FRANK T. DIXON; DEANA M. DIXON, Plaintiffs,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. formerly known as WACHOVIA MORTGAGE, FSB formerly known as WORLD SAVINGS BANK, FSB, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 11-10368-WGY.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

July 22, 2011.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIAM G. YOUNG, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Frank and Deana Dixon (collectively “the Dixons”) bring this cause of action against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo“), seeking (1) an injunction prohibiting Wells Fargo from foreclosing on their home; (2) specific performance of an oral agreement to enter into a loan modification; and (3) damages. Wells Fargo, having removed the action from state court, now moves for dismissal of the Dixons’ complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the allegations are insufficient to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel and that, to the extent the Dixons have stated a state-law claim, it is preempted by the Home Owners’ Loan Act (“HOLA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1700, and its implementing regulations, 12 C.F.R. §§ 500-99.

[...]

Undoubtedly, the claim that Wells Fargo failed to uphold a promise to consider the Dixons for a loan modification relates to Wells Fargo’s “servicing” of the mortgage. See 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b)(10). But the standard for express preemption is more than “relates to.” See Coffman, 2010 WL 3069905, at *6 (citing In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, 491 F.3d at 643-44). The claim must “purport[] to impose requirements” regarding loan servicing for express preemption to apply. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b). Here, the Dixons do not aim to impose any substantive requirement on the loan modification process used by Wells Fargo, in particular, or federal savings banks, in general. Coffman, 2010 WL 3069905, at *9. The promissory estoppel claim seeks not to attack Wells Fargo’s underlying loan servicing policies and practices, but rather to hold the lender to its word, on which the Dixons relied to their detriment. Enforcement of Wells Fargo’s promise merely requires the lender to deal fairly and honestly, which no more burdens those lending operations listed in paragraph (b) than it does everyday business transactions. Bishop, 2010 WL 4115463, at *5 (“[R]equiring a bank to perform the obligations of its contract in good faith implicates none of the concerns embodied in HOLA.”); see Morse v. Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Whitman, 536 F. Supp. 1271, 1281 (D. Mass. 1982) (Aldrich, J.) (“An award of Chapter 93A exemplary damages against defendant would no more threaten the ability of federal savings and loan associations to perform their functions in the Commonwealth than it would state-chartered savings and loan associations, or other corporations subject to the statute.”). “Only claims that are specific to a defendant’s lending activities, as distinguished from legal duties applicable to all businesses, are preempted by HOLA.” Cuevas v. Atlas Realty/Fin. Servs., Inc., No. C 07-02814 JF, 2008 WL 268981, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2008).

Turning to paragraph (c) of section 560.2, the Dixons’ promissory estoppel claim “affect[s] lending businesses, just as [it would] affect any other business that enters into contracts or makes representations during the course of its operations.” Gibson, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28. Because it has some effect on lending, a presumption of preemption arises. 61 Fed. Reg. at 50966. This presumption is rebutted here, however, because promissory estoppel, as a state common-law doctrine of general applicability, is “not designed to regulate lending and do[es] not have a disproportionate or otherwise substantial effect on lending.” Gibson, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28-29. All businesses, not just federal savings associations, are subject to the predicate duty that the Dixons seek to enforce — a duty to honor promises made. Compliance with that duty would not require Wells Fargo to alter its loan modification program, or any substantive aspect of its approach to servicing loans, but it would ensure that consumers like the Dixons reasonably could rely on their lenders’ statements without suffering harm as a result.

