Decided on February 24, 2015
Supreme Court, Queens County

JP Morgan Chase National Bank, Plaintiff,

against

Janet Fashakin, Defendants.

18980/11
Leonard Livote, J.

Plaintiff cross-moves for summary judgment in this mortgage foreclosure action.

Where, as here, a plaintiff’s standing to commence a foreclosure action is placed in issue by the defendant, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove its standing to be entitled to relief (Citimortgage, Inc. v. Stosel, 89 AD3d 887, 888 [Dept 2011]). A plaintiff in a mortgage foreclosure action has standing where it is the holder of both the subject mortgage and of the underlying note at the time the action is commenced (MLCFC 2007-9 Mixed Astoria, LLC v. 36-02 35th Ave. Development, LLC, 116 AD3d 745, 746 [2 Dept 2014]).

The plaintiff in this action, JP Morgan Chase Bank (” JP Morgan”), named itself as the creditor in the complaint. In its motion for summary judgment, however, plaintiff attests that the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) is the “beneficial” owner of the mortgage, and that JP Morgan is the [*2]servicing agent.

A servicing agent may commence a foreclosure when it identifies the owner of the note and mortgage, the action is expressly maintained in the plaintiff’s capacity as servicing agent, and the owner of the note and mortgage has delegated authority to act with respect to the note and mortgage (CWCapital Asset Management, LLC v. Great Neck Towers, LLC, 99 AD3d 850, 851 [2 Dept 2012]; CWCapital Asset Management LLC v. Charney-FPG 114 41st Street, LLC, 84 AD3d 506, 507 [1st Dept 2011]).

In the instant case, plaintiff identified itself as the creditor, maintained the action in its own name and has failed to offer any evidence that the owner of the note and mortgage has delegated authority to commence and maintain this action. Thus, there is an issue of fact regarding standing and the cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.

Defendant moves to vacate the note of issue on the grounds that her request for production of documents has not been complied with. Plaintiff does not directly address this assertion in its opposition papers. Rather, plaintiff asserts that defendant has failed to show that the outstanding discovery would lead to the discovery of a material issue of fact that would defeat plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. In view of the fact that plaintiff’s summary judgment motion has been denied, this is not a viable argument. Accordingly, it is

Ordered, that the note of issue is stricken and plaintiff is directed to comply with the outstanding document request.

Submit Order/Judgment.

Dated: February 24, 2015

……………………….

Leonard Livote, A.J.S.C.

Top Wall Street firm specializes in financial, securities and corporate law

The Charlotte Observer-

Departing U.S. Attorney Anne Tompkins is joining a legal firm linked to one of her biggest cases – the lawsuit against Bank of America over soured mortgage bonds.

Tompkins, the top federal prosecutor in western North Carolina since 2010, will be joining the Charlotte office of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, a Wall Street firm that specializes in financial, securities and corporate law, sources tell the Observer.

Cadwalader’s 40-plus local attorneys operate out of the Carillon building on West Trade Street, which also houses Tompkins and her staff.

Read more here: http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article11159708.html#storylink=cpy

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

ONE. VICIOUS. CYCLE.

National Mortgage News-

The Home Affordable Modification Program continues to disappoint.

As of Dec. 31, one in three struggling homeowners who received a loan modification through HAMP ultimately redefaulted on those loans, a new report has found.

Meanwhile, the program that was supposed to help some 4 million families avoid foreclosure has helped only a fraction of that amount, according to a report the special inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Christy Romero, presented to Congress last month.

[NATIONAL MORTGAGE NEWS]

Reuters-

Morgan Stanley said it will pay $2.6 billion to the U.S. government to resolve potential claims stemming from the sale of mortgage bonds before the financial crisis, reducing its 2014 profit by more than half.

Morgan Stanley increased its legal reserves by about $2.8 billion, which lowered its 2014 income from continuing operations by $2.7 billion, or $1.35 per share, the bank said in a regulatory filing. (1.usa.gov/1FueJWH)

The bank had reported earnings from continuing operations of $5.83 billion, or $2.96 per share, for 2014.

[REUTERS]

Updated February 25, 2015

CNBC–

In 2008, the nation entered into a financial crisis widely believed to have been caused by excesses in the residential mortgage industry. By 2010, the nation thought it had put in place a series of measures that not only would resolve the crisis but would insure that it never happened again. Yet, here we are in 2015 looking at another potential mortgage crisis. Only this time it is different. In 2008, funds flowed in waves into the mortgage industry. In 2015, it appears the funds are drying up.

Supreme Court of the United States
No. 13-884

ROCKY FUJIO TAKUSHI, INDIVIDUALLY and as TRUSTEE
OF THE ALBERT G. TAKUSHI REVOCABLE LIVING
TRUST DATED APRIL 11, 2007,
Petitioner

v.

BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

THIS CAUSE having been submitted on the petition for writ of certiorari and the response thereto.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the above court is vacated with costs, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, 574 U. S. ___ (2015).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitioner Rocky Fujio Takushi, Individually and as Trustee of The Albert G. Takushi Revocable Living Trust Dated April 11, 2007, recover from BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) for costs herein expended.

January 20, 2015
Clerk’s costs: $300.00

Who runs the world and who owns the White House?

Bloomberg-

Eight days after joining the Treasury Department as an adviser, Antonio Weiss was the lead U.S. official listed at a meeting with Wall Street executives. It’s a role typically played by the undersecretary for domestic finance — the same post Weiss lost after Democratic senators stymied his nomination.

Weiss’s presence at that Feb. 3 meeting on quarterly debt sales shows him diving into many of the same tasks that would have come with the undersecretary’s job. The former Lazard Ltd. global head of investment banking is now working on issues ranging from debt management to housing finance and global market developments. One big difference: his job as counselor to Secretary Jacob J. Lew doesn’t require Senate confirmation.

As one of the few top Treasury aides with broad financial-industry experience, Weiss is likely to take on an influential, if low-profile, function shaping policy, according to former officials. That comes at a crucial time, with the cost of servicing the $18.1 trillion national debt poised to rise as the Federal Reserve prepares to increase interest rates from near zero.

[BLOOMBERG]

Photographer: Jin Lee/Bloomberg

Funny to hear that the CFTC is investigating after learning back in 2012 that an Anonymous JP Morgan whistle blower tells CFTC that JPM manipulates the silver market & conspires in manipulating gold, then just like that the CFTC deletes the whistle blower submission off its website!

Good thing it was posted on here!

REUTERS-

The U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission are investigating at least 10 major banks for possible rigging of precious-metals markets, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing people close to the inquiries.

DoJ prosecutors are scrutinizing the price-setting process for gold, silver, platinum and palladium in London, while the CFTC has opened a civil investigation, the newspaper said.

The banks are HSBC Holdings Plc, Bank of Nova Scotia, Barclays Plc, Credit Suisse Group AG, Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman Sachs Group Inc, JPMorgan Chase & Co, Societe Generale, Standard Bank Group Ltd and UBS Group AG, the Journal said.

[REUTERS]

image credit: coinweek.com

Special Master from 2010 has submitted a Second Report on the 2010 OTSC. No one can clarify “communication.” Wells Fargo and now OneWest Bank, FSB.

SUPERIOR COURT OF
JEW JERSEY
CHANCERY DIVISION-
GENERAL EQUITY PART
MERCER COUNTY

IN THE MATTER OF RESIDENTIAL
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
PLEADING AND DOCUMENT
IRREGULARITIES

ORDER APPROVING SECOND
REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL MASTER
CONCERNING
ONEWEST BANK FSB
AND DISCHARGING SPECIAL
MASTER

H/T Street Insider–

ATLANTA, Feb 23, 2015 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE via COMTEX) —

Ocwen Financial Corporation OCN, +4.27% announced today that its subsidiary, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”) and Nationstar Mortgage LLC, an indirectly held, wholly owned, subsidiary of Nationstar Mortgage Holdings Inc. NSM, +10.20% (collectively “Nationstar”), have signed an agreement in principle for the sale by Ocwen of residential mortgage servicing rights on a portfolio consisting of approximately 81,000 performing loans owned by Freddie Mac with a total principal balance of approximately $9.8 billion. Subject to a definitive agreement, approvals by Freddie Mac and FHFA and other customary conditions, Ocwen and Nationstar expect the transaction to close by March 31, 2015 and the loan servicing to transfer in April 2015.

“This transaction represents the first step in the execution of our previously-announced strategy to transfer certain types of non-strategic servicing,” said Ronald M. Faris, Chief Executive Officer of Ocwen. “We look forward to exploring additional MSR transactions with Nationstar.”

“We are pleased to enter into an agreement to acquire this portfolio from Ocwen,” said Jay Bray, Chief Executive Officer of Nationstar. “We look forward to expeditiously closing this portfolio and welcome the new customers to Nationstar.”

About Ocwen Financial Corporation

Ocwen Financial Corporation is a financial services holding company which, through its subsidiaries, is engaged in the servicing and origination of mortgage loans. Ocwen is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, with offices throughout the United States and support operations in India and the Philippines. Utilizing proprietary technology, global infrastructure and superior training and processes, Ocwen provides solutions that help homeowners and make our clients’ loans worth more. Ocwen may post information that is important to investors on its website (www.Ocwen.com).

