Rodriguez had reached out to Occupy Fights Foreclosures (OFF), a group that’s affiliated with Occupy LA, when she was being evicted. OFF says that Bank of America violated state laws when it made the foreclosure sale.
“We found that the documents showed that the sale was void,” Suzanne O’Keeffe, a writer and OFF activist, told KCAL-9 “They didn’t do the procedures right.”
The results from tests in Arizona, Nevada and New York, where BofA is finishing up mailings to 1,000 troubled borrowers, won’t be clear for 60 days, a spokesman said.
LA TIMES-
Unable to qualify for modifications on Bank of America mortgages, a few of California’s most distressed homeowners are being offered one last chance to stay in their homes: Become renters instead.
Testing a mortgage-to-lease program in the Golden State, Bank of America Corp. sent 300 letters this week inviting borrowers without other options to apply. An additional 1,500 letters will go out in the next few weeks as BofA — which also is testing the program in three other states — evaluates whether a national rollout is feasible.
The response to the foreclosure fraud settlement fund raid in multiple states, now up close to a billion dollars, has been shockingly muted. No progressive group or housing-focused organization has done much more than grumble about the fact that money intended to go to homeowners is being diverted into state budgets all over the country.
But one state is trying to fight back. In Arizona, a group of homeowners have filed a lawsuit against state Attorney General Thomas Horne and State Treasurer Doug Ducey, arguing that the $50 million the state will skim off the settlement payout for the General Fund (out of a total of $97.7 million) violates the settlement agreement. Here’s the meat of the complaint:
4. On May 1, 2012, the Arizona Legislature passed a general appropriations bill, SB 1523. Governor Brewer signed SB 1523 on May 7, 2012. In SB 1523, the legislature directed the Attorney General to place $50 million of the Settlement Funds, more than half of the funds that are to be deposited into Court Ordered Trust Fund, into the state’s general fund.
5. If this transfer occurs, the Settlement Funds in the Court Ordered Trust Fund will not be used for the designated purposes and distressed Arizona homeowners will not receive the assistance they need to be able to stay in their homes and avoid foreclosure.
6. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin Defendants from taking any action to transfer the Settlement Funds from the Court Ordered Trust Fund into the state’s general fund and from using the Court Ordered Trust Fund for purposes not designated int he Consent Judgments.
Two homeowners, Joseph Morones and Elvira Hernandez …
On behalf of StopForeclosureFraud I wish our readers a safe and happy holiday. Hope you are enjoying your extended weekend.
Today, we honor the men and women that have died in service while defending and protecting our country’s freedom. Please also take the time to remember other family members and friends that have passed away on this special day.
It says something about the ubiquity of the alternative mortgage registration system created by the nation’s bankers that it is now suing itself in a Utah lawsuit.
But even without that anomaly, the lawsuit is a bizarre confluence of factors that has caught a Draper couple in a situation where they bought a home based on a clean title report only to now be in court fighting to ensure the transaction was legitimate.
sets of 100 documents for each of seven law firms — Vaden, Dale & Decker, Castle Stawiarski, Hopp, Aronowitz & Mecklenburg , Medved and Janeway
The Denver Post-
Mortgage fraud investigators with the Colorado Attorney General’s office have gathered documents filed with at least four county public trustees’ offices by some of the state’s largest foreclosure law firms, according to several people familiar with the request.
Trustees in four counties confirmed they each provided hundreds of pages of documents — mostly bid and cure statements associated with foreclosures spanning a five-year period — in response to a request by the attorney general’s consumer protection division.
Deputy Attorney General Jan Zavislan, who heads that office’s consumer protection division, declined to comment about the scope or nature of the request, or even to say it was an inquiry or formal investigation.
Trying to count the number of bank screwups during the foreclosure crisis is a little like guessing the amount of change in a huge jar: You can see that the answer is “an awful lot,” but without breaking the jar and counting by hand, there’s no way to know for sure.
On Thursday, however, just how much homeowner misery Ally Financial may be responsible for came to light after the Federal Reserve released a letter between the bank’s mortgage servicing unit, GMAC Mortgage, and its auditing firm detailing exactly how many borrowers’ cases may have been mishandled.
Ally, formerly an arm of General Motors, needed a $17.2 billion bailout to survive the mortgage crash. It repaid about $5.5 billion, meaning taxpayers own 74 percent of the bank. Earlier this month, the bank sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection for ResCap, its residential mortgage unit.
