Wait ’til it comes out that many of these foreclosures were unnecessary because Fannie Mae staff declined to compel its servicers to comply with the federally-mandated servicer guidelines. Servicers prefer to foreclose rather than to provide troubled borrowers with the dignified exit that President Obama wants for us. Fannie Mae is letting them get away with this cruel abuse. Who will stop them?

NYT-

Remember the robo-signers, those mortgage loan automatons who authenticated thousands of foreclosure documents over the years without verifying the information they were swearing to?

Well, they’re back, in a manner of speaking, at least in Florida. Their dubious documents are being used to hound former borrowers years after their homes went into foreclosure.

Robo-signer redux, as it might be called, has come about because of an aggressive pursuit of former borrowers by debt collectors hired by Fannie Mae, the mortgage finance giant. What Fannie is trying to recoup from these borrowers is the difference between what the borrowers owed on the mortgages when they were foreclosed and the amount Fannie received when it resold the properties.

[NEW YORK TIMES]

1. Introduction

Older Americans, like many of their younger counterparts, increasingly have debts in collection. From 2002 to 2012, the percentage of American consumers with at least one account in collection increased from less than 9 percent to a record 14.6 percent (approximately 30 million adults).1 Older Americans are likely to continue being part of this trend as many of them hold debt and struggle to stay current on their obligations.2

Since September 2013, consumers have submitted more complaints with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau) about debt collection than about any other product or service.3 Older consumers are no exception to this trend. This snapshot provides an overview of the debt collection complaints that older consumers submitted to the CFPB from July 2013 to September 2014.
4

Idiots to even think about this purchase!

Bloomberg-

Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup Inc. (C) are selling multiple pools of soured U.S. mortgages to meet demand from investment firms that are pushing prices higher, according to three people with knowledge of the matter.

Bank of America put about $1 billion of troubled debt on the market last week, consisting of nonperforming loans and some where payments have resumed, said the people, who asked not to be identified because the offerings are private. The Charlotte, North Carolina-based lender also is marketing about $1 billion of soured home loans with Wells Fargo & Co., according to one of the people. Citigroup is separately selling about $1 billion of nonperforming and re-performing mortgages, the people said.

Dan Frahm, a spokesman for Bank of America, and Mark Costiglio, a spokesman for Citigroup in New York, declined to comment on the loan sales. Elise Wilkinson, a spokeswoman for San Francisco-based Wells Fargo, also declined to comment.

[BLOOMBERG]

HuffPOST-

Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) gained a leadership position in the Senate Democratic caucus Thursday, giving the prominent progressive senator a key role in shaping the party’s policy priorities.

Warren’s new role, which was created specifically for her, will be strategic policy adviser to the Democratic Policy and Communications Committee, helping to craft the party’s policy positions and priorities. She will also serve as a liaison to progressive groups to ensure they have a voice in leadership meetings and discussions, according to a source familiar with the role.

A source close to Warren told The Huffington Post that the senator was interested in the position because she wanted to have a seat at the table in the leadership meetings in order to influence the agenda.

[HUFFINGTONPOST]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

This is a revelation.  Relevant to all of you readers because they all are affected by both the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act Disclosures.

Data Brokers

A Call for Transparency and Accountability

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In today’s economy, Big Data is big business. Data brokers—companies that collect consumers’ personal
information and resell or share that information with others—are important participants in this Big Data
economy.

[…]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.

Anyone care to start a worthless petition to have this thing investigated?

Tampa Bay-

Please listen closely to the following message so we may direct your call to the appropriate department or outside agency.

If you are calling to report a case of consumer fraud, please check first with the attorney general’s list of campaign donors to determine whether this is a case our office might be likely to dismiss or ignore.

If you are calling from another state to request the attorney general join some litigation elsewhere that has absolutely nothing to do with Florida or its citizens, please direct your call to the Republican Party of Florida where all of those decisions are actually made and then later forwarded to the attorney general.

[TAMPABAY]

image: villages-news.com

The Banksters are coming!

It’s clear that today’s policies create winners and losers. The winners include real estate agents and home builders, who want to increase borrowing and sell ever-larger and more expensive homes. The losers, as we saw in the financial crisis, are borrowers of modest means who are lured into financing arrangements they can’t afford. When the result is foreclosure and eviction, one of the central goals of homeownership — building equity — is undone.

MEMORANDUM TO: Drafting Committee Members, Advisors and Observers, Proposed Home Foreclosure Procedures Act FROM: Bill Breetz, Chair DATE: November 7, 2014 RE: November 14-15, 2014 Drafting Committee meeting
Palmer House Hilton, 17 E. Monroe Street, Chicago, IL 20036
(312) 726-7500

Contents
Introduction Page 1
Appendix A – the Agenda Page 2
Comments on this Draft Page 3
Additional Observations regarding Holder In Due Course Page 10 Developments in The Field Since Our Last Meeting Page 13 (with a summary of the Exhibits)
List of Exhibits Page 20

II COMMENTS ON THIS DRAFT

You should have already received both a redlined and clean draft of the most recent version of the Home Foreclosure Procedures Act from the Chicago office for consideration at our Chicago meeting. With that same email, you should also have received an extensive letter from Mark Greenlee of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

Once again, that draft represents the work of our two excellent co-Reporters – James Charles Smith of the University of Georgia Law School and Alan White of CUNY Law School in New York City – and several conference calls between the Co-Reporters, American Bar Association Advisor Barry Nekritz and me. I continue to be most grateful for Jim, Alan and Barry’s scholarship, drafting efforts and pragmatic approach to the drafting challenges we face in what remains a highly important subject.

The current draft is based on the draft considered at the annual meeting of the ULC this past July. All the amendments to that draft – as shown in the redlined version that you have – come from three sources.

First, they reflect the comments and debate which the Committee received at the annual meeting.

