path looks promising, maybe the Supreme Court, DOJ or Governor. But try to engage her in anything that actually has any real teeth to it, like say for example, millions of Californians losing their homes to Fraudclosure, neighborhoods being decimated by empty homes and neglected properties, a second tsunami of fraudclosures looming, and she’ll block you from her Facebook page. The Homeowner “Bill of Rights” offers Californians false hope of surviving the Homeowner Hunger Games. New rules and all that. It’s like telling Tony Soprano’s men that they can’t whack you while Pauly Walnuts is still raping you. Wait your turn.

But I digress. Where does a homeowner actually get anyone to really hear them out? To fully understand the soul sucking misery that we find ourselves in when trying to work with these mega banks that are on robotic search and destroy mode? Who really understands the complexities? The anguish and the insanity of the matrix we are placed in when following the “rules” in place to try to save what is ours in these unprecedented times; Our homes. Our investment. Our legal rights in a complex bloody labyrinth of red tape and manufactured BS.

We try our congressional office, they smile and nod with compassion and knowing. Tsk tsk sigh. They act as if they’ll try their best to intervene on our behalf, set you up with a special Single Point Of Contact (aka SPOC) in the “executive offices” that have a little more accountability since it’s a US Congressional office letterhead and all. Sorta put more time constraints on Pauly Walnuts to respond to our requests and the infinite supply of paperwork we fax, mail, Fed Ex and produce time after time after time after time after time. We have turned into a paper producing incoherent human copy machine, holding the tiniest pessimistic optimism somewhere in the back of our minds that this time we have a “complete package” with every T crossed. We have become wild eyed Vegas strip junkies gambling the entire nest egg at this point. Come on baby, ten times is the charm. I’m due damn it I’m due. Alright one more time….

“What is it?” we wonder. How did we get here? This abyss of systematic bureaucratic bankster abuse.

It’s epic. The stakes are as high as it gets. We are in deep. We begin to realize that our congressional offices are as useful as a confession to a child molester posing as a priest. We realize our letters to the AGs, the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Oprah, Obama, Jill Biden’s manicurist, the HOPE hotline. (How sad is that? The HOPE hotline?) No answers there either.

We somehow break through the imposed shame that everyone keeps to themselves as homeowners in this position been conveniently branded as “deadbeats”. We feel like losers. We feel so alone, so lost in this matrix of complexities, legalities, and consequences. The stakes are so high, our faith is so fragmented.

We begin to talk about it with friends and family. We start to put it out there little by little as to how much we are struggling with these obstacles, these unprecedented times, these impenetrable banks that supposedly have programs in place to assist us in “Making Home Affordable”. Banks have rules right? Our govt has laws right? Where are we in this big picture? Don’t we as homeowners and citizens have a right to stand our ground, to keep what we built against false claims and lack of standing, aka “show me the note” dude?

Who is there for us in this vapid game we’ve been pulled into in good faith to save our homes? Our investments, our retirement? Who?

WE are. We are there for each other. We start to connect and talk about the lawlessness, the impossible inarticulate anguish and insanity we’ve been exposed to in the guise of sustaining our homes. We start to listen to each other’s stories and the similarities begin to reflect clear patterns of abuse. Clear patterns of harm and of our undoing by instruction. Step by step, we have blindly and diligently in all good faith followed the instructions we were given by the servicing bank that tells us we won’t be considered as having a legitimate hardship unless we are in default, that we need to miss a few payments to receive assistance, submit and resubmit hundreds of pages of documents again and again and again until we start to realize it’s all rigged. A big fat hoax. The biggest Ponzi scheme since Bernie Madoff, only this is multiplied times millions of families and individuals. Millions of titles and altered titles. This scam is unprecedented. The biggest financial sting in our history. The modern day bankster business plan. Wells Fargo, “Together we’ll go far”. Welcome to modern day psychological terrorism. Who’s gonna be the last man or woman standing? Who’s more likely to run out of money, stamina, steam and wherewithal first?

Yes indeed, Wells Fargo Sucks, and so does Bank of America, Chase, Citi, Ocwen, Nationstar, Penny Mack. What a coincidence huh? Ever get the feeling they’re the same criminal enterprise? The same robo signing Caligraphy workshops. The same bank rebranding themselves hand over fist, trying to erase their tracks, complicate what they confiscate unlawfully. They all seem to be playing the same shell game, the same abuses and patterns in place ultimately to bring about the swift demise of the American Homeowner. The modification of the middle class, the mastication and regurgitation of the American dream. “Here ya go, sorry for the confusion. Here’s a few thousand dollars for the relocation. Three days to vacate. Your house has been auctioned off. Don’t worry, if you’re lucky maybe we’ll rent it back to you. Sign here. Love, Linda Green.”

Yes, #WellsFargo#Sucks. Hashtag that #John Stumpf and all the pathetic SPOCs that service your robo signing, loss of docs, cubicle monkeys selling their souls for a Bed Bath and Beyond gift card, dressing as homeless people at your Halloween office parties, SPOCs assisting in the take-down of the American homeowner, SPOCs that redirect us, disconnect us and are complicit in the zombie fee collecting business plan to abusively foreclose us into oblivion. “This call will be monitored and recorded. This is an attempt to collect a debt”. Really? Show me the money? Show me the note. Show me the securitized debt. “Hello. Hello?”

Not only did the worlds biggest banks and their henchmen the Department of Justice, the AGs, the lack of hope on the Hope hotline take down the world economy, the business plan in place is to cut us off at the knees as we attempt (by following their rules) to stagger to our feet. To speak truth to corrupt power.

Well guess what. We are on our feet. We are talking to one another, networking, building coalitions, groups of activists. Home grown ground troops. We are comparing notes, robo signer names, editorial email lists, servicing abuses, patterns of fraud. We are deciphering the complexities in the lack of standing these big bad blowhards have in the homeowner hunger games. We are armed with the power of what stubborn strong willed fighters on a mission have in common. We are taking names and blasting them out to every Facebook group, Twitter feed and Instagram stream we can muster – all day every day. The TRUTH. WE the people are showing up for each other and it is a powerful force to reckon with. The truth is a potent undeniable living thing, and if you present the truth in regard to the law, even Pauly Walnuts goes to the big house at some point or sleeps with the fish. Occupy the truth. Move your money from these criminal institutions to smaller community banks and credit unions. Demand everything in writing, record calls, put them on defense and stay on offense. Share share share with like minded others. Yes it’s the Homeowner Hunger games, but we are hungry and we have nothing to lose. Time to bite the vampire and bleed them out. Wake up and join us. They are coming for us, but much to their astonishment we are not running anywhere but directly AT them. WE are coming for them.

Join us at “Wells Fargo Sucks” (group) and “Fraudclosure Fighters” (group pages) on Facebook. Several other groups as well (Home Defenders League, Occupy Our Homes, Bank Fraud Revealed, and many many more) in which we network, cross reference, decipher, support, take names, graph charts, network with auditing forensic experts and attorneys, Occupy and serve one another in the common quest to dismantle the Fraudclosure machine, expose the servicing abuses, bringing the truth HOME in seeking justice and saving ourselves against an arrogant out of control Goliath that never saw us coming.

We are the heroes we’ve been waiting for. Join us.

Lainey Hashorva

Please forgive typos – my brain is faster than my fangers.

.

Lainey Hashorva is a Social Media Activist, Investigative Journalist and Entrepreneur. Join the discussion on Facebook in her group, Fraudclosure Fighters with like minded others. Please visit her ETSY store LaineyBean.

 

© 2010-13 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD9 Comments

CFPB Finance & Services Complaints Center

CFPB Finance & Services Complaints Center

CFPB Complaints

 

Scroll down and if you have an issue be sure to file a complaint.

 

 

 

 

 

.

