Rolling Stone political reporter Matt Taibbi joins HuffPost Live to discuss the fact that it seems as though public workers take the brunt of the criticism for state budget short falls.
Wells Fargo & Co said on Monday it will pay $780 million in cash to Freddie Mac to resolve substantially all repurchase liabilities on home loans sold to the government-controlled mortgage company prior to 2009.
The largest U.S. mortgage lender said the settlement was reached on September 27 and totaled $869 million before adjusting for credits related to prior loan repurchases.
Wells Fargo announced the settlement five days after Citigroup Inc agreed to pay Freddie Mac $395 million to settle similar claims over roughly 3.7 million mortgages sold from 2000 to 2012.
I have been reviewing my proof and witnesses and have been working on streamlining the process. At this point, I have determined that I will not be presenting you as a witness since the allegations contained in your complaint can be established through another witness that will be testifying about items that only she can attest to. I do not want to duplicate and prolong. I am sure you can understand….
Not so fassst! I might post something later this week (if it gets filed) that ties FDIC and JPMC together in this scam.
Reuters-
JPMorgan Chase & Co’s possible $11 billion settlement of government mortgage probes has been complicated by a dispute with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp over responsibility for losses at the former Washington Mutual Inc, said people familiar with the matter.
The dispute, between the largest U.S. bank and the FDIC, could leave the federal agency on the hook for billions the bank is expected to pay as part of the settlement and substantially reduce the amount of the penalty JPMorgan actually pays to the government, some analysts said.
JPMorgan is seeking a “global” settlement of federal and state mortgage-related probes that could involve a payment of $7 billion in cash plus $4 billion for consumers, according to other people familiar with negotiations.
Saw this coming… in the end we will find out some savvy investors were in on this with the banks all along.
Reuters-
As Richmond, California, moves forward with a plan to help struggling homeowners by using its power of eminent domain to seize underwater mortgages, the list of those concerned about it is growing – and now includes the pension fund for many of the very same city workers pushing the plan.
The $268 billion California Public Employees’ Retirement System, the nation’s largest public pension fund, joins banks and other investors in worrying that Richmond’s plan will undermine the value of its holdings.
Calpers holds about $11 billion in income-producing mortgage-backed securities, though it calculates it has just $27,000 in exposure to mortgages targeted by Richmond.
“We are sympathetic to homeowners but as fiduciaries our focus must be in the best interests of our members,” Calpers spokesman Joe DeAnda told Reuters in the fund’s first public statement on Richmond’s plan. “We are watching the issue closely and have some concerns about the precedent this may set and the impact to investors.”
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK
ROYAL PARK INVESTMENTS SA/NV, Plaintiff,
vs.
CREDIT SUISSE AG, CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC, DLJ MORTGAGE CAPITAL, INC. and CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP., Defendants.
EXCERPTS- 274. As previously discussed, the certificates never should have received the safe, “investment grade” ratings touted by defendants in the Offering Documents. In truth, the certificates were anything but safe, “investment grade” securities, as defendants well knew. In fact, the certificates were exactly the opposite – extremely risky, speculative grade “junk” bonds or worse, backed by low credit quality, extremely risky loans. As defendants were well aware, the certificates were each backed by numerous loans that had not been originated pursuant to their stated underwriting guidelines, with many loans being made without any regard for the borrowers’ true repayment ability, and/or on the basis of falsely inflated incomes and property values, as alleged above. Moreover, as also alleged above, the LTV ratios and Primary Residence Percentages for the loans had been falsified so as to make the loans (and thus, the certificates) appear to be of much higher credit quality than they actually were.
