Bloomberg-

On a rainy night in November, Mark Futral, wearing a red hooded sweatshirt, approached a white ranch house in Flowery Branch, a northeastern suburb of Atlanta, crowbar in hand.

He adjusted a headlamp and slid his fingers under a front window to lift it open. His dog Bella, a 40-pound Rhodesian Ridgeback mix, barreled through and Futral followed, squeezing into an empty room with tan carpet peeling from the floor. It was the sixth home he’d broken into that day.

Though he’s occasionally mistaken for a thief, Futral, 37, is working for Blackstone Group LP (BX), one of the world’s most sophisticated investors. For the past 18 months, he’s picked locks, shimmied under garage doors and crawled through windows to get into foreclosed homes the company has bought.

[BLOOMBERG]

H/T ZERO HEDGE

CONTINUE TO ZEROHEDGE FOR MANY MORE…

BOSTON – As a result of an investigation by Attorney General Martha Coakley’s office, the state pension fund will receive $11.3 million this week as part of a settlement with Countrywide Securities Corporation (CSC). This case is part of the AG’s industry-wide review of residential mortgage securitization practices in Massachusetts.

AG Coakley’s settlement with CSC includes a total payment of $17.3 million, including the $11.3 million to compensate government investors with the Pension Reserves Investment Management Board (PRIM), as well an additional $6 million paid to the Commonwealth. 

“We are pleased to return these critical public funds to the state pension system,” AG Coakley said. “It is important to hold Wall Street accountable for its role in the subprime lending crisis. Our office will continue its leading role in this area as we work to help homeowners and others harmed by investment banks.”

In addition to the payment provided to PRIM, the state pension fund can expect to receive another $7 million by early 2014 as a result of the AG’s recent settlement with JPMorgan announced last month.

AG Coakley’s office was the first in the nation to investigate and hold Wall Street securitization firms accountable for their role in the subprime mortgage crisis. These investigations have resulted in six settlements to date with total payments of more than $300 million. The initiative began with a $60 million recovery against Goldman Sachs relating to its securitization of “doomed to fail” Massachusetts subprime loans.

Today’s announcement is the most recent development in this on-going investigation into the role of Wall Street investment banks in funding, purchasing and securitizing unfair residential mortgage loans. It follows the resolution of similar matters that include consumer relief directed to homeowners, money used to compensate investors, and payments to the Commonwealth:

• May 2009: Goldman Sachs paid $60 million
• June 2010: Morgan Stanley paid $102 million
• November 2011: Royal Bank of Scotland paid $52 million
• September 2013: Barclays Bank PLC paid $36 million.
• November 2013: JPMorgan paid $34 million

AG Coakley’s office has been a national leader in pursuing banks and investment giants for their role in the economic crisis. In addition to recoveries involving the securitization of loans, AG Coakley has also obtained settlements with Countrywide, Fremont Investment and Loan, Option One and others on behalf of Massachusetts homeowners. In 2012, AG Coakley’s office joined a $25 billion nationwide settlement with the five major lenders over unlawful foreclosure practices.

AG Coakley’s first-in-the-nation HomeCorps program, established with funds from the national mortgage settlement, continues to provide assistance to borrowers across the state with dedicated loan modification specialists and through a series of grants.

More information about AG Coakley’s work during the lending crisis can be found here.

The investigation of CSC’s securitization practices was handled by Assistant Attorneys General Aaron Lamb, Peter Leight, and Glenn Kaplan of Attorney General Martha Coakley’s Insurance and Financial Services Division. 

###########

Source: http://www.mass.gov

Bill Moyers–

A US-led trade deal is currently being negotiated that could increase the price of prescription drugs, weaken financial regulations and even allow partner countries to challenge American laws. But few know its substance.

The pact, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), is deliberately shrouded in secrecy, a trade deal powerful people, including President Obama, don’t want you to know about. More than 130 members of Congress have asked the White House for greater transparency about the negotiations and were essentially told to go fly a kite. While most of us are in the dark about the contents of the deal, which Obama aims to seal by year end, corporate lobbyists are in the know about what it contains.

December 30, 2013

Fannie Mae Reaches $591 Million Repurchase Agreement with Wells Fargo

Agreement Completes Reviews to Resolve Legacy Issues with Lenders

Keosha Burns

202-752-7840

WASHINGTON, DC – Fannie Mae (FNMA/OTC) has reached a $591 million agreement with Wells Fargo to resolve repurchase requests on certain loans originated prior to 2009.  After adjustments for prior repurchases, Wells Fargo will pay Fannie Mae $541 million in the fourth quarter of 2013 and be released from repurchase liability for these loans, with certain exceptions. 

“We have closed out our legacy repurchase reviews with this agreement with Wells Fargo,” said Timothy J. Mayopoulos, President and CEO of Fannie Mae.  “This agreement represents a fitting conclusion to our year of hard work to put legacy issues in the rear view mirror and begin 2014 focused on improving the future of housing finance.”

Wells Fargo will remain obligated for certain other contractual responsibilities under the resolution agreement.

In addition to its agreement with Wells Fargo, Fannie Mae has reached resolutions this year with a number of lenders on repurchase issues and other matters.  These agreements have been reached with eligible lenders of all sizes, including:

• A $10.3 billion agreement announced in January 2013 with Bank of America including resolution of repurchase issues on certain loans, transfer of servicing rights on 941,000 loans, and repurchase of 30,000 loans by Bank of America. Additionally, the agreement included a $1.3 billion compensatory fee payment for servicing obligations.
• A $968 million agreement announced in July 2013 with CitiMortgage to resolve repurchase issues on certain loans.
• A $373 million agreement announced in October 2013 with SunTrust to resolve repurchase issues on certain loans.
• A $670 million agreement announced in October 2013 with J.P. Morgan Chase to resolve repurchase issues on certain loans.
• A $121.5 million agreement announced in November 2013 with Flagstar to resolve repurchase issues on certain loans.
• A $140 million agreement with PNC reached in December 2013 to resolve repurchase issues on certain loans.
• An $83 million agreement with HSBC Bank USA, N.A. reached in December 2013 to resolve repurchase issues on certain loans.

Fannie Mae disclosed in its most recent 10-Q filing that as of September 30, 2013, it had completed reviews on approximately 94 percent of the loans delivered from 2005-2008 for underwriting defects that would trigger potential repurchase requests and that the company expects to complete those reviews by the end of 2013.

Source: http://www.fanniemae.com

Bankers are getting their holiday bonuses again this year, to the tune of over $91 billion, and some don’t know what to do with all that extra money. One group, called The Other 98 Percent, has proposed that bankers give their bonuses to the homeowners who lost their homes due to foreclosures that never should have happened. RT’s Ameera David talks to Alexis Goldstein, communications director for Other98.com, about the group’s proposal and why they chose homeowners who had been foreclosed upon as the recipients.

LA TIMES-

A federal judge will soon decide how much Bank of America should pay for some of Countrywide Financial Corp.’s sins in the lead-up to the financial crisis.

Federal prosecutors want BofA to pay $864 million after the bank’s stinging defeat in a major civil fraud trial in October. A jury found BofA liable in a case centered on a Countrywide program called “The Hustle,” which churned out risky home loans before selling them to mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

But whatever penalty the bank might pay, it will amount to a mere drop in the bucket of BofA’s legal bills — much of it stemming from its ill-fated acquisition of the former Calabasas mortgage lender in 2008.

“It’s chump change,” said Dick Bove, bank analyst at Rafferty Capital Markets.

[LA TIMES]

Do pull your shorts up just yet…

While the banks can get away with paying taxes for their fraud …you on the other hand get screwed no matter what is right!

WAPO-

Struggling homeowners could be hit with an unexpected tax bill in the new year.

A law that spared people who owe more than their homes are worth from being saddled with extra taxes when their banks provide mortgage relief is expiring next week. Congress hasn’t extended it.

Underwater homeowners often try to negotiate with their bank so that they can sell their homes for less than they owe in a short sale or have their mortgage balance reduced. But the difference between what the homeowner owes and the lower sales price approved by the bank is considered income for the homeowner and subject to tax by the Internal Revenue Service.