About Nationstar

Based in Dallas, Texas, Nationstar earns fees through the delivery of quality servicing, origination and transaction based services related principally to single-family residences throughout the United States. Additional corporate information is available on the investors tab at www.nationstarmtg.com.

Forward Looking Statements

This news release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. Forward-looking statements by their nature address matters that are, to different degrees, uncertain. Forward-looking statements and involve a number of assumptions, risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially.

Important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those suggested by the forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, the following: adverse effects on our business as a result of recent regulatory settlements; reactions to the announcement of such settlements by key counterparties; increased regulatory scrutiny and media attention, due to rumors or otherwise; uncertainty related to claims, litigation and investigations brought by government agencies and private parties regarding our servicing, foreclosure, modification and other practices; any adverse developments in existing legal proceedings or the initiation of new legal proceedings; our ability to effectively manage our regulatory and contractual compliance obligations; the adequacy of our financial resources, including our sources of liquidity and ability to fund and recover advances, repay borrowings and comply with debt covenants; our servicer and credit ratings as well as other actions from various rating agencies, including the impact of recent downgrades of our servicer ratings; volatility in our stock price; the characteristics of our servicing portfolio, including prepayment speeds along with delinquency and advance rates; our ability to contain and reduce our operating costs; our ability to successfully modify delinquent loans, manage foreclosures and sell foreclosed properties; uncertainty related to legislation, regulations, regulatory agency actions, government programs and policies, industry initiatives and evolving best servicing practices; as well as other risks detailed in Ocwen’s reports and filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), including its annual report on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2013 (filed with the SEC on 08/18/14) and its quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2014 (filed with the SEC on 10/31/14). Anyone wishing to understand Ocwen’s business should review its SEC filings. Ocwen’s forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made and, except for our ongoing obligations under the U.S. federal securities laws, we undertake no obligation to update or revise forward-looking statements whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

CONTACT: Investors: Stephen Swett T: (203) 614-0141 E: shareholderrelations@ocwen.com Media: Sard Verbinnen & Co Margaret Popper/David Millar T: (212) 687-8080

Copyright (C) 2015 GlobeNewswire, Inc. All rights reserved.

________________

Under Nationstar’s Mergers & Acquisitions, It’s current status is pending. http://investors.nationstarholdings.com/mnahistory.aspx?iid=4288863&keydeal=200311

The Bank of New York Mellon, fka The Bank of New York, as Trustee for CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-13, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
v.
Shirley T. Carson, Defendant-Appellant,
Bayfield Financial LLC and Collins Financial Services, Defendants.

For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by April A.G. Hartman, Jeffrey R. Myer, and Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc. Oral argument by April A.G. Hartman.

An amicus curiae brief by Grant F. Langley city attorney; Danielle M. Bergner, deputy city attorney; and Kail J. Decker, assistant city attorney, on behalf of the City of Milwaukee.

An amicus curiae brief by Catherine M. Doyle, Amanda E. Adrian, and Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Inc., on behalf of the Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee.

PROSSER, ZIEGLER, GABLEMAN, JJJ., concur.

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.

¶1 Petitioner, Bank of New York Mellon (“the Bank”), seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals that reversed the circuit court’s denial of Shirley Carson’s motion to amend a judgment of foreclosure on her former home.^[1] She requested that the court find the property to be abandoned and that it order a sale of the property upon expiration of five weeks from the date of entry of the amended judgment. The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court erroneously determined that it was without authority to grant the motion.

¶2 The Bank asserts that Wis. Stat. § 846.102 (2011-12)^[2], the statute governing foreclosure of abandoned properties, does not require it to sell a property after it obtains a judgment of foreclosure and the redemption period has passed. It maintains that the statute is permissive, not mandatory, and that it cannot be required to sell a property. The Bank further contends that even if the statute does mandate that the Bank sell the abandoned property after the redemption period, it provides no deadline for doing so. Thus, the Bank concludes that it is free to execute on its judgment at any time within five years after rendition of the judgment, and the circuit court is without authority to order it to sell the property at a specific time.

¶3 Based on the statute’s plain language and context, we conclude that when the court determines that a property is abandoned, Wis. Stat. § 846.102 authorizes the circuit court to order a mortgagee to bring the property to sale after the redemption period. We further conclude, consistent with the purpose of the statute, that the circuit court shall order the property to be brought to sale within a reasonable time after the redemption period. The circuit court’s determination of what constitutes a reasonable time should be based on the totality of the circumstances in each case.

¶4 In this case, the circuit court did not reach the issue of whether the property had been abandoned. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for such a determination and further proceedings.

I

¶5 In 2007, Countrywide Home Loans loaned $52,000 to Carson. As security for the debt, Carson mortgaged her home on Concordia Avenue in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. After Carson defaulted on her payments, Countrywide and Carson entered an agreement modifying the terms of the loan. Subsequently, Carson again defaulted on the loan payments.

¶6 The Bank, as trustee for Countrywide, filed a complaint against Carson, seeking a judgment of foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged premises. Attempts to serve Carson at the Concordia Avenue property were unsuccessful. In his affidavit, the process server observed that the house appeared to be vacant. On his first visit he reported that the garage had been boarded, that the snow was not shoveled, there were no footprints in it, and there was no furniture in the house. Notes from his successive visits state that the snow was still not shoveled and there were still no footprints around the house.

¶7 Thereafter, the Bank published notice of the foreclosure action in a local newspaper. Carson, who was physically and financially unable to care for the property, did not file an answer or otherwise dispute the foreclosure. In April 2011, BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, apparently a loan servicer for Countrywide, filed a City of Milwaukee Registration of Abandoned Property in Foreclosure form for the property.^[3]

¶8 The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of the Bank. It determined that Carson owed the Bank $81,356.59. After acknowledging that the property was not owner occupied, the court directed that the property “shall be sold at public auction under the direction of the sheriff, at any time after three month(s) from the date of entry of judgment.” The judgment also enjoined both parties from committing waste on the premises and specified that in the event the property is abandoned by the defendants, the Bank “may take all necessary steps to secure and winterize the subject property.”

¶9 After the judgment was entered, the Bank did not take steps to secure the property. It was repeatedly burglarized and vandalized. At one point someone started a fire in the garage. Despite an order from the City of Milwaukee Department of Neighborhood Services to maintain the property, the Bank did not do so. Carson received notices of accumulated trash and debris, as well as notices of overgrown weeds, grass, and trees. The City imposed approximately $1,800 in municipal fines on her and she made payments of approximately $25 per month toward the fines.

¶10 By November 2012, more than 16 months after the judgment of foreclosure was entered, the Bank had not sold the property and had no plans to sell it. Carson filed a motion to amend the judgment to include a finding that the property was abandoned and an order that the sale of the premises be made upon expiration of five weeks from the date of entry of the amended judgment, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 846.102.^[4]

¶11 In support of her motion, Carson referenced the affidavit from the process server indicating that the house appeared vacant. She produced her own affidavit stating that she had terminated her utility accounts, that the property had been vandalized, that the doors and windows on the house had been boarded, and that the garage had been damaged by fire. She also produced the form the loan servicer filed with the City of Milwaukee registering the premises as an abandoned property, violation notices from the City indicating that there was trash and debris on the property, a copy of the complaint record from the City, and a re-inspection fee letter from the City.

¶12 The circuit court denied Carson’s motion. It observed that Wis. Stat. § 846.102 did not specifically grant it authority to order the Bank to sell the property at a specific time. It explained “I can’t find anywhere in the statute [Wis. Stat. § 846.102] that I have the authority to grant the relief that [Carson is] requesting.” The court further noted that the statute contemplates that the redemption period be elected by the mortgagee, not the borrower, and questioned whether a mortgagee could be compelled to execute a judgment when someone else is seeking the order. Accordingly, it stated, “I’m specifically finding that I don’t have the authority . . . so the motion is denied on those grounds.”

¶13 Carson appealed, arguing that under Wis. Stat. § 846.102 the circuit court did have the authority to order sale of the property upon expiration of the redemption period. The court of appeals agreed with Carson. Bank of New York v. Carson, 2013 WI App 153, ¶9, 352 Wis. 2d 205, 841 N.W.2d 573. It determined that “the plain language of the statute directs the court to ensure that an abandoned property is sold without delay, and it logically follows that if a party to a foreclosure moves the court to order a sale, the court may use its contempt authority to do so.” Id., ¶13. Accordingly, it reversed the circuit court and remanded the case. Id., ¶16.

II

¶14 This case presents two issues. First, we are asked to determine whether Wis. Stat. § 846.102 authorizes a circuit court to order a mortgagee to bring a property to sale. Second, we are asked whether a court can require a mortgagee to bring a property to sale at a certain point in time. Both questions require us to determine the scope of authority granted to the circuit court by Wis. Stat. § 846.102. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court of appeals. Bank Mut. v. S.J. Boyer Constr., Inc., 2010 WI 74, ¶21, 326 Wis. 2d 521, 785 N.W.2d 462.