In response to the bankruptcy proceedings, which typically require a public disclosure of financial information, the Federal Reserve released a letter …
Docket Number: 85260-0 Title of Case: Albice v. Premier Mortg. Servs. of Wash., Inc. File Date: 05/24/2012 Oral Argument Date: 09/22/2011
SOURCE OF APPEAL —————- Appeal from Mason County Superior Court 07-2-00172-1 Honorable Toni A Sheldon
JUSTICES ——– Barbara A. Madsen Signed Majority Charles W. Johnson Majority Author Tom Chambers Signed Majority Susan Owens Signed Majority Mary E. Fairhurst Signed Concurrence James M. Johnson Signed Majority Debra L. Stephens Concurrence Author Charles K. Wiggins Signed Majority Steven C. González Did Not Participate Gerry L. Alexander, Justice Pro Tem. Signed Majority
Richard L. Ditlevson Dixon Rodgers Kee & Pearson PS 324 W Bay Dr Nw Ste 201 Olympia, WA, 98502-4926
Philip Albert Talmadge Talmadge/Fitzpatrick 18010 Southcenter Pkwy Tukwila, WA, 98188-4630
Counsel for Respondent(s) Douglas N Kiger Blado Kiger Bolan, PS 4717 S 19th St Ste 109 Tacoma, WA, 98405-1167
Jonathan W. Blado Blado Kiger Bolan PS 4717 S 19th St Ste 109 Tacoma, WA, 98405-1167
View the Opinion in PDF Format
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
CHRISTA L. ALBICE, a married woman, ) and BART A. TECCA and ) No. 85260-0 KAREN L. TECCA, husband and wife, ) ) Respondents, ) ) v. ) En Banc ) PREMIER MORTGAGE SERVICES OF ) WASHINGTON, INC., a Washington ) corporation; OPTION ONE MORTGAGE ) CORPORATION, a California corporation, ) ) Defendants, ) ) RON DICKINSON and “JANE DOE”) DICKINSON, husband and wife, ) ) Petitioners. ) ___________________________________ ) Filed May 24, 2012
C. JOHNSON, J. — This case involves interpretation of the deeds of trust act,
chapter 61.24 RCW, and the statutory procedural requirements for nonjudicially
foreclosing on an owner’s interest. This case also involves whether, under the facts
here, the property owner waived the right to challenge the sale and whether the
purchaser of the nonjudicial foreclosure sale statutorily qualifies as a bona fide
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
purchaser (BFP).
The trial court ruled that despite procedural noncompliance, the purchaser
was a BFP under the statute and quieted title in the purchaser. The Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that failure to comply with the statutory requirements was reason
to set the sale aside and that factually, the purchaser did not qualify as a BFP. We
affirm the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
Christa Albice and Karen Tecca (hereinafter Tecca) inherited the property at
issue here. In 2003, Tecca borrowed $115,500 against the property. Clerk’s Papers
(CP) at 305. The property was appraised at $607,000 in 2003 (CP at 1038) and at
$950,000 in 2007. CP at 394. The loan was serviced by Option One Mortgage
Corporation (Option One), and Premier Mortgage Services of Washington (Premier)
acted as the trustee. Option One and Premier shared databases, having access to the
same loan information, and everyone who worked for Premier was an employee of
Option One.
In 2006, Tecca defaulted on the loan and received a notice of trustee’s sale,
setting the foreclosure sale for September 8, 2006. CP at 460. Tecca then, in July
2006, negotiated and entered into a forbearance agreement to cure the default. The
2
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
total reinstatement amount was for $5,126.97, which included $1,733.79 for
estimated foreclosure fees and costs. CP at 471. Under the agreement, payments
were due the 16th of each month, ending January 16, 2007. CP at 472. Although
Tecca tendered each payment late, Option One accepted each payment, except for
the last. The last payment was sent on February 2, 2007, but was rejected by Option
One. During a deposition, Premier’s representative, an Option One employee,
testified that the last late payment was the only breach of the Forbearance
Agreement. CP at 259. Tecca learned the final payment was rejected on February
10, 2007, and the payment was refunded on February 16, 2007. Although the
Forbearance Agreement provided that upon breach, a 10-day written notice would
be sent, Tecca never received this notice. CP at 468, 454.
The trustee’s sale originally set for September 8, 2006 was continued six
times. Each continuance was tied to the payments Tecca made under the
Forbearance Agreement. The foreclosure sale took place on February 16, 2007. CP
at 352-59. Through an agent, the petitioner, Ron Dickinson, successfully bid $130,000 for the property.1
Dickinson has purchased about 9 of his 13 properties at nonjudicial
1 Although four or five bidders showed up at the original sale date, only two bidders, one being Dickinson’s agent, appeared at the February 16 sale. CP at 360, 426.
3
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
foreclosure sales. CP at 418-19. Dickinson buys and sells houses as a business. He
has familiarized himself with foreclosure law to some extent to keep himself out of
“trouble.” CP at 428. When Dickinson learned that the Tecca property was for sale,
he researched the property and obtained a copy of the notice of trustee’s sale, which
listed the amount in arrears as $1,228.03. CP at 526, 530. About a week before the
originally scheduled sale, Dickinson visited Karen Tecca’s home and offered to buy
the property. She refused and told him the sale would not happen. CP at 421.
Dickinson attended the first scheduled sale, kept track of postponements, and
phoned Premier to determine the next sale date. He was surprised when the property
did finally come up for sale.
Tecca first learned the property was sold when Dickinson told Tecca they no
longer owned it and needed to leave. Dickinson then filed an unlawful detainer
action and sought to quiet title. Tecca countersued, seeking to quiet title in an action
to set aside the nonjudicial sale. Tecca also brought suit against Option One and
Premier, but the trial court dismissed the action based on an arbitration clause.