Company Name More Information About
1st Alliance Lending Click Here 1st Alliance Lending complaint, 1st Alliance Lending complaints, 1st Alliance Lending dispute, 1st Alliance Lending disputes
1st Fidelity Loan Servicing Click Here 1st Fidelity Loan Servicing complaint, 1st Fidelity Loan Servicing complaints, 1st Fidelity Loan Servicing dispute, 1st Fidelity Loan Servicing disputes
1st Franklin Financial Corporation Click Here 1st Franklin Financial Corporation complaint, 1st Franklin Financial Corporation complaints, 1st Franklin Financial Corporation dispute, 1st Franklin Financial Corporation disputes
1st Maryland Mortgage Corporation Click Here 1st Maryland Mortgage Corporation complaint, 1st Maryland Mortgage Corporation complaints, 1st Maryland Mortgage Corporation dispute, 1st Maryland Mortgage Corporation disputes
1st Midwest Mortgage Corp Click Here 1st Midwest Mortgage Corp complaint, 1st Midwest Mortgage Corp complaints, 1st Midwest Mortgage Corp dispute, 1st Midwest Mortgage Corp disputes
21st Mortgage Corporation Click Here 21st Mortgage Corporation complaint, 21st Mortgage Corporation complaints, 21st Mortgage Corporation dispute, 21st Mortgage Corporation disputes
360 Mortgage Click Here 360 Mortgage complaint, 360 Mortgage complaints, 360 Mortgage dispute, 360 Mortgage disputes
Able Mortgage Click Here Able Mortgage complaint, Able Mortgage complaints, Able Mortgage dispute, Able Mortgage disputes
Absolute Mortgage Company Inc. Click Here Absolute Mortgage Company Inc. complaint, Absolute Mortgage Company Inc. complaints, Absolute Mortgage Company Inc. dispute, Absolute Mortgage Company Inc. disputes
Academy Mortgage Click Here Academy Mortgage complaint, Academy Mortgage complaints, Academy Mortgage dispute, Academy Mortgage disputes
Access Group Click Here Access Group complaint, Access Group complaints, Access Group dispute, Access Group disputes
ACE Cash Express Inc. Click Here ACE Cash Express Inc. complaint, ACE Cash Express Inc. complaints, ACE Cash Express Inc. dispute, ACE Cash Express Inc. disputes
Acopia, LLC Click Here Acopia, LLC complaint, Acopia, LLC complaints, Acopia, LLC dispute, Acopia, LLC disputes
Acre Mortgage Click Here Acre Mortgage complaint, Acre Mortgage complaints, Acre Mortgage dispute, Acre Mortgage disputes
ACS Education Services Click Here ACS Education Services complaint, ACS Education Services complaints, ACS Education Services dispute, ACS Education Services disputes
Advance Mortgage Corporation Click Here Advance Mortgage Corporation complaint, Advance Mortgage Corporation complaints, Advance Mortgage Corporation dispute, Advance Mortgage Corporation disputes
Advance Title & Abstract, Inc. Click Here Advance Title & Abstract, Inc. complaint, Advance Title & Abstract, Inc. complaints, Advance Title & Abstract, Inc. dispute, Advance Title & Abstract, Inc. disputes
AES/PHEAA Click Here AES/PHEAA complaint, AES/PHEAA complaints, AES/PHEAA dispute, AES/PHEAA disputes
Alabama Housing Finance Authority Click Here Alabama Housing Finance Authority complaint, Alabama Housing Finance Authority complaints, Alabama Housing Finance Authority dispute, Alabama Housing Finance Authority disputes
Alaska Commission on Post Secondary Education Click Here Alaska Commission on Post Secondary Education complaint, Alaska Commission on Post Secondary Education complaints, Alaska Commission on Post Secondary Education dispute, Alaska Commission on Post Secondary Education disputes
Allen Tate Mortgage Services, Inc. Click Here Allen Tate Mortgage Services, Inc. complaint, Allen Tate Mortgage Services, Inc. complaints, Allen Tate Mortgage Services, Inc. dispute, Allen Tate Mortgage Services, Inc. disputes
Allied International Credit Corporation Click Here Allied International Credit Corporation complaint, Allied International Credit Corporation complaints, Allied International Credit Corporation dispute, Allied International Credit Corporation disputes
Allied Mortgage Group Click Here Allied Mortgage Group complaint, Allied Mortgage Group complaints, Allied Mortgage Group dispute, Allied Mortgage Group disputes
Ally Bank Click Here Ally Bank complaint, Ally Bank complaints, Ally Bank dispute, Ally Bank disputes
Alpine Mortgage Services, LLC Click Here Alpine Mortgage Services, LLC complaint, Alpine Mortgage Services, LLC complaints, Alpine Mortgage Services, LLC dispute, Alpine Mortgage Services, LLC disputes
Amcap Mortgage, Ltd. Click Here Amcap Mortgage, Ltd. complaint, Amcap Mortgage, Ltd. complaints, Amcap Mortgage, Ltd. dispute, Amcap Mortgage, Ltd. disputes
Amegy Bank Click Here Amegy Bank complaint, Amegy Bank complaints, Amegy Bank dispute, Amegy Bank disputes
American Advisors Group Click Here American Advisors Group complaint, American Advisors Group complaints, American Advisors Group dispute, American Advisors Group disputes
American Credit Acceptance, LLC Click Here American Credit Acceptance, LLC complaint, American Credit Acceptance, LLC complaints, American Credit Acceptance, LLC dispute, American Credit Acceptance, LLC disputes
American Eagle Mortgage Co., LLC Click Here American Eagle Mortgage Co., LLC complaint, American Eagle Mortgage Co., LLC complaints, American Eagle Mortgage Co., LLC dispute, American Eagle Mortgage Co., LLC disputes
American Equity Mortgage, Inc. Click Here American Equity Mortgage, Inc. complaint, American Equity Mortgage, Inc. complaints, American Equity Mortgage, Inc. dispute, American Equity Mortgage, Inc. disputes
American Federal Mortgage Corporation Click Here American Federal Mortgage Corporation complaint, American Federal Mortgage Corporation complaints, American Federal Mortgage Corporation dispute, American Federal Mortgage Corporation disputes
American Fidelity Mortgage Services, Inc. Click Here American Fidelity Mortgage Services, Inc. complaint, American Fidelity Mortgage Services, Inc. complaints, American Fidelity Mortgage Services, Inc. dispute, American Fidelity Mortgage Services, Inc. disputes
American Finance House of Lariba Click Here American Finance House of Lariba complaint, American Finance House of Lariba complaints, American Finance House of Lariba dispute, American Finance House of Lariba disputes
American Financial Lending, Inc. Click Here American Financial Lending, Inc. complaint, American Financial Lending, Inc. complaints, American Financial Lending, Inc. dispute, American Financial Lending, Inc. disputes
American Financial Network, Inc. Click Here American Financial Network, Inc. complaint, American Financial Network, Inc. complaints, American Financial Network, Inc. dispute, American Financial Network, Inc. disputes
American Financial Resources, Inc. Click Here American Financial Resources, Inc. complaint, American Financial Resources, Inc. complaints, American Financial Resources, Inc. dispute, American Financial Resources, Inc. disputes
American Financing Corporation Click Here American Financing Corporation complaint, American Financing Corporation complaints, American Financing Corporation dispute, American Financing Corporation disputes
American Honda Finance Corporation Click Here American Honda Finance Corporation complaint, American Honda Finance Corporation complaints, American Honda Finance Corporation dispute, American Honda Finance Corporation disputes
American Internet Mortgage, Inc Click Here American Internet Mortgage, Inc complaint, American Internet Mortgage, Inc complaints, American Internet Mortgage, Inc dispute, American Internet Mortgage, Inc disputes
American Lending Solutions, LLC Click Here American Lending Solutions, LLC complaint, American Lending Solutions, LLC complaints, American Lending Solutions, LLC dispute, American Lending Solutions, LLC disputes
American Pacific Mortgage Corporation Click Here American Pacific Mortgage Corporation complaint, American Pacific Mortgage Corporation complaints, American Pacific Mortgage Corporation dispute, American Pacific Mortgage Corporation disputes
American Southwest Mortgage Corpration Click Here American Southwest Mortgage Corpration complaint, American Southwest Mortgage Corpration complaints, American Southwest Mortgage Corpration dispute, American Southwest Mortgage Corpration disputes
Americash Click Here Americash complaint, Americash complaints, Americash dispute, Americash disputes
AmeriFirst Financial, Inc. Click Here AmeriFirst Financial, Inc. complaint, AmeriFirst Financial, Inc. complaints, AmeriFirst Financial, Inc. dispute, AmeriFirst Financial, Inc. disputes
AmeriFirst Home Mortgage Click Here AmeriFirst Home Mortgage complaint, AmeriFirst Home Mortgage complaints, AmeriFirst Home Mortgage dispute, AmeriFirst Home Mortgage disputes
Amerisave Click Here Amerisave complaint, Amerisave complaints, Amerisave dispute, Amerisave disputes
Amerivest Mortgages Click Here Amerivest Mortgages complaint, Amerivest Mortgages complaints, Amerivest Mortgages dispute, Amerivest Mortgages disputes
Amex Click Here Amex complaint, Amex complaints, Amex dispute, Amex disputes
Andesite Finance Company, LLC Click Here Andesite Finance Company, LLC complaint, Andesite Finance Company, LLC complaints, Andesite Finance Company, LLC dispute, Andesite Finance Company, LLC disputes
Apex Home Loans, Inc. Click Here Apex Home Loans, Inc. complaint, Apex Home Loans, Inc. complaints, Apex Home Loans, Inc. dispute, Apex Home Loans, Inc. disputes
Arbor Mortgage Click Here Arbor Mortgage complaint, Arbor Mortgage complaints, Arbor Mortgage dispute, Arbor Mortgage disputes
Arbor Residential Mortgage LLC Click Here Arbor Residential Mortgage LLC complaint, Arbor Residential Mortgage LLC complaints, Arbor Residential Mortgage LLC dispute, Arbor Residential Mortgage LLC disputes
Ark-La-Tex Financial Services, LLC Click Here Ark-La-Tex Financial Services, LLC complaint, Ark-La-Tex Financial Services, LLC complaints, Ark-La-Tex Financial Services, LLC dispute, Ark-La-Tex Financial Services, LLC disputes
Army and Air Force Exchange Service Click Here Army and Air Force Exchange Service complaint, Army and Air Force Exchange Service complaints, Army and Air Force Exchange Service dispute, Army and Air Force Exchange Service disputes
Arvest Bank Click Here Arvest Bank complaint, Arvest Bank complaints, Arvest Bank dispute, Arvest Bank disputes
Aspen Home Mortgage Group Click Here Aspen Home Mortgage Group complaint, Aspen Home Mortgage Group complaints, Aspen Home Mortgage Group dispute, Aspen Home Mortgage Group disputes
Assent Inc. Click Here Assent Inc. complaint, Assent Inc. complaints, Assent Inc. dispute, Assent Inc. disputes
Associated Bank Click Here Associated Bank complaint, Associated Bank complaints, Associated Bank dispute, Associated Bank disputes
Associated Mortgage Corporation Click Here Associated Mortgage Corporation complaint, Associated Mortgage Corporation complaints, Associated Mortgage Corporation dispute, Associated Mortgage Corporation disputes
Astoria Federal Click Here Astoria Federal complaint, Astoria Federal complaints, Astoria Federal dispute, Astoria Federal disputes
Atlantic Home Loans, Inc. Click Here Atlantic Home Loans, Inc. complaint, Atlantic Home Loans, Inc. complaints, Atlantic Home Loans, Inc. dispute, Atlantic Home Loans, Inc. disputes
Atlantic Mortgage Direct LLC Click Here Atlantic Mortgage Direct LLC complaint, Atlantic Mortgage Direct LLC complaints, Atlantic Mortgage Direct LLC dispute, Atlantic Mortgage Direct LLC disputes
Atlantis National Services, Inc. Click Here Atlantis National Services, Inc. complaint, Atlantis National Services, Inc. complaints, Atlantis National Services, Inc. dispute, Atlantis National Services, Inc. disputes
Aurora Financial Group Inc. Click Here Aurora Financial Group Inc. complaint, Aurora Financial Group Inc. complaints, Aurora Financial Group Inc. dispute, Aurora Financial Group Inc. disputes
Avante Click Here Avante complaint, Avante complaints, Avante dispute, Avante disputes
Axia Financial, LLC Click Here Axia Financial, LLC complaint, Axia Financial, LLC complaints, Axia Financial, LLC dispute, Axia Financial, LLC disputes
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico Click Here Banco Popular de Puerto Rico complaint, Banco Popular de Puerto Rico complaints, Banco Popular de Puerto Rico dispute, Banco Popular de Puerto Rico disputes
Banco Popular North America Click Here Banco Popular North America complaint, Banco Popular North America complaints, Banco Popular North America dispute, Banco Popular North America disputes
Banco Santander Puerto Rico Click Here Banco Santander Puerto Rico complaint, Banco Santander Puerto Rico complaints, Banco Santander Puerto Rico dispute, Banco Santander Puerto Rico disputes
BancorpSouth Bank Click Here BancorpSouth Bank complaint, BancorpSouth Bank complaints, BancorpSouth Bank dispute, BancorpSouth Bank disputes
Bank of America Click Here Bank of America complaint, Bank of America complaints, Bank of America dispute, Bank of America disputes
Bank of China USA Click Here Bank of China USA complaint, Bank of China USA complaints, Bank of China USA dispute, Bank of China USA disputes
Bank of Hawaii Click Here Bank of Hawaii complaint, Bank of Hawaii complaints, Bank of Hawaii dispute, Bank of Hawaii disputes
Bank of the West Click Here Bank of the West complaint, Bank of the West complaints, Bank of the West dispute, Bank of the West disputes
BankUnited Click Here BankUnited complaint, BankUnited complaints, BankUnited dispute, BankUnited disputes
Barclays Click Here Barclays complaint, Barclays complaints, Barclays dispute, Barclays disputes
Bay Equity Click Here Bay Equity complaint, Bay Equity complaints, Bay Equity dispute, Bay Equity disputes
Bay Valley Mortgage Group Click Here Bay Valley Mortgage Group complaint, Bay Valley Mortgage Group complaints, Bay Valley Mortgage Group dispute, Bay Valley Mortgage Group disputes
Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC Click Here Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC complaint, Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC complaints, Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC dispute, Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC disputes
BB&T Financial Click Here BB&T Financial complaint, BB&T Financial complaints, BB&T Financial dispute, BB&T Financial disputes
BBVA Compass Click Here BBVA Compass complaint, BBVA Compass complaints, BBVA Compass dispute, BBVA Compass disputes
BBVA Puerto Rico Click Here BBVA Puerto Rico complaint, BBVA Puerto Rico complaints, BBVA Puerto Rico dispute, BBVA Puerto Rico disputes
Bill Henson Co, Inc. Click Here Bill Henson Co, Inc. complaint, Bill Henson Co, Inc. complaints, Bill Henson Co, Inc. dispute, Bill Henson Co, Inc. disputes
BluFi Lending Click Here BluFi Lending complaint, BluFi Lending complaints, BluFi Lending dispute, BluFi Lending disputes
BMO Harris Click Here BMO Harris complaint, BMO Harris complaints, BMO Harris dispute, BMO Harris disputes
BMW Financial Services Click Here BMW Financial Services complaint, BMW Financial Services complaints, BMW Financial Services dispute, BMW Financial Services disputes
BNY Mellon Click Here BNY Mellon complaint, BNY Mellon complaints, BNY Mellon dispute, BNY Mellon disputes
Bogman, Inc Click Here Bogman, Inc complaint, Bogman, Inc complaints, Bogman, Inc dispute, Bogman, Inc disputes
BOK Financial Corp Click Here BOK Financial Corp complaint, BOK Financial Corp complaints, BOK Financial Corp dispute, BOK Financial Corp disputes
Bond Corporation Click Here Bond Corporation complaint, Bond Corporation complaints, Bond Corporation dispute, Bond Corporation disputes
Boulder Lending Group Click Here Boulder Lending Group complaint, Boulder Lending Group complaints, Boulder Lending Group dispute, Boulder Lending Group disputes
Brady Distributing Company Click Here Brady Distributing Company complaint, Brady Distributing Company complaints, Brady Distributing Company dispute, Brady Distributing Company disputes
Brandywine Professional Services Click Here Brandywine Professional Services complaint, Brandywine Professional Services complaints, Brandywine Professional Services dispute, Brandywine Professional Services disputes
Brazos Higher Education Servicing Click Here Brazos Higher Education Servicing complaint, Brazos Higher Education Servicing complaints, Brazos Higher Education Servicing dispute, Brazos Higher Education Servicing disputes
Brazos Loan Servicing Click Here Brazos Loan Servicing complaint, Brazos Loan Servicing complaints, Brazos Loan Servicing dispute, Brazos Loan Servicing disputes
Bridgelock Capital Click Here Bridgelock Capital complaint, Bridgelock Capital complaints, Bridgelock Capital dispute, Bridgelock Capital disputes
Budget Mortgage Corp. Click Here Budget Mortgage Corp. complaint, Budget Mortgage Corp. complaints, Budget Mortgage Corp. dispute, Budget Mortgage Corp. disputes
Business Starters, Inc Click Here Business Starters, Inc complaint, Business Starters, Inc complaints, Business Starters, Inc dispute, Business Starters, Inc disputes
Byrider Franchising, LLC Click Here Byrider Franchising, LLC complaint, Byrider Franchising, LLC complaints, Byrider Franchising, LLC dispute, Byrider Franchising, LLC disputes
C & A Mortgage Services of Florence, Inc. Click Here C & A Mortgage Services of Florence, Inc. complaint, C & A Mortgage Services of Florence, Inc. complaints, C & A Mortgage Services of Florence, Inc. dispute, C & A Mortgage Services of Florence, Inc. disputes
Caliber Funding LLC Click Here Caliber Funding LLC complaint, Caliber Funding LLC complaints, Caliber Funding LLC dispute, Caliber Funding LLC disputes
Caliber Home Loans, Inc Click Here Caliber Home Loans, Inc complaint, Caliber Home Loans, Inc complaints, Caliber Home Loans, Inc dispute, Caliber Home Loans, Inc disputes
California Bank & Trust Click Here California Bank & Trust complaint, California Bank & Trust complaints, California Bank & Trust dispute, California Bank & Trust disputes
Capital Benefit, Inc. Click Here Capital Benefit, Inc. complaint, Capital Benefit, Inc. complaints, Capital Benefit, Inc. dispute, Capital Benefit, Inc. disputes
Capital One Click Here Capital One complaint, Capital One complaints, Capital One dispute, Capital One disputes
Carbucks of Delaware, Inc Click Here Carbucks of Delaware, Inc complaint, Carbucks of Delaware, Inc complaints, Carbucks of Delaware, Inc dispute, Carbucks of Delaware, Inc disputes
Carrington Mortgage Click Here Carrington Mortgage complaint, Carrington Mortgage complaints, Carrington Mortgage dispute, Carrington Mortgage disputes
Cascade Mortgage, Inc. Click Here Cascade Mortgage, Inc. complaint, Cascade Mortgage, Inc. complaints, Cascade Mortgage, Inc. dispute, Cascade Mortgage, Inc. disputes
Cash Call Click Here Cash Call complaint, Cash Call complaints, Cash Call dispute, Cash Call disputes
Castle & Cooke Mortgage Click Here Castle & Cooke Mortgage complaint, Castle & Cooke Mortgage complaints, Castle & Cooke Mortgage dispute, Castle & Cooke Mortgage disputes
Cathay Bank Click Here Cathay Bank complaint, Cathay Bank complaints, Cathay Bank dispute, Cathay Bank disputes
Century Financial Group Click Here Century Financial Group complaint, Century Financial Group complaints, Century Financial Group dispute, Century Financial Group disputes
CF Funding Click Here CF Funding complaint, CF Funding complaints, CF Funding dispute, CF Funding disputes
CFAM Financial Services, LLC Click Here CFAM Financial Services, LLC complaint, CFAM Financial Services, LLC complaints, CFAM Financial Services, LLC dispute, CFAM Financial Services, LLC disputes
CFG Financial Solutions Inc. Click Here CFG Financial Solutions Inc. complaint, CFG Financial Solutions Inc. complaints, CFG Financial Solutions Inc. dispute, CFG Financial Solutions Inc. disputes
CGB Agri Financial Services Click Here CGB Agri Financial Services complaint, CGB Agri Financial Services complaints, CGB Agri Financial Services dispute, CGB Agri Financial Services disputes
Charles Schwab Bank Click Here Charles Schwab Bank complaint, Charles Schwab Bank complaints, Charles Schwab Bank dispute, Charles Schwab Bank disputes
Charlottesville Settlement Company Click Here Charlottesville Settlement Company complaint, Charlottesville Settlement Company complaints, Charlottesville Settlement Company dispute, Charlottesville Settlement Company disputes
Cherry Creek Mortgage Click Here Cherry Creek Mortgage complaint, Cherry Creek Mortgage complaints, Cherry Creek Mortgage dispute, Cherry Creek Mortgage disputes
Churchill Mortgage Corporation Click Here Churchill Mortgage Corporation complaint, Churchill Mortgage Corporation complaints, Churchill Mortgage Corporation dispute, Churchill Mortgage Corporation disputes
Cimmaron Escrow Inc. Click Here Cimmaron Escrow Inc. complaint, Cimmaron Escrow Inc. complaints, Cimmaron Escrow Inc. dispute, Cimmaron Escrow Inc. disputes
CIS Direct Lending Click Here CIS Direct Lending complaint, CIS Direct Lending complaints, CIS Direct Lending dispute, CIS Direct Lending disputes
Citibank Click Here Citibank complaint, Citibank complaints, Citibank dispute, Citibank disputes
Citizens Savings & Loan Corporation Click Here Citizens Savings & Loan Corporation complaint, Citizens Savings & Loan Corporation complaints, Citizens Savings & Loan Corporation dispute, Citizens Savings & Loan Corporation disputes
City National Bank Click Here City National Bank complaint, City National Bank complaints, City National Bank dispute, City National Bank disputes
Citywide Mortgage Associates, Inc. Click Here Citywide Mortgage Associates, Inc. complaint, Citywide Mortgage Associates, Inc. complaints, Citywide Mortgage Associates, Inc. dispute, Citywide Mortgage Associates, Inc. disputes
Cleveland Home Title Agency Click Here Cleveland Home Title Agency complaint, Cleveland Home Title Agency complaints, Cleveland Home Title Agency dispute, Cleveland Home Title Agency disputes
Clifton Mortgage Services, LLC Click Here Clifton Mortgage Services, LLC complaint, Clifton Mortgage Services, LLC complaints, Clifton Mortgage Services, LLC dispute, Clifton Mortgage Services, LLC disputes
CMG Financial Click Here CMG Financial complaint, CMG Financial complaints, CMG Financial dispute, CMG Financial disputes
Coast Professional, Inc. Click Here Coast Professional, Inc. complaint, Coast Professional, Inc. complaints, Coast Professional, Inc. dispute, Coast Professional, Inc. disputes
Coastal Finance Company, Inc. Click Here Coastal Finance Company, Inc. complaint, Coastal Finance Company, Inc. complaints, Coastal Finance Company, Inc. dispute, Coastal Finance Company, Inc. disputes
Coastal States Mortgage Click Here Coastal States Mortgage complaint, Coastal States Mortgage complaints, Coastal States Mortgage dispute, Coastal States Mortgage disputes
Cobalt Mortgage Click Here Cobalt Mortgage complaint, Cobalt Mortgage complaints, Cobalt Mortgage dispute, Cobalt Mortgage disputes
College Loan Corporation Click Here College Loan Corporation complaint, College Loan Corporation complaints, College Loan Corporation dispute, College Loan Corporation disputes
Colonial Mortgage Service Co. Of America Click Here Colonial Mortgage Service Co. Of America complaint, Colonial Mortgage Service Co. Of America complaints, Colonial Mortgage Service Co. Of America dispute, Colonial Mortgage Service Co. Of America disputes
Colorado Housing and Finance Authority Click Here Colorado Housing and Finance Authority complaint, Colorado Housing and Finance Authority complaints, Colorado Housing and Finance Authority dispute, Colorado Housing and Finance Authority disputes
Comerica Click Here Comerica complaint, Comerica complaints, Comerica dispute, Comerica disputes
Commerce Bank Click Here Commerce Bank complaint, Commerce Bank complaints, Commerce Bank dispute, Commerce Bank disputes
Common Fund Mortgage Click Here Common Fund Mortgage complaint, Common Fund Mortgage complaints, Common Fund Mortgage dispute, Common Fund Mortgage disputes
Community Home Lending Click Here Community Home Lending complaint, Community Home Lending complaints, Community Home Lending dispute, Community Home Lending disputes
ConServe Click Here ConServe complaint, ConServe complaints, ConServe dispute, ConServe disputes
Consumer Education Services, Inc. Click Here Consumer Education Services, Inc. complaint, Consumer Education Services, Inc. complaints, Consumer Education Services, Inc. dispute, Consumer Education Services, Inc. disputes
Consumer Financial Services Click Here Consumer Financial Services complaint, Consumer Financial Services complaints, Consumer Financial Services dispute, Consumer Financial Services disputes
Consumer Portfolio Services Click Here Consumer Portfolio Services complaint, Consumer Portfolio Services complaints, Consumer Portfolio Services dispute, Consumer Portfolio Services disputes
Consumer Protection Assistance Coalition, Inc Click Here Consumer Protection Assistance Coalition, Inc complaint, Consumer Protection Assistance Coalition, Inc complaints, Consumer Protection Assistance Coalition, Inc dispute, Consumer Protection Assistance Coalition, Inc disputes
Consumer Real Estate Finance Co. Click Here Consumer Real Estate Finance Co. complaint, Consumer Real Estate Finance Co. complaints, Consumer Real Estate Finance Co. dispute, Consumer Real Estate Finance Co. disputes
Continental Home Loans Inc. Click Here Continental Home Loans Inc. complaint, Continental Home Loans Inc. complaints, Continental Home Loans Inc. dispute, Continental Home Loans Inc. disputes
Convergent Outsourcing Click Here Convergent Outsourcing complaint, Convergent Outsourcing complaints, Convergent Outsourcing dispute, Convergent Outsourcing disputes
CoreScore Report by CoreLogic Credco Click Here CoreScore Report by CoreLogic Credco complaint, CoreScore Report by CoreLogic Credco complaints, CoreScore Report by CoreLogic Credco dispute, CoreScore Report by CoreLogic Credco disputes
Cornerstone Home Lending Inc. Click Here Cornerstone Home Lending Inc. complaint, Cornerstone Home Lending Inc. complaints, Cornerstone Home Lending Inc. dispute, Cornerstone Home Lending Inc. disputes
Cornerstone Mortgage, Inc. Click Here Cornerstone Mortgage, Inc. complaint, Cornerstone Mortgage, Inc. complaints, Cornerstone Mortgage, Inc. dispute, Cornerstone Mortgage, Inc. disputes
CountryPlace Acceptance Corporation Click Here CountryPlace Acceptance Corporation complaint, CountryPlace Acceptance Corporation complaints, CountryPlace Acceptance Corporation dispute, CountryPlace Acceptance Corporation disputes
Credit Acceptance Corporation Click Here Credit Acceptance Corporation complaint, Credit Acceptance Corporation complaints, Credit Acceptance Corporation dispute, Credit Acceptance Corporation disputes
Credit Technology, Inc. Click Here Credit Technology, Inc. complaint, Credit Technology, Inc. complaints, Credit Technology, Inc. dispute, Credit Technology, Inc. disputes
Credit Union Mortgage Association Click Here Credit Union Mortgage Association complaint, Credit Union Mortgage Association complaints, Credit Union Mortgage Association dispute, Credit Union Mortgage Association disputes
CRL Home Loans Click Here CRL Home Loans complaint, CRL Home Loans complaints, CRL Home Loans dispute, CRL Home Loans disputes
CrossCountry Mortgage Inc. Click Here CrossCountry Mortgage Inc. complaint, CrossCountry Mortgage Inc. complaints, CrossCountry Mortgage Inc. dispute, CrossCountry Mortgage Inc. disputes
Daiyaan, Inc Click Here Daiyaan, Inc complaint, Daiyaan, Inc complaints, Daiyaan, Inc dispute, Daiyaan, Inc disputes
DAS Acquisition Company, LLC Click Here DAS Acquisition Company, LLC complaint, DAS Acquisition Company, LLC complaints, DAS Acquisition Company, LLC dispute, DAS Acquisition Company, LLC disputes
Data Mortgage Inc. Click Here Data Mortgage Inc. complaint, Data Mortgage Inc. complaints, Data Mortgage Inc. dispute, Data Mortgage Inc. disputes
Deutsche Bank Click Here Deutsche Bank complaint, Deutsche Bank complaints, Deutsche Bank dispute, Deutsche Bank disputes
Deval LLC Click Here Deval LLC complaint, Deval LLC complaints, Deval LLC dispute, Deval LLC disputes
DeWitt Mortgage Services and Property Management, LLC Click Here DeWitt Mortgage Services and Property Management, LLC complaint, DeWitt Mortgage Services and Property Management, LLC complaints, DeWitt Mortgage Services and Property Management, LLC dispute, DeWitt Mortgage Services and Property Management, LLC disputes
DHI Mortgage Click Here DHI Mortgage complaint, DHI Mortgage complaints, DHI Mortgage dispute, DHI Mortgage disputes
Direct Lenders, LLC Click Here Direct Lenders, LLC complaint, Direct Lenders, LLC complaints, Direct Lenders, LLC dispute, Direct Lenders, LLC disputes
Direct Mortgage Loans, LLC Click Here Direct Mortgage Loans, LLC complaint, Direct Mortgage Loans, LLC complaints, Direct Mortgage Loans, LLC dispute, Direct Mortgage Loans, LLC disputes
Doral Capital Corporation Click Here Doral Capital Corporation complaint, Doral Capital Corporation complaints, Doral Capital Corporation dispute, Doral Capital Corporation disputes
Dovenmuehle Mortgage Inc. Click Here Dovenmuehle Mortgage Inc. complaint, Dovenmuehle Mortgage Inc. complaints, Dovenmuehle Mortgage Inc. dispute, Dovenmuehle Mortgage Inc. disputes
DriveTime Click Here DriveTime complaint, DriveTime complaints, DriveTime dispute, DriveTime disputes
E*Trade Bank Click Here E*Trade Bank complaint, E*Trade Bank complaints, E*Trade Bank dispute, E*Trade Bank disputes
East West Bank Click Here East West Bank complaint, East West Bank complaints, East West Bank dispute, East West Bank disputes
Edfinancial Services Click Here Edfinancial Services complaint, Edfinancial Services complaints, Edfinancial Services dispute, Edfinancial Services disputes
Embrace Home Loans Inc Click Here Embrace Home Loans Inc complaint, Embrace Home Loans Inc complaints, Embrace Home Loans Inc dispute, Embrace Home Loans Inc disputes
Empire Home Mortgage, Inc Click Here Empire Home Mortgage, Inc complaint, Empire Home Mortgage, Inc complaints, Empire Home Mortgage, Inc dispute, Empire Home Mortgage, Inc disputes
Enter Mortgage Inc Click Here Enter Mortgage Inc complaint, Enter Mortgage Inc complaints, Enter Mortgage Inc dispute, Enter Mortgage Inc disputes
Envoy Mortgage Ltd. Click Here Envoy Mortgage Ltd. complaint, Envoy Mortgage Ltd. complaints, Envoy Mortgage Ltd. dispute, Envoy Mortgage Ltd. disputes
Equidata, Inc. Click Here Equidata, Inc. complaint, Equidata, Inc. complaints, Equidata, Inc. dispute, Equidata, Inc. disputes
Equifax Click Here Equifax complaint, Equifax complaints, Equifax dispute, Equifax disputes
EverBank Click Here EverBank complaint, EverBank complaints, EverBank dispute, EverBank disputes
Evesham Mortgage, LLC Click Here Evesham Mortgage, LLC complaint, Evesham Mortgage, LLC complaints, Evesham Mortgage, LLC dispute, Evesham Mortgage, LLC disputes
Executive Lending Group, LLC Click Here Executive Lending Group, LLC complaint, Executive Lending Group, LLC complaints, Executive Lending Group, LLC dispute, Executive Lending Group, LLC disputes
Exeter Finance Corp Click Here Exeter Finance Corp complaint, Exeter Finance Corp complaints, Exeter Finance Corp dispute, Exeter Finance Corp disputes
Experian Click Here Experian complaint, Experian complaints, Experian dispute, Experian disputes
Expert Global Solutions, Inc. Click Here Expert Global Solutions, Inc. complaint, Expert Global Solutions, Inc. complaints, Expert Global Solutions, Inc. dispute, Expert Global Solutions, Inc. disputes
Express Aviation Click Here Express Aviation complaint, Express Aviation complaints, Express Aviation dispute, Express Aviation disputes
Fairway Consumer Discount Company Click Here Fairway Consumer Discount Company complaint, Fairway Consumer Discount Company complaints, Fairway Consumer Discount Company dispute, Fairway Consumer Discount Company disputes
Fay Servicing, LLC Click Here Fay Servicing, LLC complaint, Fay Servicing, LLC complaints, Fay Servicing, LLC dispute, Fay Servicing, LLC disputes
FCI Lender Services Inc. Click Here FCI Lender Services Inc. complaint, FCI Lender Services Inc. complaints, FCI Lender Services Inc. dispute, FCI Lender Services Inc. disputes
Fidelity National Financial, Inc Click Here Fidelity National Financial, Inc complaint, Fidelity National Financial, Inc complaints, Fidelity National Financial, Inc dispute, Fidelity National Financial, Inc disputes
Fifth Third Bank Click Here Fifth Third Bank complaint, Fifth Third Bank complaints, Fifth Third Bank dispute, Fifth Third Bank disputes
Financial Freedom Mortgage Inc Click Here Financial Freedom Mortgage Inc complaint, Financial Freedom Mortgage Inc complaints, Financial Freedom Mortgage Inc dispute, Financial Freedom Mortgage Inc disputes
Fink & McGregor Mortgage, LC Click Here Fink & McGregor Mortgage, LC complaint, Fink & McGregor Mortgage, LC complaints, Fink & McGregor Mortgage, LC dispute, Fink & McGregor Mortgage, LC disputes
First Advantage Corporation Click Here First Advantage Corporation complaint, First Advantage Corporation complaints, First Advantage Corporation dispute, First Advantage Corporation disputes
First American Mitigators, PLLC. Click Here First American Mitigators, PLLC. complaint, First American Mitigators, PLLC. complaints, First American Mitigators, PLLC. dispute, First American Mitigators, PLLC. disputes
First Associates Loan Servicing LLC Click Here First Associates Loan Servicing LLC complaint, First Associates Loan Servicing LLC complaints, First Associates Loan Servicing LLC dispute, First Associates Loan Servicing LLC disputes
First California Mortgage Co Click Here First California Mortgage Co complaint, First California Mortgage Co complaints, First California Mortgage Co dispute, First California Mortgage Co disputes
First Centennial Mortgage Corporation Click Here First Centennial Mortgage Corporation complaint, First Centennial Mortgage Corporation complaints, First Centennial Mortgage Corporation dispute, First Centennial Mortgage Corporation disputes
First Choice Loan Services, Inc. Click Here First Choice Loan Services, Inc. complaint, First Choice Loan Services, Inc. complaints, First Choice Loan Services, Inc. dispute, First Choice Loan Services, Inc. disputes
First Citizens Click Here First Citizens complaint, First Citizens complaints, First Citizens dispute, First Citizens disputes
First Colony Mortgage Click Here First Colony Mortgage complaint, First Colony Mortgage complaints, First Colony Mortgage dispute, First Colony Mortgage disputes
First County Mortgage, LLC Click Here First County Mortgage, LLC complaint, First County Mortgage, LLC complaints, First County Mortgage, LLC dispute, First County Mortgage, LLC disputes
First Data Corporation Click Here First Data Corporation complaint, First Data Corporation complaints, First Data Corporation dispute, First Data Corporation disputes
First Financial Services, Inc. Click Here First Financial Services, Inc. complaint, First Financial Services, Inc. complaints, First Financial Services, Inc. dispute, First Financial Services, Inc. disputes
First Guaranty Mortgage Corporation Click Here First Guaranty Mortgage Corporation complaint, First Guaranty Mortgage Corporation complaints, First Guaranty Mortgage Corporation dispute, First Guaranty Mortgage Corporation disputes
First Hawaiian Bank Click Here First Hawaiian Bank complaint, First Hawaiian Bank complaints, First Hawaiian Bank dispute, First Hawaiian Bank disputes
First Home Mortgage Corp Click Here First Home Mortgage Corp complaint, First Home Mortgage Corp complaints, First Home Mortgage Corp dispute, First Home Mortgage Corp disputes
First Marblehead Education Resources Click Here First Marblehead Education Resources complaint, First Marblehead Education Resources complaints, First Marblehead Education Resources dispute, First Marblehead Education Resources disputes
First Midwest Financial Click Here First Midwest Financial complaint, First Midwest Financial complaints, First Midwest Financial dispute, First Midwest Financial disputes
First Mortgage Company, LLC Click Here First Mortgage Company, LLC complaint, First Mortgage Company, LLC complaints, First Mortgage Company, LLC dispute, First Mortgage Company, LLC disputes
First Mortgage Corporation Click Here First Mortgage Corporation complaint, First Mortgage Corporation complaints, First Mortgage Corporation dispute, First Mortgage Corporation disputes
First Mortgage Solutions Click Here First Mortgage Solutions complaint, First Mortgage Solutions complaints, First Mortgage Solutions dispute, First Mortgage Solutions disputes
First National Bank of Omaha Click Here First National Bank of Omaha complaint, First National Bank of Omaha complaints, First National Bank of Omaha dispute, First National Bank of Omaha disputes
First Niagara Bank Click Here First Niagara Bank complaint, First Niagara Bank complaints, First Niagara Bank dispute, First Niagara Bank disputes
First Republic Bank Click Here First Republic Bank complaint, First Republic Bank complaints, First Republic Bank dispute, First Republic Bank disputes
First Southwestern Financial Services, LLC Click Here First Southwestern Financial Services, LLC complaint, First Southwestern Financial Services, LLC complaints, First Southwestern Financial Services, LLC dispute, First Southwestern Financial Services, LLC disputes
First Tennessee Bank Click Here First Tennessee Bank complaint, First Tennessee Bank complaints, First Tennessee Bank dispute, First Tennessee Bank disputes
First Wholesale Lending, Inc Click Here First Wholesale Lending, Inc complaint, First Wholesale Lending, Inc complaints, First Wholesale Lending, Inc dispute, First Wholesale Lending, Inc disputes
FirstBank Click Here FirstBank complaint, FirstBank complaints, FirstBank dispute, FirstBank disputes
FirstBank of Puerto Rico Click Here FirstBank of Puerto Rico complaint, FirstBank of Puerto Rico complaints, FirstBank of Puerto Rico dispute, FirstBank of Puerto Rico disputes
FirstMerit Bank Click Here FirstMerit Bank complaint, FirstMerit Bank complaints, FirstMerit Bank dispute, FirstMerit Bank disputes
FirsTrust Mortgage, Inc. Click Here FirsTrust Mortgage, Inc. complaint, FirsTrust Mortgage, Inc. complaints, FirsTrust Mortgage, Inc. dispute, FirsTrust Mortgage, Inc. disputes
FIS Global Click Here FIS Global complaint, FIS Global complaints, FIS Global dispute, FIS Global disputes
Flagship Financial Group Click Here Flagship Financial Group complaint, Flagship Financial Group complaints, Flagship Financial Group dispute, Flagship Financial Group disputes
Flagstar Bank Click Here Flagstar Bank complaint, Flagstar Bank complaints, Flagstar Bank dispute, Flagstar Bank disputes
Flat Branch Mortgage, Inc. Click Here Flat Branch Mortgage, Inc. complaint, Flat Branch Mortgage, Inc. complaints, Flat Branch Mortgage, Inc. dispute, Flat Branch Mortgage, Inc. disputes
Fleet Mortgage Corp Click Here Fleet Mortgage Corp complaint, Fleet Mortgage Corp complaints, Fleet Mortgage Corp dispute, Fleet Mortgage Corp disputes
Florida Equity Capital Click Here Florida Equity Capital complaint, Florida Equity Capital complaints, Florida Equity Capital dispute, Florida Equity Capital disputes
Ford Motor Credit Company Click Here Ford Motor Credit Company complaint, Ford Motor Credit Company complaints, Ford Motor Credit Company dispute, Ford Motor Credit Company disputes
Franklin American Mortgage Company Click Here Franklin American Mortgage Company complaint, Franklin American Mortgage Company complaints, Franklin American Mortgage Company dispute, Franklin American Mortgage Company disputes
Franklin Credit Management Click Here Franklin Credit Management complaint, Franklin Credit Management complaints, Franklin Credit Management dispute, Franklin Credit Management disputes
Franklin Mortgage Solutions, LLC Click Here Franklin Mortgage Solutions, LLC complaint, Franklin Mortgage Solutions, LLC complaints, Franklin Mortgage Solutions, LLC dispute, Franklin Mortgage Solutions, LLC disputes
Frederick J. Hanna & Associates, P.C. Click Here Frederick J. Hanna & Associates, P.C. complaint, Frederick J. Hanna & Associates, P.C. complaints, Frederick J. Hanna & Associates, P.C. dispute, Frederick J. Hanna & Associates, P.C. disputes
Freedom Mortgage Click Here Freedom Mortgage complaint, Freedom Mortgage complaints, Freedom Mortgage dispute, Freedom Mortgage disputes
Frontier Financial, Inc. Click Here Frontier Financial, Inc. complaint, Frontier Financial, Inc. complaints, Frontier Financial, Inc. dispute, Frontier Financial, Inc. disputes
Frost Bank Click Here Frost Bank complaint, Frost Bank complaints, Frost Bank dispute, Frost Bank disputes
Galin Mortgage Lending, LLC Click Here Galin Mortgage Lending, LLC complaint, Galin Mortgage Lending, LLC complaints, Galin Mortgage Lending, LLC dispute, Galin Mortgage Lending, LLC disputes
Gateway Funding Click Here Gateway Funding complaint, Gateway Funding complaints, Gateway Funding dispute, Gateway Funding disputes
Gateway Mortgage Group, LLC Click Here Gateway Mortgage Group, LLC complaint, Gateway Mortgage Group, LLC complaints, Gateway Mortgage Group, LLC dispute, Gateway Mortgage Group, LLC disputes
GC Services Limited Partnership Click Here GC Services Limited Partnership complaint, GC Services Limited Partnership complaints, GC Services Limited Partnership dispute, GC Services Limited Partnership disputes
GE Capital Retail Click Here GE Capital Retail complaint, GE Capital Retail complaints, GE Capital Retail dispute, GE Capital Retail disputes
GenEquity Mortgage, Inc Click Here GenEquity Mortgage, Inc complaint, GenEquity Mortgage, Inc complaints, GenEquity Mortgage, Inc dispute, GenEquity Mortgage, Inc disputes
General Information Services, Inc Click Here General Information Services, Inc complaint, General Information Services, Inc complaints, General Information Services, Inc dispute, General Information Services, Inc disputes
Generation Mortgage Click Here Generation Mortgage complaint, Generation Mortgage complaints, Generation Mortgage dispute, Generation Mortgage disputes
Genesis Lending Click Here Genesis Lending complaint, Genesis Lending complaints, Genesis Lending dispute, Genesis Lending disputes
Genworth Financial Click Here Genworth Financial complaint, Genworth Financial complaints, Genworth Financial dispute, Genworth Financial disputes
Georgia Student Finance Authority Click Here Georgia Student Finance Authority complaint, Georgia Student Finance Authority complaints, Georgia Student Finance Authority dispute, Georgia Student Finance Authority disputes
GM Financial Click Here GM Financial complaint, GM Financial complaints, GM Financial dispute, GM Financial disputes
GMFS LLC Click Here GMFS LLC complaint, GMFS LLC complaints, GMFS LLC dispute, GMFS LLC disputes
Goldman Sachs Bank USA Click Here Goldman Sachs Bank USA complaint, Goldman Sachs Bank USA complaints, Goldman Sachs Bank USA dispute, Goldman Sachs Bank USA disputes
Granite State Management & Resources Click Here Granite State Management & Resources complaint, Granite State Management & Resources complaints, Granite State Management & Resources dispute, Granite State Management & Resources disputes
Grassland Financial Services, LLC Click Here Grassland Financial Services, LLC complaint, Grassland Financial Services, LLC complaints, Grassland Financial Services, LLC dispute, Grassland Financial Services, LLC disputes
Great Lakes Click Here Great Lakes complaint, Great Lakes complaints, Great Lakes dispute, Great Lakes disputes
Green Tree Mortgage Company, LP Click Here Green Tree Mortgage Company, LP complaint, Green Tree Mortgage Company, LP complaints, Green Tree Mortgage Company, LP dispute, Green Tree Mortgage Company, LP disputes
Green Tree Servicing, LLC Click Here Green Tree Servicing, LLC complaint, Green Tree Servicing, LLC complaints, Green Tree Servicing, LLC dispute, Green Tree Servicing, LLC disputes
Greenlight Financial Click Here Greenlight Financial complaint, Greenlight Financial complaints, Greenlight Financial dispute, Greenlight Financial disputes
GreenPlanet Servicing, LLC Click Here GreenPlanet Servicing, LLC complaint, GreenPlanet Servicing, LLC complaints, GreenPlanet Servicing, LLC dispute, GreenPlanet Servicing, LLC disputes
Gryphon Corp Click Here Gryphon Corp complaint, Gryphon Corp complaints, Gryphon Corp dispute, Gryphon Corp disputes
GSF Mortgage Corporation Click Here GSF Mortgage Corporation complaint, GSF Mortgage Corporation complaints, GSF Mortgage Corporation dispute, GSF Mortgage Corporation disputes
GTL Investments, Inc. Click Here GTL Investments, Inc. complaint, GTL Investments, Inc. complaints, GTL Investments, Inc. dispute, GTL Investments, Inc. disputes
Guaranteed Home Mortgage Company, Inc. Click Here Guaranteed Home Mortgage Company, Inc. complaint, Guaranteed Home Mortgage Company, Inc. complaints, Guaranteed Home Mortgage Company, Inc. dispute, Guaranteed Home Mortgage Company, Inc. disputes
Guaranteed Rate Click Here Guaranteed Rate complaint, Guaranteed Rate complaints, Guaranteed Rate dispute, Guaranteed Rate disputes
Guardian Mortgage Company Click Here Guardian Mortgage Company complaint, Guardian Mortgage Company complaints, Guardian Mortgage Company dispute, Guardian Mortgage Company disputes
Guild Mortgage Click Here Guild Mortgage complaint, Guild Mortgage complaints, Guild Mortgage dispute, Guild Mortgage disputes
Habitat for Humanity Click Here Habitat for Humanity complaint, Habitat for Humanity complaints, Habitat for Humanity dispute, Habitat for Humanity disputes
Hallmark Home Mortgage, LLC Click Here Hallmark Home Mortgage, LLC complaint, Hallmark Home Mortgage, LLC complaints, Hallmark Home Mortgage, LLC dispute, Hallmark Home Mortgage, LLC disputes
Hamilton National Mortgage Company Click Here Hamilton National Mortgage Company complaint, Hamilton National Mortgage Company complaints, Hamilton National Mortgage Company dispute, Hamilton National Mortgage Company disputes
Heartland Payment Systems Click Here Heartland Payment Systems complaint, Heartland Payment Systems complaints, Heartland Payment Systems dispute, Heartland Payment Systems disputes
Higher Education Student Assistance Authority (HESAA) Click Here Higher Education Student Assistance Authority (HESAA) complaint, Higher Education Student Assistance Authority (HESAA) complaints, Higher Education Student Assistance Authority (HESAA) dispute, Higher Education Student Assistance Authority (HESAA) disputes
HireRight Solutions, Inc. Click Here HireRight Solutions, Inc. complaint, HireRight Solutions, Inc. complaints, HireRight Solutions, Inc. dispute, HireRight Solutions, Inc. disputes
Home Finance of America Inc. Click Here Home Finance of America Inc. complaint, Home Finance of America Inc. complaints, Home Finance of America Inc. dispute, Home Finance of America Inc. disputes
Home Financing Center Click Here Home Financing Center complaint, Home Financing Center complaints, Home Financing Center dispute, Home Financing Center disputes
Home Loan Center Inc f/k/a LendingTree Click Here Home Loan Center Inc f/k/a LendingTree complaint, Home Loan Center Inc f/k/a LendingTree complaints, Home Loan Center Inc f/k/a LendingTree dispute, Home Loan Center Inc f/k/a LendingTree disputes
Home Servicing LLC Click Here Home Servicing LLC complaint, Home Servicing LLC complaints, Home Servicing LLC dispute, Home Servicing LLC disputes
Hometown Equity Mortage Click Here Hometown Equity Mortage complaint, Hometown Equity Mortage complaints, Hometown Equity Mortage dispute, Hometown Equity Mortage disputes
HomeTown Lenders, LLC Click Here HomeTown Lenders, LLC complaint, HomeTown Lenders, LLC complaints, HomeTown Lenders, LLC dispute, HomeTown Lenders, LLC disputes
Hometown Mortgage Services, Inc. Click Here Hometown Mortgage Services, Inc. complaint, Hometown Mortgage Services, Inc. complaints, Hometown Mortgage Services, Inc. dispute, Hometown Mortgage Services, Inc. disputes
Hometrust Mortgage Company Click Here Hometrust Mortgage Company complaint, Hometrust Mortgage Company complaints, Hometrust Mortgage Company dispute, Hometrust Mortgage Company disputes
Honolulu HomeLoans, Inc. Click Here Honolulu HomeLoans, Inc. complaint, Honolulu HomeLoans, Inc. complaints, Honolulu HomeLoans, Inc. dispute, Honolulu HomeLoans, Inc. disputes
House of Finance Corp. Click Here House of Finance Corp. complaint, House of Finance Corp. complaints, House of Finance Corp. dispute, House of Finance Corp. disputes
HSBC Click Here HSBC complaint, HSBC complaints, HSBC dispute, HSBC disputes
Hudson City Savings Bank Click Here Hudson City Savings Bank complaint, Hudson City Savings Bank complaints, Hudson City Savings Bank dispute, Hudson City Savings Bank disputes
Hunter Financial Group Click Here Hunter Financial Group complaint, Hunter Financial Group complaints, Hunter Financial Group dispute, Hunter Financial Group disputes
Hyundai Capital America Click Here Hyundai Capital America complaint, Hyundai Capital America complaints, Hyundai Capital America dispute, Hyundai Capital America disputes
IBERIABANK Click Here IBERIABANK complaint, IBERIABANK complaints, IBERIABANK dispute, IBERIABANK disputes
IDA, Inc. Click Here IDA, Inc. complaint, IDA, Inc. complaints, IDA, Inc. dispute, IDA, Inc. disputes
Imortgage.com, Inc. Click Here Imortgage.com, Inc. complaint, Imortgage.com, Inc. complaints, Imortgage.com, Inc. dispute, Imortgage.com, Inc. disputes
Innovis Click Here Innovis complaint, Innovis complaints, Innovis dispute, Innovis disputes
Integra Holdings Inc. Click Here Integra Holdings Inc. complaint, Integra Holdings Inc. complaints, Integra Holdings Inc. dispute, Integra Holdings Inc. disputes
Integrity First Financial Click Here Integrity First Financial complaint, Integrity First Financial complaints, Integrity First Financial dispute, Integrity First Financial disputes
Integrity Home Loan Click Here Integrity Home Loan complaint, Integrity Home Loan complaints, Integrity Home Loan dispute, Integrity Home Loan disputes
Integrity Solution Services, Inc. Click Here Integrity Solution Services, Inc. complaint, Integrity Solution Services, Inc. complaints, Integrity Solution Services, Inc. dispute, Integrity Solution Services, Inc. disputes
Interbank Mortgage Company Click Here Interbank Mortgage Company complaint, Interbank Mortgage Company complaints, Interbank Mortgage Company dispute, Interbank Mortgage Company disputes
Interlinc Mortgage Services, LLC Click Here Interlinc Mortgage Services, LLC complaint, Interlinc Mortgage Services, LLC complaints, Interlinc Mortgage Services, LLC dispute, Interlinc Mortgage Services, LLC disputes
International City Mortgage, Inc. Click Here International City Mortgage, Inc. complaint, International City Mortgage, Inc. complaints, International City Mortgage, Inc. dispute, International City Mortgage, Inc. disputes
Investment Management Company, LLC Click Here Investment Management Company, LLC complaint, Investment Management Company, LLC complaints, Investment Management Company, LLC dispute, Investment Management Company, LLC disputes
Investors Bank Click Here Investors Bank complaint, Investors Bank complaints, Investors Bank dispute, Investors Bank disputes
Iowa Student Loan Click Here Iowa Student Loan complaint, Iowa Student Loan complaints, Iowa Student Loan dispute, Iowa Student Loan disputes
iServe Trust Click Here iServe Trust complaint, iServe Trust complaints, iServe Trust dispute, iServe Trust disputes
Ivan Brown Click Here Ivan Brown complaint, Ivan Brown complaints, Ivan Brown dispute, Ivan Brown disputes
J Martinez Investments LLC Click Here J Martinez Investments LLC complaint, J Martinez Investments LLC complaints, J Martinez Investments LLC dispute, J Martinez Investments LLC disputes
James B. Nutter & Company Click Here James B. Nutter & Company complaint, James B. Nutter & Company complaints, James B. Nutter & Company dispute, James B. Nutter & Company disputes
JKS Mortgage, LLC Click Here JKS Mortgage, LLC complaint, JKS Mortgage, LLC complaints, JKS Mortgage, LLC dispute, JKS Mortgage, LLC disputes
JLM R.E. Investments Click Here JLM R.E. Investments complaint, JLM R.E. Investments complaints, JLM R.E. Investments dispute, JLM R.E. Investments disputes
Jonsue, LLC Click Here Jonsue, LLC complaint, Jonsue, LLC complaints, Jonsue, LLC dispute, Jonsue, LLC disputes
JPay Inc. Click Here JPay Inc. complaint, JPay Inc. complaints, JPay Inc. dispute, JPay Inc. disputes
JPMorgan Chase Click Here JPMorgan Chase complaint, JPMorgan Chase complaints, JPMorgan Chase dispute, JPMorgan Chase disputes
K & B Capital Corp Click Here K & B Capital Corp complaint, K & B Capital Corp complaints, K & B Capital Corp dispute, K & B Capital Corp disputes
K. Hovnanian American Mortgage, L.L.C. Click Here K. Hovnanian American Mortgage, L.L.C. complaint, K. Hovnanian American Mortgage, L.L.C. complaints, K. Hovnanian American Mortgage, L.L.C. dispute, K. Hovnanian American Mortgage, L.L.C. disputes
KeyBank NA Click Here KeyBank NA complaint, KeyBank NA complaints, KeyBank NA dispute, KeyBank NA disputes
Kirkston Mortgage Lending LLC Click Here Kirkston Mortgage Lending LLC complaint, Kirkston Mortgage Lending LLC complaints, Kirkston Mortgage Lending LLC dispute, Kirkston Mortgage Lending LLC disputes
Kondaur Capital Corporation Click Here Kondaur Capital Corporation complaint, Kondaur Capital Corporation complaints, Kondaur Capital Corporation dispute, Kondaur Capital Corporation disputes
Kramer & Frank, P.C. Click Here Kramer & Frank, P.C. complaint, Kramer & Frank, P.C. complaints, Kramer & Frank, P.C. dispute, Kramer & Frank, P.C. disputes
Kwik Mortgage Corporation Click Here Kwik Mortgage Corporation complaint, Kwik Mortgage Corporation complaints, Kwik Mortgage Corporation dispute, Kwik Mortgage Corporation disputes
Ladera Lending, Inc Click Here Ladera Lending, Inc complaint, Ladera Lending, Inc complaints, Ladera Lending, Inc dispute, Ladera Lending, Inc disputes
Lakeview Mortgage Inc. Click Here Lakeview Mortgage Inc. complaint, Lakeview Mortgage Inc. complaints, Lakeview Mortgage Inc. dispute, Lakeview Mortgage Inc. disputes
Land/Home Financial Services Click Here Land/Home Financial Services complaint, Land/Home Financial Services complaints, Land/Home Financial Services dispute, Land/Home Financial Services disputes
LeaderOne Financial Corporation Click Here LeaderOne Financial Corporation complaint, LeaderOne Financial Corporation complaints, LeaderOne Financial Corporation dispute, LeaderOne Financial Corporation disputes
Lender Live Click Here Lender Live complaint, Lender Live complaints, Lender Live dispute, Lender Live disputes
Lenderfi, Inc. Click Here Lenderfi, Inc. complaint, Lenderfi, Inc. complaints, Lenderfi, Inc. dispute, Lenderfi, Inc. disputes
Lending Solutions Mortgage/ LSI Mortgage Click Here Lending Solutions Mortgage/ LSI Mortgage complaint, Lending Solutions Mortgage/ LSI Mortgage complaints, Lending Solutions Mortgage/ LSI Mortgage dispute, Lending Solutions Mortgage/ LSI Mortgage disputes
Liberty Home Equity Solutions, Inc Click Here Liberty Home Equity Solutions, Inc complaint, Liberty Home Equity Solutions, Inc complaints, Liberty Home Equity Solutions, Inc dispute, Liberty Home Equity Solutions, Inc disputes
Lincoln Mortgage Company Click Here Lincoln Mortgage Company complaint, Lincoln Mortgage Company complaints, Lincoln Mortgage Company dispute, Lincoln Mortgage Company disputes
Live Well Financial, Inc. Click Here Live Well Financial, Inc. complaint, Live Well Financial, Inc. complaints, Live Well Financial, Inc. dispute, Live Well Financial, Inc. disputes
Loan Care Click Here Loan Care complaint, Loan Care complaints, Loan Care dispute, Loan Care disputes
Loan Servicing Group Click Here Loan Servicing Group complaint, Loan Servicing Group complaints, Loan Servicing Group dispute, Loan Servicing Group disputes
Loan To Learn Click Here Loan To Learn complaint, Loan To Learn complaints, Loan To Learn dispute, Loan To Learn disputes
LoanDepot Click Here LoanDepot complaint, LoanDepot complaints, LoanDepot dispute, LoanDepot disputes
Lobel Financial Corporation Click Here Lobel Financial Corporation complaint, Lobel Financial Corporation complaints, Lobel Financial Corporation dispute, Lobel Financial Corporation disputes
Lynx Asset Services, LLC Click Here Lynx Asset Services, LLC complaint, Lynx Asset Services, LLC complaints, Lynx Asset Services, LLC dispute, Lynx Asset Services, LLC disputes
Lyons Mortgage Services, Inc Click Here Lyons Mortgage Services, Inc complaint, Lyons Mortgage Services, Inc complaints, Lyons Mortgage Services, Inc dispute, Lyons Mortgage Services, Inc disputes
M&T Bank Click Here M&T Bank complaint, M&T Bank complaints, M&T Bank dispute, M&T Bank disputes
Maine Educational Loan Authority (MELA) Click Here Maine Educational Loan Authority (MELA) complaint, Maine Educational Loan Authority (MELA) complaints, Maine Educational Loan Authority (MELA) dispute, Maine Educational Loan Authority (MELA) disputes
Market Place Mortgage Corp. Click Here Market Place Mortgage Corp. complaint, Market Place Mortgage Corp. complaints, Market Place Mortgage Corp. dispute, Market Place Mortgage Corp. disputes
Marsh Associates, Inc. Click Here Marsh Associates, Inc. complaint, Marsh Associates, Inc. complaints, Marsh Associates, Inc. dispute, Marsh Associates, Inc. disputes
MAS Associates, LLC Click Here MAS Associates, LLC complaint, MAS Associates, LLC complaints, MAS Associates, LLC dispute, MAS Associates, LLC disputes
McGlone Mortgage Company Click Here McGlone Mortgage Company complaint, McGlone Mortgage Company complaints, McGlone Mortgage Company dispute, McGlone Mortgage Company disputes
Medallion Mortgage Company LLC Click Here Medallion Mortgage Company LLC complaint, Medallion Mortgage Company LLC complaints, Medallion Mortgage Company LLC dispute, Medallion Mortgage Company LLC disputes
MEFA Click Here MEFA complaint, MEFA complaints, MEFA dispute, MEFA disputes
Megastar Financial Corp. Click Here Megastar Financial Corp. complaint, Megastar Financial Corp. complaints, Megastar Financial Corp. dispute, Megastar Financial Corp. disputes
Member Mortgage Services Click Here Member Mortgage Services complaint, Member Mortgage Services complaints, Member Mortgage Services dispute, Member Mortgage Services disputes
Mercedes-Benz Financial Services Click Here Mercedes-Benz Financial Services complaint, Mercedes-Benz Financial Services complaints, Mercedes-Benz Financial Services dispute, Mercedes-Benz Financial Services disputes
Mesce Associates, Inc. Click Here Mesce Associates, Inc. complaint, Mesce Associates, Inc. complaints, Mesce Associates, Inc. dispute, Mesce Associates, Inc. disputes
MetLife Bank Click Here MetLife Bank complaint, MetLife Bank complaints, MetLife Bank dispute, MetLife Bank disputes
Metro Capital Mortgage Corporation Click Here Metro Capital Mortgage Corporation complaint, Metro Capital Mortgage Corporation complaints, Metro Capital Mortgage Corporation dispute, Metro Capital Mortgage Corporation disputes
Metropolitan Home Mortgage, Inc. Click Here Metropolitan Home Mortgage, Inc. complaint, Metropolitan Home Mortgage, Inc. complaints, Metropolitan Home Mortgage, Inc. dispute, Metropolitan Home Mortgage, Inc. disputes
MicroBilt / PRBC (formerly CL Verify) Click Here MicroBilt / PRBC (formerly CL Verify) complaint, MicroBilt / PRBC (formerly CL Verify) complaints, MicroBilt / PRBC (formerly CL Verify) dispute, MicroBilt / PRBC (formerly CL Verify) disputes
Mid Valley Financial Click Here Mid Valley Financial complaint, Mid Valley Financial complaints, Mid Valley Financial dispute, Mid Valley Financial disputes
MidAmerica Mortgage Inc Click Here MidAmerica Mortgage Inc complaint, MidAmerica Mortgage Inc complaints, MidAmerica Mortgage Inc dispute, MidAmerica Mortgage Inc disputes
MID-ISLAND MORTGAGE CORP Click Here MID-ISLAND MORTGAGE CORP complaint, MID-ISLAND MORTGAGE CORP complaints, MID-ISLAND MORTGAGE CORP dispute, MID-ISLAND MORTGAGE CORP disputes
Midwest Loan Services, Inc. Click Here Midwest Loan Services, Inc. complaint, Midwest Loan Services, Inc. complaints, Midwest Loan Services, Inc. dispute, Midwest Loan Services, Inc. disputes
Midwest Mortgage Investments LTD Click Here Midwest Mortgage Investments LTD complaint, Midwest Mortgage Investments LTD complaints, Midwest Mortgage Investments LTD dispute, Midwest Mortgage Investments LTD disputes
Millenium Home Mortgage Click Here Millenium Home Mortgage complaint, Millenium Home Mortgage complaints, Millenium Home Mortgage dispute, Millenium Home Mortgage disputes
MLD Mortgage, Inc. Click Here MLD Mortgage, Inc. complaint, MLD Mortgage, Inc. complaints, MLD Mortgage, Inc. dispute, MLD Mortgage, Inc. disputes
Model Finance Company Click Here Model Finance Company complaint, Model Finance Company complaints, Model Finance Company dispute, Model Finance Company disputes
MOHELA Click Here MOHELA complaint, MOHELA complaints, MOHELA dispute, MOHELA disputes
Moneydart Global Services Inc. Click Here Moneydart Global Services Inc. complaint, Moneydart Global Services Inc. complaints, Moneydart Global Services Inc. dispute, Moneydart Global Services Inc. disputes
MoneyGram Click Here MoneyGram complaint, MoneyGram complaints, MoneyGram dispute, MoneyGram disputes
Morgan Stanley Click Here Morgan Stanley complaint, Morgan Stanley complaints, Morgan Stanley dispute, Morgan Stanley disputes
Moritz Partners L.P. Click Here Moritz Partners L.P. complaint, Moritz Partners L.P. complaints, Moritz Partners L.P. dispute, Moritz Partners L.P. disputes
Morris, Hardwick, Schneider, LLC Click Here Morris, Hardwick, Schneider, LLC complaint, Morris, Hardwick, Schneider, LLC complaints, Morris, Hardwick, Schneider, LLC dispute, Morris, Hardwick, Schneider, LLC disputes
Mortgage America, Inc. Click Here Mortgage America, Inc. complaint, Mortgage America, Inc. complaints, Mortgage America, Inc. dispute, Mortgage America, Inc. disputes
Mortgage Capital Associates, Inc. Click Here Mortgage Capital Associates, Inc. complaint, Mortgage Capital Associates, Inc. complaints, Mortgage Capital Associates, Inc. dispute, Mortgage Capital Associates, Inc. disputes
Mortgage Center, L. C. Click Here Mortgage Center, L. C. complaint, Mortgage Center, L. C. complaints, Mortgage Center, L. C. dispute, Mortgage Center, L. C. disputes
Mortgage Counseling Center Click Here Mortgage Counseling Center complaint, Mortgage Counseling Center complaints, Mortgage Counseling Center dispute, Mortgage Counseling Center disputes
Mortgage Investors Corporation Click Here Mortgage Investors Corporation complaint, Mortgage Investors Corporation complaints, Mortgage Investors Corporation dispute, Mortgage Investors Corporation disputes
Mortgage Lenders of America, LLC Click Here Mortgage Lenders of America, LLC complaint, Mortgage Lenders of America, LLC complaints, Mortgage Lenders of America, LLC dispute, Mortgage Lenders of America, LLC disputes
Mortgage Master Inc Click Here Mortgage Master Inc complaint, Mortgage Master Inc complaints, Mortgage Master Inc dispute, Mortgage Master Inc disputes
Mortgage Master Service Corp Click Here Mortgage Master Service Corp complaint, Mortgage Master Service Corp complaints, Mortgage Master Service Corp dispute, Mortgage Master Service Corp disputes
Mortgage Research Center, LLC Click Here Mortgage Research Center, LLC complaint, Mortgage Research Center, LLC complaints, Mortgage Research Center, LLC dispute, Mortgage Research Center, LLC disputes
Mortgage South of Tennessee Inc. Click Here Mortgage South of Tennessee Inc. complaint, Mortgage South of Tennessee Inc. complaints, Mortgage South of Tennessee Inc. dispute, Mortgage South of Tennessee Inc. disputes
Mortgage Unlimited L.L.C. Click Here Mortgage Unlimited L.L.C. complaint, Mortgage Unlimited L.L.C. complaints, Mortgage Unlimited L.L.C. dispute, Mortgage Unlimited L.L.C. disputes
Mountain West Financial, Inc Click Here Mountain West Financial, Inc complaint, Mountain West Financial, Inc complaints, Mountain West Financial, Inc dispute, Mountain West Financial, Inc disputes
MTH Lending Group, L.P. Click Here MTH Lending Group, L.P. complaint, MTH Lending Group, L.P. complaints, MTH Lending Group, L.P. dispute, MTH Lending Group, L.P. disputes
National Bank of Arizona Click Here National Bank of Arizona complaint, National Bank of Arizona complaints, National Bank of Arizona dispute, National Bank of Arizona disputes
National Education Servicing, LLC Click Here National Education Servicing, LLC complaint, National Education Servicing, LLC complaints, National Education Servicing, LLC dispute, National Education Servicing, LLC disputes
Nations Reliable Lending Click Here Nations Reliable Lending complaint, Nations Reliable Lending complaints, Nations Reliable Lending dispute, Nations Reliable Lending disputes
Nationstar Mortgage Click Here Nationstar Mortgage complaint, Nationstar Mortgage complaints, Nationstar Mortgage dispute, Nationstar Mortgage disputes
Nationwide Advantage Mortgage Company Click Here Nationwide Advantage Mortgage Company complaint, Nationwide Advantage Mortgage Company complaints, Nationwide Advantage Mortgage Company dispute, Nationwide Advantage Mortgage Company disputes
Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc Click Here Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc complaint, Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc complaints, Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc dispute, Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc disputes
Nationwide Direct Mortgage Click Here Nationwide Direct Mortgage complaint, Nationwide Direct Mortgage complaints, Nationwide Direct Mortgage dispute, Nationwide Direct Mortgage disputes
Nationwide Equities Corporation Click Here Nationwide Equities Corporation complaint, Nationwide Equities Corporation complaints, Nationwide Equities Corporation dispute, Nationwide Equities Corporation disputes
Navy FCU Click Here Navy FCU complaint, Navy FCU complaints, Navy FCU dispute, Navy FCU disputes
Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America (“NACA”) Click Here Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America (“NACA”) complaint, Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America (“NACA”) complaints, Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America (“NACA”) dispute, Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America (“NACA”) disputes
Neighborhood Housing Services of Richmond, Inc Click Here Neighborhood Housing Services of Richmond, Inc complaint, Neighborhood Housing Services of Richmond, Inc complaints, Neighborhood Housing Services of Richmond, Inc dispute, Neighborhood Housing Services of Richmond, Inc disputes
Nelnet Click Here Nelnet complaint, Nelnet complaints, Nelnet dispute, Nelnet disputes
Network Capital Funding Corporation Click Here Network Capital Funding Corporation complaint, Network Capital Funding Corporation complaints, Network Capital Funding Corporation dispute, Network Capital Funding Corporation disputes
Network Funding, L.P. Click Here Network Funding, L.P. complaint, Network Funding, L.P. complaints, Network Funding, L.P. dispute, Network Funding, L.P. disputes
Nevada State Bank Click Here Nevada State Bank complaint, Nevada State Bank complaints, Nevada State Bank dispute, Nevada State Bank disputes
New American Funding Click Here New American Funding complaint, New American Funding complaints, New American Funding dispute, New American Funding disputes
New Cornerstone Mortgage, LLC Click Here New Cornerstone Mortgage, LLC complaint, New Cornerstone Mortgage, LLC complaints, New Cornerstone Mortgage, LLC dispute, New Cornerstone Mortgage, LLC disputes
New Day Financial, LLC Click Here New Day Financial, LLC complaint, New Day Financial, LLC complaints, New Day Financial, LLC dispute, New Day Financial, LLC disputes
New Penn Financial Click Here New Penn Financial complaint, New Penn Financial complaints, New Penn Financial dispute, New Penn Financial disputes
New Southern Loans, Inc Click Here New Southern Loans, Inc complaint, New Southern Loans, Inc complaints, New Southern Loans, Inc dispute, New Southern Loans, Inc disputes
New York Community Bank Click Here New York Community Bank complaint, New York Community Bank complaints, New York Community Bank dispute, New York Community Bank disputes
New York State Higher Education Services Corporation (HESC)- Click Here New York State Higher Education Services Corporation (HESC)- complaint, New York State Higher Education Services Corporation (HESC)- complaints, New York State Higher Education Services Corporation (HESC)- dispute, New York State Higher Education Services Corporation (HESC)- disputes
NFM, Inc. Click Here NFM, Inc. complaint, NFM, Inc. complaints, NFM, Inc. dispute, NFM, Inc. disputes
Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation Click Here Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation complaint, Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation complaints, Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation dispute, Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation disputes
North State Acceptance, LLC Click Here North State Acceptance, LLC complaint, North State Acceptance, LLC complaints, North State Acceptance, LLC dispute, North State Acceptance, LLC disputes
Northern Ohio Investment Company Click Here Northern Ohio Investment Company complaint, Northern Ohio Investment Company complaints, Northern Ohio Investment Company dispute, Northern Ohio Investment Company disputes
NorthStar Technologies Click Here NorthStar Technologies complaint, NorthStar Technologies complaints, NorthStar Technologies dispute, NorthStar Technologies disputes
NOVA Financial & Investment Corporation Click Here NOVA Financial & Investment Corporation complaint, NOVA Financial & Investment Corporation complaints, NOVA Financial & Investment Corporation dispute, NOVA Financial & Investment Corporation disputes
NuView Financial Services, LLC Click Here NuView Financial Services, LLC complaint, NuView Financial Services, LLC complaints, NuView Financial Services, LLC dispute, NuView Financial Services, LLC disputes
NVR Inc Click Here NVR Inc complaint, NVR Inc complaints, NVR Inc dispute, NVR Inc disputes
O.D. REI, Inc Click Here O.D. REI, Inc complaint, O.D. REI, Inc complaints, O.D. REI, Inc dispute, O.D. REI, Inc disputes
Ocwen Click Here Ocwen complaint, Ocwen complaints, Ocwen dispute, Ocwen disputes
Oklahoma Motor Credit Company Click Here Oklahoma Motor Credit Company complaint, Oklahoma Motor Credit Company complaints, Oklahoma Motor Credit Company dispute, Oklahoma Motor Credit Company disputes
Old Dominion Mortgage Co., Inc Click Here Old Dominion Mortgage Co., Inc complaint, Old Dominion Mortgage Co., Inc complaints, Old Dominion Mortgage Co., Inc dispute, Old Dominion Mortgage Co., Inc disputes
Old Republic National Title Holding Co. Click Here Old Republic National Title Holding Co. complaint, Old Republic National Title Holding Co. complaints, Old Republic National Title Holding Co. dispute, Old Republic National Title Holding Co. disputes
Old Republic Title Holding Company, Inc Click Here Old Republic Title Holding Company, Inc complaint, Old Republic Title Holding Company, Inc complaints, Old Republic Title Holding Company, Inc dispute, Old Republic Title Holding Company, Inc disputes
One Reverse Mortgage Click Here One Reverse Mortgage complaint, One Reverse Mortgage complaints, One Reverse Mortgage dispute, One Reverse Mortgage disputes
OneWest Bank Click Here OneWest Bank complaint, OneWest Bank complaints, OneWest Bank dispute, OneWest Bank disputes
Online Mortgage Group, LLC Click Here Online Mortgage Group, LLC complaint, Online Mortgage Group, LLC complaints, Online Mortgage Group, LLC dispute, Online Mortgage Group, LLC disputes
On-Site Manager, Inc. Click Here On-Site Manager, Inc. complaint, On-Site Manager, Inc. complaints, On-Site Manager, Inc. dispute, On-Site Manager, Inc. disputes
Openonline, LLC Click Here Openonline, LLC complaint, Openonline, LLC complaints, Openonline, LLC dispute, Openonline, LLC disputes
Pacific National Lending, Inc. Click Here Pacific National Lending, Inc. complaint, Pacific National Lending, Inc. complaints, Pacific National Lending, Inc. dispute, Pacific National Lending, Inc. disputes
Pacific Residential Mortgage, LLC Click Here Pacific Residential Mortgage, LLC complaint, Pacific Residential Mortgage, LLC complaints, Pacific Residential Mortgage, LLC dispute, Pacific Residential Mortgage, LLC disputes
Pacific Union Financial, LLC Click Here Pacific Union Financial, LLC complaint, Pacific Union Financial, LLC complaints, Pacific Union Financial, LLC dispute, Pacific Union Financial, LLC disputes
Paramount Residential Mortgage Group, Inc. Click Here Paramount Residential Mortgage Group, Inc. complaint, Paramount Residential Mortgage Group, Inc. complaints, Paramount Residential Mortgage Group, Inc. dispute, Paramount Residential Mortgage Group, Inc. disputes
Partners for Payment Relief Click Here Partners for Payment Relief complaint, Partners for Payment Relief complaints, Partners for Payment Relief dispute, Partners for Payment Relief disputes
Patriot Mortgage Corporation Click Here Patriot Mortgage Corporation complaint, Patriot Mortgage Corporation complaints, Patriot Mortgage Corporation dispute, Patriot Mortgage Corporation disputes
PayPal Click Here PayPal complaint, PayPal complaints, PayPal dispute, PayPal disputes
PennyMac Loan Services, LLC Click Here PennyMac Loan Services, LLC complaint, PennyMac Loan Services, LLC complaints, PennyMac Loan Services, LLC dispute, PennyMac Loan Services, LLC disputes
Pentagon FCU Click Here Pentagon FCU complaint, Pentagon FCU complaints, Pentagon FCU dispute, Pentagon FCU disputes
Peoples Home Equity, Inc. Click Here Peoples Home Equity, Inc. complaint, Peoples Home Equity, Inc. complaints, Peoples Home Equity, Inc. dispute, Peoples Home Equity, Inc. disputes
Peoples Inc. Click Here Peoples Inc. complaint, Peoples Inc. complaints, Peoples Inc. dispute, Peoples Inc. disputes
People’s United Bank Click Here People’s United Bank complaint, People’s United Bank complaints, People’s United Bank dispute, People’s United Bank disputes
PHH Mortgage Click Here PHH Mortgage complaint, PHH Mortgage complaints, PHH Mortgage dispute, PHH Mortgage disputes
Pinnacle Capital Mortgage Click Here Pinnacle Capital Mortgage complaint, Pinnacle Capital Mortgage complaints, Pinnacle Capital Mortgage dispute, Pinnacle Capital Mortgage disputes
Platinum Home Mortgage Corporation Click Here Platinum Home Mortgage Corporation complaint, Platinum Home Mortgage Corporation complaints, Platinum Home Mortgage Corporation dispute, Platinum Home Mortgage Corporation disputes
Plaza Home Mortgage Click Here Plaza Home Mortgage complaint, Plaza Home Mortgage complaints, Plaza Home Mortgage dispute, Plaza Home Mortgage disputes
Pleasant Valley Home Mortgage Corporation Click Here Pleasant Valley Home Mortgage Corporation complaint, Pleasant Valley Home Mortgage Corporation complaints, Pleasant Valley Home Mortgage Corporation dispute, Pleasant Valley Home Mortgage Corporation disputes
PMAC Mortgage Services Click Here PMAC Mortgage Services complaint, PMAC Mortgage Services complaints, PMAC Mortgage Services dispute, PMAC Mortgage Services disputes
PNC Bank Click Here PNC Bank complaint, PNC Bank complaints, PNC Bank dispute, PNC Bank disputes
Premium Credit Bureau Click Here Premium Credit Bureau complaint, Premium Credit Bureau complaints, Premium Credit Bureau dispute, Premium Credit Bureau disputes
Prestige Financial Services, Inc. Click Here Prestige Financial Services, Inc. complaint, Prestige Financial Services, Inc. complaints, Prestige Financial Services, Inc. dispute, Prestige Financial Services, Inc. disputes
Primary Residential Mortgage Click Here Primary Residential Mortgage complaint, Primary Residential Mortgage complaints, Primary Residential Mortgage dispute, Primary Residential Mortgage disputes
Prime Credit Corporation Click Here Prime Credit Corporation complaint, Prime Credit Corporation complaints, Prime Credit Corporation dispute, Prime Credit Corporation disputes
PrimeLending, A PlainsCapital Company Click Here PrimeLending, A PlainsCapital Company complaint, PrimeLending, A PlainsCapital Company complaints, PrimeLending, A PlainsCapital Company dispute, PrimeLending, A PlainsCapital Company disputes
Private Bank & Trust Click Here Private Bank & Trust complaint, Private Bank & Trust complaints, Private Bank & Trust dispute, Private Bank & Trust disputes
Proficio Mortgage Ventures, LLC Click Here Proficio Mortgage Ventures, LLC complaint, Proficio Mortgage Ventures, LLC complaints, Proficio Mortgage Ventures, LLC dispute, Proficio Mortgage Ventures, LLC disputes
Prospect Mortgage Click Here Prospect Mortgage complaint, Prospect Mortgage complaints, Prospect Mortgage dispute, Prospect Mortgage disputes
Provident Funding Click Here Provident Funding complaint, Provident Funding complaints, Provident Funding dispute, Provident Funding disputes
Prudent Law Group Click Here Prudent Law Group complaint, Prudent Law Group complaints, Prudent Law Group dispute, Prudent Law Group disputes
Pulte Mortgage Click Here Pulte Mortgage complaint, Pulte Mortgage complaints, Pulte Mortgage dispute, Pulte Mortgage disputes
Quality Loan Service Corporation Click Here Quality Loan Service Corporation complaint, Quality Loan Service Corporation complaints, Quality Loan Service Corporation dispute, Quality Loan Service Corporation disputes
Quantum Servicing Company Click Here Quantum Servicing Company complaint, Quantum Servicing Company complaints, Quantum Servicing Company dispute, Quantum Servicing Company disputes
Quicken Loans Click Here Quicken Loans complaint, Quicken Loans complaints, Quicken Loans dispute, Quicken Loans disputes
Rabobank Click Here Rabobank complaint, Rabobank complaints, Rabobank dispute, Rabobank disputes
Rapid Mortgage Click Here Rapid Mortgage complaint, Rapid Mortgage complaints, Rapid Mortgage dispute, Rapid Mortgage disputes
RBC Bank (Georgia) Click Here RBC Bank (Georgia) complaint, RBC Bank (Georgia) complaints, RBC Bank (Georgia) dispute, RBC Bank (Georgia) disputes
RBS Citizens Click Here RBS Citizens complaint, RBS Citizens complaints, RBS Citizens dispute, RBS Citizens disputes
Real Estate Mortgage Network, Inc. Click Here Real Estate Mortgage Network, Inc. complaint, Real Estate Mortgage Network, Inc. complaints, Real Estate Mortgage Network, Inc. dispute, Real Estate Mortgage Network, Inc. disputes
Real Time Resolutions Click Here Real Time Resolutions complaint, Real Time Resolutions complaints, Real Time Resolutions dispute, Real Time Resolutions disputes
Red Rock Mortgage & Lending LLC Click Here Red Rock Mortgage & Lending LLC complaint, Red Rock Mortgage & Lending LLC complaints, Red Rock Mortgage & Lending LLC dispute, Red Rock Mortgage & Lending LLC disputes
Redwood Mortgage Investors Click Here Redwood Mortgage Investors complaint, Redwood Mortgage Investors complaints, Redwood Mortgage Investors dispute, Redwood Mortgage Investors disputes
Regency Mortgage Corp Click Here Regency Mortgage Corp complaint, Regency Mortgage Corp complaints, Regency Mortgage Corp dispute, Regency Mortgage Corp disputes
Regional Management Corp. Click Here Regional Management Corp. complaint, Regional Management Corp. complaints, Regional Management Corp. dispute, Regional Management Corp. disputes
Regions Click Here Regions complaint, Regions complaints, Regions dispute, Regions disputes
Reliance First Capital, LLC Click Here Reliance First Capital, LLC complaint, Reliance First Capital, LLC complaints, Reliance First Capital, LLC dispute, Reliance First Capital, LLC disputes
Republic Mortgage Home Loans, LLC Click Here Republic Mortgage Home Loans, LLC complaint, Republic Mortgage Home Loans, LLC complaints, Republic Mortgage Home Loans, LLC dispute, Republic Mortgage Home Loans, LLC disputes
Residential Credit Solutions Click Here Residential Credit Solutions complaint, Residential Credit Solutions complaints, Residential Credit Solutions dispute, Residential Credit Solutions disputes
Residential Finance Corporation Click Here Residential Finance Corporation complaint, Residential Finance Corporation complaints, Residential Finance Corporation dispute, Residential Finance Corporation disputes
Residential Mortgage Services Click Here Residential Mortgage Services complaint, Residential Mortgage Services complaints, Residential Mortgage Services dispute, Residential Mortgage Services disputes
Resource Pro Click Here Resource Pro complaint, Resource Pro complaints, Resource Pro dispute, Resource Pro disputes
Resurgent Capital Services L.P. Click Here Resurgent Capital Services L.P. complaint, Resurgent Capital Services L.P. complaints, Resurgent Capital Services L.P. dispute, Resurgent Capital Services L.P. disputes
Reverse Mortgage Solutions Click Here Reverse Mortgage Solutions complaint, Reverse Mortgage Solutions complaints, Reverse Mortgage Solutions dispute, Reverse Mortgage Solutions disputes
Rhode Island Student Loan Authority Click Here Rhode Island Student Loan Authority complaint, Rhode Island Student Loan Authority complaints, Rhode Island Student Loan Authority dispute, Rhode Island Student Loan Authority disputes
Ricart Financial Services Click Here Ricart Financial Services complaint, Ricart Financial Services complaints, Ricart Financial Services dispute, Ricart Financial Services disputes
RMK Financial Corp Click Here RMK Financial Corp complaint, RMK Financial Corp complaints, RMK Financial Corp dispute, RMK Financial Corp disputes
RMR Financial dba Princeton Capital Click Here RMR Financial dba Princeton Capital complaint, RMR Financial dba Princeton Capital complaints, RMR Financial dba Princeton Capital dispute, RMR Financial dba Princeton Capital disputes
Robert P. Tomasso Mortgage Company, Inc Click Here Robert P. Tomasso Mortgage Company, Inc complaint, Robert P. Tomasso Mortgage Company, Inc complaints, Robert P. Tomasso Mortgage Company, Inc dispute, Robert P. Tomasso Mortgage Company, Inc disputes
Rochester Home Equity, Inc. Click Here Rochester Home Equity, Inc. complaint, Rochester Home Equity, Inc. complaints, Rochester Home Equity, Inc. dispute, Rochester Home Equity, Inc. disputes
Round Point Mortgage Click Here Round Point Mortgage complaint, Round Point Mortgage complaints, Round Point Mortgage dispute, Round Point Mortgage disputes
Routh Crabtree Olsen Click Here Routh Crabtree Olsen complaint, Routh Crabtree Olsen complaints, Routh Crabtree Olsen dispute, Routh Crabtree Olsen disputes
RP Funding Incorporated Click Here RP Funding Incorporated complaint, RP Funding Incorporated complaints, RP Funding Incorporated dispute, RP Funding Incorporated disputes
RPM Mortgage Click Here RPM Mortgage complaint, RPM Mortgage complaints, RPM Mortgage dispute, RPM Mortgage disputes
Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC Click Here Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC complaint, Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC complaints, Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC dispute, Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC disputes
Sallie Mae Click Here Sallie Mae complaint, Sallie Mae complaints, Sallie Mae dispute, Sallie Mae disputes
Santander Consumer USA Click Here Santander Consumer USA complaint, Santander Consumer USA complaints, Santander Consumer USA dispute, Santander Consumer USA disputes
Security Finance Click Here Security Finance complaint, Security Finance complaints, Security Finance dispute, Security Finance disputes
Security National Mortgage Click Here Security National Mortgage complaint, Security National Mortgage complaints, Security National Mortgage dispute, Security National Mortgage disputes
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc Click Here Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc complaint, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc complaints, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc dispute, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc disputes
Selene Finance Click Here Selene Finance complaint, Selene Finance complaints, Selene Finance dispute, Selene Finance disputes
Sente Mortgage Click Here Sente Mortgage complaint, Sente Mortgage complaints, Sente Mortgage dispute, Sente Mortgage disputes
Sentrix Financial Services Click Here Sentrix Financial Services complaint, Sentrix Financial Services complaints, Sentrix Financial Services dispute, Sentrix Financial Services disputes
Sentry Abstract Co. Click Here Sentry Abstract Co. complaint, Sentry Abstract Co. complaints, Sentry Abstract Co. dispute, Sentry Abstract Co. disputes
SERVICELINK LOSS MITIGATION SERVICES Click Here SERVICELINK LOSS MITIGATION SERVICES complaint, SERVICELINK LOSS MITIGATION SERVICES complaints, SERVICELINK LOSS MITIGATION SERVICES dispute, SERVICELINK LOSS MITIGATION SERVICES disputes
Servis One, Inc. Click Here Servis One, Inc. complaint, Servis One, Inc. complaints, Servis One, Inc. dispute, Servis One, Inc. disputes
Seterus Click Here Seterus complaint, Seterus complaints, Seterus dispute, Seterus disputes
Sierra Pacific Mortgage Click Here Sierra Pacific Mortgage complaint, Sierra Pacific Mortgage complaints, Sierra Pacific Mortgage dispute, Sierra Pacific Mortgage disputes
Signature Bank Click Here Signature Bank complaint, Signature Bank complaints, Signature Bank dispute, Signature Bank disputes
Siwell Inc Click Here Siwell Inc complaint, Siwell Inc complaints, Siwell Inc dispute, Siwell Inc disputes
SN SERVICING CORPORATION Click Here SN SERVICING CORPORATION complaint, SN SERVICING CORPORATION complaints, SN SERVICING CORPORATION dispute, SN SERVICING CORPORATION disputes
Social Finance, Inc. Click Here Social Finance, Inc. complaint, Social Finance, Inc. complaints, Social Finance, Inc. dispute, Social Finance, Inc. disputes
Solace Financial Click Here Solace Financial complaint, Solace Financial complaints, Solace Financial dispute, Solace Financial disputes
Sound Mortgage Click Here Sound Mortgage complaint, Sound Mortgage complaints, Sound Mortgage dispute, Sound Mortgage disputes
South Carolina Student Loan Click Here South Carolina Student Loan complaint, South Carolina Student Loan complaints, South Carolina Student Loan dispute, South Carolina Student Loan disputes
Southern Trust Mortgage Click Here Southern Trust Mortgage complaint, Southern Trust Mortgage complaints, Southern Trust Mortgage dispute, Southern Trust Mortgage disputes
SouthPoint Financial Services Click Here SouthPoint Financial Services complaint, SouthPoint Financial Services complaints, SouthPoint Financial Services dispute, SouthPoint Financial Services disputes
Southwest Stage Funding LLC Click Here Southwest Stage Funding LLC complaint, Southwest Stage Funding LLC complaints, Southwest Stage Funding LLC dispute, Southwest Stage Funding LLC disputes
Sovereign Bank Click Here Sovereign Bank complaint, Sovereign Bank complaints, Sovereign Bank dispute, Sovereign Bank disputes
Specialized Loan Servicing LLC Click Here Specialized Loan Servicing LLC complaint, Specialized Loan Servicing LLC complaints, Specialized Loan Servicing LLC dispute, Specialized Loan Servicing LLC disputes
Spiriter LLC Click Here Spiriter LLC complaint, Spiriter LLC complaints, Spiriter LLC dispute, Spiriter LLC disputes
Springleaf Finance Click Here Springleaf Finance complaint, Springleaf Finance complaints, Springleaf Finance dispute, Springleaf Finance disputes
St. James Mortgage Click Here St. James Mortgage complaint, St. James Mortgage complaints, St. James Mortgage dispute, St. James Mortgage disputes
Standard Mortgage Corporation Click Here Standard Mortgage Corporation complaint, Standard Mortgage Corporation complaints, Standard Mortgage Corporation dispute, Standard Mortgage Corporation disputes
State Employee’s Credit Union Click Here State Employee’s Credit Union complaint, State Employee’s Credit Union complaints, State Employee’s Credit Union dispute, State Employee’s Credit Union disputes
State Farm Bank Click Here State Farm Bank complaint, State Farm Bank complaints, State Farm Bank dispute, State Farm Bank disputes
State Home Mortgage Click Here State Home Mortgage complaint, State Home Mortgage complaints, State Home Mortgage dispute, State Home Mortgage disputes
State Law Group Click Here State Law Group complaint, State Law Group complaints, State Law Group dispute, State Law Group disputes
State Street Bank Click Here State Street Bank complaint, State Street Bank complaints, State Street Bank dispute, State Street Bank disputes
Statebridge Company Click Here Statebridge Company complaint, Statebridge Company complaints, Statebridge Company dispute, Statebridge Company disputes
Stearns Lending Click Here Stearns Lending complaint, Stearns Lending complaints, Stearns Lending dispute, Stearns Lending disputes
Sterling Home Loans Inc Click Here Sterling Home Loans Inc complaint, Sterling Home Loans Inc complaints, Sterling Home Loans Inc dispute, Sterling Home Loans Inc disputes
Sterling Infosystems, Inc. Click Here Sterling Infosystems, Inc. complaint, Sterling Infosystems, Inc. complaints, Sterling Infosystems, Inc. dispute, Sterling Infosystems, Inc. disputes
Sterling Jewelers Inc. Click Here Sterling Jewelers Inc. complaint, Sterling Jewelers Inc. complaints, Sterling Jewelers Inc. dispute, Sterling Jewelers Inc. disputes
Stonegate Mortgage Corporation Click Here Stonegate Mortgage Corporation complaint, Stonegate Mortgage Corporation complaints, Stonegate Mortgage Corporation dispute, Stonegate Mortgage Corporation disputes
Streeter Brothers Mortgage Corp Click Here Streeter Brothers Mortgage Corp complaint, Streeter Brothers Mortgage Corp complaints, Streeter Brothers Mortgage Corp dispute, Streeter Brothers Mortgage Corp disputes
Student Loan Finance Corporation Click Here Student Loan Finance Corporation complaint, Student Loan Finance Corporation complaints, Student Loan Finance Corporation dispute, Student Loan Finance Corporation disputes
Suburban Mortgage Company of New Mexico Click Here Suburban Mortgage Company of New Mexico complaint, Suburban Mortgage Company of New Mexico complaints, Suburban Mortgage Company of New Mexico dispute, Suburban Mortgage Company of New Mexico disputes
Summit Mortgage Corporation Click Here Summit Mortgage Corporation complaint, Summit Mortgage Corporation complaints, Summit Mortgage Corporation dispute, Summit Mortgage Corporation disputes
Sun West Mortgage Company, Inc. Click Here Sun West Mortgage Company, Inc. complaint, Sun West Mortgage Company, Inc. complaints, Sun West Mortgage Company, Inc. dispute, Sun West Mortgage Company, Inc. disputes
SunTrust Bank Click Here SunTrust Bank complaint, SunTrust Bank complaints, SunTrust Bank dispute, SunTrust Bank disputes
Supreme Lending Click Here Supreme Lending complaint, Supreme Lending complaints, Supreme Lending dispute, Supreme Lending disputes
Susquehanna Bank Click Here Susquehanna Bank complaint, Susquehanna Bank complaints, Susquehanna Bank dispute, Susquehanna Bank disputes
SVI Group Inc. Click Here SVI Group Inc. complaint, SVI Group Inc. complaints, SVI Group Inc. dispute, SVI Group Inc. disputes
Swe Homes LP Click Here Swe Homes LP complaint, Swe Homes LP complaints, Swe Homes LP dispute, Swe Homes LP disputes
Synovus Bank Click Here Synovus Bank complaint, Synovus Bank complaints, Synovus Bank dispute, Synovus Bank disputes
Tammac Holdings Click Here Tammac Holdings complaint, Tammac Holdings complaints, Tammac Holdings dispute, Tammac Holdings disputes
Taylor Morrison Home Funding Click Here Taylor Morrison Home Funding complaint, Taylor Morrison Home Funding complaints, Taylor Morrison Home Funding dispute, Taylor Morrison Home Funding disputes
TCF National Bank Click Here TCF National Bank complaint, TCF National Bank complaints, TCF National Bank dispute, TCF National Bank disputes
TD Bank Click Here TD Bank complaint, TD Bank complaints, TD Bank dispute, TD Bank disputes
Tebo Financial Services, Inc. Click Here Tebo Financial Services, Inc. complaint, Tebo Financial Services, Inc. complaints, Tebo Financial Services, Inc. dispute, Tebo Financial Services, Inc. disputes
Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board Click Here Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board complaint, Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board complaints, Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board dispute, Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board disputes
The Huntington National Bank Click Here The Huntington National Bank complaint, The Huntington National Bank complaints, The Huntington National Bank dispute, The Huntington National Bank disputes
The Northern Trust Company Click Here The Northern Trust Company complaint, The Northern Trust Company complaints, The Northern Trust Company dispute, The Northern Trust Company disputes
The Star Financial Click Here The Star Financial complaint, The Star Financial complaints, The Star Financial dispute, The Star Financial disputes
Third Federal Savings & Loan Click Here Third Federal Savings & Loan complaint, Third Federal Savings & Loan complaints, Third Federal Savings & Loan dispute, Third Federal Savings & Loan disputes
Third Financial Services Corp Click Here Third Financial Services Corp complaint, Third Financial Services Corp complaints, Third Financial Services Corp dispute, Third Financial Services Corp disputes
Toll Brothers Inc. Click Here Toll Brothers Inc. complaint, Toll Brothers Inc. complaints, Toll Brothers Inc. dispute, Toll Brothers Inc. disputes
Total Mortgage Services LLC Click Here Total Mortgage Services LLC complaint, Total Mortgage Services LLC complaints, Total Mortgage Services LLC dispute, Total Mortgage Services LLC disputes
Toyota Motor Credit Corporation Click Here Toyota Motor Credit Corporation complaint, Toyota Motor Credit Corporation complaints, Toyota Motor Credit Corporation dispute, Toyota Motor Credit Corporation disputes
Trans-Fast Remittance LLC Click Here Trans-Fast Remittance LLC complaint, Trans-Fast Remittance LLC complaints, Trans-Fast Remittance LLC dispute, Trans-Fast Remittance LLC disputes
TransUnion Click Here TransUnion complaint, TransUnion complaints, TransUnion dispute, TransUnion disputes
Trinity Credit Services Click Here Trinity Credit Services complaint, Trinity Credit Services complaints, Trinity Credit Services dispute, Trinity Credit Services disputes
Tuition Options LLC Click Here Tuition Options LLC complaint, Tuition Options LLC complaints, Tuition Options LLC dispute, Tuition Options LLC disputes
U.S. Bancorp Click Here U.S. Bancorp complaint, U.S. Bancorp complaints, U.S. Bancorp dispute, U.S. Bancorp disputes
UAS LoanService (University Accounting Service) Click Here UAS LoanService (University Accounting Service) complaint, UAS LoanService (University Accounting Service) complaints, UAS LoanService (University Accounting Service) dispute, UAS LoanService (University Accounting Service) disputes
UBS Bank Click Here UBS Bank complaint, UBS Bank complaints, UBS Bank dispute, UBS Bank disputes
UMB Bank Click Here UMB Bank complaint, UMB Bank complaints, UMB Bank dispute, UMB Bank disputes
Umpqua Bank Click Here Umpqua Bank complaint, Umpqua Bank complaints, Umpqua Bank dispute, Umpqua Bank disputes
Union Bank Click Here Union Bank complaint, Union Bank complaints, Union Bank dispute, Union Bank disputes
Union National Mortgage Co Click Here Union National Mortgage Co complaint, Union National Mortgage Co complaints, Union National Mortgage Co dispute, Union National Mortgage Co disputes
United Fidelity Funding, Corp Click Here United Fidelity Funding, Corp complaint, United Fidelity Funding, Corp complaints, United Fidelity Funding, Corp dispute, United Fidelity Funding, Corp disputes
United Guaranty Click Here United Guaranty complaint, United Guaranty complaints, United Guaranty dispute, United Guaranty disputes
United Pacific Mortgage Click Here United Pacific Mortgage complaint, United Pacific Mortgage complaints, United Pacific Mortgage dispute, United Pacific Mortgage disputes
United Security Financial Corp Click Here United Security Financial Corp complaint, United Security Financial Corp complaints, United Security Financial Corp dispute, United Security Financial Corp disputes
United Shore Financial Services, LLC Click Here United Shore Financial Services, LLC complaint, United Shore Financial Services, LLC complaints, United Shore Financial Services, LLC dispute, United Shore Financial Services, LLC disputes
United Student Aid (USA) Funds Click Here United Student Aid (USA) Funds complaint, United Student Aid (USA) Funds complaints, United Student Aid (USA) Funds dispute, United Student Aid (USA) Funds disputes
Universal American Mortgage Company, LLC Click Here Universal American Mortgage Company, LLC complaint, Universal American Mortgage Company, LLC complaints, Universal American Mortgage Company, LLC dispute, Universal American Mortgage Company, LLC disputes
Universal Finance, Inc. Click Here Universal Finance, Inc. complaint, Universal Finance, Inc. complaints, Universal Finance, Inc. dispute, Universal Finance, Inc. disputes
Universal Lending Corporation Click Here Universal Lending Corporation complaint, Universal Lending Corporation complaints, Universal Lending Corporation dispute, Universal Lending Corporation disputes
Urban Financial Group Inc Click Here Urban Financial Group Inc complaint, Urban Financial Group Inc complaints, Urban Financial Group Inc dispute, Urban Financial Group Inc disputes
US Gold Cards Inc Click Here US Gold Cards Inc complaint, US Gold Cards Inc complaints, US Gold Cards Inc dispute, US Gold Cards Inc disputes
US Mortgage Corporation Click Here US Mortgage Corporation complaint, US Mortgage Corporation complaints, US Mortgage Corporation dispute, US Mortgage Corporation disputes
US Wide Financial Click Here US Wide Financial complaint, US Wide Financial complaints, US Wide Financial dispute, US Wide Financial disputes
USAA Savings Click Here USAA Savings complaint, USAA Savings complaints, USAA Savings dispute, USAA Savings disputes
Valley Estates Escrow Click Here Valley Estates Escrow complaint, Valley Estates Escrow complaints, Valley Estates Escrow dispute, Valley Estates Escrow disputes
Valley National Bank Click Here Valley National Bank complaint, Valley National Bank complaints, Valley National Bank dispute, Valley National Bank disputes
Van Dyk Mortgage Corporation Click Here Van Dyk Mortgage Corporation complaint, Van Dyk Mortgage Corporation complaints, Van Dyk Mortgage Corporation dispute, Van Dyk Mortgage Corporation disputes
Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance Click Here Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance complaint, Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance complaints, Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance dispute, Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance disputes
Vanderwey Investments, LLC Click Here Vanderwey Investments, LLC complaint, Vanderwey Investments, LLC complaints, Vanderwey Investments, LLC dispute, Vanderwey Investments, LLC disputes
Vantium Capital Click Here Vantium Capital complaint, Vantium Capital complaints, Vantium Capital dispute, Vantium Capital disputes
Vectra Bank of Colorado Click Here Vectra Bank of Colorado complaint, Vectra Bank of Colorado complaints, Vectra Bank of Colorado dispute, Vectra Bank of Colorado disputes
Venta Financial Group, Inc Click Here Venta Financial Group, Inc complaint, Venta Financial Group, Inc complaints, Venta Financial Group, Inc dispute, Venta Financial Group, Inc disputes
VHDA Click Here VHDA complaint, VHDA complaints, VHDA dispute, VHDA disputes
Vista Mortgage Corporation Click Here Vista Mortgage Corporation complaint, Vista Mortgage Corporation complaints, Vista Mortgage Corporation dispute, Vista Mortgage Corporation disputes
Volunteer Mortgage Inc Click Here Volunteer Mortgage Inc complaint, Volunteer Mortgage Inc complaints, Volunteer Mortgage Inc dispute, Volunteer Mortgage Inc disputes
VW Credit, Inc Click Here VW Credit, Inc complaint, VW Credit, Inc complaints, VW Credit, Inc dispute, VW Credit, Inc disputes
W.J. Bradley Mortgage Click Here W.J. Bradley Mortgage complaint, W.J. Bradley Mortgage complaints, W.J. Bradley Mortgage dispute, W.J. Bradley Mortgage disputes
Wallick and Volk Inc Click Here Wallick and Volk Inc complaint, Wallick and Volk Inc complaints, Wallick and Volk Inc dispute, Wallick and Volk Inc disputes
Washington Federal Click Here Washington Federal complaint, Washington Federal complaints, Washington Federal dispute, Washington Federal disputes
Watermark Capital, INC. Click Here Watermark Capital, INC. complaint, Watermark Capital, INC. complaints, Watermark Capital, INC. dispute, Watermark Capital, INC. disputes
Waterstone Mortgage Corporation Click Here Waterstone Mortgage Corporation complaint, Waterstone Mortgage Corporation complaints, Waterstone Mortgage Corporation dispute, Waterstone Mortgage Corporation disputes
WCDA Wyoming Community Development Authority Click Here WCDA Wyoming Community Development Authority complaint, WCDA Wyoming Community Development Authority complaints, WCDA Wyoming Community Development Authority dispute, WCDA Wyoming Community Development Authority disputes
WCS Funding Group Click Here WCS Funding Group complaint, WCS Funding Group complaints, WCS Funding Group dispute, WCS Funding Group disputes
WCS LENDING LLC Click Here WCS LENDING LLC complaint, WCS LENDING LLC complaints, WCS LENDING LLC dispute, WCS LENDING LLC disputes
Webster Bank Click Here Webster Bank complaint, Webster Bank complaints, Webster Bank dispute, Webster Bank disputes
Weichert Financial Services Click Here Weichert Financial Services complaint, Weichert Financial Services complaints, Weichert Financial Services dispute, Weichert Financial Services disputes
Wells Fargo Click Here Wells Fargo complaint, Wells Fargo complaints, Wells Fargo dispute, Wells Fargo disputes
Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Click Here Weltman, Weinberg & Reis complaint, Weltman, Weinberg & Reis complaints, Weltman, Weinberg & Reis dispute, Weltman, Weinberg & Reis disputes
Westar Mortgage Corporation Click Here Westar Mortgage Corporation complaint, Westar Mortgage Corporation complaints, Westar Mortgage Corporation dispute, Westar Mortgage Corporation disputes
Western Union Click Here Western Union complaint, Western Union complaints, Western Union dispute, Western Union disputes
Westlake Services, LLC Click Here Westlake Services, LLC complaint, Westlake Services, LLC complaints, Westlake Services, LLC dispute, Westlake Services, LLC disputes
Whitney Bank Click Here Whitney Bank complaint, Whitney Bank complaints, Whitney Bank dispute, Whitney Bank disputes
Wholesale Capital Corporation Click Here Wholesale Capital Corporation complaint, Wholesale Capital Corporation complaints, Wholesale Capital Corporation dispute, Wholesale Capital Corporation disputes
Windermere Mortgage Services Series LLC Click Here Windermere Mortgage Services Series LLC complaint, Windermere Mortgage Services Series LLC complaints, Windermere Mortgage Services Series LLC dispute, Windermere Mortgage Services Series LLC disputes
World Omni Financial Corp. Click Here World Omni Financial Corp. complaint, World Omni Financial Corp. complaints, World Omni Financial Corp. dispute, World Omni Financial Corp. disputes
World Wide Land Transfer, Inc. Click Here World Wide Land Transfer, Inc. complaint, World Wide Land Transfer, Inc. complaints, World Wide Land Transfer, Inc. dispute, World Wide Land Transfer, Inc. disputes
WR Starkey Mortgage, LLP Click Here WR Starkey Mortgage, LLP complaint, WR Starkey Mortgage, LLP complaints, WR Starkey Mortgage, LLP dispute, WR Starkey Mortgage, LLP disputes
Yale Mortgage Corporation Click Here Yale Mortgage Corporation complaint, Yale Mortgage Corporation complaints, Yale Mortgage Corporation dispute, Yale Mortgage Corporation disputes
Zions First National Bank Click Here Zions First National Bank complaint, Zions First National Bank complaints, Zions First National Bank dispute, Zions First National Bank disputes

