November, 2010 - FORECLOSURE FRAUD - Page 2

Archive | November, 2010

IA APPEALS COURT |”Sheriff’s Sale Null and Void, Returning Legal Title to Owner” BANK OF NEW YORK v SMITH

IA APPEALS COURT |”Sheriff’s Sale Null and Void, Returning Legal Title to Owner” BANK OF NEW YORK v SMITH

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 0-407 / 09-1816

FFMLT 04-FF10, BANK OF NEW YORK,
as Successor in Interest to JP MORGAN
CHASE BANK, N.A., as Trustee,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BARBRA J. SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.

Excerpt:

Bank of New York also contends any issue concerning the validity of the foreclosure judgment is moot because it already bought the property at the sheriff’s sale. We find this claim without merit because we have the power to declare a judgment null and void, even if the judgment has previously been executed. See Hell, 238 Iowa at 513-14, 28 N.W.2d at 2-3 (holding the two-year statute of limitations had run, rendering the judgment null and void even though a levy had been made on the property and the debtor’s credits had already been garnished). “A void judgment ordinarily cannot be made valid and operative by . . . a sale on execution held under it.” Halverson v. Hageman, 249 Iowa 1381, 1390, 92 N.W.2d 569, 575 (1958) (citation omitted). The fact that an execution sale has occurred does not moot the issue presented.

V. Conclusion.
We conclude the legislature did not intend a demand to delay sale obtained pursuant to Iowa Code section 654.21 to toll the two-year statute of limitations in section 615.1. Therefore, the July 24, 2009 special execution of the July 5, 2007 foreclosure judgment came nineteen days too late, rendering the judgment null and void.

We reverse the decision of the district court and remand for entry of a decree declaring the sheriff’s sale null and void, returning legal title to Smith, and declaring the July 5, 2007 foreclosure judgment null and void for any purpose other than set off or counterclaim. Costs are assessed to the Bank of New York.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

BANK OF NEW YORK v SMITH

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© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD2 Comments

[READ] ‘MERS’ Letter From Essex County Register of Deeds John O’Brien to AG Martha Coakley

[READ] ‘MERS’ Letter From Essex County Register of Deeds John O’Brien to AG Martha Coakley

These are excellent words…

It has been brought to my attention that a number of states have alleged in court filings that MERS intentionally failed to pay recording fees and failed to disclose the transfer and assignments of interest in property, solely to avoid and decrease the recordation fees owed tot he counties and the state.

Letter From Essex County Register of Deeds John O’Brien to AG Martha Coakley

[ipaper docId=43910838 access_key=key-1s9z1zu0nuw8tzlnxo4p height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD5 Comments

[VIDEO] Dylan Ratigan Show: Rep. Marcy Kaptur, MERS, FRAUDCLOSURE FRAUD COVER UP

[VIDEO] Dylan Ratigan Show: Rep. Marcy Kaptur, MERS, FRAUDCLOSURE FRAUD COVER UP

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD2 Comments

IA APPEALS COURT |”MORTGAGE NULL & VOID” DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY v. GAUPPS

IA APPEALS COURT |”MORTGAGE NULL & VOID” DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY v. GAUPPS

Back by popular demand…first posted this back on July 1, 2010.

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, As Trustee of Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass Through Certificates, Series 2004-X3, Under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement Dated as of September 1, 2004, Without Recourse, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DAVID J. GAUPP, ALEXANDRA C. GAUPP, NATHAN PARTON and SPOUSE OF NATHAN PARTON, REBEKAH J. BARTON and SPOUSE OF REBEKAH J. BARTON, WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., and PARTIES IN POSSESSION,, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 0-272/09-0700.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Filed June 30, 2010.

Excerpt:

On October 21, 2008, the Partons and Wells Fargo filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that (1) the mortgage held by Deutsche Bank was invalid; and (2) the mortgage held by Deutsche Bank could not be foreclosed because the Partons were bona fide purchasers for value. On February 12, 2009, the district court issued its ruling finding that the Gaupps and Granger conveyed their interest in the property to G & G Properties on July 3, 2002, and when G & G Properties recorded the deed on September 24, 2002, it became the record titleholder. Gaupp did not have any interest in the property when he executed the mortgage in favor of Ameriquest/Deutsche Bank and after the mortgage was executed, Gaupp never obtained title to the property. G & G Properties did not convey the property to anyone prior to May 19, 2006, when the Partons purchased the property. As a result, the mortgage held by Deutsche Bank was “null and void.” The district court granted the Partons and Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the petition for foreclosure. Deutsche Bank appeals.

<SNIP>

Deutsche Bank asserts that the district court erred in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The parties do not dispute that at the time Gaupp executed the promissory note and mortgage, he did not hold title to the property and that G & G Properties was the record titleholder. Deutsche Bank cannot avoid the fundamental principal that a party that has no interest in a particular piece of real property cannot validly mortgage that property. See, e.g., Lee v. Lee, 207 Iowa 882, 885, 223 N.W. 888, 890 (Iowa 1929) (holding a mortgage invalid because the mortgagor had no interest in the property at the time the mortgage was given); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 111, at 102-03 (2009) (discussing that “[o]ne who has no ownership interest in property has no right to mortgage it” and if one does so, the mortgage creates no interest in the property). At the time Gaupp obtained the loan from Ameriquest, he did not have any interest in the property and therefore, the mortgage instrument attempting to secure the promissory note was invalid.

Deutsche Bank argues that Gaupp acquired title to the property on December 31, 2003, when the Gaupps and Granger executed the “Corrected Warranty Deed,” which Deutsche Bank further argues resulted in the mortgage becoming valid.[ 3 ] However, this argument fails because Gaupp did not acquire an interest in the property when the “Corrected Warranty Deed” was executed on December 31, 2003. On July 3, 2002, the Gaupps and Granger conveyed the property to G & G Properties. After this conveyance, Gaupp had no interest in the property and could not convey the property to anyone. See Iowa Code § 557.3 (2007) (“Every conveyance of real estate passes all the interest of the grantor therein, unless a contrary intent can be reasonably inferred from the terms used.”). After the July 3, 2002 conveyance, only G & G Properties was able to convey title to the property. Any such attempt by Gaupp to do so would be and was invalid as he was no longer the titleholder. Therefore, the attempts by the Gaupps and Granger to convey the property on December 31, 2003, and February 2, 2005, were not valid conveyances.[ 4 ] Additionally, because the invalid conveyances were outside the chain of title, they were stray deeds when recorded. See William Stoebuck and Dale Whitman, The Law of Property § 11.11 (3rd ed. 2000) (“The term `chain of title’ is a shorthand way of describing the collection of documents which one can find by the use of the ordinary techniques of title search.”); 1 C.J.S. Abstracts of Title § 15, at 320 n.8 (2009) (“Instrument executed by owner [that] is recorded before acquisition or after relinquishment of title by owner is outside chain of title . . . .”).[ 5 ] Title remained with G & G Properties from July 3, 2002 until May 5, 2006, when G & G Properties conveyed its solely held interest in the property to the Partons. Therefore the chain of title went from G & G Properties to the Partons. Gaupp did not have title to the property when he executed the mortgage instrument now held by Deutsche Bank nor did he subsequently obtain title. We affirm the district court’s findings and ruling.

Continue reading below…

deutsche bank v. gaupp

[ipaper docId=43882170 access_key=key-1f17kw0du74j6dtls3yz height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD2 Comments

FL CLASS ACTION: Alleging Lender Processing Service “LPS” Violated Federal Securities Laws

FL CLASS ACTION: Alleging Lender Processing Service “LPS” Violated Federal Securities Laws

City of St. Clair Shores General Employees Retirement System

v

Lender Processing Services, Inc., Jeffrey S. Carbiener, Lee A. Kennedy, and Francis K. Chan

The complaint alleging violations of the federal securities laws by Lender Processing Services, Inc. and certain of its officers and/or directors. The class action was commenced in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on behalf of purchasers of LPS securities between July 29, 2009 and October 4, 2010 (the “Class Period”) by Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP.

LPS CLASS

[ipaper docId=43794502 access_key=key-1wej89yk64l79dcp7srt height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD6 Comments

GUEST COMMENT: OneWest Has Become the Poster Child

GUEST COMMENT: OneWest Has Become the Poster Child

By: OneMacIndyWest

I want to tell you all a little story. The story begins, as all American dreams do, with unfettered hope and belief, but has, over time, become a nightmare from the darkest recesses of our national psyche. This is not a fairy tale, and I beg you to see yourself in our heroine; for you could find yourself in her shoes very soon. And I promise you that that is not a place you want to be. But read on, and judge the veracity of my words for yourself.

I have been in the mortgage industry for almost a decade, and have seen my share of the ugly side of lending: the foreclosures, the forgotten families, and the greedy, heartless, faceless “holder of the note” gone wild. I have experienced all of this more times than I care to admit, and have been ashamed of my industry more times than I care to count, but the borrower I wish to tell you of was the reason I broke into this business in the first place. People like her, hard-working, honest Americans, are the ones a broker like myself looks for day and night, and strives to take care of in whatever capacity we are capable of.

Why you ask? What makes her so special? There are many answers to these questions, and the easy answer would be that she perfectly fit the mold we in the business look for. She had been employed for 22 years with the same corporation, and had managed to pay every liability on time for her entire adult life. No late payments, no missed payments, and nothing at all to indicate that she would ever change. Her credit score was 780, and she had owned a home for 10 years in Miami Beach (an expensive place to buy). This showed unequivocally that she understood liability, and knew how to get things done in the lending market. In short, she was a lender’s dream come true. A loan you approve and forget about because the payments are always in on time, and so, as a lender, you just count money for 30 years. What could be better from our point of view than that? Every lender in the world will tell you the answer to that question is nothing; absolutely nothing.

This lady decided to move to Chicago to be closer to her corporate office, so she sold her home in Miami and took her dreams and possessions north to Chicago. This took place in 2006 while the housing bubble was still growing larger, and no one outside of the industry had any expectation that it may burst at any time. She did her due diligence while looking for a home in the Chicago area, and eventually settled on a brand new property in an area ripe for gentrification. Basically, she bought in an older neighborhood that was undergoing massive urban renewal projects that were projected to raise property values in her area significantly; as long as there was no unforeseen disaster looming. That is the danger of things unforeseen. They eventually come to pass, and no one is prepared to combat them.

She started with an Interest-Only Loan as at that time it made more sense to use her principal money on personal investments rather than giving it to a lender to make decisions with. Even though interest rates were high at the time, IO rates slightly higher than fixed, she was able to get the property for almost $75K less than it initially appraised for, so she was already ahead of the game. She maintained her perfect history, 0×30 on her mortgage, and everything else for that matter, but that was before the wise and powerful bankers in America decided to play 3-Card Monty with America’s future.