Tecca’s and Dickinson’s actions were consolidated. Dickinson cross-claimed
against Option One and Premier, but he voluntarily dismissed those claims.
Dickinson moved for summary judgment to establish that he was a BFP and
4
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
entitled to quiet title. Tecca also moved for summary judgment, arguing the
foreclosure sale should be set aside because the sale occurred after the statutory
deadline and Premier was not a qualified trustee with authority to conduct the sale.
The trial court granted Dickinson’s motion, ruling that Dickinson was a BFP and
despite procedural noncompliance by the trustee, the recitations in the trustee’s deed
were conclusive evidence of statutory compliance in favor of BFPs. The issue of
whether Premier was a qualified trustee was left for trial. Following trial, the court concluded Premier was authorized to act as the trustee,2 quieted title in Dickinson,
and awarded Dickinson damages.
Tecca appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, setting the sale aside. It
reversed the trial court’s award of damages and instead awarded Tecca costs and
fees as the prevailing party under RCW 4.84.010. Albice v. Premier Mortg. Servs.
2 The trial court concluded Premier had statutory authority to act as a trustee under RCW 61.24.010, determining Premier was qualified based on its internal records rather than annual reports filed with the Secretary of State. We do not reach this issue.
5
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
1. Whether a trustee’s sale taking place beyond the 120 days permitted by RCW
61.24.040(6) warrants invalidating the sale.
2. Whether, under the circumstances of this case, a borrower waives the right to
bring a postsale challenge for failing to utilize the presale remedies under
RCW 61.24.130.
3. Whether a bona fide purchaser can prevail despite an otherwise invalid sale.
ANALYSIS
This case raises questions of law and statutory interpretation on appeal from
summary judgment. Our review is de novo. Lamtec Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 170
The deeds of trust act, chapter 61.24 RCW,3 creates a three-party mortgage
system allowing lenders, when payment default occurs, to nonjudicially foreclose by
trustee’s sale. The act furthers three goals: (1) that the nonjudicial foreclosure
process should be efficient and inexpensive, (2) that the process should result in
interested parties having an adequate opportunity to prevent wrongful foreclosure,
and (3) that the process should promote stability of land titles. Cox v. Helenius, 103
3 This chapter was revised in 2009 and 2012. No changes affect any of the statutes at issue here; thus, the current version is cited.
6
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
Wn.2d 383, 387, 693 P.2d 683 (1985). Because the act dispenses with many
protections commonly enjoyed by borrowers under judicial foreclosures, lenders
must strictly comply with the statutes and courts must strictly construe the statutes
in the borrower’s favor. Udall v. T.D. Escrow Servs., Inc., 159 Wn.2d 903, 915-16,
154 P.3d 882 (2007); Koegel v. Prudential Mut. Sav. Bank, 51 Wn. App. 108, 111-
12, 752 P.2d 385 (1988). The procedural requirements for conducting a trustee sale
are extensively spelled out in RCW 61.24.030 and RCW 61.24.040. Procedural
irregularities, such as those divesting a trustee of its statutory authority to sell the
property, can invalidate the sale. Udall, 159 Wn.2d at 911.
1. Procedural Irregularities
Throughout the proceedings, Tecca has argued that the trustee’s failure to
comply with certain statutory requirements renders the sale invalid. These
procedural irregularities or defects include that Premier had no authority to conduct
the sale 161 days after the original sale date under RCW 61.24.040(6), that Premier
violated RCW 61.24.090(1) by failing to discontinue the sale after they cured
default more than 11 days before the actual sale date, and that the recitals contained
in the trustee’s deed were inadequate under RCW 61.24.040(7). Regarding the
recitals, the Court of Appeals agreed with Tecca, concluding that because the deed
7
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
of trust failed to recite any facts triggering the protections of RCW 61.24.040(7),
Dickinson was not protected from the undisputed defects in the sale. The Court of
Appeals then set the sale aside based on its conclusion that Premier had no statutory
authority to sell the property when it continued the sale past the 120 days permitted
by the act. We agree with the Court of Appeals’ holding that Premier lost statutory
authority after it continued the sale past 120 days from the original sale date and that
the sale was invalid. We need not address or resolve any further issues regarding
other procedural irregularities.
RCW 61.24.040(1)(f), (2) provides the requirements for a deed of trust
foreclosure, including the notice requirements for the trustee’s sale and foreclosure.
Under RCW 61.24.040(6), a trustee may continue a sale “for any cause the trustee
deems advantageous . . . for a period or periods not exceeding a total of one
hundred twenty days” (emphasis added). A plain reading of this provision permits a
trustee to continue a sale once or more than once but unambiguously limits the
trustee from continuing the sale past 120 days.
When a party’s authority to act is prescribed by a statute and the statute
includes time limits, as under RCW 61.24.040(6), failure to act within that time
violates the statute and divests the party of statutory authority. Without statutory
8
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
authority, any action taken is invalid. As we have already mentioned and held, under
this statute, strict compliance is required. Udall, 159 Wn.2d at 915-16. Therefore,
strictly applying the statute as required, we agree with the Court of Appeals and
hold that under RCW 61.24.040(6), a trustee is not authorized, at least not without
reissuing the statutory notices, to conduct a sale after 120 days from the original sale
date, and such a sale is invalid.