¶15 Our goal in statutory interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended effect. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. Interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statutory language. Id., ¶45. “Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning.” Id.

¶16 In seeking to give a statute its intended effect, we are cognizant that “[a] statute’s purpose or scope may be readily apparent from its plain language or its relationship to surrounding or closely-related statutes—that is, from its context or the structure of the statute as a coherent whole.” Id., ¶49. Thus, statutory language is interpreted “in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes.” Id., ¶46.

¶17 Where the statutory language is ambiguous we turn to extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, to help us discern the meaning of a statute. Id., ¶51. “[A] statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses.” Id., ¶47 (citations omitted).

III

¶18 We begin with the language of the statute at issue. Wisconsin Stat. § 846.102 governs actions for enforcement of mortgage liens on abandoned properties.^[5] Under the statute, if the court makes an affirmative finding that a property has been abandoned, it shall enter a judgment stating that “the sale of such mortgaged premises shall be made upon the expiration of 5 weeks from the date when such judgment is entered.” Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1). It states:

(1) In an action for enforcement of a mortgage lien if the court makes an affirmative finding upon proper evidence being submitted that the mortgaged premises have been abandoned by the mortgagor and assigns, judgment shall be entered as provided in s. 846.10 except that the sale of such mortgaged premises shall be made upon the expiration of 5 weeks from the date when such judgment is entered. Notice of the time and place of sale shall be given under ss. 815.31 and 846.16 and placement of the notice may commence when judgment is entered.

Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1) (emphasis added).

¶19 The statute further permits entities other than the mortgagee to present evidence that a property had been abandoned and describes what type of evidence should be considered:

(2) In addition to the parties to the action to enforce a mortgage lien, a representative of the city, town, village, or county where the mortgaged premises are located may provide testimony or evidence to the court under sub. (1) relating to whether the premises have been abandoned by the mortgagor. In determining whether the mortgaged premises have been abandoned, the court shall consider the totality of the circumstances, including the following:

(a) Boarded, closed, or damaged windows or doors to the premises.

(b) Missing, unhinged, or continuously unlocked doors to the premises.

(c) Terminated utility accounts for the premises.

(d) Accumulation of trash or debris on the premises.

(e) At least 2 reports to law enforcement officials of trespassing, vandalism, or other illegal acts being committed on the premises.

(f) Conditions that make the premises unsafe or unsanitary or that make the premises in imminent danger of becoming unsafe or unsanitary.

Wis. Stat. § 846.102(2).

¶20 The plain language of the statute grants the circuit court the authority to order a bank to sell the property. Indeed, under the statute the court’s judgment must include a requirement that the property be sold. It provides that if the court makes a finding of abandonment then “judgment shall be entered as provided in s. 846.10 except that the sale of such mortgaged premises shall be made upon the expiration of 5 weeks from the date when such judgment is entered.”^[6] Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1) (emphasis added).

¶21 Generally, “the word `shall’ is presumed mandatory when it appears in a statute.” Karow v. Milwaukee Cnty. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 570, 263 N.W.2d 214 (1978); see also Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57:2 (7th ed. 2008) (“`Shall’ is considered presumptively mandatory unless there is something in the context or the character of the legislation which requires it to be looked at differently.”). We have previously interpreted “shall” as mandatory when used in Wis. Stat. ch. 846. GMAC Mortgage Corp. v. Gisvold, 215 Wis. 2d 459, 478, 572 N.W.2d 466 (1998).

¶22 We acknowledge, however, that although the word “shall” suggests that a statutory provision is mandatory, the legislature’s use of the word “shall” is not governed by a per se rule. See State v. R.R.E., 162 Wis. 2d 698, 707, 470 N.W.2d 283 (1991). This court has previously explained that “`[s]hall’ will be construed as directory if necessary to carry out the intent of the legislature.” Id.; see also State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶15, 262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155 (court considers legislative intent in determining whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory); State v. Thomas, 2000 WI App 162, ¶9, 238 Wis. 2d 216, 617 N.W.2d 230 (noting that factors to consider in determining whether a statute is mandatory include “the statute’s nature, the legislative objective for the statute, and the potential consequences to the parties, such as injuries or wrongs.”).

¶23 The context in which “shall” is used in Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1) indicates that the legislature intended it to be mandatory. First, when the legislature uses the terms “shall” and “may” in the same statutory section, it supports a mandatory reading of the term “shall” as the legislature is presumed to be aware of the distinct meanings of the words. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 215 Wis. 2d at 478; Karow, 82 Wis. 2d at 571; Singer 7 Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57:3. In Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1) the legislature used both “shall” and “may” indicating its intent that the words have different meanings.

¶24 Second, a comparison with the neighboring statutes also suggests that the term “shall” in Wis. Stat. § 846.102 was intended to be mandatory. The statutes on both sides of Wis. Stat. § 846.102 address mortgage foreclosures in other circumstances. Wisconsin Stat. § 846.101 addresses foreclosures on 20-acre properties.^[7] Wisconsin Stat. § 846.103 addresses foreclosures on commercial properties and multifamily residences.^[8] Under both statutes it is up to the mortgagee to elect whether to seek a foreclosure judgment. See Wis. Stat. § 846.101 (court enters judgment if mortgagee waives judgment of deficiency and permits the mortgagor to remain in possession of the property until it is sold); Wis. Stat. § 846.103 (same). In contrast to these neighboring statutes, Wis. Stat. § 846.102 does not require action by the mortgagee after it has initiated a foreclosure proceeding. It specifically permits entities other than the mortgagee to appear and submit evidence of abandonment. Wis. Stat. § 846.102(2). As the court of appeals stated, once a mortgagee has filed a foreclosure action, the focus of the proceeding is on the condition of the property, not the mortgagee’s preference. Bank of New York, 352 Wis. 2d 205, ¶12.

¶25 The Bank contends that the court of appeals’ interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.103 in Arch Bay Holdings LLC-Series 2008B v. Matson, No. 2013AP744, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2014), and Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Matson, No. 2012AP1981, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 30, 2013), is dispositive on the issue of whether the court can require a mortgagee to sell an abandoned property. In Deutsche Bank, the court of appeals determined that the language in Wis. Stat. § 846.103 permitted the mortgagee to sell the property once the statutory prerequisites were met, but did not require it. No. 2012AP1981, ¶20. In Arch Bay, the court reached the same conclusion when interpreting a judgment containing the same language as the statute. No. 2013AP744, ¶17.

¶26 The Bank maintains that because the court of appeals determined that the language of Wis. Stat. § 846.103 was not mandatory, the same construction should be applied to Wis. Stat. § 846.102. However, as discussed above, Wis. Stat. § 846.103 and Wis. Stat. § 846.102 are significantly different statutes.^[9] See supra ¶20. Further, Arch Bay and Deutsche Bank are unpublished and have no precedential authority. Wis. Stat. § 809.23(3)(b). Although they may be cited as persuasive authority, given the above discussion, they do not persuade us that the language in Wis. Stat. § 846.102 is permissive.

¶27 Considering the statute’s clear language and its context, the Bank’s argument that it cannot be required to sell a property under Wis. Stat. § 846.102 is unpersuasive. Wisconsin Stat. § 846.102 mandates that the court order a sale of the mortgaged premises if certain conditions are met. Those conditions do not depend on action by the mortgagee alone and are not dependent on its acquiescence or consent.

IV

¶28 Having determined that Wis. Stat. § 846.102 authorizes a court to order a mortgagee to bring a property to sale, we turn to consider whether a court can also require a mortgagee to bring a property to sale at a certain point in time.

¶29 Again, we begin with the words of the statute. It provides that “the sale of such mortgaged premises shall be made upon the expiration of 5 weeks from the date when such judgment [of foreclosure] is entered.” Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1). This language is indicative of the time frame a court must impose for the sale: “upon expiration of 5 weeks.”

¶30 The Bank asserts that even if Wis. Stat. § 846.102 mandates that the circuit court order a sale of the property after the redemption period, it provides no time limit for the sale. Absent any specific timeline, the Bank contends that it has five years to execute its judgment under Wis. Stat. § 815.04.^[10]

¶31 We decline to adopt the Bank’s argument. We acknowledge that the word “upon” in Wis. Stat. § 846.102 is ambiguous as “upon expiration of 5 weeks from the date when such judgment is entered” could be read to mean any time after the five weeks but before the five years. It could also be interpreted to mean immediately upon expiration of five weeks or something in between. In discerning the answer to our inquiry, we examine here the context of the statute, its legislative history, and the purpose of the statute.

¶32 When considered in light of its neighboring statutes, the context of Wis. Stat. § 846.102 suggests that the legislature intended a prompt sale. Wisconsin Stat. § 846.101, addressing 20-acre properties, provides that if the mortgagee waives judgment of deficiency and permits the mortgagor to remain in the property until it is sold, the court shall enter a judgment that the property be sold after the expiration of six months from the date of the judgment. Wisconsin Stat. § 846.103, addressing foreclosures of commercial properties and multifamily residences, provides that the mortgagee waives judgment of deficiency and permits the mortgagor to remain in the property until it is sold, the court shall enter a judgment that the property be sold after the expiration of three months from the date of the judgment. Wis. Stat. § 846.103(2).