With the national housing market once again rattled by an overwhelming number of foreclosures, other federal courts have been grappling recently with the preemption issue in cases factually indistinguishable from the present one. Yet, no consensus has emerged with respect to HOLA’s reach. In DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10-CV-01390-LHK, 2011 WL 311376 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2011), for example, the plaintiffs had complied with the steps required by Wells Fargo for a loan modification, which they had been assured would be successful, when abruptly and without warning they lost their home to foreclosure. Id. at *1-2. The court held that the plaintiffs’ intentional misrepresentation claim against Wells Fargo was not preempted by HOLA because it “d[id] not attempt to impose substantive requirements regarding loan terms, disclosures, or servicing or processing procedures.” Id. at *7. Similarly, in Becker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:10-cv-02799 LKK KJN PS, 2011 WL 1103439 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2011), where the plaintiff “allege[d] that he was promised a modification even though [the lender] never intended to modify his loan or seriously consider his application,” the court concluded that the “plaintiff’s fraud claim appears to arise from a more `general duty not to misrepresent material facts,’ and therefore it does not necessarily regulate lending activity.” Id. at *8-9.^[9] In contrast, however, the court in Zarif v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10cv2688-WQH-WVG, 2011 WL 1085660 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2011), held that the plaintiffs’ state-law claims, including intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel, were preempted by HOLA because they “specifically challenge the processing of Plaintiffs’ loan modification application and servicing of Plaintiffs’ mortgage.” Id. at *3.^[10] There, like here, the plaintiffs faced foreclosure after following Wells Fargo’s instruction to stop making their payments while waiting for their loan modification application to be processed.

[...]

It is said that talk is cheap. The Dixons’ allegations are easy to make, yet until their veracity is put to the test, foreclosure is inappropriate. But just as the homeowner ought not suffer a wrongful foreclosure, so too the bank has an equal and proper interest in realizing on its mortgage security by putting the home on the market at a foreclosure sale, selling it to a viable buyer, and lending the funds derived to other potential home buyers. This case is but a microcosm of much larger economic issues; to a significant extent, our national economy may depend upon promptly sorting out the issues raised here. Clogging the operation of the mortgage foreclosure system with court delay simply will not work. Either individual rights will be submerged, and people will lose their homes unlawfully, or home mortgage liquidity will atrophy, the larger economy will suffer, and potential home buyers will be denied homeownership, although financially able to support mortgage payments.

A prompt trial of this case is thus absolutely crucial. Here in Massachusetts, this federal district court — one of the most productive in the country, United States v. Massachusetts, Civil Action No. 09-11623-WGY, slip op. at chart, ECF. No. 134-1 (D. Mass. May 4, 2011) (Massachusetts is one of “America’s Most Productive federal district courts”) — can provide such a trial.^[11]

Accordingly, this case is ordered placed on the September running trial list,^[12] and the parties shall be ready for trial on Tuesday, September 6, 2011.

SO ORDERED.

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OS-

Earlier this year, the Florida Attorney General’s Office was in the midst of a pull-no-punches investigation into foreclosure fraud.

Investigators were exposing rampant abuses. They’d netted a $2 million settlement from one company. And they were gunning for more.

But then in May, two things happened:

First, the “special counsel” to Attorney General Pam Bondi left to take a high-level job with one of the very companies the office was investigating.

One week later, the investigators were forced out of their jobs, told late on a Friday afternoon that they had 90 minutes to decide whether to resign or be fired.

[ORLANDO SENTINEL]

NY Times-

YOU’D think the mortgage bust would qualify as a teachable moment.

But some people refuse to learn from mistakes — a list that apparently includes certain mortgage bankers. Their industry is fighting a new rule that might prevent a repeat of the lending binge that helped drive our economy off a cliff.

In case you just arrived from another planet: America’s mortgage mania was fueled by home loans with poisonous features that made them virtually impossible to repay. It was fun while it lasted, at least for the financial types who profited by making dubious loans and selling them to investors.

[NEW YORK TIMES]

Although disappointing not to see the final outcome behind the documents, this does not settle well with the FRAUD obviously involved.

“We conclude that this is a question of great public importance, as many, many mortgage foreclosures appear tainted with suspect documents,” the appeals court wrote in certification to the Supreme Court.

according to Miami Herald-

Both sides have agreed to settle a high-profile foreclosure fraud case pending before the Florida Supreme Court.

Details of the settlement were not disclosed in a brief stipulation filed Thursday with the high court.

The 4th District Court of Appeal in West Palm Beach had certified the case as a matter of “great public importance.”

The appeal court ruled Roman Pino couldn’t try to prove the Bank of New York Mellon defrauded him when it foreclosed on his Greenacres home.