[WASHINGTON POST]

Bet NY’ers are now regretting not electing Mr. Spitzer!

Bloomberg-

Alicia Glen, head of urban investment for Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS), was named deputy mayor for housing and economic development by New York Mayor-elect Bill de Blasio.

Glen, 47, who has run the department since 2002, arranged government partnerships and financed more than $5 billion in dozens of residential, mixed-use and commercial projects in the U.S., according to Columbia University Business School, where she’s an adjunct faculty member. The urban-investment group also helped finance New York’s bike-sharing program, the largest in the U.S.

“Alicia is a pioneer in developing innovative financing and investments that have improved the lives of thousands of New Yorkers,” Goldman Sachs Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein said in an e-mail.

[BLOOMBERG]

FTC Puts Conditions on Fidelity National Financial’s Acquisition of Lender Processing Services

Fidelity Required to Sell Title Plant Assets in Six Oregon Counties and the Portland Metropolitan Area

For Release
December 24, 2013

Fidelity National Financial, Inc. has agreed to settle Federal Trade Commission charges that its proposed $2.9 billion acquisition of Lender Processing Services, Inc. (LPS) would likely substantially lessen competition by combining the firms’ title plant assets in several local markets in Oregon.

To preserve competition, the proposed settlement requires Fidelity to sell a copy of LPS’s title plants in six Oregon counties and an ownership interest equivalent to LPS’s share of a jointly owned title plant in the Portland, Oregon, metropolitan area. These divestitures are designed to counteract the likely anticompetitive effects of the transaction, while preserving any efficiencies that might arise from the combination of Fidelity and LPS.

Title plants are databases used by abstractors, title insurers, title insurance agents, and others to determine the title status of real property. Title plant users access this information to establish the chain of title and make other determinations in order to underwrite and issue title insurance policies.

On May 28, 2013, Fidelity entered into an agreement to acquire LPS for approximately $2.9 billion. Fidelity is a publicly traded company based in Jacksonville, Florida. It is a leading provider of mortgage services and diversified services to the mortgage industry, and is the largest title insurance underwriter in the United States. LPS also is a publicly traded company based in Jacksonville. It is a leading provider of technology solutions, transaction services, and data and analytics to the mortgage and real estate industries.

According to the FTC’s complaint, the proposed combination of Fidelity’s and LPS’s title plant assets in six individual Oregon counties and the tri-county Portland, Oregon metropolitan area is likely to substantially lessen competition, in violation of U.S. antitrust laws.

Oregon law requires title insurers to own an interest in a title plant in each county in which they issue policies. This requirement creates a barrier to entry for new firms seeking to provide title insurance underwriting. The proposed acquisition would eliminate one of only a few available title plants in six Oregon counties, and make it possible for Fidelity and only one other underwriter to exclude competing firms from having an interest in a joint title plant in the Portland metropolitan area. Without the provisions in the consent order, the FTC alleges that the proposed acquisition is likely to increase the risk of anticompetitive coordination between title plant owners in these local markets.

The proposed order settling the FTC’s charges will restore competition that is likely lost through the merger but will not interfere with any efficiencies that may be associated with the combination of the two companies. The proposed order requires Fidelity to sell a copy of LPS’s title plants serving the following Oregon counties to an FTC-approved acquirer within five months of closing the acquisition: 1) Clatsop, 2) Columbia, 3) Coos, 4) Josephine, 5) Polk, and 6) Tillamook. The required divestitures will preserve the number of independent title plants in each county.

In addition, the proposed order requires Fidelity to sell an ownership interest equivalent to LPS’s share in the joint title plant that serves the Portland area to an FTC-approved buyer, also within five months of the deal’s close. It also prohibits Fidelity from exercising its voting rights or influencing others to expel the buyer from the joint plant in the event that the buyer fails to operate an active title business for three months. This provision ensures that the buyer will have the flexibility to develop and carry out its title insurance business.

Finally, the proposed order requires Fidelity to notify the FTC in advance before acquiring any title plants in Oregon in certain circumstances that might raise anticompetitive concerns, and includes an order to maintain assets that requires Fidelity to maintain the title plant assets and the joint plant until the divestitures are complete.

The Commission vote to accept the consent agreement containing the proposed consent order for public comment was 3-1, with Commissioner Joshua D. Wright voting no. The Commission issued a separate statement and Commissioner Wright issued a dissenting statement. The FTC will publish a description of the consent agreement package in the Federal Register shortly. The agreement will be subject to public comment for 30 days, beginning today and continuing through January 23, 2014, after which the Commission will decide whether to make the proposed consent order final. Interested parties can submit written comments electronically or in paper form by following the instructions in the “Invitation To Comment” part of the “Supplementary Information” section.

Comments in paper form should be mailed or delivered to: Federal Trade Commission, Office of the Secretary, Room H-113, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20580. The FTC is requesting that any comment filed in paper form near the end of the public comment period be sent by courier or overnight service, if possible, because U.S. postal mail in the Washington area and at the Commission is subject to delay due to heightened security precautions. Comments can be submitted electronically.

NOTE: The Commission issues an administrative complaint when it has “reason to believe” that the law has been or is being violated, and it appears to the Commission that a proceeding is in the public interest. When the Commission issues a consent order on a final basis, it carries the force of law with respect to future actions. Each violation of such an order may result in a civil penalty of up to $16,000.

The FTC’s Bureau of Competition works with the Bureau of Economics to investigate alleged anticompetitive business practices and, when appropriate, recommends that the Commission take law enforcement action. To inform the Bureau about particular business practices, call 202-326-3300, send an e-mail to antitrust{at}ftc{dot}gov, or write to the Office of Policy and Coordination, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, 601 New Jersey Ave., N.W., Room 7117, Washington, DC 20001. To learn more about the Bureau of Competition, read Competition Counts. Like the FTC on Facebook, follow us on Twitter, and subscribe to press releases for the latest FTC news and resources.
Contact Information

MEDIA CONTACT:
Mitchell J. Katz
Office of Public Affairs
202-326-2161

STAFF CONTACT:
Jessica S. Drake
Bureau of Competition
202-326-3144

source: ftc.gov

Well at this point it’s pretty common knowledge that all the bloated banksters in the cartel are literally sucking the soul out of us, homeowner by homeowner, house by house, city by city, state by state. Puffing themselves up like the Pillsbury Doughboy that ate Godzilla and Manhattan. Picking their teeth with our land records.

So where are the Attorneys General? Where is that, oh geez, what was it called again? Oh yeah, The Mortgage Fraud Task Force. What ever happened to that? Maybe Jamie Dimon bought it for his daughter and commemorated it into a nice little holiday snow globe for his 2013 holiday party give away bags.

In California we have the oh so special California Homeowner Bill of Rights. AG Kamala Harris beamed, eyes glistening at the signing of that photo op behind Gov Jerry Brown, as if she’d just handed over the mega lottery loot to a homeless family of twelve. Kamala Harris is always camera ready, always ready for her next sound bite on CNN or PR release in front of the state flag. Her career path looks promising, maybe the Supreme Court, DOJ or Governor. But try to engage her in anything that actually has any real teeth to it, like say for example, millions of Californians losing their homes to Fraudclosure, neighborhoods being decimated by empty homes and neglected properties, a second tsunami of fraudclosures looming, and she’ll block you from her Facebook page. The Homeowner “Bill of Rights” offers Californians false hope of surviving the Homeowner Hunger Games. New rules and all that. It’s like telling Tony Soprano’s men that they can’t whack you while Pauly Walnuts is still raping you. Wait your turn.

But I digress. Where does a homeowner actually get anyone to really hear them out? To fully understand the soul sucking misery that we find ourselves in when trying to work with these mega banks that are on robotic search and destroy mode? Who really understands the complexities? The anguish and the insanity of the matrix we are placed in when following the “rules” in place to try to save what is ours in these unprecedented times; Our homes. Our investment. Our legal rights in a complex bloody labyrinth of red tape and manufactured BS.