275. In order to obtain “investment grade” credit ratings for the certificates, defendants were required to work with the Credit Rating Agencies. Specifically, defendants were required to provide the Credit Rating Agencies with information concerning the underlying loans, which the Credit Rating Agencies then put into their computerized ratings models to generate the credit ratings. In order to procure the falsely inflated ratings defendants desired for the certificates, defendants fed the Credit Rating Agencies falsified information on the loans, including, without limitation, false loan underwriting guidelines, false LTV ratios, false borrower FICO scores, false borrower DTI ratios, and false Primary Residence Percentages. Among other things, defendants falsely represented to the Credit Rating Agencies that virtually none of the loans in any of the offerings had LTV ratios in excess of 100%. Defendants also misrepresented and underreported the numbers of loans that had LTV ratios in excess of 80% in many cases. Defendants further misrepresented that the loans had much higher Primary Residence Percentages than they actually did. Defendants also concealed from the Credit Rating Agencies that most of the loans were not originated pursuant to the underwriting guidelines stated in the Offering Documents and/or were supported by falsely inflated incomes, appraisals and valuations. Defendants also never informed the Credit Rating Agencies that Clayton had detected defect rates of 32% in the samples of loans it tested for the Credit Suisse Defendants or that Credit Suisse had put 33.4% of those identifiably defective loans into the offerings. Defendants also never told the Credit Rating Agencies that defendants did no further testing on the vast majority of loans despite their awareness that there were significant numbers of defective loans detected by the test samples.
276. That the credit ratings stated in the Offering Documents were false and misleading is confirmed by subsequent events, as set forth supra. Specifically, after the sales of the certificates to plaintiff were completed, staggering percentages of the loans underlying the certificates began to go into default because they had been made to borrowers who either could not afford them or never intended to pay them. Indeed, in a majority of the loan groups at issue herein, at least 33% of the loans currently in the trusts are in default. A substantial number of loan groups have default rates above 37%.
277. The average default rate for all the certificates at issue herein currently hovers at around 32.5%. In other words, over three in ten loans currently in the trusts are in default. It is also important to understand that these reported default rates are for loans that are currently still in the trusts. Any prior loans that were in default and which had been previously liquidated or sold, and thus written off and taken out of the trusts, have not been included in the calculations. Therefore, the foregoing default rates do not include earlier defaults, and thus understate the cumulative default rates for all of the loans that were originally part of the trusts.
278. Further proving that the credit ratings stated in the Offering Documents were false and misleading is the fact that all of the certificates have since been downgraded to reflect their true credit ratings, now that the true credit quality (or more accurately, lack of quality) and riskiness of their underlying loans is known. Indeed, all of plaintiff’s 20 certificates have now been downgraded to speculative “junk” status or below by S&P and/or Moody’s. Moreover, 12 of plaintiff’s 20 certificates now have a credit rating of “D” by S&P and/or “C” by Moody’s, indicating that they are in “default,” and reflecting that they have suffered losses and/or writedowns, and/or have completely stopped paying. In other words, approximately 60% of plaintiff’s certificates are in default. This is strong evidence that defendants lied about the credit ratings. This is so because the high, “investment grade” credit ratings assigned to plaintiff’s certificates had a probability of default of between “less than 1%” (Levin-Coburn Report at 6) for the highest rated certificates and 2.6% (according to Moody’s) for certificates rated even lower than plaintiff’s. The huge discrepancy in the actual default rates (60%) and the historically expected default rates (less than 2.6%) demonstrates the falsity of defendants’ statements regarding the credit ratings.
279. These massive downgrades – in many cases, from “safest of the safe” “AAA” ratings to “junk” (anything below Baa3 or BBB-) – show that, due to defendants’ knowing use of bogus loan data, the initial ratings for the certificates, as stated in the Offering Documents, were false. Indeed, the fact that 100% of the certificates are now rated at “junk” status or below, and approximately 60% of the certificates are now in default, is compelling evidence that the initial high ratings touted by defendants in the Offering Documents were grossly overstated and false.
E. Defendants Materially Misrepresented that Title to the Underlying Loans Was Properly and Timely Transferred
280. An essential aspect of the mortgage securitization process is that the issuing trust for each RMBS offering must obtain good title to the mortgage loans comprising the pool for that offering. This is necessary in order for plaintiff and the other certificate holders to be legally entitled to enforce the mortgage and foreclose in case of default. Accordingly, at least two documents relating to each mortgage loan must be validly transferred to the trust as part of the securitization process – a promissory note and a security instrument (either a mortgage or a deed of trust).
281. The rules for these transfers are governed by the law of the state where the property is located, by the terms of the pooling and servicing agreement (“PSA”) for each securitization, and by the law governing the issuing trust (with respect to matters of trust law). Generally, state laws and the PSAs require that the trustee have physical possession of the original, manually signed note in order for the loan to be enforceable by the trustee against the borrower in case of default.