As the signs of the encroaching financial apocalypse began to show themselves, she attempted, through her lender, to pursue refinancing, but was told her case called for the loan modification process. The press was making a fuss about how these modifications were the way for borrowers to get the help they needed to stay afloat in the carnage that followed the bubble bursting, and as an intelligent and savvy borrower with a perfect history she expected the process to go smoothly for her. In that assumption, she would have been right if not for the new credit card laws passed that allowed the companies to raise their interest rates and reduce the line of credit available on any given card. These changes have had an enormous, unintended consequence in the lending world since loans are in large part based on debt-to-income (DTI) ratios.

Imagine this borrower has a credit line of $10K on a card with only a $2K balance, but is then targeted by the credit card company for a reduced credit line of say $2500, so her 20% balance has now become 80% without her actually doing anything irresponsible. Yet, when lenders looked at her DTI they would see that she is nearly maxed out on her card, and in this industry that is a major red flag. She understood DTI, and how it could affect her ability to qualify for extra money (even though she did nothing untoward or rash in terms of spending), but why should that hamper her from getting a reduced rate? It is asinine to ask a person to re-qualify for something they already have, or to tell them they must qualify to save money, but this is what is happening in America today. She signed no agreement stating she could not refinance in the future with the help of her lender, so all she is left with are questions. Questions that for her and the millions like her, unfortunately, have no good answers. The American Dream, for this model American, is quickly becoming the American Nightmare.

There are so many questions our borrower wants to ask, but there are no phone lines to call or government offices to visit with any answer other than, “talk to the lender”. This is just endless runaround from the lender, and more and more frustration for her and her family. How is it possible to be locked into a loan, with bankruptcy laws so much tougher, and have absolutely no way to refinance? More transparency in the industry is great, but how can our borrowers appease the credit companies interest hikes while losing equity in their property due to the housing catastrophe and still meet the necessary financial obligations they agreed to prior to this meltdown? This is a recipe for mass bankruptcy and foreclosure; two things that hurt us all in the long run.

It was March of 2009 when our borrower started the conversation about refinancing with her current mortgage company, Indy Mac, from the 7.625% IO-Loan to a 4.5% fixed rate. They explained to her that she would need to print out a new financial packet, and send it, along with all other pertinent information, in to be reviewed before they could proceed; she did just that. After an entire month had passed, she called in to check the status of her application, and was told that the servicing company, Indy Mac, was changing hands, but she would still be taken care of by the new investor, One West.
Just like that, she and thousands of other customers were being sold to the highest bidder, and after some research she discovered that One West actually only paid up to far less than full value for these notes. It gets better. One West actually had the federal government guarantee them anything lost over a certain percentage. What does this mean you ask? All the numbers are there in black and white on the internet for anyone to see; but no one looks. You do not have to be a rocket scientist to see that it would be more profitable to foreclose quickly and collect the guaranteed funds than to refinance the borrower’s note at a current market rate.

The changing of the servicer of her note, as unsettling as it was, would have been fine if not for the dramatic change in guidelines and customer service she experienced. This often happens after a change of this magnitude in any business field, but these differences were downright ridiculous. She was informed that the financial packet she had sent was no longer valid, so she would have to assemble another one before any process could begin. So, once again she followed procedure in hopes of capturing that elusive lower interest rate.

She waited and waited for a call to inform her of the status of her newest application, and finally tried calling herself to enquire; but to no avail. Her calls were treated as a joke. They repetitiously asked for the same documents, and even claimed after three business days that they had never received her fax, and that it took all that time to verify whether or not they had received her documentation. They have done this over 50 times from March of 2009 to the present day! That is preposterous, shameful, and ought to be criminal! But it gets better; or worse for our heroine.

After calling repeatedly for three months she finally got them to look at her application. They told our borrower that the check stubs submitted were out of date according to Fannie Mae guidelines (must be less than 90 days old), but when she remedied that they told our borrower that her check stubs were fraudulent. Check stubs from one of the three largest airlines in the world which she has worked with for more than 20 years by the way. They focused on some minutiae that they knew to be nothing, but she was forced to get a complete employment record from her employer to along with a Letter of Explanation (LOX) from her Human Resources department. This process has stretched into years with no results. She was even told that the best way to get help is to be late on her mortgage payments! Imagine that. It has become so bad that when she follows up on any fax or correspondence they claim she has never talked to anyone about her issue, and when she asked about recording the conversation she was told it was against their policy. I am not making this up. Every word is true and to the point, and the point is that One West and Indy Mac, Fannie Mae and the federal government are fleecing, and failing we the people.

This is dangerous and uncontrolled corporate behavior, and it cannot be allowed to continue. One West has become the poster child for what is wrong with this industry; what is wrong with America in fact. In my humble opinion (and that of thousands of other Americans…not to mention all the honest lenders in the industry), they have pulled out all the stops when it comes to delaying and deceiving their customers in order to get a government handout and make a dishonest buck. This must not be allowed to stand.

Help her. She has asked again and again, and researched every option. She can’t refinance due to not having value. She can’t modify because it’s not profitable to the lender to do so, and she can’t walk away as her state won’t allow this. Why I ask myself? Is it considered walking away if you have no more options? Why is it easier to profit from bad deals than good ones? There is no hope for this borrower that she can see. The only hope I can think of is a Federal Reserve for primary borrowers in America. By that, I mean the feds open the vaults to primary homeowners at a specific rate, and work directly with the borrowers from a federal standpoint. Cut the banks out. Let them focus on commercial deals and second homes where the rates are higher and people know what they are getting into from day one. I do not think these customers’ closing paperwork said anything about having to stay in one rate for thirty years. Do you know anyone on record in today’s environment that can say they stayed in their home for thirty years at the same rate? I don’t think that is even possible. Please share…

Here are some sites that clearly have people in the same situation, read, educate, follow and post, let’s start the revolt against One West/ Indy Mac and Fannie Mae.

Go to Google, You-tube or any engine for that matter and type class action Indy Mac, Type Complaints Indy Mac/ One West; you will see firsthand what we are all up against.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD2 Comments

REWIND: “MERS DOUBLE ASSIGNMENT” IN RE MORENO, Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts, Eastern Div. 2010

REWIND: “MERS DOUBLE ASSIGNMENT” IN RE MORENO, Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts, Eastern Div. 2010

In re: SIMEON MORENO, Chapter 13, Debtor

Case No. 08-17715-FJB.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts, Eastern Division.

May 24, 2010.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION OF PROPERTY ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY

FRANK J. BAILEY, Bankruptcy Judge

In the Chapter 13 case of debtor Simeon Moreno, Property Asset Management, Inc. (“PAM”), claiming to be the assignee of a mortgage originally given by the debtor to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as nominee for lender GE Money Bank, moved for relief from the automatic stay to foreclose the mortgage. Moreno initially opposed the motion but then withdrew his objection, whereupon the Court granted the relief requested. Months later, at Moreno’s request, the Court vacated the order granting relief from stay and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the Motion for Relief from Stay for the limited purpose of reconsidering whether PAM had an interest in the mortgage it sought to foreclose and, to that extent, standing to seek relief from stay.[1] Having held the evidentiary hearing and received proposed findings and conclusions, the Court now enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Findings of Fact and Procedural History

On January 23, 2007, Moreno executed a promissory note in the principal amount of $492,000, payable to lender GE Money Bank. GE subsequently endorsed the note in blank, whereupon possession of the note was transferred through a series of holders and ultimately to Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (“LBHI”), who held the note when PAM filed its Motion for Relief from Stay and continues to hold it now.[2] LBHI, through one of its employees and through LBHI’s attorney, who not coincidentally also is PAM’s attorney in the present matter, produced the original note at the evidentiary hearing. PAM is not now a holder of the note or an entity for whose benefit another has held the note.

To secure the promissory note, Moreno gave a mortgage on the real property at 5 Maple Street, West Roxbury, Massachusetts (the “Property”) to MERS as nominee for GE (the “Mortgage”). The Mortgage specifies that MERS “is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for [GE] and [GE’s] successors and assigns. MERS is the mortgagee under this security instrument.” The Mortgage further provides that Moreno does hereby mortgage, grant and convey to MERS (solely as nominee for [GE] and [GE’s] successors and assigns) and to the successors and assigns of MERS, with power of sale, the [Property]. . . . Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for [GE] and [GE’s] successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action required of [GE] including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security Instrument.

The Mortgage was duly recorded.

MERS administers an electronic registry to track the transfer of ownership interest and servicing rights in mortgage loans. With respect to certain loans of which its members are the beneficial owners, MERS also serves as mortgagee of record and holds legal title to the mortgages in a nominee capacity. MERS remains the mortgagee of record when beneficial ownership interests or servicing rights are sold from one member of the MERS system to another. When the beneficial interest in a mortgage loan is transferred from one member of the MERS system to another, MERS tracks the transfer through its internal records. When rights are transferred from a member of the MERS system to a non-member, MERS executes and records an assignment from MERS to the non-member.

To facilitate the execution of the assignments from MERS, MERS designates “certifying officers,” who are typically employees of MERS member firms. MERS authorizes these employees, through formal corporate resolutions, to execute assignments on behalf of MERS. On or about January 6, 2005, MERS, through a document entitled Corporate Resolution and issued by its board of directors, authorized Denise Bailey, an employee of Litton Loan Servicing L.P. (“Litton”), a member of MERS, to execute such assignments on behalf of MERS. In the language of the authorizing document (the “MERS Authorization”),[3] Ms. Bailey was authorized to, among other things, “assign the lien of any mortgage loan naming MERS as the mortgagee when the Member [Litton] is also the current promissory note-holder, or if the mortgage loan is registered on the MERS System, is shown [sic] to be registered to the Member”[4]; and Ms. Bailey was further authorized to “take any such actions and execute such documents as may be necessary to fulfill the Member’s servicing obligations to the beneficial owner of such mortgage loan (including mortgage loans that are removed from the MERS System as a result of the transfer thereof to a non-member of MERS).” In each instance, Bailey’s authority to act is dependent on the existence of a specified relationship of Litton, the MERS member for whom she is employed, to the loan in question.

The Moreno loan was entered into the MERS tracking database in the ordinary course of business. Thereafter, MERS tracked the beneficial interest in the loan. The beneficial interest was transferred from G.E. Money Bank to WMC Mortgage Corporation; then, on September 19, 2007, from WMC Mortgage Corporation to Aurora Bank FSB (formerly known as Lehman Brothers Bank FSB), and then, on July 30, 2008, from Aurora Bank FSB to LBHI. Aurora Bank was at all relevant times a wholly-owned subsidiary of LBHI.

With respect to the Moreno Mortgage, MERS remained the mortgagee of record until, on or about April 30, 2008, MERS, acting through Denise Bailey, assigned the Mortgage to PAM. At the time, Aurora Bank FSB was the beneficial owner of the loan. In executing the MERS assignment to PAM, Ms. Bailey purported to be acting under her MERS Authorization.