Source: http://www.ablecontent.com/cfpbdatabase/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=680

© 2010-13 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD4 Comments

DOLLENS v WELLS FARGO | NM 2nd Judicial District – Wrongful Foreclosure = $3.1 Million in Actual & Punitive Damages

DOLLENS v WELLS FARGO | NM 2nd Judicial District – Wrongful Foreclosure = $3.1 Million in Actual & Punitive Damages

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Christopher Dollens et al.,

v

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al.

LETTER DECISION

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Decedent James Dollens (Decedent) purchased a home in 2003, with a loan from Wells Fargo
Home Mortgage (Wells Fargo) for $133,700. Decedent’s loan was in good standing until his
accidental death on August 18,2010 at his workplace.

Prior to Decedent’s death, he purchased a mortgage accidental death insurance policy in January
2010. The policy was marketed and sold through Wells Fargo, and underwritten by Minnesota
Life Insurance Company (Minnesota Life). The policy premium was $15.12 monthly, and was
added to Decedent’s monthly mortgage payment and collected by Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo was
both the insured and the policyholder.

After Decedent’s death his son, Christopher Dollens (Dollens), notified Wells Fargo and
Minnesota Life via telephone call of his death. He also made a claim under the accidental death
policy to Minnesota Life, and told Wells Fargo that he would be appointed personal
representative of his father’s estate. Additionally, Decedent’s widow, Dina Dollens, contacted
Wells Fargo and notified them of his death and the accidental death policy.

As a result of the death of Decedent, no payments were made for several months on the
mortgage. Wells Fargo sent monthly statements regarding the loan being in default. In
December 2010 counsel for Wells Fargo sent a demand and cure letter regarding the missed
mortgage payments. Dollens retained counsel to provide the necessary documentation to Wells
Fargo showing that he was the personal representative of his father’s estate, and to notify them
that a claim was being made under the accidental death policy. In a letter dated January 10,2011
Dollens’ counsel requested that Wells Fargo not pursue collections and foreclosure while the
claim was pending. Wells Fargo did not respond to the letter.

In February 2011 Minnesota Life also requested that Wells Fargo delay any adverse action on
the account while the claim was pending. Again, there was no response from Wells Fargo.
Minnesota Life initially denied the claim under the accidental death policy, but subsequently
reversed its decision and approved the claim. It sent a Notice of Death form to Wells Fargo
requesting the balance due on the account. Wells Fargo completed the form on February 16,
2011 and stated that the amount due on the account at the time of Decedent’s death was
$121,082.31.

Also, in February 2011, Wells Fargo initiated a foreclosure against Decedent’s home, in spite of
the request by the Personal Representative’s counsel and Minnesota Life to delay adverse action
on the mortgage. Wells Fargo hired foreclosure counsel, and costs and fees accrued as a result of
the foreclosure action being filed.

On October 5,2011 Wells Fargo received a check for $133,559.15 from Minnesota Life for the
proceeds due under the accidental death policy. Rather than post and apply the funds
immediately, Wells Fargo posted the funds five days later, on October 10, 2011, placed them
into a suspense account and paid costs and fees, before applying the payment to interest and the
outstanding principal. Applying the Minnesota Life payment in this manner led to a balance of
$4,416.45 still being owed on the account.

Although the investor, Freddie Mac, in August 2012 authorized a charge-off due to the low
balance on the account, Wells Fargo continued collection efforts for some time. As part of the
collection efforts, Wells Fargo demanded amounts due which were not owed or valid. Beverly
DeCaro (DeCaro), a Wells Fargo employee, testified that continuing collection efforts after the
charge-off and demanding amounts which were not owed, were “mistakes”. She also testified
that the manner in which this account was handled was in keeping with the customary practices
and procedures of Wells Fargo.

With regards to the manner in which the insurance proceeds were applied, Wells Fargo posited
that because of the fees and costs which accrued due to the default and foreclosure action, it did
not consider the insurance proceeds to be sufficient to payoff the account in full, thus it applied
the funds as if the account were reinstated rather than being paid off. However, Wells Fargo did
not notify the Estate that the account was reinstated, and, more significantly, did not dismiss the
foreclosure action.

Despite the October payment of$133,559.15 and testimony that Wells Fargo considered the loan
reinstated, the order of dismissal in the foreclosure action was not entered until March 20, 2012,
months after the insurance proceeds were applied to the account. Wells Fargo offered no valid
justification for its continuation of the foreclosure action for five months after being paid.

CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE AND BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

The Court was persuaded by Plaintiffs’ evidence as to this claim. The Court finds numerous
willful breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the Court also finds that Wells
Fargo committed a wrongful foreclosure.

Plaintiffs presented significant and credible evidence that Wells Fargo marketed and sold
decedent the mortgage accidental death policy. After decedent purchased the policy, Defendant
sent decedent an acknowledgement letter stating that his application was approved and enclosing
the policy. In addition, the letter informed decedent that the policy “helps protect your family
family’s financial security”. (Stipulated Exhibit 3) There can be no doubt that the insurance
policy was marketed to homeowners and created an expectation that the balance of their
mortgage would be paid in the event of their death and was done to provide peace of mind to
decedent and to prevent financial hardship to decedent’s heirs. There can also be no doubt that
such an expectation is reasonable. Wells Fargo admitted that payment of the mortgage balance
was the purpose of the insurance. (Wells Fargo’s Answer to Request for Admission No.3)

In light of the fact that Wells Fargo represented and sold the insurance policy on behalfofMLlC,
collected the monthly premiums for the policy, and had proof of decedent’s death, it should have
taken into consideration the policy before proceeding to foreclose on the property. Wells Fargo
sold the insurance to prevent this very scenario.

In spite of the fact that Wells Fargo sold decedent the mortgage accidental death policy, and was
the policyholder and insured, upon receiving news of decedent’s death, it did nothing to assist
the Estate insofar as making a claim or appealing the denial of the claim. The Court finds that
upon learning of the death of decedent, Wells Fargo should have made a claim with MLlC for
the death benefit. Apparently, ignoring its ability to make a death benefit claim is typical of how
Wells Fargo deals with such situations. DeCaro testified that while many mortgagors die prior to
the expiration of the term of the mortgage, Wells Fargo has no policies or procedures in place to
make claims or otherwise assist estates. This is a systemic failure on the part of Wells Fargo.
Beyond the fact that it has no policies or procedures with regards to accounts with mortgage
accidental death polices, it failed in this case to even take that fact into account. The evidence
showed that both MLlC and counsel for the personal representative requested that Wells Fargo
delay adverse action on the account while the accidental death claim was pending. Instead,
Wells Fargo proceeded to foreclosure on February 9, 2011. Wells Fargo’s inability,
unwillingness, and failure to take action when requested by MLlC is shocking, particularly in
light of Wells Fargo’s ongoing commercial relationship with MLlC.

The Court also finds that Wells Fargo failed to follow the Freddie Mac servicer guidelines, to the
detriment of the Estate. As testified to by Plaintiff’s expert, Andrew Pizor, and Wells Fargo
witness DeCaro, the servicer guidelines are for the benefit of the borrower. Specifically, Wells
Fargo should have granted the Estate a forbearance on the mortgage, and it failed to do so.
Plaintiffs’ expert, Pizor, testified credibly that Wells Fargo should have granted forbearance
based on the Freddie Mac guidelines, and had it done so, late fees, attorneys’ fees, and costs
would not have been incurred, and the foreclosure would not have occurred. Furthermore, the
Estate would not have had to hire counsel to represent it in the foreclosure and incur attorneys’
fees. Thus, this misconduct by Wells Fargo caused the damages to the Estate.

The Court further finds that Wells Fargo’s application of the insurance proceeds was improper
and again to the detriment of the Estate. Rather than apply the proceeds to interest and principal,
as required by the Note, Wells Fargo paid its fees and expenses, which led to the result of the
insurance proceeds being insufficient to payoff the outstanding balance under the Note. This
practice, according to Wells Fargo employees, should not have occurred.

The typical procedure when such a check is received is to only use the funds to payoff the loan.
Wells Fargo employee , Luann Tupa, testified to the practice and procedure. In addition,
Stipulated Exhibit 27 is a series of emails among Wells Fargo employees that discusses the
practice. Apparently, the normal Wells Fargo practice is that when optional product funds (i.e.,
mortgage accidental death proceeds) are received, attorneys’ fees are waived so that the funds
can be used to payoff the loan. As noted in the emails, the reason for the practice is because of
“the incredibly high reputational risk associated with these loans. Wells Fargo actually markets
these Life Insurance products with our mortgage portfolio and we service them attached to the
loan itself…we are honoring those benefits and doing as much as we can to have the loan paid in
full per that policy.”

Yet, in this case, that practice was not followed. Instead, Wells Fargo put its interests before the
Estate and paid numerous other fees, many of which were not proper, with the result that the
insurance proceeds were insufficient to payoff the loan balance. Clearly, Wells Fargo did not
honor the trust and confidence decedent placed in it when he purchased the policy with the intent
of avoiding this very scenario. Wells Fargo Vice President, Robert Dudacek, stated that
decedent’s decision to purchase the mortgage accidental death policy ensured his “family’s
financial security.” (Stip. Exhibit 3) Unfortunately, Wells Fargo took a course of action that
was for its benefit rather than decedent’s family’s financial security. The conduct by Wells
Fargo was a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and resulted in a wrongful
foreclosure. Plaintiffs’ entitlement to damages is discussed separately.

CLAIM FOR VIOLATION OF THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT

The Court was persuaded by Plaintiffs’ evidence with regards to this claim. Specifically, the
Court finds that Wells Fargo violated the Act by marketing and selling mortgage accidental death
insurance to decedent for the purposes of protecting his “family’s financial security”, and then
after it received notice of decedent’s death, attempted to collect the mortgage payments, and
then instituted a foreclosure when it knew there was a mortgage accidental death policy in place,
for which it had collected premiums for some months. The Court finds that because Wells Fargo
was the “licensed agency representing … the insurer”, it had knowledge that the purpose of the
policy was to pay the mortgage balance in the event of the mortgagor’s accidental death. The
Court further finds that Wells Fargo also knew that the decedent’s Estate would not be liable for
the debt unless the claim was denied, after all appeals.

Wells Fargo marketed the life insurance policy knowing at the time it sold the policy that it had
no policies or procedures in place to make claims or otherwise assist estates. Wells Fargo took
advantage of a lack of knowledge, ability, experience or capacity of decedent’ and his family
members, and its actions tended to or did deceive decedent.

The previously set forth acts by Wells Fargo are also a violation of the UPA. In particular the
improper fees and costs assessed against the account and continuing to try to collect on the
account after the charge-off of the loan, and improperly claiming that the Estate owed more
money than was due are violations of the UPA.

There is no doubt that Wells Fargo’s conduct was intended to take advantage of a lack of
knowledge, ability, experience or capacity of decedent’s family members, and tended to or did
deceive. Further, its conduct caused damages to Plaintiffs for which they are entitled to
compensation.

CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

The previously set forth acts by Wells Fargo are also a breach of contract. Plaintiffs met their
burden on this claim. The Court finds that Wells Fargo breached the terms of the Note by
improperly assessing fees and costs, which resulted in assessment of additional interest, fees and
costs against the account. In fact, Wells Fargo concedes that approximately $400.00 of
inspections fees paid by the Estate shall be reimbursed by it. (Pretrial Order and #51 of Wells
Fargo’s closing argument)

The evidence established that Wells Fargo violated the terms of the Note by using the insurance
proceeds to pay its fees and costs first instead of interest and the balance due. This
misapplication of the insurance proceeds caused the Note to keep a balance after the proceeds
were applied, which resulted in the account going into default again, and Wells Fargo claiming a
debt when none would have existed, but for its misapplication of the insurance proceeds.
Plaintiffs are entitled to damages.

DAMAGES

Wells Fargo’s contention that Plaintiffs failed to mitigate their damages is unpersuasive. Wells
Fargo admits that the Estate should be reimbursed approximately $400.00 for improper fees, but
Wells Fargo has not paid that amount. Wells Fargo has not taken its own action that could have
lowered its damages or displayed any consideration for its customer/decedent’s heirs.

Plaintiffs I presented credible evidence of damages of$15,633.42 in improper late fees, improper
property preservation fees, corporate advance fees, monthly payments that would not have been
due had Wells Fargo properly applied the insurance proceeds and otherwise acted in compliance
with its duties to its customer. The Court finds each of these causes of action, Wrongful
Foreclosure; Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; Breach of Contract; and
Unfair Trade Practices have identical damages of$15,633.42.

Undoubtedly, there was sufficient evidence presented to justify imposition of punitive damages
against Wells Fargo, or treble damages under the UPA. The evidence of Wells Fargo’s
misconduct was staggering. Certain evidence in particular highlights Wells Fargo’s indifference
to its customers. Wells Fargo charged the Estate for lawn care of the property (i.e., cutting the
grass), even though no grass was actually cut. The reason for this was that Wells Fargo claimed
that pursuant to the Freddie Mac guidelines, it was required to have the grass cut every 25-30
days; thus, it believed it was appropriate to bill the Estate for this regardless of whether it was
necessary. The property at issue did not have a lawn. This is but one of many facts supporting an
award of punitive damages.

Compelling evidence was presented that Wells Fargo acted intentionally by improperly assessing
fees and costs against the estate, misapplying the MLIC insurance proceeds check, failing to
follow the Freddie Mac servicer guidelines, failing to credit the account with the MLIC check
when it was received and assessing interest against the account for the five days it did not credit
the MLIC check, improperly initiating a foreclosure action, misrepresenting the status of the
foreclosure to the Court in pleadings, sending collection letters/monthly statements to the estate
claiming amounts not due, and improperly assessing fees against the estate for inspections which
were not necessary. All of Wells Fargo’s actions were designed to increase its profits without
regard for the decedent or his family, and in many instances, violated the terms of the Note.

Contrary to Wells Fargo’s arguments, the mistakes were not “minor.” During the pendency of the
litigation, and at trial, Wells Fargo used its computer-driven systems as an excuse for its
“mistakes”. However, the evidence established that this misconduct was systematic and not the
result of an isolated error, or an error because of some unique fact.

Plaintiffs expert testified that Wells Fargo has previously been assessed with significant punitive
damages or fines for improper behavior similar to the conduct that occurred in this matter. No
evidence was offered that Wells Fargo has changed its behavior as a result of any prior sanction
or punitive damage award. Instead the evidence was of ongoing systematic misconduct that
Wells Fargo prefers to label as “minor.”

The evidence in this case established that the type of conduct exhibited by Wells Fargo in this
case has happened repeatedly across the country. See e.g., In re Jones, 2012 WL 1155715
(Bkrtcy.E.D.La.,2012) (Wells Fargo assessed improper fees and charges, including for property
inspections and misapplied payments. Attorney fees and punitive damages awarded.); In Re
Stewart, 647 F.3 553 (5th Cir. 2011) (Assessed fees and costs against account prior to applying
mortgage payment, contrary to terms of the note.); Filson v. Wells Fargo Home Morg., Inc.,
2008 WL 3914899 (Tenn.Ct.App., 2008) (Wells Fargo wrongfully held funds in suspense
account instead of applying to mortgage balance which resulted in default and their subsequent
attempt to foreclose.); In Re Nibbelink, 403 B.R. 113 (M.D.Fla. 2009) (Wells Fargo charged
improper fees. Punitive damages and attorney fees awarded.); and De La Fuente v. Wells Fargo,
430 B.R. 764 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2010) (Wells Fargo used bad accounting practices and failed to
correct its loan records. Punitive damages and attorney fees awarded).

Plaintiffs expert testified to an Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s Consent Order which
found that Wells Fargo systematically mishandled foreclosures and applied payments
improperly. He further testified that what happened in this case is not an isolated incident.

While the Court cannot punish Wells Fargo for being “an unsavory individual or business”, it
nonetheless may consider its similar conduct when assessing reprehensibility as it relates to the
imposition of punitive damages. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,
422-23(2003). In addition, under New Mexico law, the conduct of the Defendant towards others
may be considered in the determining the nature and enormity of the wrongful conduct. UJI131827A,
NMRA.

The Court is aware that it cannot punish Wells Fargo for acts in other cases, or for conduct
outside this case. Likewise, Wells Fargo cannot be punished for acts for which it has already
been punished. However, the Court can consider the reprehensibility of Wells Fargo’s systemic
misconduct, Wells Fargo’s net worth, and the need for deterrence. The evidence of wrongful
conduct in this case merits significant punitive damages.

This Court finds that Plaintiffs’ argument is persuasive that the attorneys’ fees which were
incurred by them should be considered in factoring the amount of punitive damages that should
be awarded. Due to the egregious nature of the conduct of Wells Fargo, the Court will consider
the fees in its calculation of punitive damages.

This Court finds that but-for this misconduct by Wells Fargo, Plaintiffs would have incurred a
small amount of attorney fees. Attorney fees are a recoverable damage under the UPA and under
NMSA §48-7-24.

Despite having multiple opportunities to contest the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees,
Defendant raised no objection to their hourly rate or the time expended on each task. In spite of
Defendant’s failure to object to the reasonableness of the fees claim, the Court reviewed each
page of the Attorney Fee Affidavit and finds that the fees claimed shall be reduced by
$15,164.00 due to the fact that there appeared to be duplication of work among the Plaintiffs’
counsel, or the work did not require the efforts of more than one counsel. The claimed 1470
hours was reduced by 51 hours for total hours expended of 1419 hours’. The Court denies the
request for costs for electronic filing and attorney travel expenses with the exception of travel
expenses incurred to depose Wells Fargo’s 30(b)(6) witnesses in St. Paul, Minnesota, but
otherwise awards all fees and costs as requested by Plaintiffs for an award of $439,051.44, plus
gross receipts taxes on the fees.

As for the attorneys’ travel expenses incurred for the deposition of Wells Fargo’s 30(b)(6)
witnesses, the Court finds that those expenses are recoverable in this circumstance. The
depositions were the subject of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel 30(b)(6) depositions, filed on
September 10, 2012. In response to the motion, Wells Fargo filed a Response and Motion for
Protective Order protesting the taking of the witnesses’ deposition in Albuquerque. The Court,
at that time, decided that Plaintiffs’ counsel would travel to St. Paul, Minnesota to take the
depositions. Plaintiffs’ counsel reserved the right to seek re-allocation of the costs. The Court
believes that it is appropriate for these expenses to be a recoverable cost due to Wells Fargo’s
unwillingness to reduce fees and expenses by objecting to the witnesses’ deposition being taken
in Albuquerque, in spite of Wells Fargo’s presence in Albuquerque. Further, Wells Fargo
brought two of the three witnesses to Albuquerque for trial. It was only when Plaintiffs wished
to reduce the fees/expenses in the litigation that Wells Fargo objected to them traveling to New
Mexico. Accordingly, the Court finds that the travel expenses of $3,071.07 for travel to St. Paul,
Minnesota, are recoverable and included that amount in the award of $439,051.44. The Court
finds damages of $15,633.42, plus attorneys’ fees and costs of $439,051.44, for a total of
$454,684.86.

The Court awards $2,728,109.16 in punitive damages. As stated above, the Court considered
attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in factoring the award of punitive damages. By the time of the
completion of the briefing on the attorney fees issue and responding to Defendant’s Motion to
Strike, attorneys’ fees and costs amounted to $439,051.44.

Mindful of the ratios to be considered with regards to punitive damages, the Court believes that
Wells Fargo’s conduct justifies a higher ratio. In light of the repeated, systematic nature of
Wells Fargo’s misconduct, the Court calculated the punitive damages at six times the
compensatory damages of $454,684.86. Awarding a ratio of 6 results in a punitive damages
award of $2,728,109.16. Total damages, without treble damages under the UPA, are
compensatory damages of $15,633.42, attorneys’ fees and costs of $439,051.44, and punitive
damages of$2,728,109.16, for a total damages award of$3,182,794.02.

If Plaintiffs elect to recover all of their relief under the UPA, the Court believes that pursuant to
Atherton v. Gopin, 272 P. 3d 700 (Ct. App. 2012), the fee award may also be trebled. Thus, if
Plaintiffs elect for a recovery under the UPA, the total award would be $1,364,054.58.

DEFENDANT’S MOTON TO WITHDRAW ADMISSIONS

At the time of trial, in response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Order Showing Admitted Facts As
Uncontroverted, Wells Fargo requested that it be allowed to withdraw the following admissions:

(2) In January of2010 Wells Fargo sold Mr. Dollens mortgage accidental death insurance under
the group policy with Minnesota Life. (Wells Fargo’s Answer to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint, ‘il4, 73 and 99)

(18) Wells Fargo applied the Minnesota Life payment first to fees and costs assessed on
mortgage loan [sic], then to accrued interest and outstanding principal. (Wells Fargo’s Answer
to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, ‘il51 and Ill.)

With regards to (2), Wells Fargo argued that this issue was contested by it and was mistakenly
admitted in its Answer. While Wells Fargo argued that its admission in the Answer to the
Second Amended Complaint was a mistake, the Court believes the facts belie the admission
being a mistake. For example, in the Answer to the Second Amended Complaint, Wells Fargo
admitted the fact three times. Also, in its Answer to the Amended Complaint, filed on March 12,
2012, (several months earlier) it admitted the very same fact. The Court believes that due to
Wells Fargo’s admission of this fact numerous times during the pendency of the litigation,
Plaintiffs were entitled to rely on it. Additionally, the admissions, coupled with the last-minute
request to withdraw the admissions, lead the Court to believe that Wells Fargo was attempting to
place Plaintiffs at a disadvantage for trial by attempting to change its defense strategy at a time
when Plaintiffs would have no opportunity to challenge the denial.

As for (18), Wells Fargo admitted the fact two separate times, and claims, yet again, that the
admission was a mistake. The Court was not persuaded that the admission was a mistake, but a
last-minute attempt to change strategy at trial. The Motion is denied.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER RULING IN DUHIGG LAW FIRM V.
WELLS FARGO

At the conclusion of Plaintiffs’ evidence at trial, Wells Fargo moved for reconsideration of the
Court’s ruling in this companion case. 3 The Court denies the motion and its ruling stands as to
its denial of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Unjust Enrichment claim.

As a result of that ruling, Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted an attorney fee affidavit to establish its
attorneys’ fees incurred due to pursuing the insurance proceeds under the Minnesota Life policy,
and fees incurred for having to file the lawsuit for unjust enrichment. The Court overrules Wells
Fargo’s objections as to the fees and concludes that the fees are reasonable, and prejudgment
interest of 15% is allowed. As for the costs, the Court finds that the itemized costs are
recoverable, with the exception of $26.00 in e-filing fees. Accordingly, fees and costs totaling
$51,879.08 up through April 16, 2013 should be awarded to Plaintiffs for those claims.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE AND FOR SANCTIONS

In response to Plaintiffs filing an Attorney Fee Affidavit for attorneys’ fees incurred as an
element of damages due to Wells Fargo’s misconduct, rather than address the reasonableness of
the fees, Wells Fargo’s counsel instead chose to file the above-referenced Motion. The Court
deems Wells Fargo’s failure to object to the reasonableness of the fees as a waiver. For the
record, Wells Fargo misconstrued the Court’s ruling as to the issue of attorneys’ fees when the
matter was briefly discussed at the conclusion of trial. The Court does not believe that Plaintiffs’
counsel submission of the attorney fee affidavit is in violation of any ruling, nor does it merit
sanctions.

To the extent that an argument can be made that the evidence of the attorneys’ fees incurred
during the litigation was submitted after the close of evidence, the Court finds that neither of the
statutes under which the Court is awarding fees limit the recovery to the time evidence closes.
Even if this was the law, Plaintiffs’ counsel presented good cause for the evidence to be reopened
for this limited purpose. Wells Fargo failed to establish prejudice as a result of this
attorney fee affidavit being submitted during the closing argument briefing period. Moreover,
prior to Plaintiffs’ counsel filing the affidavit, they offered to counsel for Wells Fargo the
opportunity to file a sur-reply to the Closing Argument Reply. Wells Fargo’s counsel’s response
to this offer was that they were “not interested.” Thus, Wells Fargo waived the right to provide
rebuttal argument/evidence to the Court on this issue.

As for the remaining arguments that portions of Plaintiffs’ Closing Argument should be stricken,
the Court was not persuaded, except with regards to Footnote 8 of the Closing Argument Reply,
which Plaintiff s counsel agreed should not be considered by the Court.

The Motion to Strike and for Sanctions is denied.

EXHIBIT CE

The Court withheld ruling on the admissibility of this document to allow Plaintiffs’ counsel an
opportunity to review it. Plaintiffs’ counsel has informed the Court that it does not object to the
admission of the document, thus it is admitted.

Finally, the judgment that is entered in this matter should carry post-judgment interest at 15%.

A copy of this letter decision shall be placed in the Court file.

Beatrice . Brickhouse
District Judge

BJBlbjw

Down Load PDF of This Case

© 2010-13 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD0 Comments

Merritt v. Mozilo | The … judgments in favor of Bank of America and Lewis are REVERSED… In sum, the Merritts stated a cause of action for conspiracy to commit fraud against Bank of America and Lewis

Merritt v. Mozilo | The … judgments in favor of Bank of America and Lewis are REVERSED… In sum, the Merritts stated a cause of action for conspiracy to commit fraud against Bank of America and Lewis

. . . 

We conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal as to Countrywide defendants and that the trial court did not err when it sustained the demurrers of First American and MERS. We also conclude that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers of Bank of America and Lewis. Accordingly, the judgments in favor of First American and MERS are affirmed and the judgments in favor of Bank of America and Lewis are reversed.

 . . .

On April 15, 2000, Does 2-30 of Bear Stearns and Lewis explained to Mozilo and other Countrywide officers that Bear Stearns and Bank of America “would provide Countrywide with the loan contract agreements” that they “needed Countrywide to get borrowers to sign, and such contracts required Mozilo to design loans in a way which would strip borrowers savings, income and property equity before leading to default and foreclosure after statute of limitations had run out on breach of contract, fraud and other civil limitations.” A month later, Does 2-30 of Bear Stearns and Lewis told Mozilo that Countrywide would have to conceal that it was acting as a broker for Bear Stearns or Bank of America. If Mozilo agreed to the terms discussed during the meetings, Bear Stearns would lend funds to borrowers for whom Mozilo brokered loans. Bear Stearns provided Mozilo with a “Master Repurchase Agreement” which committed Countrywide to broker loans for Bear Stearns and Bear Stearns would fund such loans as long as the terms of the loans met the specifications that Bank of America and Bear Stearns required. The Countrywide Board of Directors then authorized Mozilo and others to enter into agreements with Bear Stearns, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, MERS, and First American
 . . .
In sum, the Merritts stated a cause of action for conspiracy to commit fraud against Bank of America and Lewis. However, the trial court properly found that it failed to state a cause of action against First American and MERS
 
20

 . . .
IV. Disposition

The judgments in favor of First American and MERS are affirmed and the judgments in favor of Bank of America and Lewis are reversed. Costs are awarded to First American and MERS. Bank of America, Lewis, and the Merritts are to bear their own costs.

.

.

Filed 9/13/13 Merritt v. Mozilo CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

SALMA MERRITT et al., H037414
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Super. Ct. No. CV159993)

v.

ANGELO MOZILO et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

Plaintiffs Salma Merritt and David Merritt obtained two loans to purchase their
home. After the Merritts were unable to repay the loans, they filed an action against
multiple defendants for alleged predatory lending practices. The named defendants are
Angelo R. Mozilo, David Sambol, Michael Colyer, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., and
Countrywide Financial Corporation (collectively Countrywide defendants), Kenneth
Lewis, and Bank of America Corporation (Bank of America), MERSCORP Holding, Inc.
(MERS), First American Title Company (First American), and Johnny Chen.1 The third
amended complaint alleged causes of action for conspiracy to commit the following:
fraud (first cause of action); breach of fiduciary duty (second cause of action); unfair
business practices (third, fourth, and fifth causes of action); breach of title insurance
contract (sixth cause of action); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (seventh

1
Johnny Chen is not a party to this appeal.
cause of action). The trial court overruled Countrywide defendants’ demurrer to four
causes of action and sustained their demurrer without leave to amend to three causes of
action. The trial court also sustained the demurrers of First American, MERS, Lewis, and
Bank of America without leave to amend to all causes of action.
On appeal, the Merritts contend that the trial court erred: (1) by failing to apply
the elements of conspiracy law; (2) by refusing the proffered amendment to the third
amended complaint and by failing to grant leave to amend; (3) by sustaining the
demurrers to the conspiracy to commit breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy to commit
breach of title insurance contract, and conspiracy to inflict emotional distress causes of
action as to Lewis, Bank of America, MERS and First American; and (4) by sustaining
certain causes of action as to Countrywide defendants.
We conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal as to
Countrywide defendants and that the trial court did not err when it sustained the
demurrers of First American and MERS. We also conclude that the trial court erred in
sustaining the demurrers of Bank of America and Lewis. Accordingly, the judgments in
favor of First American and MERS are affirmed and the judgments in favor of Bank of
America and Lewis are reversed.

I. Statement of Facts2
A. The Merritts’ Initial Loan Transaction
In February 2006, the Merritts entered into an agreement to purchase a townhouse
in Sunnyvale for $729,000. The Merritts spoke to one lender who offered to provide
2
The Merritts are representing themselves. The statement of facts is based on the
allegations in the 100-page third amended complaint. This court has augmented the
record on appeal to include 279 pages of exhibits that were attached to the third amended
complaint. We “ ‘accept as true both facts alleged in the text of the complaint and facts
appearing in exhibits attached to it. If the facts appearing in the attached exhibit
contradict those expressly pleaded, those in the exhibit are given precedence.
[Citations.]’ ” (Sarale v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 225, 245.)
2
them with a loan with monthly payments of $4,600 per month while another offered a
loan with monthly payments of $4,800. The Merritts then contacted Colyer, who was
employed by Countrywide. Colyer told them that he could arrange a loan with payments
“maybe 40 percent lower” than what the other lenders had quoted. The Merritts provided
Colyer with their financial information, which stated that David Merritt’s gross income
for 2006 would be $60,000 and Salma Merritt would receive temporary disability
payments of $5,200.3 The disability payments would decrease to $1,400 in
September 2008.
On March 15, 2006, two days before the deadline to remove the loan contingency
from the purchase agreement, Colyer gave the Merritts a good faith estimate based on a
30-year Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loan for $729,000 with an interest rate
between 1 and 3 percent. This written estimate indicated that monthly payments would
be between $1,800 and $2,200 for principal and interest if the Merritts made a down
payment of 5 percent of the purchase price. Relying on the estimate, the Merritts
removed the loan contingency on their purchase agreement.
On March 20, 2006, Colyer informed the Merritts that his underwriters were
reluctant to approve their loan. About five days later, he informed the Merritts that he
was able to work out a loan with monthly payments of $5,200. When the Merritts told
him that they could not afford this loan, he told them that they would be subject to a
lawsuit if they did not close escrow. The Merritts then contacted the two lenders from
whom they had previously obtained estimates, and they were told that there was not
enough time to underwrite the loan prior to the close of escrow.
On March 26, 2006, Colyer called the Merritts and told them that he was able to
secure “ ‘the best loan possible.’ ” This new loan was actually two loans or a “ ‘Combo
loan’ ” that consisted of a 30-year adjustable rate mortgage for $591,200 (first loan) and a

3
There is no indication as to how frequently Salma Merritt would receive these
payments.
3
home equity line of credit (HELOC) for $147,800. The interest-only payments on the
first loan were $3,202.33 per month and the interest rate was 6.5 percent for the first five
years. The interest rate on the HELOC was 7.5 percent the first month and adjusted
periodically thereafter. The Merritts would eventually be required to pay $6,693 per
month on the first loan and an additional $2,400 per month in interest on the HELOC.
On March 26, 2006, Financial Title Company (FTC) provided Javani Wyatt, its
escrow agent, with two sets of documents that were partially filled out with financial
information. FTC also “instructed her to do whatever she could to convince [the
Merritts] to sign their set of documents, leave [them] with the second mostly blank
documents and return them to her supervisor.” When David Merritt began reading the
documents, Wyatt stated that she did not have time for him to read them and that she
would provide the Merritts with a copy of every document so they could read them later.
The Merritts signed the documents. When David Merritt began making copies of the
signed documents, Wyatt told him that they would be able to get signed copies from
Countrywide.
On March 29, 2006, Colyer filled in the blank portions of the documents that the
Merritts had signed and returned them to First American. Does 91-95 of First American
recorded the deeds of trust and the notes, and transmitted the deeds of trust to Bear
Stearns and the notes to MERS. MERS transmitted the notes to Wells Fargo. The deeds
of trust for the first loan and the HELOC, which were recorded on March 30, 2006, stated
that the borrowers were the Merritts, the lender was Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., the
trustee was Recontrust Company, N.A., and MERS was the nominee for the lender.
Between October 2006 and October 2008, the Merritts contacted Countrywide
defendants, Lewis, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Bank of America, and Wells Fargo,
and requested their signed loan documents. The documents were not provided. The
Merritts also asked that their loans be replaced with an FHA loan “or other traditional
loan that they could afford to repay.”
4
Between May 2006 and October 2008, Countrywide defendants, Lewis, and Bank
of America charged the Merritts four to seven interest rate points above the amount set
forth in the HELOC agreement. On January 20, 2009, Bank of America provided the
Merritts with copies of their loan documents, but “these documents were different,
specifically the HELOC Agreement and Note than what [the Merritts] recall[ed].”

B. Loan Modification
In February 2009, Does 71-80 of Bank of America “produced a modification of
original loans on orders of Wells Fargo” pursuant to its agreement with Bear Stearns “in
order to cover up . . . March 2006 fraudulent acts” and “the 2006 to 2008 overcharges.”
The loan modification “was a continuation of predatory lending practices of
Countrywide.” Though the new loan provided a temporary 4.5 percent interest rate, Does
71-80 “continued to mislead [the Merritts] b[]y representing that they only needed to pay
the interest and was in fact designed to not pay down the principle.” They also failed to
disclose that the payments did not include the HELOC payments, payment of property
taxes, homeowners insurance, and other fees.

C. Allegations of Defendants’ Roles in Alleged Conspiracy
1. Background
Beginning in January 1993, James Cayne, CEO of Bear Stearns, directed brokers
to encourage private investors to place their funds into mortgage-backed security pools,
which would be lent to individuals seeking residential loans. Cayne then began
implementing a plan in which Bear Stearns would identify real estate brokers “who
would agree to represent to borrowers that they were purchasing loans that were
traditional loans – i.e. fixed 30 year loan[s] – and conceal the fact that the loans were not
conventional loans at all[.]”

5
2. First American and MERS
In January 1995, Does 2-30 of Bear Stearns first met with Kennedy, CEO of First
American, and R.K. Arnold, CEO of MERS. Additional meetings were held in February
and March 1995, in which Does 2-30 of Bear Stearns explained how they wished to work
with Kennedy, Arnold, and Wells Fargo “to make enormous amounts of money from
residential mortgage borrowers.” Does 2-30 informed them that “they were going to
solicit billions in private dollars to fund mortgages for borrowers and needed to employ
brokers willing to craft loans designed to strip equity from Americans, increase
likelihood of loan defaults and to give Investors the opportunity to foreclose and resell
properties to make more profit. . . . Bear Stearns with Does 2-30 stated that in order to
conceal their identities from public record they would need Loan Brokers, Escrow and
Title agents, to not record Investors names with local County Clerk Recorders, but to
falsify local County Recorder Records by naming some entity in their place who would
be bound to not divulge their identities publicly.”
On February 15, 1995, Arnold informed Bear Stearns that he would form MERS,
which would record its name with county recorders in place of Bear Stearns, and thus
conceal Bear Stearns’ identity from borrowers. Between January 2000 and December
2010, Arnold instructed MERS members not to disclose to borrowers, including the
Merritts, that MERS was acting as a front man for Bear Stearns.
In February 1995, Kennedy presented the Bear Stearns proposal to the First
American Board of Directors. The board of directors then approved the agreement with
Bear Stearns that called for First American “to instruct and train its Escrow and Title
Insurance staff to falsify county records and not report title defects to borrowers or the
public.”
In early 2000, MERS agreed to enroll Countrywide as a member if Mozilo would
agree to “lead Countrywide into falsifying loan documents and county records, as well as
keeping secret the fraudulent nature of [MERS], its activities and purposes.”
6
Between January 2000 and March 2006, First American entered into agreements
with various title companies to produce escrow and title search functions that First
American could underwrite. Between January 2006 and March 2006, First American
also required these companies to ignore title defects.
On March 20, 2006, First American directed its agent FTC to conduct a title
search of the subject property. The subject property “was recorded as belonging to
MERS,” the “Note was separated from deed of trust,” and there were “multiple breaks in
the title, possibly more than a dozen holders in due course claiming rights to Property and
no way to validate a clean title.” First American directed its FTC agent to ignore the title
defects, to issue a preliminary title report, and to withhold certain documents from the
Merritts so that they would not learn of the title defects.
On March 27, 2006, Does 91-95 of First American instructed Wyatt, pursuant to
its agreement with Bear Stearns, to take two sets of documents, which consisted of two
notes and two deeds of trust, to the Merritts’ home for their signatures. Does 91-95,
acting on instructions from Colyer, did not include material terms of the loan in the set of
documents that were to be given to the Merritts, such as the amount of payments and the
interest rates. These documents, however, stated that the amount of the first loan was
$591,200 and that of the HELOC was $147,800, and that MERS was a beneficiary.
3. Bank of America and Lewis
Between January and May 2000, Does 2-30 of Bear Stearns held talks with Lewis,
CEO of Bank of America, and Mozilo, CEO of Countrywide, “about lending money to
mortgage borrowers which they wished to hire Countrywide to broker for Bear Stearns.”
During these discussions, Lewis informed Countrywide that Bank of America wanted to
lend subprime loans to achieve greater profits, but “they did not wish to lend predatory
loans directly . . . and wished to use Countrywide to broker their funds with certain types
of borrowers.”

7
On April 15, 2000, Does 2-30 of Bear Stearns and Lewis explained to Mozilo and
other Countrywide officers that Bear Stearns and Bank of America “would provide
Countrywide with the loan contract agreements” that they “needed Countrywide to get
borrowers to sign, and such contracts required Mozilo to design loans in a way which
would strip borrowers savings, income and property equity before leading to default and
foreclosure after statute of limitations had run out on breach of contract, fraud and other
civil limitations.” A month later, Does 2-30 of Bear Stearns and Lewis told Mozilo that
Countrywide would have to conceal that it was acting as a broker for Bear Stearns or
Bank of America. If Mozilo agreed to the terms discussed during the meetings, Bear
Stearns would lend funds to borrowers for whom Mozilo brokered loans. Bear Stearns
provided Mozilo with a “Master Repurchase Agreement” which committed Countrywide
to broker loans for Bear Stearns and Bear Stearns would fund such loans as long as the
terms of the loans met the specifications that Bank of America and Bear Stearns required.
The Countrywide Board of Directors then authorized Mozilo and others to enter into
agreements with Bear Stearns, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, MERS, and First
American.
Between March 2000 and March 2006, Does 2-30 of Bear Stearns and Lewis, on
behalf of Bank of America, entered into agreements that committed them to providing
funds for Countrywide “to find borrowers who could be induced into buying subprime
and later HELCO/Pay Option ARM ‘Combo’ loans.”
Between March and December 2000, Mozilo, Lewis, Does 2-30, and Wells Fargo
spoke with each other monthly regarding Mozilo’s “efforts to move Countrywide to
broker subprime loans for them.” In June 2000, Bear Stearns and Lewis asked Mozilo to
“disregard California laws regarding his real estate broker fiduciary duties, and to
manage Countrywide in a way which publicly presented Countrywide as the actual lender
of the funds being loaned out.” Mozilo agreed to do so.

8
Between July and September 2000, Sambol, president of marketing for
Countrywide, instructed Does 31-50 of Countrywide to prepare training programs for
brokers, such as Colyer, on how to conceal from borrowers Countrywide’s predatory
lending practices. Between January 2001 and March 2006, Sambol also worked with
others to design loans “with payments that increased over time to take 75, 90 and more
than 100% of borrowers income so they could ensure that borrower would default and be
subjected to foreclosure.” These loans were designed pursuant to agreements Mozilo
made with Bear Stearns and Bank of America.
Between 2003 and 2007, “approximately 50% of the loans produced by
Countrywide were loans brokered for” Bear Stearns and Bank of America. Lewis spoke
with Mozilo between January 2006 and December 2007. Mozilo told Lewis that he
would sell Countrywide “at a very cheap price” to Bank of America if Lewis “would do
whatever he could to cover up Mozilo et al deeds in the event their fraud became known
and they were prosecuted.” Lewis presented this proposal to the Bank of America Board
of Directors in December 2007. The board of directors authorized Lewis “to enter into
this and other details of agreement with Mozilo and his team.”
Between December 2007 and July 2008, Lewis and Mozilo negotiated the terms of
the sale of Countrywide to Bank of America. Lewis assured Mozilo that he “would cover
up the predatory loan practices and other frauds committed by Mozilo, Sambol and
others.” After an audit of Countrywide was conducted, Lewis learned that “most of the
Countrywide loans which they had sold, including [the Merritts’ loan] were predatory
loans . . . and that Countrywide was intentionally falsifying monthly charges to
borrowers,” including the Merritts. After Lewis lobbied the board of directors to view
this as “a good opportunity” for Bank of America, the board of directors accepted Lewis’
assessment and his agreement with Mozilo to cover up Countrywide’s fraud. The board
of directors also “agreed that since they were generating hundreds of millions of dollars
in additional profits by falsely overcharging borrowers, that they would not stop
9
overcharging borrowers, including [the Merritts], unless borrowers complained.”
Between July 2008 and March 2009, Bank of America sent the Merritts monthly billing
statements which overcharged them.

II. Statement of the Case
In December 2009, the Merritts filed a complaint against Countrywide defendants,
Lewis, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Chen, and John Stumpf for restitution, injunctive
relief, rescission, and civil penalties. The complaint alleged causes of action for
conspiracy to commit fraud, misleading statements, unfair business practices, violation of
Civil Code section 1920, race discrimination in housing, and conspiracy. After Bank of
America filed a demurrer to the complaint, the trial court sustained the demurrers with
leave to amend to five causes of action and overruled the demurrers to the conspiracy
cause of action.
In August 2010, prior to the deadline for First American to file its response to the
initial complaint, the Merritts filed a first amended complaint pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 472 against Countrywide defendants, Lewis, Bank of America, Chen,
John Benson, MERS, and First American. The causes of action alleged in the first
amended complaint included fraud, conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, unfair business
practices, breach of contract, breach of title insurance contract, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Following demurrers to the first amended complaint, the trial court
sustained the demurrers of Countrywide defendants, Lewis, Bank of America, and MERS
with leave to amend. However, the trial court sustained Wells Fargo’s demurrer without
leave to amend. The Merritts filed an appeal from the order sustaining the demurrer of
Wells Fargo without leave to amend.
Before the hearing on First American’s demurrer to the first amended complaint in
December 2010, the Merritts filed a second amended complaint against the same
defendants with the exception of Wells Fargo. The second amended complaint alleged
10
causes of action for fraud and misrepresentation, conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty,
unfair business practices, breach of contract, breach of title insurance contract, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court then sustained demurrers to the
second amended complaint with leave to amend.
In April 2011, the Merritts filed their third amended complaint. The third
amended complaint alleged causes of action for conspiracy to commit the following:
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, unfair business practices, breach of title insurance
contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress. In July 2011, the Merritts filed an
amendment to their third amended complaint. Following a hearing in August 2011 on the
demurrers to the third amended complaint, the trial court issued an order striking the
amendment to the third amended complaint. The trial court also sustained the demurrers
of First American, MERS, Lewis, and Bank of America without leave to amend to all
causes of action. However, the trial court overruled Countrywide defendants’ demurrer
to four causes of action and sustained their demurrer without leave to amend to three
causes of action.
In October 2011, the Merritts filed a notice of appeal.
In December 2011, this court reversed the judgment in Merritt v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (Dec. 19, 2011, H036259) [nonpub. opn.] and directed the trial court to enter
a new order sustaining Wells Fargo’s demurrer to the first and second causes of action
with leave to amend to state a single cause of action for conspiracy to defraud.4 This
court also rejected the Merritts’ procedural claims and concluded that they had waived
their claims of error regarding their causes of action for unfair business practices, breach
of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the title insurance contract, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

4
This court has taken judicial notice of the opinion in case No. H036259, Merritt v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
11
III. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction
Countrywide defendants contend that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the
appeal as to them. They point out that the trial court overruled their demurrer to the first,
third, fourth, and fifth causes of action.
“In general, the right to an appeal is entirely statutory; unless specified by statute
no judgment or order is appealable.” (Garau v. Torrance Unified School Dist. (2006)
137 Cal.App.4th 192, 198.) Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)
provides that only final judgments are appealable. “Judgments that leave nothing to be
decided between one or more parties and their adversaries . . . have the finality required
by section 904.1, subdivision (a).” (Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7
Cal.4th 725, 741.) Here, as the Merritts concede, a final judgment has not been entered
against Countrywide defendants. Thus, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal
as to them.
The Merritts’ reliance on Kuperman v. Great Republic Life Ins. Co. (1987) 195
Cal.App.3d 943 (Kuperman) is misplaced. In that case, the trial court struck the
plaintiffs’ third amended complaint in its entirety, thereby leaving no issues to be
determined between the plaintiffs and one of the defendants. (Id. at pp. 946-947.) The
Court of Appeal held the order was appealable as a final judgment. In contrast to
Kuperman, here, issues remain to be determined between the Merritts and Countrywide
defendants.
The Merritts also argue that policy reasons support treating the trial court’s order
as an appealable order. However, appellate review is available only where authorized by
statute, and Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 does not grant us jurisdiction on this
basis.
The Merritts alternatively request that we treat their appeal as a petition for a writ
of mandate. “ ‘A petition to treat a nonappealable order as a writ should only be granted
12
under [the most] extraordinary circumstances, “ ‘compelling enough to indicate the
propriety of a petition for writ . . . in the first instance . . . .’ [Citation.]” ’ ” (Wells
Properties v. Popkin (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1055.) Since the circumstances before
us are neither extraordinary nor compelling, we decline to treat the present appeal as to
Countrywide defendants as a petition for a writ of mandate.
We next consider the issue of our jurisdiction as to the other defendants. Though
the record contains a judgment of dismissal in favor of First American and thus is
appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, there is no judgment of
dismissal in favor of Lewis, Bank of America or MERS. “The general rule of
appealability is this: ‘An order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not
appealable, and an appeal is proper only after entry of a dismissal on such an order.’
[Citation.] But ‘when the trial court has sustained a demurrer to all of the complaint’s
causes of action, appellate courts may deem the order to incorporate a judgment of
dismissal, since all that is left to make the order appealable is the formality of the entry of
a dismissal order or judgment.’ ” (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 528,
fn. 1.) Thus, we will treat the order sustaining the demurrers of Lewis, Bank of America,
and MERS as appealable.

B. Sufficiency of the Third Amended Complaint
1. Waiver
We first consider whether the Merritts have failed to substantively address their
conspiracy to commit fraud cause of action (first) and conspiracy to commit unfair
business practices causes of action (third, fourth, and fifth), and thus have waived any
argument of error by the trial court in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend to
these causes of action.
We presume that the judgment is correct and the appellant has the burden of
overcoming this presumption by affirmatively showing error. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001)
13
24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141.) “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but
fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
waived. [Citations.]” (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.)
In challenging the trial court’s ruling on the conspiracy to commit fraud and the
conspiracy to commit unfair business practices causes of action, the Merritts rely on the
legal principles on conspiracy and fraud as set forth in Merritt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Thus, they have met their burden as to the conspiracy to commit fraud cause of action.
However, there was no discussion in that case regarding the conspiracy to commit unfair
business practices. In the present appeal, the Merritts have failed to present any reasoned
argument with citations to authority as to the underlying tort of unfair business practices.
They do not set forth the elements of unfair business practices and how their third, fourth,
and fifth causes of action survive the demurrers. Merely summarizing the allegations in
the third amended complaint and claiming that the trial court did not understand the
elements of conspiracy law is insufficient.5 Though we conclude that they have not
waived the issue of whether the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the first
cause of action for conspiracy to commit fraud, the Merritts have waived any further
claim of error on appeal with regard to the third, fourth, and fifth causes of action.
2. Standard of Review
“In determining whether plaintiffs properly stated a claim for relief, our standard
of review is clear: ‘ “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly
pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We
also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” [Citation.] Further, we give the
complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.

5
We remind the Merritts that self-represented litigants are “held to the same
standards as attorneys. [Citation.]” (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 536, 543.) “[S]elf-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient
treatment.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984.)
14
[Citation.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] And when it is sustained
without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the
defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion
and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm. [Citations.]
The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.’
[Citations.]” (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.)
3. Conspiracy
Since each cause of action alleges a conspiracy to commit a specified tort, we
summarize the general principles regarding conspiracy. “Conspiracy is not a cause of
action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually
committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or
design in its perpetration. [Citation.] By participation in a civil conspiracy, a
coconspirator effectively adopts as his or her own the torts of other coconspirators within
the ambit of the conspiracy. [Citation.] In this way, a coconspirator incurs tort liability
co-equal with the immediate tortfeasors.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi
Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 510-511 (Applied Equipment).) However, “[b]y its
nature, tort liability arising from conspiracy presupposes that the coconspirator is legally
capable of committing the tort, i.e., that he or she owes a duty to plaintiff recognized by
law and is potentially subject to liability for breach of that duty.” (Id. at p. 511.)
“The elements of a civil conspiracy are ‘(1) the formation and operation of the
conspiracy; (2) the wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto; and (3) the damage
resulting. [Citations.]’ ” (Mosier v. Southern Cal. Physicians Ins. Exchange (1998) 63
Cal.App.4th 1022, 1048.) Because civil conspiracy is easy to allege, “plaintiffs have a
weighty burden to prove it. [Citation.] They must show that each member of the
conspiracy acted in concert and came to a mutual understanding to accomplish a common
and unlawful plan, and that one or more of them committed an overt act to further it.
15
[Citation.] It is not enough that the conspiring officers knew of an intended wrongful act,
they had to agree—expressly or tacitly—to achieve it. Unless there is such a meeting of
the minds, ‘ “the independent acts of two or more wrongdoers do not amount to a
conspiracy.” ’ ” (Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 312, 333.)
“[A] plaintiff is entitled to damages from those defendants who concurred in the
tortious scheme with knowledge of its unlawful purpose. [Citation.] Furthermore, the
requisite concurrence and knowledge ‘ “ ‘may be inferred from the nature of the acts done,
the relation of the parties, the interests of the alleged conspirators, and other
circumstances.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Tacit consent as well as express approval will suffice to
hold a person liable as a coconspirator.” (Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d
773, 784-785.)6
a. First Cause of Action – Conspiracy to Commit Fraud
The Merritts contend that “the CEO’s with Boards of Directors of Bear Stearns,
Wells Fargo, MERS[], [First American, Bank of America] and Countrywide . . . entered
into agreements as early as 2000 and onward, to help Bear Ste[a]rns defraud borrowers.”
“The elements of fraud are: (1) a misrepresentation (false representation,
concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); (3) intent to
defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.”
(Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 990.) “ ‘Promissory
fraud’ is a subspecies of the action for fraud and deceit. A promise to do something
necessarily implies the intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without
such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that may be actionable fraud.
[Citations.] [¶] An action for promissory fraud may lie where a defendant fraudulently

6
The Merritts allege in the first, second, sixth and seventh causes of action that
defendants “knowingly and willfully conspired and agreed among themselves to” commit
the underlying torts. Conclusory allegations regarding the formation and operation of a
conspiracy are insufficient and are disregarded. (Choate v. County of Orange, supra, 86
Cal.App.4th at p. 333.)
16
induces the plaintiff to enter into a contract. [Citations.]” (Lazar v. Superior Court
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 (Lazar).)
“In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations
do not suffice. [Citations.] ‘. . . [¶] This particularity requirement necessitates pleading
facts which “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations
were tendered.” ’ [Citation.] A plaintiff’s burden in asserting a fraud claim against a
corporate employer is even greater. In such a case, the plaintiff must ‘allege the names of
the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to
whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written.’ [Citation.]”
(Lazar, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 645.)
In the present case, the third amended complaint alleges that, executives of Bear
Stearns, Bank of America, and Countrywide held talks to discuss lending money to
mortgage borrowers beginning in 2000. Lewis informed Countrywide that Bank of
America wanted to lend subprime loans to achieve greater profits, it did not want to be
publicly identified with predatory lending, and it wanted Countrywide to target certain
borrowers. Bank of America would also provide Countrywide with contracts for
borrowers to sign that would be designed “so borrowers would not be able to pay off
loans,” thereby leading to default and foreclosure. Between March and December 2000,
executives of Countrywide, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo spoke monthly regarding
Mozilo’s “efforts to move Countrywide to broker subprime loans for them.” Lewis also
asked Mozilo to “disregard California laws regarding his Real Estate Broker fiduciary
duties” which Mozilo agreed to do. Pursuant to this plan, Countrywide began a training
program for its brokers on predatory lending practices as well as a deceptive marketing
campaign. Between 2003 and 2007, approximately 50 percent of the loans produced by
Countrywide were funded by Bear Stearns and Bank of America. Beginning in January
2006, Lewis and Mozilo discussed Bank of America’s purchase of Countrywide “at a
very cheap price” if Bank of America agreed to cover up Countrywide’s fraudulent
17
conduct. In December 2007, the Bank of America Board of Directors authorized Lewis
to enter into the agreement with Countrywide, and Bank of America purchased
Countrywide in July 2008. Bank of America then learned that “most of Countrywide’s
loans which they had sold, including [the Merritts], were predatory loans” and that
“Countrywide was intentionally falsifying monthly charges to borrowers” including the
Merritts. Between July 2008 and March 2009, Bank of America continued
Countrywide’s practice of overcharging the Merritts. In 2009, the Merritts signed a loan
modification agreement with Bank of America, which “was a continuation of predatory
lending practices of Countrywide,” and Bank of America misled them as to the terms of
the agreement.
Here, there are no allegations that Bank of America had any interest in the
Merritts’ first loan or the HELOC or that they funded these loans, thus distinguishing it
from Wells Fargo’s participation in the conspiracy to defraud the Merritts. However,
Lewis, on behalf of Bank of America, agreed before the Merritts obtained their loans
from Countrywide to supply Countrywide with funds if Countrywide would sell
subprime loans for Bank of America. Bank of America also specified the terms of the
loans that Countrywide would offer to borrowers. Thus, Lewis and Bank of America
participated in the formation of the conspiracy with Countrywide and came to a mutual
understanding of how to accomplish their unlawful goal. After Countrywide
implemented the plan, Lewis and Bank of America agreed to cover up Countrywide’s
fraudulent conduct, continued Countrywide’s practice of overcharging the Merritts, and
misled them as to the terms of the loan modification agreement. Thus, these allegations
were sufficient to state a cause of action against Bank of America and Lewis for
conspiracy to commit fraud.
As to First American and MERS, the first cause of action alleges that Kennedy
and Arnold met with Bear Stearns and agreed to conceal Bear Stearns’ identity from
borrowers. First American and Arnold would ignore “title defects.” These title defects
18
consisted of: (1) deeds of trust showing MERS as the beneficiary, and (2) the
“separation” of deeds of trusts and the underlying notes resulting from loan
securitization.
“As case law explains, ‘MERS is a private corporation that administers the MERS
System, a national electronic registry that tracks the transfer of ownership interests and
servicing rights in mortgage loans. Through the MERS System, MERS becomes the
mortgagee of record for participating members through assignment of the members’
interests to MERS. MERS is listed as the grantee in the official records maintained at
county register of deeds offices. The lenders retain the promissory notes, as well as the
servicing rights to the mortgages. The lenders can then sell these interests to investors
without having to record the transaction in the public record. MERS is compensated for
its services through fees charged to participating MERS members.’ [Citation.]” (Gomes
v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1151 (Gomes).) Under
California law, MERS has authority to act as the beneficiary under a deed of trust.
(Gomes, at pp. 1155-1156 [MERS authorized to initiate foreclosure as deed of trust
beneficiary]; Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 270-271
[MERS has the authority to act as nominee for the lender] (Fontenot).) Here, the deeds
of trust state that MERS was “the beneficiary.” However, the deeds of trust also
specifically restrict MERS’ interest to that of a “ ‘nominee’ ” for the lender. “A ‘nominee’
is a person or entity designated to act for another in a limited role—in effect, an agent.”
(Fontenot, at p. 270.) The Merritts have not alleged that they were unable to make their
payments or negotiate a modification of their loans because they did not know who the
lender was. Thus, the Merritt’s contention that MERS is not a proper beneficiary under
the deed of trust cannot support their claim that First American and MERS engaged in
any fraudulent conduct by recording MERS as a beneficiary.
Similarly, the Merritts’ allegations that securitization of the loans constituted a
title defect do not state a claim of conspiracy to commit fraud against First American and
19
MERS. Securitization does not affect the validity of a loan. A secured promissory note
that is traded on the secondary market remains secured because the mortgage or deed of
trust follows the note. (Civ. Code, § 2936 [“The assignment of a debt secured by
mortgage carries with it the security.”].) Thus, a lender or trustee does not lose its
interest in the loan when it “was packaged and resold in the secondary market, where it
was put into a trust pool and securitized.” (Lane v. Vitek Real Estate Industries Group
(E.D.Cal. 2010) 713 F.Supp.2d 1092, 1099; Hafiz v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.
(N.D.Cal. 2009) 652 F.Supp.2d 1039, 1043 [rejecting the plaintiff’s theory that
“defendants lost their power of sale pursuant to the deed of trust when the original
promissory note was assigned to a trust pool”].)
The Merritts also alleged that First American was liable for misrepresentation and
concealment of material facts because it was an agent of the other defendants. However,
conclusory agency or secondary liability allegations are insufficient to state a cause of
action. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 133-134, fn.
12 (Moore).) The Merritts further alleged that Wyatt, who was an agent of First
American, gave the Merritts documents which “were partially filled out with financial
information.” These allegations are also insufficient to state a claim that First American
participated in a conspiracy to defraud the Merritts. First American was the escrow agent
in the transaction, and its only duty was to comply with the written instructions of the
parties to the escrow. (Summit Financial Holdings, Ltd. v. Continental Lawyers Title Co.
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 705, 711 (Summit).) First American had nothing to do with arranging,
brokering, processing, underwriting, or making the loans to the Merritts.
In sum, the Merritts stated a cause of action for conspiracy to commit fraud
against Bank of America and Lewis. However, the trial court properly found that it failed
to state a cause of action against First American and MERS.

20
b. Second Cause of Action – Conspiracy to
Commit Breach of Fiduciary Duty
“In order to plead a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, there must be
shown the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately
caused by that breach.” (Pierce v. Lyman (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1101, superseded
by statute on another ground as stated in Pavicich v. Santucci (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 382,
396.) To state a cause of action for conspiracy to breach a fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must
establish that each of the coconspirators owed a fiduciary duty to him or her and are
potentially subject to liability for breach of that duty. (Applied Equipment, supra, 7
Cal.4th at p. 511.)
It is not clear what the Merritts’ arguments are as to this cause of action. They
begin by summarizing the allegations in the third amended complaint and assert that
these facts “support fiduciary claim.” They then rely on Smith v. Home Loan Funding,
Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Smith) for the proposition that “it is not a Company’s
name or how a Company is registered, or even mostly conducts business with most
borrowers, but how they actually behave on a case-by-case basis. That is what
determines whether a registered mortgage broker forms a fiduciary relationship or not.” 7
Smith recognized that “[a] mortgage broker has a fiduciary duty to a borrower. A
mortgage lender does not.” (Smith, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1332.) In Smith, the
defendant funded most of its loans to borrowers and brokered other loans to third party
lenders. (Ibid.) One of the defendant’s loan officers told the plaintiff that he was a
mortgage broker and that he could “ ‘shop the loan’ ” for her. (Id. at. p. 1333.) Though
the loan officer repeatedly told the plaintiff that the loan would not have a prepayment
penalty, a prepayment penalty was included in a rider to the promissory note. (Id. at

7
The Merritts also alleged that each of the defendants was an agent for the other
defendants. As previously stated, conclusory agency or secondary liability allegations
are insufficient to state a cause of action. (Moore, supra, 51 Cal.3d 120, 133-134, fn. 12.)
21
p. 1334.) Smith held that there was substantial evidence that the defendant and its loan
officer acted as mortgage brokers and breached their fiduciary duties to the plaintiff. (Id.
at pp. 1335-1336.)
Here, the Merritts have not alleged any facts that Bank of America and Lewis
acted as mortgage brokers. Since they acted as lenders, they owed no fiduciary duty to
the Merritts.8
We next consider the nature of the duty owed by First American and MERS to the
Merritts. First American owed a fiduciary duty to the parties to the escrow. (Summit,
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 711.) However, as previously stated, First American’s duty was to
comply with the written escrow instructions. (Ibid.) “Absent clear evidence of fraud, an
escrow holder’s obligations are limited to compliance with the parties’ instructions.”
[Citations.]” (Ibid.) Here, the Merritts did not allege that First American breached any
escrow instructions. They appear to be arguing that First American breached its fiduciary
duty by recording MERS as the beneficiary under the deed of trust, thereby falsifying
records and failing to inform the Merritts of title defects. As previously discussed,
neither First American nor MERS engaged in any fraudulent conduct. Moreover, the
Merritts cite no authority for the proposition that MERS owed a fiduciary duty to them.
c. Sixth Cause of Action – Conspiracy to
Breach of Title Insurance Contract
The Merritts also contend that though they titled the cause of action as conspiracy
to breach title insurance contract, “the allegations show[] . . . [First American] and its

8
For the same reason, Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773 does not
assist the Merritts’ position. In Wyatt, the defendants were engaged in the loan brokerage
business. Prior to signing the loan documents, the plaintiffs asked the broker about “the
rate of interest, late payments, and the size of the balloon payment due at the end of the
loan period.” (Id. at p. 782.) Since the broker provided “materially misleading and
incomplete information,” Wyatt held that there was substantial evidence to support the
finding that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs. (Id. at
pp. 782-783.)
22
agent FTC, was hired by the Merritts with its promise to perform fraud-free Title Search,
fraud-free Title Report and fraud-free Close of Escrow.”
In this cause of action, the Merritts alleged that First American issued a policy of
title insurance to them, breached the policy by recording MERS as the beneficiary and
refused to indemnify them for their losses pursuant to the terms of the policy. The
Merritts also alleged that Countrywide defendants, Bear Stearns, Wells Fargo, MERS,
and First American “conspired and agreed among themselves to breach the Title
Insurance purchased” by the Merritts.
However, the Merritts cannot state a claim for conspiracy to breach a title
insurance contract, because no such cause of action exists. “Conspiracy is not a cause of
action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually
committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or
design in its perpetration. [Citation.]” (Applied Equipment, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 510-
511.) Given that there can be no cause of action for conspiracy to breach a title insurance
contract, the trial court properly sustained the demurrer to the sixth cause of action as to
Bank of America, Lewis, MERS, and First American.
Moreover, to the extent that the Merritts are now contending that First American
breached its contract with them, their contention fails. First, as previously discussed,
recordation of the deeds of trust which designated MERS as the beneficiary is not
actionable under California law. Second, schedule B of the policy, which was attached to
the third amended complaint, states that “this Policy does not insure against loss, costs,
attorneys’ fees, and expenses resulting from . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [the] Deed of Trust . . . .”
Third, the Merritts’ claim that First American breached the title policy by refusing to
deliver copies of the loan documents, failing to close escrow at the title company,
discouraging them from reading the loan documents, not preparing the appropriate
number of copies of the loan documents, failing to deliver a notice of their right to
rescind the loans with filled in dates, not delivering Truth in Lending disclosures filled in,
23
and refusing to allow David Merritt to make copies of their signed loan documents has no
merit. “Title insurance is a contract by which the title insurer agrees to indemnify its
insured against losses caused by defects in or encumbrances on the title not excepted
from coverage. [Citation.]” (Vournas v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. (1999) 73
Cal.App.4th 668, 675.) The Merritts’ allegations are not covered under the policy and
thus cannot constitute a breach of the title policy.
d. Seventh Cause of Action – Conspiracy to Commit
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Merritts next contend that Countrywide defendants, First American, MERS,
Lewis, Bank of America, and Bear Stearns conspired to intentionally inflict emotional
distress on them. They argue that they were promised “one 30-year fixed loan with
payments between $1,800 and $2,200; but were given at the very last moment two loans
totaling $5,000 and set to balloon into $10,000 monthly installments” and were
overcharged on their loans.
The elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim are (1) the
defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the defendant intended to cause
emotional distress or recklessly disregarded the probability of causing emotional distress;
(3) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (4) the defendant’s outrageous
conduct was the cause of the severe emotional distress. (Davidson v. City of Westminster
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 209 (Davidson).)
Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America (1985) 38 Cal.3d 892 (Sanchez-Corea)
provides an example of outrageous conduct by a lender. In Sanchez-Corea, McGowen, a
vice-president with the defendant bank, handled the account for the plaintiffs’ company
and used bank funds to cover overdrafts on this account without the bank’s knowledge.
(Id. at pp. 896-897.) The bank also provided a loan of $70,000 to the plaintiffs. (Id. at
p. 897.) After the bank discovered that McGowen had embezzled funds, including
$240,000 that was allegedly credited to the plaintiffs’ account, the bank demanded
24
$240,000 from the plaintiffs and refused to extend additional credit. (Ibid.) The
plaintiffs disagreed with the bank as to the amount of money that they owed and
eventually brought suit against the bank. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the award of damages to the
plaintiffs for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and summarized the evidence as
follows: “There is evidence from which the jury could have determined that the Bank
acted outrageously in reaction to the plight in which the Sanchez-Coreas found
themselves as a result of vice president McGowen’s conduct. Testimony indicated that
Bank officers Jones and Timerman failed to advise plaintiffs that the Bank had
determined not to give [the plaintiffs’ company] any further loans. According to
Sanchez-Corea, the Bank’s office misrepresented to him that further financial assistance
would be forthcoming but only if plaintiffs assigned all their past, present and future
accounts receivable to the Bank. A day after the plaintiffs made such an assignment, the
Bank refused the further loan. There was evidence that the Bank forced the Sanchez-
Coreas to execute excessive guarantees and security agreements. In addition to [the
plaintiffs’ company’s] pledge of over $262,000 of accounts receivable for a $70,000 note,
Mrs. Sanchez-Corea executed a $50,000 guaranty for a $30,000 note, and Mr. Sanchez-
Corea was directed to purchase a life insurance policy in the amount of $40,000 naming
the Bank as beneficiary. Furthermore, there was extensive testimony about an incident at
the San Franciscan Hotel in San Francisco. According to the testimony, Bank officials
publicly ridiculed Mr. and Mrs. Sanchez-Corea, using profanities in their statements. A
friend who was with the Sanchez-Coreas testified that Bank employees were pointing at
the Sanchez-Coreas and the employees were laughing about the financial plight of [the
plaintiffs’ company].” (Id. at pp. 908-909.)
In contrast to Sanchez-Corea, here, as a matter of law, none of the conduct alleged
by the Merritts was “ ‘so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a
civilized community. [Citations.]’ ” (Davidson, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 209.)
25
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by sustaining the demurrer to the seventh cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress as to Bank of America, Lewis,
MERS, and First American.9
Relying on Bird v. Saenz (2002) 28 Cal.4th 910 (Bird), the Merritts contend that
“when a plaintiff witnesses a third-party victim being inflicted with harm, a cause of
action exist[s] for the party who witnessed infliction.” Thus, they claim that they have
stated a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the bystander
theory since they “witnessed each other going through certain damage as a result of the
continuous fraud over an initial 3 year period; after they tried fruitlessly to rescind their
loans; loss thousands, faced financial ruin and homelessness.” There is no merit to this
contention.
Bird stated the elements of a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress under a bystander theory: “ ‘a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional
distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person if, but only
if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of
the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury
to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress—a reaction beyond
that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal
response to the circumstances.’ [Citation.]” (Bird, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 915.) Bird
held that the plaintiffs could not state a negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of
action because they were not present in the operating room when their relative’s artery
was transected and they did not know that the care she was receiving was inadequate.
(Id. at pp. 921-922) Here, the alleged injury occurred when the loan documents were

9
Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949 does
not assist the Merritts. In Kendall, the defendant bank did not challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the award of damages for infliction of emotional distress. (Id.
at p. 955.)
26
signed by the Merritts and they were unaware that it was causing injury. Accordingly,
they cannot state a cause of action under this theory.

C. Amendment to Third Amended Complaint
The Merritts argue that the trial court erred by striking the amendment to their
third amended complaint. We disagree.
The trial court found that the Merritts “filed . . . a document purported to be an
Amendment to the Third Amended Complaint. This document was filed without leave of
court and was objected to by the moving Defendants. As such, the Court finds that it was
filed improperly and strikes this filing.”
Code of Civil Procedure section 472 provides in relevant part: “Any pleading may
be amended once by the party of course, and without costs, at any time before the answer
or demurrer is filed, or after demurrer and before the trial of the issue of law thereon, by
filing the same as amended and serving a copy on the adverse party . . . .” “ ‘[A] litigant
does not have a positive right to amend his pleading after a demurrer thereto has been
sustained. “His leave to amend afterward is always of grace, not of right. [Citation.]”
[Citation.]’ . . . After expiration of the time in which a pleading can be amended as a
matter of course, the pleading can only be amended by obtaining the permission of the
court. [Citations.]” (Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th
603, 612-613.)
Here, demurrers had been filed, and thus the Merritts no longer had a right to
amend as a matter of course. Instead, they were required to obtain the trial court’s
permission to file the amendment to the third amended complaint. Since the Merritts
failed to follow the proper procedure, the trial court did not err by striking the amendment
to the third amended complaint.
We next consider whether the Merritts have failed to carry their burden that they
could amend their complaint to cure any defects. “To satisfy that burden on appeal, a
27
plaintiff ‘must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that
amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.’ [Citation.] The assertion of an
abstract right to amend does not satisfy this burden. [Citation.] The plaintiff must clearly
and specifically set forth the ‘applicable substantive law’ [citation] and the legal basis for
amendment, i.e., the elements of the cause of action and authority for it. Further, the
plaintiff must set forth factual allegations that sufficiently state all required elements of
that cause of action. [Citations.] Allegations must be factual and specific, not vague or
conclusionary. [Citation.]” (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 39, 43-44.)
Here, the Merrits request that this court review the amendment to the third
amended complaint. This amendment adds allegations primarily against the Countrywide
defendants and causes of action for negligent torts. However, the Merritts have failed to
state how this amendment will cure the defects in their third amended complaint. They
have not set forth the applicable law and specific factual allegations that satisfy the
elements of a cause of action. Accordingly, we conclude that the Merritts have failed to
carry their burden on appeal.

IV. Disposition
The judgments in favor of First American and MERS are affirmed and the
judgments in favor of Bank of America and Lewis are reversed. Costs are awarded to
First American and MERS. Bank of America, Lewis, and the Merritts are to bear their
own costs.

28
_______________________________
Mihara, J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________
Elia, Acting P. J.