Second, a considerable number of amendments were generated from the several discussions of the draft among the co-Reporters, Barry Nekritz and me. Third, we received substantial proposed amendments from the Style Committee developed at its September meeting, and which were discussed in a day-long meeting with Judge Yeakel (Chair of the Style Committee), the co-Reporters, the ABA Advisor and me. All of us who met with Judge Yeakel appreciate the work of the Style Committee; their efforts have substantially enhanced the readability and clarity of the draft As always, the draft reflects substantial policy issues and I touch on those issues below. However, this draft contains many fewer policy differences compared to earlier drafts, as we have resolved many of them (at least for the moment) in earlier meetings.

[…]

Jaime Lathrop, Brooklyn, N.Y. (David Lavery of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Peter B. Skelos, J.P., Sheri S. Roman, Sylvia O. Hinds-Radix, Hector D. Lasalle, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

ORDERED that the order dated November 18, 2013, is modified, on the law, on the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, (1) by deleting the provision thereof directing the plaintiff to submit a proposed loan modification order to the defendant Fay Williams and the court, (2) by deleting the provision thereof canceling interest accrued between the date of the initial settlement conference in June 2010 and the date that the parties agree to a loan modification, and substituting therefor a provision canceling interest accrued between the date of the initial settlement conference in June 2010 and the date on which settlement negotiations recommence, (3) by deleting the provision thereof barring the plaintiff from charging the defendant Fay Williams any attorney’s fees or costs incurred in this action, and substituting therefor a provision barring the plaintiff from charging the defendant Fay Williams any attorney’s fees or costs incurred in this action between the date of the initial settlement conference in June 2010 and the date on which settlement negotiations recommence, (4) by deleting the provision thereof directing the plaintiff, within 60 days, to provide the defendant Fay Williams with a payoff statement which incorporates the cancellation of interest from June 2010 and which does not assess any attorney’s fees or costs incurred in this action, and substituting therefor a provision directing the plaintiff, within 60 days from service upon it of a copy of this decision and order, to provide the defendant Fay Williams with a payoff statement which incorporates the cancellation of interest accrued between the date of the initial settlement conference in June 2010 and the date on which settlement negotiations recommence and which does not assess any attorney’s fees or costs between the date of the initial settlement conference in June 2010 and the date on which settlement negotiations recommence, (5) by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was to reject the referee’s report and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the plaintiff’s motion to the extent indicated hereinabove, and (6) by deleting the provision thereof confirming stated portions of the referee’s report and substituting therefor a provision confirming those stated portions to the extent indicated hereinabove; as so modified, the order dated November 18, 2013, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the defendant Fay Williams, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

In June 2006, the defendant Fay Williams and nonparty Credit Suisse Financial Corporation (hereinafter Credit Suisse) agreed to an adjustable rate mortgage loan in the sum of $516,800 for property located in Brooklyn (hereinafter the property). The terms of the mortgage note provided that in the event of default, Williams would pay the mortgagee’s attorney’s fees and costs. The defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (hereinafter MERS) recorded the mortgage as nominee for Credit Suisse. In July 2009, Williams allegedly defaulted on the mortgage note. In February 2010, MERS purportedly assigned the mortgage note to the plaintiff, US Bank National Association, as Trustee for CSMC ARMT 2006-3 (hereinafter US Bank).

In February 2010, US Bank commenced this action to foreclose on the mortgage. US Bank never appeared for mandatory conferencing. Instead, nonparty servicer ASC/Wells retained nonparty Steven J. Baum, P.C. (hereinafter Baum, and hereinafter collectively with ASC/Wells and US Bank, the foreclosing parties), to prosecute the action and participate in foreclosure conferencing. Between June 2010 and July 2011, Baum and Williams participated in 10 settlement conferences, during which Baum represented that Williams might qualify for loan modification via the federal Home Affordable Modification Program (hereinafter HAMP) and repeatedly asked her to submit additional documentation regarding the HAMP application. In July 2011, the foreclosing parties advised the Supreme Court that, notwithstanding their prior representations, US Bank had denied review of Williams’s HAMP application because it was contractually prohibited by a 2006 Pooling and Servicing Agreement (hereinafter PSA) from modifying the interest rate or term of the mortgage.

In a referee’s report dated May 8, 2012, the referee found, inter alia, that the foreclosing parties failed to negotiate in good faith for more than a year, prolonged the workout process, and wasted judicial resources by causing Williams to submit multiple HAMP applications and to attend numerous settlement conferences, even though they knew the PSA prohibited US Bank from modifying the applicable interest rate or term. Accordingly, the referee recommended an order (1) directing ASC/Wells to review Williams for an affordable loan modification under HAMP using payoff figures from June 2010 and to submit a proposed modification offer to Williams and the court; (2) directing the parties to appear for a hearing to determine whether to impose sanctions against the foreclosing parties for failure to negotiate in good faith; (3) barring US Bank from recovering an attorney’s fee and costs from Williams; and (4) tolling all interest accrued on the mortgage note between the initial conference date in June 2010 and the date on which the parties enter into a loan modification agreement.

By order dated July 2, 2012 (hereinafter the July 2012 order), the Supreme Court, on its own initiative, in effect, confirmed the relevant provisions of the referee’s report. In September 2012, the Supreme Court directed the parties to make a further attempt at modification. The foreclosing parties subsequently refused to offer loan modification to Williams due to US Bank’s refusal to allow reductions in the interest and term. On or about April 23, 2013, US Bank provided a payoff statement to Williams which included interest accrued since June 2010 and an attorney’s fee incurred in the action.

On or about July 5, 2013, Williams moved to hold US Bank in civil contempt based on its failure to comply with the provisions of the July 2012 order directing it, in effect, to provide a payoff statement excluding accrued interest since the date of the initial settlement conference in June 2010 and charges for an attorney’s fee and costs. US Bank opposed the motion and moved to vacate the July 2012 order and reject the referee’s report. The Supreme Court accepted US Bank’s contention that it had no notice of the referee’s report or of the court’s order confirming it, and thus, the court treated US Bank’s motion as a timely motion to reject the referee’s report.