The MERS Authorization limited Ms. Bailey’s authority to act for MERS to matters with respect to which Litton was involved in at least one of the ways specified in the above-quoted language from the MERS Authorization. There is evidence, and I find, that Aurora Bank FSB had requested that Litton transfer the loan from MERS to PAM in anticipation of foreclosure. However, PAM has adduced no evidence that Litton had any specified connection to this loan at the time it executed this assignment. There is no evidence that Litton was then (or at any time) the servicer of the loan for Aurora Bank or that Litton was registered as servicer of the loan in the MERS system.[5] (PAM does not contend that Litton was the holder of the promissory note or the owner of the beneficial interest in the loan.)

Scott Drosdick, a vice-president of LBHI and witness for PAM at the evidentiary hearing, testified that Aurora Bank’s instruction to Litton to transfer the mortgage to PAM was later “ratified by LBHI.” Drosdick did not explain what he meant by this, precisely how and when this ratification occurred. Absent such evidence and clarification, this testimony is too vague to have any definite meaning; accordingly I give it no weight.

By a master servicing agreement dated February 1, 1999, LBHI engaged Aurora Loan Services, Inc., now known as Aurora Loan Services LLC (“ALS”), as master servicer of certain loans, including eventually the present Moreno loan. In turn, ALS engaged Litton to service certain loans, including eventually this same loan.

After Bailey executed the MERS assignment to PAM, Bailey executed another assignment of the same mortgage from MERS to LBHI. This second assignment was never recorded; nor is there evidence that it was ever delivered by MERS to LBHI.

Moreno filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on October 13, 2008, commencing the present bankruptcy case. On November 13, 2008, LBHI, acting through its servicer Litton Loan Servicing, LP, filed a proof of claim in this case; the proof of claim asserts a claim, secured by real estate, in the total amount of $530,168.04, the same secured claim as PAM now seeks relief from stay to enforce by foreclosure. On the proof of claim form itself, Litton actually identifies the creditor claimant as simply “Litton,” but on an explanatory document attached to the proof of claim form, Litton states that the claim is filed by “Litton Loan Servicing, LP, as Servicing Agent for Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.” The proof of claim does not mention PAM or indicate in any way that the mortgage securing the claim is held by anyone other than LBHI.

On March 31, 2009, and at LBHI’s direction, PAM filed the present motion for relief from the automatic stay, seeking relief from the automatic stay to foreclose and to preserve its rights as to a potential deficiency. PAM intends and is obligated to remit the proceeds of the intended foreclosure sale to Aurora Loan Services LLC, as servicer for LBHI. Regarding ownership of the note and Mortgage, PAM stated in the motion only that it was the holder of a mortgage originally given by Moreno to MERS, that the mortgage secured a note given by Moreno to GE, and that MERS had assigned the mortgage to PAM. PAM did not indicate that LBHI was the current holder of the note or that it held the mortgage as nominee for the benefit of LBHI or of any other entity. The motion did not mention LBHI.

Moreno filed a response to the motion, in essence an objection, in which he expressly admitted PAM’s allegation that his prepetition arrearage was $39,442.49 and, by lack of denial, tacitly admitted that Moreno was some four months in arrears on his postpetition payments under the mortgage. By these allegations and admissions, PAM has established that Moreno is in default on his mortgage loan obligations; the Court rejects Moreno’s request for a finding that PAM has not established a default. The response made no issue of PAM’s standing to foreclose or to seek relief from stay and did not dispute PAM’s allegations regarding ownership of the note and Mortgage. In any event, before a hearing was held on the motion, Moreno, through counsel, withdrew his objection. Consequently, on April 28, 2009, and without a hearing or any review of apparent inconsistencies in the bankruptcy record concerning ownership of the mortgage and note, the court granted PAM relief from the automatic stay to foreclose and to preserve its rights as to a potential deficiency.

PAM had not yet foreclosed when, on December 2, 2009 and by new counsel, Moreno filed an adversary complaint against PAM and, with it, a motion for preliminary injunction. The complaint sought among other things (i) an order invalidating the mortgage on account of irregularities in its origination and (ii) a declaration that PAM was not the holder of the mortgage and note. In the motion for preliminary injunction, Moreno asked that the foreclosure be stayed, or that the automatic stay be reimposed, pending disposition of the adversary proceeding. On December 7, 2009, after a hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, the Court found that the motion was, in part, essentially one to vacate the order granting relief from the automatic stay, vacated that order, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the motion for relief. The order specified that the sole issue at the evidentiary hearing would be PAM’s standing to seek relief from the automatic stay, all other issues under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) being deemed established. After discovery, the evidentiary hearing was held on April 8, 2010, and, with the submission of proposed findings and conclusions, the matter was then taken under advisement.

Discussion

As the party seeking relief from stay to foreclose a mortgage on the debtor’s property, PAM bears the burden of proving that it has authority under applicable state law to foreclose the mortgage in question and, by virtue of that authority, standing to move for relief from the automatic stay to foreclose. PAM contends that it has such authority and standing because, although it does not hold the promissory note that the mortgage secures, it does have title to the mortgage itself; and it holds that title as nominee of and for the benefit of the note holder, LBHI, and is foreclosing for LBHI. In these circumstances, PAM contends, a mortgagee has a right under Massachusetts law to foreclose for the benefit of the note holder and therefore standing to move for relief from stay to foreclose. The Debtor objects, arguing (among other things) that Massachusetts law prohibits foreclosure by one who holds only the mortgage and not the note it secures. I need not address the merits of this and other objections because, even if the theory is a valid one, it requires proof that PAM is the present title holder of the mortgage, and PAM has not carried its burden in this regard.

To show that it presently holds the mortgage, PAM must show a valid assignment of the mortgage from MERS to itself. PAM contends that it holds the mortgage by assignment from MERS. Accordingly, PAM must show that the assignment, which was executed for MERS by Denise Bailey, was within the scope of Bailey’s limited authority to act for MERS.

Ms. Bailey’s authority to act for MERS is defined in the MERS Authorization in seven enumerated paragraphs. In each, Ms. Bailey’s authority to act is dependent on the existence of a specified relationship of Litton, the MERS member by whom she is employed, to the loan in question. PAM has submitted no evidence of the existence of any such relationship. The beneficial owner of the loan at the time of the assignment was Aurora Bank FSB, but there is no evidence that Litton was at the time the servicer of the loan for Aurora Bank FSB or was registered with MERS as such. The Court does not find that Aurora Bank FSB had not retained Litton as its servicer; there is simply no evidence on the issue. But the burden is on PAM to prove that it had, and PAM has not adduced evidence to that effect.

Accordingly, by a separate order, the Court will deny PAM’s motion for relief from the automatic stay without prejudice to renewal upon proper proof.

[1] All other issues were resolved upon entry of the original order granting relief from stay. No cause has been adduced to revisit any but the narrow issue of standing.

[2] Moreno contends that LBHI, which is in bankruptcy proceedings of its own, may have sold its interest in the note through a court-approved sale in its bankruptcy case. However, Moreno does not contend that possession of the note has passed from LBHI to the alleged purchaser (or any nominee of the purchaser), and therefore the alleged possible sale is irrelevant, as possession undisputedly remains in LBHI. In any event, Moreno attempted to establish the fact of the alleged sale by designating certain documents on the docket of the LBHI case and asking the Court to take judicial notice of these and then to find them on its own and to determine from them whether the promissory note in question was among the assets transferred. Having found the alleged sale to be irrelevant, the Court declined to take judicial notice of the bankruptcy documents. However, the proffer also failed for two additional reasons: first, that Moreno did not take a position as to whether a sale did occur, only that the Moreno note may have been among those transferred in the sale; and second, even if the court had taken judicial notice as requested, it remained Moreno’s obligation, which he has not fulfilled, to produce the documents in question and to explain in the first instance how one would conclude from them that the asset in question was among those transferred.

[3] MERS Corporate Resolution, attached to Bailey Affidavit as Exhibit 1.

[4] The grammatical difficulty in this second clause is native to the authorizing document.

[5] The original affidavit of Scott Drosdick includes the following two sentences:

By Master Servicing Agreement dated February 1, 1999, LBHI engaged Aurora Bank FSB (f/k/a Lehman Brothers Bank FSB), to master service, among other things, the Loan [the Moreno loan]. In turn, Aurora Bank FSB engaged Litton pursuant to a Flow Subservicing Agreement dated October 1, 2007, to service the loan.”

By an amendment to the affidavit and in testimony, Drosdick later amended his affidavit to correct this passage by striking Aurora Bank FSB from the first sentence and in its place inserting Aurora Loan Services LLC. Drosdick did not expressly change the second sentence, but that sentence, which begins with the critical words “in turn,” would be nonsensical unless the same substitution—Aurora Loan Services LLC for Aurora Bank FSB—were also made in the second sentence. Therefore, though the second sentence might perhaps be read in isolation as evidence that Litton was servicing the loan for Aurora Bank FSB at the time when Bailey executed the assignment, that sentence cannot credibly be so construed.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD0 Comments

[MUST READ] FULL TRANSCRIPT OF KEMP v. COUNTRYWIDE

[MUST READ] FULL TRANSCRIPT OF KEMP v. COUNTRYWIDE

EXCERPT:

THE COURT: All right. I have the supplemental and
12 second supplemental submissions of Countrywide and the reply.
13 Mr. Kaplan, I look to you first. I am, frankly, appalled at
14 the confusion and lack of credibility of Countrywide’s
15 response to the issue of the note — the possession of the
16 note.
17 We started out with Ms. DeMartini’s testimony that
18 the note never leaves the servicer. She says that she saw a
19 Federal Express receipt whereby the actual note, the physical,
20 original note was transferred to the Foreclosure Department
21 internally in the same building, but that the note had not yet
22 been located. That’s where we stood at that point.
23 Then we had a submission, the supplemental
24 submission saying the original note has been found and can be
25 available for inspection. It doesn’t say where it was found,

1 who had possession or the like, but it was found and is
2 available for inspection.
3 And then without any explanation, there is a lost
4 note affidavit presented dated February of 2007 indicating
5 that the note cannot be found. No explanation provided. What
6 do I do with that, Mr. Kaplan?

<SNIP>

THE COURT: It’s amazing how sloppy this
2 presentation was, and I’m very disappointed about that.
3 Anyway — all right. Well, thank you, Mr. Kaplan. Do you
4 want to present testimony? Does it matter, you know, because
5 there is no testimony regarding possession by Bank of New York
6 as Trustee, correct?

7 MR. KAPLAN: That’s correct, Your Honor. I’m not
8 disputing that. That’s what Ms. DeMartini testified to, that
9 the note — she had no record of this note leaving and going
10 across country, across wherever, to Bank of New York.