______________________________
Márquez, J.

Merritt et al. v. Mozilo et al.
H037414

29

Down Load PDF of This Case

© 2010-13 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

U.S. Bank, N.A. v Rodriguez | NYSC – U.S. Bank & Wells Fargo Slammed for NOT Following HAMP Guidelines…

U.S. Bank, N.A. v Rodriguez | NYSC – U.S. Bank & Wells Fargo Slammed for NOT Following HAMP Guidelines…

Decided on September 5, 2013

Supreme Court, Bronx County

 

U.S. Bank, N.A., as Trustee for Bear Stearns asset Backed Securities, 2006- AC1, Plaintiff,

against

Jorge Luis Rodriguez, et al., Defendants.

380504-11

 

Shapiro, DiCaro & Barak, LLC, Rochester, NY (Scott Ferraro, Esq., of counsel) for the Plaintiff ; Legal Services NYC-Bronx, Bronx, NY (James J. Jantarasami, Esq., of counsel) for the Defendant.

Robert E. Torres, J.

In this foreclosure action, the defendant Jorge Luis Rodriguez (Rodriguez) seeks an order, pursuant to CPLR 3408 and Uniform Civil Rule 202.12, finding that the plaintiff U. S. Bank, N.A. (US Bank), and its loan servicer, Wells Fargo Bank (Wells Fargo), violated their duty to negotiate in good faith during mandatory settlement conferences. Rodriguez maintains that the plaintiff has not provided a timely decision on his loan modification application that comports with the applicable federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) guidelines.

Specifically, Rodriguez claims that Wells Fargo mishandled and misapplied the HAMP guidelines as to his eligibility for HAMP. Therefore, Wells Fargo materially violated the HAMP guidelines, and demonstrated a lack of good faith. Consequently, Rodriguez is seeking an order that: (1) directs US Bank to process and decide his loan modification under the HAMP guidelines; (2) tolls the accrual of interest, late fees and US Bank’s counsel fees until such time as the court determines that the plaintiff is in compliance with CPLR 3408; and (3) tolls the accrual of interest, late fees and US Bank’s counsel fees retroactively from June 22, 2012. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and insists it has fairly complied with the HAMP guidelines.

For the reasons that follow, the defendant’s motion is granted.

Background

A. HAMP

The United States Department of Treasury (DOT) established HAMP pursuant to Sections 101 and 109 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (12 USC 5201-5261). HAMP is designed to prevent avoidable home foreclosures by incentivizing loan servicers to reduce the required monthly mortgage payments for certain struggling homeowners. Under the program, servicers are obliged to abide by guidelines promulgated by DOT when determining a mortgagor’s eligibility for a permanent loan modification (see US Dept. of Treasury, Making Home Affordable Program, Handbook for Servicers of Non-GSE Mortgages, at 27 [Dec. 15, 2011]). A Servicer Participation Agreement (SPA) committed Wells Fargo to perform certain loan modifications and foreclosure prevention services for eligible loans. The SPA incorporated a “Program Documentation,” which set forth guidelines, procedures, instructions, documentation, and directives issued by DOT, Fannie Mae, or Freddie Mac in connection with the duties of participating servicers.

Originally, the HAMP Tier 1 program was set up to assist borrowers who are delinquent on their mortgages for their primary residence or facing imminent risk of default. Borrowers in risk of defaulting on their mortgages can then apply to the program, and the mortgage servicer provides the modification or prevention services to the borrower. As a condition of participating in the program, servicers must comply with guidelines and procedures issued by DOT (see Commitment to Purchase Financial Instrument and Servicer Participation Agreement, https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/servicer.jsp; see also Home Affordable Modification Program: Overview, https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/hamp.jsp [accessed July 30, 2013]).

HAMP Tier 1 has the following guidelines of eligibility: (1) the mortgage loan must have originated prior to December 31, 2008; (2) the mortgage must be a first lien; financial hardship must be demonstrated by the homeowner; the property must be one to four units; there cannot be any previous loan modification under HAMP; the property must be the principal residence; and the monthly payment must be greater than 31% of the borrower’s monthly gross income. Once a borrower meets this criteria, a servicer will review the financial information provided by the borrower to determine if he is eligible for the Tier 1 program [*2](see hamp4owners.org/hamp-program/guideline/hamp-tier-1 [accessed July 31, 2012]).

Thereafter, the servicer is to add to the loan balance or principal, the accrued interest, homeowner’s insurance, property taxes and other out-of-pocket escrow advances as well as other servicing advances such as legal fees paid to third parties (also known as PITI, or principal, interest, taxes and insurance). After the servicer has the new balance figured, the interest rate on the loan is reduced to hit the 31% ratio for the target monthly mortgage payment (id.). This rate can be as low as 2%. If lowering the interest rate to 2% does not get the monthly payment amount low enough, the servicer can review whether the loan should be extended to 480 months (see US Treasury, Supplemental Directive 09-01, at 9). If lowering the interest rate and extending the loan term still doesn’t meet the target monthly payment of 31%, the servicer is to then subtract a calculated amount from the unpaid principal balance. This “principal forebearance” is non-interest bearing, and non-amortizing. It will, as well, create a balloon payment that will be due at the earliest possible time that the borrower transfers the property, pays off the loan through refinancing, or when the loan matures.

The first program was expanded on June 1, 2012 to assist more distressed homeowners qualify for loan modifications, and it is known as the Tier 2 program (see www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/HAMP [accessed July 31, 2013]). . The Tier 2 program now permits owners of rental or commercial properties to modify mortgages and reduce monthly payments. As set forth in Tier 1, HAMP Tier 2 does not apply to mortgage loans through Fannie Mae or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration or another federal agency. Tier 2 allows modification of up to three mortgages. The program applies to loans originated before January 1, 2009. Servicers are also required to offer forbearance assistance to unemployed homeowners for 12 months. Borrowers who weren’t successful with a HAMP 1 Trial Payment Plan (TPP) are eligible to apply for HAMP 2 modification, as long as 12 months have passed. In addition, the Tier 2 program revised the debt-to-income ratio for qualification, and sets the pre-modification monthly mortgage payment below 31 % of debt-to-income ratio. Borrowers are not eligible under Tier 2 if their debt-to-income ratio is less than 25% or greater than 42%. Tier 2 eligibility also requires a 10% or greater reduction in monthly principal and interest payments after modification. If the reduction is less, the mortgage is not eligible for modification under HAMP. The Net Present Value was also revised to qualify more homeowners. The Tier 2 program contemplates instances where [*3]a borrower may be ineligible for the Tier 1 program. Therefore, if a the borrower’s pre-modification monthly payment was below 31%, or a positive NPV could not be achieved without excessive forebearance, or if a negative NPV came up, the Tier 2 program could potentially help an unqualified Tier 1 applicant.

Starting in February 2013, the range of allowable monthly payments expanded. As explained in Supplemental Directive 1209, the new monthly payment must be between 10% and 55% of a borrower’s gross income or a range specified by the loan servicer, provided that the allowable percentage range fits between the old/new percentage (id.). This new rule affects the check of HAMP Tier 2 eligibility after the proposed new payment is calculated, but it does not otherwise change the procedure for calculating the new payment. All home loans that meet the HAMP eligibility criteria for HAMP Tier 1 or Tier 2 are to be evaluated using a particular software, which automatically evaluates for both Tier 1 and Tier 2, and is to reflect the NPV results of modification under each tier.

DOT directives implementing HAMP provide that within 30 days from the date that an initial package is received from a person applying for a HAMP modification, and if the borrower’s documentation is complete, the servicer must either “[s]end the borrower a Trial Period Plan Notice[,] or [m]ake a determination that the borrower is not eligible for HAMP and communicate this determination to the borrower in accordance with the Borrower Notice guidance . . . .” (US Dept. of Treasury, Supplemental Directive No. 10-01, at 3 [Jan. 28, 2010]).

B. The Parties

In the present case, there is a trust that holds the legal title to the Rodriguez loan. US Bank acts as trustee on behalf of the trust. Trustees seldom exercise any meaningful day-to-day authority over a loan. There are also investors in the trust, who have a beneficial ownership interest in a loan and its proceeds. Wells Fargo is both a mortgage lender and a mortgage loan servicer. As the loan servicer, Wells Fargo stands in for the trust, the beneficial owners of the loans, and the investors in virtually all dealings with homeowners. It is the servicer to whom homeowners mail their monthly payments, the servicer who provides billing and tax statements for homeowners, and the servicer to whom a homeowner in distress must address a petition for a loan modification. [*4]

C. Rodriguez’s Efforts to Modify his Loan

CPLR 3408 (a) requires a mandatory settlement conference in every residential foreclosure action during which the plaintiff, through its servicer, and the defendant are to negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable resolution, including a loan modification, if possible. Here, the parties first appeared for a settlement conference on January 19, 2012. Rodriguez was unrepresented at the time. Rodriguez was informed that the financial documents that he had submitted were stale. He was allegedly directed to submit a new application package. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned to April 24, 2012. Subsequently, on March 22, 2012, Rodriguez submitted, through his Legal Services NYC-Bronx attorney, an application for a loan modification through HAMP.

On April 24, 2012, another schedule was agreed upon by the parties for the exchange of financial documents and information. On May 16, 2012, Rodriguez submitted updated financials to Wells Fargo, the loan servicer. At the third settlement conference, held on June 22, 2012, US Bank had not made any decision on the loan modification request, and the matter was adjourned to July 20, 2012 for a decision on the defendant’s application.

At the fourth settlement conference on July 20, 2012, a decision on the defendant’s loan modification application had not been made. Nonetheless, the bank’s representative, Shawn Malloy (Malloy) indicated that the defendant would likely be denied for the HAMP Tier 1 Program because the monthly mortgage payment, including principal, interest, property taxes and hazard insurance was supposedly less than 31% of the defendant’s gross monthly income. Defendant’s attorney pointed out that the bank was using an incorrect principal and interest payment to calculate the defendant’s application. He argued that Wells Fargo used an inappropriate figure of $1,338 per month. The correct amount was $1,681.99, which permits the defendant to clear the eligibility threshold and go on to the “waterfall” test. Defendant’s counsel then requested a tolling of interest retroactively to June 22, 2012 based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the prior order. A decision was not made on the tolling request. The case was adjourned to August 17, 2012.

On or about August 10, 2012, US Bank sent a denial letter stating that “we were unable to reduce your principal and interest payment by 10% or more as required to comply with the terms of the [HAMP] program” (see affirmation of Jantarasami, exhibit E, Denial Letter). On August 12, 2012, defendant’s [*5]counsel, via email, responded to the denial letter as follows:

“Without addressing the accuracy of your client’s computations, be advised that the requirement your client refers to applies only in HAMP Tier 2 evaluations. We still have not received any Tier 1 determination, and per HAMP rules, a Tier 2 analysis is to be conducted (if at all) only after a borrower is considered and rejected for Tier 1. It is not a requirement of the Tier 1 Standard Modification Waterfall that the monthly PITIA be reduced by 10%. Please have your client run a HAMP Tier 1 analysis of my client as soon as possible. The next settlement conference in this matter is scheduled for 8/17/12 and your client’s attached letter does not satisfy its obligation per the 7/20/12 Order, to issue a decision on my client’s HAMP application.”

(id., exhibit F).

At the fifth settlement conference on August 17,2012, the court was advised that Rodriguez had been denied both a HAMP modification and a traditional modification. The case was adjourned to September 7, 2012 for US Bank to respond to the concerns raised in the defendant’s email.

At the next settlement conference held on September 7, 2012, US Bank had still not responded to the August 12, 2012 email. Defendant’s counsel advised the court that he would appeal Wells Fargo’s decision. The court adjourned the matter to October 26, 2012, and set September 21, 2012 as a deadline for US Bank to respond with a detailed denial letter with any and all values used in the review be sent in writing directly to the defendant’s attorney.

On September 18, 2012, US Bank resent the denial letter of August 10, 2012, purporting to respond “as requested at the 9/7/12 conference” (id., exhibit I). Defendant’s counsel wrote to the plaintiff’s representative, advising that a tolling application would follow for failing to respond to his August 12, 2012 email.

On October 11, 2012, US Bank sent a new denial letter. Again, the proffered basis for the denial was exactly the same as previously raised by the plaintiff, namely, that the pre-modification principal, interest, taxes was allegedly less than 31% of the defendant’s gross monthly income. Once again, defendant’s counsel notified the plaintiff that it was relying on the wrong principal and interest figure (PI), i.e. the interest- only PI, instead of the fully amortizing PI. Plaintiff did not respond further, and at the seventh settlement conference, the [*6]defendant’s counsel was directed by Referee Josephine Bastone to submit his lack of good faith/tolling application on written motion. On November 30, 2012, the present motion was submitted to the court.

Discussion

As an initial matter, not before the court for decision is the efficacy or wisdom of Wells Fargo’s internal procedures for evaluating loan modification requests. The issue here is whether the facts as alleged by Rodriguez are sufficient to demonstrate a violation of CPLR 3408 (f)’s good faith requirement. The court finds that Rodriguez has demonstrated that the plaintiff violated its duty to negotiate in good faith during the settlement conference process.

The New York Legislature has not established a definitive test to determine a lack of good faith. Generally, good faith under New York case law is an interpretative concept, “necesitat[ing] examination of a state of mind” (Credit Suisse First Boston v Utrecht-America Fin. Co., 80 AD3d 485, 487 [1st Dept 2011], quoting Coan v Estate of Chapin, 156 AD2d 318, 319 [1st Dept 1989]). “Conduct such as providing conflicting information, refusal to honor agreements, unexcused delay, unexplained charges, and misrepresentations have been held to constitute bad faith’” (Flagstar Bank, FSB v Walker, 37 Misc 3d 312, 317 n 6 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2012] [internal citations omitted]; see also One West Bank, FSB v Greenhut, 36 Misc 3d 1205 [A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51197 [U] [Sup Ct, Westchester County 2012]). The test applied in Flagstar is tethered to the specific HAMP guidelines. Using the HAMP provisions as an appropriate benchmark of good faith in negotiations, as stated in Flagstar, would enable the bank to abide by both state and federal regulations (Flagstar Bank, FSB v Walker. 36 Misc 3d at 317-318).

Another line of cases extended this concept to ascribe a lack of good faith to a plaintiff-mortgagee, which has engaged in dilatory tactics and “failed to provide proper review and extend to defendant an affordable loan modification” (see Deutsche Bank Trust Co. of America v Davis, 32 Misc 3d 1210 [A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51238 [U], *2 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2011]). The test applied in a third line of cases is the failure to “work out a loan modification, as required by statute, with a homeowner who is gainfully employed” and “earns income [sufficient] to sustain a modified payment” (see BAC Home Loans Servicing v Westervelt, 29 Misc 3d 1224 [A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51992 [U], *5 [Sup Ct, Dutchess County 2010]). However, a duty to negotiate in good faith does [*7]not guarantee that the negotiations will be fruitful (see e.g. JP Morgan Chase, N.A. v Ilardo, 36 Misc 3d 359, 379 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2012]). Nor does the duty to negotiate in good faith compel either party to consent to the other’s position. Thus, the mere fact that the parties failed to reach a loan modification agreement does not necessarily mean that the duty to negotiate in good faith was breached. As stated by the Appellate Division, First Department, in Wells Fargo Bank v Van Dyke (101 AD3d 638, 639 [1st Dept 2012]), “[a]ny determination of good faith must be based on the totality of the circumstances.”

The court has an affirmative duty to “ensure that each party fulfills its obligations to negotiate in good faith and see that conferences are not unduly delayed or subject to willful dilatory tactics so that the rights of both parties may be adjudicated in a timely manner” (Uniform Rule 202.12-a[c] [4]). In an appropriate case, equity requires the cancellation of interest awarded to the mortgagee on an unpaid principal balance of a mortgage (see e.g. Citibank, N.A. v Van Brunt Props, LLC, 95 AD3d 1158, 1159 [2d Dept 2012]; Norwest Bank Minn., N.A. v E.M.V. Realty Corp., 94 AD3d 835, 837 [2d Dept 2010]).

As previously stated, where it is shown that a foreclosure plaintiff failed to follow HAMP guidelines, such failure violates the plaintiff’s CPLR 3408(f) duty to proceed in good faith. In this case, the court concludes that under the totality of the circumstances test, Wells Fargo violated its good faith obligation.

To begin, Wells Fargo attended and participated in all settlement conferences. Apparently another foreclosure prevention alternative, a traditional loan modification, was considered by Wells Fargo in the instant case. But it is unclear whether Wells Fargo’s dealings contemplated a loan modification. Specific eligibility and review procedures are delineated in the HAMP guidelines, which mandate how a servicer and borrower are to conduct themselves during the loan modification process. Participants, as well, in the mandatory settlement conference part must abide by those same guidelines.

Defendant’s counsel claims that he has studied the HAMP loan modification criteria, and noticed significant errors by Wells Fargo that affected his client’s eligibility for a loan modification. Conversely, Wells Fargo asserts reliance on a formula it uses to calculate HAMP modifications that was allegedly created by DOT, and imbedded in the computer program it uses to calculate HAMP modifications. However, strict adherence [*8]to internal guidelines, and not the HAMP guidelines, may not meet the requisites of “good faith.”

The question then becomes whether predetermined reliance on in-house standards requiring either the acceptance or rejection of a loan modification application, as opposed to a fact-sensitive and accommodating inquiry under the HAMP guidelines, is “good faith” sufficient to survive this CPLR 3408 (f) motion.

This court uses trained referees to handle the mandatory settlement conference part. Following the instruction of Referee Bastone, on August 17, 2012, to address Rodriguez’s concerns and provide him with a more detailed explanation for the denial of his loan modification application, Wells Fargo agreed to respond to Rodriguez’s request. However, the plaintiff’s last letter regarding the defendant’s modification application failed to comply with the court’s directive (see Wells Fargo Bank v Salyamov, 2012 WL 6729904, 2012 NY Misc LEXIS 5792 [Sup Ct, Richmond Cty, 2012]).

Moreover, Rodriguez’s representation that Wells Fargo inexplicably refused to evaluate him under both the Tier 1 and Tier 2 programs, which the loan servicer must do under the HAMP guidelines, stands unchallenged by Wells Fargo. Rodriguez certainly has the right to be evaluated under Tier 1 and Tier 2. Rodriguez, as well, has the right to examine the criteria used by Wells Fargo to approve or reject his application. He also has the right to ask Wells Fargo to consider using an appropriate principal and interest figure. These are not unreasonable requests. Wells Fargo having agreed to the terms of the HAMP guidelines was under an obligation to honor those requests. Wells Fargo, however, ignored those rights and requests. Thus, Wells Fargo categorically refused to comply with the current HAMP directives, and work toward a possible loan modification in “good faith.” Just because Wells Fargo followed its internal guidelines does not immunize its conduct from court review or sanctions.

Conclusion

In the interests of equity, it is hereby

ORDERED that the defendant Jorge Louis Rodriguez’s motion for an order pursuant to CPLR 3408 (f) and Uniform Rule 202.12 finding the plaintiff in violation of its duty to negotiate in good faith during the settlement conferences is granted; and it is further [*9]

ORDERED that the plaintiff U. S. Bank, N.A., and its loan servicer, Wells Fargo, are barred from collecting any interest, unpaid late fees, or attorneys’ fees incurred from July 20, 2012 (the date that the defendant received the HAMP denial in court) until the defendant is given a final detailed determination on his loan modification application, after review of all possible HAMP options for which he may be eligible; and it is further

ORDERED that once a final review and determination are completed, the parties are directed to contact the mandatory settlement conference part to schedule a conference; and it is further

ORDERED that a bank representative fully familiar with the file and with full authority to settle the matter appear at the next conference; and it is further

ORDERED that appearing counsel must be fully authorized to dispose of the case as required by statute (see CPLR 3408[c]); and it is further

ORDERED that failure of the plaintiff, and its loan servicer, to comply with this order may result in further sanctions, including exemplary damages and loss of the privilege of appearing by local counsel in all foreclosure settlement conferences conducted in Bronx County.

Dated: August , 2013

ENTER:

_______________________

ROBERT E. TORRES J.S.C.

Down Load PDF of This Case

© 2010-13 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD0 Comments

Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v Monroy (2013) 215 CA4th 972 | DANGEROUS ASSIGNMENTS

Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v Monroy (2013) 215 CA4th 972 | DANGEROUS ASSIGNMENTS

Even if this were a real liar’s loan (i.e., when the borrower had truly, and voluntarily, lied in her loan application), the original lender might well have had a cause of action for fraud, but not the successor holder of the mortgage, to whom no such lies had been told. Heritage’s standing was as an assignee, not as a victim.

REFinBlog-

The same appellate panel that delivered a terrifying punch to the residential lending industry a few months ago in Jolley v Chase Home Fin., LLC (2013) 213 CA4th 872, reported at 36 CEB RPLR 46 (Mar. 2013) (which is now official, since the supreme court declined to review it), has now given another branch of that industry an equally frightening setback in Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v Monroy (2013) 215 CA4th 972. More fully described on p 84 of this issue, the case concerned a financial institution (Heritage) whose business model involved buying up defaulted junior mortgages that had already been rendered worthless by senior foreclosures, and then attempting to collect whatever it could from the former mortgagors, even when-as in this case-those mortgages were purchase money loans, and therefore uncollectible because of CCP §580b’s one-action rule.

After acquiring Ms. Monroy’s mortgage and sending three demand letters to her, Heritage discovered that she had apparently falsified her income on her original loan application and had wrongly represented the purchase as an arm’s-length transaction when, in fact, she was buying the house from her son. Emboldened by these discoveries, Heritage wrote Monroy again and also filed a complaint against her for fraud. She responded by cross-complaining that Heritage was violating the California and federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Acts.

After a lot of procedural skirmishing, the trial court sustained Monroy’s demurrer to Heritage’s complaint and granted summary judgment to her on her cross-complaint, awarding her $1 in damages but also $90,000 in attorney fees and costs. All of this was affirmed on appeal.

The published and lengthy appellate decision, although sometimes surprising in its reasoning, gives a good deal of guidance to practitioners-especially those who represent creditors and their collection arms or cohorts-as to the many dangers lurking in attempts to collect residential debt obligations too energetically.

Careless Handling of Assignments …

continue reading [REFinBlog]

 

Filed 3/29/13  Heritage Pacific Financial v. Monroy CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

 

HERITAGE PACIFIC FINANCIAL, LLC,

              Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, and

              Appellant,

v.

MARIBEL MONROY,

              Defendant, Cross-complainant, and

              Respondent.

 

 

 

 

      A135274, A136043

 

      (Contra Costa County

      Super. Ct. No. C10-01607)

 

Maribel Monroy executed two promissory notes with WMC Mortgage Corp. (WMC) when purchasing a home in Richmond, California in 2006 (the Richmond property).  After a foreclosure on the senior deed of trust, Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC (Heritage) acquired Monroy’s second promissory note from WMC.  Heritage sent Monroy a letter attached to a complaint and summons advising her that Heritage had filed a lawsuit against her alleging various fraud claims.  The letter admonished that any misinformation provided by Monroy on her original loan application with WMC could result in civil liability and that Heritage would proceed with a lawsuit if it were unable to resolve the matter with Monroy.  Monroy filed a cross-complaint against Heritage, alleging violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Rosenthal Act) and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA or the Act).

              After permitting Heritage to amend its complaint three times, the trial court sustained Monroy’s demurrer against Heritage’s pleading on the grounds that Heritage had failed to provide or allege an assignment agreement with sufficient particularity to demonstrate that the assignment of Monroy’s promissory note included an intent to assign WMC’s tort claims against the borrower.  Thereafter, Monroy moved for summary judgment or adjudication on her cross-complaint.  The court denied her motion as to her claim of a violation of the Rosenthal Act but granted the motion as to a violation of the FDCPA, on the condition that Monroy agree to damages in the amount of one dollar.  Monroy agreed to the damage award of one dollar and the court entered judgment in her favor.  Subsequently, Monroy requested attorney fees and costs under title 15 of the United States Code section 1692k(a)(3), and the court found that Monroy was the prevailing party and entitled to attorney fees and costs in the amount of $89,489.60.  The court concluded that the issues regarding the cross-complaint and complaint were interrelated and could not be reasonably separated.  Heritage separately appealed the judgment and the award of attorney fees and we, on our own motion, consolidated the appeals.

              On appeal, Heritage argues that it sufficiently set forth allegations to support a claim that the assignment from WMC included an intent to assign WMC’s tort claims against Monroy and that the trial court improperly weighed the evidence when sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.  It also contends that triable issues of fact exist regarding Monroy’s FDCPA claim and therefore the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.  Finally, it objects to the award and amount of attorney fees.  We are not persuaded by Heritage’s argument, and affirm the judgment and the award of attorney fees.  

BACKGROUND

              Monroy is Spanish speaking and works as a housekeeper.  On November 26, 2006, she purchased the Richmond property for $425,000.  Monroy executed two promissory notes with WMC.  She obtained a senior mortgage loan for $340,000 and a junior mortgage loan for $85,000 (the note, the second note, or the promissory note).  Both promissory notes were secured by a deed of trust on the property.  The beneficiary of each deed of trust was Mortgage Electronic Servicing Corporation.

Both the first and second promissory notes provided in the first paragraph the following:  “I understand that the Lender may transfer this Note.  The Lender or anyone who takes this Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under this Note will be called the ‘Note holder.’ ”  Monroy signed a form stating that the information in the loan application was true and correct and acknowledged that “any intentional or negligent misrepresentation of this information . . . may result in civil liability, including monetary damages.”

On her loan application, Monroy claimed to make $9,200 per month as the owner of Maribel’s Cleaning Services.  Monroy signed a certification that she did not have a family or business relationship with the seller of the property. 

The seller of the Richmond property was Marvin E. Monroy, Monroy’s son.  He received $53,258.49 as a result of the sale.  Monroy bought the house from her son because he was not able to make the mortgage payments. 

At this same time, on November 20, 2006, property in Manteca (the Manteca property) was purchased in Monroy’s name and a promissory note was executed for the amount of $312,000.  According to Monroy, the Manteca property was purchased under her name as a result of identity theft.  She stated that in 2006 she was unaware of this transaction.  She averred that she has never been to the Manteca Property.  In 2008, Monroy submitted to the credit-reporting agency a verified fraud statement.  In this statement, she asserted that a mortgage in Manteca was opened in her name as a result of the identity theft.

Monroy failed to make her mortgage payments on the Richmond property, which resulted in a foreclosure on the senior deed of trust on August 28, 2008. 

On May 22, 2009, Heritage acquired Monroy’s second promissory note as part of a “larger pool of loans.”  Heritage is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of Texas and its principal place of business is in Dallas County, Texas.  Heritage sent Monroy a letter stating that it had purchased her second unpaid loan.  Heritage was unsuccessful in speaking with Monroy.  In October 2009, Heritage sent by certified mail another notice of the transfer of the ownership of the note.  Heritage sent Monroy a third notice in December 2009.  In this notice, it asserted that she was obligated to pay Heritage the unpaid balance on the second promissory note. 

Heritage did further research and concluded that Monroy had misrepresented her income and submitted false documentation regarding her income on her original loan application.  Heritage also discovered that Monroy’s son was the seller of the Richmond property.  Additionally, it uncovered the documents related to the Manteca property. 

On June 1, 2010, Heritage filed a complaint against Monroy for intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, promise without intent to perform, and negligent misrepresentation based on her loan application with WMC.  Heritage alleged that it was not barred from pursuing its action by any antideficiency statute because it was not seeking a deficiency judgment for the balance of a promissory note following foreclosure, but was seeking a judgment for Monroy’s alleged fraud in connection with her loan application.  Heritage requested actual damages in the amount of $85,000, the sum owed on the promissory note, and also asked for punitive damages. 

On June 27, 2010, Monroy received a letter dated May 25, 2010, from Heritage that attached Heritage’s summons and complaint against her.  The letter advised her about its civil action against her and stated in bold type:  “Should you wish to voluntarily provide us with your federal tax return transcripts, a signed copy of Form 4506-T (Request for Transcript of Tax Return) and/or your proof of residency in the property made the subject of our Complaint, please contact us at your earliest convenience . . . .”  The letter directed:  “If you notify us of your intent to voluntarily provide us with this documentation, we may suspend actions to provide you with an opportunity to provide us with copies of the same.”  The letter told Monroy to notify Heritage if she wanted to provide a copy of her promissory note as Heritage, “as assignee of the promissory note, has the right to reverify the information contained therein.”  The letter admonished Monroy that “any misinformation or misrepresentations provided in the [loan] application are a violation of federal law and may result in ‘civil liability, including monetary damages, to any person who may suffer any loss due to reliance upon any misrepresentation’ for which Heritage . . . currently seeks.”  The letter warned that if Heritage was unable to resolve the matter by the date Monroy’s answer to the complaint was due, Heritage would “have no other option but to proceed with litigation against” her.  The letter declared that it was “from a debt collector” and was “an attempt to collect a debt.”

On July 28, 2010, Monroy answered Heritage’s complaint and filed a cross-complaint alleging violations of the Rosenthal Act (Civ. Code, § 1788 et seq.) and the FDCPA (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.).  A little more than a month later, on September 2, Heritage demurred to the cross-complaint and filed a motion to strike the pleading.  On November 16, 2010, Monroy filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on Heritage’s complaint.

On December 28, 2010, the trial court overruled Heritage’s demurrer to Monroy’s cross-complaint and denied its motion to strike.  On this same date, the court granted with leave to amend Monroy’s motion for judgment on Heritage’s complaint.  The court explained that Heritage had failed to allege that the lender had assigned its fraud claims to it and Heritage had conceded that no California legal authority held that the assignment of a promissory note automatically constituted an assignment of a lender’s fraud claims.  The court added:  “If [Heritage] chooses to amend its complaint so as to specifically allege an assignment of the lender’s fraud claims, [Heritage] shall make such allegations with the particularity required of a fraud cause of action, and [Heritage] shall attach as an exhibit to the amended complaint a full and legible copy of any written assignment agreement.”

Heritage filed its first amended complaint for the same four causes of action on December 23, 2010.  Heritage attached Monroy’s second promissory note for $85,000, and alleged in the pleading that the assignment was recorded on the last page of the promissory note. 

Monroy demurred to the first amended complaint.  On April 7, 2011, the trial court sustained Monroy’s demurrer “with one last opportunity” for Heritage to amend.  (Bold omitted.)  The court explained that Heritage had “still failed to adequately allege an assignment of the original lender’s tort claims, as distinct from an assignment of the original lender’s contractual rights under the subject promissory note.”  The court cited Sunburst Bank v. Executive Life Ins. Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1164.  The court concluded that Heritage had “not attached to its complaint a written assignment agreement, as specified in the court’s ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and [Heritage] ha[d] not alleged the formation of an oral assignment agreement.”

The trial court noted in the order that Heritage had represented at oral argument that it would amend the pleading to allege “the existence of either a written assignment of the original lender’s tort claims, or an assignment agreement implied in fact from circumstances other than the mere assignment of contractual rights.”  The court admonished Heritage that its future pleading must “allege with the particularity required of a fraud cause of action all the circumstances showing the formation and terms” of an implied agreement if Heritage was relying on an assignment implied in fact.  The amended complaint also needed to allege “whether the subject promissory note was assigned before or after foreclosure of the first deed of trust and the corresponding extinguishment of the second deed of trust securing the promissory note.” 

On May 10, 2011, Heritage filed its second amended complaint (the SAC).  The SAC again set forth claims for intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, promise without intent to perform, and negligent misrepresentation.  Heritage alleged that after the foreclosure on the first deed of trust, WMC sold Monroy’s promissory note secured by the second deed of trust on the Richmond property and “assigned any and all rights WMC may have including but not limited to any right to fraud claims against [Monroy].  Such assignment is evidenced by signature and stamp of the secretary of WMC . . . on the last page of the note . . . .”  Heritage further alleged:  “In assigning [Monroy’s] loan, [Heritage] as assignee of WMC obtained all rights, title and interest in and to the mortgage loan by [Monroy].  The assignment to [Heritage] included assignment of the original lender’s (WMC) tort claim.  The assignment of tort claims is implied in the language of the loan sell agreement to [Heritage] including but not limited to language such as ‘Seller does hereby sell, assign and convey to Buyer, its successors and assigns, all right, title and interest in the loan.’  The loan sell agreement also provided that ‘the Seller transfers assign, set-over, quitclaim and convey to Buyer all right, title and interest of the Seller in the mortgage loan.’ ” 

The SAC also added the following language:  “The assignment of the tort claim is also implied by conduct of the parties in the secondary mortgage market as it is custom and practice in the mortgage industry to assign any and all rights and interests including any right to tort claim against the borrower when selling mortgage loan.  [Heritage] alleges that based on the conduct of the parties and the language included in the buy sell agreement of the loan, and the custom and practice of lenders such as WMC, the assignment of [Monroy’s] loan by WMC included assignment of any and all tort claims.”  The SAC also asserted that the language of the loan application signed by Monroy implied the assignment of tort claims.

Monroy demurred to the SAC, and Heritage attached a declaration of Diane Taylor, a representative for WMC Mortgage, LLC, to its “sur-reply in support” of its opposition to Monroy’s demurrer.  Taylor’s declaration dated August 4, 2011, stated:  “As Assistant Secretary, I am authorized to speak on behalf of WMC Mortgage, LLC, successor to WMC . . . .”  She stated that WMC relied on the information provided by the borrower applying for a loan to determine the borrower’s “eligibility for the products offered.”  She stated:  “When WMC sold its mortgage loans to third parties, WMC assigned all of its legal rights (in tort as well as contract), as the originating lender, to the buyer—including, but not limited to, the right to recover against a borrower for fraud.”  (Underline omitted.) 

On August 15, 2011, the trial court filed its order sustaining without leave to amend Monroy’s demurrer to Heritage’s SAC.  The court explained:  “Despite being afforded an opportunity to amend, [Heritage] has still failed to adequately allege an assignment of the original lender’s tort claims, as distinct from an assignment of the original lender’s contractual rights under the subject promissory note.  [Citation.]  [Heritage] has not attached to its complaint a written assignment agreement . . . , and [Heritage] has not adequately alleged the formation of an oral assignment agreement.” 

The trial court stated that there was an independent ground for sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.  The SAC stated that the promissory note was assigned after foreclosure of the first deed of trust and the corresponding extinguishment of the second deed of trust securing the promissory note.  The court found that “there was no underlying property interest supporting an incidental assignment of the original lender’s fraud claims.” 

On November 18, 2011, Monroy filed a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication on her cross-complaint.  Monroy asserted that Heritage was involved in the business practice of filing invalid fraud claims to avoid California’s antideficiency laws in order to collect on nonrecourse debts or convert them into recourse default judgments.  With regard to the claim of violating the FDCPA, Monroy alleged that Heritage was a debt collector and was engaged in a deceptive debt collections practice within the meaning of title 15, United States Code sections1692d, 1692e, and 1692f.  Monroy cited the letter Heritage sent her after it had filed the lawsuit against her.  Monroy also asserted that Heritage had violated provisions of the Rosenthal Act under Civil Code sections 1788.17 and 1788.13, subdivision (k).  Monroy claimed that she was entitled to $1,000 for Heritage’s violation of the FDCPA and $1,000 for Heritage’s violation of the Rosenthal Act. 

Heritage opposed the motion for summary judgment and also requested a continuance to conduct additional discovery.  In its opposition to Monroy’s motion for summary judgment, Heritage agreed that it was a debt collector but disputed the contention that the FDCPA applied.  Heritage argued that the FDCPA did not apply because Monroy bought the Richmond property for her son and also purchased a home in Manteca.  It also disputed the allegation that it engaged in deceptive debt collections practices within the meaning of the FDCPA or that it violated the Rosenthal Act. 

On February 21, 2012, the trial court issued its order granting in part and denying in part Monroy’s motion for summary adjudication on her cross-complaint.  The court granted Monroy’s motion as to her claim that Heritage violated the FDCPA.  The court found that Heritage’s conduct in threatening Monroy with the prosecution of legal claims that had no merit violated the FDCPA.  The court noted that Heritage had made a binding judicial admission that it received the assignment of Monroy’s note after the foreclosure of the first deed of trust, and that event extinguished the second deed of trust securing Monroy’s note.  The court advised that it could not grant summary adjudication on her cause of action for monetary damages because the issue of the amount of damages remained unresolved; it thus awarded statutory damages in the nominal amount of one dollar.  The court added:  “If Monroy insists on receiving a greater amount, then summary adjudication must be denied and the matter must proceed to trial.” 

The trial court denied Monroy’s summary adjudication motion with regard to her claim that Heritage violated the Rosenthal Act.  The court concluded there was a triable issue of fact as to Heritage’s statutory “unclean hands” defense.  The court also sustained a number of Heritage’s objections to the declaration of Monroy’s counsel. 

The trial court denied Heritage’s request for a continuance to conduct additional discovery.  Heritage’s four discovery motions were set for a hearing 10 days after the scheduled trial date and thus the court found that Heritage’s discovery requests were untimely.  Further, the court found that there was no good cause for granting a continuance. 

On March 12, 2012, the trial court filed its entry of judgment in favor of Monroy and against Heritage and awarded Monroy nominal statutory damages of one dollar on her cross-complaint, the maximum sum she could receive without a trial on her FDCPA claim.  The order stated that Monroy was the “prevailing party.” 

Heritage filed a timely notice of appeal.

On March 23, 2012, Monroy filed a memorandum of costs.  On May 10, 2012, Monroy filed her motion for attorney fees and costs under title 15 of the United States Code section 1692k(a)(3).  Heritage filed its memorandum in opposition on June 6, 2012. 

The trial court held a hearing on Monroy’s fee motion on June 19, 2012.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated it was granting Monroy’s motion.  The court explained:  “As the judge in this case, I did go over the billings and I didn’t see anything that I could say was unreasonable for hours spent on certain tasks.  And I felt the hourly rate was within the acceptable parameters for Bay Area attorneys.”

On July 10, 2012, the court filed its order granting Monroy’s motion for an award of attorney fees and expenses.  The order stated that Monroy was the prevailing party and entitled “to the full amount of her attorney’s fees relating to the FDCPA claim as well as to Heritage’s complaint.”  The court added:  “The issues are synonymous and interrelated and cannot reasonably be separated.”  The court concluded that counsel’s hourly fee rate of $450 was “within acceptable parameters for attorneys of [counsel’s] skill and experience practicing” in the San Francisco Bay area, and that the time spent was 194.5 hours.  The court denied the enhancement requested.  The court awarded fees in the amount of $87,525 ($450 x 194.5).  The court awarded litigation expenses in the amount of $1,964.60.  

On this same date, July 10, 2102, the trial court entered an amended judgment, stating that it had sustained with prejudice Monroy’s demurrer to Heritage’s SAC, and had granted Monroy’s motion for summary adjudication on her claim in her cross-complaint for violations of the FDCPA.  The court repeated that Monroy shall take statutory damages of one dollar on her cross-complaint, the maximum she could receive without a trial.  The court stated that Monroy was the prevailing party and awarded her $89,489.60 for attorney fees and litigation costs and expenses ($87,525 + $1,964.60).  Thus, the total judgment in favor of Monroy and against Heritage was $89,490.60 ($89,489.60 + $1.00 in damages). 

Heritage filed a timely notice of appeal from the order awarding attorney fees.  This court on its own motion consolidated both of Heritage’s appeals.

On November 8, 2012, Monroy filed a request for judicial notice of an order in a class certification lawsuit against Heritage and of Heritage’s requests for default judgments against other plaintiffs in a different lawsuit.  Heritage opposed the request and argued that Monroy is asking this court to take judicial notice of facts in documents and these facts may not be true.  On December 5, 2012, we issued an order that the opposed request for judicial notice would be decided with the merits of the appeal.

“ ‘Taking judicialnotice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.’  [Citation.]  While courts take judicialnotice of public records, they do not take notice of the truth of matters stated therein.  [Citation.]  ‘When judicialnotice is taken of a document, . . . the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable.’  [Citation.]”  (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)  Accordingly, we take judicial notice of the existence of these court documents (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a)), but do not take notice of the disputed facts in the documents.

DISCUSSION

I.  The Demurrer against Heritage’s SAC

A.  The Standard of Review, The Pleading Requirements for Alleging Fraud, and the

      Burden of Proof When Alleging an Assignment

The trial court sustained Monroy’s demurrer against Heritage’s SAC without leave to amend.  The standard of review governing an appeal from the judgment after the trial court sustains a demurrer without leave to amend is well established.  “ ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  [Citation.]  We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’  [Citation.]  Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.  [Citation.]  When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.  [Citation.]  And when it is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment:  if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm.  [Citations.]  The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.”  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

Here, Heritage alleged that it had a right to pursue misrepresentations Monroy made in her loan application to WMC based on a claim that WMC assigned its torts claims against Monroy to it.  “The burden of proving an assignment falls upon the party asserting rights thereunder [citations].”  (Cockerell v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 284, 292.)  An assignment agreement “must describe the subject matter of the assignment with sufficient particularity to identify the rights assigned.”  (Mission Valley East, Inc. v. County of Kern (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 89, 97.)  An assignment is “a manifestation to another person by the owner of the right indicating his [or her] intention to transfer, without further action or manifestation of intention, the right to such other person, or to a third person.”  (Cockerel, at p. 291.)  As with contracts generally, the nature of an assignment is determined by ascertaining the intent of the parties.  (Cambridge Co. v. City of Elsinore (1922) 57 Cal.App. 245.) 

Furthermore, the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings does not apply to fraud causes of action.  “In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.”  (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)  This requirement serves two purposes.  First, it gives the defendant notice of the definite charges to be met.  Second, the allegations “should be sufficiently specific that the court can weed out nonmeritorious actions on the basis of the pleadings.  Thus the pleading should be sufficient ‘ “to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of fraud.’  ”  (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Goods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216-217, superseded by statute on another issue.) 

B.  The Adequacy of the Fraud Allegations

Heritage argues that it adequately alleged that WMC assigned its fraud claims against Monroy to it.  The trial court’s insistence that it had to attach a document establishing the assignment shows, according to Heritage, that the court improperly considered the sufficiency of the evidence when ruling on the demurrer.  For the reasons discussed below, we disagree with Heritage’s contention.

Heritage cites various allegations in its SAC where it asserted in a conclusory fashion that WMC assigned to Heritage its tort claims when WMC transferred to Heritage its rights under Monroy’s promissory note.  In particular it cites its allegations that WMC “sold the loan and assigned any and all rights WMC may have including but not limited to any right to fraud claim” against Monroy.  It further alleged that this assignment was “evidenced by signature and stamp of the secretary of WMC” on the last page of the note.  Heritage set forth in its SAC that as the assignee of WMC, Heritage “obtained all rights, title and interest in and to the mortgage loan by defendant[,]” including WMC’s tort claim.  Heritage claimed that the assignment of tort claims was implied by the following language in the agreement between Heritage and WMC:  “ ‘Seller does hereby sell, assign and convey to Buyer, its successors and assigns, all right, title and interest in the loan.’  The loan sell agreement also provided that ‘the Seller transfers assign, set-over, quitclaim and convey to Buyer all rights, title and interest of the Seller in the mortgage loan.’ ” The SAC added that WMC acknowledged on May 9, 2011, that it assigned to Heritage its tort claims. 

Heritage contends that its SAC also alleged assignment of the tort claims based on implied conduct of the parties, as follows:  “The assignment of the tort claim is also implied by conduct of the parties in the secondary mortgage market as it is custom and practice in the mortgage industry to assign any and all rights and interests including any right to tort claim against the borrower when selling mortgage loan.  [Heritage] alleges that based on the conduct of the parties and the language included in the buy sell agreement of the loan, and the custom and practice of lenders such as WMC, the assignment of [Monroy’s] loan by WMC included assignment of any and all tort claims.” 

Heritage also maintains that the language in Monroy’s loan implied an assignment, as Monroy acknowledged the following:  “ ‘Each of the undersigned specifically represents to Lender and to lender’s actual or potential agents, brokers, processors, attorneys, insurers, servicers, successors and assigns and agrees and acknowledges that:  (1) the information provided in this application is true and correct as of the date set forth opposite my signature and that any intentional or negligent misrepresentation of this information contained in this application may result in civil liability, including monetary damages, to any person who may suffer any loss due to reliance upon any misrepresentation that I have made on this application. . . .  (6)  The Lender, its servicers, successors or assigns may rely on this information contained in the application. . . .’ ”  (Bold omitted.) 

Heritage insists that the foregoing language and the attached document, which was the written indorsement containing the signature and stamp of the secretary of WMC on the last page of the promissory note, were sufficient, and the trial court should have overruled Monroy’s demurrer.

We agree that the allegations in Heritage’s SAC and the attached indorsement showed an assignment of Monroy’s promissory note.  However, the assignment of this contract right did not carry with it a transfer of WMC’s tort rights.  While no particular form of assignment is required, it is essential to the assignment of a right that the assignor manifests an intention to transfer “the right.”  (Sunburst Bank v. Executive Life Ins. Co., supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164.)

An assignment of a right generally carries with it an assignment of other rights incident thereto.  (Civ. Code, § 1084.)  The fraud claims based on Monroy’s loan application with WMC are not “incidental to” the transfer of the promissory note to Heritage.  “A suit for fraud obviously does not involve an attempt to recover on a debt or note.”  (Guild Mortgage Co. v. Heller (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1505, 1512; see also Millner v. Lankershim Packing Co. (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 315, 319-320 [assignment of mortgage did not include assignment of right to recover for injury to the mortgaged property]; Schauer v. Mandarin Gems of Cal., Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 949, 956-957 [divorce agreement awarding diamond ring purchased by husband to wife did not automatically transfer husband’s claim against jeweler for fraud].)  For example, in Williams v. Galloway (1962) 211 Cal.App.2d 302, the corporation’s sale and transfer to a second corporation “ ‘[a]ll personal property’ ” and all “ ‘property held on a leas[e]hold basis’ ” did not transfer a claim for money the first corporation had against its former lessor.  (Id. at pp. 304-305.)

In the present case, the indorsement and allegations established that WMC assigned the second promissory note to Heritage.  The transfer of the promissory note provided Heritage with contract rights.  Fraud rights are not, as a matter of law, incidental to the transfer of the promissory note.[1]

It is true that incidental rights may include certain ancillary causes of action but the assignment agreement “must describe the subject matter of the assignment with sufficient particularity to identify the rights assigned.”  (Mission Valley East, Inc. v. County of Kern, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d at p. 97.)  “[A] basic tenet of California contract law dictates that when a particular right or set of rights is defined in an assignment, additional rights not similarly defined or named cannot be considered part of the rights transferred.”  (DC3 Entertainment, LLC v. John Galt Entertainment, Inc. (W.D. Wash. 2006) 412 F.Supp.2d 1125, 1144.)