Here, Premier issued the notice of trustee’s sale listing the sale date as
September 8, 2006. Premier held the actual sale on February 16, 2007, 161 days
from the original sale date in violation of the statute and divesting its statutory
authority to sell. The sale was invalid.
2. Waiver
Though undisputed that Premier failed to strictly comply with its statutory
obligations, Dickinson nevertheless contends Tecca waived their right to bring a
postsale challenge by failing to pursue the presale remedies provided for in RCW
61.24.040(1)(f)(IX). Waiver is an equitable principle that can apply to defeat
someone’s legal rights where the facts support an argument that the party
relinquished their rights by delaying in asserting or failing to assert an otherwise
available adequate remedy. Dickinson urges us to find waiver, contending that at
9
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
any time after Tecca received notice of their presale rights and before the actual
sale, they could have restrained the sale and litigated the issue of the alleged breach
of the Forbearance Agreement and underlying debt. He argues that because Tecca
failed to use their presale remedies, their postsale challenge is barred. We disagree.
We have found waiver in a foreclosure setting where the facts support its
application. In Plein, we established that waiver of any postsale challenge occurs
where a party (1) received notice of the right to enjoin the sale, (2) had actual or
constructive knowledge of a defense to foreclosure prior to the sale, and (3) failed to
bring an action to obtain a court order enjoining the sale. Plein v. Lackey, 149
Wn.2d 214, 227, 67 P.3d 1061 (2003) (citing Cox, 103 Wn.2d at 388). In that case,
the borrower received the notices of foreclosure and trustee’s sale, notifying him of
his presale right to seek a restraining order. Almost two months before the
scheduled sale, the borrower sought a permanent injunction barring the trustee’s
sale on grounds that there was no default on the underlying debt. In addition, the
parties were involved in a lawsuit disputing corporate dealings and other actions.
The borrower failed to seek a temporary injunction, which would have halted the
sale pending a hearing on the merits of the permanent injunction. As a result, the
sale proceeded as scheduled, on the date listed in the notices, and the property was
10
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
sold before the hearing. Plein, 149 Wn.2d at 220-21. Under these circumstances, in
finding waiver, we recognized that allowing the borrower to delay asserting a
defense until after the sale would have defeated the spirit and intent of the act.4
Plein, 149 Wn.2d at 228 (citing Peoples Nat’l Bank of Wash. v. Ostrander, 6 Wn.
App. 28, 32, 491 P.2d 1058 (1971)). Given that the borrower had adequate
opportunity to utilize his presale remedies to prevent wrongful foreclosure, we
explained that finding waiver under those circumstances furthered the goals of the
act. Plein, 149 Wn.2d at 228.
Waiver, however, cannot apply to all circumstances or types of postsale
challenges. RCW 61.24.040(1)(f)(IX) provides that “[f]ailure to bring . . . a lawsuit
may result in waiver of any proper grounds for invalidating the Trustee’s sale”
(emphasis added). The word “may” indicates the legislature neither requires nor
intends for courts to strictly apply waiver. Under the statute, we apply waiver only
4 Similarly, the Court of Appeals has found waiver in cases where the challenging party failed to seek a temporary restraining order even though they knew of proper grounds for such an order well in advance of the sale. See, e.g., Peoples Nat’l Bank of Wash. v. Ostrander, 6 Wn. App. 28, 32, 491 P.2d 1058 (1971) (defendants were barred from asserting a postsale challenge when defendants chose to wait until after the sale, about five months after discovery of the alleged fraud, to assert their claimed defense); Koegel, 51 Wn. App. at 116 (borrower waived right to contest the sale because as early as a month prior to the sale, the borrower, more than once, threatened to enjoin the sale, and the borrower’s attorney attended the sale but made no continuance request or objection); County Express Stores, Inc. v. Sims, 87 Wn. App. 741, 744, 752, 943 P.2d 374 (1997).
11
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
where it is equitable under the circumstances and where it serves the goals of the
act. Unlike judicial foreclosures, trustee foreclosure sales are conducted with little
to no oversight. Still, once a property is sold, the act favors purchasers over
property owners and other borrowers by giving preference to the third
goal — stability of land titles. It does so by creating, at minimum, a rebuttable
presumption that the sale was conducted in compliance with the procedural requirements of the act.5 Thus, in determining whether waiver applies, the second
goal — that the nonjudicial foreclosure process should result in is interested parties
having an adequate opportunity to prevent wrongful foreclosure — becomes
particularly important.
Under the facts of this case, we conclude waiver cannot be equitably
established. Dickinson seemingly argues that Tecca’s presale remedies were
triggered the moment they received notice of the trustee’s sale. Yet this argument
assumes the borrower can challenge the underlying debt. Although this was correct
in Plein, because the borrower believed the debt had been paid, here, when Tecca
5 RCW 61.24.040(7) provides that the deed’s recital of statutory compliance constitutes “prima facie evidence of such compliance and conclusive evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value.”
