Laurence Schneider, principal investor in three companies, Mortgage Resolution Servicing LLP, S&A Capital Partners, Inc., and 1st Fidelity Loan Servicing, filed a False Claims Act case against JPMorgan Chase for fraudulent claims of consumer relief and the nation’s largest bank’s failure to comply with mortgage loan servicing requirements, under the National Mortgage Settlement, HAMP and Making Home Affordable Program. The case asserts that JP Morgan Chase improperly took credits for loans hidden in a secret system of records known as RCV1, which were not being properly serviced as federally related mortgages. As a result, JP Morgan Chase received credit against its multi-billion settlements with the United States Department of Justice that it never should have received.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE
STATES OF CALIFORNIA,
DELAWARE, FLORIDA, GEORGIA,
HAWAII, ILLINOIS, INDIANA, IOWA,
MONTANA, NEVADA, NEW
HAMPSHIRE, NEW JERSEY, NEW
MEXICO, NEW YORK, NORTH
CAROLINA, RHODE ISLAND,
TENNESSEE, VIRGINIA, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.,
Ex rel. LAURENCE SCHNEIDER,
J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, J.P.
MORGAN CHASE & COMPANY; AND
CHASE HOME FINANCE LLC,
Case. No. 1:14-cv-01047-RMC
Judge Rosemary M. Collyer
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
A. Defendant’s Fraud
3. Defendant Chase’s fraud arises out of its response to efforts by the United States
Government (“Government” or “Federal Government”) and the States (the “States”)1 to remedy
the misconduct of Chase and other financial institutions whose actions significantly contributed
to the consumer housing crisis.
4. Defendant’s misconduct resulted in the issuance of improper mortgages,
premature and unauthorized foreclosures, violation of service members’ and other homeowners’
rights and protections, the use of false and deceptive affidavits and other documents, and the
waste and abuse of taxpayer funds. Each of the allegations regarding Defendant contained
herein applies to instances in which one or more, and in some cases all, of the defendants
engaged in the conduct alleged.
5. In March 2012, after a lengthy investigation (in part due to other qui tam
plaintiffs) under the Federal False Claims Act, the Government, along with the States, filed a
complaint against Chase and the other banks responsible for the fraudulent and unfair mortgage
practices that cost consumers, the Federal Government, and the States tens of billions of dollars.
Specifically, the Government alleged that Chase, as well as other financial institutions, engaged
in improper practices related to mortgage origination, mortgage servicing, and foreclosures,
including, but not limited to, irresponsible and inadequate oversight of the banks’ quality control
6. These improper practices had previously been the focus of several administrative
enforcement actions by various government agencies, including but not limited to, the Office of
the Controller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Bank and others. Those enforcement actions
resulted in various other Consent Orders that are still in full force and effect.
7. In April 2012, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
approved a settlement between the Federal Government, the States, the Defendant and four other
banks, which resulted in the NMSA. The operative document of this agreement was the Consent
Judgment (“Consent Judgment” or “Agreement”). The Consent Judgment contains, among other
things, Consumer Relief provisions. The Consumer Relief provisions required Chase to provide
over $4 billion in consumer relief to their borrowers. This relief was to be in the form of, among
other things, loan forgiveness and refinancing. Under the Consent Judgment, Chase received
“credits” towards its Consumer Relief obligations by forgiving or modifying loans it maintained
as a result of complying with the procedures and requirements contained in Exhibits D and D-1
of the Consent Judgment.
8. The Consent Judgment also contains Servicing Standards in Exhibit A that were
intended to be used as a basis for granting Consumer Relief. The Servicing Standards were
tested through various established “Metrics” and were designed to improve upon the lack of
quality control and communication with borrowers. Compliance was overseen by an
9. The operational framework for the Servicing Standards and Consumer Relief
requirements of the NMSA was based on a series of Treasury Directives that were themselves
designed as part of the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program. The MHA program was a
critical part of the Government’s broad strategy to help homeowners avoid foreclosure, stabilize
the country’s housing market, and improve the nation’s economy by setting uniform and industry
wide default servicing protocols, policies and procedures for the distribution of federal and
proprietary loan modification programs.