Here, none of the allegations regarding assignment in the SAC specified that the assignment was transferring the ancillary right of a tort claim.  The document attached by Heritage did not support any claim of an assignment by WMC to Heritage of its fraud claims against Monroy.  This document was the promissory note signed by Monroy, which, on the last page, contained the signature and stamp of the secretary of WMC.  Directly under “Pay to the order of” was Heritage’s stamp.  The transfer of the promissory note by indorsement did not show a clear intent to assign WMC’s fraud claim.  (See Comm. Code, § 3201 et seq.)  The conveyance of the promissory note to Heritage does not establish that WMC assigned to Heritage its right to the performance of other, distinct obligations owed by Monroy, such as the obligation to provide truthful information.  (See Cambridge Co. v. City of Elsinore, supra, 57 Cal.App. at pp. 249-250.)

Additionally, the allegations did not show an assignment of the tort claims based on custom and practice.  “While no particular form of assignment is necessary, the assignment, to be effectual, must be a manifestation to another person by the owner of the right indicating his intention to transfer, without further action or manifestation of intention, the right to such other person, or to a third person.  [Citation.]”  (Cockerell v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., supra, 42 Cal.2d at p. 291.)  The parties’ intention is determined by considering their words and acts as well as the subject matter of the contract.  (Lumsden v. Roth (1955) 138 Cal.App.2d 172, 175.)  The assignment agreement in the present case is completely silent regarding any tort claim and nothing in the agreement suggests that the assignment included any rights other than those rights incidental to the contract rights.  Heritage cannot allege general custom and practice to expand the assignment agreement to include ancillary rights not specified.

Heritage claims that the decision in National Reserve Co. v. Metropolitan Trust Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 827, 833 (National Reserve) supports its position that WMC’s tort claims were assigned with the transfer of the note.  Our Supreme Court in National Reserve stated that an unqualified assignment of a contract vests in the assignee “all rights and remedies incidental thereto.”  (Id. at p. 833.)  Heritage then proceeds to cite portions of the following quote:  “If . . . an accrued cause of action cannot be asserted apart from the contract out of which it arises or is essential to a complete and adequate enforcement of the contract, it passes with an assignment of the contract as an incident thereof.  Thus, the assignment of a contract passes from assignor to assignee an accrued cause of action for rescission [citations], and a creditor’s assignee acquires the right to set aside a prior fraudulent conveyance by the debtor.  [Citations.]  As a corollary, if an assignor by express provision of a contract is denied the right to assert an accrued cause of action after he has assigned away his interest in the contract, the right to sue passes to his assignee.  There would otherwise be no one to enforce the right.”  (Ibid.

Heritage ignores the language in National Reserve, supra, 17 Cal.2d 827, which directly preceded the paragraph it quotes from the decision.  In the preceding paragraph, the Supreme Court noted that incidental rights may “include certain ancillary causes of action arising out of the subject of the assignment and accruing before the assignment is made.”  (Id. at p. 833.)  However,  “[u]nless an assignment specifically or impliedly designates them, accrued causes of action arising out of an assigned contract, whether ex contractu or ex delicto, do not pass under the assignment as incidental to the contract if they can be asserted by the assignor independently of his continued ownership of the contract and are not essential to a continued enforcement of the contract.”  (Ibid.)

Applying the legal principles set forth in National Reserve to the present case, Heritage has failed to state a claim for a cause of action for fraud based on Monroy’s loan application.  Neither the indorsement nor the other allegations in the SAC authorize the assignment, specifically or impliedly, of WMC’s tort claims.  As already stressed, fraud is an ancillary cause of action to the promissory note.

Heritage maintains that it did not have to allege details and could simply allege a clear statement of the ultimate facts necessary to the cause of action.  (See Lyon v. Master Holding Corp. (1942) 50 Cal.App.2d 238, 241.)  Heritage claims that it was sufficient for it to plead the ultimate fact of ownership of the property at the time it filed this action and cites a 1924 case, Commercial Credit Co. v. Peak (1924) 195 Cal. 27, 32-33.  This case does not help Heritage.  Commercial Credit involved recovering the value of personal property or chattel.  (Id. at p. 29.)  This case did not involve a promissory note; it did not involve a claim based on the assignment of a tort; nor did it involve claims based on fraud.  Thus, Commercial Credit has no application to the present case.  Heritage ignores that every element of a fraud cause of action must be pleaded specifically.

Finally, Heritage complains that the trial court was assessing the veracity of the allegations in the SAC, and cites the court’s order instructing it to attach a writing to show an assignment as proof that the court improperly assessed the weight of the evidence.  We disagree with Heritage’s conclusion. 

“A written contract may be pleaded either by its terms––set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference––or by its legal effect.  [Citation.]  In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must ‘allege the substance of its relevant terms.  This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.’  [Citation.]”  (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.)  Since the allegations in Heritage’s pleadings did not set forth with specificity any assignment of the tort claims, the trial court properly instructed Heritage to attach the written agreement that evinced an intent to assign the tort claims.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it found that Heritage failed to state causes of action for fraud based on assignment.[2]

C. Denying Heritage Leave to Amend its SAC

              Heritage contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not permit it to amend its SAC.

The court abuses its discretion in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff can show a reasonable possibility of curing the defect in the complaint by amendment.  (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)  Heritage has the burden of proving that an amendment would cure the defect.  (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) 

In support of its argument that it should have been permitted to amend its pleading a third time, Heritage argues that its SAC was sufficient and that it could have amended the pleading to indicate that WMC intended to transfer its tort rights to Heritage.  In the trial court, Heritage attached a declaration of Taylor, a representative for WMC Mortgage, LLC.  Taylor’s declaration dated August 24, 2011, stated:  “As Assistant Secretary, I am authorized to speak on behalf of WMC Mortgage, LLC, successor to WMC . . . .”  She confirmed that WMC relied on the information provided by the borrower applying for a loan to determine the borrower’s “eligibility for the products offered.”  She declared:  “When WMC sold its mortgage loans to third parties, WMC assigned all of its legal rights (in tort as well as contract), as the originating lender, to the buyer—including, but not limited to, the right to recover against a borrower for fraud.”  (Underline omitted.) 

Taylor’s declaration on August 24, 2011, more than two years after Heritage acquired Monroy’s unpaid note as part of a “larger pool of loans,” does not shed any light on the parties’ intent at the time of the assignment.  The assignment agreement contains absolutely no language indicating that WMC intended to transfer any rights ancillary to the right to collect on the promissory note.  Contract “rights” do not exist as disembodied abstractions apart from a contract that created them.  More precisely, in California, “the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract is the source of contractual rights and duties.”  (Pacific Gas & E.Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 38.)  Thus, we assess the intent at the time the agreement is formed, not years later.

              The trial court provided Heritage with ample opportunity to cure the defect in its pleading; Heritage failed to demonstrate it could cure the defect.  The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the third demurrer against Heritage’s pleading without leave to amend.

II.  The Grant of Summary Adjudication on Monroy’s Cross-Complaint

A.  The Trial Court’s Ruling

              Monroy alleged violations of the Rosenthal Act and the FDCPA in her cross-complaint.  She claimed that Heritage violated the FDCPA by attempting to collect a debt not owed, by using unconscionable, false, deceptive, and/or misleading means to seek to collect a debt, and by threatening legal actions that could not be legally taken.

Monroy moved for summary adjudication on her claims and the trial court denied the motion as to her claim of violating the Rosenthal Act.  It granted her motion as to her claim that Heritage violated the FDCPA, and awarded Monroy damages in the amount of one dollar.  The court found that Heritage’s conduct in threatening Monroy with the prosecution of legal claims that had no merit violated the FDCPA.[3]

B.  Standard of Review

To prevail on a summaryadjudication motion, a cross-complainant must prove “each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on that cause of action. . . .”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)  Only if the cross-complainant satisfies this burden will the burden shift to the cross-defendant “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Ibid.)  The cross-defendant “may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Ibid.)

“In reviewing whether these burdens have been met, we strictly scrutinize the moving party’s papers and construe all facts and resolve all doubts in favor of the party opposing the motion.  [Citations.]”  (Innovative Business Partnerships, Inc. v. Inland Counties Regional Center, Inc. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 623, 628.)  On appeal, the trial court’s ruling is examined under a de novo standard of review.  (Brinton v. Bankers Pension Services, Inc. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 550, 555.)

C.  TheFDCPA

              The purpose of the FDCPA is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”  (15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).)  “A basic tenet of the Act is that all consumers, even those who have mismanaged their financial affairs resulting in default on their debt, deserve ‘the right to be treated in a reasonable and civil manner.’ ”  (Bass v. Stopler, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C. (7th Cir. 1997) 111 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Bass).)  Since the FDCPA is a remedial statute, “it should be construed liberally in favor of the consumer.”  (See, e.g., Johnson v. Riddle (10th Cir. 2002) 305 F.3d 1107, 1117.) 

The word “ ‘creditor’ means any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such term does not include any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.”  (15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4).)  “The term ‘debt’ means any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.”  (15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).)

              The FDCPA defines “ ‘debt collector’ ” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. . . .  [T]he term includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. . . .”  (15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).)

              Under the FDCPA, “A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”  (15 U.S.C. § 1692e.)  A violation of this section includes “[t]he false representation of” “the character, amount, or legal status of any debt[.]”  (15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A).)  A violation also includes “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken . . . .”  (15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5).)  Additionally, a violation occurs if the debt collector uses “any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer” (15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10)) or makes “[t]he false representation or implication that accounts have been turned over to innocent purchasers for value” (15 U.S.C. § 1692e(12)).  

              State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims under the FDCPA.  (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).)  The FDCPA will not impose any liability “to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any advisory opinion of the Bureau, notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred, such opinion is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.”  (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e).)

D.  Heritage Violated the FDCPA

              When alleging a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the plaintiff is a consumer, as defined by the FDCPA; (2) the debt arises out of a transaction primarily for personal, family or household purposes; (3) the defendant is a debt collector, as that phrase is defined by the FDCPA; and (4) the defendant violated a provision of the Act.  (15 U.S.C. § 1692e; Heintz v. Jenkins (1995) 514 U.S. 291, 294; Wallace v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A. (6th Cir. 2012) 683 F.3d 323, 326.)

              Monroy’s claim was based on the collection letter dated May 25, 2010, sent to her by Heritage.  She received the letter on June 28, 2010, and it was attached to the summons and complaint against her.  The letter advised that Heritage had commenced a civil action against Monroy and admonished her that “any misinformation or misrepresentations provided in the [loan] application are a violation of federal law and may result in ‘civil liability, including monetary damages, to any person who may suffer any loss due to reliance upon any misrepresentation’ for which Heritage . . . currently seeks.”  The letter warned that if Heritage was unable to resolve the matter by the date Monroy’s answer was due, Heritage would “have no other option but to proceed with litigation against” her.  The letter declared that it was “from a debt collector” and was “an attempt to collect a debt.”  In the trial court, in Heritage’s separate statement of disputed facts in support of its opposition to Monroy’s motion for summary adjudication, Heritage admitted that it was a debt collector and that it was attempting to collect an alleged debt against Monroy. 

Thus, the undisputed facts established that Heritage was a debt collector and attempting to collect a debt from Monroy.  Monroy’s obligation was to pay for “personal, family, or household purposes” (15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5)), as this was a debt incurred to purchase a home in which, according to Monroy’s declaration, she intended to live.  There was evidence that a Manteca property was also purchased in Monroy’s name, but there is no evidence that she ever lived in that home or intended to live in that home.  Indeed, the unchallenged evidence was that Monroy was the victim of identity theft and that she did not know anything about the Manteca property.  Monroy stated that she lived at the Richmond property and Heritage presented no evidence that she resided at another location.

The evidence also supported a finding that the letter Heritage sent to Monroy violated the FDCPA.  The letter attached to the complaint and summons threatened Monroy with a lawsuit for any misinformation she provided on her loan application with WMC.  Heritage asserted that Monroy owed it the money for any fraud on her application because it was now the owner of the promissory note.  As discussed extensively above, Heritage’s claims based on fraud had no merit.  Thus, Heritage violated the FDCPA when it indicated in the letter that it had the right to sue Monroy for any misinformation submitted on the promissory note and when it attempted to induce her to settle with Heritage. 

Additionally, according to Ben Ganter, the director of client relations for Heritage, Heritage acquired Monroy’s unpaid note as part of a larger pool of loans that included both secured and unsecured mortgage loans.  He acknowledged that Heritage then “seeks to collect on the unpaid balances of the notes it purchased” and that “Heritage’s business model is collecting on the loans it purchases.”  Heritage purchased Monroy’s junior loan without any knowledge about the accuracy of the loan application.  Before Heritage discovered the alleged fraud, it sent Monroy letters telling her that she was obligated to pay Heritage “for the unpaid balance of the note . . . .”  According to Ganter, a third notice of Monroy’s obligation to pay [Heritage] for the unpaid balance on the Note was sent via postal mail in December of 2009.  These notices clearly violated the FDCPA because, as the trial court found, Heritage had made a binding judicial admission that it received the assignment of Monroy’s note after the foreclosure of the first deed of trust, and that event extinguished the second deed of trust securing Monroy’s note under the antideficiency statutes (see Code Civ. Proc., § 580b).

              Heritage complains that Monroy alleged that the complaint sent to her attached to the letter violated the FDCPA and a legal action is not a communication covered by the FDCPA.  We need not address this argument because Monroy’s claim was not based on a communication under the FDCPA, but based on the debt collector’s using “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”  (15 U.S.C. § 1692e.) 

              Heritage also argues that “debt,” as defined by the FDCPA, does not include tort claims.  As already noted, Heritage also violated the FDCPA when it sent a notice demanding payment on the money owed on the promissory note when that debt had been extinguished under the antideficiency statutes.  Furthermore, we disagree with Heritage’s argument that tort claims are never debts under the FDCPA.

In support of its argument that a “debt” does not include a tort claim, Heritage cites various cases that have held that any obligation to pay damages arising from a tort claim, court judgment, or criminal activity does not constitute a debt under the FDCPA.  (See, e.g., Fleming v. Pickard (9th Cir. 2009) 581 F.3d 922, 925-926 [cause of action for tortious conversion is not a debt under the FDCPA]; Turner v. Cook (9th Cir. 2004) 362 F.3d 1219, 1227 [tort judgment resulting from business-related conduct not a debt under the FDCPA because “ ‘when we speak of ‘transactions,’ we refer to consensual or contractual arrangements, not damage obligations thrust upon one as a result of no more than her own negligence’ ”]; Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc. (11th Cir. 1998) 140 F.3d 1367, 1371 [holding that the obligation to pay arose from a tort, and not from a consumer transaction, and therefore was not a debt under the FDCPA]; Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group (3d Cir. 1987) 834 F.2d 1163, 1167-1169.) 

In the cases cited by Heritage, the obligations to pay were created by something other than a consumer transaction and were not consensual.  (See, e.g., Fleming v. Pickard, supra, 581 F.3d at p. 925 [“ ‘at a minimum, a “transaction” under the FDCPA must involve some kind of business dealing or other consensual obligation’ ”].)  Thus, we agree that courts have consistently excluded tort obligations or criminal activity from the FDCPA’s definition of “debt” when the tort obligations do not arise out of a consensual transaction.  In Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, supra, 834 F.2d 1163, for example, the Third Circuit held that the FDCPA did not apply to attempts by cable television companies to collect money from people who allegedly had stolen cable television signals by installing illegal antennas.  (Zimmerman, at pp. 1167-1169.)  There was no FDCPA “debt” in Zimmerman because the obligations arose out of a theft rather than a transaction.  Neither the complaint nor the demand letter included any assertion of an offer of extension of credit and therefore no transaction had occurred.  (Zimmerman,at pp. 1167-1169.)

As already stressed, a debt or obligation under the FDCPA must be based on a consumer consensual or contractual arrangement, not a damage obligation.  (See, e.g., Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., supra, 140 F.3d at p. 1372).  Unlike the cases upon which Heritage relies, the present case is not a situation in which Monroy never had a contractual arrangement of any kind with WMC.  Rather, Monroy’s alleged debt to Heritage arose out of her transaction with WMC to purchase the Richmond property.  The alleged fraud claims clearly arose out of a residential mortgage transaction and Heritage cannot avoid the application of the FDCPA simply because it alleged in its pleading that Monroy’s obligation to it was based on the misrepresentations she made on her loan application rather than on a breach of her obligations under the contract.

Heritage declares that the present case is similar to Turner v. Cook, supra, 362 F.3d 1219, but Turner is clearly distinguishable from the present case.  In Turner, the appellees obtained a judgment against Stephen Turner and “the judgment arose from allegations of various business interference torts” by Turner against the appellees.  (Id. at pp. 1222-1223.)  Subsequently, the appellees filed a claim that Turner fraudulently conveyed his real and personal property to prevent the appellees from collecting on the judgment.  (Id. at p. 1223.)  Turner claimed that the appellees violated the FDCPA when attempting to collect the judgment.  (Turner, at pp. 1223-1224.)  When rejecting the claim under FDCPA, the Ninth Circuit held that a tort judgment is not a debt under the FDCPA.  (Turner, at p. 1227.)  Turner had admitted that the judgment was based on alleged business interference torts, not any consumer transaction, and it was immaterial that the fraudulent conveyance action involved Turner’s home.  (Id. at p. 1228.) 

 

In Turner v. Cook, supra, 362 F.3d 1219, the liability arose from tortious activity, not from a consensual transaction.  By contrast, here, Monroy and WMC entered into a consensual loan agreement for the purchase of a residential home.

Heritage argues that the present liability did not arise out of a consensual transaction because WMC did not consent to mortgage fraud.  Heritage maintains that the present transaction is the same as the theft of goods or services. 

Heritage’s argument is contrary to the court decisions that have held that there is no automatic fraud exception to the FDCPA. (See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Check Investors, Inc. (3d Cir. 2007) 502 F.3d 159, 170; Keele v. Wexler (7th Cir. 1998) 149 F.3d 589, 595.)  “ Absent an explicit showing that Congress intended a fraud exception to the Act, the wrong occasioned by debtor fraud is more appropriately redressed under the statutory and common law remedies already in place, not by a judicially-created exception that selectively gives a green light to the very abuses proscribed by the Act.’ ”  (F.T.C.,at p. 170.) 

The breadth of the phrase “any obligation or alleged obligation” is not limited to a particular set of obligations.  (Bass, supra, 111 F.3d at p. 1325.)  Thus, a replevin action, even though it is a tort claim, may be a debt under the FDCPA.  (Rawlinson v. Law Office of William M. Rudow, LLC (4th Cir.  2012) 460 Fed.Appx. 254, 257.)  “[A] court should look beyond the label of the debt collection practice to determine whether a ‘debt’ is being collected.”  (Ibid.)

Here, WMC and Monroy consented to the loan application.  The fraud action, even though it is a tort claim, arose from the consensual loan transaction, and thus it is a debt under the FDCPA.

E. No Defense to the Application of the FDCPA

              Heritage contends that it has a defense, as a matter of law, to the application of the FDCPA.  It claims that it relied on an advisory opinion by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that collecting on tort damages is not a debt for purposes of the FDCPA. 

              The FDCPA provides an affirmative defense for “ ‘any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any [FTC] advisory opinion’ . . . .”  (Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA (2010) 599 U.S. 573, ___ [130 S.Ct. 1605, 1607] (Jerman), quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e).)  However, “ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally.”  (Jerman, at p. ___ [p. 1611].) 

The “advisory opinion” relied upon by Heritage is a letter dated August 27, 1992, written to an attorney in Florida.[4]  The attorney wished to know if the claim for civil damages against an alleged shoplifting offender would be covered under the FDCPA.  The letter stated that these torts would not be debts as defined in the FDCPA and admonished that “[t]he views expressed herin represent an informal staff opinion.  As such, they are not binding on the [FTC]. . . .”

This letter is an “informal staff opinion” and not an advisory opinion.  Furthermore, the claim of damages arising from a theft, as was the subject of the FTC’s letter, is clearly distinguishable from the present case.  As already discussed, Heritage was not collecting on tort damages, but on a claim of fraud arising out of a loan contract. 

Courts held as early as 1998 that there is no automatic fraud exception to the FDCPA.  (Keele v. Wexler, supra, 149 F.3d at p. 595 [“neither the text nor underlying legislative history of the FDCPA lends itself to the recognition of a fraud exception”].)  Heritage’s ignorance of the law does not provide it with an affirmative defense to the application of the FDCPA.

F.  No Triable Issue of Fact

              Heritage argues that the trial court should not have granted the summary adjudication motion because there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the tort claims had been assigned.  It complains that the court refused to consider its evidence of assignment. 

              In support of this argument, Heritage cites Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P. v. Lobel (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1531 (Cadlerock).  In Cadlerock, a single lender provided a borrower with two non-purchase money loans secured by two deeds of trust against the same real property, and then assigned the junior loan to a third party.  (Id. at p. 1536.)  The court held that the assignee of the junior loan was not precluded from seeking a deficiency judgment against the borrower after the senior loan was extinguished by a foreclosure sale of the property.  (Id. at pp. 1546-1547.)  The court stressed that the junior loan had been assigned prior to the foreclosure sale.  (Ibid.)  In Cadelrock, the antideficiency statute did not preclude the assignee of the junior loan from seeking a deficiency judgment after the extinguishment of the senior loan, held by a different entity, because there was no evidence that the lender created two loans “as an artifice to evade” Code of Civil Procedure section 580d.  (Cadlerock, at p. 1547.)

              Cadlerock has no applicability to the present case.  Unlike the situation in Cadlerock, Monroy’s loans were purchase money loans and the antideficiency statutes applied to both her senior and junior loans under Code of Civil Procedure section 580b.  Furthermore, the junior loan was assigned to Heritage after the foreclosure.  Critical to the holding in Cadlerock was the fact that the junior loan had been assigned prior to the trustee’s sale.  (Cadlerock, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1546-1547.)

              Here, the undisputed facts establish that Monroy’s loans were covered by the antideficiency statutes and that the junior loan was assigned to Heritage after the foreclosure on the senior loan.  Thus, there was no triable issue of fact that Heritage could seek payment for breach of the promissory note.  Furthermore, as already discussed, Heritage has failed to identify any evidence that raised a triable issue of material fact as to its argument that the assignment agreement included WMC’s potential tort claims against Monroy.  Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting Monroy’s motion for summary adjudication on her claim that Heritage violated the FDCPA.

III.  Attorney Fees

A.  Fees Awarded and the Standard of Review

The trial court found that Monroy was the prevailing party and entitled to attorney fees under the FDCPA.  (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).)  The court awarded Monroy attorney fees in the amount of $450 an hour for 194.5 hours for the lodestar amount of $87,525.  The court also awarded Monroy litigation expenses in the amount of 1,964.60. 

“Unless authorized by either statute or agreement, attorney’s fees ordinarily are not recoverable as costs.  [Citations.]”  (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 127-128.)  The FDCPA provides for attorney fees to be awarded to the prevailing party.  (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).)  “Courts have discretion in calculating reasonable attorney’s fees under this statute” (Jerman, supra, 599 U.S. at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 1621]), but the award of at least some modicum of attorney’s fees is mandatory under the FDCPA when the defendant is found to have violated the Act because “congress chose a ‘private attorney general’ approach to assume enforcement of the FDCPA” (Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc. (9th Cir. 2008) 523 F.3d 973, 978).

“ ‘On review of an award of attorneyfees after trial, the normal standard of review is abuse of discretion.  However, de novo review of such a trial court order is warranted where the determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorneyfees . . . have been satisfied amounts to statutory construction and a question of law.’ ”  (Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1175.)

              Any challenge based on the amount of the fee awarded is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (PLCM Group) [“the trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee”].)  An appellate court will interfere with the trial court’s determination of the amount of reasonable attorney fees only where there has been a manifest abuse of discretion.  (Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell Enterprises, Inc. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 215, 228.)  “ ‘The “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in [the] court, and while [the judge’s] judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong” ’—meaning that [the trial judge] abused [his or her] discretion.”  (PLCM Group, at p. 1095.)

              “[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.  ‘California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.’  [Citation.]  The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.  [Citations.]  The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.  [Citation.]  Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.  [Citation.]”  (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.)

B.  The Degree of Success

Heritage contends that the trial court did not apply the proper standard of law, and then argues that the attorney fee award was excessive because the trial court did not reduce the award on the basis that Monroy’s success was limited.  The decision whether to reduce an award because of a determination that the party enjoyed limited success is not reviewed de novo, as Heritage argues, but for an abuse of discretion. 

              The United States Supreme Court has held that the level of a party’s success is relevant to the amount of the fees to be awarded, and fees should not be awarded for the work on an unsuccessful claim.  (Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 434-435.)  The court in Hensley did not discuss the FDCPA, but addressed a nearly identical fee shifting statute applicable to civil rights litigation (42 U.S.C. § 1988).  The court recognized that “unrelated claims [may be] unlikely to arise with great frequency” because the case may present a single claim or the claims “will involve a common core of facts or will be based on related legal theories.  Much of counsel’s time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis.  Such a lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims.  Instead the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained” in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.  (Hensley, at p. 435.) 

“If . . . a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount.  This will be true even where the plaintiff’s claims were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith. . . .  [T]he most critical factor is the degree of success obtained.”  (Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 436, italics added.)  To be compensable, an attorney’s time must be “reasonable in relation to the success achieved.”  (Ibid.)

Here, Heritage argues that Monroy’s attorney fees are unreasonably large in comparison to Monroy’s recovery of $1.00.  It also maintains that Monroy admitted at her deposition that she did not know what the case was about and, thus, according to Heritage, she had no stake in this action.  Heritage complains that the trial court failed to take into consideration the limited amount of success achieved and asserts that its violation of the FDCPA was only a technicality as Monroy could not show any damages.

In support of this argument, Heritage cites federal and California cases involving attorney fees in non-FDCPA cases.  (Farrar v. Hobby (1992) 506 U.S. 103; Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 989; Environmental Protection Information Center v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 217, 238; Sokolow v. County of San Mateo (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 231, 249.)  These cases stress that the degree or extent of the plaintiff’s success must be considered when determining reasonable attorney fees.  For example, in Farrar, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging a violation of his civil rights under title 42 of the United States Code section 1983 and demanded $17 million from six defendants and, after 10 years of litigation and two trips to the Court of Appeals, he received one dollar from one defendant.  (Farrar, at p. 107.)  The United States Supreme Court held that attorney fees should not be awarded because a technical vindication of one’s constitutional rights alone was not enough to justify an award of attorney fees under section 1988.  (Farrar, at p. 115.)  The award of only nominal damages highlighted the plaintiff’s failure to prove actual injury or any basis for awarding punitive damages.  (Ibid.) 

Courts have applied the reasoning of Farrar v. Hobby, supra, 506 U.S. 103 to FDCPA cases.  (See, e.g., Zagorski v. Midwest Billing Services, Inc. (7th Cir. 1997) 128 F.3d 1164, 1166 [remanding to the district court to determine reasonable attorney fees in a FDCPA case and instructing the court to use as a guide the methodology “traditionally employed in determining appropriate fees” under title 42 United States Code section 1988]; Johnson v. Eaton (5th Cir. 1996) 80 F.3d 148, 151 [plaintiff awarded no actual or statutory damages and the mere technical violation of the FDCPA was not sufficient to support an award of attorney fees]; Tolentino v. Friedman (7th Cir. 1995) 46 F.3d 645, 651.)  Although courts when awarding attorney fees in FDCPA cases have followed Farrar by considering limited or partial success, these same courts have generally been reluctant to reduce fee awards on the basis of a low monetary recovery since FDCPA statutory damages are capped at $1,000, and a $1,000 recovery doe not render a plaintiff’s success “limited.”  (See, e.g., Defenbaugh v. JBC & Associates, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2004, No. C-03-0651 JCS) 2004 WL 1874978.)  Congress created an incentive for attorneys to represent plaintiffs in FDCPA cases by providing for fee shifting, and a requirement of proportionality between attorney fees and damages would discourage attorneys from accepting representation of FDCPA plaintiffs; this would be inconsistent with the FDCPA’s statutory scheme.  (See, e.g., Phenow v. Johnson, Rodenberg & Lauinger, PLLP (D.Minn. 2011) 766 F.Supp.2d 955, 959.)  The fees should be adequate to attract competent counsel, but they should not be “so large that it is a windfall for attorneys––who should not be encouraged to grow fat off of lackluster cases, or pester the court with trifles in the hopes of capturing large attorneys’ fees from dubious claims.”  (Obenauf v. Frontier Financial Group, Inc. (D.N.M. 2011) 785 F.Supp.2d 1188, 1214.)

Here, Monroy alleged violations of the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act and did not allege actual damages, but requested the maximum statutory damages of $1,000 under each statute for a total statutory award of $2,000.  Her sole complaint was that Heritage had engaged in an unlawful collections effort, which was evinced by the collection letters and the lawsuit against her.  Monroy was completely successful in establishing the unlawfulness of Heritage’s behavior.  Monroy agreed to a nominal damage award to avoid the costs of litigation, but she was still the prevailing party.  A plaintiff who wins a nominal amount of statutory damages has brought a “successful action” under the FDCPA.  (See Thornton v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP (11th Cir. 2008) 312 Fed.Appx. 161, 164.) 

Under the FDCPA, the court in awarding damages is to consider “the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional . . . .”  (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1).)  Here, the trial court recognized that Heritage wrote a number of letters to Monroy that violated the FDCPA.  The court considered that Monroy did not seek to add unnecessary legal fees by insisting on litigating the damages.  It also considered that she did not initiate the lawsuit against Heritage, but filed a counterclaim in response to Heritage’s attempts to force her to pay money that she did not owe. 

Lastly, while the award here was nominal, that is not necessarily controlling because “an award of nominal damages can represent a victory in the sense of vindicating rights even though no actual damages are proved.”  (Farrar v. Hobby, supra, 506 U.S. at p. 121, O’Connor, J., concurring.)  Success may be measured by “the significance of the legal issues on which the plaintiff prevailed and the public purpose the litigation served.”  (Morales v. City of San Rafael (9th Cir. 1996) 96 F.3d 359, 365.)  This lawsuit may spur Heritage to cease unlawful conduct against other consumers, which is an important consideration.

We thus conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not reducing the attorney fee award based on an argument that Monroy achieved limited success.

C.  The Number of Hours Expended

              Heritage objects to the amount of the fee charged by Peter B. Fredman, counsel for Monroy, and asserts that the calculation included hours for work not reasonably expended in pursuit of Monroy’s successful claim.  (See, e.g., Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 407, 424 [appellate court determined trial court properly deleted hours spent on unsuccessful petition for rehearing of a prior appeal].)  Specifically, Heritage objects to the following:  2.4 hours spent by Fredman on March 25, 2011, for attending to a letter from Heritage that threatened Fredman with a libel suit; .06 of an hour spent on April 21 and 22, 2011, for drafting a declaration in support of a motion in a different superior court class action lawsuit where Heritage was a party; 9.6 hours for attending to matters regarding the class action case and/or conferring with class counsel; 7.9 hours for communicating with another attorney regarding a demurrer hearing;[5] .02 of an hour on May 31, 2011, for reviewing investigation material of a defendant in another case involving Heritage; .08 of an hour on July 25, 2011, for a conference with another person involving Heritage in Bankruptcy Court; and 3.2 hours for an appearance at a summary judgment hearing when Fredman missed the hearing but made an appearance later to deliver a proposed order.  Heritage claims that awarding fees for the foregoing, which equals 23.26 hours, was an abuse of discretion.

At the hearing on attorney fees, counsel for Heritage made a number of specific complaints about the reasonableness of the hours billed.  For example, Heritage argued that Fredman billed his client .6 hours for preparing a declaration for another action; Heritage also objected to billing for work allegedly done on other cases unrelated to the present action.  The trial court responded that it did not see “any of this in any of your papers.”  Counsel for Heritage answered that it was in its opposition.  The court commented that it would have to take another look, but instructed counsel to proceed with argument.  At the end of the hearing, the court affirmed its tentative ruling.  Heritage maintains that the court made its ruling without reviewing its papers as promised and therefore it clearly abused its discretion. 

              The record indicates that the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in determining the number of hours spent on the lawsuit.  The trial court considered Heritage’s argument that the abovementioned charges were unreasonable.  The court listened to argument and obviously concluded that the argument by Heritage’s counsel lacked merit and that it was unnecessary to read through the opposition papers again to determine if each specific objection had actually been raised in Heritage’s opposition.

The trial court stated, “As the judge in this case, I did go over the billings and I didn’t see anything that I could say was unreasonable for hours spent on certain tasks.”  Thus, the court specifically stated that it found the hours worked by Monroy’s attorney to have been reasonably spent, and rejected Heritage’s argument that approximately 24 hours were unreasonably spent.  The trial court had a reasonable basis for making this determination in light of the detailed timekeeping records and supporting declarations provided by Fredman.  Heritage has failed to demonstrate that the court’s finding that these hours were reasonably expended in pursuit of Monroy’s claim exceed the bounds of reason.  (See, e.g., Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1250.) 

D.  The Reasonable Hourly Rate

Heritage contends that the hourly rate of $450, which the trial court awarded Fredman, was unreasonable.

In determining hourly rates, the court must look to the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community.”  (Bell v. Clackamas County (9th Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 858, 868.)  The rates of comparable attorneys in the forum district are usually used.  (See Gates v. Deukmejian (9th Cir. 1992) 987 F.2d 1392, 1405.)  In making its calculation, the court should also consider the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.  (Schwarz v. Secretary of Health & Human Services (9th Cir. 1995) 73 F.3d 895, 906.)  The court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate.  (Ingram v. Oroudjian (9th Cir. 2011) 647 F.3d 925, 928.)  “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.”  (United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp. (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) 

Here, Fredman declared that he had 15 years of experience and his “old” hourly rate was $450 per hour.  (He declared that his rate had increased to $500-$525 per hour.)  He noted that this rate had been approved for his work in a class action settlement in the superior courts and federal court.  He added that this hourly rate did not include a contingency risk.  Fredman also attached the declaration of Attorney Richard Pearl.  Pearl summarized the hourly rates charged by various law firms for comparable services.  According to his analysis, fees awarded in class actions cases in 2012, for 12-15 years of experience, varied from $455 to $610 per hour. 

The trial court concluded that counsel’s hourly fee rate of $450 was “within acceptable parameters for attorneys of counsel’s skill and experience practice in the San Francisco Bay area” and it denied the enhancement Fredman requested.  The court added:  “Whether it’s this kind of case or any other kind of case, I know that is a fee that is charged in the community.  I can’t say that it’s unreasonable.”

Heritage claims that the trial court abused its discretion in accepting the hourly rate of $450 because it did not consider similar work in the community that was equally complex.  It argues that the attorney fees discussed by Pearl in his declaration were not applicable because they were class action cases and more complex than the present case.  Heritage also distinguishes the cases cited by Fredman where the courts awarded him his hourly rate of $450 as being complex class action cases that did not allege a violation of the FDCPA.  Heritage cites a 2007 federal case where the billing rate in a FDCPA case was reduced to $250.  (Navarro v. Eskanos & Adler (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2007, No. C 02-03430 WHA) 2007 WL 4200171 (Navarro), vacated by Navarro v. Eskanos & Adler (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2007, No. C 06-2231 WHA) 2007 WL 448306.)

We do not find Heritage’s argument to be persuasive.  The attorney fees awarded in Navarro, a 2007 federal case where the legal work was completed in 2006, have little relevance to the hourly rate of fees for legal work done in 2010 through 2012.  Monroy’s counsel submitted evidence supporting his hourly rate and Heritage did not submit evidence of current rates contradicting this rate.  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it used the hourly rate of $450.

E.  Block Billing

Heritage asserts that the trial court should have reduced the amount of the attorney fees requested because Fredman used block billing.  In support of this argument, Heritage states that Fredman submitted records demonstrating that he billed 182.6 hours in this litigation.  Heritage fails to provide any citation to the record to support this statement. 

Heritage complains in a conclusory fashion that Fredman assigned a block of time to multiple tasks rather than itemizing the time spent on each task.  It asserts that the use of block billing makes it impossible to discern the amount of time spent on each task.  In support of this argument, Heritage relies on Bell v. Vista United School Dist. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672.[6]  In Bell, the court reversed an attorney fee award because the block billing made it impossible for the court to apportion the fees between a cause of action alleging a Brown Act violation for which statutory fees are allowed and other causes of action.  (Id. at p. 689.)  Brown does not suggest that block billing is never appropriate.

Trial courts retain discretion to penalize block billing when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not.  (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1324-1325; Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 689.)  The trial court identified no such problem here, and Heritage has completely failed to show that block billing occurred or that 182.6 hours billed for litigation was unreasonable.

F.  Apportionment

              Heritage argues that the trial court erred when it awarded attorney fees associated with the litigation in defense of the tort claims against Monroy because no statute or contract provided for fees in defense of these claims.  In a separate argument, it asserts that the court should also have separated the fees associated with Monroy’s unsuccessful claim of a violation of the Rosenthal Act. 

In attacking the fees awarded, Heritage in its opening brief does not even mention the trial court’s ruling that the issues raised by Heritage’s complaint and Monroy’s counter claims for violating the Rosenthal Act and the FDCPA “are synonymous and interrelated and cannot reasonably be separated.”  Noticeably absent from Heritage’s briefs in this court is any discussion of the substantial authority supporting a trial court’s decision not to apportion fees when all of the claims are interrelated.

“When a cause of action for which attorneyfees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorneyfees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on the statutory cause of action.  However, the joinder of causes of action should not dilute the right to attorneyfees.  Such fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation of an issue common to both a cause of action for which fees are permitted and one for which they are not.  All expenses incurred on the common issues qualify for an award.”  (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of San Francisco (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133 see also Liton Gen. Engineering Contractor, Inc. v. United Pacific Insurance (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 577, 588.) 

The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Heritage’s fraud claims based on WMC’s assignment of the promissory note and Monroy’s counter claims that Heritage violated the Rosenthal Act and FDCPA were interrelated.  The facts and issues related to Heritage’s claims and Monroy’s counter claims were almost identical, as they both related to the question whether Heritage had a legal right to collect money from Monroy.  We agree with the trial court’s finding that Heritage’s causes of action were closely interrelated with Monroy’s counter claims. 

We conclude that nothing in the record indicates that the trial judge, who presided over the entire case, abused her discretion in calculating the award of attorney fees.

DISPOSITION

              The judgment and the order awarding attorney fees are affirmed.  Heritage is to pay the costs of both appeals.

                                                                                                  _________________________

                                                                                                  Lambden, J.

 

 

We concur:

 

 

_________________________

Kline, P.J.

 

 

_________________________

Richman, J.

39

 


[1]  The antideficiency statutes bar any breach of contract claim by Heritage against Monroy.

[2]  Monroy also argues that the antideficiency statutes barred Heritage’s claims and that the fraud claim could not be assigned.  Heritage argues, among other things, that the antideficiency statutes do not preclude an action against a borrower for fraud in the inducement of a loan.  (See, e.g., Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1237-1238; see Code of Civ. Proc., § 726, subd. (f)).

The trial court did set forth a second, independent basis for its ruling.  Since the promissory note was assigned after foreclosure of the first deed of trust, the trial court stated that the second deed of trust securing the promissory note had been extinguished and “there was no underlying property interest supporting an incidental assignment of the original lender’s fraud claims.”  We need not address this independent ground for sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.

[3]  Heritage has forfeited any argument that the trial court should have granted its request for a continuance to permit it to conduct additional discovery because it did not raise this argument in its opening brief.  (See, e.g., People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [if no legal argument with citation to authority “ ‘is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration’ ”].)

[4]  We note that Heritage does not even make any particular citation to the “advisory opinion” but simply asserts that “[t]he FTC issued an advisory opinion stating that collecting on tort damages is not a debt for purposes of the FDCPA in a letter to James R. Palmer.”

[5]  This attorney specially appeared on behalf of Monroy at the third demurrer hearing on August 9, 2011, because Fredman was on vacation in Michigan.  These hours included the hours billed by the attorney for the work completed and the appearance.

[6]  Heritage also argues that the California State Bar’s Committee on Mandatory Fee Arbitration does not distinguish between apportioned and non-apportioned cases and the Bar opined that block billing hides accountability.  Heritage seems to be suggesting that we should take this statement of the State Bar as law and ignore the consistent precedent in California cases that provide trial courts with the discretion about whether to penalize block billing.  The State Bar’s comment about block billing in fee arbitrations is not binding on state courts. 

Down Load PDF of This Case

© 2010-13 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

WALKER v QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP. OF WASHINGTON, SPS | (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) – DTA, the FDCPA, and the CPA

WALKER v QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP. OF WASHINGTON, SPS | (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) – DTA, the FDCPA, and the CPA

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

PUBLISHED OPINION

DOUG WALKER, an individual,

Appellant,

v.
QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP.
OF WASHINGTON, a Washington
corporation; SELECT PORTFOLIO
SERVICING, INC., a Utah
corporation,
coo

Respondents,

 

FILED: August 5, 2013 3^

707 F. Supp. 2d 1115

, 1123 (W.D. Wash 2010).
28 No. CV-08-00142, 2009 WL 484448 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 24, 2009).
29 Noted at 140 Wn. App. 1032 (2007).
-12-
NO. 65975-8-1/13

The court in Vawter stated four reasons for its holding. First, it explained,

“The Vawters have not identified any statutory provision of the DTA that permits

a cause of action for wrongful institution of foreclosure proceedings.”30 The court

did not address the effect of the 2009 amendments to RCW 61.24.127 because

the savings clause did not apply in the case before it.31 But, construing RCW

61.24.127(1 )(c) in a borrower’s favor, this statute demonstrates that the

legislature recognized a cause of action for damages for DTA violations. As

previously noted, nothing in the statute requires that the violation resulted in the

wrongful sale of the property.

Second, the court in Vawter explained that the legislature “established a

comprehensive scheme for the nonjudicial foreclosure process” and that “to the

extent the legislature intended to permit a cause of action for damages, it could

have said so.”32 But, the legislature has spoken and, with RCW 61.24.127(1 )(c),

recognized a cause of action for damages caused by violations of the DTA.

30 Vawter, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
31 Although the court recognized that “the Washington legislature
amended the DTA to add a handful of new protections and safeguards for
borrowers and grantors,” the homeowners acknowledged that the amendments
did not govern the nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings at issue in their case.
Accordingly, the court determined that it “need not consider the effect of these
amendments for purposes of the present motion.” Vawter, 707 F. Supp. 2d at
1122 n.9.
32 Vawter. 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
-13-
NO. 65975-8-1 /14

Third, the court reasoned that allowing a presale cause of action for

damages would “spawn litigation under the DTA for damages, thereby interfering

with the efficient and inexpensive nature of the nonjudicial foreclosure process,

while at the same time failing to address directly the propriety of foreclosure or

advancing the opportunity of interested parties to prevent wrongful foreclosure.”

Bain observed that the lending industry has institutionalized a series of deceptive

practices,34 that MERS has been involved with “an enormous number of

mortgages in the country (and our state), perhaps as many as half nationwide,”35
and that MERS “often issue[s] assignments without verifying the underlying

information.”36 Thus, the lending industry and MERS have already spawned the

feared litigation with their institutionalized practices. Holding the lending industry

liable for damages caused by its DTA violations should produce greater

compliance and a reduction in future litigation. Thus, the availability of a presale

cause of action for damages could significantly reduce the long-term system-

wide expenses of nonjudicial foreclosures under the DTA.

Finally, the court in Vawter stated that even if it were to recognize a

presale cause of action for damages under the DTA, “the court is not persuaded

33 Vawter, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
34 Bain, 175 Wn.2d at 117.
35 Bain, 175 Wn.2d at 118.
36 Bain. 175 Wn.2d at 118 n.18.
-14-
NO. 65975-8-1/15

that it could be maintained without a showing of prejudice.”37 There, the plaintiffs

could not show prejudice because they conceded that the trustee’s sale was

discontinued and that one of the defendants possessed the note.38 Additionally,

the court determined that prematurely appointing a successor trustee, before

authority to make such an appointment, was a “non-prejudicial timing mistake”

because the trustee reappointed the successor after it was assigned a beneficial

interest in the deed of trust.39 Further, pre-Bain, the court explained, “Even

accepting the Vawters’ factual allegation that MERS exists to maintain records

regarding the ownership of mortgages, this does not mean that MERS cannot

hold a beneficial interest under the Deed of Trust.”40

Here, Walker alleges that MERS never had a beneficial interest because it

never held the note. Under Bain, it could never be a lawful beneficiary. Walker

also alleges damages caused by Select’s and Quality’s unlawful actions taken in

violation of the DTA. Walker’s allegations strongly support recognizing a presale

cause of action for damages under the DTA because he pleads facts showing he

has suffered prejudice from Select’s and Quality’s unlawful conduct.

37 Vawter, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
38 Vawter. 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1122-23, 1124.
39 Vawter, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1127.
40 Vawter, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
-15-
NO. 65975-8-1/16

Quality and Select cite Massev v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP41 to
support their argument that there is “no cause of action for damages for violation

of the DTA where the trustee’s sale is discontinued.” But, in Massev, as in

Vawter, the court followed Pfau and Krienke and did not consider the 2009

amendments to the DTA.42

MERS never held the note and, based on Walker’s amended complaint,

we can hypothesize that MERS never had independent authority to appoint a

beneficiary. We can further hypothesize that Select did not hold Walker’s note at

the time it appointed Quality. No Washington case law relieves from liability a

party causing damage by purporting to act under the DTA without lawful authority

to act or failing to comply with the DTA’s requirements.

Notably, the language of RCW 61.24.127(1 )(c) refers only to “[fjailure of

the trustee to materially comply with the provisions of this chapter." (Emphasis

added.) We need not decide if this may prevent a borrower from suing a

beneficiary under some circumstances. Our Supreme Court has recognized, in

the context of a CPA claim, "Where the beneficiary so controls the trustee so as

to make the trustee a mere agent of the beneficiary, then as principle [sic], the

41 No. C12-1314, 2012 WL 5295146 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2012).
42 Massev. 2012 WL 5295146, at *4.
-16-
NO. 65975-8-1/17

beneficiary may be liable for the acts of its agent.”43 Here, we can plausibly
hypothesize Select controlling Quality’s actions violating the DTA.