STATE OF NEW YORK STATE
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF KINGS

VALLEY NATIONAL BANK, as successor
in interest to The Park Avenue Bank,

against

DO-RAY 46, INC., ROLF GFUMSTEAD, EMILY FISHER
a/k/a EMILY L. FISHER, WANK ADAMS SKLAVIN
OF TAXATION AND FINANCE, THE NEW YON CITY
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, PARK AVENUE FUNDING,
LLC, HANKS SALOON a/k/a CLOCKTOWER 46, INC.,
HEIDE TROW AND SONIA GORDON D/B/A STIR IT UP

EXCERPTS:

Order should not be entered as follows:

1. Vacating the default judgment, dated April 8,20 10, in the herein action, pursuant to CPLR 501 5(a) and (a)(3);  Order of Sale, dated May 2 201 1, pursuant to CPLR 501 5(a), (a)(3) and (a)(5);

[...]

staying the foreclosure sale of the subject premises, scheduled for Thursday, July 28,201 1; and staying the passing of the deed of the subject premises, since, among other reasons:

(a) plaintiff commenced knowing that it had no cause of action to foreclose on the Subject Premises as there was payment default as alleged in the complaint;
(b) plaintiff misrepresented in some instances, and in other instances, failed to provide certain facts to the Court to secure a default judgment and a judgment of foreclosure and sale;
(c) plaintiff failed to meet the CPLR standard for requisite proof of its claim for a default judgment and for a judgment of foreclosure and sale;
(d) plaintiff failed to comply with the CPLR requirement to substitute in the proper party as plaintiff – that is, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”) – following the FDIC’s seizure of plaintiff more than 12 months ago;
(e) plaintiff secured a judgment of foreclosure and sale on the basis of an attorney affirmation that failed to substantially comply with the Justice Lippman’s affirmation requirements in foreclosure actions and this Court’s express order of December 10,2010 therefor as part of plaintiff’s application for a judgment of foreclosure and sale;
( f ) plaintiff – which following March 12,20 10 – was no longer in operation – submitted an application for a judgment of foreclosure and sale and substitution of Valley National Bank as plaintiff without the requisite proof that Valley National Bank was the owner and holder of the relevant notes.

[...]

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Palm Beach Post-

An Orlando lawmaker wants two former state foreclosure investigators reinstated if performance evaluations he has requested reflect high rankings for the duo.

Democratic Rep. Darren Soto sent a public records request Wednesday to Florida Attorney General Pam Bondi, asking for evaluations and documents related to the forced resignations of Theresa Edwards and June Clarkson.

The two former assistant attorneys general had been the lead investigators on the state’s foreclosure fraud cases, but were abruptly told in May to resign or they would be fired.

[PAM BEACH POST]

DEMUCHA v WELLS FARGO | California Appeals Court Reverses & Remands “QUIET TITLE, FRAUD & MISREPRESENTATION, SLANDER OF CREDIT”

A Bakersfield homeowner is taking on a bank, in a battle that could have sweeping implications for people facing foreclosure.

Mark Demucha wants Wells Fargo to prove it owns his home loan. And, if his lawsuit is successful, it could set a legal precedent that slows or even stops foreclosures across the state.

[KGET]

MOSHE MAZINE and JAACOV E. BOUSKILA, Appellants,
v.
M & I BANK, Appellee.

Case No. 1D10-2127.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Opinion filed July 22, 2011.

David H. Charlip of Charlip Law Group, LC, Aventura, for Appellants.

Erin Berger, Florida Default Law Group, PL, Tampa, for Appellee.

VAN NORTWICK, J.

Moshe Mazine and Jaacov Bouskila appeal an amended final judgment of mortgage foreclosure in favor of M & I Bank, appellee. Because the documentary evidence necessary to establish the amount owed under the note and mortgage was admitted without proper foundation and it is undisputed that M & I Bank was not the holder of the mortgage and note, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The party seeking foreclosure must present evidence that it owns and holds the note and mortgage to establish standing to proceed with a foreclosure action. Servedio v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 46 So. 3d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). Because a promissory note is a negotiable instrument and because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note, the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder. See § 673.3011, Fla. Stat. (2009); Taylor v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 44 So. 3d 618 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). An allegation of default in a complaint must be proven by competent evidence. See Terra Firma Holdings v. Fairwinds Credit Union, 15 So. 3d 885 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