We try our congressional office, they smile and nod with compassion and knowing. Tsk tsk sigh. They act as if they’ll try their best to intervene on our behalf, set you up with a special Single Point Of Contact (aka SPOC) in the “executive offices” that have a little more accountability since it’s a US Congressional office letterhead and all. Sorta put more time constraints on Pauly Walnuts to respond to our requests and the infinite supply of paperwork we fax, mail, Fed Ex and produce time after time after time after time after time. We have turned into a paper producing incoherent human copy machine, holding the tiniest pessimistic optimism somewhere in the back of our minds that this time we have a “complete package” with every T crossed. We have become wild eyed Vegas strip junkies gambling the entire nest egg at this point. Come on baby, ten times is the charm. I’m due damn it I’m due. Alright one more time….

“What is it?” we wonder. How did we get here? This abyss of systematic bureaucratic bankster abuse.

It’s epic. The stakes are as high as it gets. We are in deep. We begin to realize that our congressional offices are as useful as a confession to a child molester posing as a priest. We realize our letters to the AGs, the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Oprah, Obama, Jill Biden’s manicurist, the HOPE hotline. (How sad is that? The HOPE hotline?) No answers there either.

We somehow break through the imposed shame that everyone keeps to themselves as homeowners in this position been conveniently branded as “deadbeats”. We feel like losers. We feel so alone, so lost in this matrix of complexities, legalities, and consequences. The stakes are so high, our faith is so fragmented.

We begin to talk about it with friends and family. We start to put it out there little by little as to how much we are struggling with these obstacles, these unprecedented times, these impenetrable banks that supposedly have programs in place to assist us in “Making Home Affordable”. Banks have rules right? Our govt has laws right? Where are we in this big picture? Don’t we as homeowners and citizens have a right to stand our ground, to keep what we built against false claims and lack of standing, aka “show me the note” dude?

Who is there for us in this vapid game we’ve been pulled into in good faith to save our homes? Our investments, our retirement? Who?

WE are. We are there for each other. We start to connect and talk about the lawlessness, the impossible inarticulate anguish and insanity we’ve been exposed to in the guise of sustaining our homes. We start to listen to each other’s stories and the similarities begin to reflect clear patterns of abuse. Clear patterns of harm and of our undoing by instruction. Step by step, we have blindly and diligently in all good faith followed the instructions we were given by the servicing bank that tells us we won’t be considered as having a legitimate hardship unless we are in default, that we need to miss a few payments to receive assistance, submit and resubmit hundreds of pages of documents again and again and again until we start to realize it’s all rigged. A big fat hoax. The biggest Ponzi scheme since Bernie Madoff, only this is multiplied times millions of families and individuals. Millions of titles and altered titles. This scam is unprecedented. The biggest financial sting in our history. The modern day bankster business plan. Wells Fargo, “Together we’ll go far”. Welcome to modern day psychological terrorism. Who’s gonna be the last man or woman standing? Who’s more likely to run out of money, stamina, steam and wherewithal first?

Yes indeed, Wells Fargo Sucks, and so does Bank of America, Chase, Citi, Ocwen, Nationstar, Penny Mack. What a coincidence huh? Ever get the feeling they’re the same criminal enterprise? The same robo signing Caligraphy workshops. The same bank rebranding themselves hand over fist, trying to erase their tracks, complicate what they confiscate unlawfully. They all seem to be playing the same shell game, the same abuses and patterns in place ultimately to bring about the swift demise of the American Homeowner. The modification of the middle class, the mastication and regurgitation of the American dream. “Here ya go, sorry for the confusion. Here’s a few thousand dollars for the relocation. Three days to vacate. Your house has been auctioned off. Don’t worry, if you’re lucky maybe we’ll rent it back to you. Sign here. Love, Linda Green.”

Yes, #WellsFargo#Sucks. Hashtag that #John Stumpf and all the pathetic SPOCs that service your robo signing, loss of docs, cubicle monkeys selling their souls for a Bed Bath and Beyond gift card, dressing as homeless people at your Halloween office parties, SPOCs assisting in the take-down of the American homeowner, SPOCs that redirect us, disconnect us and are complicit in the zombie fee collecting business plan to abusively foreclose us into oblivion. “This call will be monitored and recorded. This is an attempt to collect a debt”. Really? Show me the money? Show me the note. Show me the securitized debt. “Hello. Hello?”

Not only did the worlds biggest banks and their henchmen the Department of Justice, the AGs, the lack of hope on the Hope hotline take down the world economy, the business plan in place is to cut us off at the knees as we attempt (by following their rules) to stagger to our feet. To speak truth to corrupt power.

Well guess what. We are on our feet. We are talking to one another, networking, building coalitions, groups of activists. Home grown ground troops. We are comparing notes, robo signer names, editorial email lists, servicing abuses, patterns of fraud. We are deciphering the complexities in the lack of standing these big bad blowhards have in the homeowner hunger games. We are armed with the power of what stubborn strong willed fighters on a mission have in common. We are taking names and blasting them out to every Facebook group, Twitter feed and Instagram stream we can muster – all day every day. The TRUTH. WE the people are showing up for each other and it is a powerful force to reckon with. The truth is a potent undeniable living thing, and if you present the truth in regard to the law, even Pauly Walnuts goes to the big house at some point or sleeps with the fish. Occupy the truth. Move your money from these criminal institutions to smaller community banks and credit unions. Demand everything in writing, record calls, put them on defense and stay on offense. Share share share with like minded others. Yes it’s the Homeowner Hunger games, but we are hungry and we have nothing to lose. Time to bite the vampire and bleed them out. Wake up and join us. They are coming for us, but much to their astonishment we are not running anywhere but directly AT them. WE are coming for them.

Join us at “Wells Fargo Sucks” (group) and “Fraudclosure Fighters” (group pages) on Facebook. Several other groups as well (Home Defenders League, Occupy Our Homes, Bank Fraud Revealed, and many many more) in which we network, cross reference, decipher, support, take names, graph charts, network with auditing forensic experts and attorneys, Occupy and serve one another in the common quest to dismantle the Fraudclosure machine, expose the servicing abuses, bringing the truth HOME in seeking justice and saving ourselves against an arrogant out of control Goliath that never saw us coming.

We are the heroes we’ve been waiting for. Join us.

Lainey Hashorva

Please forgive typos – my brain is faster than my fangers.

.

Lainey Hashorva is a Social Media Activist, Investigative Journalist and Entrepreneur. Join the discussion on Facebook in her group, Fraudclosure Fighters with like minded others. Please visit her ETSY store LaineyBean.

CFPB Complaints

Scroll down and if you have an issue be sure to file a complaint.

.

Source: http://www.ablecontent.com/cfpbdatabase/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=680

NYT-

The good news arrived in a confidential letter from the Federal Reserve Board in Washington. The nation’s biggest bank, JPMorgan Chase, had won the right to expand its reach in a lucrative business that has nothing to do with banking: electricity.

Areas like electricity are generally off limits to banks because of the risks involved. But with its June 2010 letter, the Fed let JPMorgan take an even bigger role selling electricity in California and the Midwest, saying the push would “reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public that outweigh any potential adverse effects.”

Three months later, JPMorgan traders began a scheme to manipulate electricity prices, ultimately forcing consumers in those regions to pay more every time they flicked on a light switch or an air-conditioner, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission subsequently contended.

[NEW YORK TIMES]

image: www.dreamstime.com

For Immediate Release Contact:

Corinne Russell (202) 649-3032
Stefanie Johnson (202) 649-3030

December 20, 2013

FHFA Announces $1.9 Billion Settlement
With Deutsche Bank

.

Washington, DC — The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), as conservator of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, today announced it has reached a settlement with
Deutsche Bank AG, related companies and specifically named individuals for $1.925
billion to resolve claims in FHFA v. Deutsche Bank AG, et al., as well as certain other
matters. The settlement addresses claims alleging violations of federal and state
securities laws in connection with private-label mortgage-backed securities (PLS)
purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac between 2005 and 2007.

