November, 2010 | FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA

Archive | November, 2010

FULL DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF COUNTRYWIDE BOfA LINDA DiMARTINI

FULL DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF COUNTRYWIDE BOfA LINDA DiMARTINI

EXCERPTS:

Q So the original —
5 A — and I’ve been to her office.
6 Q — the original was located in your office?
7 A Yes.
8 Q Where’s your office located?
9 A Simi Valley, California.
10 Q And has the original of this allonge remained in your
11 office until you appeared here today?
12 A We had sent it on to — to our attorneys. They were in
13 possession of it.
14 Q And again, who do you believe is the holder of the note
15 and mortgage here?
16 A Well, Countrywide — Bank of America — whatever we’re
17 calling ourselves these days, we are Bank of America now — we
18 originated this loan. It was originated via a broker and it’s
19 really always been a Countrywide loan. The investor is Bank
20 of New York. We are the servicer of the loan.
21 Q Now, when you say it’s really a Countrywide loan, wasn’t
22 it sold? Wasn’t this loan securitized and ultimately sold —
23 sold to this trust?
24 A Right, it would have been securitized and sold. They are
25 the investors of the loan. But we are the ones that would

<SNIP>

9 A Who is in possession of the note? We have the note in our
10 origination file.
11 Q So — so Bank of New York as trustee does not hold the
12 note, is that correct, or is not in possession of the note?
13 A The original note to my knowledge is in the origination
14 file.
15 Q Where is the — do you have it here today?
16 A No, I don’t have it with me here today.
17 Q So you don’t have the note?
18 A It’s in our office.
19 Q So it’s in your office, it’s not with this trust that owns
20 the — that’s supposedly holds the — or is the owner of this
21 note, is that correct?
22 A That’s correct.
23 Q And your testimony is that this allonge was never
24 submitted to — it was never in the possession of Bank of New
25 York as trustee for the certificate holder, is that correct?

<SNIP>

9 Q And this allonge, it’s a stand-alone document, correct?
10 It’s not attached to anything, is that correct?
11 A I’m not sure I’m understanding your question.
12 Q Was there anything — when you brought the original that’s
13 in front of you, did you remove it? Was it stapled to
14 something else?
15 A No, it wouldn’t have necessarily been stapled to something
16 else. There would have probably been other documents showing
17 the — you know, we would have shown her the note. We would
18 have reviewed all of that before.

Continue Below…

Down Load PDF of This Case

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

Foreclosure Mills and The 4 Minute Foreclosure

Foreclosure Mills and The 4 Minute Foreclosure

For you to understand a little more about “the 4 minute foreclosure” you first have to know some key players in the controversy surrounding the foreclosure process today. I included a few excerpts from an article written by Gerlad B. Alt for DS News March of 2007 that you will find at the end. I only wish MERS was included in this article because without this device none of this would have been made possible.

The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), known as Freddie Mac, is a public government sponsored enterprise (GSE), headquartered in the Tyson’s Corner CDP in unincorporated Fairfax County, VirginiaFreddie Mac, one of America’s biggest buyers of home mortgages, is a stockholder-owned corporation chartered by Congress in 1970 to keep money flowing to mortgage lenders in support of home-ownership and rental housing.

Freddie Mac was the first investor to improve on the so-called standard timeframes by tightening the noose and imposing what seemed at the time like draconian and arbitrary standards for completion of legal actions for foreclosure and bankruptcy. To reinforce its point, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation adopted a designated counsel program under which the attorneys chosen to participate were expected to meet and be graded against these more stringent dates.

LOGS Network is a multi-state network of title companies and law firms and connecting them via a proprietary web-hosted software system. They developed a proprietary statistical program called ASAP (Attorney Scorecard and Performance) to help manage the more than 250 law firms its outsourcing division. By introducing , invented the field counsel industry that serves residential mortgage banking. LOGS Network was co-founded by Gerald M. Shapiro of Shapiro & Fishman PA a law firm who handles foreclosures for the financial industry. His network held a virtual monopoly on all foreclosure and bankruptcy work nationwide until the early 1990s. In addition, he preempted the entire industry by creating the “cradle to grave” concept through business developments in title, closing, document preparation, foreclosures, REO, outsourcing, collection, and debt acquisition businesses.

Fidelity National, a national default outsourcing and information provider, was one of the first in the industry to implement time-frames a high priority instead of a guideline standards. It instituted a policy recognizing and rewarding those attorneys who did work for its clients in a consistently shorter time than their competition. Fidelity mentality was the faster the better and by publicizing and comparing the time to completion of various legal tasks among the hundreds of law firms doing work for its client base. It created a demand for attorneys to keep up with their business practices in the same sequence that other industries have had to in the sense of “recreating the wheel” so to speak to keep up with growing competition.