¶33 The statute at issue in this case, Wis. Stat. § 846.102, prompts faster sales with fewer requirements for abandoned premises than its neighboring statutes. It provides that upon finding abandonment, the court shall enter a judgment that the premises shall be sold after the expiration of five weeks. Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1). Unlike its neighboring statutes, Wis. Stat. § 846.102 does not contain the requirements that the mortgagee waive deficiency judgment and permit the mortgagor to remain on the premises in order for the court to order a sale. When viewed in light of its neighboring statutes, the loosened requirements in Wis. Stat. § 846.102 evince an intent to ensure a prompt sale of the property.

¶34 The contrary statutory intent asserted by the Bank is unconvincing. Referencing the redemption periods in Wis. Stat. §§ 846.101, 846.102 and 846.103, the Bank contends that the purpose behind the statute is to create delay so that defaulted borrowers will have one last chance to retain their properties. However, the Bank’s assertion ignores the differences between Wis. Stat. § 846.102 and those neighboring statutes. Wisconsin Stat. § 846.102 addresses properties that have been abandoned, properties which borrowers no longer have an interest in retaining. Thus, the policy concern of creating a delay does not appear to be implicated.

¶35 The legislative intent for a prompt sale is also supported by the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 846.102. In 2011, Wis. Stat. § 846.102 was amended to shorten the redemption period for abandoned properties from two months to five weeks, to add subsection (2) permitting the city, town, village, or county to provide testimony or evidence of abandonment, and to indicate what sort of evidence of abandonment a court should consider. 2011 WI Act 136, §§ 1r, 2 (enacted Mar. 21, 2012). The Act was introduced as 2011 Senate Bill 307 with bipartisan support. Four individuals spoke at the public hearing on the bill: its sponsor, a representative of the City of Milwaukee, a representative of Legal Action of Wisconsin, and a representative of the Wisconsin Bankers Association. 2011 Senate Bill 307, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Financial Institutions and Rural Issues, 2011 Regular Session, Nov. 30, 2011. Each individual referenced that the bill’s intent was to help municipalities deal with abandoned properties in a timely manner.^[11]

¶36 Two of the speakers explained that abandoned properties were a significant problem in Milwaukee. Such properties increase the crime rate and have a destabilizing impact on neighborhoods. This testimony echoes researchers’ findings that home abandonment leads to blight:

Abandoned homes substantially decrease the value of neighboring properties, which in turn lowers the tax revenue cities can collect to help alleviate the blight caused by abandonment. Moreover, abandoned homes become public nuisances, such as fire hazards, that can endanger the community.

Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for the Rise in Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 1169, 1171.^[12]

¶37 Interpreting Wis. Stat. § 846.102 as permitting sale at any time within five years after judgment is entered would exacerbate the problem that the statute was meant to ameliorate. Such an interpretation would allow mortgagees to initiate foreclosures, but fail to bring the properties to sale for an extended period of time, leaving the properties in legal limbo.^[13]

¶38 Multiple studies have remarked upon the negative impact of such a scenario. For example, a study by the Government Accountability Office determined that abandoned foreclosures create unsightly and dangerous properties that contribute to neighborhood decline. GAO, Mortgage Foreclosures: Additional Mortgage Servicer Actions Could Help Reduce the Frequency and Impact of Abandoned Foreclosures, GAO-11-93 at 29 (Nov. 2010). “[A]s a result of vandalism, exposure, and neglect, vacant properties can become worthless. . . . abandoned foreclosures that remain vacant for extended periods pose significant health, safety, and welfare issues at the local level.” Id. at 31.

¶39 Another study has observed that “[t]he result of these abandoned foreclosures has been devastating to cities and consumers throughout the country.” Judith Fox, The Foreclosure Echo: How Abandoned Foreclosures are Reentering the Market through Debt Buyers, 26 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 25, 29-30 (2013). “With no threat of citation for nuisance violations, and thus little incentive to maintain the premises, many lenders very well may allow the properties they control to deteriorate.” Kristin M. Pinkston, In the Weeds: Homeowners Falling Behind on their Mortgages, Lenders Playing the Foreclosure Game, and Cities Left Paying the Price, 34 S. Ill. U.L.J. 621, 633 (2009). Failing to interpret Wis. Stat. § 846.102 as enabling a court to require a prompt sale would inhibit its use as a tool to address abandoned properties.

¶40 Because its context and the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 846.102 clearly indicate that the statute was intended to help municipalities deal with abandoned properties in a timely manner, we decline to interpret it so as to permit properties to languish abandoned for five years. Cf. Waller v. Am. Transmission Co., 2013 WI 77, ¶108, 350 Wis. 2d 242, 833 N.W.2d 764 (construing statute in a manner to further the statutory purpose); Bank Mut., 326 Wis. 2d 521, ¶¶71-76 (interpreting Wis. Stat. § 846.103 in a manner consistent with the statute’s goals).

¶41 In order to give effect to the statute’s purpose, we interpret the requirement in Wis. Stat. § 846.102 that a court order an abandoned property to be brought to sale after the five week redemption period as a requirement that the court order the property to be brought to sale within a reasonable time after the redemption period. Admittedly, what is considered a reasonable time will vary with the circumstances of each case. The circuit court is in the best position to consider arguments and evidence on this issue. Thus, we leave it to the circuit court’s discretion to determine, after considering the totality of the circumstances, what a reasonable period of time may be for each case, in light of the statute’s purpose.

V

¶42 In this case, the circuit court did not determine whether the property on Concordia Avenue was abandoned. Rather, it denied Carson’s motion after concluding that it did not have the authority to order the mortgagee to bring the property to sale as requested by Carson. Given that we have concluded that the circuit court does have such authority, a finding as to whether the property has been abandoned is needed here. Absent a finding of abandonment, sale of the property cannot be ordered under Wis. Stat. § 846.102.

¶43 Accordingly, we remand the case to the circuit court to determine whether the Concordia property has been abandoned. If the court finds that the property has been abandoned, it shall consider the totality of the circumstances and, consistent with the statutory purpose, enter an order stating the reasonable time after the redemption period in which the mortgagee must bring the property to sale.

VI

¶44 In sum, based on the statute’s plain language and context we conclude that when the court determines that the property is abandoned, Wis. Stat. § 846.102 authorizes the circuit court to order a mortgagee to bring a mortgaged property to sale after the redemption period.

¶45 We further conclude, consistent with the purpose of the statute, that the circuit court shall order the property to be brought to sale within a reasonable time after the redemption period. The circuit court’s determination of what constitutes a reasonable time should be based on the totality of the circumstances in each case.

¶46 In this case, the circuit court did not reach the issue of whether the property had been abandoned. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and remand the case to the circuit court for such a determination and further proceedings.

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.

¶47 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. (concurring).

I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm the court of appeals. I do not agree with the majority’s reasoning in support of this decision. In my view, the owner of real property may seek a judicial sale of the property when the owner’s authority to sell is impeded or otherwise in doubt. Wis. Stat. § 840.03(1)(g). However, the ultimate availability of this judicial “remedy” is dependent upon the equities involved, including recognition of the “interests in real property” of others. Wis. Stat. § 840.01. For the reasons stated below, I respectfully concur.

I

¶48 The majority opinion is preoccupied with an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.102, which is part of the chapter on Real Estate Foreclosure. Chapter 846 is a detailed and vitally important chapter of the Wisconsin Statutes. Section 846.102, entitled “Abandoned premises,” is a significant provision within the chapter. A mistaken interpretation of this section is likely to have profound ramifications on real estate financing in Wisconsin.

¶49 The early sections of Chapter 846 set out foreclosure procedure in a variety of situations. Before examining these sections, I believe it is useful to reiterate several fundamental principles.

¶50 A mortgage has been defined as “any agreement or arrangement in which property is used as security.” Wis. Stat. § 851.15. “Wisconsin is a lien-theory state with regard to mortgages. A mortgage creates a lien on real property but does not convey title to the property to the mortgagee (lender).” Lawrence Sager, Wisconsin Real Estate Practice & Law 137 (11th ed. 2004).

¶51 In simple terms, a “mortgage conveys an interest in the real estate to the lender as security for the debt, while the mortgage note is a promise to repay the debt. Mortgages are the most common form of loan instruments in Wisconsin.” Id.

¶52 The foreclosure provisions of Chapter 846 are invoked by mortgagees (lenders) when a mortgagor (borrower) fails to repay a debt. The law provides protections for the mortgagor, so that a mortgagee cannot move too quickly against the mortgagor, and the mortgagor has a period to redeem the property after foreclosure.

¶53 As a practical matter, a mortgagee invokes the foreclosure provisions of Chapter 846 when its loan is not being repaid. However, foreclosure does not transfer ownership of the property to the mortgagee. Thus, the mortgagee does not control the mortgaged property after foreclosure, and it may end up receiving no payment on its loan until the property is sold and the sale is confirmed. As a result, the mortgagee normally has a strong incentive for a prompt sale after foreclosure.