10. Before the Consent Judgment was entered into, Chase sold a significant amount
of its mortgage obligations to individual investors. Between 2006 and 2010, the Relator bought
the rights to thousands of mortgages owned and serviced by Chase. Unbeknownst to the Relator,
these mortgages were saturated with violations of past and present regulations, statutes and other
governmental requirements for first and second federally related home mortgage loans.
11. After both the Consent Judgment was signed and the MHA program was in effect,
numerous borrowers, whose 2nd lien mortgages had been sold by Chase to the Relator, received
debt-forgiveness letters from Chase that were purportedly sent pursuant to the Consent
12. Relator, through his contacts at Chase, was made aware that 33,456 letters were
sent by Chase on September 13, 2012 to second-lien borrowers. On December 13, 2012 another
approximately 10,000 letters were sent, and on January 31, 2013 another approximately 8,000
letters were sent, for a total of over 50,000 debt-forgiveness letters. These letters represented to
the recipient borrowers that, pursuant to the terms of the NMSA, the borrowers were discharged
from their obligations to make further payments on their mortgages, which Chase stated, it had
forgiven as a “result of a recent mortgage servicing settlement reached with the states and federal
government.” None of these borrowers made an application for a loan modification as required
by the Consent Judgment. These letters were not individually reviewed by Chase to ensure that
Chase actually owned the mortgages or to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the borrower’s
information but instead were “robo-signed”; each of the letters sent out was signed by “Patrick
Boyle” who identified himself as a Vice President at Chase.
13. Relator’s experience with Chase’s baseless debt-forgiveness letters was not
unique. Several other investors were also affected by Chase choosing to mass mail the “robo-
signed” debt-forgiveness letters to thousands of consumers from its system of records in order to
earn credits under the terms of the Consent Judgment and to avoid detection of its illegal and
discriminatory loan servicing policies and procedures.
14. In addition to the debt forgiveness letters sent, and after both the Consent
Judgment was signed and the MHA program was in effect, numerous borrowers, whose 1st
mortgages had been sold by Chase to the Relator, had their 1st mortgages liens quietly released.
15. Relator, through his third party servicer, which was handling normal and
customary default mortgage servicing activities, was made aware that several lien releases were
filed in the public records on mortgage loans that were owned by Relator in the fall of 2013.
Through Relator’s subsequent investigation of the property records for 1st mortgage loans that
Chase had previously sold to Relator, scores of additional lien releases were also discovered.
16. During the course of Relator’s investigation of Chase’s servicing practices, he
discovered that Chase maintains a large set of loans outside of its primary System of Records
(“SOR”), which is known as the Recovery One population (“RCV1” or “RCV1 SOR”). RCV1
was described to the Monitor by Chase as an “application” for loans that had been charged off
but still part of its main SOR. However, once loans had been charged off by Chase, the accuracy
and integrity of the information pertaining to the borrowers’ accounts whose loans became part
of the RCV1 population was and is fatally and irreparably flawed. Furthermore, the loans in the
RCV1 were not serviced according to the requirements of Federal law, the Consent Judgment,
the MHA programs or any of the other consent orders or settlements reached by Chase with any
government agency prior to the NMSA.2
17. Chase’s practice of sending unsolicited debt-forgiveness letters to intentionally
pre-selected borrowers of valueless loans did not meet the Servicing Standards set out in the
Consent Judgment to establish eligibility for credits toward its Consumer Relief obligations.
This practice enabled Chase to reduce its cost of complying with the Consent Judgment and
MHA program, while at the same time enhancing its own profits through unearned Consumer
Relief credits and MHA incentives. Chase sought to take credit for valueless charged-off and
third-party owned loans instead of applying the Consumer Relief under the NMSA and MHA
2 By letter dated September 16, 2015 to Schneider’s counsel, in reference to Relator’s claim that
“Chase concealed from the Monitor and MHA-C both the existence of the RCV1 charged-off
and the way those loans were treated for purposes of HAMP solicitations and NMS metrics
testing”, Chase’s counsel stated that “Those allegations are wholly incorrect. Chase repeatedly
disclosed the relevant facts to both the Monitor and MHA-C.”