282. In addition, in order to preserve the bankruptcy-remote status of the issuing trusts in RMBS transactions, the notes and security instruments are generally not transferred directly from the mortgage loan originators to the trusts. Rather, the notes and security instruments are generally initially transferred from the originators to the sponsors of the RMBS offerings. After this initial transfer to the sponsor, the sponsor in turn transfers the notes and security instruments to the depositor. The depositor then transfers the notes and security instruments to the issuing trust for the particular securitization. This is done to protect investors from claims that might be asserted against a bankrupt originator. Each of these transfers must be valid under applicable state law in order for the trust to have good title to the mortgage loans.
283. Moreover, the PSAs generally require the transfer of the mortgage loans to the trusts to be completed within a strict time limit – three months – after formation of the trusts in order to ensure that the trusts qualify as tax-free real estate mortgage investment conduits (“REMICs”). In order for the trust to maintain its tax free status, the loans must have been transferred to the trust no later than three months after the “startup day,” i.e., the day interests in the trust are issued. See Internal Revenue Code §860D(a)(4). That is, the loans must generally have been transferred to the trusts within at least three months of the “closing” dates of the offerings. In this action, all of closing dates occurred in 2005, 2006 or 2007, as the offerings were sold to the public. If loans are transferred into the trust after the three-month period has elapsed, investors are injured, as the trusts lose their tax-free REMIC status and investors like plaintiff may face several adverse draconian tax consequences, including: (1) the trust’s income becoming subject to corporate “double taxation”; (2) the income from the late-transferred mortgages being subject to a 100% tax; and (3) if late transferred mortgages are received through contribution, the value of the mortgages being subject to a 100% tax. See Internal Revenue Code §§860D, 860F(a), 860G(d).
284. In addition, applicable state trust law generally requires strict compliance with the trust documents, including the PSAs, so that failure to strictly comply with the timeliness, endorsement, physical delivery, and other requirements of the PSAs with respect to the transfers of the notes and security instruments means the transfers would be void and the trust would not have good title to the mortgage loans.
285. To this end, all of the Offering Documents relied upon by plaintiff stated that the loans would be timely transferred to the trusts. See §V, supra. For example, in the HEAT 2007-3 Offering Materials, the Credit Suisse Defendants represented that “on the closing date for the initial mortgage loans and on any subsequent transfer date for the subsequent mortgage loans, the depositor will sell, transfer, assign, set over and otherwise convey without recourse to the trustee in trust for the benefit of the certificateholders all right, title and interest of the depositor in and to each mortgage loan.” HEAT 2007-3 Pros. Supp. at S-33.
286. However, defendants’ statements were materially false and misleading when made. Contrary to defendants’ representations that they would legally and properly transfer the promissory notes and security instruments to the trusts, defendants in fact systematically failed to do so. This failure was driven by defendants’ desire to complete securitizations as fast as possible and maximize the fees they would earn on the deals they closed. Because ensuring the proper transfer of the promissory notes and mortgages hindered and slowed defendants’ securitizations, defendants deliberately chose to disregard their promises to do so to plaintiff.
287. Defendants’ failure to ensure proper transfer of the notes and the mortgages to the trusts at closing has already resulted in damages to investors in securitizations underwritten by defendants. Trusts are unable to foreclose on loans because they cannot prove they own the mortgages, due to the fact that defendants never properly transferred title to the mortgages at the closing of the offerings. Moreover, investors are only now becoming aware that, while they thought they were purchasing “mortgaged-backed” securities, in fact they were purchasing non-mortgagedbacked securities.
[…]
293. Other public reports corroborate the fact that the loans were not properly transferred. For example, Cheryl Samons, an office manager for the Law Office of David J. Stern – a “foreclosure mill” under investigation by the Florida Attorney General for mortgage foreclosure fraud that was forced to shut down in March 2011 – signed tens of thousands of documents purporting to establish mortgage transfers for trusts that closed in 2005 and 2006 in 2008, 2009 and 2010 from Mortgage Electronic Registration Services, an electronic registry that was intended to eliminate the need to file transfers in the county land records. In depositions in foreclosure actions, Samons has admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts recited on the mortgage transfers that were used in foreclosure actions to recover the properties underlying the mortgages backing RMBS. See, e.g., Deposition of Cheryl Samons, Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., as Trustee for Morgan Stanley ABS Capital 1 Inc. Trust 2006-HE4 v. Pierre, No. 50-2008-CA-028558-XXXMB (Fla. Cir. Ct., 15th Jud. Cir., Palm Beach City, May 20, 2009).