¶54 The mortgagee is usually entitled to a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor in the event that sale of the property does not satisfy the debt. In truth, however, many mortgagors do not have the wherewithal to satisfy a deficiency judgment. This is one reason why the mortgagee may waive its right to a deficiency judgment in order to speed up sale of the property. There is no reason for the mortgagee to delay sale of the property unless there is a rational economic reason to do so.

¶55 Wisconsin Stat. § 846.10 is the basic foreclosure statute. It reads in part:

(1) If the plaintiff recovers the judgment shall describe the mortgaged premises and fix the amount of the mortgage debt then due and also the amount of each installment thereafter to become due, and the time when it will become due, and whether the mortgaged premises can be sold in parcels and whether any part thereof is a homestead, and shall adjudge that the mortgaged premises be sold for the payment of the amount then due and of all installments which shall become due before the sale, or so much thereof as may be sold separately without material injury to the parties interested, and be sufficient to pay such principal, interest and costs; and when demanded in the complaint, direct that judgment shall be rendered for any deficiency against the parties personally liable and, if the sale is to be by referee, the referee must be named therein.

Wis. Stat. § 846.10(1).

¶56 Subsection (2) then reads:

(2) . . . No sale involving a one- to 4-family residence that is owner-occupied at the commencement of the foreclosure action . . . may be held until the expiration of 12 months from the date when judgment is entered, except a sale under s. 846.101 or 846.102. . . . In all cases the parties may, by stipulation, filed with the clerk, consent to an earlier sale.

Wis. Stat. § 846.10(2).

¶57 Section 846.101 deals with foreclosure sales (primarily of residential property under 20 acres) in which the mortgagor has agreed to a shorter period of time for sale and redemption (six months) and the “plaintiff” (mortgagee) has elected in its complaint to waive its right to a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor.

¶58 Section 846.102 permits an even shorter period between foreclosure and sale (five weeks) when the court finds that the mortgagor has abandoned the property—that is, “relinquishment of possession or control of the premises whether or not the mortgagor or the mortgagor’s assigns have relinquished equity and title.” Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1).

¶59 Section 846.103 relates to “Foreclosures of commercial properties and multifamily residences.”

¶60 The mortgagee is the “plaintiff” under these four sections. The mortgagor does not need to sue the mortgagee because the mortgagor may stipulate to a sale without initiating litigation. Wis. Stat. § 846.10(2).

¶61 That the mortgagee is the “plaintiff” under Wis. Stat. § 846.102 is clear from the opening phrase of the section: “In an action for enforcement of a mortgage lien. . . .” The mortgagee has the “mortgage lien” on mortgaged property as well as standing to enforce the lien; the mortgagor does not have either. Moreover, although § 846.102 does not use the word “plaintiff,” as surrounding §§ 846.10, 846.101, and 846.103 do, § 846.102 refers back to § 846.10: “judgment shall be entered as provided in s. 846.10. . . .”

¶62 Any notion that a municipality could bring an action under § 846.102 is belied by the language in subsection (2), which limits the role of “a representative” of a municipality to providing testimony or evidence of abandonment.^[1]

II

¶63 In this case, the Bank of New York brought suit against Shirley Carson under Wis. Stat. § 846.101. The Bank waived its right to a deficiency judgment. The complaint, filed January 25, 2011, reads in part:

6. The mortgagors expressly agreed to the reduced redemption period provisions contained in Chapter 846 of the Wisconsin Statutes; the plaintiff hereby elects to proceed under section 846.101 with a six month period of redemption, thereby waiving judgment for any deficiency against every party who is personally liable for the debt, and to consent that the owner, unless he or she abandons the property, may remain in possession and be entitled to all rents and profits therefrom to the date of confirmation of the sale by the court.

¶64 The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Mel Flanagan, Judge, entered a default judgment (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment) on June 13, 2011. The court found that “the mortgaged premises . . . shall be sold at public auction under the direction of the sheriff, at any time after three month(s) from the date of entry of judgment.” (Emphasis added.) The court also found “THAT NO DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT MAY BE OBTAINED AGAINST ANY DEFENDANT.” The court determined that the mortgagor’s indebtedness totaled $81,356.59.

¶65 The mortgagor made no effort to redeem the property. In fact, she abandoned the property, according to an affidavit she filed with the court on November 6, 2012.

¶66 On the same date, the mortgagor filed a motion in the original foreclosure case. The mortgagor brought the motion under Wis. Stat. §§ 806.07(g) & (h) and 846.102. The motion sought to reopen the foreclosure judgment pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07 and to compel the Bank to sell the mortgaged property “upon the expiration of 5 weeks from the date of entry of the amended judgment” under Wis. Stat. § 846.102.

¶67 As the majority opinion notes, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Jane Carroll, Judge, denied the motion. The court “observed that Wis. Stat. § 846.102 did not specifically grant it authority to order the Bank to sell the property at a specific time.” Majority op., ¶12.

It explained “I can’t find anywhere in the statute [Wis. Stat. § 846.102] that I have the authority to grant the relief that [Carson is] requesting.” The court further noted that the statute contemplates that the redemption period be elected by the mortgagee, not the borrower, and questioned whether a mortgagee could be compelled to execute a judgment when someone else is seeking the order. Accordingly, it stated, “I’m specifically finding that I don’t have the authority . . . so the motion is denied on those grounds.”

Id.

¶68 The court of appeals reversed. Bank of New York v. Carson, 2013 WI App 153, 352 Wis. 2d 205, 841 N.W.2d 573. The court of appeals criticized the Bank (mortgagee) for not maintaining the property. Id., ¶5. More important, the court of appeals concluded that a mortgagor could rely on Wis. Stat. § 846.102 to compel a sale of the mortgagor’s property:

We . . . conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that only the Bank could elect the five-week abandonment period provided in the statute. The trial court could have . . . decided to amend the judgment to a foreclosure of an abandoned property as described by § 846.102.

Id., ¶12. The court of appeals added:

The statutory language also makes clear that the trial court did have the power to order the Bank to sell the property upon the expiration of the redemption period. . . . We conclude that the plain language of the statute directs the court to ensure that an abandoned property is sold without delay, and it logically follows that if a party to a foreclosure moves the court to order a sale, the court may use its contempt authority to do so.

Id., ¶13.

¶69 The majority affirms the court of appeals without disavowing these pronouncements. On the contrary, the majority adopts the method of statutory interpretation used by the court of appeals, see majority op., ¶¶18, 20, 21, 23, 24, to reach the following conclusions:

(1) “The plain language of [Wis. Stat. § 846.102] grants the circuit court the authority to order a bank to sell the property.” Id., ¶20. “[I]f the court makes a finding of abandonment then `judgment shall be entered as provided in s. 846.10 except that the sale of such mortgaged premises shall be made upon the expiration of 5 weeks from the date when such judgment is entered.’ Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1) (emphasis added).” Id. (footnote omitted).

(2) “The context in which `shall’ is used in Wis. Stat. § 846.102(1) indicates that the legislature intended it to be mandatory.” Id., ¶23.

(3) “Wis. Stat. § 846.102 does not require action by the mortgagee after it has initiated a foreclosure proceeding. . . . As the court of appeals stated, . . . the focus of the proceeding is on the condition of the property, not the mortgagee’s preference.” Id., ¶24.

(4) “Considering the statute’s clear language and its context, the Bank’s argument that it cannot be required to sell a property under Wis. Stat. § 846.102 is unpersuasive. Wisconsin Stat. § 846.102 mandates that the court order a sale of the mortgaged premises if certain conditions are met. Those conditions do not depend on action by the mortgagee alone and are not dependent on its acquiescence or consent.” Id., ¶27.

(5) “[W]e turn to consider whether a court can also require a mortgagee to bring a property to sale at a certain point in time.” Id., ¶28. “[W]e begin with the words of the statute. . . . This language is indicative of the time frame a court must impose for the sale: `upon expiration of 5 weeks.'” Id., ¶29.

(6) “[T]he context of Wis. Stat. § 846.102 suggests that the legislature intended a prompt sale.” Id., ¶32. “The legislative intent for a prompt sale is . . . supported by the legislative history. . . .” Id., ¶35.

¶70 I acknowledge that the majority opinion softens its holdings by requiring a court acting under Wis. Stat. § 846.102 to order mortgaged property to be “brought to sale within a reasonable time after the redemption period.” Id., ¶41. But this statement is inconsistent with the majority’s overall interpretation of the statute.

III

¶71 The majority opinion radically revises the law on mortgage foreclosure. Under Wisconsin law, a lending institution like the Bank of New York does not own the property upon which it holds a mortgage as security for a debt. The mortgagee’s obvious goal is to be repaid on its loan, with interest for the use of its money. When this goal becomes infeasible, the mortgagee prudently seeks to minimize its loss. Sometimes the mortgagee delays the sale of foreclosed property in the expectation that the circumstances for sale will improve. The majority opinion substantially impairs the mortgagee’s ability to minimize or mitigate a loss.