By having a goal of recovering nonconforming assets for the servicers this put pressure on the time frames they had in order to recover title.

Of course, when the only acceptable
test for quality becomes a simple test
of speed, it is inevitable that some of
the participants will feel compelled
to cut corners to stay in the game.

Click Image For PDF

DSN_FORE2_March07

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

WALLSTREET, BEWARE “MEGALEAKS” HEADING FOR YOU

WALLSTREET, BEWARE “MEGALEAKS” HEADING FOR YOU

WikiLeaks plans to release a U.S. bank’s documents

Mon Nov 29, 6:52 pm ET

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – The founder of whistle-blower website WikiLeaks plans to release tens of thousands of internal documents from a major U.S. bank early next year, Forbes Magazine reported on Monday.

Julian Assange declined in an interview with Forbes to identify the bank, but he said that he expected that the disclosures, which follow his group’s release of U.S. military and diplomatic documents, would lead to investigations.

“We have one related to a bank coming up, that’s a megaleak. It’s not as big a scale as the Iraq material, but it’s either tens or hundreds of thousands of documents depending on how you define it,” Assange said in the interview posted on the Forbes website.

He declined to identify the bank, describing it only as a major U.S. bank that is still in existence.

Asked what he wanted to be the result of the disclosure, he replied: “I’m not sure. It will give a true and representative insight into how banks behave at the executive level in a way that will stimulate investigations and reforms, I presume.”

He compared this release to emails that were unveiled as a result of the collapse of disgraced energy company Enron Corp.

“This will be like that. Yes, there will be some flagrant violations, unethical practices that will be revealed, but it will also be all the supporting decision-making structures and the internal executive ethos … and that’s tremendously valuable,” Assange said.

“You could call it the ecosystem of corruption. But it’s also all the regular decision making that turns a blind eye to and supports unethical practices: the oversight that’s not done, the priorities of executives, how they think they’re fulfilling their own self-interest,” he said.

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BLOOMBERG: BofA Mortgage Morass Deepens After Employee Says Trustee Didn’t Get Notes

BLOOMBERG: BofA Mortgage Morass Deepens After Employee Says Trustee Didn’t Get Notes

Testimony by a Bank of America Corp. employee in a New Jersey personal bankruptcy case may give more ammunition to homeowners and investors in their legal battles over defaulted mortgages.

Linda DeMartini, a team leader in the company’s mortgage- litigation management division, said during a U.S. Bankruptcy Court hearing in Camden last year that it was routine for the lender to keep mortgage promissory notes even after loans were bundled by the thousands into bonds and sold to investors, according to a transcript. Contracts for such securitizations usually require the documents to be transferred to the trustee for mortgage bondholders.

In the case, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Judith H. Wizmur on Nov. 16 rejected a claim on the home of John T. Kemp, ruling his mortgage company, now owned by Bank of America, had failed to deliver the note to the trustee. That could leave the trustee with no standing to take the property, and raises the question of whether other foreclosures could similarly be blocked.

Following the decision, the bank disavowed the statements by DeMartini, whom it had flown in from California to testify. It was the policy of Countrywide Financial Corp., acquired by Bank of America in July 2008, to deliver notes as called for in its securitization contracts, according to Larry Platt, an attorney at K&L Gates LLP in Washington designated by the bank to answer questions about the case.

“This particular employee was mistaken in what she said,” Platt said in a telephone interview.

Attorney Analysis

Wizmur’s ruling is being scrutinized by lawyers for borrowers seeking to stall repossessions as a way to press lenders to modify their debt. Attorneys for homeowners have already won cases by calling into doubt the legitimacy of affidavits used to take back properties.

“If this is correct, many, many, many foreclosures already occurred in which this plaintiff didn’t have the note,” said Bruce Levitt, the South Orange, New Jersey, attorney representing Kemp. “This could affect thousands or hundreds of thousands of loans.”

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

The Big Lie: MERS Mortgages in Massachusetts by Jamie Ranney, Esq.

The Big Lie: MERS Mortgages in Massachusetts by Jamie Ranney, Esq.

by Jamie Ranney, Esq.
Jamie Ranney, PC
4 Thirty Acres Lane
Nantucket, MA 02554
jamie@nantucketlaw.pro
508-228-9224

This memo will focus on MERS-designated mortgages in Massachusetts.