294. The need to fabricate or fraudulently alter mortgage assignment documentation provides compelling evidence that, in many cases, title to the mortgages backing the certificates plaintiff purchased was never properly or timely transferred. This fact is confirmed by an investigation conducted by plaintiff concerning one of the specific offerings at issue herein, which revealed that the vast majority of loans underlying the offering were not properly or timely transferred to the trust.
295. Specifically, plaintiff performed an investigation concerning the mortgage loans purportedly transferred to the trust for the Credit Suisse Defendants’ HEAT 2007-3 offering. The closing date for this offering was on or about May 1, 2007. Plaintiff reviewed the transfer history for 272 loans that were supposed to be timely transferred to this trust. Thirty-five (35) of the loans were not and have never been transferred to the trust. Twenty-one (21) additional loans were never assigned to the trust, and were paid in full in the name of the originator (or a third party). In addition, two (2) other loans that were supposed to be transferred to the trust were transferred to entities other than the trust, but not to the trust. The remainder of the loans (214) were eventually transferred to the trust, but all such transfers occurred between late 2007 and the present, well beyond the three-month time period required by the trust documents. In other words, none of the reviewed mortgage loans were timely transferred to the trust, a 100% failure rate. 296. The foregoing example, coupled with the public news, lawsuits and settlements discussed above, plainly establishes that defendants failed to properly and timely transfer title to the mortgage loans to the trusts. Moreover, it shows that defendants’ failure to do so was widespread and pervasive. In fact, the specific example discussed above shows that defendants utterly and completely failed to properly and timely transfer title. Defendants’ failure has caused plaintiff (and other RMBS investors) massive damages. As noted by law professor Adam Levitin of Georgetown University Law Center on November 18, 2010, in testimony he provided to the a U.S. House Subcommittee investigating the mortgage crisis, “[i]f the notes and mortgages were not properly transferred to the trusts, then the mortgage-backed securities that the investors[] purchased were in fact non-mortgaged-backed securities” (emphasis in original), and defendants’ failure “ha[d] profound implications for [R]MBS investors” like plaintiff.
Any other ponzi would have been shut down immediately. This unless once upon a time these cartels used a bribe.
Enough said.
Bloomberg-
Citigroup Inc. (C) is poised to be the next U.S. bank to attract legal and regulatory scrutiny as JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) looks to settle a host of probes, according to an analyst at Portales Partners LLC.
Citigroup’s $5 billion estimate of potential legal costs that weren’t covered by reserves at midyear is second only to JPMorgan, Charles Peabody of Portales said yesterday in a Bloomberg Radio interview. That shows Citigroup may be bracing for more legal challenges, Peabody said.
A record 23,116,928 American households were enrolled in the federal government’s Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)—AKA food stamps—during the month of June, according to data released this month by the Department of Agriculture.
That outnumbers the 20,618,000 households that the Census Bureau estimated were in the entire Northeastern United States as of the second quarter of 2013.
[…]
In fiscal 2009, the year President Barack Obama was inaugurated, there was a monthly average of 15,161,469 American households on food stamps, according to the Department of Agriculture.
Who else is able to call up the AG and just get a meeting like that when their firm is under criminal investigation? Do other citizens get talk things through mano-a-mano with the AG himself?
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
———————————————————————- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
-v-
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendant.
JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge:
The United States brings this civil fraud action against Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo” or the “Bank”), alleging that the Bank engaged in misconduct in originating and underwriting government-insured home mortgage loans. The Government seeks damages and civil penalties, likely to total hundreds of millions of dollars, under the False Claims Act (the “FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq.; the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), 12 U.S.C. § 1833a; and New York common law. Wells Fargo moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that: (1) the Government released the claims at issue pursuant to a consent judgment entered by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in a previous lawsuit; (2) many of the Government’s FCA and common law claims are time barred; (3) the Amended Complaint fails to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b); and (4) the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.1
For the most part, Wells Fargo’s arguments are unavailing. As an initial matter, the consent judgment does not bar any of the Government’s claims. Furthermore, the claims are pleaded with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b). In addition, the federal statutory claims are sufficient to allege a plausible basis for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). And, on the current record, there is no basis to dismiss any of the statutory claims as untimely. Therefore, all of the Government’s federal statutory claims may proceed. Many of the Government’s common law claims, however, must be, and are, dismissed. In particular, any tort claims that arose before June 25, 2009, are time barred. Additionally, the Government’s mistake of fact and unjust enrichment claims are dismissed in their entirety: Those arising before 2004 are untimely, and those arising thereafter are barred because the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development was aware of Wells Fargo’s misconduct at the time. Accordingly, as explained in more detail below, Wells Fargo’s motion is DENIED as to the Government’s federal statutory claims and GRANTED in part and DENIED in part with respect to the Government’s common law claims. 2
In his latest article for Rolling Stone, Matt Taibbi reports that Wall Street firms are now making millions in profits off of public pension funds nationwide. “Essentially it is a wealth transfer from teachers, cops and firemen to billionaire hedge funders,” Taibbi says. “Pension funds are one of the last great, unguarded piles of money in this country and there are going to be all sort of operators that are trying to get their hands on that money.”
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, solely as Trustee for the MORGAN STANLEY ABS CAPITAL I INC. TRUST, SERIES 2007-HE6, Plaintiff,
v.
WMC MORTGAGE L.L.C., as successorby- merger to WMC Mortgage Corp., and GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORPORATION, Defendants.
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, solely in its capacity as Trustee (the “Trustee”) of the Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust, Series 2007-HE6 (the “Trust”), brings this Complaint against WMC Mortgage L.L.C., as successor-by-merger to WMC Mortgage Corp. (“WMC”), and General Electric Capital Corporation (“GE Capital” and together with WMC, “Defendants”). The Trustee hereby alleges as follows:
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. This is a breach of contract action concerning a transaction known as a mortgage securitization. WMC, GE Capital’s wholly-owned subsidiary, “originated” or made loans totaling more than $666 million to 3,399 borrowers (the “Mortgage Loans”), then grouped or “pooled” the loans and sold them to the Trust. Investors in the Trust, known as “Certificateholders,” were supposed to receive income as the borrowers repaid the Mortgage Loans.
2. WMC, by the terms of the contract, assured the Trust and Certificateholders that the borrowers were in a position to repay the Mortgage Loans. It did so in four crucial ways: First, WMC made 67 separate representations and warranties that the borrowers were creditworthy and that the Mortgage Loans were properly originated and represented accurately; second, WMC promised to notify the Trustee when those representations and warranties were breached; third, WMC promised to repurchase Mortgage Loans in material breach of its representations and warranties to make the Trust whole; and, fourth, WMC promised to indemnify the Trustee for breaches. This four-part remedial framework allocates to WMC the risk that the Mortgage Loans may breach WMC’s representations and warranties.
3. It turns out that the bulk of the Mortgage Loans were bad because the borrowers were not creditworthy or because WMC did not conform to underwriting standards. WMC has breached its representations and warranties, has breached its duty to notify the Trustee of breaches, has refused to repurchase the bad loans, and has breached its duty to indemnify the Trustee. The Trust, and consequently Certificateholders, are entitled to damages in excess of $500 million.
4. Accordingly, the Trustee, on behalf of the Trust, brings this action to enforce the contract and receive the benefit of the bargain.
In 2007, a knock at Barbara Freeman front door, came with a great opportunity: to be debt free and take care of her sick husband.
This year, another knock at that same door was a sheriff’s deputy serving foreclosure papers and that’s when her nightmare began.
The widow is now at the brink of losing everything she and her husband worked for all because of a reversed mortgage. In the most simplified terms, reverse mortgages differ from “regular mortgages” because in the latter, a homeowner makes monthly payments to a lender.
But in a reverse mortgage, a homeowner borrows against their home equity which means a lender pays (s)he either a lump sum or monthly while the homeowner pays nothing.
Antonina Juarez paid the rent on her Fair Haven apartment every month, even after her landlord was foreclosed on by Fannie Mae. Now Fannie Mae wants her and her kids to leave their home, violating the quasi-governmental lender’s own policy of not evicting tenants during foreclosure.
Juarez (pictured), who’s 33, is fighting the eviction with the help of attorney Amy Marx, of New Haven Legal Assistance.