¶72 The opinion shifts to the circuit court the authority to set the date for sale of abandoned property. It gives the court authority to disregard the preferences of the mortgagee as to the timing of the sale when the mortgagee files for foreclosure under Wis. Stat. §§ 846.10, 846.101, or 846.102.

¶73 Because of this loss in flexibility, mortgagees are likely to act to protect their interests. For instance, the costs of borrowing money to finance residential real estate transactions are likely to go up, and some potential borrowers will be denied loans altogether.

¶74 Under the new regime, thousands of foreclosed properties statewide may have to be scheduled for sale within a few months of this decision because they have already been held by mortgagees without sale for an “unreasonable” period after foreclosure.

¶75 These consequences are not discussed by a majority that is a bit too eager to depict mortgage lenders as the source of the problem.

¶76 Knowing what they face if they file for foreclosure when the timing is not propitious, many mortgagees may choose not to file foreclosure actions. If mortgagees forego filing, leverage will transfer from mortgagees to non-paying mortgagors.

¶77 Still, some mortgagors may wish to extricate themselves from their continuing ownership responsibilities.

¶78 The majority attempts to preclude a mortgagor from becoming a plaintiff under Wis. Stat. § 846.102, majority op.,

¶18 n.5, by suggesting that only a mortgagee may initiate an action under Chapter 846. This is a correct interpretation of the chapter. However, it does not account for Wis. Stat. § 840.03.

¶79 Wisconsin Stat. § 840.01(1) defines the term “interest in real property.”^[2] The definition implicates those who own or hold title to land (like Shirley Carson) and those with “security interests and liens on land” (like the Bank of New York).

¶80 Wisconsin Stat. § 840.03 then provides: Real property remedies. (1) Any person having an interest in real property may bring an action relating to that interest, in which the person may demand the following remedies singly, or in any combination, or in combination with other remedies not listed, unless the use of a remedy is denied in a specified situation:

(a) Declaration of interest.

(b) Extinguishment or foreclosure of interest of another.

(c) Partition of interest.

(d) Enforcement of interest.

(e) Judicial rescission of contract.

(f) Specific performance of contract or covenant.

(g) Judicial sale of property and allocation of proceeds.

(h) Restitution.

(i) Judicial conveyance of interest.

(j) Possession.

(k) Immediate physical possession.

(l) Restraint of another’s use of, or activities on, or encroachment upon land in which plaintiff has an interest.

(m) Restraint of another’s use of, activities on, or disposition of land in which plaintiff has no interest; but the use, activity or disposition affect plaintiff’s interest.

(n) Restraint of interference with rights in, on or to land.

(o) Damages.

(2) The indication of the form and kind of judgment in a chapter dealing with a particular remedy shall not limit the availability of any other remedies appropriate to a particular situation.

(Emphasis added.)

¶81 Section 840.03 includes in its listed remedies “Judicial sale of property” and “Judicial conveyance of interest.” Mortgagors may seek to secure one of these remedies to escape the responsibilities of ownership.

¶82 As I read the statute, the owner of property may “bring an action” for a judicial sale or a judicial conveyance of interest. Although a mortgagor may not be able to serve as plaintiff in a foreclosure action under any of the foreclosure statutes, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 846.10, 846.101, 846.102, and 846.103, the mortgagor may be able to invoke the new principles this court has discovered in Wis. Stat. § 846.102 when it “brings an action” for judicial sale or conveyance of interest under Wis. Stat. § 840.03(1).

¶83 Wisconsin Stat. § 840.03(1) has been part of Wisconsin law for 40 years. See § 16, Chapter 189, Laws of 1973 (creating Wis. Stat. § 840.03(1) (1974)). It has been interpreted as creating substantive rights. SJ Props. Suites v. Specialty Fin. Grp., LLC, 864 F. Supp. 2d 776 (E.D. Wis. 2012). Nonetheless, a mortgagor seeking the sale of his or her property or the conveyance of his or her property under Wis. Stat. § 840.03(1) would heretofore have been required to show that the mortgagor was entitled equitably to this remedy, inasmuch as it is clear that a defaulting mortgagor does not have the same powers and prerogatives as a mortgagee under Wis. Stat. § 846.102.

¶84 “An action to foreclose a mortgage is equitable in nature.” Wis. Brick & Block Corp. v. Vogel, 54 Wis. 2d 321, 327, 195 N.W.2d 664 (1972) (citing Frick v. Howard, 23 Wis. 2d 86, 96, 126 N.W.2d 619 (1964)); see also Harbor Credit Union v. Samp, 2011 WI App 40, ¶19, 332 Wis. 2d 214, 796 N.W.2d 813; JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA v. Green, 2008 WI App 78, ¶11, 311 Wis. 2d 715, 753 N.W.2d 536; First Fin. Sav. Ass’n v. Spranger, 156 Wis. 2d 440, 444, 456 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1990). This equity prevails throughout the proceedings. GMAC Mortg. Corp. v. Gisvold, 215 Wis. 2d 459, 480, 572 N.W.2d 466 (1998). The court’s discretion should be exercised so that “no injustice shall be done to any of the parties.” Strong v. Catton, 1 Wis. 408, 424 (1853).

¶85 Considering equity, a mortgagee may want to delay the sale of mortgaged property that has been abandoned for legitimate economic reasons. Admittedly, the mortgagee might be forced to recognize that such a delay will constitute a burden on the mortgagor in terms of maintenance and taxes. Consequently, it is not inherently unreasonable for a mortgagor to seek relief from such a burden, inasmuch as it is unrealistic to expect that a mortgagor will properly maintain and pay the taxes on property it has abandoned. At the same time, however, if the mortgagee is expected to assume responsibility for abandoned property, the mortgagee must be given reasonable options, even if unpalatable, rather than be forced into an unwanted sale without the protection of the equitable principles upon which mortgage foreclosures rest.

¶86 The majority opinion alters these principles by its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.102. It forces prompt public sales despite the objection of the mortgagee. This interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.102 does not comport with the statute’s language or its legislative history and will often be inequitable to the mortgagee. Even a mortgagee that conscientiously maintains abandoned property may be forced to sell it quickly at the direction of the court.

¶87 I agree that the mortgagor here is entitled to seek the statutorily recognized remedy of “sale,” but only as provided under Wis. Stat. § 840.03(1)(g), prior to the court’s mistaken interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.102. For the reasons set forth, I respectfully concur.

¶88 I am authorized to state that Justice ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence.

[1] Bank of New York v. Carson, 2013 WI App 153, 352 Wis. 2d 205, 841 N.W.2d 573 (reversing judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Jane V. Carroll, judge).

[2] All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated.

[3] “Loan servicers are the entities that collect payments for mortgages, provide billing and tax payments to the homeowners, and have sole control over the modification of a loan.” Andrew Peace, Coming Up for Air: The Constitutionality of Using Eminent Domain to Condemn Underwater Mortgages, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 2167, 2178 n.82 (2013).

[4] Wisconsin Stat. § 846.102(1) states:

In an action for enforcement of a mortgage lien if the court makes an affirmative finding upon proper evidence being submitted that the mortgaged premises have been abandoned by the mortgagor and assigns, judgment shall be entered as provided in s. 846.10 except that the sale of such mortgaged premises shall be made upon the expiration of 5 weeks from the date when such judgment is entered.

[5] The language of the statute and its placement within chapter 846 indicate that it governs only foreclosure actions initiated by mortgagees.

[6] Wisconsin Stat. § 846.10 states, in relevant part:

(1) If the plaintiff recovers the judgment shall describe the mortgaged premises and fix the amount of the mortgage debt then due and also the amount of each installment thereafter to become due, and the time when it will become due, . . . and shall adjudge that the mortgaged premises be sold for the payment of the amount then due . . . and when demanded in the complaint, direct that judgment shall be rendered for any deficiency against the parties personally liable. . . . (2)

[7] Wisconsin Stat. § 846.101 states:

(1) If the mortgagor has agreed . . . to the provisions of this section, and the foreclosure action involves a one- to 4-family residence that is owner-occupied at the commencement of the action . . . the plaintiff in a foreclosure action of a mortgage on real estate of 20 acres or less . . . may elect . . . to waive judgment for any deficiency which may remain due to the plaintiff after sale of the mortgaged premises . . . and to consent that the mortgagor, unless he or she abandons the property, may remain in possession of the mortgaged property and be entitled to all rents, issues and profits therefrom to the date of confirmation of the sale by the court.

(2) When plaintiff so elects, judgment shall be entered as provided in this chapter, except that . . . the sale of such mortgaged premises shall be made upon the expiration of 6 months from the date when such judgment is entered.

[8] Wisconsin Stat. § 846.103 provides:

(1) No foreclosure sale involving real property other than a one- to 4-family residence that is owner-occupied at the commencement of the foreclosure action. . . may be held until the expiration of 6 months from the date when judgment is entered except a sale under sub. (2). . . .