In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court, in effect, denied Williams’s motion to hold US Bank in civil contempt and denied that branch of US Bank’s motion which was to reject the referee’s report. The Supreme Court also, in effect, granted that branch of US Bank’s motion which was to vacate the July 2012 order and, thereupon, confirmed the referee’s report to the extent of directing US Bank to review Williams for an affordable mortgage loan modification pursuant to the HAMP using payoff figures from June 2010 and to submit a proposed loan modification order to Williams and the court, canceling all interest accrued on the subject mortgage loan between the date of the initial settlement conference in June 2010 and the date that the parties agree to a loan modification, barring US Bank from charging Williams any attorney’s fees or costs incurred in this action, and directing US Bank, within 60 days, to provide Williams with a payoff statement which incorporates the cancellation of interest from June 2010 and which does not assess any attorney’s fees or costs incurred in this action. US Bank appeals.

“A foreclosure action is equitable in nature and triggers the equitable powers of the court” (Norwest Bank Minn., NA v E.M.V. Realty Corp., 94 AD3d 835, 836; see Notey v Darien Constr. Corp., 41 NY2d 1055, 1055-1056; Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Horkan, 68 AD3d 948, 948). “Once equity is invoked, the court’s power is as broad as equity and justice require'” (Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Horkan, 68 AD3d at 948, quoting Norstar Bank v Morabito, 201 AD2d 545, 546).

The record supports the referee’s finding that the foreclosing parties failed to negotiate in good faith. Thus, the Supreme Court properly directed US Bank to review Williams for HAMP modification, in light of the referee’s findings, in effect, that it had thus far failed to fulfill its statutory obligation to do so (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers, 108 AD3d 9, 23).

However, the Supreme Court erred in directing US Bank to submit a proposed loan modification order to Williams and the court, as the court was without authority to force parties to reach an agreement (see Flagstar Bank, FSB v Walker, 112 AD3d 885, 886; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers, 108 AD3d at 20, 22).

Contrary to US Bank’s contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion canceling certain interest accrued on the mortgage note after June 2010. “In an action of an equitable nature, the recovery of interest is within the court’s discretion. The exercise of that discretion will be governed by the particular facts in each case, including any wrongful conduct by either party” (Dayan v York, 51 AD3d 964, 965 [citations omitted]; see CPLR 5001[a]; Norwest Bank Minn., NA v E.M.V. Realty Corp., 94 AD3d at 837; Danielowich v PBL Dev., 292 AD2d 414, 415). The record demonstrates that the foreclosing parties repeatedly represented to the referee and to Williams that they were considering Williams for HAMP loan modification and repeatedly demanded that Williams submit additional documentation in support of that application, notwithstanding the prohibition against such a modification in the PSA, which they did not disclose until approximately 13 months after negotiations began. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in finding that US Bank was not entitled to collect interest accrued as a result of its wrongful conduct (see generally US Bank N.A. v Sarmiento, ___ AD3d ___, 2014 NY Slip Op 05533 [2d Dept 2014]; Norwest Bank Minn., NA v E.M.V. Realty Corp., 94 AD3d at 836; Dayan v York, 51 AD3d at 965).

However, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in canceling interest accrued between June 2010 and until such date as the parties agreed to loan modification, as the Supreme Court lacked authority to force US Bank to agree to modify the mortgage note (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers, 108 AD3d at 20; Flagstar Bank, FSB v Walker, 112 AD3d at 886). Rather, the court should have directed cancellation of interest accrued between June 2010 and the date on which settlement negotiations recommence (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers, 108 AD3d at 20; Norwest Bank Minn., NA v E.M.V. Realty Corp., 94 AD3d at 837; Dayan v York, 51 AD3d at 965-966; Preferred Group of Manhattan, Inc. v Fabius Maximus, Inc., 51 AD3d 889, 890; Danielowich v PLB Dev., 292 AD2d at 415).

Further, the Supreme Court erred in barring US Bank from charging Williams an attorney’s fee and costs incurred as a result of the action, as that provision of the order constituted an improper attempt to rewrite the mortgage note. Instead, upon its finding that the Referee’s report was supported by the record, that sanctions were appropriate, and, in effect, that US Bank still was obligated pursuant to CPLR 3408(f) to negotiate in good faith, the court should have barred US Bank from charging Williams an attorney’s fee and costs incurred between the date of the initial settlement conference and the date on which settlement negotiations recommence (see Norwest Bank Minn., NA v E.M.V. Realty Corp., 94 AD3d at 837; Dayan v York, 51 AD3d at 965-966; Preferred Group of Manhattan, Inc. v Fabius Maximus, Inc., 51 AD3d at 890; Danielowich v PLB Dev., 292 AD2d at 415).

US Bank’s remaining contentions are without merit.

SKELOS, J.P., ROMAN, HINDS-RADIX and LASALLE, JJ., concur.

ADRIANNA MIHALYI, Appellant,
v.
LASALLE BANK, N.A., Appellee.

Marc James Ayers and Mary Ann Couch of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Birmingham, for appellee.

CONNER, J.

Adrianna Mihalyi appeals the trial court’s order denying her motion for attorney’s fees, which she filed after LaSalle Bank voluntarily dismissed its foreclosure action. She argues that she is entitled to recover prevailing party attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes (2007), and the attorney’s fees provision in her mortgage. We agree.

LaSalle Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings against Mihalyi, and she filed an answer and affirmative defense in which she sought attorney’s fees and costs “under the terms and conditions of the Note and Mortgage sued upon.” Approximately four years later, the trial court issued a notice of lack of prosecution, giving LaSalle Bank sixty days to create record activity. LaSalle Bank filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice and the court dismissed the case. A week later, Mihalyi filed her motion for attorney’s fees, citing the attorney’s fee provision in the note and mortgage. Section twenty-two of the mortgage provides that the “[l]ender shall be entitled to collect all expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies . . . including, but not limited to, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” The trial court denied her motion.