11 THE COURT: And you do understand as well that the
12 Pooling and Servicing Agreement requires that transfer, that
13 physical transfer of the note in accordance with — and
14 endorsement — in accordance with UCC requirements?
15 MR. KAPLAN: I understand that, Your Honor. I’ll
16 simply say for the sake of edification, but this is — and I
17 was told it was all e-filed — this is apparently the index to
18 this Master Servicing Agreement showing all the loans and it
19 does reference the Kemp loan. It’s a double-side document,
20 includes all the loans.
21 And I can say that, although Your Honor is right and
22 the UCC and the Master Servicing Agreement apparently requires
23 that, procedure seems to indicate that they don’t physically
24 move documents from place to place because of the fear of loss
25 and the trouble involved and the people handling them. They

basically execute the necessary documents and retain them as
2 long as servicing’s retained. The documents only leave when
3 servicing is released.
4 THE COURT: They take their chances.
5 MR. KAPLAN: I understand, Your Honor.
6 THE COURT: Understood. Thank you.
7 Counsel, the proof of claim was filed — let’s see
8 — it was filed by Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., servicer for
9 Bank of New York — now, that’s wrong. We understand that.
10 Can the — can these problems be corrected post-petition? In
11 other words, we know that claims can be transferred post12
petition.
13 What about if the note, the original note now that
14 has seemingly appeared, is now transferred to the Bank of New
15 York as Trustee and amended, it wouldn’t have to — well, it
16 would be amended to reflect that Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
17 is not the right party, but Countrywide Home Loans, Master
18 Servicing or servicing whatever that name is, as servicer for
19 Bank of New York, Trustee, is filing this proof of claim,
20 what’s wrong with that?

FULL DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF KEMP v. COUNTRYWIDE

[ipaper docId=43766376 access_key=key-ihmrb27iwescbiprqux height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD2 Comments

ILLINOIS CLASS ACTION: “Special Process Server” WASHINGTON v. WELLS FARGO, BofA

ILLINOIS CLASS ACTION: “Special Process Server” WASHINGTON v. WELLS FARGO, BofA

Excerpt:

The Special Process Server in the Mortgage Foreclosure Action was
purportedly appointed pursuant to the Administrative Order. The purported
appointment took place before Defendant initiated the Mortgage Foreclosure
Action. The purported appointment violated Section 2O2 and was, therefore,
ineffective, unlawful and void.

WASHINGTON v Wells Fargo, Bank of America

[ipaper docId=43758409 access_key=key-2k5g1uqi0eqnokeca2ip height=600 width=600 /]

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NY CLASS ACTION: ‘Accelerating Foreclosure, Robo-Signers’ BRIAN COSTIGAN v. Citigroup

NY CLASS ACTION: ‘Accelerating Foreclosure, Robo-Signers’ BRIAN COSTIGAN v. Citigroup

FIRST COUNT

Breach of Contract

SECOND COUNT

Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

THIRD COUNT

Fraud/Intentional Misrepresentation

FOURTH COUNT

Constructive Fraud/Negligent Misrepresentation

FIFTH COUNT

Negligent Processing of Loan Modifications and Foreclosures

SIXTH COUNT

Violation of the New York Deceptive Practices Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349, et.seq.

SEVENTH COUNT

Violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), N.J.S.A. 56.8-1, et. seq.

EIGHTH COUNT

Violation of Constitutional Rights Under Color of State Law, 42 U.S.C. 1983

BRIAN COSTIGAN v. Citigroup

[ipaper docId=43749401 access_key=key-2hc2trj9ngfzph1d6b6s height=600 width=600 /]

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[NYSC] MODIFICATION GONE WILD! BAC Home Loans Servicing v Westervelt

[NYSC] MODIFICATION GONE WILD! BAC Home Loans Servicing v Westervelt

BAC Home Loans Servicing v Westervelt
2010 NY Slip Op 51992(U)
Decided on November 18, 2010
Supreme Court, Dutchess County
Pagones, J.

LISA GORDON, ESQ.
FRANKEL LAMBERT, WEISS,
WEISMAN & GORDON, LLP
Attorneys for Plaintiff
20 West Main Street
Bay Shore, New York 11706

Excerpt:

Not surprisingly, in the wake of this new legislation, decisions are beginning to emerge in which the courts are finding that the banks have engaged in discriminatory, unconscionable, and onerous lending practices and are now negotiating settlements of these oppressive loans in bad faith. In particular, one court, upon finding that the bank’s conduct “has been and is inequitable, unconscionable, vexatious and opprobrious,” vacated the judgment of foreclosure and canceled [*5]the entire mortgage obligation (see IndyMac Bank v Yano-Horoski, 26 Misc 3d 717 [Sup. Ct, Suffolk County 2009]) and in another case, upon finding that the bank’s conduct was “shockingly inequitable” and in bad faith, the same court forever barred the bank from collecting claimed interest accrued on the loan from the date of default and any claimed legal fees and expenses; fixed the mortgage obligation to be no more than the principal balance, and awarded exemplary damages in the amount of $100,000 (see Emigrant Mtge. Co., Inc. v Corcione, NYLJ, Apr. 21, 2010, at 25 col 3 [Sup. Ct, Suffolk County, Spinner, J.). In another case, the court fashioned an equitable remedy when the parties reach an impasse in settlement negotiations. The bank had agreed to a modification lowering the mortgage payment to $3,000 per month, but the homeowners sought to pay $2,000 per month. The court, concerned with “discriminatory lending practices” and the fact that “the mortgage was granted to a minority buyer for the purchase of property in a minority area” which would eventually call for an interest rate exceeding 9%, found a rebuttable presumption of discriminatory lending practice and froze the interest rate at a maximum of 9%. In addition, the court ordered the homeowners to make a deposit into the court of $10,000 to avoid foreclosure and ordered the parties to split the $1,000 difference in the mortgage payment gap (see Aames, supra).

Accordingly, the court, sua sponte, finds that the Bank has not acted in good faith in negotiating a settlement with this homeowner. Indeed, the homeowner’s representation that plaintiff inexplicably refused to re-examine her income – which the bank must do under HAMP directives – stands uncontradicted. Further, in the face of counsel’s inadequate excuse for defaulting in appearance and failing to follow up with the court attorney referee, counsel still categorically refuses to comply with the spirit of the statute and work towards a modification with this homeowner, even though the homeowner earns income to sustain a modified payment. This court is hard-pressed to comprehend why plaintiff would rather seize the property in foreclosure than work out a loan modification, as required by statute, with a homeowner who is gainfully employed.

The Bank elected to pursue an equitable remedy (see Bieber v Goldberg, 133 App Div 207, 210 [2d Dep’t 1909]; see also IndyMac, supra]), and “the very commencement of this action by Plaintiff invokes the Court’s equity jurisdiction” (IndyMac, supra, 26 Misc 3d at 723). In addition, the court seeks to ensure that the primary statutory goal of keeping homeowners in their homes (see CPLR R3408[a]) and the concomitant obligation of ensuring that the parties act in good faith (see 22 NYCRR 202.12-a(c)(4) are met. Toward that end, this court has the power to impose an equitable remedy commensurate with the Bank’s bad faith regarding this loan modification (see e.g. Aaems Funding Corp., supra; IndyMac, supra; M & T Mtge. Corp. v Foy, 20 Misc 3d 274 [Sup. Ct, Kings County 2008]).

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that the law firm of Frankel Lambert, Weiss, Weisman & Gordon, LLP shall appear at a hearing to be scheduled to show cause why it should not be sanctioned in an amount to be determined by the court pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-2.1; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff is barred from collecting any arrears incurred from October 8, 2010 (the date the homeowner received the HAMP denial) until the date the homeowner is given a final determination on her loan modification application, after review and determination of all possible modifications for which the homeowner may be eligible and the case is released from [*6]the settlement part;

ORDERED that plaintiff is barred from collecting any interest incurred from October 8, 2010 until the date of a final loan modification determination and the case is released from the settlement part; and it is further

ORDERED that any unpaid late fees are waived from October 8, 2010; and it is further

ORDERED that any loan modification fees are to be either waived or refunded to the homeowner; and it is further;

ORDERED that any attorneys’ fees claimed to have been incurred from the date of the default until the date of this order are not to be included in the calculation of the homeowners’ modified mortgage payment or otherwise imposed on the homeowners, but, rather, any request for attorneys fees is hereby severed and to be submitted to the court for separate, independent review as to their reasonableness; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties appear for a further conference in the Foreclosure Settlement Part of the Dutchess County Supreme Court, 10 Market Street, Poughkeepsie, New York on December 20, 2010 at 12 p.m.; and it is further

ORDERED that a bank representative fully familiar with the file and with full authority to settle the matter appear at the next conference, and it is further

ORDERED that Frankel Lambert, Weiss, Weisman & Gordon, LLP is directed to appear at the next conference by either a member of the firm or an associate of the firm. Local Counsel may not appear at this conference. Appearing counsel must be fully authorized to dispose of the case as required by statute (see CPLR 3408[c]).

Adjournments are only granted with leave of court.

Failure of plaintiff to comply with this order may result in further sanctions, including discharge of the underlying mortgage obligation, exemplary damages and loss of the privilege of appearing by local counsel in all foreclosure settlement conferences conducted in Dutchess County.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

BAC Home Loans Servicing v WESTERVELT

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD5 Comments

The Big Fail by Adam Levitin

The Big Fail by Adam Levitin

posted by Adam Levitin
.

Last week the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey issued an opinion in a case captioned Kemp v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. This case looks like the first piece of evidence in what might turn out to be the Securitization Fail or, in homage to Michael Lewis, The Big Fail.

Briefly, Countrywide as servicer filed a proof of claim for a mortgage in a bankruptcy case on behalf of Bank of New York as trustee for a securitization trust.  The bankruptcy court denied the claim because there was no evidence that Bank of New York ever owned the mortgage. The mortgage note had never been negotiated or delivered to Bank of New York, despite the requirement to do so in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) that governed the securitization of the loan.  That meant that Bank of New York as trustee had no interest in the loan, so the proof of claim filed on its behalf was disallowed.

This opinion could turn out to be incredibly important.  It provides a critical evidence for the argument that many securitization transactions simply failed to be effective because non-compliance with the terms of the transaction:  failure to properly transfer the mortgage meant that the mortgages were never actually securitized.  The rest of this post explains the chain of title issue in mortgage securitizations and how Kemp fits into the issue.

Note and Mortgage Transfers in Securitizations

A residential mortgage securitization is a transaction that involves a series of transfers of two types of documents:  mortgage notes (the IOUs made by mortgage borrowers) and mortgages (the security instrument that says the lender may foreclose on the house if the borrower defaults on the note).   Ultimately, both the notes and mortgages need to be properly transferred to a trust that will pay for them by issuing securities (backed by the mortgages and notes, hence residential mortgage-backed securities or RMBS). If the notes and mortgages aren’t properly transferred to the trust, then the securities that the trust issues aren’t mortgage-backed and are worthless.

So the critical issue here is whether the notes and mortgages were properly transferred to the securitization trusts.  To determine this, we need to figure out two things.  First, what is the proper method for transferring the notes and mortgages, and second, whether that method was followed. For this post, I’m going to focus solely on the notes. There are issues with the mortgages too, but that gets much, more complicated and doesn’t directly connect with Kemp.