12
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
received the notice, they had no grounds to challenge the underlying debt. In fact, by
entering into the Forbearance Agreement, they were acknowledging default on their
loan payment. This postponed the foreclosure sale, and tendering each monthly
payment gave them additional time to cure the default. While making these
payments, Tecca had no reason to seek an order restraining a sale that may not even
proceed.6
Further, unlike in Plein, where the borrower had a defense almost two months
prior to the sale, here, Tecca had no knowledge of their alleged breach in time to
restrain the sale. Tecca tendered all payments, albeit late, under the Forbearance
Agreement. Option One accepted all of those late payments and permitted Premier
to continue the sale each time, except for the last. By repeatedly accepting the prior
late payments, Option One created expectancy in Tecca that their last late payment
would also be accepted. Tecca could not have known Option One would consider
their last late payment a breach of the agreement having never done so before. They
reasonably believed their last payment cured the default. While the Forbearance
Agreement stated they would receive a 10-day written notice upon breach, Tecca
6 Unlike in Plein, where the sale proceeded as scheduled on the date in the notices, the sale here was continued six times.
13
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
never received this notice.7 They rightly assumed the sale would be canceled after
they tendered their last payment.8 And after learning their property had been sold,
Tecca promptly brought their countersuit, showing no intention of “sleeping on”
their rights.
Additionally, and equally important, to ensure trustees strictly comply with
the requirements of the act, courts must be able to review postsale challenges where,
like here, the claims are promptly asserted. Although Dickinson contends this
defeats the third goal, the goal is to promote the stability of land titles. Cox, 103
Wn.2d at 387. Enforcing statutory compliance encourages trustees to conduct
procedurally sound sales. When trustees strictly comply with their legal obligations
under the act, interested parties will have no claim for postsale relief, thereby
7 Dickinson argues that Option One notified Tecca of the breach by sending a letter on January 31, 2007. Karen Tecca, however, testified at her deposition that she did not receive the purported letter, and while Option One produced an internal electronic copy of the letter, it produced no proof of service. We view the facts in the light most favorable to Tecca as the nonmoving party on summary judgment.
8 As Tecca contends, Premier was required to discontinue the sale under RCW 61.24.090(1) as they submitted final payment curing the default more than 11 days prior to the actual sale date. Although under the Forbearance Agreement Tecca tendered payments to Option One, as the Court of Appeals noted, Albice, 157 Wn. App. at 934 n.16, it would be disingenuous to suggest Premier had no notice of Tecca’s final payment. Option One and Premier were closely affiliated, if not the same company. The two companies shared databases, that is, had access to the same loan information, and everyone who worked for Premier was an employee of Option One.
14
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
promoting stable land titles overall. Under the facts here, we hold that Tecca did not
waive their rights.
3. Bona Fide Purchaser
Despite the trustee’s failure to strictly comply with the statutory
requirements and in addition to the waiver argument, Dickinson contends he is a
BFP and should receive title. While the trial court concluded that Dickinson was a
BFP, the Court of Appeals disagreed. We agree with the Court of Appeals.
Under RCW 61.24.040(7), the deed’s “recital shall be prima facie evidence
of [statutory] compliance and conclusive evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers.”9 Whether Dickinson was a BFP is factual and legal inquiry. A BFP is
one who purchases property without actual or constructive knowledge of another’s
9 As mentioned, Tecca also contends that the recitals in the deed were inadequate to demonstrate compliance with the statute and cannot protect Dickinson even if he were a BFP. The act requires the deed to “recite the facts showing that the sale was conducted in compliance with all of the requirements of this chapter and of the deed of trust.” RCW 61.24.040(7) (emphasis added). Here, the deed contained conclusory language stating “[a]ll legal requirements and all provisions of said Deed of Trust have been complied with, as to acts to be performed and notices to be given, as provided in Chapter 61.24 RCW.” CP at 824. Although Dickinson argues that the recitals in the deed are almost identical to the form deed in 4 Washington State Bar Association, Washington Real Property Deskbook § 47.11(16) (3d ed. Supp. 2001), the party drafting the deed, or any legal document, must still consult the law to ensure compliance. The statute requires the deed to recite “facts” showing statutory compliance. Not only did the deed contain conclusory language stating compliance, the deed also misleadingly listed the sale date in the notice of trustee’s sale as February 16, 2007, instead of the original sale date of September 8, 2006. It also incorrectly states that the default was not cured, that is, that final payment was not tendered, 11 days prior to the date of the trustee’s sale. It is questionable whether the recitals in the deed satisfied the statute.
15
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
claim of right to, or equity in, the property, and who pays valuable consideration.
But if the purchaser has knowledge or information that would cause an ordinarily
prudent person to inquire further, and if such inquiry, reasonably diligently pursued,
would lead to discovery of title defects or of equitable rights of others regarding the
property, then the purchaser has constructive knowledge of everything the inquiry
would have revealed. Thus, in considering whether a person is a BFP, we ask (1)
whether the surrounding events created a duty of inquiry, and if so, (2) whether the
purchaser satisfied that duty. In this determination, we consider the purchaser’s
knowledge and experience with real estate. Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wn.2d 170,
175-76, 685 P.2d 1074 (1984).