In January 2009, M & I Bank filed a complaint seeking foreclosure of a mortgage naming Mazine and Bouskila as party defendants. An amended complaint later followed, but the named plaintiff remained the same. After several motions challenging the sufficiency of service of process and personal jurisdiction, Bouskila eventually filed an answer which denied almost all of allegations of the amended complaint, including the allegation that Bouskila secured a mortgage on the real property at issue and the allegation as to amount in default. Mazine did not file an answer but moved to dismiss the amended complaint on several grounds, including the ground that the entity listed on the note and mortgage was “M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank,” not the named plaintiff, “M & I Bank.” The motion to dismiss was not considered by the trial court before the cause was heard at a bench trial.

The only witness to testify at the bench trial regarding the allegations of the amended complaint was David Taxdal, the regional security officer for “M & I Marshall and Ilsley Bank” in the State of Florida. According to Taxdal’s testimony, his “duties and responsibilities are fraud investigation, internal investigation and physical security for the branches” in Florida, and he does not originate loans, service loans or collect loans in default. Through Taxdal, the bank attempted to introduce several documents, including an affidavit as to amounts due and owing. The affidavit was executed by Michael Koontz, who did not appear at trial, and the bank sought to introduce it as a business record. Taxdal testified that he had no knowledge as to who prepared the documents submitted at trial by the bank as he is not involved in the preparation of documents such as the ones proffered by the bank, that he does not keep records as a records custodian, that he has no personal knowledge as to how the information in the affidavit as to the amounts due and owing was determined or whether it was prepared in the normal course of business, and that he did not know whether such information was accurate.

Counsel for the defendants vigorously opposed admission of the affidavit of indebtedness, the only evidence of the amount allegedly in delinquency, as a business record. Counsel observed that the affiant (Koontz) was not subject to cross-examination, and that given the matters to which Taxdal testified it was evident that Taxdal “has no knowledge of the basis upon which this affidavit was prepared.”

The trial court denied defendants’ objection and admitted the affidavit without explanation. This was error. Before a document may be admitted as a business record, a foundation for such admission must be laid. Section 90.803(6), Florida Statutes (2010), allows the admission of records of a regularly kept business activity when the business record was made at or near the time of the matters reported and when the business record is made by a person having personal knowledge of the matters reported or when the information supplied in the record is supplied by a person with knowledge. Further, it must be shown that the business record was kept in the ordinary course of a regularly conducted business activity and that it is the regular practice of the business keeping the record to make such a business record. Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2008). While it is not necessary to call the individual who prepared the document, the witness through whom a document is being offered must be able to show each of the requirements for establishing a proper foundation. Forester v. Norman Roger Jewell & Brooks, 610 So. 2d 1369, 1373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

Here, none of the requirements for admission of a business record were met. As noted, Taxdal candidly admitted that he had no knowledge as to the preparation or maintenance of the documents offered by the bank, including the affidavit as to amounts due and owing. Taxdal did not testify and, indeed, could not testify, that the affidavit as to the amounts owed was actually kept in the regular course of business. Further, he did not know if the source of the information contained in the affidavit was correct. He did not know if the amounts reported in the affidavit were accurate. There was no attempt to admit the affidavit by certification or declaration pursuant to section 90.803(6)(c), Florida Statutes.

Accordingly, because no foundation was laid, the admission of the affidavit was erroneous. Because the affidavit was the only evidence as to the amount of defendants’ default, the error was harmful necessitating that the amended final judgment of foreclosure be reversed.

Furthermore, the trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion for a directed verdict given the lack of proof that the named plaintiff and appellee, M & I Bank, holds the mortgage and note. “M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank” is shown as the holder of both the note and mortgage. At the time the bank offered the affidavit as to amounts due and owing into evidence, Taxdal testified that M & I Bank FSB — which we assume is M & I Bank — and M & I Marshall and Ilsley Bank are different entities.^[1] The amended judgment of foreclosure styles the prevailing party as “M & I Bank,” not “M & I Marshall and Ilsley Bank.” To have standing to foreclose, it must be demonstrated that the plaintiff holds the note and mortgage in question. See Khan v. Bank of America, N.A., 58 So. 3d 927 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011), and Philogene v. ABN Amro Mtg. Group, Inc., 948 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Therefore, because M & I Bank had not demonstrated it possessed the standing to proceed in the foreclosure action, we must reverse on this issue as well.