Because the legislature recognized a presale cause of action for damages

in RCW 61.24.127(1)(c), we hold that a borrower has an actionable claim against

a trustee who, by acting without lawful authority or in material violation of the

DTA, injures the borrower, even if no foreclosure sale occurred. Additionally,

where a beneficiary, lawful or otherwise, so controls the trustee so as to make

the trustee a mere agent of the beneficiary, then, as principal, it may have

vicarious liability.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

Walker also asserts that Quality and Select violated the FDCPA. He

alleges that Select meets the “debt collector” definition of

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) because he defaulted on his debt before MERS

purported to assign it to Select. Additionally, “if SELECT was a ‘debt collector’

within the terms of the FDCPA at the time of its assignment of the debt, its agent,

[Quality], would certainly be one.” Walker argues that Quality violated

15 U.S.C. § 1692e “through the use of false and misleading representations” and

violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f with a “threat to take nonjudicial action to dispossess

the Plaintiff of his residence without a present right to possession.” He claims

43 Klem, 176Wn.2dat791 n.12.
-17-
NO. 65975-8-1/18

that Select violated these provisions of the FDCPA with its “representations” and

“actions” “made in connection with the purported collection of a debt,” as well as

its “misstatements of fact regarding a debt owed to SELECT.”

The FDCPA “applies only to ‘debt collectors,’ which are entities who

regularly collect debts for others, not to ‘creditors,’ who are collecting on their

own behalf.”44 The statute defines a “debt collector” as

any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or
the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the
collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to
collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be
owed or due another…. For the purpose of section 1692f(6) of
this title, such term also includes any person who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business
the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security
interests.1 ]

A debt is “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money

arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services

which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or

household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to

judgment.”46

44 Am. Express Centurion Bank v. Stratman, 172 Wn. App. 667, 676, 292
P.3d 128 (2012) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); Discover Bank v. Ray, 139 Wn.
App. 723, 727, 162 P.3d 1131 (2007)).
45 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6).
46 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5).
-18-
NO. 65975-8-1/19

Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using a “false,

deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the

collection of any debt.” Section 1692f prohibits a debt collector from using “unfair

or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” A debt

collector violates that section by “[t]aking or threatening to take any nonjudicial

action to effect dispossession or disablement of property if there is no present

right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable

security interest.”47

Here, Quality makes no claim that it is a creditor collecting on its own

behalf. Instead, Quality argues that it is not a statutory debt collector because it

does not regularly collect consumer debts owed to another. Quality also states

that pursuing nonjudicial foreclosure under a deed of trust does not constitute

debt collection.

“‘[M]ortgage servicer companies and others who service outstanding debts

for others, [are not debt collectors] so long as the debts were not in default when

taken for servicing.’”48 Thus, “‘[although there is no statutory definition of 'loan

servicer' under the Act, a loan servicer will become a debt collector under

47 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A).
48 Oliver v. Ocwen Loan Servs.. LLC. No. C12-5374, 2013 WL 210619, at
*3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2013) (second alteration in original) (quoting Mansour v.
Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp..

618 F. Supp. 2d 1178

, 1182 (D. Ariz. 2009)).
-19-
NO. 65975-8-1/20

§ 1692a(6)(F)(iii) if the debt was in default or treated as such when it was

acquired.'"49

In Jara v. Aurora Loan Services. LLC,50 the United States District Court for

the Northern District of California recognized that most district courts within the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have concluded that foreclosure proceedings do

not constitute "debt collection" within the meaning of the FDCPA. The court

noted, however, that "acts taken in furtherance of a foreclosure proceeding can

be the basis of a FDCPA claim, but only if they are alleged as violations of 15

U.S.C. § 1692f(6)."51 The court adopted the District of Idaho's reasoning:

[l]f “debt collection” generally included the enforcement of a security
interest, the language specifying so for the purposes of § 1692f(6)
would be surplusage, and such a construction would violate a “long
standing canon of statutory construction that terms in a statute
should not be construed so as to render any provision of that
statute meaningless or superfluous.”1521
Although the Ninth Circuit has not ruled on this issue, “[t]he current trend among

district courts in the Ninth Circuit is to find that, at least insofar as defendant

confines itself to actions necessary to effectuate a nonjudicial foreclosure, only

49 Oliver. 2013 WL 210619, at *4 (quoting Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank.
FSB.

681 F.3d 355

, 360 n.4 (6th Cir. 2012)).
50 No. C 11-00419,2011 WL 6217308, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14,2011).
51 Jara, 2011 WL 6217308, at *5.
52 Jara. 2011 WL 6217308, at *5 (quoting Armacost v. HSBC Bank USA.
No. 10-CV-274, 2011 WL 825151, at *5 (D. Idaho Feb. 9, 2011)).
-20-
NO. 65975-8-1/21

§ 1692f(6) of the FDCPA applies.”53 We join this trend in recognizing a claim

under § 1692f, which is consistent with the statutory language.

Here, the trial court properly dismissed Walker’s claims under 15

U.S.C. § 1692e. Nothing in the record indicates that Quality or Select engaged in

any activities beyond those necessary to institute foreclosure proceedings. “Acts

required to institute foreclosure proceedings, such as the recording of a notice of

default, alone, are not debt collection activities for purposes of the FDCPA unless

alleged in relation to a claim for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6).”54 Therefore,
Walker’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e fails.

The trial court erred, however, by dismissing Walker’s claim under

15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Because his arguments concern Quality’s and Select’s

actions to enforce a security interest, these parties may constitute “debt

collectors” within the statute’s meaning. Assuming that Walker’s allegations are

true, neither Quality nor Select had a present right to possess the property

through nonjudicial foreclosure because they never held the note or the

underlying debt and were not lawfully appointed under the DTA. IfWalker is able

to prove these underlying DTA violations, he may also be able to show that

Quality and Select violated § 1692f(6) by threatening judicial foreclosure.

53 McDonald v. OneWest Bank. FSB. No. C10-1952, 2012 WL 555147, at
*4 n.6 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 21, 2012).
54 Jara, 2011 WL 6217308, at *5.
-21-
NO. 65975-8-1/22

Presuming that the facts stated in Walker’s amended complaint are true,

the trial court could potentially grant relief under 15 U.S.C. § 16921 Accordingly,

the trial court erred by dismissing his FDCPA claim.

Consumer Protection Act

Walker next claims that Quality and Select violated the CPA. The CPA

declares unlawful unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or

practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.55 Generally, to prevail in a

private CPA claim, the plaintiff must prove (1) an unfair or deceptive act or

practice (2) occurring in trade or commerce (3) affecting the public interest, (4)

injury to a person’s business or property, and (5) causation.56 The failure to

establish any of these elements is fatal to a CPA claim.57 Here, in light of our
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Bain58 and Klem,59 Quality and Select

contend only that Walker fails to meet the fourth and fifth elements.

55 RCW 19.86.020.
56 Hangman Ridge Training Stables. Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105
Wn.2d 778, 784-85, 719 P.2d 531 (1986).
57 Indoor Billboard/Wash.. Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Wash., 162 Wn.2d
59,74, 170P.3d10(2007).
58 In Bain, a case against MERS, the court recognized that the plaintiff
presumptively met the first element because “characterizing MERS as the
beneficiary has the capacity to deceive.” 175 Wn.2d at 117. The plaintiff also
presumptively met the second element based upon “considerable evidence that
MERS is involved with an enormous number of mortgages in the country (and
our state), perhaps as many as half nationwide.” 175 Wn.2d at 118. Third, the
court opined that “there certainly could be injury under the CPA” if the
homeowner borrower could not determine the noteholder, if there were incorrect
or fraudulent transfers of the note, or if concealing loan transfers deprived the
-22-
NO. 65975-8-1/23

The CPA does not define an “unfair or deceptive act or practice.” Whether

an alleged act is unfair or deceptive presents a question of law.60 A consumer
may establish an unfair or deceptive act by showing “either that an act or practice

‘has a capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public,’ or that ‘the alleged

act constitutes a per se unfair trade practice.’”61 “Implicit in the definition of

‘deceptive’ under the CPA is the understanding that the practice misleads or

misrepresents something of material importance.”62 Whether an unfair act has
the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public is a question of fact.63
To establish a per se violation, a plaintiff must show “that a statute has been

violated which contains a specific legislative declaration of public interest

impact.”64

homeowner of rights that require the homeowner to sue or to negotiate with the
actual noteholder. 175 Wn.2d at 118-19.
59 In Klem. the court held that “a claim under the Washington CPA may be
predicated upon a per se violation of statute, an act or practice that has the
capacity to deceive substantial portions of the public, or an unfair or deceptive
act or practice not regulated by statute but in violation of public interest.” 176
Wn.2d at 787. The court determined that a trustee’s failure to fulfill its duty to the
borrower constituted a “deceptive act” under the CPA. 176 Wn.2d at 787.
60 Holiday Resort Cmtv. Ass’n v. Echo Lake Assocs.. LLC. 134 Wn. App.
210, 226, 135 P.3d 499 (2006).
61 Saunders v. Lloyd’s of London. 113 Wn.2d 330, 344, 779 P.2d 249
(1989) (Quoting Hangman Ridge. 105Wn.2d at 785-86).
6* Holiday Resort. 134 Wn. App. at 226.
63 Holiday Resort. 134 Wn. App. at 226-27.
64 Hangman Ridge. 105 Wn.2d at 791.
-23-
NO. 65975-8-1/24

Walker asserts that his allegations describe a per se violation of the CPA,

thereby satisfying the first two elements,65 because Quality and Select violated

“statutes related to the collection of a debt.”66 Alternatively, Walker lists four acts

that he contends were deceptive: (1) Quality sent a notice of default to Walker

“despite not meeting the requirements of a successor trustee under RCW

61.24.010(2) which [Quality] and SELECT knew or should have known at the

time the Notice of Default was issued”; (2) Quality and Select “facilitated a

deceptive and misleading effort to wrongfully execute and record documents

[Quality] and SELECT knew or should have known contained false statements

related to the Appointment of Successor Trustee and Assignment of Deed of

Trust”; (3) Quality and Select sent, executed, and recorded a notice of trustee’s

sale that they “knew contained false statements in that no obligation of the

Plaintiff was ever owed to SELECT, the purported ‘beneficiary’”; and (4) “that as

a result of this conduct, [Quality] and SELECT knew that its conduct amounted to

wrongful foreclosure and was further in violation of the FDCPA.”

To meet the fourth and fifth elements, Walker must allege facts

demonstrating that Quality’s and Select’s deceptive acts caused him harm. To

65 Hangman Ridge. 105 Wn.2d at 786.
66 See Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash.. 166 Wn.2d 27, 53, 204 P.3d
885 (2009) (“When a violation of debt collection regulations occurs, it constitutes
a per se violation of the CPA . . . under state and federal law, reflecting the public
policy significance of this industry.”).
-24-
NO. 65975-8-1 / 25

prove causation, the “plaintiff must establish that, but for the defendant’s unfair or

deceptive practice, the plaintiff would not have suffered an injury.”67

Walker alleges as his injuries “the distraction and loss of time to pursue

business and personal activities due to the necessity of addressing the wrongful

conduct through this and other actions” and “the necessity for investigation and

consulting with professionals to address Respondents’ wrongful foreclosure and

collection practices and violation of RCW 61.24, et seq.” Additionally, he “had to

take time off from work and incurred travel expenses to consult with an attorney

to address the misconduct of the Defendants.”

In Panag v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Washington,68 our Supreme Court

held, “[T]he injury requirement is met upon proof the plaintiff’s ‘property interest

or money is diminished because of the unlawful conduct even if the expenses

caused by the statutory violation are minimal.’” Investigative expenses, taking

time off from work, travel expenses, and attorney fees are sufficient to establish

injury under the CPA.69

Walker also alleges that but for Quality’s and Select’s deceptive acts, he

would not have suffered these same injuries. Walker asserts that the deceptive

documents induced him to incur expenses to investigate whether Select and

67 Indoor Billboard. 162 Wn.2d at 84.
68 166 Wn.2d 27, 57, 204 P.3d 885 (2009) (quoting Mason v. Mortg. Am.,
Inc.. 114 Wn.2d 842, 854, 792 P.2d 142 (1990)).
69 See Panag. 166 Wn.2d at 62.
-25-
NO. 65975-8-1/26

Quality had authority to act against him and to address their allegedly improper

deceptive acts. Thus, he pleads facts sufficient to establish causation. Because

Walker pleads facts that, if proved, could satisfy all five elements, we conclude

that the trial court erred by dismissing his CPA claim.

Quiet Title

Finally, Walker claims that the court erred by dismissing his action to quiet

title to his property. He alleges, “As MERS was never a legitimate beneficiary

under RCW 61.24.005 and the interest in the Deed of Trust has been effectively

segregated from the interest in the Note, the Deed of Trust is no longer a valid

lien upon Mr. Walker’s property.”

To support his argument, Walker cites the Restatement (Third) of

Property: Mortgages, which states, in a comment, that “in general a mortgage is

unenforceable if it is held by one who has no right to enforce the secured

obligation.”70 He also cites numerous cases outside this jurisdiction for the notion

that “the segregation of the Note from the Deed of Trust through the assignment

of the Deed of Trust from MERS to SELECT without a valid assignment of the

Note renders the subject Deed of Trust a nullity and an improper lien against Mr.

Walker’s property.” He requests that the court clear the “improper cloud” on his

70 Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Mortgages § 5.4 cmt. e (1997).
-26-
NO. 65975-8-1/27

property and quiet his title, although he cites no authority recognizing such a

cause of action based upon the facts in this case.

In response, Quality and Select assert that Walker has not alleged any

facts demonstrating that he holds title superior to the deed of trust. They also

claim that he must allege payment of his loan to sufficiently plead a claim to quiet

title. For this proposition they cite Evans v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP.71

holding that a plaintiff seeking to quiet title against a purported lender or other

holder of a debt secured by a deed of trust must allege satisfaction of the

secured obligation.

The logic of such a rule is overwhelming. Under a deed of trust, a
borrower’s lender is entitled to invoke a power of sale if the
borrower defaults on its loan obligations. As a result, the
borrower’s right to the subject property is contingent upon the
borrower’s satisfaction of loan obligations. Under these
circumstances, it would be unreasonable to allow a borrower to
bring an action to quiet title against its lender without alleging
satisfaction of those loan obligations. Plaintiffs have not provided
any rationale that would support an alternate rule.[72]
An action to quiet title is an equitable proceeding “designed to resolve

competing claims of ownership.”73 RCW 7.28.010 requires Walker to bring an

action to quiet title against “the person claiming the title or some interest” in real

property in which he has a valid interest. “A ‘plaintiff in an action to quiet title

71 No. C10-0656, 2010 WL 5138394 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
72 Evans. 2010 WL 5138394, at *4.
73 Kobza v. Tripp, 105 Wn. App. 90, 95, 18P.3d621 (2001).
-27-
NO. 65975-8-1 / 28

must prevail, if he prevails at all, on the strength of his own title, and not on the

weakness of the title of his adversary.’”74

In Bain, the Supreme Court declined to decide the legal effect of MERS

acting as an unlawful beneficiary under the DTA. However, the court stated its

inclination to agree with MERS’s assertion that any violation of the DTA “‘should

not result in a void deed of trust, both legally and from a public policy

standpoint.’”75 The court also noted, “[l]f in fact MERS is not the beneficiary, then

the equities of the situation would likely (though not necessarily in every case)

require the court to deem that the real beneficiary is the lender whose interests

were secured by the deed of trust or that lender’s successors.”76 While dicta,
these statements identify critical problems with Walker’s argument.

Here Walker does not allege a claim to quiet title based upon the strength

of his own title. Instead, he asks the court to void a consensual lien against his

property because of a defect in the instrument creating that lien, the designation

of an ineligible entity as beneficiary of the deed of trust. As previously noted, he

cites no authority recognizing this defect as a basis to void a deed of trust and

offers no equitable reason why a court should recognize his claim. As a matter of

74 Wash. State Grange v. Brandt. 136 Wn. App. 138, 153, 148 P.3d 1069
(2006) (quoting City of Centralia v. Miller, 31 Wn.2d 417, 422, 197 P.2d 244
(1948)).
75 Bain. 175 Wn.2d at 114.
76 Bain. 175 Wn.2d at 111.
-28-
NO. 65975-8-1/29

first impression, we decline to do so. We reject the argument that this defect in a

deed of trust, standing alone, renders it void and note that Washington courts

have repeatedly enforced between the parties a deed or mortgage that failed to

comply with the statutory requirement of an acknowledgement.77 The trial court

properly dismissed Walker’s action to quiet title.

Attorney Fees

Walker requests costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred on this

appeal under RAP 18.1 and the deed of trust. RAP 18.1 permits a prevailing

party to recover fees incurred on appeal if the party can recover such fees at

trial.78 “A party must prevail on the merits before being considered a prevailing

party-”79 Because Walker, at least at this point, does not prevail on the merits, he

is not entitled to costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal.

CONCLUSION

Because Walker alleges facts that, if proved, would entitle him to relief, we

reverse the trial court’s order dismissing his claims under CR 12(c) for violations

77 Bremner v. Shafer. 181 Wash. 376, 384, 43 P.2d 27 (1935).
78 Landberg v. Carlson. 108 Wn. App. 749, 758, 33 P.3d 406 (2001).
79 Ryan v. Dep’t of Soc. &Health Servs.. 171 Wn. App. 454, 476, 287 P.3d
629 (2012).
-29-
NO. 65975-8-1 / 30

of the DTA, the FDCPA, and the CPA and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. We affirm the court’s dismissal of his action to quiet

title.

*-T- tj

WE CONCUR:

-30-

Down Load PDF of This Case

© 2010-13 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD3 Comments

Obama’s HAMP Initiative Struggling To Help Homeowners

Obama’s HAMP Initiative Struggling To Help Homeowners

If only Obama could only help homeowners as it has helped the bankster gangsters over and over and over again.

 

HuffPO-

A government auditor has warned that the U.S. Treasury Department doesn’t understand why distressed homeowners are re-defaulting at an “alarming” rate on government-aided mortgages, costing taxpayers more than $800 million and renewing questions over the administration’s efforts to help troubled borrowers.

The troubling report by the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or SIGTARP, comes as President Barack Obama is set to deliver Wednesday what aides describe as a major address on the economy and the middle class. By detailing the administration’s shortcomings in aiding homeowners, the report may undercut Obama’s message.

The Home Affordable Modification Program — the White House’s signature effort to assist struggling borrowers in the wake of the financial crisis and Great Recession — was initially promised to help up to 4 million homeowners avoid foreclosure. Through May, fewer than 880,000 borrowers were making payments on their new HAMP mortgages. The $50 billion commitment to the program has shrunk to about $38 billion. Less than $9 billion has been spent so far on housing programs under the bank bailout program known as TARP.

[HUFFINGTON POST]

© 2010-13 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD0 Comments

Florida governor signs bill HB 87 to speed up state’s foreclosure process

Florida governor signs bill HB 87 to speed up state’s foreclosure process

Watch this video and you’ll see what kind of person he is.

You ignorant people that voted for him!! Sorry but had to vent.


Housing Wire-

Florida’s governor signed a much-discussed foreclosure bill Friday, enacting a series of provisions aimed at speeding up the default process in the state.

While the legislation is considered a response to Florida’s untimely foreclosure timelines, it’s a big shift that has attracted a great deal of attention.

Attorneys working within the foreclosure space note House Bill 87 comes with new legal and procedural requirements.

[HOUSING WIRE]

Image: wmxdesign

© 2010-13 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD2 Comments

HB 87 | With friends like Ms. Bondi in Tallahassee, banks hardly need another gift

HB 87 | With friends like Ms. Bondi in Tallahassee, banks hardly need another gift

This should be a sequel to: Meet FL AG Pam Bondi, Foreclosure Fraudsters’ BFF

 

Palm Beach Post-

The Legislature finally has passed a bill to ease Florida’s foreclosure crisis. The problem is, it’s a bad bill that Gov. Scott should veto.

Rep. Kathleen Passidomo, R-Naples, sponsor of House Bill 87, believes that giving banks the right to seek a quicker hearing would get the state’s 350,000 foreclosure cases resolved faster. Her approach might make sense if the banks weren’t causing the backlog by not acting on the cases they file.

Though some homeowners employ attorneys who are responsible for delays, the vast majority are at the mercy of lenders who set the timetable for how quickly cases move, or don’t move. It takes an average of two years to dispose of foreclosure lawsuits in Florida because too often lenders and servicers don’t want to assume the taxes, association dues and expenses to list a house for sale that they incur after taking possession. They also don’t want a glut of foreclosures depressing prices and furthering their losses. So they let cases languish. On Friday, the backlog prompted the Florida Supreme Court to order that trial courts hire magistrates, to move more cases.

HB 87 would let lenders seek a “show cause” hearing, forcing homeowners into court quickly to prove that they shouldn’t be foreclosed on. That would not light a fire under the banks.

[PALM BEACH POST]

© 2010-13 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD0 Comments

HB 87 | Passidomo’s foreclosure reform proposal passes Legislature

HB 87 | Passidomo’s foreclosure reform proposal passes Legislature

Naples Daily News-

The third time’s the charm for one Southwest Florida representative’s top priority.

The state Senate this morning voted 26-13 to approve a measure that speeds up the foreclosure process. The bill – which has been sponsored by Rep. Kathleen Passidomo, R-Naples, for the past three years – now heads to the governor’s office for his signature.

“I can’t believe it,” said Passidomo, as she walked back to House chambers after being on the Senate floor for the vote. “It’s really terrific.”

The foreclosure bill — House Bill 87 — shortens the time period that banks can collect losses from five years to one; requires banks to produce the note at the time of the foreclosure; and allows lien holders, like a homeowner association, to initiate the foreclosure process.

[NAPLES DAILY NEWS]

© 2010-13 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD0 Comments

CA CLASS ACTION: Bias v. WELLS FARGO | M-T-D goes down in FLAMES. Overcharges controversy. RICO / UCL / Fraud allegations SURVIVE dismissal AND a “hint” at potential CRIMINAL PROSECUTION possible

CA CLASS ACTION: Bias v. WELLS FARGO | M-T-D goes down in FLAMES. Overcharges controversy. RICO / UCL / Fraud allegations SURVIVE dismissal AND a “hint” at potential CRIMINAL PROSECUTION possible

The class claims the defendants use an automated mortgage loan management system, and subsidiaries, to “fraudulently conceal their unlawful assessment of improperly marked-up or unnecessary fees for default-related services, cheating borrowers who can least afford it.”

excerpts

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have engaged and continue to engage in fraudulent practices in connection with their home mortgage loan services, in which Defendants assess fraudulent fees upon a homeowner’s default.[1]

. . . 

Plaintiffs allege their mortgage contracts disclosed that Defendants will pay for default-related services when necessary, which would be reimbursed by borrowers, but “[n]owhere [wa]s it disclosed to borrowers that the servicer may mark-up the actual cost of those services to make a profit.” (SAC ¶ 42.) Defendants identified the marked-up fees as “Other Charges” or “Other Fees” on mortgage statements. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 48 & 57.) When borrowers inquired about the fees, Defendants allegedly concealed and misled the borrowers to dissuade them from challenging the charges, and told them that the fees were in accordance with their mortgages. (Id. ¶ 57.)

 

. . .

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DECLINES to hold, at this juncture, that Plaintiffs are unable to allege a violation of the UCL based on the choice of law provision in the mortgage agreements or based on due process considerations. These issues are better suited for determination at the class certification stage, and Wells Fargo’s Motion based on these grounds is hereby DENIED.

 

 . . .

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Wells Fargo’s Motion on the ground that Plaintiffs lack UCL standing.

 

 . . .

Plaintiffs, they have alleged sufficient facts to state a claim under the second and third tests. Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss the UCL claim based on the “unfair” prong is DENIED.

 

 . . .

For these reasons, Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss the UCL claim based on the “fraudulent” prong is DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss the first claim for violation of the UCL is DENIED in its entirety.

 

 . . .

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Wells Fargo’s Motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of the RICO claims based on lack of standing.

 

. . .

Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a fraudulent scheme as is required for mail and wire fraud.

 

[19] Accordingly, the Court DENIES Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss the RICO claim based on failure to allege predicate acts of racketeering activity.

. . .

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ second claim for violation of RICO under Section 1962(c).

 

. . .

For these reasons, Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss the third claim for conspiracy under Section 1962(d) is DENIED.

 

. . .

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss the fourth claim for unjust enrichment.

 

. . .

For the foregoing reasons, the Court

DENIES Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss the fifth claim for fraud.

[6] Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants established an inter-company division or d/b/a called Premiere Asset Services (located in San Bernardino, California) which exists “to generate revenues” for Wells Fargo and “does not operate at arms-length” with Wells Fargo. (SAC ¶¶ 49-50.) This business is a “vehicle” that provides Wells Fargo with false pretenses to obtain undisclosed profits. (Id. ¶¶ 51 & 56 (“phony third party vendor”).) While Wells Fargo argued at oral argument that other allegations “negate” Premiere’s connection to California, any existing ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the pleading. Walling, 476 F.2d at 396.
[18] The Court is, again, not persuaded by Wells Fargo’s arguments that the fees were overall “reasonable” and that the alleged conduct simply amounts to breach of contract. See United States v. Ali, 620 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Defendants counter that, at most, they are only in breach of contract with Microsoft and that a contract dispute is not itself grounds for mail or wire fraud. . . . We do not read [Defendants' cited authority] to preclude Defendants’ criminal prosecution in this case. The simple fact that Microsoft may have brought a civil contract claim against Defendants does not immunize Defendants’ conduct from criminal prosecution if that conduct meets the elements of the criminal statutes as well.”) (emphasis in original).

 

________________________________________________________________________


History

 

Monday, 27 February 2012 12:12

Chase, Wells Fargo Mortgage Fee Abuse Class Action Lawsuit

By Sarah Pierce

Wells FargoWells FargChaseo and JPMorgan Chase have been hit with a class action lawsuit alleging that the two lending giants cheated hundreds of thousands of borrowers who were late on mortgage payments by charging excessive and abusive default fees. 

The class action lawsuit claims Wells Fargo and Chase charged homeowners over-inflated fees once they began to fall behind in their mortgage payments, sometimes by as much as 300 percent. Together, the two lenders service approximately 25 percent of all U.S. mortgages, which means they may have potentially defaulted borrowers out of a billion dollars or more, attorneys for the Class estimate. 

“Loan agreements require that default-related services must be reasonable and appropriate,” said an attorney representing the Class. ”Banks are not allowed to mark up the charges so they can make a profit, but that is exactly what they have done.”

The amount of the inflated or unnecessary charges the banks charge can very, running as low as $20 to as much as $135, the class action lawsuit says. The fees are charged when a borrower is late on a payment, and the bank’s computer programs begin the default process by levying fees against the borrower.

In addition to charging unnecessary and marked-up fees, the class action lawsuit says the banks concealed the fees through “cryptic wording.” These fees are typically listed on a borrower’s monthly statement as “other charges,” “miscellaneous charges” or “corporate advances” in an attempt to hide the true nature of the charges, the class action lawsuit says. 

According to the class action lawsuit, one of these fees the banks charge is used to hire a real estate broker to assess the value of the home based on similar properties. The real estate agent’s assessment is called the broker’s price opinion (BPO) and is used to help the lender price the property for foreclosure. 

[Chase, Wells Fargo Mortgage Fee Abuse Class Action Lawsuit] link

____________________________________________

Inline image 4

Wells Fargo Bank and JPMorgan Chase face RICO class action

Posted on: February 29th, 2012 by Steve Larson

 

According to a complaint filed in a federal RICO class action, Wells Fargo Bank and JPMorgan Chase charge homebuyers who go into default inflated fees and interest rates.  Lead plaintiff Latara Bias claims the defendants, including Chase Home Finance, service almost 20 million mortgage loans, approximately 25 percent of the home loans made in the United States.

The class claims the defendants use an automated mortgage loan management system, and subsidiaries, to “fraudulently conceal their unlawful assessment of improperly marked-up or unnecessary fees for default-related services, cheating borrowers who can least afford it.”

The plaintiffs concede that when mortgage borrowers go into default, it is natural for lenders to act to protect their interest in the property.

“However, lenders are not permitted to mark up fees for such services to earn a profit,” the complaint states.  Nor are lenders permitted to assess borrowers’ accounts for defaulted-related service fees that are unreasonable and unnecessary.  Nevertheless…using false pretences to conceal the truth from borrowers, that is precisely what defendants do.”

“In effect, to generate hearty profits, defendants have substituted inflated interest rates with inflated fees.  Defendants formed enterprises — associations of subsidiaries and affiliate companies — and designed schemes to disguise hidden mark-ups, and unnecessary fees so that they could earn additional, undisclosed profits.  Through these unlawful enterprises, defendants mark up the fees charged by vendors, often by 100 percent or more, and then, without disclosing the mark-up, assess borrowers’ accounts for the hidden profits.  In connection with their schemes, defendants also have a practice of routinely assessing fees for default-related services, even when they are unnecessary and inappropriate.  Employing this strategy, defendants are able to quietly profit from default-related service fees at the expense of struggling consumers.  Indeed, in the fourth quarter of 2011 alone, defendant Wells Fargo & Co. saw a 20 percent increase in profits.”

The class claims these tricks evolved and expanded dramatically in recent years.

 


See also:

Inline image 3

Tuesday, February 14, 2012

By DAN MCCUE
. . .

HOME EQUITY THEFT REPORTER

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 2012

Suit: Banksters “Fraudulently Conceal Their Unlawful Assessment Of Improperly Marked-Up Or Unnecessary Fees For Default-Related Services”

 ______________________________________________________________________________

 


LATARA BIAS, ERIC BREAUX, and NAN WHITE-PRICE, 

individually and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.

WELLS FARGO & COMPANY and WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendants.

Case No. 12-cv-00664-YGR.
United States District Court, N.D. California.
April 25, 2013.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs initiated this class action on February 10, 2012 concerning fraudulent practices in connection with the servicing of their home mortgage loans. (Dkt. No. 1.) After a previous round of motions, the Court ordered that claims against each of the three groups of defendants be severed into three separate actions. (Dkt. No. 59.) Thereafter, Named Plaintiffs Latara Bias, Eric Breaux, and Nan White-Price filed the Second Amended Class Action Complaint (“SAC”) against Defendants Wells Fargo & Company and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (collectively, “Wells Fargo” or “Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 61.)

Wells Fargo filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on August 7, 2012, seeking dismissal of the SAC without leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 66.) On August 21, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their Opposition to the Wells Fargo Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 67.) Wells Fargo filed their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss on August 28, 2012. (Dkt. No. 68.) The Court held oral argument on November 6, 2012. (Dkt. No. 72.)

Having carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings in this action, oral argument at the hearing held on November 6, 2012, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have engaged and continue to engage in fraudulent practices in connection with their home mortgage loan services, in which Defendants assess fraudulent fees upon a homeowner’s default.[1] (SAC ¶¶ 1-2.) As part of a fraudulent scheme, Defendants “formed an enterprise with their respective subsidiaries, affiliates, and `property preservation’ vendors, . . . unlawfully mark[ed] up default-related fees charged by third parties[,] and assess[ed] them against borrowers’ accounts” for an undisclosed profit. (Id. ¶ 8.) Specifically, “Defendants order[ed] default-related services from their subsidiaries and affiliated companies, who, in turn, obtain[ed] the services from third-party vendors.” (Id. ¶ 40.) The third-party vendors charged Defendants for their services, but Defendants “assess[ed] borrowers a fee that [wa]s significantly marked-up from the third-party vendors’ actual fees for the services.” (Id.see also id. ¶¶ 45, 54 & 57.)

Plaintiffs allege their mortgage contracts disclosed that Defendants will pay for default-related services when necessary, which would be reimbursed by borrowers, but “[n]owhere [wa]s it disclosed to borrowers that the servicer may mark-up the actual cost of those services to make a profit.” (SAC ¶ 42.) Defendants identified the marked-up fees as “Other Charges” or “Other Fees” on mortgage statements. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 48 & 57.) When borrowers inquired about the fees, Defendants allegedly concealed and misled the borrowers to dissuade them from challenging the charges, and told them that the fees were in accordance with their mortgages. (Id. ¶ 57.)

The allegedly marked-up fees included Broker’s Price Opinion fees (“BPOs”) and appraisal fees. (SAC ¶¶ 30 & 43-57.) With regard to BPOs, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants established an “inter-company division or d/b/a” called Premiere Asset Services (“Premiere”), which participated as a member of the enterprise and existed to generate revenue and undisclosed profits for Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 48-52.) Although affiliated with Wells Fargo, Premiere advertised to “make it appear as though [it] [wa]s an independent company” providing BPOs. (Id. ¶ 51.) However, Plaintiffs allege Premiere was created to act as a “phony third party vendor” such that it would appear to borrowers that amounts assessed on accounts were third-party costs. (Id.¶ 56.) Premiere sub-contracted BPOs to different local real estate brokers and, at Defendants’ direction, invoiced Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. “as if [it] was an independent, third-party vendor.” (Id. ¶ 52.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “never actually pa[id]” the invoices or Premiere for the BPOs, but paid a lesser amount directly to the local real estate brokers and assessed borrowers’ accounts for a marked-up amount on the manufactured “invoices.” (Id. ¶¶ 53-57.)

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants used a sophisticated home loan management program provided by Fidelity National Information System, Inc. called Mortgage Servicing Package (the “Program”). (SAC ¶ 36.) The Program “automatically implement[ed] decisions about how to manage borrowers’ accounts based on internal software logic” and imposed the default-related fees when a loan was past due. (Id. ¶ 37.) The parameters and guidelines for the Program were inputted by Defendants and “designed by the executives” at Wells Fargo. (Id. ¶¶ 35-38.)

As stated supra, Wells Fargo serviced Plaintiffs’ mortgages. (SAC ¶¶ 64 & 66.) As to Plaintiffs Bias and Breaux, Wells Fargo began assessing $95 BPOs on December 28, 2006. (Id. ¶ 65 (also assessing on September 27, 2007 and March 28, 2008).) Bias and Breaux allege they paid some or all of the unlawful fees assessed on their account. (Id.) Plaintiff White-Price was assessed $100 in “Other Charges” on September 19, 2011, and believes she paid some or all of the unlawful fees assessed on her account. (Id. ¶ 67.) In addition, borrowers have suffered additional harm resulting from: (i) charges for default-related services accumulated over time such that borrowers were driven further into default and/or more ensured to stay in default; (ii) damage to credit scores; (iii) the inability to obtain favorable interest rates on future loans because of their default; and (iv) in some cases, foreclosure. (Id. ¶¶ 59-63.)

On the basis of the allegations summarized above, Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of a class of “[a]ll residents of the United States of America who had a loan serviced by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. or its subsidiaries or divisions, and whose accounts were assessed fees for default-related services, including Broker’s Price Opinions, and inspection fees, at any time, continuing through the date of final disposition of this action.” (SAC ¶ 74.) The SAC alleges five claims.

Plaintiffs’ first claim alleges a violation of California Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq. (“UCL” or “Section 17200″) based on the allegedly unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices summarized above. (SAC ¶¶ 88-100.) Specifically, Defendants omitted a true itemization or description of the fees assessed and concealed the marked-up fees in violation of the disclosures in the mortgage agreements. Defendants were not legally authorized to collect these fees, and Plaintiffs/class members believed they were obligated to pay the amounts assessed when they were not so obligated. Plaintiffs/class members had a reasonable expectation that under the operative agreements and law, the charges were valid and Defendants were not unlawfully marking-up fees. In addition, Defendants lulled borrowers into a sense of trust and dissuaded them from challenging the unlawful fees by telling them the fees were in accordance with the mortgage agreements. Plaintiffs allege they have been injured and suffered loss of money or property, and that they would not have paid the fees (or would have challenged them) if not for Defendants’ concealment of material facts.

Plaintiffs’ second claim alleges a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. section 1962(c). (SAC ¶¶ 101-123.) The alleged “enterprise” consisted of: (i) Wells Fargo & Company, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., including their directors, employees, and agents; (ii) their subsidiaries and affiliated companies; and (iii) their third-party vendors, including “property preservation” vendors[2] and the real estate brokers who provide BPOs. (SAC ¶ 104.) This “association-in-fact” enterprise is an “ongoing, continuing group . . . of persons and entities associated together for the common purpose of limiting costs and maximizing profits by fraudulently concealing assessments for unlawfully marked-up fees for default-related services on borrowers’ accounts.” (Id. ¶105; see id. ¶¶ 3, 8, 46, 49, 104-108.) The members—while “systematic[ally] link[ed]” through contractual and financial ties—act according to policies established by Wells Fargo executives but also “have an existence separate and distinct from the enterprise.” (Id. ¶¶ 106-107.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ scheme constituted “racketeering activity” based on acts of mail and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. sections 1341 and 1343), by which Defendants communicated false information regarding the alleged fees due and omitted the true amounts at issue through use of the mail and wires. Plaintiffs seek treble damages under RICO.

Plaintiffs’ third claim alleges a conspiracy to violate RICO. (SAC ¶¶ 124-128.) Defendants allegedly conspired to violate RICO as summarized above, were aware of the nature and scope of the enterprise’s unlawful scheme, and agreed to participate in said scheme. Plaintiffs’ fourth claim alleges unjust enrichment as a result of the wrongful acts and omissions of material fact. (Id. ¶¶ 129-138.) Plaintiffs seek restitution and an order disgorging all profits obtained by Defendants. Plaintiffs’ fifth claim alleges common law fraud as summarized above. (Id. ¶¶ 139-151.)

In the pending Motion, Wells Fargo argues that the first claim for violation of the UCL should be dismissed either because a choice of law provision requires the application of Louisiana (not California) law, or alternatively, Plaintiffs lack standing and otherwise fail to state a claim. As to the second, third, and fifth claims for violation of RICO, conspiracy to violate RICO, and fraud, Wells Fargo contends those claims are not pled with particularity and, as to RICO, Plaintiffs lack standing. Finally, Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiffs allege a valid and enforceable contract in the SAC and thus the fourth claim for unjust enrichment is unavailable.

Plaintiffs oppose all of these arguments and request leave to amend if the Court dismisses any claim. The Court addresses each claim in turn.

II. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed against a defendant for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against that defendant. Dismissal may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). For purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court “must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). Any existing ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the pleading. Walling v. Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d 393, 396 (9th Cir. 1973).

However, mere conclusions couched in factual allegations are not sufficient to state a cause of action. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)see also McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 1988). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, “for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory `factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Courts may dismiss a case without leave to amend if the plaintiff is unable to cure the defect by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000).

A. First Claim: UCL Claim

1. Choice of Law: California versus Louisiana Law

California choice of law rules apply albeit the parties focus on different tests under California law. (Mot. at 5; Opp. at 6.)

Wells Fargo’s analysis is contractual and focuses on the choice of law provision in the mortgage documents. In that situation, Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 459, 465-66 (1992) sets forth the test for determining the enforceability of arm’s length contractual choice of law provisions. The court must first examine whether the party advocating the provision has met its burden of establishing the claims fall within its scope. Washington Mutual Bank, FA v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 4th 906, 915-16 (2001) (confirming that Nedlloyd should be applied to class claims subject to enforceable choice of law agreements). If the claims fall within the scope of the choice of law provision, then the court must “determine either: (1) whether the chosen state has a substantial relationship to the parties or their transaction, or (2) whether there is any other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice of law.” Nedlloyd,3 Cal. 4th at 466Washington Mutual, 24 Cal. 4th at 916. If neither (1) or (2), supra, is met, then the court need not enforce the parties’ choice of law. On the other hand, if either (1) or (2) is met, the court “must next determine whether the chosen state’s law is contrary to a fundamental policy of California.” Nedlloyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 466(emphasis in original); Washington Mutual, 24 Cal. 4th at 916. If there is no conflict, the parties’ choice of law shall be applied; but, if there is a fundamental conflict with California law, then the court must determine whether California has a materially greater interest than the chosen state on the particular issue. A choice of law provision shall not be enforced where California has a materially greater interest than the chosen state. Nedlloyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 466Washington Mutual, 24 Cal. 4th at 916-17.

Wells Fargo offers three arguments. First, under the Nedlloyd test, it has met its burden of establishing a substantial relationship to the chosen state because Plaintiffs are residents of Louisiana, they own property there, and executed the contracts there. Wells Fargo contends Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that the application of Louisiana law would violate a fundamental policy of California. (Mot. at 6-7.)

Second, Wells Fargo argues that even if the Court declines to enforce the choice of law provision, courts routinely decline to apply a state’s laws to out-of-state transactions that do not involve a resident of the state. (Id. at 7.) It asserts that merely having headquarters or principal place of business in San Francisco is an insufficient aggregation of contacts (which must exist to apply the UCL), particularly because the properties are located in Louisiana and the relevant conduct, including BPOs and inspections, otherwise occurred there. (Id. at 8.)

Finally, even if the Court finds sufficient contacts to California have been alleged, Wells Fargo argues it prevails under a traditional choice of law “governmental interest” analysis. Wells Fargo identifies “crucial differences” between California’s UCL and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, LSA R.S. 51:401, et seq. (“Louisiana CPL”), namely that: (i) the Louisiana CPL prohibits class actions; and (ii) California’s UCL has a four-year statute of limitations while the Louisiana CPL has a one-year statute. (Mot. at 9.)

Plaintiffs counter that choice of law is usually addressed at the class certification stage and urges the Court to defer this issue until then. (Opp. at 5.) Plaintiffs further dispute that Nedlloyd is the appropriate test, arguing that this is not a breach of contract case, but rather, a fraud case. Plaintiffs argue the appropriate test is “governmental interest” test set forth in McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 48 Cal. 4th 68, 81-82 & 87-88 (2010) and endorsed in Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 2012).[3] Plaintiffs identify California’s governmental interest as regulating fraudulent practices and the conduct of businesses within California, which have an effect both in California and throughout the country. (Opp. at 5 & 7.) Moreover, Plaintiffs argue the fraudulent conduct, concealment, and decisions by Wells Fargo executives are alleged to have occurred in California.

The Court finds that Nedlloyd applies here. The governmental interest test, although overlapping with Nedlloyd to the extent that state interests or policies must be examined, applies where “there is no advance agreement on applicable law.”Washington Mutual Bank, 24 Cal. 4th at 915 (noting, however, that “a trial court considering a nationwide class certification might be required to utilize both analyses”).

The conduct at issue here arises from fees purportedly due under agreements containing a section entitled: “Governing Law; Severability; Rules of Construction.” This section provides, in relevant part:

This Security Instrument shall be governed by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located. All rights and obligations contained in this Security Instrument are subject to any requirements and limitations of Applicable Law.

(Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (“RJN” [Dkt. No. 65]), Ex. 1 at ECF p. 12 and Ex. 2 at ECF p. 12.)[4] The agreements further provide that:

“Applicable Law” means all controlling applicable federal, state and local statutes, regulations, ordinances and administrative rules and orders (that have the effect of law) as well as all applicable final, non-appealable judicial opinions.

(RJN, Ex. 1 at ECF p. 3 and Ex. 2 at ECF p. 4.)

Applying the three-part Nedlloyd test, the Court finds that the choice of law determination in this case is better suited for the class certification stage because the record with respect to balancing the competing states’ interests is not sufficiently developed. First, the Court finds that Wells Fargo, as advocate of the choice of law provision, has met its burden of establishing that class claims fall within its scope.Washington Mutual, 24 Cal. 4th at 916.[5] Proceeding to the next step of Nedlloyd, the Court must next determine whether the chosen state has (1) a “substantial relationship to the parties or their transaction” or (2) whether there is “any other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice of law.” Washington Mutual, 24 Cal. 4th at 916. Louisiana does have a substantial relationship to the claims because, at a minimum, the properties are located there and the default-related services occurred there. The final step of Nedlloyd requires the Court to determine “whether the chosen state’s law is contrary to a fundamental policy of California” and, if contrary, which state has a “materially greater interest” in determining the particular issue. Id. at 916-17 (emphasis in original). That analysis is more difficult, and premature, when dealing with a potential nationwide class action. See id. at 918-19. Ultimately, Plaintiffs will bear the burden of establishing whether issues relating to choice of law can survive the test for class certification. Id. at 922, 926 & 928.

Here, the full scope on where Defendants’ conduct occurred (and the actual extent of their conduct) has yet to be fully determined. Such determination should be made based on a more complete record than currently exists. See Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 4th 214, 222 & 224-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding trial court erred in certifying nationwide UCL class action for non-California residents where “the facts developed below show the claims . . . are for injuries suffered by non-California residents, caused by conduct occurring outside of California’s borders”) (emphasis supplied). The Court must now take as true the allegation that the scheme was designed by executives at Wells Fargo. (SAC ¶¶ 20-26, 35 & 107.) Defendants take issue with the fact that the SAC does not explicitly state that the decisions or conduct occurred within California; however, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, the totality of Plaintiffs’ allegations sufficiently state that the scheme was initiated and perpetrated by executives in California. Usher, 828 F.2d at 561.[6] The allegations made by Plaintiffs here are plausible, and whether Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is ultimately tied to California solely by a California headquarters cannot be discerned without the benefit of discovery. For that reason, a determination is better suited for the class certification stage.[7]

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DECLINES to hold, at this juncture, that Plaintiffs are unable to allege a violation of the UCL based on the choice of law provision in the mortgage agreements or based on due process considerations. These issues are better suited for determination at the class certification stage, and Wells Fargo’s Motion based on these grounds is hereby DENIED.

2. UCL Standing

a. Summary of Law

The issues of concern under UCL standing are injury and reliance. A UCL claim may be brought “by a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. In a class action, UCL standing must be established as to the class representatives themselves. In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 306 (2009) (“Tobacco II“);Plascencia v. Lending 1st Mortg., 259 F.R.D. 437, 448 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“only the named plaintiff in a UCL class action need demonstrate injury and causation”), order clarified on other grounds, No. C 07-4485 CW, 2011 WL 5914278 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011). “[A] party must . . . (1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.” Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court,51 Cal. 4th 310, 322 (2011) (emphasis in original). “[A] party who has lost money or property generally has suffered injury in fact.” Id. (emphasis in original).