The facts pertaining to Dickinson’s status are undisputed. We give, as did the
Court of Appeals, substantial weight to Dickinson’s real estate experience.
Dickinson has extensive experience with nonjudicial foreclosure sales, purchasing 9
of his 13 properties at such sales. He familiarized himself with foreclosure law and
knew enough about the process to obtain the notice of trustee’s sale from a title
company.
Dickinson had within his knowledge sufficient facts to put an experienced
real estate purchaser, such as himself, on inquiry notice. He had a copy of the notice
16
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
of trustee’s sale, which listed the amount in arrears as only $1,228.03, suggesting
Tecca had substantial equity in the property. CP at 530. Dickinson contacted Tecca,
who refused to sell him the property and insisted the sale would not happen.
Dickinson kept track of the numerous continuances and was surprised that the
property was finally up for sale, five months after the date listed in the notice. The
number of continuances, however, chilled the bidding process, contributing to the
grossly inadequate purchase price. Although four or five bidders showed up to the
original sale, only Dickinson and another bidder showed up at the actual sale.
Dickinson was prepared to bid up to $450,000 for the property, showing he knew
the property was worth at least that much. The substantial equity coupled with the
minor default amount, Tecca’s intention to keep the property, and the numerous
continuances created a duty of inquiry, which Dickinson failed to satisfy. Given that
he had already contacted Tecca once, Dickinson could have contacted Tecca again
to determine whether default had been cured. Had Dickinson made a reasonably
diligent inquiry, he could have discovered that the numerous continuances were tied
to payments under the Forbearance Agreement. Because real estate investment was
his livelihood, Dickinson should have taken more care with this purchase in order to
claim BFP protection. We agree with the Court of Appeals and hold that Dickinson
17
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
was not a BFP.
CONCLUSION
The nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings here were marred by repeated
statutory noncompliance. The financial institution acting as the lender also appeared
to be acting as the trustee under a different name; the lender repeatedly accepted
late payments and, at its sole discretion, rejected only the final late payment that
would have cured the default; and the trustee conducted a sale without statutory
authority. Equity cannot support waiver given these procedural defects and the
purchaser’s status as a sophisticated real estate investor or buyer who had
constructive knowledge of the defects in the sale.
We conclude the trustee sale was invalid. We affirm the Court of Appeals and
remand to the trial court to enter an order declaring the sale invalid and quieting title
in Tecca as against Dickinson. We also affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision
reversing the trial court’s judgments for rent, costs, and statutory attorney fees in
favor of Dickinson.
AUTHOR: Justice Charles W. Johnson
WE CONCUR:
18
Albice v. Dickinson, Cause No. 85260-0
Chief Justice Barbara A. Madsen Justice James M. Johnson
Justice Tom Chambers Justice Charles K. Wiggins
Justice Susan Owens Gerry L. Alexander, Justice Pro Tem.
J.P. Morgan ChaseJPM -1.21% & Co. Chairman and Chief Executive James Dimon has been invited to appear before a key Senate panel on June 7 to explain what led to his company’s $2 billion-plus trading loss.
J.P. Morgan said Mr. Dimon will testify but didn’t immediately commit to the date. “Jamie will of course be available to testify next month. We are working with the House and Senate to determine a timeframe that work for both chambers and allow us to provide the most thorough testimony next month,” a J.P. Morgan spokeswoman said.
Senate Banking Committee Chairman Sen. Tim Johnson (D., S.D.) announced the date of Mr. Dimon’s appearance Friday. He had previously said that he would ask Mr. Dimon to testify, but the date hadn’t been announced. The hearing will start at 10 a.m.
Wells Fargo & Co. has handed over hundreds of emails and other documents related to its mortgage-backed securities business to the Securities and Exchange Commission after being taken to court, according to a person familiar with the matter.
The decision by the fourth-biggest U.S. bank to bow to the SEC’s demands for the information resolves a legal spat.
“Wells Fargo continues to believe its disclosures in offering documents pertaining to residential mortgage-backed securities containing Wells Fargo mortgages were proper and appropriate,” a spokeswoman for Wells Fargo said.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
————————————————————————–X
PATRICIA ROTH, A/K/A PATRICIA MCCARTHY,
Individually and on behalf of
a class of borrowers similarly situated,
Plaintiff
Against
CITIMORTGAGE INC.
Defendants
————————————————————————–X
EXCERPT:
80. The class of persons Plaintiff seeks to represent are those owners of “owner occupied” residential structures or condominiums (or who have an interest in such real property) who’s mortgage loans are serviced by Defendant, and who have been injured by Defendant’s pattern of systematically, violating and circumventing the provisions of RESPA (12 U.S.C. Section 2605(e) et seq.), and the FDCPA (15 U.S.C. § 1692(c) et seq.), as well as New York GBL § 349 within one year from the date of the commencement of this action.