(2) If the mortgagor of real property other than a one- to 4-family residence that is owner-occupied at the commencement of the foreclosure action . . . has agreed . . . to the provisions of this section, the plaintiff in a foreclosure action of a mortgage. . . may elect by express allegation in the complaint to waive judgment for any deficiency which may remain due to the plaintiff after sale of the mortgaged premises . . . and to consent that the mortgagor, unless he or she abandons the property, may remain in possession of the mortgaged property and be entitled to all rents, issues and profits therefrom to the date of confirmation of the sale by the court. When the plaintiff so elects, judgment shall be entered as provided in this chapter, except that . . . the sale of the mortgaged premises shall be made upon the expiration of 3 months from the date when such judgment is entered.

[9] We decline to interpret the similar sale language in Wis. Stat. §§ 846.101 and 846.103 as it is not at issue in this case.

[10] Wisconsin Stat. § 815.04(1)(a) provides:

Upon any judgment of a court of record perfected as specified in s. 806.06 or any judgment of any other court entered in the judgment and lien docket of a court of record, execution may issue at any time within 5 years after the rendition of the judgment. When an execution has been issued and returned unsatisfied in whole or in part other executions may issue at any time upon application of the judgment creditor.

[11] The hearing can be viewed online at: http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/ArchiveList.aspx? cm=152.

[12] The City of Milwaukee submitted an amicus brief detailing the scope of the City’s abandoned property problem. It noted that there are currently 4,900 vacant buildings in the City. According to the City’s records, approximately 400 of those 4,900 properties are currently in some stage of mortgage foreclosure.

Abandoned properties in Milwaukee are a magnet for crime and create unsafe conditions. The City explained that since 2011, its police department has responded to at least 2,025 burglaries, 93 aggravated assaults, 84 robberies, 44 sexual assaults, 36 sudden deaths, and 7 homicides at vacant buildings. Further, the City’s fire department reported a 163% increase in the number of fires occurring in vacant residential buildings between 2005 and 2012.

[13] Various terms are used to describe this situation, including: “abandoned foreclosure,” “bank walkaway,” “zombie title/property,” and “limbo loan.” See Judith Fox, The Foreclosure Echo: How Abandoned Foreclosures are Reentering the Market Through Debt Buyers, 26 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 25, 31 (2013).

[1] The principal author of the bill creating subsection (2) of Wis. Stat. § 846.102, Senator Glenn Grothman, explained that the purpose of the legislation was to shorten the redemption period in abandonment cases from two months to five weeks and to permit municipalities to present evidence of abandonment. He testified: “The effects of this bipartisan bill will be modest, but they are an attempt to better balance the needs of municipalities and responsible homeowners while still protecting the rights of property owners who may have fallen on hard times.” Legislative Council File for 2011 S.B. 307, Letter from Sen. Glenn Grothman to Members of the Assembly Committee on Financial Institutions (Feb. 1, 2012), available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/comtmats/old/11files/sb0307_201112 01084222.pdf.

[2] Wisconsin Stat. § 840.01(1) reads:

(1) Except as provided in sub. (2), “interest in real property” includes estates in, powers under ch. 702 over, present and future rights to, title to, and interests in real property, including, without limitation by enumeration, security interests and liens on land, easements, profits, rights of appointees under powers, rights under covenants running with the land, powers of termination and homestead rights. The interest may be an interest that was formerly designated legal or equitable. The interest may be surface, subsurface, suprasurface, riparian or littoral.

LAW 360-

Slightly more than a month after the U.S. Supreme Court found that borrowers need only to notify their creditors of their intention to rescind a mortgage within three years, lenders are still trying to figure out just how to respond to a potential flood of rescission requests, attorneys say.

The Supreme Court’s January decision in Jesinoski et al. v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc. et al. said that the Truth In Lending Act gave borrowers the power to rescind their mortgages simply by notifying lenders of their lenders of their intentions within three years. The decision ended a circuit split wherein many courts had ruled that borrowers were required to sue within three years of their mortgage financing transaction in order to have it rescinded. 

[LAW 360] registration needed

Absolutely, the the same thoughts as I read that foreclosures are now a thing of the past.

Mandelman Matters–

This won’t take long. It’s not like I want to write about this topic. It’s just that I feel obligated to say something here, because if you’re reading the mainstream news… or the lack of mainstream news… it could seem that the foreclosure crisis is now behind us… AND IT’S NOT.

In fact, I can tell you that it’s not even close.

Maybe the mainstream media has simply gotten tired of the topic. And it’s not like they’ve ever had a particularly good handle on what’s going on in real life when it come to foreclosures in general. So, perhaps I shouldn’t be surprised at the latest coverage, or lack thereof.

But I am surprised.

As recently as September of last year, RealtyTrac has been reporting that the crisis is “well behind us.” In its U.S. Foreclosure Market Report™ for August 2014, were reported on 116,913 U.S. properties in August, an increase of 7 percent from the previous month but still down 9 percent from a year ago.

Now, it’s important to realize that RealtyTrac defines “foreclosure filings” as including, “default notices, scheduled auctions and bank repossessions.” That means that all of the delinquent loans on which no Notice of Default has been sent out… yet… aren’t included. And there are always plenty of those. (For the record, I wrote about RealtyTrac’s September 2014 report on September 20th last year, and explained in detail what I found to be wrong or misleading.)

Still, RealtyTrac concludes the report’s numbers as reflecting, “the smallest decrease in the last 47 consecutive months of year-over-year declines in U.S. foreclosure activity.”

And, RealtyTrac’s vice president, Daren Blomquist, referring to the September 2014 report was quoted as saying…

“The August foreclosure numbers demonstrate that although the foreclosure crisis is well behind us, the messy business of cleaning up the distress lingering from the housing bust continues in many markets. The annual increase in foreclosure auctions — the first since the robo-signing controversy rocked the foreclosure industry back in late 2010 — indicates mortgage servicers are finally adjusting to the new paradigms for proper foreclosure that have been implemented in many states, whether by legislation or litigation or both.”

Like I said last September, “Oh, shut-up Daren.”

First of all, there are the Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs), which are interest only loans for ten years, so the HELOCs that were taken out in 2004 and 2005 are all due to become fully amortizing loans… meaning that their monthly payments are increasing significantly. That is already causing foreclosures to rise, and it will continue to do so through 2018.

The L.A. Times wrote about this looming threat last August under the headline: “Home equity line defaults are likely to rise.” David Dayen, writing for The New Republic late last August, also covered the topic, saying…

“TransUnion, the credit rating firm, estimates that between $50 and $79 billion in home-equity loans risk default because of the increased payments, which could add hundreds or even thousands of dollars to payments a month.”

For another thing, the HAMP loan modifications that were granted in 2009 and 2010 were almost all modified to a lower interest rate, but only for five years… so they are also now resetting to higher rates and therefore higher monthly payments. Since most people’s incomes have not recovered to pre-crises levels, these higher payments are also a source of increasing delinquencies and therefore potential foreclosures.

There are also a number of second mortgages, among other factors, that are causing increasing numbers of foreclosures.  Just a couple of weeks ago, on February 11th, Mike Sunnuck, writing for the Phoenix Business Journal reported…

• “Foreclosures hit a 20-month high both in Phoenix and Arizona as a whole in January.
• Foreclosures jumped more than 100 percent in January compared to December both in Phoenix and statewide, according to new numbers today from RealtyTrac. There were more than 2,300 homes and condos in the foreclosure process last month. That is up 104 percent from December. Statewide that increase is 109 percent from January 2014.
• Foreclosure activity both locally and statewide are at 20-month highs as banks step up their repossessions, auctions and filing of default notices.
• According to RealtyTrac, Phoenix saw a 45 percent increase in January foreclosures compared a year earlier… foreclosure auctions in Arizona were up 37 percent in January, also a 20-month high and bank repossessions are up 61 percent… those same repossessions are up 58 percent in Phoenix.”

RealtyTrac also reported that foreclosure activity, whatever that means, was also reportedly up “in states such as Ohio, New Jersey, Maryland and California and metropolitan areas such as St. Louis, Los Angeles and San Francisco… and the worst cities for foreclosures include Atlantic City, Las Vegas and eight Florida markets including Tampa, Orlando, Miami and Jacksonville.”

Of course, compared with the carnage that went on during 2009-10, the number of completed foreclosures today is lower, but it’s akin to saying it has declined from the intolerable to merely tragic.  From three million, or so, down to $1.5 million last year is hardly something about which to brag.  It’s “down” to almost 30,000 completed foreclosures a week, “down” to over 4,000 a day… in this country… from sea to shining sea.

Does any of that sound like a foreclosure crisis that’s behind us? Not even close. In fact, it sounds a lot like the same sort of foreclosure crisis I’ve been writing about since 2008.

Follow the bouncing ball…

Then there’s the seemingly-impossible-to-count remaining unresolved delinquent loans that have been bouncing around the still-largely-dysfunctional loan modification process for the last several years… in fact, quite a few are still bouncing around after five or even six years.

How do I know this to be true?