1.  How Do You Transfer a Note?


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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

Lawsuit Involving Goldman Sachs and Countrywide, New Century & Freemont “JUNK” Securities

Lawsuit Involving Goldman Sachs and Countrywide, New Century & Freemont “JUNK” Securities

Excerpts:

I. Goldman Performed Increasingly Careful Due Diligence On Billions Of Dollars Of Subprime Mortgage Loans That It Purchased During 2005 And 2006, And Therefore Knew That Large Numbers Of Those Loans Were Defective.

II. Goldman Knew That Mortgage Loans And RMBS issued By Countrywide, New Century, And Fremont During 2005 And 2006 Had Declined Dramatically In Safety, Security, And Likelihood of Repayment.

Continue reading…

landesbank v. GS 3

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

WATCH YOUR CAR IF IT’S PAID OFF…IT’S NOT JUST HOMES THEY ARE SEIZING!

WATCH YOUR CAR IF IT’S PAID OFF…IT’S NOT JUST HOMES THEY ARE SEIZING!

I was alerted from a car owner that her vehicle was towed away even when she has been making her timely payments, she was told her loan was sold from Mitsubishi to another lender but this was not Wells Fargo (to make this clear). She never received any notice of the loan having been transferred out of Mitsubishi Motors and is inquiring as to who the new lien holder is. Now, she has to pay to get her vehicle out of the tow yard! RIDICULOUS!

Which prompted me to do some research and came into this video below. It’s not only homes they are repossessing without any liens, no loan outstanding.

Pointers:

  • Wells Fargo tows car with no loan
  • She has proof she has NO NOTE, paid car off
  • She shows police she has no loan and provides them her “clear” title
  • Police ignore and proceed to remove her car

It’s not only homes they are taking with no note and “clear” title.

“We’ve been hearing of similar cases in the area” Jesse Jones -K5News

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD4 Comments

NY SECURITIES CLASS ACTION: DODONA v. GOLDMAN SACHS

NY SECURITIES CLASS ACTION: DODONA v. GOLDMAN SACHS

Excerpt:

According to the Senate Subcommittee […]

“Investment banks such as Goldman Sachs were not simply market-makers, they were self-interested promoters of risky and complicated financial schemes that helped trigger the crisis…They bundled toxic mortgages into complex financial instruments, got the credit rating agencies to label them as AAA securities, and sold them to investors, magnifying and spreading risk throughout the financial system, and all too often betting against the instruments they sold and profiting at the expense of their clients…The 2009 Goldman Sachs annual report stated that the firm ‘did not generate enormous revenues by betting against residential related products’…These e-mails show that, in fact, Goldman made a lot of money by betting against the mortgage market.”

[ipaper docId=43622622 access_key=key-yvcc5ierinpkgd8wdvp height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

FORM X-17F-1A MISSING/LOST/STOLEN/COUNTERFEIT SECURITIES REPORT

FORM X-17F-1A MISSING/LOST/STOLEN/COUNTERFEIT SECURITIES REPORT

General Rules and Regulations
promulgated
under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Rule 17f-1 — Requirements for Reporting and Inquiry with Respect to Missing, Lost, Counterfeit or Stolen Securities


(a) Definitions. For purposes of this section:

(1) The term reporting institution shall include every national securities exchange, member thereof, registered securities association, broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, government securities broker, government securities dealer, registered transfer agent, registered clearing agency, participant therein, member of the Federal Reserve System and bank whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;

(2) The term uncertificated security shall mean a security not represented by an instrument and the transfer of which is registered upon books maintained for that purpose by or on behalf of the issuer;

(3) The term global certificate securities issue shall mean a securities issue for which a single master certificate representing the entire issue is registered in the nominee name of a registered clearing agency and for which beneficial owners cannot receive negotiable securities certificates;

(4) The term customer shall mean any person with whom the reporting institution has entered into at least one prior securities-related transaction; and

(5) The term securities-related transaction shall mean a purpose, sale or pledge of investment securities, or a custodial arrangement for investment securities.

(6) The term securities certificate means any physical instrument that represents or purports to represent ownership in a security that was printed by or on behalf of the issuer thereof and shall include any such instrument that is or was:

(i) Printed but not issued;

(ii) Issued and outstanding, including treasury securities;

(iii) Cancelled, which for this purpose means either or both of the procedures set forth in Sec. 240.17Ad-19(a)(1); or

(iv) Counterfeit or reasonably believed to be counterfeit.

(7) The term issuer shall include an issuer’s:

(i) Transfer agent(s), paying agent(s), tender agent(s), and person(s) providing similar services; and

(ii) Corporate predecessor(s) and successor(s).

(8) The term missing shall include any securities certificate that:

(i) Cannot be located or accounted for, but is not believed to be lost or stolen; or

(ii) A transfer agent claims or believes was destroyed in any manner other than by the transfer agent’s own certificate destruction procedures as provided in Sec. 240.17Ad-19.

(b) Every reporting institution shall register with the Commission or its designee in accordance with instructions issued by the Commission except:

(1) A member of a national securities exchange who effects securities transactions through the trading facilities of the exchange and has not received or held customer securities within the last six months;

(2) A reporting institution that, within the last six months, limited its securities activities exclusively to uncertificated securities, global securities issues or any securities issue for which neither record nor beneficial owners can obtain a negotiable securities certificate; or

(3) A reporting institution whose business activities, within the last six months, did not involve the handling of securities certificates.

(c) Reporting requirements–

(1) Stolen securities.

(i) Every reporting institution shall report to the Commission or its designee, and to a registered transfer agent for the issue, the discovery of the theft or loss of any securities certificates where there is substantial basis for believing that criminal activity was involved. Such report shall be made within one business day of the discovery and, if the certificate numbers of the securities cannot be ascertained at that time, they shall be reported as soon thereafter as possible.

(ii) Every reporting institution shall promptly report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation upon the discovery of the theft or loss of any securities certificate where there is substantial basis for believing that criminal activity was involved.

(2) Missing or lost securities. Every reporting institution shall report to the Commission or its designee, and to a registered transfer agent for the issue, the discovery of the loss of any securities certificate where criminal actions are not suspected when the securities certificate has been missing or lost for a period of two business days. Such report shall be made within one business day of the end of such period except that:

(i) Securities certificates lost, missing, or stolen while in transit to customers, transfer agents, banks, brokers or dealers shall be reported by the delivering institution by the later of two business days after notice of non-receipt or as soon after such notice as the certificate numbers of the securities can be ascertained.

(ii) Where a shipment of retired securities certificates is in transit between any transfer agents, banks, brokers, dealers, or other reporting institutions, with no affiliation existing between such entities, and the delivering institution fails to receive notice of receipt or non-receipt of the certificates, the delivering institution shall act to determine the facts. In the event of non-delivery where the certificates are not recovered by the delivering institution, the delivering institution shall report the certificates as lost, stolen, or missing to the Commission or its designee within a reasonable time under the circumstances but in any event within twenty business days from the date of shipment.

(iii) Securities certificates considered lost or missing as a result of securities counts or verifications required by rule, regulation or otherwise (e.g., dividend record date verification made as a result of firm policy or internal audit function report) shall be reported by the later of ten business days after completion of such securities count or verification or as soon after such count or verification as the certificate numbers of the securities can be ascertained.

(iv) Securities certificates not received during the completion of delivery, deposit or withdrawal shall be reported in the following manner:

(A) Where delivery of the securities certificates is through a clearing agency, the delivering institution shall supply to the receiving institution the certificate number of the security within two business days from the date of request from the receiving institution. The receiving institution shall report within one business day of notification of the certificate number;

(B) Where the delivery of securities certificates is in person and where the delivering institution has a receipt, the delivering institution shall supply the receiving institution the certificate numbers of the securities within two business days from the date of request from the receiving institution. The receiving institution shall report within one business day of notification of the certificate number;

(C) Where the delivery of securities certificates is in person and where the delivering institution has no receipt, the delivering institution shall report within two business days of notification of non-receipt by the receiving institution; or

(D) Where delivery of securities certificates is made by mail or via draft, if payment is not received within ten business days, the delivering institution shall confirm with the receiving institution the failure to receive such delivery; if confirmation shows non-receipt, the delivering institution shall report within two business days of such confirmation.

(3) Counterfeit securities. Every reporting institution shall report the discovery of any counterfeit securities certificate to the Commission or its designee, to a registered transfer agent for the issue, and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation within one business day of such discovery.

(4) Transfer agent reporting obligations. Every transfer agent shall make the reports required above only if it receives notification of the loss, theft or counterfeiting from a non-reporting institution or if it receives notification other than on a Form X-17F-1A or if the certificate was in its possession at the time of the loss.

(5) Recovery. Every reporting institution that originally reported a lost, missing or stolen securities certificate pursuant to this Section shall report recovery of that securities certificate to the Commission or its designee and to a registered transfer agent for the issue within one business day of such recovery or finding. Every reporting institution that originally made a report in which criminality was indicated also shall notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the securities certificate has been recovered.

(6) Information to be reported. All reports made pursuant to this Section shall include, if applicable or available, the following information with respect to each securities certificate:

(i) Issuer;

(ii) Type of security and series;

(iii) Date of issue;

(iv) Maturity date;

(v) Denomination;

(vi) Interest rate;

(vii) Certificate number, including alphabetical prefix or suffix;

(viii) Name in which registered;

(ix) Distinguishing characteristics, if counterfeit;

(x) Date of discovery of loss or recovery;

(xi) CUSIP number;

(xii) Financial Industry Numbering System (”FINS”) Number; and

(xiii) Type of loss.

(7) Forms. Reporting institutions shall make all reports to the Commission or its designee and to a registered transfer agent for the issue pursuant to this section on Form X-17F-1A. Reporting institutions shall make reports to the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to this Section on Form X-17F-1A, unless the reporting institution is a member of the Federal Reserve System or a bank whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in which case reports may be made on the form required by the institution’s appropriate regulatory agency for reports to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(d) Required inquiries.

(1) Every reporting institution (except a reporting institution that, acting in its capacity as transfer agent, paying agent, exchange agent or tender agent for an equity issue, or registrar for a bond or other debt issue, compares all transactions against a shareholder or bondholder list and a current list of stop transfers) shall inquire of the Commission or its designee with respect to every securities certificate which comes into its possession or keeping, whether by pledge, transfer or otherwise, to ascertain whether such securities certificate has been reported as missing, lost, counterfeit or stolen, unless:

(i) The securities certificate is received directly from the issuer or issuing agent at issuance;

(ii) The securities certificate is received from another reporting institution or from a Federal Reserve Bank or Branch;

(iii) The securities certificate is received from a customer of the reporting institution; and

(A) Is registered in the name of such customer or its nominee; or

(B) Was previously sold to such customer, as verified by the internal records of the reporting institution;

(iv) The securities certificate is received as part of a transaction which has an aggregate face value of $10,000 or less in the case of bonds, or market value of $10,000 or less in the case of stocks; or

(v) The securities certificate is received directly from a drop which is affiliated with a reporting institution for the purposes of receiving or delivering certificates on behalf of the reporting institution.