81. The central questions in this litigation relate to the Defendant’s pattern of practice whereby (a) it systematically and deliberately violated and circumvented the provisions of RESPA (12 U.S.C. Section 2605(e) et seq.) by (a) its complete failure to respond, or its inadequate responsiveness, to QWRs, as well as its timeliness of responses in providing the information in response to QWRs, (b) by Defendant’s failure to remove information regarding any alleged overdue payments, to consumer reporting agencies during its review of said QWR’s, and (c) for Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.) in circumventing Plaintiff’s attorney(s) by corresponding directly with the mortgagor instead of Plaintiff’s attorney(s) in responding to QWRs. It is alleged that Defendant’s violations of the aforementioned statutes resulted in damages to the Plaintiff, as well as the class she seeks to represent, in the form of (a) statutory violations as well as (b) actual damages as mentioned hereinabove.
No indictments for any of the Massive Wall Street FRAUD!
One of the BIGGEST cover ups in US History! The regulators found no fraud. (link to email docs)
Bloomberg-
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission investigators have concluded their probe of possible financial fraud at Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and determined that they will probably not recommend any enforcement action against the firm or its former executives, according to an excerpt of an internal agency memo.
The agency has been grappling with the case for more than three years amid questions from lawmakers and investors as to whether Lehman misrepresented its financial health before filing the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history in September 2008.
An attorney for two East Valley homeowners at risk of losing their homes asked a judge Thursday to block lawmakers from raiding a special fund designed to help prevent foreclosures.
Tim Hogan of the Center for Law in the Public Interest said the state was given $97 million as part of a nationwide settlement of a mortgage fraud claim against five major lenders. He said the part of the deal signed by Attorney General Tom Horne requires the cash to be put into a special trust fund to be used only for specified purposes.
But the Legislature decided to take $50 million of that to help balance the state budget, a move approved by Gov. Jan Brewer. And while Horne expressed displeasure, he never challenged the move.
I don’t see LPS mentioned in this article, does anyone know the numbers they revealed?
WSJ-
For the last year or so, real-estate listing and valuation service Zillow has been overhauling its methodology for determining how many homes out there are “under water,” meaning their owners owe more in mortgage debt to lenders than the value of their properties.
Today, it rolls out its new negative equity report, which shows, among other things, that nearly 16 million U.S. homeowners, or 31.4% of all homeowners with a mortgage, were under water in 2012. They owe $1.2 trillion more than the value of their homes.
And though the negative equity share has fallen since last year’s tally of 32.4% (Zillow also revised its data based on the new methodology going back five quarters), it’s still higher than previous negative equity estimates, including the most-commonly cited one, from mortgage-data firm CoreLogic.
This is very cool! Just for this I will buy his latest CD to do my share because he doesn’t have to go at this alone.
Thank You Mr. McGraw!
AP-
Tim McGraw will be saluting veterans in a big way while on tour this summer.
The country music superstar is giving away 25 mortgage-free houses – one for each stop on his upcoming “Brothers of the Sun” tour with Kenny Chesney – to wounded or needy service members.
McGraw will kick off the campaign with a Memorial Day concert for military members at New York City’s Beacon Theatre during Fleet Week.
During the same week that JPMorgan announced a $2 Billion loser of a bet, Bullard said, “We do not need these companies to be as big as they are. We should say we want smaller institutions so that they can safely fail if they need to fail.”
This isn’t the first time we’ve heard from one of the Federal Reserves on the topic of breaking up the big banks this month. Dallas Fed Chief Richard Fisher, who Business Insider refers to as “a staunch hawk on monetary policy” published a terrific 39-page presentation a few weeks ago titled, “Choosing the Road to Prosperity,” with cool charts, nifty illustrations, and is surprisingly simply worded and easy to understand. The slide show makes a cogent argument against TBTF.
This information should go viral to alert consumers in California.
Law Office of Peter Fredman-
Heritage Pacific Financial is a Texas debt collector that has developed a business model of suing borrowers for fraud on foreclosed second mortgage debts that are uncollectable because of California anti-deficiency law. In this case, I defended the borrower and cross-sued the debt collector for unlawful debt collection practices. Our position is that the debt collector cannot sue for fraud because it was not defrauded, including because it purchased the debt with full knowledge that the first mortgage had been foreclosed on, and because the fraud claim was not assigned and is not assignable.
An Eyewitness News and California Watch investigation found that families across California were being sued after they lost their homes to foreclosure.
Mina Shahab lives in a cramped apartment in Woodland Hills. She shares it with her brother who is stricken with cancer. A few years ago, she took out two loans and bought a spacious four-bedroom home in Northridge.
It was the American dream for the native of Iran who came here looking for freedom. But she lost her job, and then lost her home to foreclosure.
“I love this country, and seeing this happen to its citizens is very painful,” she said.
Bank of America Corp. (BAC) and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. lost a bid to dismiss a lawsuit claiming they shortchanged Texas counties out of uncollected mortgage filing fees.
“The plaintiffs have brought sufficient evidence to allow the case to go forward,” U.S. District Judge Reed O’Connor in Dallas said. O’Connor threw out several claims in the lawsuit at the end of a court hearing today.