Schneider’s counsel requested that Chase provide all documents demonstrating the “relevant
facts” to support Chase’s statement. Chase has refused to provide said documents, citing
Chase‘s concerns with providing documents that it had previously provided to the U.S.
Government. While Chase has offered to allow Chase’s counsel to read such documents
“verbatim” to Schneider’s counsel, Schneider knows of no supportable reason why documents
previously disclosed to the U.S. Government should not be shared with Schneider in his capacity
as a Relator under the FCA. No privilege exists for such a claim and therefore Schneider has
rejected this limitation. Such documents, if they in fact exist, should be produced before such a
defense can be raised, particularly because Chase’s counsel has raised the issue of Rule 11
18. The Servicing Standards and the Consumer Relief Requirements of the Consent
Judgment are set forth in Exhibits A and D of that document. The Consent Judgment is
governed by the underlying Servicer Participation Agreements of the MHA program, which
required mandatory compliance with the Treasury Directives under the MHA Handbook
(“Handbook”). Chase is required to demonstrate compliance with the Handbook’s guidelines in
the form of periodic certifications to the government. Chase ignored the requirements of
Exhibits A and D of the Consent Judgment, especially with respect to the RCV1 population of
loans. Therefore, Chase has been unable to service with any accuracy the charged-off loans it
owns and to segregate those loans that it no longer owns. As such, any certifications of
compliance with the Consent Judgment or the Services Participation Agreement (“SPA”) are
19. Relator conducted his own investigations and found that the Defendants sent loan
forgiveness letters to consumers for mortgages that Chase no longer owns or that were not
eligible for forgiveness credit. Further, Chase continues to fail to meet its obligations to service
loans and to prevent blight as required by both the Consent Judgment and SPA. Chase’s
intentional failure to monitor, report and/or service these loans, and its issuance of invalid loan
forgiveness letters and lien releases, evidence an attempt to thwart the goal of the Consent
Judgment and the MHA program. The purpose of this scheme was to quickly satisfy the
Defendant’s Consumer Relief obligations as cheaply as possible, without actually providing the
relief that Chase promised in exchange for the settlement that Chase reached with the Federal
Government and the States. In addition, Chase applied for and received MHA incentive
payments without complying with the MHA mandatory requirements. In short, Chase decreased
its liabilities, increased its revenues, avoided its obligations, and provided little to no relief to
20. The mere existence of RCV1 makes all claims by Chase that it complied with the
Servicing Standards and the Consumer Relief Requirements of the Consent Judgment false.
Likewise, the existence of RCV1 makes all claims by Chase that it complied with the SPA of the
MHA program false.
B. Damages to the Government Related to the NMSA
21. Exhibit E of the Consent Judgment provides for penalties of up to $5 million for
failure to meet a prescribed Metric of the Servicing Standards. Exhibit E, ¶ J.3(b) at E15.
22. Exhibit D of the Consent Judgment provides:
If Servicer fails to meet the commitment set forth in these Consumer Relief
Requirements within three years of the Servicer’s Start Date, Servicer shall pay an
amount equal to 125% of the unmet commitment amount, except that if Servicer
fails to meet the two year commitment noted above, and then fails to meet the
three year commitment, the Servicer shall pay an amount equal to 140% of the
unmet three-year Commitment amount.
Exhibit D, ¶10.d. at D-11.
23. The required payment set out in Exhibit D, ¶10.d is made either to the United
States or the States that are parties to the Consent Judgment. Fifty percent of any payment is
distributed to the United States. Consent Judgment, Exhibit E, ¶ J.c.(3)c. at E-16.
24. As explained in more detail below, Chase was required to certify that it was in
compliance with the Servicing Standards and the Consumer Relief Requirements. Many, if not
all, of the loans that Chase identified for credits against the $4 billion Consumer Relief
provisions were not eligible for the credit, because Chase did not comply with the Servicing
Standards or the Consumer Relief Requirements. Specifically, all loan modification programs
must be made available to all borrowers, who may then apply to determine eligibility. Hundreds
of thousands of borrowers’ accounts, in the RCV1 system of records, were not considered for all
eligible loss mitigation options (even though they could likely have qualified). Due to this
omission none of the loan modification programs qualified for Consumer Relief Credit. Thus,
Chase did not and does not qualify for any of the Consumer Relief Credit for which it applied.