Marx has fought this battle before, and thought that she’d won.
In 2008, Marx helped win a landmark victory when Fannie Mae agreed to a new national policy of halting evictions of tenants in buildings it has foreclosed on. Fannie Mae created the policy after Marx and fellow legal aid attorney Amy Eppler-Epstein threatened a lawsuit.
“Years later, it feels like we’re back to square one,” Marx said.
Sept. 26 (Bloomberg) — JPMorgan Chase & Co. Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon arrived at the Justice Department in Washington this morning. Dimon is set to meet with Attorney General Eric Holder over the settlement discussions related to multiple mortgage bond investigations, according to a person familiar with the meeting. (Source: Bloomberg)
Battered by defaults on loans it insures, the Federal Housing Administration is expected to tap the Treasury Department for $1 billion to $1.5 billion to plug a budget shortfall, according to three people familiar with the agency’s finances.
The FHA is expected to ask for the funds at the end of the month, the sources said. If it does, it would be the first time in its 79-year history that the agency needed a bailout from the Treasury.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT
DEBORAH E. FOCHT, Appellant,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO WELLS FARGO BANK MINNESOTA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE, IN TRUST FOR THE HOLDERS OF STRUCTURED ASSET SECURITIES CORPORATION – AMORTIZING RESIDENTIAL COLLATERAL TRUST MORTGAGE PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2002-BC10, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 25, 2013. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Charles E. Williams, Judge.
Deborah E. Focht, pro se.
Jeffrey S. Lapin of Lapin & Leichtling, LLP, Coral Gables, and Ronnie H. Bitman of Powell & Pearson, LLP, Winter Park, for Appellee.
EXCERPT:
. . .
We note that the supreme court has not applied this standing principle in
the exact context presented in this case. And we question whether, in light of the
ongoing foreclosure crisis in this State, the supreme court would adhere to this principle
in cases in which a plaintiff has acquired standing by the time judgment is entered.
Accordingly, we certify the following question as one of great public importance:
CAN A PLAINTIFF IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION CURE
THE INABILITY TO PROVE STANDING AT THE
INCEPTION OF SUIT BY PROOF THAT THE PLAINTIFF
HAS SINCE ACQUIRED STANDING?
. . .
The trial courts have been overwhelmed by foreclosure filings. In many of
these civil lawsuits the defendants, under a duty to plead in good faith, should be
expected to admit that they received the money, signed the notes and mortgages, and
failed to make the payments. They may often have legitimate affirmative defenses, but
the delayed production of the original note and mortgage in a case where the note and
mortgage are in default should not justify a dismissal of the legal proceeding.
Presumably, our mandate requires the dismissal of this foreclosure action,
which in turn will undo the foreclosure sale. Ms. Focht will regain possession of her
property and apparently continue her free use of the duplex while the lender continues
to make advances to cover the expenses typically paid from escrow. Our certified
question of great public importance is dispositive of this appeal and worthy of
TAMPA, Fla., Sept. 13, 2013 /PRNewswire-iReach/ — Albertelli Law, a leader in full-service creditors’ rights representation in Florida and Georgia, today announced a new leadership structure and operational pivot designed to improve case resolution efficiency and maximize client value.
“Our firm’s structure has been redesigned with dedicated legal teams matched to our client’s functional teams. The result has been a client-centric operating philosophy where our firm’s focus matches our clients’ goals,” said Albertelli. “It builds on our strategic foundation of people and technology to provide the most efficient and effective case resolution strategies at maximum value for our clients.”
Leading this evolution at the firm as Chief Operating Officer and EVP of Firm Operations are industry veterans Scott Barnes and John Shelley respectively.
Scott Barnes, who most recently served as Senior Managing Director at Lender Processing Services (LPS), has more than 20 years of nationally recognized experience in default mortgage servicing, specifically in foreclosure, bankruptcy, and special asset services. During his time with LPS, Scott developed, implemented and managed the Default Solutions business. Prior to his tenure with LPS, he served as SVP of Operations for Fidelity National Foreclosure & Bankruptcy Solutions and was also employed with First Union National Bank as Vice President of Default Servicing.