O’Connor allowed the counties to seek damages and an injunction limiting future filings by MERS. He rejected county allegations that MERS was filing false liens, which would have allowed the counties to seek $10,000 for each contested filing.
Appellee. ________________________________ Opinion filed May 23, 2012. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County; James R. Thompson, Judge. Robert J. Hynds of The Hagen Law Firm, Fort Myers, for Appellant. Ryan J. Weeks of Albertelli Law, Tampa, for Appellee. KELLY, Judge.
The appellants, Robert J. Boye and Carmen B. Forgione, challenge the final summary judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of Citimortgage, Inc., n/k/a Nationstar Mortgage, LLC. Because genuine issues of material fact remain regarding appellants’ affirmative defense of lack of notice, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
On March 4, 2009, Citimortgage filed a complaint against appellants seeking foreclosure, alleging that appellants had not made any payments on their mortgage since September 1, 2008. Appellants filed an answer and affirmative defenses asserting, in part, that Citimortgage had not provided them with proper notice of the default prior to accelerating the debt as required under the mortgage. Appellants also sought discovery from Citimortgage requesting numerous documents relating to the loan including any items showing a declaration of default. Thereafter, Citimortgage filed a motion for summary judgment. While the motion for summary judgment was pending, appellants filed a motion to compel discovery based on Citimortagage’s failure to produce the items requested, specifically the letter of default. The trial court granted appellants’ motion to compel. When Citimortgage failed to produce the letter, appellants filed a motion for sanctions as well as a motion for continuance of the trial. After a hearing, the trial court denied both of appellants’ motions and entered a final judgment of foreclosure.
“A movant is entitled to summary judgment ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and other materials as would be admissible in evidence on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Estate of Githens ex rel. Seaman v. Bon Secours-Maria Manor Nursing Care Ctr., 928 So. 2d 1272, 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden to prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. “Where a defendant pleads affirmative defenses, the plaintiff moving for summary judgment must either factually refute the affirmative defenses by affidavit or establish their legal insufficiency.” Bryson v. Branch Banking and Trust Co., 75 So. 3d 783, 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). This court must view “every possible inference in favor of the party against whom summary judgment has been entered.” Estate of Githens ex rel. Seaman, 928 So. 2d at 1274 (quoting Maynard v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 861 So. 2d 1204, 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)). If the record raises even the slightest doubt that an issue might exist, that doubt must be resolved against the moving party and summary judgment must be denied. Nard, Inc. v. DeVito Contracting & Supply, Inc., 769 So. 2d 1138, 1140 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
Here, the record reflects genuine issues of material fact regarding whether appellants had been provided with the notice of default. At the summary judgment hearing, counsel for Citimortgage acknowledged that it did not have a copy of the notice and although Citimortgage introduced testimony that its records indicated the notice was sent, there was no evidence to establish that the notice was mailed to the proper address. See Star Lakes Estates Ass’n, Inc. v. Auerbach, 656 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (reversing summary judgment of foreclosure and stating that although proof of mailing normally raises a rebuttable presumption that mail was received, such presumption only arises when there is proof that mail is being sent to the correct address). Because Citimortgage failed to prove that it provided appellants with the requisite notice of default as required by the mortgage, it did not meet its burden of proof on summary judgment and is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Konsulian v. Busey Bank, N.A., 61 So. 3d 1283 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Frost v. Regions Bank, 15 So. 3d 905, 906-07 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Therefore, we reverse the final judgment of foreclosure and remand for further proceedings.
For Oriane and Norman Rousseau, their hopes of keeping the modest California house that had been their dream home ended with a loud noise while Oriane was in the kitchen.
She rushed to the bedroom, unsure of what had happened. But when the part-time nurse smelled sulphur, she understood. Opening the door Oriane saw her husband on the bed with his head wrapped in a blanket. “I saw blood on the wall. I lifted up the comforter a little and then I lost it,” Oriane told the Guardian in an interview.
Norman’s suicide on May 13 was the worst possible end for the Rousseau’s nightmarish experience of America’s foreclosure crisis. But it was a long, surreal and twisted journey to get there. It began in May 2009, when Wachovia, now part of Wells Fargo, told the Rousseaus they had missed a mortgage payment on their home in Newbury Park, an hour outside Los Angeles.
Even though the Rousseaus had made the payment – and had the receipt to prove it –
The Federal Reserve Board on Wednesday announced the availability of a new video that explains how borrowers who believe they were financially harmed during the mortgage foreclosure process in 2009 and 2010 can apply for a free, independent foreclosure file review.
The brief announcement reminds borrowers that, as part of the enforcement actions taken in April 2011 by federal banking regulatory agencies, they may be eligible to receive compensation if the independent review finds evidence of direct financial injury due to servicer error. Borrowers are eligible for a review if their primary residence was in the foreclosure process in 2009 or 2010 and their mortgage loan servicer is participating in the Independent Foreclosure Review. The list of participating servicers can be found at: www.IndependentForeclosureReview.com or at www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/independent-foreclosure-review.htm
The deadline to request a foreclosure review is July 31, 2012. For more information, borrowers may call 888-952-9105 or visit www.IndependentForeclosureReview.com .
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