Because I hear from homeowners all over the country every single day who are still struggling through the process or trying to save their homes from foreclosure as they remain unable to make a payment after falling behind years ago. (In fact, I just helped one homeowner’s loan get modified after seven years of not making a mortgage payment… not that I’m suggesting that as being a good idea.)

The point is… for many, the loan modification process is still much like driving a 40 year-old car with a million miles on it that doesn’t have tires or a steering wheel, and is perpetually running on empty. Some people manage to get to a destination, but most are stuck somewhere along the road waiting for roadside assistance that never comes.

In judicial states it’s probably worse than non-judicial ones… New York and New Jersey come immediately to mind… but it’s plenty bad all over. The reality is that I still get as many calls and emails as I ever did, and the problems people are having are the same as they always were.

It shouldn’t come as a surprise to anyone that this is the case. After all, what have we done at the state or federal level over the last few years that would have changed the situation for the better? The answer is… nothing.

So, are we thinking that the problems that caused eight million Americans to lose homes to foreclosure are going to fix themselves? Because if that’s what you’re thinking might happen, then all I can say is please pass the bong… and the Oreos… because I want some of whatever you’re smoking.

The foreclosure crisis is nowhere near over… the economy is still on what could be described as government-funded life support… most kids under 30 are living with their parents… qualifying for a mortgage remains painful and difficult… and if you’re not underwater, then you’re close. Maybe not in North Dakota or Iowa… I’m talking about places where people actually live.

And I don’t care about what the media has to say about the subject. I get proof of the ongoing crisis in my email inbox every single day. I’ll let you know when that changes.

Mandelman out.

~~~

P.S. If you need help getting your loan modified, especially if you’re with Bank of America or Ocwen, but others are okay as well, email me at: mandelman@mac.com.  I want to hear your story and can usually help in some way.

source: http://mandelman.ml-implode.com/2015/02/the-foreclosure-crisis-is-behind-us-where-who-says/

Cross posted from Clouded Titles Blog

The Osceola County, Florida Clerk has delivered 17 cases of certified evidence taken from the real property and court records as part of his commissioned Forensic Examination.  What follows is the official press release from DK Consultants LLC, which will be released to the national media shortly:

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

(San Antonio, Texas) — DK Consultants LLC has officially released the evidence package from the 2014 Osceola County, Florida Forensic Examination to the Clerk of the Circuit Court, Armando Ramirez, who has tendered the evidence to the Osceola County Sheriff’s Department’s Economic Crimes Unit, who is allegedly investigating criminal wrongdoing in the filing of alleged fraudulent documents in the Osceola County real property and court records.

The forensic examination, which resulted in the release of a 738-page, two-volume report (not including table of contents and exhibits) was released to the Clerk on December 30, 2014 after a 5-1/2-month-long forensic review of over 400 foreclosure case files and their related documents and assignments, all of which were sampled from  public record between June 1, 2012 and June 1, 2014.  While not exhaustive, the examination did encompass a relevantly significant statistical number of filings.

It is highly likely that those in the Osceola County rank and file electorate who were aware of the Clerk’s actions in commissioning this forensic examination may have misunderstood his intent. As a result of this examination, the Clerk himself as well as this firm, have been the subject of the investigation instead of the information discussed in the report, particularly in the area of what constitutes “public record” under the Florida Open Records Act, in an apparent attempt to undermine the purposes of the report and bring public scorn on those who endeavored to produce it. This Clerk is the only Clerk in the United States of America to ever conduct such an examination and he should be lauded and not chastised by the rank and file for doing so.

In the forensic examination report, the information contained was also worded in such a way as to protect any personal identifying information from the public view.  Following the release of the report, it was discovered that certain partners and associates of the law firm representing the interests of Osceola County, as well as judges and hierarchy in the State Attorney’s office for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, had suspect documents filed in connection with their chains of title, again, based strictly on a cursory first glance at the public records in both Osceola and Orange Counties in Florida.

We do not take for granted that this forensic examination has obviously hit a nerve with many of those who represent the status quo in Osceola County, Florida.  We believe that many of these officials appear content to see the continued trashing of the real property records in this and every other county in the State of Florida.

To that end, it became obvious to this firm that despite the AG Settlement in February of 2012, it is apparent that robosigning and document manufacturing is still ongoing and being used to “create standing” on behalf of foreclosing Plaintiffs, along with the apparent computer manipulation of note allonges and indorsement stamps, most of which were presented to Osceola County courts with the intent to mislead the court into granting them summary judgment of foreclosure.

These types of behaviors will continue unless those responsible are held criminally accountable.  Under Florida Criminal Code § 817.535, it is a felony in Florida to record documents which knowingly contain false and misleading information with the intent to deprive a homeowner of their property.  Filing verified complaints with the court knowing they contain manufactured, false and misrepresentative information constitutes perjury on the part of those collaborating in the submission of false documents and information contained in those complaints.

The information contained in the report names financial institutions, servicing entities, known document manufacturing plants and individual notaries public who appear complicit in these types of behaviors. The suspect list of alleged perpetrators runs into the hundreds of individuals and their representative firms who may have committed acts that constitute probable cause for violation of Florida criminal statutes.

DK Consultants LLC and its independent contractors cannot and will not cooperate with any law firm or agency representing law enforcement that holds the Clerk or this report in contempt, with the intent to discredit the hard work and dedication that went into the production of this report.  We were asked by the Clerk to perform a service, which in fact was performed for an eminently reasonable fee. The documents speak for themselves.  Tens of thousands of Floridians are affected by the results shown in the report, even if they themselves were not the subject of discussion in it.

The political climate is this State appears to indicate that if you take campaign contributions from the financial sector, then you owe someone.  This is why nothing typically gets done when scenarios presented in this forensic examination become public knowledge.  This allows the suspects frauds to continue, which has affected a large number of the voting constituency of Osceola County in Florida, along with the other 66 counties in this State.

It is sad that we should have to remind those who represent the County and its voting public as well as its body politic that they have a singular duty to protect and serve, not to harass and intimidate and serve the interests of those who caused the financial crash of 2008 and continue to manipulate the interests that serve Osceola County and other jurisdictions. The public should not tolerate this behavior and should demand that the contents of this report be investigated to bring justice to those homeowners especially aggrieved by the processes effectuated by the suspect individuals and institutions uncovered in the forensic examination.

Respectfully submitted,

Dave Krieger

Managing Member

DK Consultants LLC

(512) 718-9604

NBC-

CAPE CORAL, FL – For the first time we are getting a closer look at a case Cape Coral Police say has been full of twists and turns.

“This is a very unique case,” said Major Crimes Unit Sergeant Bennett Walker.

Walker explains it’s mainly because for every lead, a new challenge arises in trying to ID the body found inside the Cape Coral home located off SE 19th Lane.

“Because of the length this person was deceased we can’t do that and we don’t have any close friends, family relatives that can assist us with that,” said Walker.

[NBC]

image credit: NBC-2

Rolling Stone-

This is the age of the whistleblower. From Chelsea Manning to Edward Snowden to the latest cloak-and-dagger lifter of files, ex-HSBC employee Hervé Falciani, whistleblowers are becoming to this decade what rock stars were to the Sixties — pop culture icons, global countercultural heroes.

But one of America’s ugliest secrets is that our own whistleblowers often don’t do so well after the headlines fade and cameras recede. The ones who don’t end up in jail like Manning, or in exile like Snowden, often still go through years of harassment and financial hardship. And while we wait to see if Loretta Lynch is confirmed as the next Attorney General, it’s worth taking a look at how whistleblowers in America fared under the last regime.

One man’s story in particular highlights just about everything that can go wrong when you give evidence against your bosses in America: former Countrywide/Bank of America whistleblower Michael Winston.

Wells Fargo Bank racked up $57,000 in fines for code violations at a single-family home in Altamonte Springs, and now the bank wants a discount on its bill.

Orlando Sentinel-

The Wells Fargo home is an example of a large fine associated with a long-term foreclosure property. The number of such properties has declined since the Great Recession; but the longer such homes are vacant, the more serious problems they cause. Over the past month, Sentinel writer Mary Shanklin has covered the issue of zombie foreclosures in several stories with databases. Such properties can cause concern about surrounding property values.

The Wells Fargo home, at 333 E. Citrus Street in Altamonte Springs, has been racking up fines since May 2011 — including a stagnant swimming pool and missing fences. The bank took action to correct problems on several occasions. According to a Seminole County report, Wells Fargo took possession of the property in August 2011 through a foreclosure judgment.

[ORLANDO SENTINEL]

Reuters-

U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder said on Tuesday he has given federal prosecutors a 90-day deadline to decide whether they can bring cases against individuals for their roles in the 2008 financial crisis.

U.S. attorneys who brought cases against institutions over misconduct in the pooling and sale of residential mortgage-backed securities have been asked “to try to develop cases against individuals and to report back in 90 days with regard to whether they think they can successfully bring criminal or civil cases against those individuals,” Holder said in a public appearance at the National Press Club.

The Justice Department, in conjunction with other authorities, extracted record penalties from major banks in 2013 and 2014 for inappropriately marketing risky mortgage securities in the run-up to the financial crisis.

[REUTERS]