On appeal, Mihalyi argues she is entitled to recover prevailing party attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105(7) and the attorney’s fees provision in the note and mortgage, because LaSalle Bank voluntarily dismissed the foreclosure action. LaSalle Bank does not dispute that section 57.105(7) permits Mihalyi to claim fees as the prevailing party. However, LaSalle Bank argues that Mihalyi failed to provide any evidence as to the reasonableness of the fees.

A trial judge’s ruling on a motion for attorney’s fees “is a matter committed to sound judicial discretion which will not be disturbed on appeal, absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.” Turovets v. Khromov, 943 So. 2d 246, 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting DiStefano Constr., Inc. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 597 So. 2d 248, 250 (Fla. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, where entitlement depends on the interpretation of a statute or contract the ruling is reviewed de novo. Stevens v. Zakrzewski, 826 So. 2d 520, 521 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

A claim for attorney’s fees, whether based on statute or contract, must be pled. Stockman v. Downs, 573 So. 2d 835, 837 (Fla. 1991). A party pleading entitlement to attorney’s fees must also move the trial court for the same and present proof of fees within a reasonable time after the judgment is entered. McAskill Publ’ns, Inc. v. Keno Bros. Jewelers, Inc., 647 So. 2d 1012, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Once fee entitlement is determined, the party requesting the fees is entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to the reasonableness of the amount of fees. See Guyton v. Leonard Dewey Wilkinson Action Welding Supply, Inc., 707 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).

A plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal makes a defendant the “prevailing party” within the meaning of subsection 57.105(7), even if the plaintiff refiles the case and prevails. Nudel v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 60 So. 3d 1163, 1165 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Subsection 57.105(7) states:

If a contract contains a provision allowing attorney’s fees to a party when he or she is required to take any action to enforce the contract, the court may also allow reasonable attorney’s fees to the other party when that party prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to the contract.

The statute makes a unilateral contract clause for attorney’s fees bilateral in effect. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Chambers, 732 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Assuming the request for attorney’s fees is properly pled, “[t]he award is mandatory, once the lower court determines that a party has prevailed.” Holiday Square Owners Ass’n v. Tsetsenis, 820 So. 2d 450, 453 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (citation omitted).

Since LaSalle Bank voluntarily dismissed the foreclosure action against Mihalyi, she is the prevailing party. In her answer and affirmative defense, Mihalyi properly pled her claims for attorney’s fees, pursuant to the attorney’s fee provision in her mortgage.^[1] Then she filed a motion for attorney’s fees within thirty days of the service of voluntary dismissal, in compliance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525.

The trial court determined Mihalyi’s entitlement to attorney’s fees at a motion calendar hearing, which was most likely a non-evidentiary hearing. See D’Amato v. D’Amato, 848 So. 2d 462, 463-64 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (explaining that Broward County does not permit the introduction of evidence at “Motion Calendar” hearings). Therefore, contrary to LaSalle Bank’s arguments, Mihalyi did not have the opportunity to submit evidence and the trial court would not have reached the issue of the reasonableness of the fees at the hearing.

The record reveals Mihayli is entitled to prevailing party attorney’s fees and to an evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of the amount of fees.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a determination of the reasonableness of the fees.

Reversed and Remanded for further proceedings

LEVINE and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

[1] Mihalyi did not refer to section 57.105(7) in her answer and affirmative defense seeking an award of attorney’s fees. However, in Landry v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 731 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), the court addressed a situation in which the defensive pleading sought attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105(2), Florida Statutes (1999) (subsequently renumbered as 57.105(7)) with no reference to the underlying contract. The court stated that because the promissory note was executed after the effective date of section 57.105(2), “appellants’ initial request for attorney’s fees was set forth in their answer with a specific reference to the applicable statute, and, by implication, to the contract, upon which the claim was made.” Id. at 140 (emphasis added). The court found the award of attorney’s fees proper even though the underlying contract was not mentioned in the pleading seeking fees. Here, Mihalyi’s answer and affirmative defense put LaSalle Bank on notice that she was seeking fees pursuant to the contract, and, by implication, put LaSalle Bank on notice that section 57.105(7) would be applicable. Moreover, “[w]here a party has notice that an opponent claims entitlement to attorney’s fees, and by its conduct recognizes or acquiesces to that claim or otherwise fails to object to the failure to plead entitlement, that party waives any objection to the failure to plead a claim for attorney’s fees.” Tri-County Dev. Grp., Inc. v. C.P.T. of S. Fla., Inc., 740 So. 2d 573, 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (citation omitted). LaSalle Bank did not move to strike the portion of the answer and affirmative defense seeking an award of attorney’s fees.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTORIA URENIA, an
individual; SOLEDAD CORONA,
an individual,
Plaintiffs,

v.

PUBLIC STORAGE, a real
estate investment trust;
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a
governmental entity; BANK OF
AMERICA, N.A.; MICHAEL ANZ,
Defendants.
___________________________

EXCERPTS:

[…]

Salon-

Despite all the unabashed punditry, relatively little is known by the country about Loretta Lynch, the low-profile U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, who President Obama nominated on Saturday to replace Eric Holder as Attorney General. We’ve heard about the cases Lynch has prosecuted for the government, from the police shooting of Haitian immigrant Abner Louima to public corruption cases against the likes of Rep. Michael Grimm (R-NY).

But what’s less known is Lynch’s career in the private sector. After reviewing her record in this capacity, it’s not that she’s openly corrupted by the forces that increasingly rule our government, so much as she’s marinated in their worldview, in their cultural milieu. To ask her to take on powerful interests in finance would be like asking someone to rat out their friends.