Under the terms of the agreement, Deutsche Bank will pay approximately $1.63 billion
to Freddie Mac and $300 million to Fannie Mae. As part of the settlement, FHFA,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will release certain claims brought against Deutsche Bank
related to securities sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac between 2005 and 2007.

The settlement agreement does not release Deutsche Bank from any claims relating to
LIBOR manipulation and does not include claims made against Deutsche Bank in two
other PLS lawsuits presently the subject of ongoing litigation: FHFA v. SC Americas,
Inc., et. al., and FHFA v. Countrywide Financial Corp., et. al. The other parties to
those lawsuits were not part of the negotiations with Deutsche Bank.

This is the sixth settlement that FHFA has attained pursuant to the 18 PLS lawsuits
filed in 2011. FHFA remains committed to satisfactory resolution of the remaining
actions.

(Settlement Agreement follows; confidential materials omitted)

THE COVERED SECURITIES
Securitization Name CUSIP Action

ACE 2005-AG1 004427BV1 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2005-ASAP1 004421SY0 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2005-HE6 004421SG9 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2005-HE7 004421TV5 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-ASAP1 004421VS9 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-ASAP2 004421XB4 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-ASAP3 00442VAA5 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-ASAP4 00441UAA8 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-ASAP5 004422AA9 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-ASAP5 004422AB7 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-ASAP6 00443KAA8 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-ASAP6 00443KAB6 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-CW1 00441QAA7 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-FM1 00441VAA6 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-FM2 00442CAA7 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-HE1 004421WJ8 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-HE1 004421WK5 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-HE1 004421WL3 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-HE2 004421YR8 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-HE3 00441TAA1 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-HE4 00442BAA9 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-NC1 004421UP6 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-NC2 00441XAA2 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-NC3 00442EAC9 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-NC3 00442EAD7 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-OP1 00442PAA8 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-OP1 00442PAB6 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2006-OP2 00441YAA0 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2007-ASAP1 00442JAA2 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2007-ASAP2 00442UAA7 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2007-ASL1 00443MAA4 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2007-HE1 00443LAA6 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2007-HE2 00443PAA7 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2007-HE3 00442GAA8 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2007-HE4 00442LAA7 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2007-HE5 000797AA8 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2007-SL1 00442FAA0 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2007-WM1 004424AA5 Deutsche Bank
ACE 2007-WM2 00442KAA9 Deutsche Bank

Securitization Name CUSIP Action

DBALT 2007-OA4 25151XAC5 Deutsche Bank
DBALT 2007-OA4 25151XAE1 Deutsche Bank
INDX 2005-AR31 45660LW39 Deutsche Bank
INDX 2006-AR9 45661EGE8 Deutsche Bank
MHL 2007-1 61915YAA9 Deutsche Bank
NCHET 2006-2 64360YAP0 Deutsche Bank
NHEL 2007-1 669971AA1 Deutsche Bank
RAST 2005-A15 45660L4E6 Deutsche Bank
RAST 2005-A15 45660L4F3 Deutsche Bank

Tom, J.P., Andrias, DeGrasse, Richter, JJ.
11384 & Index 650980/12

M-5893
M-6111
M-6133

ACE Securities Corp., etc.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

—against—

DB Structured Products, Inc.,
Defendant-Appellant.
– – – – –
The Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association,
The Association of Mortgage
Investors, Professor Robert
T. Miller and Mortgage Bankers
Association,
Amici Curiae.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Shirley Werner
Kornreich, J.), entered May 14, 2013, which denied defendant’s
motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the
law, with costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed
to enter judgment accordingly.

This action is barred by the six-year statute of limitations
on contract causes of action (CPLR 213[2]).

Plaintiff alleges that defendant breached representations
and warranties in connection with the securitization of a pool of
mortgage loans governed by a Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement
(MLPA) and a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA). The MLPA and
PSA provided that the trustee was not entitled to sue or to
demand that defendant repurchase defective mortgage loans until
it discovered or received notice of a breach and the cure period
lapsed. The motion court erred in finding that plaintiff’s
claims did not accrue until defendant either failed to timely
cure or repurchase a defective mortgage loan (see Structured
Mtge. Trust 1997-2 v Daiwa Fin. Corp., 2003 WL 548868, 2003 US
Dist LEXIS 2677 [SD NY 2003]). To the contrary, the claims
accrued on the closing date of the MLPA, March 28, 2006, when any
breach of the representations and warranties contained therein
occurred (see Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399,
402 [1993]; Varo, Inc. v Alvis PLC, 261 AD2d 262, 267-268 [1st
Dept 1999], lv denied 95 NY2d 767 [2000]).

The certificate holders commenced an action on behalf of the
trust, after plaintiff refused to do so, on March 28, 2012, the
last day of the limitations period. However, defendant had not
received notice of the alleged breach until February 8, 2012.
Thus, the 60- and 90-day periods for cure and repurchase had not
yet elapsed. The certificate holders’ failure to comply with a
condition precedent to commencing suit rendered their summons
with notice a nullity (see Southern Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v
Impact Envtl. Eng’g, PLLC, 80 AD3d 505 [1st Dept 2011]).

In any event, the certificate holders lacked standing to
commence the action on behalf of the trust. The “no-action”
clause in § 12.03 of the PSA sets forth as a condition precedent
to such an action that the certificate holders provide the
trustee with “a written notice of default and of the continuance
thereof.” However, the “defaults” enumerated in the PSA concern
failures of performance by the servicer or master servicer only.
Thus, the PSA does not authorize certificate holders to provide
notices of “default” in connection with the sponsor’s breaches of
the representations (see Walnut Place LLC v Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 96 AD3d 684 [1st Dept 2012]).

Nor does the substitution of the trustee as plaintiff permit
us to deem timely filed the trustee’s complaint, which was filed
September 13, 2012 (compare e.g. HSBC Guyerzeller Bank AG v
Chascona N.V., 42 AD3d 381, 382 [1st Dept 2007] [original and
substituted plaintiffs were “affiliates in the HSBC family”];
American Home Assur. Co. v Scanlon, 164 AD2d 751, 752 [1st Dept
1990] [original and substituted plaintiffs were “both part of the
American International Group of insurance companies”]; Frankart
Furniture Staten Is. v Forest Mall Assoc., 159 AD2d 322 [1st Dept
1990] [original and substituted plaintiffs were a retail
furniture business and the actual owner of the furniture]).
In light of the foregoing, we need not reach defendant’s
alternative basis for dismissal.

M-5893
M-6111
M-6133 –
ACE Securities Corp., etc. v DB Structured
Products, Inc.
Motion and cross motions for leave to
file amicus curiae brief granted.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.
ENTERED: DECEMBER 19, 2013

AND of course the Lap Dogs decline to comment I bet because it might hurt their sale to Fidelity…

Bloomberg-

Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) is in talks with regulators that could lead to a settlement of more than $200 million over improper and fraudulent foreclosure paperwork after the 2008 credit crisis, according to people briefed on the discussions.

The deal would resolve claims that LPS falsified documents related to home seizures, including through “robo-signing.” The Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency have discussed directing at least some of the money to homeowners, said two people who spoke on condition of anonymity because the matter is private.

LPS, a mortgage-processing firm whose biggest customers have been Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC) and JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), previously settled similar matters with the Justice Department and almost every U.S. state. The Jacksonville, Florida-based company is one of the few in a group accused of foreclosure misdeeds that hasn’t made a final deal with bank regulators.

[BLOOMBERG]

You know after say about 20 dozen + or so lawsuits against the same cartels, wouldn’t you think the government would shut them down?

The only winners will be the attorneys.

Reuters-

Miami has sued Bank of America , Wells Fargo and Citibank in U.S. federal court in Florida, for discriminatory mortgage lending practices against minority residents that resulted in a rash of foreclosures, the city said on Thursday.

The lawsuits, filed on Dec. 13, accuse the banks of engaging in a “continuous pattern and practice of mortgage discrimination in Miami” since at least 2004 in violation of the U.S. Fair Housing Act of 1968, according to a court filing.