(2) Form of inquiry. Inquiries shall be made in such manner as prescribed by the Commission or its designee.

(3) A reporting institution shall make required inquiries by the end of the fifth business day after a securities certificate comes into its possession or keeping, provided that such inquiries shall be made before the certificate is sold, used as collateral, or sent to another reporting institution.

(e) Permissive reports and inquiries. Every reporting insitution may report to or inquire of the Commission or its designee with respect to any securities certificate not otherwise required by this section to be the subject of a report or inquiry. The Commission on written request or upon its own motion may permit reports to and inquiries of the system by any other person or entity upon such terms and conditions as it deems appropriate and necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors.

(f) Exemptions. The following types of securities are not subject to paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section:

(1) Security issues not assigned CUSIP numbers;

(2) Bond coupons;

(3) Uncertificated securities;

(4) Global securities issues; and

(5) Any securities issue for which neither record nor beneficial owners can obtain a negotiable securities certificates.

(g) Recordkeeping. Every reporting institution shall maintain and preserve in an easily accessible place for three years copies of all Forms X-17F-1A filed pursuant to this section, all agreements between reporting institutions regarding registration or other aspects of this section, and all confirmations or other information received from the Commission or its designee as a result of inquiry.


FORM X-17F-1A MISSING.LOST.STOLEN.COUNTERFEIT

[ipaper docId=43548756 access_key=key-1qi1zzc20m0t0fpvpzes height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

EXPLOSIVE |CASE FILE New Jersey Admissions In Testimony NOTES NEVER SENT to Trusts KEMP v. Countrywide

EXPLOSIVE |CASE FILE New Jersey Admissions In Testimony NOTES NEVER SENT to Trusts KEMP v. Countrywide

Mark my words …this is one you’re going to hear of over and over again. It’s beginning to appear … what we’ve been trying hard to break is cracking before our eyes and ears. This should raise concerns about the MERS System as well since the assignments clause states “together with the note(s) and documents therein described”.

Humpty Dumpty does indeed exist!


UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

In the Matter of John T. Kemp

John T. Kemp
v.

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.

Case No. 08-18700-JHW

APPEARANCES:

Bruce H. Levitt, Esq.
Levitt & Slafkes, PC
76 South Orange Avenue, Suite 305
South Orange, New Jersey 07079
Counsel for the Debtor

Harold Kaplan, Esq.
Dori 1. Scovish, Esq.
Frenkel, Lambert, Weiss, Weisman & Gordon, LLP
80 Main Street, Suite 460
West Orange, New Jersey 07052
Counsel for the Defendant

EXCERPT:

The new allonge was signed by Sharon Mason,
Vice President of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., in the Bankruptcy Risk
Litigation Management Department. Linda DeMartini, a supervisor and
operational team leader for the Litigation Management Department for BAC
Home Loans Servicing L.P. (“BAC Servicing”V testified that the new allonge
was prepared in anticipation of this litigation, and that it was signed several
weeks before the trial by Sharon Mason.

As to the location of the note, Ms. DeMartini testified that to her
knowledge, the original note never left the possession of Countrywide, and that
the original note appears to have been transferred to Countrywide’s foreclosure
unit, as evidenced by internal FedEx tracking numbers. She also confirmed
that the new allonge had not been attached or otherwise affIXed to the note.
She testified further that it was customary for Countrywide to maintain possession of
the original note and related loan documents.

In a supplemental submission dated September 9,2009, the defendant
asserted that “the Defendant/Secured Creditor located the original Note. The
original Note with allonge and Pooling and Servicing Agreement are available
for inspection.,,7 When the matter returned to the court on September 24,
2009, counsel for the defendant represented to the court that he had the
original note, with the new allonge now attached, in his possession. No
additional information was presented regarding the chain of possession of the
note from its origination until counsel acquired possession.

Continue reading below…

CASE FILE New Jersey Admissions In Testimony Notes Never Sent to Trusts Kemp v Countrywide

[ipaper docId=43537304 access_key=key-282sqkqnzukrmkam934g height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD12 Comments

[VIDEO] MERSCORP CEO “There are 20,000 (robo-signers) of those nationwide”

[VIDEO] MERSCORP CEO “There are 20,000 (robo-signers) of those nationwide”

Senator Merkley: How many folks have you designated as certifying officers essentially, temporarily made them members of your company? In order to execute this process?

Mr. Arnold: Well it’s not temporary… its limited… their limited to  7 specific items that they can do for MERS…ahh there are TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) of those nationwide.

Mr. Merkely: I’m sorry I’m out of time but it’s creating a legal confusion and that’s an issue and I’m sorry. Thank you all very much.

“7 VERY IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS” that may involve trillions of dollars worth of real estate that are executed by any one of these 20,000 robo-signers… But if you read on this image below …it’s well over “7 Specific Documents” more like ANY & ALL!

Actual excerpt from a MERS Agreement of Signing Authority.


© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD7 Comments

NC Attorney General Foreclosure Fraud Letter To Wells Fargo

NC Attorney General Foreclosure Fraud Letter To Wells Fargo

Excerpt:

In light of these issues, we request that Wells Fargo agree not to institute or complete any foreclosure action in this State, including foreclosure sales and evictions, until it can show that its affidavit procedures have been fully reviewed and reformed to be in compliance with law.

NC Letter

[ipaper docId=43454136 access_key=key-h1u3px2qh0o52yvi29g height=600 width=600 /]


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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD3 Comments

OPEN LETTER FROM NY BAR CHAIR TO COURTS ON FORECLOSURE AFFIRMATION REQUIREMENTS

OPEN LETTER FROM NY BAR CHAIR TO COURTS ON FORECLOSURE AFFIRMATION REQUIREMENTS

[ipaper docId=43431406 access_key=key-1p9k2xprgdcqkjajbc1u height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

2-4-1 CT Appeals Court Reversals: LaSalle v. BIALOBRZESKI, DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, v. PAUL BIALOBRZESKI

2-4-1 CT Appeals Court Reversals: LaSalle v. BIALOBRZESKI, DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, v. PAUL BIALOBRZESKI

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, TRUSTEE,
v.
PAUL BIALOBRZESKI.

(AC 29884).

Appellate Court of Connecticut.
Argued January 13, 2010.
Officially released September 21, 2010.

Paul Bialobrzeski, pro se, the appellant (defendant).

Andrew P. Barsom, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Flynn, C. J., and Bishop and Robinson, Js.[*]

Opinion

ROBINSON, J.

In this foreclosure action, the pro se defendant, Paul Bialobrzeski, claims that the plaintiff[1] lacked standing to bring the action because it was not in possession of the subject note and mortgage at the time the action was commenced. The resolution of that claim is predicated on a finding of fact that is not part of the record. Our rules of practice require the appellant to provide an adequate record for review. See Practice Book §§ 60-5 and 61-10. Because the record is devoid of a factual finding as to when the plaintiff came into possession of the note, we are unable to review the claim as to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

The following procedural history is relevant to the defendant’s appeal. On October 22, 2007, the plaintiff caused a writ of summons and complaint to be served on the defendant to foreclose the mortgage on real property located at 254 Slater Road in New Britain. The defendant filed a pro se appearance on November 19, 2007. On December 4, 2007, the plaintiff filed a motion for default for failure to plead, which was granted by the clerk. On December 13, 2007, the defendant filed an answer[2] and a motion for a continuance to retain counsel. On December 17, 2007, the court, Domnarski, J., opened the default in view of the answer filed by the defendant. On January 22, 2008, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that “there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and therefore moves for [s]ummary [j]udgment as to liability only.”[3] The defendant did not file an objection thereto. Summary judgment as to the defendant’s liability was granted summarily by the court, Dunnell, J., on February 11, 2008.[4]

On March 17, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for a continuance in which he represented that he had retained counsel, who was out of the state on business, and that counsel was necessary to articulate the defendant’s defenses and to “press forward” his motion for permission to amend his answer and to file special defenses.[5] The plaintiff objected to the motion to amend.[6] On March 27, 2008, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action. In a memorandum of law in support of the motion, he stated: “The plaintiff . . . commenced this foreclosure action on October 19, 2007. The plaintiff claims ownership of the mortgage through an assignment dated November 8, 2007 and recorded November 28, 2007. The note submitted as an exhibit contains no endorsement and no date.” Judge Domnarski denied the motion to dismiss and sustained the plaintiff’s objection thereto. On April 21, 2008, Judge Domnarski rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale, setting a sale date of August 2, 2008. The defendant filed this appeal on May 6, 2008,[7] and thereafter a motion for articulation.

In response to the defendant’s motion for articulation seeking the basis of the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, Judge Domnarski articulated: “(1) Summary judgment as to liability had previously been entered against the defendant on February 11, 2008, Dunnell, J. [and] (2) The plaintiff alleged in paragraph 4 of the complaint that it is the holder of the note and mortgage. See Villager Pond, Inc. v. [Darien], 54 Conn. App. 178 [734 A.2d 1031 (1999)].” The defendant did not seek further articulation or file a motion for review in this court. See Practice Book § 66-7.

On appeal, the defendant claims that Judge Domnarski erred “in denying the defendant’s [m]otion to [d]ismiss a mortgage foreclosure action in which the [writ of] summons, and complaint had been initiated by a plaintiff which did not own either the note or the mortgage at the time the action was initiated, lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure action, and the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the [m]otion for [f]oreclosure.”

We begin by setting forth the appropriate standard of review. “A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court. . . . [O]ur review of the trial court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [denial] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo. . . . Factual findings underlying the court’s decision, however, will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . The applicable standard of review for the denial of a motion to dismiss, therefore, generally turns on whether the appellant seeks to challenge the legal conclusions of the trial court or its factual determinations.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bonner, 290 Conn. 468, 477-78, 964 A.2d 73 (2009).

We first look to the relevant allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint. At paragraph 4, the plaintiff alleged, in part, “The Plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3, is the holder of said Note and Mortgage.” In answering the complaint, the defendant left the plaintiff to its proof as to that allegation. When the plaintiff filed its motion for summary judgment on January 22, 2008, it attached copies of the subject note and mortgage and an assignment of the mortgage. The defendant failed to object to the motion for summary judgment or to submit any evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact as to when the plaintiff acquired the note. See Practice Book § 17-45. Judge Dunnell granted the motion for summary judgment as to the defendant’s liability on February 11, 2008. The defendant did not file a motion to reargue but instead, on March 17, 2008, filed a motion for permission to amend his answer and to file special defenses, including a special defense that the plaintiff did not own the mortgage at the time the action was commenced. On March 27, 2008, the defendant also filed a motion to dismiss the action and in the memorandum of law in support thereof stated that the note submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment contained no endorsement and no date.