Lynch’s first job was as a litigation associate at Cahill Gordon & Reindel in the mid-1980s. Their litigation department includes the legendary First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams, who defended the New York Times in the Pentagon Papers case (Abrams subsequently argued the Citizens United case, on “campaign money is speech” grounds). But it also does a great deal of white-collar defense in securities and antitrust law, representing companies like AIG, HSBC, Credit Suisse, Bank of America and more. It’s a corporate law firm.

[SALON]

image: Reuters/Yuri Gripas

Huge. Loss.

New York Daily News-

Fresh off his re-election Tuesday, Gov. Cuomo faces a new challenge: losing several key staffers just as he starts his second term.

Top aide Larry Schwartz is expected to leave early next year while Budget Director Robert Megna is set to go after Cuomo unveils his state budget in late January, sources said.

Department of Financial Services Superintendent Benjamin Lawsky is also expected to leave in early 2015 — bound for the private sector, sources said.

[NY DAILY NEWS]

You better pray that you’re not in a bad neighborhood if this should happen!

Raw Story-

Imagine this scenario: You’re on an important trip miles from home and stopped in traffic, but before you can continue on your way, your car shuts down. You’ve got enough gas in the tank and no mechanical problems. But you’re stranded far from home because you’re a few days late on your car payment and the lender won’t let you drive until the debt is paid.

If this sounds like part of a dystopian future in which repo men are now cyborgs, it’s not. It’s happening today and becoming a big part of the new automotive landscape. Car dealers and automotive lenders are targeting those with poor credit by installing GPS-based kill switches, or starter-interrupt devices, on the cars that they sell.

The New York Times recently reported that about 2 million cars are now outfitted with such kill switches in the U.S., which is about one-quarter of subprime car loans, and creditors are not shy when it comes to remotely disabling cars whose owners are behind on their payments:

“Some borrowers say their cars were disabled when they were only a few days behind on their payments, leaving them stranded in dangerous neighborhoods. Others said their cars were shut down while idling at stoplights. Some described how they could not take their children to school or to doctor’s appointments. One woman in Nevada said her car was shut down while she was driving on the freeway.

“Beyond the ability to disable a vehicle, the devices have tracking capabilities that allow lenders and others to know the movements of borrowers, a major concern for privacy advocates. And the warnings the devices emit — beeps that become more persistent as the due date for the loan payment approaches — are seen by some borrowers as more degrading than helpful.”

[RAW STORY]

Perhaps if these judges did their research and weren’t bank friendly, they would have seen exactly what Judge Schack learned.

New York Law Journal-

A Brooklyn appellate court has once again upset a ruling by a trial court judge, saying he “flagrantly ignore[d]” precedent.

In Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v Islar, 2013-06996, the Appellate Division, Second Department, on Wednesday reversed Brooklyn Supreme Court Justice Arthur Schack (See Profile) and ordered the case to be reassigned to a new judge.

Schack had denied a summary judgment motion from the lender, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, on grounds that the plaintiff had not demonstrated its standing to foreclose on the mortgage.

Read more: http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202675644543/Panel-Faults-Flagrant-Disregard-of-Precedent#ixzz3IhXtjWMb

image: NYLJ/Rick Kopstein

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID WEINER, individually, and on behalf of other members of the public similarly situated,
Plaintiff,

vs.

OCWEN FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, and OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
Defendants.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR:
(1) Violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.);
(2) Violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c));
(3) Violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d));
(4) Violations of the Rosenthal fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788, et seq.);
(5) Unjust Enrichment
(6) Fraud; and
(7) Breach of Contract

Jury Trial Demanded

[…]

Decided on October 22, 2014

30234-2009

Stein, Wiener & Roth, LLP
Attorneys for Plaintiff
One Old Country Road, Suite 113
Carle Place, New York 11514

Elmer O. Escobar
Defendant Pro Se
923 Greenlawn Avenue
Islip Terrace, New York 11752
Peter H. Mayer, J.

Upon the reading and filing of the following papers in this matter: (1) Notice of Motion by the plaintiff, dated October 17, 2012, and supporting papers; and now

UPON DUE DELIBERATION AND CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT of the foregoing papers, the motion is decided as follows: it is

ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion (004) which seeks, inter alia, an order vacating the Court’s July 9, 2010 Order of Reference and granting a new Order of Reference, is hereby denied for the reasons set forth herein; and it is further

ORDERED that the plaintiff shall appear by Gerald Roth, Esq. in the Courtroom of the undersigned on December 18, 2014 at 9:30 a.m. for a Hearing to determine what, if any, sanctions should be imposed by the Court upon the plaintiff pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, et. seq.; and it is further

ORDERED that at the time of the scheduled Hearing, plaintiff shall produce for the Court’s review those documents identified herein below; and it is further

ORDERED that at the time of the Hearing, plaintiff shall produce the individuals identified herein below for the purpose of providing sworn testimony upon inquiry by the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that counsel for the plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Order upon all parties and the Referee via First Class Mail, and shall promptly thereafter file the affidavit(s) of such service with the County Clerk and provide to the Court a copy of said affidavit(s) at the time of the scheduled Hearing.

The plaintiff’s motion (004) seeks an order vacating the Court’s prior Order of Reference, granted on July 9, 2010 and filed with the County Clerk on August 2, 2010, and upon vacatur, granting, inter alia, a new Order of Reference. The basis upon which the plaintiff seeks such relief is set forth solely in plaintiff’s counsel’s Affirmation in Support, which states in relevant part:

2.[W]e are unable to move forward with the action, as we cannot confirm that the affidavit submitted by plaintiff in support of its original application was properly executed and notarized, as required, inter alia, pursuant to the October 20, 2010 Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge (AO/548/10, as amended by AO/431/11).

3.As such, plaintiff seeks relief herein vacating and setting aside the Order of Reference signed by the court on July 09, 2010. In addition, this application seeks a new Order of Reference to be granted in its place, supported by the new affidavit of merit of Steve Irwin sworn to on September 13, 2012 and annexed hereto, as well as by the Attorney Affirmation required under AO/431/11.