A spokesman for Wells Fargo said the bank was “disappointed” in the city’s decision to move ahead with what it called “baseless allegations”.

[REUTERS]

CONSENT JUDGMENT

WHEREAS, Plaintiffs, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the “CFPB” or
“Bureau”), and the States of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, the Commonwealths of Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Virginia, and the District of Columbia (collectively, “Plaintiff
States”) filed their complaint on December 19, 2013, alleging that Ocwen Financial Corporation
and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (collectively, “Defendant” or “Ocwen”) violated, among other
laws, the Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices laws of the Plaintiff States and the Consumer
Financial Protection Act of 2010.

WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to resolve their claims without the need for
litigation;

WHEREAS, Defendant has consented to entry of this Consent Judgment without trial or
adjudication of any issue of fact or law and to waive any appeal if the Consent Judgment is
entered as submitted by the parties;

WHEREAS, Defendant, by entering into this Consent Judgment, does not admit the
allegations of the Complaint other than those facts deemed necessary to the jurisdiction of this
Court;

WHEREAS, the intention of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the States in
effecting this settlement is to remediate harms allegedly resulting from the alleged unlawful
conduct of the Defendant;

WHEREAS, the State Mortgage Regulators are entering into a Settlement Agreement and
Consent Order with Ocwen to resolve the findings identified in the course of multi-state and
concurrent independent examinations of Ocwen, as well as examinations of Litton Loan
Servicing, LP and Homeward Residential, Inc., which were subsequently acquired by Ocwen.

AND WHEREAS, Defendant has agreed to waive service of the complaint and summons
and hereby acknowledges the same;

NOW THEREFORE, without trial or adjudication of issue of fact or law, without this
Consent Judgment constituting evidence against Defendant, and upon consent of Defendant, the
Court finds that there is good and sufficient cause to enter this Consent Judgment, and that it is
therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:

[…]

This one took a while…

Bloomberg-

Taylor Bean and a mortgage lender it bought in 2009, Home America Mortgage Inc., have agreed to settle the false-claims lawsuit for about $320 million, one of the people said. The government will only receive a portion of those funds from the the defunct company, said the people, who asked not to be named because the agreement was still being circulated among the parties.

Taylor Bean, which originated $17 billion in home loans in the first half of 2009, filed for bankruptcy later that year as a $3 billion scheme involving fake mortgage assets unraveled. Six Taylor Bean executives were convicted and jailed for their roles in the fraud, including former chairman Lee Farkas, who is serving a 30-year prison term for conspiracy and fraud.

[BLOOMBERG]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
1111 Polaris Parkway,
Columbus, Ohio 43240,
Plaintiff,

v.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, in its capacity as
Receiver for Washington Mutual Bank,
550 17th Street N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20429,

-and-

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, in its corporate capacity,
550 17th Street N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20429,
Defendants.

 .
NATURE OF ACTION

1. JPMC brings this action to recover substantially in excess of a billion
dollars in indemnification from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in its capacity as
Receiver for Washington Mutual Bank (“WMB”) (the “FDIC-Receiver”) under the terms of the
Purchase & Assumption Agreement between JPMC, the FDIC-Receiver, and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation in its corporate capacity (“FDIC-Corporate”, and collectively with FDICReceiver,
the “FDIC”), dated as of September 25, 2008 (the “P&A Agreement” or “P&A”),
pursuant to which JPMC acquired from the FDIC-Receiver essentially all of the assets and
assumed certain liabilities of WMB. As described more fully below, the FDIC-Receiver has
wrongly refused to acknowledge or honor its expansive indemnification obligations to JPMC
under the P&A Agreement and in doing so has subjected JPMC to massive liability.

2. The FDIC’ s indemnification obligations that are the subject of this action
are a matter of contract. They are promises that the FDIC made to JPMC to induce JPMC to
enter into the P&A Agreement when WMB failed in September 2008, in the largest bank failure
in this nation’s history. By entering into the P&A Agreement and agreeing to assume WMB’s
enormous deposit liabilities, JPMC protected the FDIC from potentially unprecedented liability
and helped ensure the stability of the country’s banking system by enabling the former WMB
branches to remain open for business as usual following the failure.

3. The FDIC-Receiver bears the primary responsibility to indemnify JPMC.
Its indemnification obligations to JPMC are paid out of existing assets held in the WMB
receivership, not borne by taxpayers or depositors. Following resolution of JPMC’s
indemnification claims, any amounts remaining in the WMB receivership would be paid out to
WMB creditors, primarily to holders of WMB senior debt, a group currently constituted mainly
of hedge funds and similar entities that have bought up WMB senior debt for pennies on the
dollar. FDIC-Corporate acts as a guarantor of the FDIC-Receiver’s indemnification obligations
to JPMC under the P&A Agreement; however, JPMC believes that the FDIC-Receiver has
sufficient assets to meet the existing indemnification obligations that are the subject of this action
and that, if the FDIC-Receiver does so, it will not be required to call upon FDIC-Corporate’s
guarantee.

4. The FDIC’ s indemnification obligations that are the subject of this action
are in addition to the obligations that the FDIC has to indemnify JPMC for any liability it may
incur with respect to the multi-billion dollar mortgage-backed securities repurchase claims being
asserted in the Deutsche Bank v. FDIC action in this Court (Civil Action No. 09-cv-1656), for
the various tax claims that are already the subject of other litigation between JPMC and the
FDIC, and for other claims in litigation where JPMC has asserted third-party claims against the
FDIC. The indemnification obligations that are the subject of this action are not exhaustive of
JPMC’ s indemnification rights under the P&A Agreement, and JPMC reserves the right to
demand indemnification from the FDIC under the P&A Agreement for matters that are not the
subject of this complaint.

[…]

THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

The facts of this case, as set forth in an earlier opinion of this court, are as follows:

“On December 31, 2009, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (hereinafter `BAC’), filed a complaint in ejectment against Bessie T. Sturdivant. Specifically, BAC alleged that it had sold at foreclosure certain property pursuant to the terms of a mortgage executed by Sturdivant, that it had purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, and that Sturdivant had failed to surrender possession of the property. Sturdivant answered and denied the material allegations of the complaint.

“BAC moved for a summary judgment, and Sturdivant opposed that motion. After conducting a hearing, the trial court, on October 29, 2010, entered a summary judgment in favor of BAC. The trial court also ordered that a writ of possession in favor of BAC be issued. Sturdivant filed a postjudgment motion, which the trial court denied. Sturdivant timely appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975.

“The record indicates the following relevant facts. In December 2007, Sturdivant obtained a loan from Security Atlantic Mortgage Co., Inc. (‘Security Atlantic’), to purchase a home. To secure the loan, Sturdivant executed a mortgage with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (‘MERS’), `solely as nominee’ for Security Atlantic. The record indicates that the loan was insured by the Federal Housing Administration (‘FHA’). A portion of the security agreement for the mortgage reads:

“`This security instrument is given to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), solely as nominee for lender, as hereinafter defined, and lender’s successors and assigns, as beneficiary…. For this purpose, borrower does hereby mortgage, grant and convey to MERS (solely as nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns) and to the successors and assigns of MERS, with power of sale, the following described property located in Jefferson County, Alabama ….

“`… Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interest granted by borrower and the security instrument; but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns) has the right to exercise any and all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the property; and to take any action required of lender….’

“Sturdivant stated in an affidavit that in March 2009 several of her family members died, that she herself became ill, and that she suffered a decrease in her income. Sturdivant testified that in March 2009 she began contacting BAC about the possibility of modifying her loan payments.

“The record indicates that when Sturdivant did not make the loan payments due in April 2009 or May 2009, BAC sent a letter on June 8, 2009, in which it identified itself as the `servicer’ of her loan. In that letter, BAC notified Sturdivant that if her default on the terms of the mortgage was not cured, the loan payments would be accelerated and the balance of the loan would be due.