Although our review of the file demonstrates that the copy of the note submitted with the motion for summary judgment does not contain an endorsement and is not dated, the defendant has not claimed on appeal that Judge Dunnell improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.[8] Rather, the defendant attacks Judge Domnarski’s reliance on Judge Dunnell’s ruling on the motion for summary judgment. The substance of the defendant’s appellate claim is that the mortgage was not assigned to the plaintiff until sometime after the action was commenced, and the plaintiff did not own the note at the time it commenced the action.[9] The defendant, however, cannot rely on the date the mortgage was assigned to the plaintiff as proof that the plaintiff did not own the note on the date the action was commenced.

“General Statutes § 49-17 permits the holder of a negotiable instrument that is secured by a mortgage to foreclose on the mortgage even when the mortgage has not yet been assigned to him. . . . The statute codifies the common-law principle of long standing that the mortgage follows the note, pursuant to which only the rightful owner of the note has the right to enforce the mortgage. . . . Our legislature, by adopting § 49-17, has provide[d] an avenue for the holder of the note to foreclose on the property when the mortgage has not been assigned to him.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Fequiere, 119 Conn. App. 570, 576-77, 989 A.2d 606, cert. denied, 295 Conn. 922, 991 A.2d 564 (2010).

The key to resolving the defendant’s claim is a determination of when the note came into the plaintiff’s possession. We cannot review the claim because Judge Domnarski made no factual finding as to when the plaintiff acquired the note. Without that factual determination, we are unable to say whether Judge Domnarski improperly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.[10] Although it is the appellant’s responsibility to provide an adequate record for review; see Practice Book §§ 60-5 and 61-10; that cannot be the end of the matter because it concerns the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . and a judgment rendered without subject matter jurisdiction is void. . . . Further, it is well established that a reviewing court properly may address jurisdictional claims that neither were raised nor ruled on in the trial court. . . . Indeed, [o]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented. . . . The court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re DeLeon J., 290 Conn. 371, 376, 963 A.2d 53 (2009). The burden of demonstrating that a party has standing to bring an action is on the plaintiff. Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, 274 Conn. 92, 104, 874 A.2d 742, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1016, 126 S. Ct. 659, 163 L. Ed. 2d 526 (2005).

“Trial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to [Practice Book] § 10-31 (a) (1) may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case. As summarized by a federal court discussing motions brought pursuant to the analogous federal rule [i.e., Fed. R. Civ. P. (12) (b) (1)], [l]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts. . . . Different rules and procedures will apply, depending on the state of the record at the time the motion is filed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650-51, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).

“[I]f the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motions to dismiss . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint.. . . [W]here a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 651-52.

In this case, the defendant questioned the plaintiff’s standing to bring the foreclosure action at the time the action was commenced. The defendant’s motion to dismiss was inspired by the exhibits attached to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The affidavit of Peter Read, an assistant vice president of Washington Mutual Bank, attests to the plaintiff being the holder of the note, but it does not resolve the factual issue as to when the plaintiff acquired the note.[11] See footnote 3 of this opinion. When the question regarding the plaintiff’s standing was raised, the court should have held a hearing to determine whether the plaintiff was the owner or holder of the note at the time the action was commenced. See Conboy v. State, supra, 292 Conn. 651-52. It is fundamental that appellate courts do not make findings of fact. Stevenson v. Commissioner of Correction, 112 Conn. App. 675, 683 n.1, 963 A.2d 1077 (when record on appeal devoid of factual findings, improper for appellate court to make its own findings), cert. denied, 291 Conn. 904, 967 A.2d 1221 (2009). The case, therefore, must be remanded to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the plaintiff was the owner or holder of the subject note at the time the action was commenced. See Cross v. Hudon, 27 Conn. App. 729, 734, 609 A.2d 1021 (1992) (court improperly failed to conduct evidentiary hearing because jurisdiction hinged on factual determination).

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a hearing on the motion to dismiss.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

[*] The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.

[1] The plaintiff is Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3.

[2] In his answer, the pro se defendant admitted that he owned the property at 254 Slater Road in New Britain and that on February 28, 2006, he executed and delivered to Long Beach Mortgage Company a note for a loan in the principal amount of $220,000. He also admitted that he is the owner of the equity of redemption in the property and is in possession of the property. The defendant left the plaintiff to its proof as to the remaining allegations of the complaint.

[3] Our review of the file demonstrates that the plaintiff attached copies of the following documents as exhibits to its motion for summary judgment: the defendant’s answer, an affidavit signed by Peter Read, an assistant vice president of Washington Mutual Bank, the subject fixed-adjustable rate note—payable to Long Beach Mortgage Company without an endorsement, the subject mortgage, the assignment of the mortgage and the notice of intent to accelerate.

In his affidavit, Read attested, among other things, as to the plaintiff’s ownership of the mortgage and note as follows: “Said mortgage was thereafter assigned to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3 by virtue of an assignment of mortgage recorded in Volume 1725 at Page 1024 of the New Britain Land Records. A true and accurate copy of said assignment is attached hereto as Exhibit C. Plaintiff in this action, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3, is the owner and holder of said note and mortgage.” Significantly, Read does not attest in the affidavit to the date the plaintiff acquired the note.

[4] The defendant did not file a motion asking Judge Dunnell to articulate the basis on which she made the factual determination that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; see Practice Book § 17-49; including the issue of the ownership of the note and mortgage and to whom the defendant was liable.

[5] The defendant proposed two special defenses. His first special defense is that the plaintiff did not own the mortgage at the time the action was commenced and his second special defense is that Washington Mutual Bank mailed the notice of intent to accelerate to the defendant but had no authority to do so as Long Beach Mortgage Company owned the mortgage at the time.

[6] According to the record, the court never ruled on the motion for permission to amend and the objection thereto.

[7] In its brief, the plaintiff argues that the defendant failed to preserve the issue presented or timely file his appeal because the appeal was not filed within twenty days of the date the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Generally, the denial of a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory ruling. Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 645 n.5, 974 A.2d 669 (2009); but see Ware v. State, 118 Conn. App. 65, 79, 983 A.2d 853 (2009) (denial of motion to dismiss based on colorable claim of sovereign immunity immediately appealable). The defendant timely filed his appeal within twenty days of the court rendering the judgment of foreclosure by sale. See Glenfed Mortgage Corp. v. Crowley, 61 Conn. App. 84, 88, 763 A.2d 19 (2000) (foreclosure by sale appealable final judgment).

[8] Even if the defendant had claimed that Judge Dunnell improperly granted the motion for summary judgment, there is no record that Judge Dunnell found that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff became the owner of the note prior to the commencement of the action.

[9] The defendant also notes correctly that the copy of the note attached to the motion for summary judgment lacked an endorsement. We have no way of knowing if Judge Dunnell inquired about that before ruling on the motion for summary judgment. In its brief to this court, the plaintiff states that the “original Note bearing endorsement was produced to the trial court at the hearing on April 21, 2008.” On April 21, 2008, judgment was rendered. It was not the date on which the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was decided. Moreover, the endorsement is not proof of the date on which the plaintiff acquired the note.

[10] The defendant did not file any exhibits or transcripts of proceedings in the trial court, if any. We do not know whether any evidence other than the attachments to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment were presented to either court at the time the motion for summary judgment and the motion to dismiss were decided. The defendant has not claimed that the plaintiff submitted insufficient evidence to determine its ownership of the note.

[11] On appeal, the plaintiff has argued, supported by citations to authority, that the holder of a note rightly may foreclose the mortgage. That argument, however, is beside the point. The relevant question is when the plaintiff became the holder.

___________________________________________________________


LASALLE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIAT-ION (TRUSTEE),
v.
PAUL S. BIALOBRZESKI ET AL.

(AC 30911).

Appellate Court of Connecticut.
Argued January 13, 2010.
Officially released September 21, 2010.

Paul S. Bialobrzeski, pro se, the appellant (defendant).

Andrew P. Barsom, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Flynn, C. J., and Bishop and Robinson, Js.[*]

Opinion

ROBINSON, J.

The pro se defendant Paul S. Bialobrzeski[1] appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the plaintiff, LaSalle Bank, National Association, as trustee for WMABS Series 2006-HE[2] Trust.2 On appeal, the defendant claims that it was improper for the trial court to deny his motion to dismiss the action because the plaintiff lacked standing. Because the record is devoid of a factual finding as to when the plaintiff acquired the note, we are unable to review the claim as to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Practice Book §§ 60-5 and 61-10. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

The following procedural history is relevant to the defendant’s appeal. On October 29, 2007, the plaintiff caused a writ of summons and complaint to be served on the defendant to foreclose the mortgage on real property at 121 Colonial Avenue in Middlebury. The defendant filed a pro se appearance on November 16, 2007. On December 14, 2007, the defendant filed an answer to the complaint in which he admitted that (1) he owned the real property at 121 Colonial Avenue in Middlebury, (2) on March 16, 2006, he executed and delivered to Long Beach Mortgage Corporation a note in the original principal amount of $350,000, and (3) he was the owner of the equity of redemption in the property and was in possession of the property. As to the remaining counts of the complaint, the defendant left the plaintiff to its proof. On that same date, the defendant filed a motion for a continuance in order to retain counsel to defend against the motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure that had been filed by the plaintiff.

On January 24, 2008, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to the defendant’s liability and attached his answer; an affidavit of Peter Read, an assistant vice president of Washington Mutual Bank, attesting that the plaintiff was the owner of the note and mortgage,[3] and that the debt was in default and the balance due; and copies of the note,[4] mortgage, assignment of the mortgage[5] and notice of intent to accelerate. The court granted the motion for summary judgment as to liability on February 11, 2008, noting that the motion had been unopposed.[6] Thereafter the defendant retained counsel, who filed a motion for permission to amend the defendant’s answer and to allege special defenses. The first proposed special defense alleged that the assignment of the mortgage from Long Beach Mortgage Company to LaSalle Bank was executed subsequent to the commencement of the action. The second proposed special defense alleged that Washington Mutual Bank allegedly mailed a notice of intent to accelerate to the defendant on May 6, 2007, and on that date the owner of the note and mortgage was Long Beach Mortgage Company and that Washington Mutual Bank lacked authority to act on behalf of Long Beach Mortgage Company. Moreover, the defendant alleged that the notice of intent to accelerate was void and the plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment of foreclosure.[7] The plaintiff objected to the defendant’s motion for permission to amend his answer and to file special defenses.[8]

On March 20, 2008, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action. In his memorandum of law in support of his motion to dismiss, the defendant stated that the action was filed on November 1, 2007, but the subject mortgage was assigned to the plaintiff on November 27, 2007, and therefore the plaintiff was not the owner of the mortgage on the date the action was commenced and lacked standing to bring it. The plaintiff objected to the motion to dismiss and argued that it was in possession of the subject note and mortgage at the time the action was commenced and that the court could take notice of the endorsement of the note by Long Beach Mortgage Company.[9] The plaintiff also cited General Statutes § 49-17 for the proposition that the statute provides an avenue for the holder of a note to obtain a judgment of foreclosure on the accompanying mortgage deed even if it had not been or never was formally assigned. On March 31, 2008, the defendant filed a supplemental memorandum of law in support of his motion to dismiss in which he contended that the burden was on the plaintiff to demonstrate that it possessed the note on the date the action was commenced and that the operation of § 49-17 does not provide proof of when the plaintiff came into possession of the note.[10]

On January 5, 2009, the court sustained the plaintiff’s objection to the motion to dismiss stating that “[t]he issue is moot, as the court has already ruled on the summary judgment motion.”[11] On March 2, 2009, the court rendered judgment of strict foreclosure and set the law day as July 28, 2009. The defendant appealed, claiming that it was improper for the court to deny his motion to dismiss because the plaintiff did not own either the note or the mortgage at the time it commenced the action and, thus, lacked standing, thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction.[12]

The standard of review applicable to a motion to dismiss is well established. “A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court. . . . [O]ur review of the trial court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [denial] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo. . . . Factual findings underlying the court’s decision, however, will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . The applicable standard of review for the denial of a motion to dismiss, therefore, generally turns on whether the appellant seeks to challenge the legal conclusions of the trial court or its factual determinations.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bonner, 290 Conn. 468, 477-78, 964 A.2d 73 (2009).