John Shelley joins Albertelli Law with over 25 years of default servicing and mortgage origination experience. Shelley most recently served as the Vice President of Foreclosure at Select Portfolio Servicing (SPS). During his 14 year tenure with SPS, Shelley successfully managed multiple initiatives and aspects including foreclosure default operations, platform integrations, implementing client subservicing requirements and fulfillment of National Mortgage Settlement requirements.
“Scott and John have operationally transitioned our firm to be more responsive to our clients” said Albertelli. “Their first-hand experience building top performing servicing operations and tremendous industry insight have positioned us well to produce top performing results across our firm, ensuring stellar legal services for years to come.”
About Albertelli Law: Albertelli Law was founded in 1997 by James E. Albertelli and is a full-service creditor’s rights law firm representing institutional and private lenders in Florida and Georgia. Albertelli Law is proud to offer a diverse attorney team specializing in the areas of residential and commercial transactions, foreclosure, bankruptcy, complex litigation, loss mitigation, and the disposition of troubled assets (REO). Albertelli Law has a strong commitment to the community and development of the law as evidenced by its pro-bono endeavors, writing and research of issues of first impression, and development of political action in the area of legal professionalism. Furthermore, Albertelli Law’s commitment to technology and efficient case management provides the scalability and responsiveness necessary to provide unparalleled representation in an ever-changing legal landscape.
Media Contact: Adam Fitch, Albertelli Law, 858-754-9662, afitch@albertellilaw.com
News distributed by PR Newswire iReach: https://ireach.prnewswire.com
Want to know how a megabank like JPMorgan gets away with so much garbage? This obscure regulator will infuriate you
SALON-
At times it doesn’t seem like JPMorgan Chase runs any legal businesses. The good news is that some in the federal government appear to be slowly catching up to their illicit enterprises. Unfortunately, there’s one regulator whose negligence is beyond problematic, and damaging the country. Meet Thomas Curry, head of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
The OCC is the obscure yet powerful primary regulator for JPMorgan Chase and other national banks — and is frankly the reason why JPMorgan believes it can run multiple illegal businesses and get away with it. The OCC has been more of the mega-bank’s pal within the government, rather than a tough-minded regulator. And a settlement in yet another case of malfeasance at JPMorgan, released late last week, shows that nothing has changed.
The case involves litigation practices by JPMorgan in various collections, and a failure to comply with the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), a statute that protects members of the military in financial transactions. It turns out that JPMorgan conducted its credit card, auto and student loan collections in the same illegal fashion as it did its foreclosure operations: using affidavits where low-level employees testified to personal knowledge of the cases without actually knowing anything about them.
Bank of America Corp’s Countrywide unit placed profits over quality in a “massive fraud” selling shoddy mortgages to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, a U.S. government lawyer said on Tuesday.
The claim came at the start of the first case by the government to go to trial against a major bank over defective mortgage practices leading up to the 2008 financial crisis.
Pierre Armand, a lawyer in the civil division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Manhattan, said Countrywide made $165 million selling loans that it promised were investment quality to Fannie and Freddie.
“What documents and witnesses will show is that the promise of quality was largely a joke,” Armand said.
___________________ 1111370 ____________________ Ex parte MERSCORP, Inc., and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Nancy O. Robertson, in her official capacity as Probate Judge of Barbour County, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
v.
MERSCORP, Inc., and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.)
Ex parte U.S. Bank National Association PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Walker County, on behalf of itself and all other similarly situated Alabama counties, and Rick Allison, Walker County Probate Judge
v.
U.S. Bank National Association) (Walker Circuit Court, CV-12-46)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Before us are two petitions for a writ of mandamus seeking review of orders denying motions to dismiss the actions based on the alleged lack of standing by the plaintiffs and, in turn, the alleged lack of subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial courts and seeking an order requiring the trial courts to grant the motions to dismiss. We have consolidated the petitions for the purpose of issuing one opinion, because the issues raised in the two petitions are identical.
In case no. 1111567, U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”), the defendant below, petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus requiring the Walker Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Walker County (“the County”) on behalf of a putative class of all Alabama counties similarly situated to Walker County in relation to U.S. Bank and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. In case no. 1111370, MERSCORP, Inc. (“MERSCORP”), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the MERS defendants”), petition this Court for a writ of mandamus requiring the Barbour Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Barbour Probate Judge Nancy O. Robertson, in her official capacity, on behalf of a putative class of all probate judges in Alabama, also seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. We deny the petitions.
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