“BAC presented evidence indicating that in September 2009 it referred the matter to an attorney to begin the foreclosure process. The record contains two letters, each dated September 20, 2009, sent by BAC’s attorney to Sturdivant. One of the September 20, 2009, letters identified BAC as the `holder of [Sturdivant’s] mortgage,’ informed Sturdivant of the total amount due under the terms of the mortgage-loan contract, and notified her of the procedures for disputing the debt. The other September 20, 2009, letter from BAC’s attorney to Sturdivant notified Sturdivant that BAC, identified as the holder of the mortgage, had instructed the attorney to proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgage and that a foreclosure sale was scheduled for October 28, 2009.

“BAC also submitted into evidence two communication logs generated by Neighborhood Housing Services of Birmingham, Inc. (‘NHSB’), an organization that Sturdivant authorized to negotiate on her behalf with `the lender’ in connection with the mortgage loan. The NHSB communication logs indicate that in late April or early May 2009 Sturdivant began the process of applying for a `work out’ of her mortgage, i.e., applying for assistance regarding, a modification of, or a restructuring of the mortgage loan. The communication logs indicate that in mid September 2009 Sturdivant was informed that BAC was seeking to foreclose on the property and that Sturdivant was continuing her efforts to obtain a modification of the mortgage loan.

“The foreclosure sale scheduled for October 28, 2009, was postponed until December 1, 2009, while BAC continued to review Sturdivant’s request for a modification of her loan. A November 13, 2009, entry on one of the NHSB communication logs indicates that NHSB was informed on that date that Sturdivant’s request was still under review but that the foreclosure sale remained scheduled for December 1, 2009. On December 1, 2009, NHSB entered a notation that it had been informed that Sturdivant `did not qualify for a loan mod on 11-7-2009.’ An assistant vice president for BAC, Ken Satsky, stated in an affidavit that, `based upon a review of the financial information provided by Ms. Sturdivant, she did not meet the applicable guidelines’ for a modification of the mortgage loan.

“In his affidavit, which was submitted in support of BAC’s summary-judgment motion, Satsky said that, `[i]n my employment capacity, I am personally familiar’ with Sturdivant’s mortgage account. Satsky’s affidavit stated that Sturdivant’s mortgage had originated with MERS, on behalf of Security Atlantic or its successors and assigns, and that foreclosure proceedings had been initiated. Satsky’s affidavit does not reference an assignment of the mortgage to BAC, and it does not indicate the identity of the entity that initiated the foreclosure proceedings. Satsky testified that Sturdivant defaulted on the note secured by the mortgage and that BAC `provided her with Notice of Default and acceleration of the debt due under said note by letter dated January 6, 2009.’ The record on appeal does not contain a letter dated January 6, 2009, and Satsky’s affidavit does not refer to the September 20, 2009, letters BAC submitted to the trial court in support of its summary-judgment motion.

“Also in support of its summary-judgment motion, BAC submitted into evidence a statement that a notice of foreclosure had been published on November 7, 2009, in the Alabama Messenger, a `weekly newspaper of general circulation.’ See § 35-10-8, Ala. Code 1975 (governing the notice required for a foreclosure sale). In that notice, BAC stated that it was the `holder of [Sturdivant’s] mortgage,’ which contained a power of sale, and that BAC would sell the property on December 1, 2009, at public auction. BAC also represented in its published notice of the proposed December 1, 2009, foreclosure sale that Sturdivant had mortgaged the property to MERS, as nominee for Security Atlantic or its successors and assigns, and that `said mortgage was subsequently assigned to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, by instrument recorded in [the probate court].’

“On December 1, 2009, the property was sold at the foreclosure sale that BAC had scheduled. BAC was the purchaser of the property at that sale. Also on December 1, 2009, MERS assigned Sturdivant’s mortgage to BAC.

“In support of its motion for a summary judgment, BAC submitted to the trial court a copy of its auctioneer’s foreclosure deed, also dated December 1, 2009, which states, among other things, that MERS had assigned the mortgage to BAC, that BAC had recorded that assignment of the mortgage, and that BAC had completed other steps necessary to obtain a deed by virtue of its purchase of the property at the foreclosure sale. With regard to the assignment of the mortgage, the December 1, 2009, auctioneer’s foreclosure deed specifically states:

“WHEREAS, BESSIE T. STURDIVANT, unmarried, executed a mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. [MERS], acting solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s Successors and Assigns on the 18th day of December 2007, on that certain real property hereinafter described, which mortgage is recorded in Book LR200801, Page 21971, of the records in the Office of the Judge of Probate, Jefferson County, Alabama; which said mortgage was subsequently assigned to BAC Home Loans Servicing LP by instrument recorded in Book 200912 Page 14464 of said Probate Court records….’

“(Emphasis added.) The `book’ and `page’ numbers identified in the above-quoted portion of the December 1, 2009, auctioneer’s foreclosure deed are not printed in typeface, as is the remainder of the deed. Rather, those numbers are handwritten insertions into the auctioneer’s foreclosure deed. The evidence submitted by BAC in support of its summary-judgment motion indicates that the December 1, 2009, assignment of Sturdivant’s mortgage from MERS to BAC and the December 1, 2009, auctioneer’s foreclosure deed were each first recorded in the office of the Jefferson Probate Court (‘the probate court’) on December 23, 2009, and the time stamps on those documents indicate that the auctioneer’s foreclosure deed was recorded one second after the assignment.

“On December 4, 2009, BAC sent a letter to Sturdivant notifying her of its purchase of the property at the December 1, 2009, foreclosure sale and demanding possession of the property pursuant to § 6-5-251, Ala. Code 1975.”

Sturdivant v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, [Ms. 2100245, Dec. 16, 2011] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (footnotes omitted), rev’d, Ex parte BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, [Ms. 1110373, Sept. 13, 2013] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2013).

In Sturdivant, supra, this court, relying on precedent from our supreme court, held that because Sturdivant’s mortgage had not been assigned to BAC at the time BAC initiated the foreclosure proceedings, BAC did not have the right to conduct the foreclosure sale and, therefore, lacked standing to prosecute its ejectment action. Id. Accordingly, this court pretermitted the discussion of the other issues raised in Sturdivant’s brief on appeal.

BAC filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to our supreme court, which consolidated the action with another action with similar facts. Our supreme court held that this court erred in determining that BAC did not have standing to prosecute its ejectment action, concluding that the issue whether the foreclosing entity had valid title to or the right to possess the property was not one that impacted the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court. Ex parte BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, So. 3d at. Rather, our supreme court held, those issues impacted the determination whether a foreclosing person or entity could meet each element of its cause of action in ejectment. Id. The supreme court explained:

“[BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (‘BAC’),] attended a foreclosure auction, was the successful bidder at that auction, paid money for the auctioned property, and received a foreclosure deed to the property. With deed in hand, [BAC] now brings an action under Alabama law, specifically § 6-6-280(b), Ala. Code 1975, claiming good title to the property at issue and the right to eject the original debtor. We are clear to the conclusion that the trial courts had subject-matter jurisdiction over [this] cause[], including any issue as to the validity in fact of [BAC’s] title to the property, this being one of the elements of proof required in an ejectment action.

“If in the end the facts do not support [BAC], or the law does not do so, so be it—but this does not mean [BAC] cannot come into court and allege, and attempt to prove, otherwise. If [BAC] fail[s] in this endeavor, it is not that [it has] a `standing’ problem, it is, as Judge Pittman recognized in Sturdivant, that [it has] a `cause of action’ problem, or more precisely in [this] case[], a `failure to prove one’s cause of action’ problem. The trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to `hear’ such `problems’—and the cases in which they arise. To the extent Cadle [v. Shabani, 950 So. 2d 277 (Ala. 2006),] holds otherwise, i.e., that a plaintiff in an ejectment action lacks `standing’ if it cannot prove one of the elements of its claim (namely, legal title or the right to possession of the property) and that the trial court in turn lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over that claim—it and other cases so holding are hereby overruled.”

Ex parte BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, ___ So. 3d at ___.