25. For these reasons, each of Chase’s certifications to the Federal Government of
compliance represents a “reverse” false claim to avoid paying money to the Government.
26. Under the FCA a person is liable for penalties and damages who:
[k]nowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or
decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).
27. Under the FCA, “the term ‘obligation’ means an established duty, whether or not
fixed, arising from an express or implied contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee
relationship, from a fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or regulation, or from the
retention of any overpayment.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3).
28. Thus, under the FCA, Chase is liable for its false claims whether or not the
government fixed the amount of the obligation owed by Chase.
29. Under the FCA, “the term ‘material’ means having a natural tendency to
influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.” U.S.C. §
30. Under the “natural tendency” test Chase is liable for its false statements so long as
they reasonably could have influenced the government’s payment or collection of money. A
statement is false if it is capable of influencing the government’s funding decision, not whether it
actually influenced the government.
31. Each of Chase’s false certifications is actionable under 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(1)(G), because they represent a false record or statement that concealed, avoided or
decreased an obligation to transmit money to the Government.
32. The Federal Government and the States agreed to the NMSA with Chase, with the
understanding that Chase would meet its obligations under the Consent Judgment.
33. As set out in the Consumer Relief Requirements, the measure of the Federal and
State Governments’ damages is up to 140 percent of the credits that Chase falsely claimed met
the requirements of the Consent Judgment and up to $5 million for each Metric the Chase failed
34. These damages are recoverable under the Federal Civil False Claims Act, 31
U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. (the “FCA”), and similar provisions of the State False Claims Acts of the
States of California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Virginia, and the District of
35. The Federal Government and the States are now harmed because they are not
receiving the benefit of the bargain for which they negotiated with Chase due to the false claims
for credit that have been made by the Defendant.
C. Damages to the Government Related to the HAMP
36. The Amended and Restated Commitment to Purchase Financial Instrument and
Servicer Participation Agreement between the United States Government and Chase provided for
the implementation of loan modification and foreclosure prevention services (“HAMP
37. The value of Chase’s SPA was limited to $4,532,750,000 (“Program Participation
38. The value of EMC Mortgage Corporation’s (“EMC”) SPA (Chase is successor in
interest) was limited to $1,237,510,000.
39. As explained in more detail below, Chase must certify that it is in compliance
with the SPA and the MHA program and must strictly adhere to the guidelines and procedures
issued by the Treasury with respect to the programs outlined in the Service Schedules (“Program
Guidelines”). The Program Guidelines pursuant to the Treasury Directives are cataloged in the
MHA Handbook (“Handbook”). None of the loans that Chase and EMC identified and
submitted for payment against their respective Participation Caps were eligible for the incentive
payment, because neither Chase nor EMC complied with the SPA and Handbook guidelines.
Specifically, all loan modification programs must be made available to all borrowers, who must
then apply to determine eligibility. Hundreds of thousands of borrowers’ mortgage loan
accounts in the RCV1 system of records were not offered and thereby unable to be considered
for all eligible loss mitigation options (even though they likely could have qualified). Due to the
omission of the RCV1 population for any loss mitigation options, none of the modifications that
Chase provided qualified for HAMP incentives. Thus, Chase does not qualify for any of the
HAMP incentives for which it applied and received funds.
40. Therefore, Chase’s certifications of compliance and its creation of records to
support those certifications represent both the knowing presentation of false or fraudulent claims
for a payment and the knowing use of false records material to false or fraudulent claims.
41. Under the FCA, a person is liable for penalties and damages who:
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for
payment or approval;
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).
42. Each of Chase’s false certifications is actionable under either 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(1)(A) and (B), because they represent a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval of a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.
43. Under HAMP, the Federal Government entered into the Commitment with Chase,
with the understanding that Chase would meet its obligations under the SPA and related Treasury
directives. The Federal Government is now harmed because it is not receiving the benefit of the
bargain for which it negotiated with Chase due to the false claims for payment that have been
made by the Defendant.