In Tobacco II, the California Supreme Court held losing that money or property “as a result of” unfair competition imposed an actual reliance requirement on plaintiffs prosecuting a UCL claim based on fraud. Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 326McNeary-Calloway v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 863 F. Supp. 2d 928, 959 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (allegations of reliance required under unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent prongs of UCL). “[R]eliance is proved by showing that the defendant’s misrepresentation or nondisclosure was `an immediate cause’ of the plaintiff’s injury-producing conduct. A plaintiff may establish that the defendant’s misrepresentation is an `immediate cause’ of the plaintiff’s conduct by showing that in its absence the plaintiff `in all reasonable probability’ would not have engaged in the injury-producing conduct.” Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 326 (internal citations omitted; alteration in original). “While a plaintiff must show that the misrepresentation was an immediate cause of the injury-producing conduct, the plaintiff need not demonstrate it was the only cause. . . . It is enough that the representation has played a substantial part, and so had been a substantial factor, in influencing his decision.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

b. Summary of Arguments

Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a claim under the UCL because they have not alleged they suffered injury in fact nor that they lost money or property as the result of unfair competition. (Mot. at 10-11.) Wells Fargo asserts that because the rates charged for BPOs were within the market rate of $30-$100, economic injury cannot exist. See Gomez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 676 F.3d 655, 658-59 & 661-62 (8th Cir. 2012) (dismissing UCL claim for lack of standing where plaintiffs admitted they were charged market rates for appraisals, which were alleged to be inflated).[8] Second, Wells Fargo contends that Plaintiffs have not pled actual reliance on the alleged misrepresentations, i.e., ”they do not specifically allege [they] ever read [documents containing misrepresentations] or how [they] each specifically acted in reliance on them.” (Mot. at 11-12.)

Plaintiffs disagree. They dispute that the market rate of BPOs is determinative because here the issue is that Defendants sought far more than actual fees and concealed the fact that borrowers were not required to repay Wells Fargo for these fees under their mortgage agreements. (Opp. at 9-10.) Moreover, Plaintiffs assert that injury has been alleged because they would not have paid the fees but for Wells Fargo’s deception. They also allege that Defendants alone maintain a complete accounting of the fees assessed and paid, thus Plaintiffs cannot allege every precise detail at this time. (Opp. at 9; SAC ¶¶ 65 & 67.) As to reliance, Plaintiffs argue that to prove reliance on an omission, they need only prove that had the information been disclosed, they would have been aware and behaved differently—which they have alleged. (See SAC ¶¶ 97-98.)

c. Analysis

The Court is satisfied with the allegations as pled. First, with respect to injury, Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that they have paid some or all of the unlawful fees assessed on their accounts. (SAC ¶¶ 65 & 67.) Taking these allegations as true, Plaintiffs have alleged an economic injury that qualifies as injury-in-fact. See Kwikset, 51 Cal. 4th at 885 (economic injury may be shown where plaintiff “surrender[s] in a transaction more, or acquire[s] in a transaction less, than he or she otherwise would have”).

As to the market rate of BPOs, regardless of whether the total amount falls within market rate, the fact remains that Plaintiffs have alleged that they paid more to Wells Fargo than they should have if Wells Fargo had simply passed on actual costs. The Court declines to hold as a matter of law that a consumer lacks UCL standing as long as he or she is only being overcharged within the market range. Further, the precedential value of Gomez v. Wells Fargo is limited as plaintiffs there conceded they had suffered no concrete financial loss.

Second, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged actual reliance. Plaintiffs allege not only that (i) the mortgage agreements that gave Wells Fargo “the right to be paid back” for costs and expenses associated with “protecting and/or assessing the value of the property” are silent on the issue of mark-ups for profit; but they also allege that (ii) they received mortgage statements that omitted a “true itemization” of the nature of the fees—identifying them as “Other Charges” or “Other Fees”—which Plaintiffs believed they were obligated to pay. (SAC ¶¶ 9, 57, 91-92, 97-98.) Put simply, Plaintiffs allege that they received their mortgage statements, believed based on the statements that they were obligated to pay these amounts to Wells Fargo, and paid them. This sufficiently states that Wells Fargo’s “misrepresentation or nondisclosure was `an immediate cause’ of the plaintiff’s injury-producing conduct” in that in its absence, plaintiff “in all reasonably probability” would not have paid the fees. Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 326see Kwikset, 51 Cal. 4th at 330 (consumer relying on product label and challenging a misrepresentation can satisfy UCL standing by alleging “that he or she would not have bought the product but for the misrepresentation”).[9]

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Wells Fargo’s Motion on the ground that Plaintiffs lack UCL standing.

3. Failure to State a UCL Claim With Particularity

Where a plaintiff chooses to allege fraudulent conduct and relies on such conduct as the basis for its UCL claim, the claim is “grounded” in or “sound[s] in fraud” such that its pleading “as a whole must satisfy the particularity requirement of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 9(b).” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2003)Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009). To be alleged with particularity under Rule 9(b), a plaintiff must allege “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged fraudulent conduct (Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997)) and “set forth an explanation as to why [a] statement or omission complained of was false and misleading” (In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). In other words, “the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud [must] be specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct . . . so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106 (first alteration supplied; internal quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiffs concede that this is a fraud case and argue that the SAC contains the requisite particularity under Rule 9(b). (Opp. at 11-12.) Because Plaintiffs’ allegations sound in fraud, the Court finds that Rule 9(b) applies.

Under Section 17200, unfair competition includes “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” A plaintiff may establish a violation based under any one of these prongs. The Court will address the unfair and fraudulent prongs in detail below.[10]

a. Unfair Prong of UCL

The California Supreme Court has not established a definitive test to determine whether a business practice is “unfair” in consumer cases. Davis v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 179 Cal. App. 4th 581, 594-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)Harmon v. Hilton Group, No. C-11-03677 JCS, 2011 WL 5914004, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011). Three tests for unfairness exist in the consumer context. Under the first test, a business practice is unfair where the practice implicates a public policy that is “tethered to specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions.” Harmon, 2011 WL 5914004, at *8 (internal citations omitted). The second test “determine[s] whether the alleged business practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers and requires the court to weigh the utility of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Under the third test, “unfair” conduct requires that: “(1) the consumer injury must be substantial; (2) the injury must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition; and (3) it must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided.” Id. (internal citations omitted); Davis, 179 Cal. App. 4th at 597-98.

Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the third test. (Mot. at 15.) As to their injury, Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiffs could have avoided any of the charges at issue simply by staying current on their payments. Further, it argues that there are countervailing benefits to conducting the property inspections and that the third-party real estate brokers and Premiere Asset Services “perform[] a service.” (Id. at 17 (citing SAC ¶¶ 51-52).)

Plaintiffs identify both the second and third tests to measure whether the alleged conduct is unfair. (Opp. at 15-17.)[11] Plaintiffs argue they have satisfied these tests with their allegations that: (i) the BPOs and property inspection fees contained undisclosed mark-ups; (ii) that the assessment of these illegitimate fees made it impossible for borrowers to become current on their loan, throwing them further into default; and (iii) the undisclosed nature of the fees makes it impossible have avoided them. (See SAC ¶¶ 40-42 & 97.) As such, the injury is substantial, not outweighed by any countervailing benefits, and practically could not have been avoided. (Id. at 17.)

At this juncture, the Court need only determine whether the allegations, taken as true, state a plausible claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Given the nature of the alleged scheme, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations of Wells Fargo’s conduct, as pled, satisfy the second test, namely the conduct is plausibly immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers. As to the third test, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that the supposed benefits outweigh Plaintiffs’ injuries. (See SAC ¶ 51 (“[Premiere] is really just a vehicle that provides Wells Fargo & Company with a false pretense for obtaining money from borrowers so that it can earn undisclosed profits.”); see also id. ¶ 56 (alleging Premiere is “a phony third party vendor”).)[12]

Whether this claim ultimately prevails in Wells Fargo’s favor is not currently at issue. Taking the allegations as a whole and in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, they have alleged sufficient facts to state a claim under the second and third tests. Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss the UCL claim based on the “unfair” prong is DENIED.

b. Fraudulent Prong of UCL

A business practice is “fraudulent” within the meaning of Section 17200 if “members of the public are likely to be deceived.” Comm. on Children’s Television v. General Foods Corp., 35 Cal. 3d 197, 211 (1983) (internal citations omitted). A UCL claim based on a fraudulent business practice is distinguishable from a claim for common law fraud. Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 177 Cal. App. 4th 1235, 1255 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). “Allegations of actual deception, reasonable reliance, and damage are unnecessary.” Comm. on Children’s Television, 35 Cal. 3d at 211. The fraudulent practice “may be based on representations to the public which are untrue, and also those which may be accurate on some level, but will nonetheless tend to mislead or deceive. . . . A perfectly true statement couched in such a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant information, is actionable under the UCL.’” Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th 1342, 1380 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted; alteration in original).

Wells Fargo argues Plaintiffs have not pled their “fraudulent” UCL claim with particularity. (Mot. at 17.) It focuses specifically on the SAC at paragraphs 113 and 114, which respectively state that “mortgage invoices, loan statements, or proofs of claims provided to borrowers fraudulently concealed the true nature of assessments made on borrowers’ accounts” and that Wells Fargo tells borrowers “in statements and other documents[] that such fees are `[i]n accordance with the terms of [their] mortgage.’” (First and third alteration supplied; see Mot. at 17.) Based on these allegations, Wells Fargo first concludes “[i]t is well established . . . that misrepresentations of law are not actionable as fraud, because statements of law are considered merely opinions and may not be relied upon absent special circumstances not present here.” (Mot. at 17.) Second, it concludes that the SAC alleges no facts supporting that Wells Fargo knew its BPOs or inspections were legally improper nor that it had no reasonable basis for stating the fees were consistent with the mortgage agreements and the law. (Id. at 17-18.)

In response, Plaintiffs argue that lesser specificity is required for a fraud by omission claim than a normal misrepresentation claim. (Opp. at 17.) In addition, Defendants have exclusive control over the particularized details of their conduct, including internal communications and the design of the scheme itself.

Although Plaintiffs’ allegations do allege a fraud based in part on omissions, a plaintiff must still plead such claim with particularity. Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1126 (“Because the Supreme Court of California has held that nondisclosure is a claim for misrepresentation in a cause of action for fraud, it (as any other fraud claim) must be pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b).”); Marolda v. Symantec Corp., 672 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“The Ninth Circuit has recently clarified that claims of nondisclosure and omission, as varieties of misrepresentations, are subject to the pleading standards of Rule 9(b).”). “When alleging fraud, a party must plead with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud, while conditions of the mind, such as knowledge and intent, may be alleged generally.“ Marolda, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (emphasis supplied).

The Court believes that even under a particularity standard, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient circumstances underlying the fraudulent practice such that Defendants have “notice of the particular misconduct . . . so that they can defend against the charge[s].” Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106 (internal citations omitted). In Marolda, a case involving false advertising, the district court held that “to plead the circumstances of omission with specificity, plaintiff must describe the content of the omission and where the omitted information should or could have been revealed, as well as provide representative samples of advertisements, offers, or other representations that plaintiff relied on to make her purchase and that failed to include the allegedly omitted information.” 672 F. Supp. 2d at 1002. Here, Plaintiffs have alleged numerous instances where the omitted information could have been revealed—namely, in the mortgage agreements themselves, in the mortgage statements reflecting the marked-up fees, or during communications with Wells Fargo where it told Plaintiffs that the fees were in accordance with their mortgage agreements. Plaintiffs provide specific dates on which they believe they were charged the marked-up fees, and allege they paid the fees without knowing their true nature. Plaintiffs describe the content of the omission as the failure to inform them that the fees were marked-up and that the majority of the fees ultimately went to Wells Fargo, and not third-party vendors performing the services. As to Defendants’ knowledge and intent, which may be alleged generally, Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo executives designed the scheme, agreed to participate in the scheme, and concealed the scheme.

Taken together, the Court finds Plaintiffs adequately allege a fraudulent business practice that is likely to deceive the public. Comm. on Children’s Television, 35 Cal. 3d at 211. True statements couched in a manner “likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant information, [are] actionable under the UCL.” Klein, 202 Cal. App. 4th at 1380 (internal quotations omitted).[13]

For these reasons, Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss the UCL claim based on the “fraudulent” prong is DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss the first claim for violation of the UCL is DENIED in its entirety.

B. RICO Claims

1. RICO Standing: 18 U.S.C. Section 1964(c) (“Section 1964″)

The “[c]ivil remedies” provision of RICO permits “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of [18 U.S.C.] section 1962 . . . [to] sue” and recover treble damages and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). “To have standing under [Section] 1964(c), a civil RICO plaintiff must show: (1) that his alleged harm qualifies as injury to his business or property; and (2) that his harm was `by reason of’ the RICO violation, which requires the plaintiff to establish proximate causation.” Canyon County v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).[14]

With regard to the requirement of injury to business or property, “[i]n the ordinary context of a commercial transaction, a consumer who has been overcharged can claim an injury to her property, based on a wrongful deprivation of her money. . . . Money, of course, is a form of property.” Id. at 976 (internal citations omitted).[15]

For the same reasons that Wells Fargo’s UCL standing argument fails, so does the RICO standing argument. Plaintiffs allege they paid the marked-up fees. Wells Fargo’s argument that no “injury in fact” exists where the charges assessed were within the market rate is not persuasive. A consumer who has been overcharged can claim injury to property under RICO based on a wrongful deprivation of money, which is a form of property. Canyon County, 519 F.3d at 976see Dufour v. BE LLC, No. C 09-03770 CRB, 2010 WL 2560409, at *11 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2010) (“Plaintiffs here allege that they were deprived of their money based upon Defendants’ conduct, which is sufficient.”).

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Wells Fargo’s Motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of the RICO claims based on lack of standing.

2. Second Claim: RICO Violation Under 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c) (“Section 1962(c)”)

Under Section 1962(c), “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” To a state a claim, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 547 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Racketeering activity is also referred to as the “predicate acts.” Living Designs, Inc. v. E. I. Dupont de Numours and Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 2005). “Rule 9(b)’s requirement that `[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity’ applies to civil RICO fraud claims.” Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted); Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 1989).

Wells Fargo challenges Plaintiffs’ RICO claim for failure to allege sufficiently: (i) predicate acts of racketeering based on mail and wire fraud; and (ii) the existence of an enterprise. The Court will address each of the disputed elements in turn.

a. Predicate Acts of Racketeering Based on Mail and Wire Fraud

“Racketeering activity” has been explicitly defined to include “any act which is indictable” under 18 U.S.C. sections 1341 and 1343 (“Section 1341″ and “Section 1343″), which prohibit mail and wire fraud, respectively. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).

Mail fraud occurs whenever a person, “`having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,’ uses the mail `for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do.’” See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 647 (2008) (quoting Section 1341). To allege a claim for mail fraud under Section 1341, “it is necessary to show that (1) the defendants formed a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) the defendants used the United States mails or caused a use of the United States mails in furtherance of the scheme; and (3) the defendants did so with the specific intent to deceive or defraud.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 1393, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1986)Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 620 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Schreiber).[16]The elements for wire fraud under Section 1343 are substantively the same as mail fraud. See Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1400. The gravamen of both offenses is the scheme to defraud. Bridge, 553 U.S. at 647Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1400 (purpose of the mail and wire fraud statutes “is to proscribe the use of the mails or wires in any situation where it is closely entwined with fraudulent activity”).

As for the mailing requirement, use of the mails need not be an essential element of the scheme. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710 (1989). Rather, any “mailing that is incident to an essential part of the scheme” (id. at 712 [internal citations and quotations omitted]) or “a step in [the] plot” (id. at 710 [alteration in original; internal citation omitted]) satisfies the mailing element. In fact, “[i]nnocent” mailings—those that “contain no false information”—or routine mailings may satisfy this element. Id. at 715. Specific intent is satisfied by “the existence of a scheme which was reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension, and this intention is shown by examining the scheme itself.”Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1400 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Wells Fargo argues that the predicate acts of racketeering—i.e., mail and wire fraud—are insufficiently pled.[17] While the SAC alleges that Wells Fargo sent Plaintiffs monthly statements showing charges that do not reflect the actual costs of services, Defendants argue that “other courts have upheld property inspection practices and fees similar to Wells Fargo’s.” (Mot. at 19.) As with the UCL claim, Wells Fargo contends that these inspections are “reasonable” and that, at most, the alleged practices amount to a breach of contract, not a fraudulent scheme prohibited by the mail or wire fraud statutes.[18] (Mot. at 19-20.) In addition, Wells Fargo asserts it was under “no duty to specifically identify each charge on its monthly statements beyond `other fees’” and that, although required, Plaintiffs fail to allege a duty to itemize to charges or disclose marked-up fees. (Id. at 20; Reply at 10-11.) Without a legal obligation to disclose, Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a fraudulent scheme under California Architectural Bldg. Products, Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1987) (“California Architectural“). (Mot. at 20 n.73; Reply at 10-11.)

Plaintiffs disagree. They identify that the scheme is meant to conceal the unlawful assessment of improperly marked up fees for default-related services, and that Wells Fargo has used the mail and wires to engage in said scheme. (Opp. at 20.) In the SAC at paragraph 111, Plaintiffs allege: “[t]hrough the mail and wire, the Wells Fargo Enterprise provided mortgage invoices, loan statements, payoff demands, or proofs of claims to borrowers, demanding that borrowers pay fraudulently concealed marked-up fees for default-related services, such as BPOs or property inspections. Defendants also accepted payments and engaged in other correspondence in furtherance of their scheme through the mail and wire.” In addition, they allege that by “[u]sing false pretenses, identifying the fees on mortgage invoices, loan statements, or proofs of claims only as `Other Charges’ or `Other Fees’ to obtain full payments from borrowers, Defendants disguised the true nature of these fees and omitted the fact that the fees include undisclosed mark-ups. By omitting and fraudulently concealing the true nature of amounts purportedly owed in communications to borrowers, Defendants made false statements using the Internet, telephone, facsimile, United States mail, and other interstate commercial carriers.” (SAC ¶ 113.)

Defendants’ reliance on California Architectural regarding a duty to disclose is distinguishable. There, on a motion for summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit held that a tile manufacturer did not have an independent duty to disclose to customers its contingency plan to close its business. Significant evidence justified summary judgment for the manufacturer because the evidence showed it was making significant, honest efforts to remain open. The court found no direct evidence (i.e., no “smoking gun”) of a “preconceived plan to close.” 818 F.2d at 1470-72 (finding that business correspondence and officers’ assurances likewise did not permit a reasonable trier of fact to infer fraud). The Ninth Circuit affirmed that no factual basis existed to support that the manufacturer had any intent to defraud as required for mail and wire fraud. Id.

Here, the circumstances are markedly different. Defendants’ alleged omissions are interwoven with misrepresentations. Wells Fargo’s failure to advise Plaintiffs of the actual cost of the BPOs is linked to the inflated cost that Wells Fargo expressly demanded as “reimbursement” in monthly mortgage statements and other documents. When asked by borrowers to substantiate the amounts demanded for reimbursement, Defendants responded that the fees were charged pursuant to agreements that borrowers had previously signed. As alleged, the fraud is equally about the failure to disclose material information as it is that the amounts demanded on mortgage statements were false because they did not correspond to the actual amounts owed pursuant to the mortgage agreements relied upon by Defendants.

The dual nature of the fraud must also be considered in light of the allegations that when asked to substantiate the charges, Defendants directed Premiere to create fictitious invoices. (SAC ¶¶ 52-56, 111 & 113.) Plaintiffs allege that Premiere did so such that it appeared Wells Fargo was merely seeking reimbursement for payments made to independent entities. Although creating the impression that Wells Fargo paid third parties pursuant to the invoices, Wells Fargo never paid those invoices and instead paid an agreed-upon lesser amount (which had been coordinated by Premiere). Wells Fargo ultimately collected the higher, invoiced amount from borrowers based, at least in part, on Premiere’s conduct.

Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a fraudulent scheme as is required for mail and wire fraud.[19] Accordingly, the Court DENIES Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss the RICO claim based on failure to allege predicate acts of racketeering activity.

b. Existence of an Enterprise

Section 1962(c) targets conduct by “any person employed by or associated with any enterprise . . . .” The Supreme Court has recognized the basic principle that Section 1962(c) imposes a distinctiveness requirement—that is, one must allege two distinct entities: a “person” and an “enterprise”[20] that is not simply the same “person” referred to by a different name. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161 & 166 (2001) (holding that under Section 1962(c), distinctiveness is satisfied and RICO applies “when a corporate employee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole owner—whether he conducts those affairs within the scope, or beyond the scope, of corporate authority”). The Supreme Court noted that the distinctiveness requirement was consistent with a prior holding that liability “depends on showing that the defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the `enterprise’s affairs,’ not just their own affairs.” Id. at 163 (quotingReves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993)).

An enterprise that is not a legal entity is commonly known as an “association-in-fact” enterprise. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 933, 939 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 2012). In Odom v. Microsoft Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that “an associated-in-fact enterprise under RICO does not require any particular organizational structure, separate or otherwise.” 486 F.3d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 2007)(no requirement of an “ascertainable structure”). “[A]n associated-in-fact enterprise is `a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.’” Id. at 552 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)); Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 (2009). Ninth Circuit precedent requires proof of three elements: (i) a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct; (ii) evidence of an “ongoing organization, formal or informal”; and (iii) evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. Odom, 486 U.S. at 552 (citing Turkette).[21]

The parties’ arguments are summarized as follows: Wells Fargo principally argues that the distinctiveness requirement is not met and, at best, Plaintiffs have only alleged that Wells Fargo participated in their own affairs, not that of the enterprise. (Mot. at 20-21.) Plaintiffs “treat[] Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Wells Fargo & Co. as the “person[,]” but also “try to create a separate `association-in-fact’ enterprise comprised of the Wells entities and vendors and brokers they utilize to perform inspections and BPOs.” (Id. at 21.) Relying primarily on Seventh Circuit authority, Wells Fargo argues that distinctiveness fails because the vendors and brokers “operated only as Wells Fargo’s agents” by providing requested services “in the course of [Wells Fargo's] normal business dealings.” (Id.) Further, the alleged misrepresentations, omissions, and use of the mail or wires—including the issuance of mortgage statements and other loan documents—were performed by Wells Fargo alone as part of its normal lending activities. (Id. at 21-22; Reply at 12.) Wells Fargo also argues that Plaintiffs fail to allege that the vendors and brokers acted with a “common purpose” to engage in fraudulent conduct. (Reply at 13.) The Court notes that Wells Fargo only briefly addresses common purpose, and does not address the remaining elements under Odom of an ongoing organization or continuing unit. As these elements are not at issue, the Court will not address them.

Plaintiffs respond that they are not required to allege any more about the enterprise than that they have. Specifically, Wells Fargo participated by establishing the policies directing the non-Wells Fargo property preservation vendors and real estate brokers, who performed the BPOs, to carry out the scheme. (Opp. at 21.) Citing Odom,Plaintiffs emphasize that an association-in-fact enterprise does not require any particular organizational structure. (Id.)

Here, Plaintiffs have met the distinctiveness and common purpose requirements. They have explicitly alleged an association-in-fact enterprise (referred to in the SAC as the “Wells Fargo Enterprise”) comprised of “Wells Fargo & Company, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., including their directors, employees, and agents, along with their `property preservation’ vendors — including First American Financial Corporation d/b/a First American Field Services, and Fidelity National Financial, Inc. d/b/a Fidelity National Field Services — and the real estate brokers who provide BPOs for Wells Fargo.” (SAC ¶ 104.) Plaintiffs also allege in paragraph 49 that Premiere Asset Services “participates as a member of the enterprise.” The Wells Fargo Enterprise “is an ongoing, continuing group or unit of persons and entities associated together for the common purpose of limiting costs and maximizing profits by fraudulently concealing assessments for unlawfully marked-up fees for default-related services on borrowers’ accounts.” (Id. ¶ 105 (emphasis supplied).) Plaintiffs have also explicitly alleged that the enterprise members, including the vendors and brokers, “devised a scheme to defraud borrowers and obtain money from them by means of false pretenses.” (Id. ¶ 46.)

Plaintiffs allege conduct specifically between and among Wells Fargo Defendantsand at least one other entity, namely Premiere, which supports the requirement that the enterprise members have “associated together for a common purpose.” As stated above, the alleged common purpose here was to limit costs and maximize profits through concealment of marked-up fees. As alleged, this scheme to profit is a sufficient common purpose. Moreover, Wells Fargo and Premiere each played different roles from each other (and from the third-party vendors and brokers) to accomplish their purpose.

Premiere sub-contracted the BPOs requested by Wells Fargo to different local real estate brokers and vendors. (SAC ¶ 52.) Premiere served a critical role connecting Defendants, who designed the scheme to defraud, with third-party vendors and brokers, who provided the default-related services at the core of the scheme. Without the third-party vendors’ and brokers’ involvement, Wells Fargo would have been unable to seek reimbursement of fees in the first place. Thus, the existence of Premiere itself, its creation of fictitious invoices to substantiate fees, Wells Fargo’s reliance on those invoices to justify the marked-up fees, and Wells Fargo’s payment of lesser amounts—independent of the invoices—directly to third-party vendors and brokers satisfy the distinctiveness requirement. Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendants have engaged in enterprise conduct, not simply their own affairs.

This case is akin to Young v. Wells Fargo & Co., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (S.D. Iowa 2009), where the court examined an alleged scheme “center[ing] around Wells Fargo’s use of a computer system that . . . [wa]s programmed to automatically assess excessive mortgage servicing fees following late payments.” Id. at 1012. In that case, the court held:

Congress clearly intended RICO liability to extend to situations where one entity directs the formation of a RICO enterprise and then makes use of the association to further a pattern of unlawful activity, even where portions of the unlawful activity do not issue directly from the RICO enterprise. Here, Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo conducted the affairs of the enterprise by ordering the property inspections, used its association-in-fact business arrangement with the property inspection vendors to conduct its unlawful practice of imposing excessive fees on the mortgagors, and engaged in mail and wire fraud to collect payments for the enterprise’s benefit. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the RICO enterprise as pleaded by Plaintiffs satisfies the requirements set forth under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

Id. at 1028 (internal citations to complaint omitted). Wells Fargo’s challenge that its actions were simply “normal business dealings” without the existence of an enterprise or any “common purpose” is fact-determinative and cannot be resolved at this juncture.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ second claim for violation of RICO under Section 1962(c).

3. Third Claim: Conspiracy to Violate RICO Under 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(d) (“Section 1962(d)”)

Under Section 1962(d), “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.” “To establish a violation of section 1962(d), Plaintiffs must allege either an agreement that is a substantive violation of RICO or that the defendants agreed to commit, or participated in, a violation of two predicate offenses.” Howard v. America Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 751 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s holding that failure to adequately plead substantive RICO violation precluded claim for conspiracy). The conspiracy defendant “must intend to further an endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements of a substantive criminal offense, but it suffices that he adopt the goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor.” Id. (quoting Salinas v. United States,522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997)). Moreover, the defendant must also have been “aware of the essential nature and scope of the enterprise and intended to participate in it.” Id.(quoting Baumer v. Pachl, 8 F.3d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1993).

As discussed supra, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a substantive RICO violation under Section 1962(c) and that Defendants agreed to participate in that RICO violation. Having developed and designed the scheme, Plaintiffs meet the pleading standard of intent to further the RICO violation and awareness of the scope of the enterprise. (See SAC ¶ 127 (Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “directed and controlled the affairs of the Wells Fargo Enterprise, were aware of the nature and scope of the enterprise’s unlawful scheme, and they agreed to participate in it.”).)

For these reasons, Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss the third claim for conspiracy under Section 1962(d) is DENIED.

C. Fourth Claim: Unjust Enrichment

Defendants argue that there is no viable unjust enrichment claim under either California or Louisiana law because Plaintiffs explicitly allege Wells Fargo violated the disclosures in the mortgage agreements. (Mot. at 23.) Specifically, the “quasi-contract theory of recovery [for unjust enrichment] cannot lie where a valid express contract covering the same subject matter exists between the parties.” (Id.seeReply at 13-14.) Even if the claim does exist, Wells Fargo contends it fails because the alleged practices cannot be deemed unjust as pled. (Mot. at 24.)

Wells Fargo never specifically argues whether California or Louisiana law applies—only that either way, a viable claim has not been stated. (Id. at 23.) Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 1996) (in California, “unjust enrichment is an action in quasi-contract, which does not lie when an enforceable, binding agreement exists defining the rights of the parties”); Drs. Bethea, Moustoukas & Weaver LLC v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 376 F.3d 399, 408 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Louisiana law provides that no unjust enrichment claim shall lie when the claim is based on a relationship that is controlled by an enforceable contract.”).

Referring only to California law, Plaintiffs argue they have pled the required elements of a claim for unjust enrichment and the viability of the claim is unaffected by the existence of the agreements. (Opp. at 24 (citing In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Mortg. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1220-21 (S.D. Cal. 2009)).) InIn re Countrywide, the district court rejected both of defendants’ arguments for dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim, holding that “[a]lthough there are contracts at issue in this case, none appears to provide for the specific recovery sought by Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim.” Id. at 1220-21 (noting conflicting case law regarding whether California recognizes unjust enrichment as a claim and declining to conclude the claim was not legally cognizable).

It is premature for the Court to take a position on whether this action derives from the “same subject matter” as the agreements such that a claim for unjust enrichment is unavailable. Moreover, the Court declines to engage in a choice of law analysis at this juncture. Plaintiffs will ultimately bear the burden of establishing whether this claim can be certified as a nationwide class. Even so, under either California or Louisiana law, Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to support a claim for unjust enrichment.[22] Whether there was legal justification for Wells Fargo’s conduct such that it was “unjust” is another factual issue that should proceed beyond the pleadings.

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss the fourth claim for unjust enrichment.

D. Fifth Claim: Fraud

Defendants argue that Louisiana law applies to the fraud claim and reiterate various arguments already made with respect to RICO. Specifically, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a duty to disclose or a special relationship that would give rise to a duty to disclose. (Mot. at 24; Becnel v. Grodner, 2007-1041 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/2/08), 982 So. 2d 891, 894 (where a fraud claim is based on an omission, “there must be a duty to speak or disclose information”).) In addition, Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiffs fail to specify the material fact that was misrepresented, have only identified statements of legal opinion, and fail to allege when and how each Plaintiff relied upon the purported misrepresentation or omission.

Plaintiffs do not specifically address which state’s law applies, but argue generally that they have alleged injury and reliance. Plaintiffs identify the mortgage contracts as containing “disclosures” regarding what occurs if borrowers default, and argue it is not disclosed that Wells Fargo will mark-up costs. (Opp. at 25.)

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that regardless of whether Plaintiffs identify a specific “duty to disclose,” the omissions and misrepresentations are inextricably tied together such that the demands for reimbursement of fees in Wells Fargo’s monthly mortgage statements are akin to misrepresentations. Wells Fargo sought reimbursement from Plaintiffs based on fictitious invoices prepared by Premiere at Wells Fargo’s direction. However, Wells Fargo did not actually pay those invoices, and instead directly paid third parties for a lesser amount—all of which occurred by a plan of Defendants’ design. (SAC ¶¶ 52-56, 111 & 113.) Plaintiffs have pled sufficient detail in the SAC under Rule 9(b) to explain why the mortgage statements and explanation of fees were false and misleading (In re GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1548), and Defendants have sufficient notice of the alleged misconduct such that they can defend themselves in this action (Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106).

The Court need not engage in a choice of law analysis at this time because under either state’s law, a claim for fraud is sufficiently pled.[23] Moreover, as noted above, it will be Plaintiffs’ ultimate burden to establish whether this fraud claim can be certified as a nationwide class.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss the fifth claim for fraud.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss. Wells Fargo shall file an answer to the SAC within fourteen (14) days. This Order terminates Dkt. No. 66.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

[1] Plaintiffs are citizens of Louisiana whose mortgages Wells Fargo serviced. (SAC ¶¶ 17-19, 64 & 66.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Wells Fargo & Company is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware and headquartered in San Francisco, California. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is a subsidiary of Wells Fargo & Company, and is a national bank organized and existing as a national association under the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. section 21, et seq., with its principal place of business in San Francisco. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs assert that Wells Fargo & Company exercises specific and financial control over Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s operations, dictates its policies and practices, and exercises power and control over it with regard to the conduct alleged in the SAC. (Id. ¶ 24.) Wells Fargo & Company is also alleged to be the ultimate recipient of ill-gotten gains alleged therein. (Id.)

[2] The property preservation vendors include First American Financial Corporation, d/b/a First American Field Services, and Fidelity National Financial, Inc. d/b/a Fidelity National Field Services. (SAC ¶ 104.)

[3] Under this test: (1) the court determines whether the relevant law of each potentially affected jurisdiction with regard to the particular issue in question is the same or different; (2) if different, the court examines each jurisdiction’s interest in the application of its own law under the circumstances to determine whether a true conflict exists; and (3) if there is a true conflict, the court carefully evaluates and compares the nature and strength of each jurisdiction’s interest in the application of its own law to determine which state’s interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state. McCann, 48 Cal. 4th at 87-88Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 39 Cal. 4th 95, 107-08 (2006). Ultimately, the Court applies the law of the state whose interest would be more impaired if its law was not applied. McCann, 48 Cal. 4th at 88.

[4] Wells Fargo seeks judicial notice of three documents under Federal Rule of Evidence 201 and the doctrine of incorporation by reference. Plaintiffs have not objected to the RJN. Exhibits 1 and 2 consist of the mortgages executed by Plaintiffs Bias and Breaux, and White-Price, respectively, which were recorded in public records. The Court hereby GRANTS judicial notice of Exhibits 1 and 2.

[5] In Washington Mutual, the California Supreme Court examined a similar choice of law provision which stated: “This Security Instrument shall be governed by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction in which the [secured property] is located.” 24 Cal. 4th at 912 (alteration in original). Citing toNedlloyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 468-70, the Washington Mutual court noted that a broadly-phrased choice of law provision should be construed as intending that the chosen law apply to all disputes arising out of the transaction or relationship. 24 Cal. 4th at 916.

[6] Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants established an inter-company division or d/b/a called Premiere Asset Services (located in San Bernardino, California) which exists “to generate revenues” for Wells Fargo and “does not operate at arms-length” with Wells Fargo. (SAC ¶¶ 49-50.) This business is a “vehicle” that provides Wells Fargo with false pretenses to obtain undisclosed profits. (Id. ¶¶ 51 & 56 (“phony third party vendor”).) While Wells Fargo argued at oral argument that other allegations “negate” Premiere’s connection to California, any existing ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the pleading. Walling, 476 F.2d at 396.

[7] Defendants also cite to federal cases Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co. and Ralston v. Mortgage Investors Group, Inc., in which the respective courts vacated an order of class certification and limited class certification to exclude non-California residents alleging UCL claims. Mazza, 666 F.3d at 594 (holding that “[u]nder the facts and circumstances of this case, . . . each member’s consumer protection claim should be governed by the consumer protection laws of the jurisdiction in which the transaction took place”); Ralston, No. 08-CV-00536-JF PSG, 2012 WL 1094633, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012) (“conclud[ing] that [a nationwide] class is precluded in this case, in which the loans at issue were consummated locally and nearly half of the borrowers reside in other states”) (emphasis in original). Importantly, in Mazza, the court vacated the district court’s class certification order, remanded for proceedings consistent with that order, and expressed no view on whether it would be correct to certify a smaller class of California purchasers or sub-classes for members in different states. 666 F.3d at 594. In neither case did the court find on a motion to dismiss that a claim had not been sufficiently pled based on alleged conduct within California.

[8] On this issue, Wells Fargo seeks judicial notice of the “BPO Brief” (attached to RJN, Ex. 3), which is publicly available and which was referenced in the SAC at paragraph 45. It appears the BPO Brief is either used and/or was prepared by the “National Association of BPO Professionals.” Based on the fact that Plaintiffs have not objected, the Court GRANTS judicial notice of the BPO Brief for determining this Motion.

[9] In addition, “a presumption, or at least an inference, of reliance arises wherever there is a showing that a misrepresentation was material.” Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 327 (internal citations omitted). It is plausible that a reasonable person would have considered this information material. (See SAC ¶ 98.) Further, the question of whether a misrepresentation is material is generally one of fact unless no reasonable jury could find that a person would be influenced by the representation or nondisclosure.Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951, 976-77 (1997). Such is not the case here.

[10] For the “unlawful” prong of a Section 17200 claim, “the UCL `borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.’”Stearns v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999)). Allegations in support of such a claim must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements of the alleged violation. Stearns, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1150. Wells Fargo argues its actions were lawful and that the “unlawful” prong fails because the RICO and fraud claims fail. (Mot. at 12-14.) Plaintiffs do not specifically dispute that the “unlawful” claim fails if their RICO and fraud claims fail. (Opp. at 13.) As discussed infra, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated their RICO and fraud claims. As such, Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss the UCL claim based on the “unlawful” prong is DENIED.

[11] Neither party argues that the first test—where an unfair practice implicates a public policy that is “tethered to specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions”—applies here. See Harmon,2011 WL 5914004, at *8. Because the parties do not apply this test, the Court will not address it further.

[12] Defendants’ cited authorities are inapposite because they either arose at the summary judgment stage, in the context of another statute, and/or did not involve the level of fraud and concealment alleged here. See Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 4th 1158, 1175 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding on summary judgment motion that inspection fees in that case did not violate UCL, based in part on evidence submitted by defendant regarding legitimacy of the conduct and showing that conduct was not unfair or unethical); Sosa v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 348 F.3d 979, 983-84 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ["RESPA"] claim because, at a minimum, “Chase benefitted the borrowers by arranging for third party contractors to perform the deliveries” that were the subject of the charges); Morales v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1228 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“While such repricing or mark-ups could be actionable for other reasons (e.g. fraud), it is not a violation of RESPA.”) (emphasis supplied); Davis,179 Cal. App. 4th at 584 (no unfair business practice based on “conduct . . . in charging successive late fees for successive late payments”).

[13] The Court disagrees with Defendants’ conclusion that no fraud occurred because the statements were, if anything, “misrepresentations of the law” (Mot. at 17 (“[S]tatements of the law are considered merely opinions and may not be relied upon absent special circumstances not present here.”).) Wells Fargo ignores that under the fraudulent prong, statements that are true may still be deceptive or misleading. Moreover, it is premature for the Court to characterize the misrepresentations at issue here as ones relating to “law” only.

[14] Wells Fargo does not seek dismissal based on the “proximate cause” requirement of RICO standing, and thus the Court does not address that issue.

[15] However, where a plaintiff is a governmental entity not acting as a “consumer” but “to enforce the laws or promote the general welfare” the analysis is slightly different. Canyon County, 519 F.3d at 976-80. Canyon County sought to recover damages under RICO for monies it spent on public health care and law enforcement services for undocumented immigrants. Id. at 971. Financial loss in that specific context was insufficient to allege injury to one’s “business or property.” Id. at 975-76. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the county lacked RICO standing. Id. at 976-80.

[16] The Supreme Court has held that “[a] plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud need not show, either as an element of its claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation, that it relied on the defendant’s alleged misrepresentations.” Bridge, 553 U.S. at 661(emphasis supplied).

[17] The Court notes that Wells Fargo does not seek dismissal based on a failure to allege a pattern of racketeering activity. As such, the Court will not address the requirements of a pattern under Section 1962(c).

[18] The Court is, again, not persuaded by Wells Fargo’s arguments that the fees were overall “reasonable” and that the alleged conduct simply amounts to breach of contract. See United States v. Ali, 620 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Defendants counter that, at most, they are only in breach of contract with Microsoft and that a contract dispute is not itself grounds for mail or wire fraud. . . . We do not read [Defendants' cited authority] to preclude Defendants’ criminal prosecution in this case. The simple fact that Microsoft may have brought a civil contract claim against Defendants does not immunize Defendants’ conduct from criminal prosecution if that conduct meets the elements of the criminal statutes as well.”) (emphasis in original).

[19] Based on the allegations in the SAC, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged use of the mail and wires as incident to an essential part of the scheme. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 711 & 712.

[20] A “`person’ includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). An “`enterprise’ includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).

[21] The Ninth Circuit in Odom noted that the definition of an enterprise is, based on its text, “not very demanding.” 486 F.3d at 548Boyle, 556 U.S. at 944 (“the very concept of an association in fact is expansive”). In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that “RICO is to be read broadly” and is to “be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.” Sedima, S.P.R.I v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985) (quoting Pub. L. 91-452 § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970)); see Boyle, 556 U.S. at 946(association-in-fact enterprise must have three structural features: a purpose; relationships among those associated with the enterprise; and longevity sufficient to permit these associations to pursue the enterprise’s purpose).

[22] A claim for unjust enrichment requires a plaintiff to plead two elements: “receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.” Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal. App. 4th 723, 726 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)see also Hirsch v. Bank of America, N.A., 107 Cal. App. 4th 708, 721-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (valid claim for unjust enrichment stated where banks collected and retained excessive fees passed through to them by title companies at the expense of plaintiffs); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Leavines, 94-651 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/10/95), 656 So. 2d 720, 721 (unjust enrichment claim under Louisiana law requires proving that: “(1) defendant was enriched, (2) plaintiff was impoverished, (3) there is a connection between the defendant’s enrichment and the plaintiff’s impoverishment, (4) there was no legal cause or justification for the enrichment and (5) there is no other remedy available for the plaintiff”).

[23] ”The elements of a cause of action for fraud in California are: “(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or `scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1126 (quoting Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 974) (emphasis supplied by Kearns). Under Louisiana law, a claim for fraud requires: (1) a misrepresentation of material fact; (2) made with the intent to deceive; (3) causing justifiable reliance with resultant injury. Becnel, 982 So. 2d at 894.

Down Load PDF of This Case

 

© 2010-13 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD3 Comments

House Finance Chair Goes on Ski Vacation with Wall Street

House Finance Chair Goes on Ski Vacation with Wall Street

by Justin Elliott ProPublica, April 30, 2013, 9:55 a.m.

In January, Rep. Jeb Hensarling, R-Texas, ascended to the powerful chairmanship of the House Financial Services Committee. Six weeks later, campaign finance filings and interviews show, Hensarling was joined by representatives of the banking industry for a ski vacation fundraiser at a posh Park City, Utah, resort.

The congressman’s political action committee held the fundraiser at the St. Regis Deer Valley, the “Ritz-Carlton of ski resortsknown for its “white-glove service” and for its restaurant by superstar chef Jean-Georges Vongerichten.

There’s no evidence the fundraiser broke any campaign finance rules. But a ski getaway with Hensarling, whose committee oversees both Wall Street and its regulators, is an invaluable opportunity for industry lobbyists.

Among those attending the weekend getaway was an official from the American Securitization Forum, a Wall Street industry group, a spokesman confirmed. It gave $2,500 in February to Hensarling’s political action committee, the Jobs, Economy, and Budget (JEB) Fund.

Len Wolfson, a lobbyist for the Mortgage Bankers Association, which gave the JEB Fund $5,000 that month, posted a picture on Instagram from the weekend of the fundraiser of the funicular at the St. Regis. (It was labeled, “Putting the #fun in #funicular. #stregis #deervalley #utah.”) Wolfson did not respond to requests for comment. (UPDATE 1 p.m. Wolfson has now set his account to private.)

Visa, which gave the JEB Fund $5,000, also sent an official. A Visa spokesman told ProPublica that in attendance were not just finance companies, but also big retailers and others.

Hensarling, a protégé of former Texas senator and famed deregulator Phil Gramm, has a mixed record regarding Wall Street. While he has been critical of “too big to fail” banks and voted against the 2008 bailout, Hensarling recently said he opposed downsizing big banks, according to Bloomberg. That stance matters now more than ever as a bipartisan duo in the Senate, David Vitter, R-La., and Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio, introduced a bill last week seeking to constrain the too-big-to-fail institutions. While the bill is considered a longshot, it has provoked intense opposition from the industry.

Meanwhile, Hensarling recently barred the head of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau from appearing before the House Financial Services Committee, citing a legal cloud over recess appointments made by President Obama.

Whatever his stance on the industry, Hensarling has been more than happy to court Wall Street’s money.

Donors working in various financial industries are Hensarling’s biggest supporters, giving him over $1 million dollars in the last election cycle, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. The congressman’s office did not respond to requests for comment.

Others donating to Hensarling’s JEB Fund around the time of the Utah ski weekend: Capital One; Credit Suisse; PricewaterhouseCoopers; MasterCard; UBS; US Bank; the National Association of Federal Credit Unions; Koch Industries, which is involved in sundry financial trading; the National Pawnbrokers Association; and payday lenders Cash America International and CheckSmart Financial. All either declined to comment or did not respond to requests.

A spokeswoman for one large bank that donated $5,000, Alabama-based Regions Financial, told ProPublica the company doesn’t discuss events employees attend for “a number of reasons, including security.”

Also donating $5,000 to Hensarling’s political committee around the time of the ski weekend was Steve Clark, a lobbyist for JP Morgan and the industry group the Financial Services Roundtable. (In 2011, a memo written by Clark and his partners for the American Bankers Association proposed an $850,000 public-relations strategy to undermine Occupy Wall Street. It leaked to MSNBC; the plan had apparently never been executed.)

Clark didn’t respond to requests for comment.

The ski weekend was a large, apparently family-friendly affair. A Utah entertainment booker told ProPublica she had hired two caricature artists for a Feb. 23 event at the St. Regis for a group of 100, including 20 children. Hensarling’s JEB Fund, paid the bill. The fund also reported spending about $1,000 on “gifts and mementos” at Deer Valley as well as charges at the upscale restaurant Talisker on Main.

Campaigns and political action committees of a few other GOP congressmen also show charges totaling more than $50,000 at the St. Regis around that time: House Rules Committee Chairman Pete Sessions of Texas; House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp of Michigan; and National Republican Congressional Committee Chairman Greg Walden of Oregon. None responded to requests for comment.

This is at least the second consecutive year that Hensarling has attended a fundraiser at Deer Valley. During the same February congressional recess last year, the National Republican Congressional Committee hosted a “Park City Ski Weekend” for Hensarling along with Sessions and Walden. Hensarling’s JEB Fund also reported about $60,000 paid to the St. Regis Deer Valley in the last election cycle. (The NRCC said it did not sponsor this year’s event.)

The Texan congressman has long had a taste for mixing skiing and politics. On the same February weekend in 2009, for example, Hensarling’s political action committee invited donors “to the second annual 2018JEB Fund Takes Jackson’” ski weekend for a minimum contribution of $2,500. The setting was the Snake River Lodge and Spa in Jackson, Wyoming, which boasted “wintertime activities fun for the entire family” including dog sledding tours and sleigh rides, according to the invitation.

Reporting contributed by Al Shaw.

 

© 2010-13 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD2 Comments

GARY DUBIN LAW OFFICES FORECLOSURE DEFENSE HAWAII and CALIFORNIA
Chip Parker, www.jaxlawcenter.com
Damian Figueroa, South Florida Realtor, Real Estate Agent
Jamie Ranney, www.NantucketLaw.pro
Kenneth Eric Trent, www.ForeclosureDestroyer.com
Susan Chana Lask, www.appellate-brief.com

Archives