On remand from our supreme court, we now reach the other issues raised by Bessie T. Sturdivant in her brief submitted to this court pertaining to whether BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (“BAC”), was entitled to a summary judgment on its cause of action for ejectment. The standard by which this court reviews a summary judgment is well settled:

“`”To grant [a summary-judgment] motion, the trial court must determine that the evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. When the movant makes a prima facie showing that those two conditions are satisfied, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present `substantial evidence’ creating a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989); § 12-21-12(d)[,] Ala. Code 1975. Evidence is `substantial’ if it is of `such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.’ West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).

“`”In our review of a summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the trial court. Ex parte Lumpkin, 702 So. 2d 462, 465 (Ala. 1997). Our review is subject to the caveat that we must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d 412 (Ala. 1990).”‘

“Payton v. Monsanto Co., 801 So. 2d 829, 832-33 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen. Ins. Co., 742 So. 2d 182, 184 (Ala. 1999)).”

Maciasz v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 988 So. 2d 991, 994-95 (Ala. 2008).

Sturdivant argues that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of BAC because, she contends, BAC did not present prima facie evidence in support of each element of its claim for ejectment. This court explained BAC’s claim seeking to eject Sturdivant from the property as follows:

“BAC’s claim for ejectment is one arising under § 6-6-280(b), Ala. Code 1975. See EB Invs., L.L.C. v. Atlantis Dev., Inc., 930 So. 2d 502 (Ala. 2005) (the claim was one in ejectment under § 6-6-280(b), Ala. Code 1975, when the complainant alleged that it was entitled to possession of land because of its purchase of the land at a foreclosure sale and that the defendant was unlawfully detaining same); Muller v. Seeds, 919 So. 2d 1174 (Ala. 2005), overruled on other grounds, Steele v. Federal Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 69 So. 3d 89 (Ala. 2010) (same); and Earnest v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Alabama, 494 So. 2d 80 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (same).

“Section 6-6-280(b) provides as follows:

“`(b) An action for the recovery of land or the possession thereof in the nature of an action in ejectment may be maintained without a statement of any lease or demise to the plaintiff or ouster by a casual or nominal ejector, and the complaint is sufficient if it alleges that the plaintiff was possessed of the premises or has the legal title thereto, properly designating or describing them, and that the defendant entered thereupon and unlawfully withholds and detains the same. This action must be commenced in the name of the real owner of the land or in the name of the person entitled to the possession thereof, though the plaintiff may have obtained his title thereto by a conveyance made by a grantor who was not in possession of the land at the time of the execution of the conveyance thereof. The plaintiff may recover in this action mesne profits and damages for waste or any other injury to the lands, as the plaintiff’s interests in the lands entitled him to recover, to be computed up to the time of the verdict.'”

Sturdivant, ___ So. 3d at ___ (Some emphasis in original; some emphasis added).

“In order to maintain an action for ejectment, a plaintiff must allege either possession or legal title….” Cadle Co. v. Shabani, 950 So. 2d 277, 279 (Ala. 2006). In Ex parte BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, supra, our supreme court clarified that either possession or legal title is an element of proof to be demonstrated in support of a cause of action for ejectment. See also § 6-6-280(b), Ala. Code 1975 (A complaint in ejectment “is sufficient if it alleges that the plaintiff was possessed of the premises or has the legal title thereto.”); Ex parte McKinney, 87 So. 3d 502, 507 n. 6 (Ala. 2011) (“`Ejectment may be maintained on proof of title carrying, as an element of ownership, a right to possession and enjoyment. …’ Lane v. Henderson, 232 Ala. 122, 124, 167 So. 270, 271 (1936).”).

In this case, BAC alleged in its ejectment complaint that it had legal title to the property. In response, Sturdivant argued that BAC’s deed, pursuant to which BAC claimed title to the property, was void because BAC could not have validly foreclosed on the mortgage. A deed resulting from a foreclosure sale may be deemed void when, among other things, “the foreclosing entity does not have the legal right to exercise the power of sale, as for example, when that entity is neither the assignee of the mortgage … nor the holder of the promissory note … at the time it commences the foreclosure proceedings.” Campbell v. Bank of America, N.A., [Ms. 2100246, June 22, 2012] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2012). “In an ejectment action, the burden is on the plaintiff, not the defendant, to prove superior title to the property in question.” Maiden v. Federal Nat’l. Mortg. Ass’n, 86 So. 3d 368, 376 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).

Section 35-10-12, Ala. Code 1975, provides in part that “[w]here a power to sell lands is given in any mortgage, the power is part of the security and may be executed by any person, or the personal representative of any person who, by assignment or otherwise, becomes entitled to the money thus secured.” (Emphasis added.) Sturdivant argues that the foreclosure sale was invalid because, she contends, BAC was not an assignee of the mortgage and, therefore, did not have the legal right to initiate foreclosure proceedings in September 2009.

However, on the same date that it released its opinion in Ex parte BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, supra, our supreme court also released Ex parte GMAC Mortgage, LLC, [Ms. 1110547, Sept. 13, 2013] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2013). In Ex parte GMAC, supra, GMAC accelerated the terms of a mortgage, gave notice of foreclosure, and scheduled a foreclosure sale. The mortgage was assigned to GMAC one day before the foreclosure sale. The mortgagors, who were defendants in GMAC’s ejectment action, challenged the validity of the foreclosure sale on the basis that GMAC had not been assigned the mortgage at the time it had initiated the foreclosure proceedings. Our supreme court held that “the validity of a foreclosure turns not on whether the foreclosing party held the mortgage and the power of sale at the time of the initiation of the foreclosure process, but on whether it held the mortgage and the power of sale `at the time the power of sale is executed.'” ___ So. 3d at ___. Thus, the court concluded, “[a]t the time GMAC Mortgage signed and delivered the foreclosure deed, it was in fact the holder of the mortgage. It had at that point the full power to exercise the power of sale so as to `foreclose’ the mortgagor’s rights in the land and convey those rights to itself or to another.” Ex parte GMAC, ___ So. 3d at ___.

Accordingly, we consider Sturdivant’s argument that BAC lacked the authority to foreclose because of the timing of its assignment in light of the recent holding of Ex parte GMAC, supra, and we must determine whether BAC presented a prima facie case that, at the time it foreclosed on Sturdivant’s mortgage, BAC had received an assignment of the mortgage. The record indicates that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), assigned the mortgage to BAC on December 1, 2009. Also on December 1, 2009, BAC conducted the foreclosure sale and obtained a foreclosure deed to Sturdivant’s property. The record contains no indication as to what time the December 1, 2009, assignment occurred or when BAC conducted the foreclosure sale on December 1, 2009.^[1] Although BAC might have had the assignment at the time it foreclosed, it failed to present evidence in support of that fact in its summary-judgment motion. Thus, BAC failed to present a prima facie case in support of its summary-judgment motion that it had received the December 1, 2009, assignment of Sturdivant’s mortgage before it foreclosed on the property on December 1, 2009. Accordingly, we conclude that BAC was not entitled to a summary judgment on the basis of having demonstrated that it had been assigned Sturdivant’s mortgage at the time it foreclosed.

However, under § 35-10-2, Ala. Code 1975, BAC might “otherwise” become entitled to foreclose. This court has held that under § 35-10-12 any person or entity who, before initiating foreclosure proceedings, becomes a holder of a promissory note secured by a mortgage and thereby is entitled to the payment of the mortgage debt may validly foreclose upon a borrower’s default. Perry v. Federal Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 100 So. 3d 1090, 1094 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012). The parties have not addressed in their briefs submitted to this court whether BAC was a holder of the promissory note secured by Sturdivant’s mortgage at the time BAC initiated the foreclosure proceedings. However, an appellate court may affirm a judgment that is correct for any reason. Ex parte Shelby Cnty. Health Care Auth., 850 So. 2d 332, 339 (Ala. 2002) (“[T]his Court will affirm a properly entered summary judgment, even if the trial court’s reasons for entering the judgment were incorrect.”). For that reason, this court addresses the issue whether the evidence would support a conclusion that BAC presented a prima facie case that it was entitled to a summary judgment on the basis that it was a holder of the note at the time it foreclosed on the property.