We first look to the relevant allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint. At paragraph 4, the plaintiff alleged, in part: “The [p]laintiff, LaSalle Bank, National Association as trustee for WMABS Series 2006-HE2 Trust, is the holder of said Note and Mortgage.” In answering the complaint, the defendant left the plaintiff to its proof as to that allegation. When the plaintiff filed its motion for summary judgment on January 24, 2008, it attached copies of the subject note and mortgage and an assignment of the mortgage. At the time the court granted the motion for summary judgment as to liability, it noted that the motion had been unopposed. The defendant did not file a motion for reargument but sought to amend his answer to include a special defense that the plaintiff did not own the mortgage at the time the action was commenced. The defendant also filed a motion to dismiss the action.

Although our review of the file demonstrates that the copy of the note submitted with the motion for summary judgment does not contain a dated endorsement, the defendant has not claimed on appeal that the court improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.[13] Rather, the defendant challenges the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. The substance of the defendant’s appellate claim is that the plaintiff did not own the note at the time it commenced the action, and the mortgage was not assigned to the plaintiff until sometime after the action was commenced. The defendant, however, cannot rely on the date the mortgage was assigned to the plaintiff as proof that the plaintiff did not own the note on the date the action was commenced.

“[Section] § 49-17 permits the holder of a negotiable instrument that is secured by a mortgage to foreclose on the mortgage even when the mortgage has not yet been assigned to him. . . . The statute codifies the common-law principle of long standing that the mortgage follows the note, pursuant to which only the rightful owner of the note has the right to enforce the mortgage. . . . Our legislature, by adopting § 49-17, has provide[d] an avenue for the holder of the note to foreclose on the property when the mortgage has not been assigned to him.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Fequiere, 119 Conn. App. 570, 576-77, 989 A.2d 606, cert. denied, 295 Conn. 922, 991 A.2d 564 (2010).

The key to resolving the defendant’s claim is a determination of when the note came into the plaintiff’s possession. We cannot review this claim because the court made no factual finding as to when the plaintiff acquired the note. Without that factual determination, we are unable to say whether the court improperly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.[14] Although the defendant did not file a motion asking the court to articulate its reason for denying the motion to dismiss, that cannot be the end of the matter because it concerns the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . and a judgment rendered without subject matter jurisdiction is void. . . . Further, it is well established that a reviewing court properly may address jurisdictional claims that neither were raised nor ruled on in the trial court. . . . Indeed, [o]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented. . . . The court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re DeLeon J., 290 Conn. 371, 376, 963 A.2d 53 (2009). The burden of demonstrating that a party has standing to bring an action is on the plaintiff. Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, 274 Conn. 92, 104, 874 A.2d 742, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1016, 126 S. Ct. 659, 163 L. Ed. 2d 526 (2005).

“Trial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to [Practice Book] § 10-31 (a) (1) may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case. As summarized by a federal court discussing motions brought pursuant to the analogous federal rule [i.e., Fed. R. Civ. P. (12) (b) (1)], [l]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts. . . . Different rules and procedures will apply, depending on the state of the record at the time the motion is filed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650-51, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).

“[I]f the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motions to dismiss . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint.. . . [W]here a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 651-52.

In this case, the defendant questioned the plaintiff’s standing to bring the foreclosure action when it was commenced. The defendant’s motion to dismiss was inspired by the exhibits the plaintiff attached to its motion for summary judgment. Read’s affidavit attests to the plaintiff being the holder of the note, but it does not resolve the factual issue as to when the plaintiff acquired the note.[15] When the question regarding the plaintiff’s standing was raised, the court should have held a hearing to determine whether the plaintiff was the owner or holder of the note at the time the action was commenced. It is fundamental that appellate courts do not make findings of fact. Stevenson v. Commissioner of Correction, 112 Conn. App. 675, 683 n.1, 963 A.2d 1077 (when record on appeal devoid of factual findings, improper for appellate court to make its own findings), cert. denied, 291 Conn. 904, 967 A.2d 1221 (2009). The case, therefore, must be remanded to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the plaintiff was the owner or holder of the subject note at the time the action was commenced. See Cross v. Hudon, 27 Conn. App. 729, 734, 609 A.2d 1021 (1992) (court improperly failed to conduct evidentiary hearing because jurisdiction hinged on factual determination).

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a hearing on the motion to dismiss.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

[*] The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.

[1] At trial, Robert Fishman, trustee for C & F Associates #2, also was a defendant, but he is not a party to this appeal. In this opinion, we refer to Bialobrzeski as the defendant.

[2] On March 2, 2009, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to substitute LaSalle Bank NA as trustee for Washington Mutual Asset-Backed Certificates WMABS Series 2006-HE2 Trust as the plaintiff. We will refer to the plaintiff and the substitute plaintiff as the plaintiff for purposes of this opinion.

[3] Significantly, Read did not attest as to the date the plaintiff acquired the note.

[4] The copy of the note attached to the motion for summary judgment indicates that the debt is payable to Long Beach Mortgage Company and contains no endorsement. We note that in his answer to the complaint the defendant indicated that the note was held by Long Beach Mortgage Corporation.

[5] The assignment of mortgage attached to the motion for summary judgment states that Long Beach Mortgage Company assigned the mortgage to LaSalle Bank, National Association as Trustee for WMABS Series 2006-HE2 Trust on November 27, 2007.

[6] The defendant filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment on March 20, 2008. In his objection, the defendant stated that the assignment of the mortgage was dated twenty-seven days after the foreclosure action was commenced and therefore the plaintiff did not own the mortgage when the action was served. He attached a copy of the assignment of the mortgage to the objection to the motion for summary judgment.

[7] Copies of the assignment of the mortgage and the notice of intent to accelerate were attached to the proposed amended answer and special defenses.

[8] It appears that no action was taken on the defendant’s motion for permission to amend his answer and the objection thereto.

[9] No note or endorsement was attached to the plaintiff’s objection.

[10] The defendant attempted to file a request for production that complied with the rules of practice to obtain evidence that the plaintiff possessed the subject note on the date the action was commenced. The court agreed with the plaintiff that there was “no valid discovery request for the court to determine if it has been complied with by the plaintiff.”

[11] It is not clear to us how the motion to dismiss could have been moot, as subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and the court must address the issue before it may proceed with the case. See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Waterbury, 111 Conn. App. 1, 5, 959 A.2d 163, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 959, 961 A.2d 422 (2008).

[12] In its brief, the plaintiff argues that the defendant failed to preserve the issue presented or timely file his appeal because the appeal was not filed within twenty days of the date the court denied the motion to dismiss. Generally, the denial of a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory ruling, which is not an appealable final judgment. Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 645 n.5, 974 A.2d 669 (2009); but see Ware v. State, 118 Conn. App. 65, 79, 983 A.2d 853 (2009) (denial of motion to dismiss based on colorable claim of sovereign immunity immediately appealable). The defendant timely filed his appeal within twenty days of the court’s rendering the judgment of strict foreclosure. See Glenfed Mortgage Corp. v. Crowley, 61 Conn. App. 84, 88, 763 A.2d 19 (2000) (foreclosure appealable final judgment).

[13] Even if the defendant had claimed that the court improperly granted the motion for summary judgment, there is no record as to the basis of the court’s finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact, including the date the subject note was endorsed to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff owned the note prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action. The defendant did not file a motion for articulation. See Practice Book § 66-5.

[14] The defendant did not file any exhibits or transcripts of the proceedings in the trial court, if any. We do not know whether there was evidence in addition to the exhibits attached to the motion for summary judgment presented to the court at the time it considered the motion for summary judgment and the motion to dismiss. The defendant has not claimed that the plaintiff submitted insufficient evidence to determine its ownership of the note.

[15] On appeal, the plaintiff has argued, supported by citations to authority, that the holder of a note rightly may foreclose the mortgage. That argument, however, is beside the point. The relevant question is when the plaintiff became the holder of the subject note.

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

Judge wants answers to foreclosure document fees

Judge wants answers to foreclosure document fees

Published: November 18, 2010 Updated: 07:41 am

DADE CITY – Pasco County Circuit Judge Susan Gardner decided to take a closer look at her foreclosure cases after law firms were accused recently of overbilling and forging documents.

She doesn’t like what she’s finding – a mountain of fees to serve notice of foreclosure lawsuits to homeowners and to people who don’t exist.

“Routinely, routinely, I’m seeing charges of $1,600, $1,800, $1,000, $800, any of those are ridiculous, and there had better be a good reason for it,” Gardner said, noting that these fees should typically be $45 to a couple hundred bucks.

The judge chose 12 random files and said she found 11 of them had what she says appear to be inflated charges to serve homeowners with lawsuits. Some of the lawyers who submitted affidavits to the court saying the fees are “reasonable” often sign their names and bar numbers in an illegible scribble, court records show.

“I used to think this was just sloppy work, but I truly have begun to wonder if it’s not concealment,” Gardner said.

The files in question involve two of the law firms that are currently under investigation by the Florida Attorney General’s Office for submitting fabricated or misleading documents in foreclosure cases.

Gardner plastered files with adhesive notes detailing her concerns and drew unhappy faces on beside fees. She issued orders this week requiring five lawyers from the firms to appear in court early next month and explain the fees and signatures. If they fail to show up, they could be arrested.

“I don’t want to throw anybody in jail, but I’m getting really angry, and I’m not going to tolerate it anymore,” Gardner said. “I want some answers. This stuff isn’t getting through on my watch.”

© 2010-19 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD3 Comments

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