In addition to the Attorney’s Affirmation in Support, counsel submits an Attorney [*2]Affirmation pursuant to AO/431/11 in which he refers to Steve Irwin as the representative with whom he communicated to confirm the purported factual accuracy of the allegations set forth in the complaint. In this regard, the Affirmation states:

3.Plaintiff’s representative can neither confirm nor deny the accuracy of the notarizations contained in the prior affidavit submitted in support of the prior applications made to the court. As such, the undersigned will be requesting the court to vacate the prior Order of Reference granted in this action. In furtherance thereof, Plaintiff’s representative has confirmed the factual accuracy of and the accuracy of the notarizations contained in the supporting affidavit and documents submitted in support of its application to vacate the prior Order of Reference, and in support of the application for a new Order of Reference.

No factual basis is provided to explain why plaintiff “cannot confirm that the affidavit submitted by plaintiff in support of its original application was properly executed and notarized,” or why “[p]laintiff’s representative can neither confirm nor deny the accuracy of the notarizations contained in the prior affidavit submitted in support of the prior applications made to the court.”

Counsel’s representations in both of his Affirmations refer to an affidavit of merit and perhaps another supporting affidavit from Steve Irwin. There are no such sworn statements from Mr. Irwin or any other plaintiff representative annexed to plaintiff’s motion papers. Consequently, all of the purported facts in support of the specific relief sought in plaintiff’s motion are set forth merely in an attorney affirmation. It is axiomatic that the affirmation of a party’s attorney, standing alone, is insufficient where he or she has no personal knowledge of the alleged facts set forth in support of a motion (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 427 NYS2d 595 [1980]; Currie v Wilhouski, 93 AD3d 816, 941 NYS2d 218 [2d Dept 2012]; Warrington v Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 35 AD3d 455, 826 NYS2d 152 [2d Dept 2006]; Palo v Principio, 303 AD2d 478, 76 NYS2d 623 [2d Dept 2003]; Falkowitz v Peters, 294 AD2d 330, 741 NYS2d 725 [2d Dept 2002]).

Also absent from plaintiff’s current motion is a copy of plaintiff’s previous motion papers which plaintiff caused the Court to rely upon in granting the July 9, 2010 Order of Reference. In relevant part, 22 NYCRR §202.7(a) states that “[t]here shall be compliance with the procedures prescribed in the CPLR for the bringing of motions.” In this regard, CPLR 2214 sets forth the requirements for furnishing papers to the court. CPLR 2214(a) requires that a “notice of motion shall specify the time and place of the hearing on the motion, the supporting papers upon which the motion is based, the relief demanded and the grounds therefor” (emphasis added). Similarly, CPLR 2214(c) states that “[e]ach party shall furnish to the court all papers served by him. The moving party shall furnish at the hearing all other papers not already in the possession of the court necessary to the consideration of the questions involved” (emphasis added). Notwithstanding these requirements, plaintiff fails to submit a copy of the prior motion papers, including the affidavit which plaintiff caused the Court to rely on in granting the Order of Reference, but which plaintiff now admits was unreliable when submitted. Failure to submit the prior motion precludes the Court from even knowing the identity of the affiant on the prior affidavit of merit.

With regard to plaintiff’s Notice of Motion, it is devoid of any reference to a statute upon which plaintiff relies in seeking the requested vacatur. Counsel’s Affirmations in support are also devoid of any statute or case authority as a basis for the relief plaintiff seeks. Although there is no requirement that a notice of motion list the statute or regulation that is the basis of the motion, at least some grounds must be mentioned (see Shields v Carbone, 99 AD3d 1100, 955 NYS2d 216 [3d Dept 2012]; Matter of Blauman-Spindler v Blauman, 68 AD3d 1105, 892 NYS2d 143 [2d Dept 2009]). Here, plaintiff states no grounds for the vacatur in its Notice of Motion, and cites no statutory or case authority in support of the requested relief.

Notwithstanding the above, it appears that plaintiff is seeking CPLR 5015(a)(5) vacatur of the original Order of Reference granted in plaintiff’s favor. CPLR 5015(a)(5) states in relevant part that “[t]he court which rendered a judgment or order may relieve a party from it upon such terms as may be just, on motion of any interested person with such notice as the court may direct, upon the ground of . . . reversal, modification or vacatur of a prior judgment or order upon which it is based.”

Generally, absent the circumstances outlined in CPLR 5015, such as newly discovered evidence, fraud, lack of jurisdiction, etc., a court order from which no appeal is taken ought to remain inviolate (Nash v The Port Auth. of NY and N.J., 22 NY3d 220, 980 NYS2d 880 [2013]; Matter of Huie, 20 NY2d 568, 285 NYS2d 610 [1967]; Glicksman v. Bd. of Educ./Central School Bd. of Comsewogue UFSD, 278 AD2d 364, 717 NYS2d 373 [2d Dept 2000]; Pigno v Bunim, 74 AD2d 567, 424 NYS2d 289 [2d Dept 1980]). It has been held that when a movant is not an aggrieved party seeking to change the legal effect of a trial court’s order, there is no basis for a motion to renew a prior motion ruled upon in the party’s favor (see Golden v Barker, 223 AD2d 769, 636 NYS2d 444 [3d Dept 1996]). Similarly, the procedure for relief under CPLR 5015(a) envisions the making of a motion by the aggrieved party (see Levine v Berlin, 46 AD2d 902, 362 NYS2d 186 [2d Dept 1974]; Peters v Berkeley, 219 AD 261, 219 NYS 709 [1st Dept 1927]).