In Alabama, a note secured by a mortgage is a negotiable instrument. Thomas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 116 So. 3d 226, 233 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012). A holder of a note secured by a mortgage is entitled to enforce the terms of the note. Perry v. Federal Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 100 So. 3d at 1094.^[2] This court has explained:

“In Harton v. Little, 176 Ala. 267, 270, 57 So. 851, 851 (1911), our supreme court held that `[i]t is not at all necessary that a mortgage deed be assigned in order to enable the owner of the debt to foreclose under a power of sale.’

“`The power of sale is a part of the security, and may be exercised by an assignee, or any person who is entitled to the mortgage debt. And a transfer of the debt, by writing or by parol, is in equity an assignment of the mortgage.’

“176 Ala. at 270, 57 So. At 851-52 (citations omitted). See also Ala. Code 1975, § 8-5-24 (‘the transfer of a … note given for the purchase money of lands, whether the transfer be by delivery merely or in writing, expressed to be with or without recourse on the transferor, passes to the transferee the lien of the vendor of the liens.’) See generally Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 5.4(a) (1997) (stating that `[a] transfer of an obligation secured by a mortgage also transfers the mortgage unless the parties to the transfer agree otherwise’).”

Perry v. Federal Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 100 So. 3d at 1095.

In Coleman v. BAC Servicing, 104 So. 3d 195, 203 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012), this court reiterated that “[t]he promissory note evidencing that debt was a bearer instrument that could be transferred in two ways: by delivery of possession or by written assignment.” (Citing § 8-5-24, Ala. Code 1975.) In that case, although it had not received an assignment of the mortgage at issue, the foreclosing entity had possession of the note secured by the mortgage; therefore, this court held that the foreclosing entity was entitled to enforce the note and foreclose on the mortgage. In so holding, this court explained that “`[t]he note is symbolic of the debt, and the physical possession of the note governs over any other indicium of its ownership.'” Coleman, 104 So. 3d at 204 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 5.4(c), cmt. following illus. 7 (Tentative Draft No. 5, March 18, 1996)).

In Nelson v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 97 So. 3d 770 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012), the record indicated that Flagstar Bank, FSB, was the entity that had the rights to service a mortgage loan on behalf of the mortgagee or note holder. MERS, as nominee for Flagstar, foreclosed on the property and obtained a foreclosure deed, which it then transferred to the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”). Fannie Mae, relying on the foreclosure deed it received from Flagstar, sought to eject the mortgagors, the Nelsons. In opposing Fannie Mae’s ejectment action, the Nelsons argued that the foreclosure deed was invalid. It was undisputed that the mortgage at issue had not been assigned to MERS or Flagstar at the time that MERS, on behalf of Flagstar, initiated the foreclosure proceedings, and, therefore, based on decisions pre-dating Ex parte GMAC, supra, the foreclosure sale could not be said to be valid based on a timely assignment. Nelson, supra.

However, in that case, this court concluded that, in its summary-judgment motion in support of its ejectment claim, Fannie Mae had failed to present any evidence indicating that Flagstar was the holder of the note at the time that MERS, on behalf of Flagstar, initiated the foreclosure proceedings. Nelson, 97 So. 2d at 779 (explaining that, under § 35-10-2, “the owner of the debt may foreclose on property that is the subject of a mortgage securing that debt if the owner is the holder of the promissory note at the time the owner initiates foreclosure proceedings”). This court concluded:

“The complete absence of any evidence indicating that Flagstar was the owner of the debt, i.e., the holder of the note, before June 5, 2009, when MERS, as nominee for Flagstar, invoked the power of sale in the mortgage means that MERS did not convey legal title to itself by virtue of the foreclosure deed because MERS had no authority to initiate the foreclosure proceedings. Consequently, the special warranty deed that Fannie Mae received from MERS two days after the foreclosure sale, which depended on its efficacy upon the validity of the MERS foreclosure deed, see 11 Thompson on Real Property § 94.07(b)(2)(I) at 390 (David A. Thomas 2d ed. 2002), was also void.”

Nelson, 97 So. 3d at 780 (emphasis added).

In Nelson, supra, this court, relying on Sturdivant, supra, held that, as a result of the void ejectment deed, Fannie Mae lacked standing to initiate its foreclosure action against the Nelsons. Our supreme court has reversed Sturdivant and held that a foreclosing entity with a purportedly valid deed does have standing to initiate an ejectment action, but that having a valid deed at the time it initiates the ejectment action is an essential element of that cause of action. Ex parte BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, ___ So. 3d at ___ (“[T]he validity in fact of the plaintiffs’ title to the property [is] one of the elements of proof required in an ejectment action.”). In addition, our supreme court in Ex parte GMAC held that there is no requirement that the foreclosing entity have title (or be a holder of the note) until the time of foreclosure, thus negating that part of Nelson in which this court held that the foreclosing entity was required to have legal title or be in possession of the note at the time the foreclosure “process” was initiated.

Accordingly, given Sturdivant’s argument concerning whether BAC met its prima facie burden and given the foregoing precedent, we must determine whether BAC presented a prima facie case indicating that it was a holder of the note at the time it foreclosed. The record indicates that BAC sent a June 8, 2009, letter to Sturdivant in which BAC stated that it “services the home loan described above on behalf of the holder of the promissory note (the `Noteholder’).”^[3] BAC did not identify the person or entity who was the “Noteholder” referenced in that letter. In a September 20, 2009, letter from counsel for BAC, the attorney who authored the letter referred to BAC as the “holder of the above mortgage.” In another September 20, 2009, letter to Sturdivant, as well as an October 28, 2009, letter, BAC’s attorney referred to Sturdivant’s mortgage as being “held by BAC.”^[4] Those statements in correspondence by an attorney, however, are unsworn representations and do not constitute evidence regarding whether BAC was a holder of the note secured by Sturdivant’s mortgage at the time of the foreclosure.

The record contains no evidence indicating if or when BAC became the holder of the note secured by the mortgage. In support of its summary-judgment motion, BAC submitted only documentary evidence, the affidavit of its attorney detailing the measures he took in initiating the foreclosure proceedings, and Satsky’s affidavit. None of those submissions sets forth evidence indicating whether BAC was merely the debt servicer for a holder of the note or whether BAC was the holder of the note by virtue of having the note in its possession.

Thus, BAC presented no evidence indicating that it was either the assignee of the mortgage or the holder of the note entitled to payment of the mortgage indebtedness at the time it foreclosed on Sturdivant’s mortgage. We must conclude that BAC failed to present a prima facie case in support of its summary-judgment motion that it had the authority to foreclose and, thus, had valid title to or the right to possess the property. Given BAC’s failure to present prima facie evidence of one of the elements of its claim in ejectment, we must reverse the summary judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings. See, e.g., Ross v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 122 So. 3d 219, 223 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013) (The foreclosing entity conceded that, because of errors in the assignment of a mortgage, there existed a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether it had the authority to foreclose, and, therefore, whether it could maintain its action in ejectment.). Our resolution of these issues makes it unnecessary to address Sturdivant’s other arguments pertaining to the summary judgment.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Pittman, Thomas, Moore, and Donaldson, JJ., concur.

[1] According to the statement in the foreclosure deed, the sale was conducted “during the legal hours of sale” on December 1, 2009.

[2] We also note that Sturdivant contends that the mortgage and the note were separated. This court has held that such a separation does not render the note unenforceable. Nelson v. Federal Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 97 So. 3d 770, 775 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012).

[3] Even assuming that the statement of its attorney could be said to be evidence indicating that BAC was the servicer of the mortgage debt, a transfer of the rights to service a loan to an entity such as BAC might, but does not necessarily, transfer to the servicer the note secured by the mortgage. Nelson, 97 So. 3d at 777.

[4] None of the letters referenced in this paragraph was authored by BAC’s appellate counsel.