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

LEWIS, and ROBERTS, JJ., CONCUR.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.

[1] Although M & I Bank filed a motion to substitute a party by which M & I Marshall and Isley Bank was to be substituted for M & I Bank, the trial court never acted upon this motion. We note that, while the name of the bank in the mortgage and note is spelled “M & I Marshall and Ilsley“, the motion to substitute spells the name somewhat differently, “M & I Marshall and Isley” (italics added).

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Progress Florida-

Friends,

Florida Attorney General Pam Bondi seems to think her first duty is to protect some of Gov. Scott’s biggest corporate pals – the banks – instead of hard working Floridians. Recently Bondi fired Florida’s two leading attorneys investigating the epidemic of foreclosure fraud ravaging our communities.

The attorneys investigating foreclosure fraud said they were forced out. Join me and sign this petition calling for an immediate investigation: http://www.progressflorida.org/bondi

June Clarkson and Theresa Edwards were tasked by then-Attorney General Bill McCollum last year to investigate allegations of widespread fraud taking place in foreclosures occurring around the state. They did their jobs well…perhaps too well for Pam Bondi.

The investigation by Clarkson and Edwards produced a blockbuster presentation entitled “Unfair, Deceptive and Unconscionable Acts in Foreclosure Cases. ” The presentation demonstrated numerous outrageous examples of blatant fraud and deception by banks and law firms initiating foreclosures known as “foreclosure mills.” Clarkson and Edward’s work was so effective it was used in other states in prosecuting foreclosure fraud . Then in May, despite a recent glowing performance evaluation, both attorneys were suddenly told by a supervisor to immediately step down or be fired.

Sign the petition calling for an investigation of Attorney General Bondi’s actions:

http://www.progressflorida.org/bondi

Thank you for your help.

(Reuters) -

MERS, the electronic mortgage registry that faces multiple investigations for its role in thousands of problematic foreclosure cases, changed its rules to lower its profile in court-supervised foreclosures.

MERS, a unit of Merscorp Inc. of Reston, Virginia, owns the computerized registry, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems. Mortgage loan giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and several of the largest U.S. banks established MERS in 1995 to circumvent the costly and cumbersome process of transferring ownership of mortgages and recording the changes with county clerks.

In rule changes announced to MERS members on July 21, the company forbade members to file any more foreclosure actions in MERS’s name.

It also required mortgage servicers to obtain mortgage assignments and record them with county clerks before beginning foreclosures.

[REUTERS]

July 27, 2011

Pam Bondi, Attorney General

Office of Attorney General
State of Florida
The Capitol PL-01
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050

Re – Public Records Request for Documents Related to Termination of Theresa Edwards and June Clarkson

Dear Madam General,

It has come to my attention that two assistant attorney generals, Theresa Edwards and June Clarkson, were recently terminated by your office for poor performance. However, public records indicate that these terminations occurred while they were in the midst of successful mortgage fraud litigation and in spite of prior successful reviews. As a member who represents an area ravaged by foreclosure fraud, these terminations present an overwhelming public concern.

REQUEST IS HEREBY MADE pursuant to Public Records Act, Chapter 119 of the Florida Statutes that your office provides me with any and all records related to job performance of Theresa Edwards and June Clarkson within the past 3 years. Please also provide a list of all case numbers for all currently active cases managed by Theresa Edwards and June Clarkson for your office as well as the amounts of any settlements occurring within the past 3 years in any cases managed by Theresa Edwards or June Clarkson along with corresponding case number.

If you have any questions or comments, please do not hesitate to contact my office. Thank you in advance for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Darren M. Soto

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
———————————-
FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY
AS CONSERVATOR FOR THE FEDERAL
NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION
AND THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN
MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

-AGAINST-

UBS AMERICAS INC., UBS REAL ESTATE
SECURITIES INC., UBS SECURITIES,
LLC, MORTGAGE ASSET
SECURITIZATION TRANSACTION, INC.,
DAVID MARTIN, PER DYRVIK, HUGH
CORCORAN, and PERTER SLAGOWITZ

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