Trial courts do have inherent discretionary and statutory power to set aside their own judgments on appropriate grounds, for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice, and the court’s inherent power of vacatur is not limited to the grounds set forth in CPLR 5015 (see Gurin v. Pogge, 112 AD3d 1028, 976 NYS2d 604 [3d Dept 2013]; McMahon v City of New York, 105 AD2d 101, 483 NYS2d 228 [1st Dept 1984]; JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Lupinacci, 2013 NY Slip Op 33625(U) [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2013]). However, before exercising its discretionary power to vacate its own July 9, 2010 Order of Reference, the Court must have adequate proof that appropriate grounds to do so exist and that the interests of substantial justice would be served if vacatur is granted. Without a complete copy of the prior motion papers and identification of the specific inadequacies in the previously submitted proofs, the Court is unable to properly make such a determination. More importantly, plaintiff now acknowledges that plaintiff “cannot confirm that the affidavit submitted by plaintiff in support of its original application was properly executed and notarized,” and that “[p]laintiff’s representative can neither confirm nor deny the accuracy of the notarizations contained in the prior affidavit submitted in support of the prior applications made to the court.”

The equivocal assertions by plaintiff not only preclude granting of the requested relief, but may constitute a basis for a finding of frivolous conduct. In relevant part, 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a) provides that “the court, in its discretion may impose financial sanctions upon any party or attorney in a civil action or proceeding who engages in frivolous conduct as defined in [130-1.1(c) of] this Part . . .”. Also, 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(b) states: “The Court, as appropriate, may make such award of costs or impose such financial sanctions against either an attorney or party to the litigation or against both.”

If plaintiff now “cannot confirm that the affidavit submitted by plaintiff in support of its original application was properly executed and notarized,” then submission of that affidavit in the first instance may constitute frivolous conduct as contemplated by 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(c). Similarly, stating that “[p]laintiff’s representative can neither confirm nor deny the accuracy of the notarizations contained in the prior affidavit” implies that plaintiff may have committed frivolous conduct on two fronts. On one hand, submitting the prior motion with an affidavit that was not accurate when submitted, or whose accuracy can not now be confirmed, may constitute frivolous conduct. On the other hand, submitting this present motion to vacate, where the plaintiff can not and does not deny the accuracy of the prior affidavit the Court relied upon in granting the prior order, would be a waste of judicial resources in seeking vacatur of that prior order and may constitute frivolous conduct for submitting a frivolous motion.

Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff’s motion is denied in all respects.

Plaintiff shall appear in the Courtroom of the undersigned on December 18, 2014 for a Hearing to determine what, if any, sanctions should be imposed upon the plaintiff pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, et. seq. At the time of the Hearing, plaintiff shall produce the following documents for Court review:

(1)a complete copy of plaintiff’s plaintiff’s prior motion for an order of reference, and all supporting documents, which resulted in the July 9, 2010 Order of Reference that plaintiff now seeks to vacate; and

(2)the Affidavit of Merit of Steve Irwin, which is referred to but not included with plaintiff’s present motion papers

Plaintiff shall also produce at the time of the Hearing the following individuals, along with proof of their identity, for the purpose of providing sworn testimony upon inquiry by the Court:

(1)all individuals who constitute “we” as referred to in paragraph 2 of plaintiff’s counsel’s Affirmation in Support;

(2)plaintiff’s representative, Steve Irwin, as well as any other plaintiff’s representatives with whom counsel communicated to confirm the purported factual accuracy of the allegations set forth in the complaint as required by AO/431/11;

(3)the individual or individuals who executed all affidavits submitted in support of plaintiff’s prior motion for an order of reference, which resulted in the July 9, 2010 Order of Reference that plaintiff now seeks to vacate, including but not limited to, the affiant who executed [*3]the affidavit of merit in the July 9, 2010 Order of Reference;

(4)the individual or individuals who notarized all documents submitted in support of plaintiff’s prior motion for an order of reference, which resulted in the July 9, 2010 Order of Reference plaintiff now seeks to vacate;

(5)the attorney or attorneys who signed Affirmations in support of plaintiff’s prior application for an order of reference, which resulted in the July 9, 2010 Order of Reference plaintiff now seeks to vacate;

(6)the individual or individuals who notarized Steve Irwin’s Affidavit of Merit, which is referred to but not included with plaintiff’s current motion papers.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
Dated:October 22, 2014

Peter H. Mayer, J.S.C.

[ ] FINAL DISPOSITION[ X ] NON FINAL DISPOSITION

DEMOCRACY NOW-

A year ago this month the U.S. Department of Justice announced that the banking giant JPMorgan Chase would avoid criminal charges by agreeing to pay $13 billion to settle claims that it had routinely overstated the quality of mortgages it was selling to investors. But how did the bank avoid prosecution for committing fraud that helped cause the 2008 financial crisis? Today we speak to JPMorgan Chase whistleblower Alayne Fleischmann in her first televised interview discussing how she witnessed “massive criminal securities fraud” in the bank’s mortgage operations. She is profiled in Matt Taibbi’s new Rolling Stone investigation, “The $9 Billion Witness: Meet the woman JPMorgan Chase paid one of the largest fines in American history to keep from talking.”

[DEMOCRACY NOW]

AmeriKa has a serious problem with their investigations and these settlements are not going to stop them.

Denver Post-

Three prominent Denver law firms have agreed to pay more than $1.7 million to settle state allegations that they intentionally inflated foreclosure costs on hundreds of properties statewide.

The settlements are the result of lawsuits filed by outgoing Attorney General John Suthers, the aftermath of a two-year investigation into alleged foreclosure fraud by law firms in Colorado that began following a number of Denver Post stories about the industry.

The investigation has already taken on the state’s biggest foreclosure outfits — The Castle Law Group, which continues to fight the case, and Aronowitz & Mecklenburg, which paid $10 million to settle and agreed to close.

In the latest cases quietly filed last week, attorney Michael Medved and Tracie Castanon, the business manager at The Law Firm of Michael Medved, agreed to pay $1 million — without admitting wrongdoing — to settle allegations that they followed the lead of the state’s biggest foreclosure law firms and overcharged some of their costs to handle foreclosure cases, according to copies of the settlement filed in Denver District Court.

Another $350,000 was set aside to ensure compliance.

[DENVER POST]

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

For More Information, Contact:

Press inquiries:  Robert Scarola at rlscarola@gmail.com
Tige C. Johnson
JOHNSON LAW, LLC
Barrister Hall
29 South LaSalle Street
Suite 220
Chicago, Illinois 60603

T 312.456.9300 F 312.416.0312

Email: tjohnson@johnsonchicago.com

 November 6, 2014

During Discovery Process, Chicago Attorney Finds WELLS FARGO Made False Statements of Material Fact to FANNIE MAE.

“We aren’t just fighting for a house. We are fighting for a home. What we have found in this case is a continued pattern of fraud and deception. We cannot allow this sort of egregious conduct to continue.” -Tige C. Johnson, Johnson Law, LLC

Chicago Attorney, Tige C. Johnson, filed an Amended Counter Complaint in the 19^th Circuit Lake County Court Waukegan, (Case # 11CH00416) Illinois on behalf of Therese Crowley, Counter Plaintiff vs. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, d/b/a Wells Fargo Home Mortgage including multiple counts of “Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Fraud by Inducement, Repeated Violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Acts and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.”

 After nearly four years of legal maneuvers, delays, and an unsuccessful attempt to conceal the discovery documents under protective orders by Wells, Johnson obtained the documents that reveal the fraud.  In his 34 page, 285 paragraph counter complaint Johnson masterfully reveals with supporting exhibits, an egregious pattern of conduct by Wells Fargo on Crowley’s file that included False Statements of Material Fact as to Wells Fargo’s Submission to Fannie Mae.

The Documents revealed that Fannie Mae, investor on Crowley’s loan, had, in fact, extended an offer for a modification that Wells Fargo never presented to Crowley. In fact, Wells Fargo repeatedly claimed her “investor”(Fannie Mae) denied her Modification application.  What Wells presented to Crowley was a “special forbearance” agreement that was her only pathway to a Loan Modification.  By inducing her into this agreement, seemingly set the stage for Wells to attempt to drive Crowley into foreclosure. With a 52% loan to value – Wells saw the profit potential.

The Discovery documents reveal the False Statements of Material Facts submitted to Fannie Mae (Investor) on behalf of Crowley, which included a false “projected foreclosure date” during the time that Crowley was under a Special Forbearance agreement.  Soon thereafter, Wells Fargo submitted a check request to Fannie Mae for $114,716.64 – Paragraph 164 of complaint “…the evidence of payment from Fannie Mae to Wells Fargo in the amount of $114,716.64, in preparation of foreclosure, suggests that Wells Fargo never intended to offer a permanent loan modification;” Johnson will explore on what basis was Wells entitled to a payout on Crowley’s loan.

A recent study shows that so called service providers like Wells Fargo make more money on a Foreclosure transactions than by offering clients loan modifications.  The documents in Crowley’s complaint substantiate this theory.  In fact Wells Fargo had a financial incentive to ignore the FANNIE MAE guidelines and worked to force a sale of Crowley‘s property.    Given the time of their submission to Fannie Mae –the exhibits in the complaint show the appraisal Wells supplied to Fannie Mae – Crowley’s property was worth $425,222.98 on a $205,000 loan.   With the equity in addition to the $114,716.64 supplied to Wells From Fannie Mae, Wells stood to profit substantially in the case of Crowley.  According to an anonymous source familiar with Wells policies,“ if a property had equity, they were almost always denied.”

The “robo-signing” foreclosure debacle, which cost Wells Fargo millions in settlements and litigation expenses, is the tail end of this process.  The beginning is the cynical approach by the Servicer, which results in the wrongful denials of qualified homeowners for Hamp Loan Modifications.  Homeowners need to see a detailed explanation of their modification denials to ensure that the Consumer is receiving a fair and accurate assessment and determination of their applications.

As Crowley said, “During this 5 year ordeal, I have been haunted about the countless people who have taken their lender at their word and may have needlessly lost their homes because they did not challenge or further investigate their Lender’s refusal to modify their loan; simply accepting they “failed to meet Investor Guidelines” – Taking them at their word – could have been a devastating error in judgment.   I am not just fighting for myself. I want to make sure other people won’t have to endure the same nightmare of harassment, frustration, and relentless stress that I have suffered.  Now we have the evidence that proves what I had sensed during that nightmare.  My hope is that other homeowners demand to see the information in their files and request what was submitted to their “Investor” to insure they were not subjected to the same horrendous conduct.”

To Crowley, it appears now, to have been a business model seeped in fraud and deception not only to her, but the Federal Government agency Fannie Mae.

H/T Public Citizen–

Meet the woman JPMorgan Chase paid one of the largest fines in American history to keep from talking

Rolling Stone-

She tried to stay quiet, she really did. But after eight years of keeping a heavy secret, the day came when Alayne Fleischmann couldn’t take it anymore.

“It was like watching an old lady get mugged on the street,” she says. “I thought, ‘I can’t sit by any longer.'”

Fleischmann is a tall, thin, quick-witted securities lawyer in her late thirties, with long blond hair, pale-blue eyes and an infectious sense of humor that has survived some very tough times. She’s had to struggle to find work despite some striking skills and qualifications, a common symptom of a not-so-common condition called being a whistle-blower.

[ROLLING STONE]

Resolve this and there is another one lurking around the corner…So resolve this!

The State-

Wells Fargo said Wednesday it is in discussions with the U.S. government to possibly resolve a 2-year-old mortgage fraud case.

The government filed the civil lawsuit in 2012 against the San Francisco-based lender, accusing it of “reckless” origination of government-backed home loans.

From 2001 to 2005, Wells certified that more than 100,000 loans met the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s origination and underwriting requirements, even though the bank knew a large percentage of them were not eligible for federal insurance, the lawsuit said.

When the loans went into default, the Federal Housing Administration was required to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in insurance claims for loans that did not qualify for federal insurance, the government claimed, among other things.

Read more here: THE STATE