In this author’s opinion two (2) things are evident after a survey of Massachusetts law.

First, MERS cannot be a valid “mortgagee” under Massachusetts law and thus MERS designated mortgages are invalid in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

This is because MERS-designated mortgages by definition “split” the security instrument (the mortgage) from the debt (the promissory note) when they are signed. This “split” invalidates the mortgage under Massachusetts law. Where the security interest is invalid upon the signing of the mortgage, MERS cannot occupy the legal position of a “mortgagee” under Massachusetts law no matter what language MERS inserts into their mortgages that purports to give them the legal position of “mortgagee”. Since MERSdesignated mortgages are invalid at their inception, it follows logically therefore that MERS mortgages are not legally capable of being recorded in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by its Registers of Deeds.

Second, even if a MERS-designated mortgage were found to be a valid security instrument in Massachusetts, each and every assignment of the mortgage and note “behind” a MERS-designated mortgage must be recorded on the public land records of the Commonwealth in order to comply with the Massachusetts recording statute at M.G.L. c. 183, s. 4 which requires that “conveyances of an estate” be recorded to be valid. A mortgage is a “conveyance of an estate” under Massachusetts law. Since MERS-designated mortgages exist for the primary purpose of holding “legal” title on the public land records while the “beneficial” interest is transferred and sold multiple times (and a mortgage cannot exist without a note under Massachusetts law), MERS-mortgages unlawfully avoid recording fees due the Commonwealth for the transfer(s) of interests under MERS-designated mortgages.

“If you tell a lie that’s big enough, and you tell it often enough, people will believe you are telling the truth, even when what you are saying is total crap.”1

Continue reading below…

[ipaper docId=44370743 access_key=key-1en9gd3bwhh0zs2atypk height=600 width=600 /]

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County Register of Deeds Picks Fight with MERS

County Register of Deeds Picks Fight with MERS

Richard Zombeck

Richard Zombeck

Eyes and Ears Mortgage Specialist and ShametheBanks.org Founder

Posted: November 29, 2010 01:31 PM
.

About a week ago, John O’Brien, Register of Deeds in Essex County Massachusetts, sent a letter to Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley asking that she look into whether MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.) failed to pay legally required recording fees in Massachusetts when a MERS-mortgage is assigned to another entity, like a trust or a bank.

MERS is a privately held company that operates an electronic registry designed to track servicing rights and ownership of mortgage loans in the United States.

MERS has seen a lot of attention of late because of the number of robo-signing cases popping up at banks and mortgage servicers. MERS has no employees, it simply assigns and designates an estimated 20,000 unpaid VPs and officersrecent testimony before Congress. around the country as certifying officers to sign off on mortgage transfers, foreclosures, and assignments, according to R.K. Arnold, President and CEO of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., in a

The recording fees Essex County has missed out on as a result of MERS purportedly bypassing normal recording channels was O’Brien’s primary concern.

In his November 18 letter to Attorney General Coakley, O’Brien wrote, “I am writing to ask that you investigate and provide me with an official opinion as to whether or not the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) has failed to pay the proper recording fees required under Massachusetts statute when a lender assigns a mortgage to another entity.”


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Problems in Mortgage Servicing From Modification to Foreclosure, Part II

Problems in Mortgage Servicing From Modification to Foreclosure, Part II

Wednesday, December 1, 2010
09:30 AM – 01:00 PM
538 Dirksen Senate Office Building

The witnesses for Panel I will be: Ms. Phyllis Caldwell, Chief, Homeownership Preservation Office, United States Department of the Treasury; The Honorable Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; The Honorable Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Mr. John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; and Mr. Edward DeMarco, Acting Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency. The witnesses for Panel II will be: Mr. Terry Edwards, Executive Vice President, Credit Portfolio Management, Fannie Mae; Mr. Donald Bisenius, Executive Vice President, Freddie Mac; Mr. Tom Deutsch, Executive Director, American Securitization Forum; and Professor Kurt Eggert, Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law.

Individuals with disabilities who require an auxiliary aid or service, including closed captioning service for webcast hearings, should contact the committee clerk at 202-224-7391 at least three business days in advance of the hearing date.

Add To My Calendar (vCal)

Witnesses

Panel 1

  • Ms. Phyllis Caldwell
    Chief, Homeownership Preservation Office
    United States Department of the Treasury
  • Honorable Sheila Bair
    Chairman
    Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
  • Honorable Daniel K. Tarullo
    Governor
    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
  • Mr. John Walsh
    Acting Comptroller of the Currency
    Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
  • Mr. Edward J. DeMarco
    Acting Director
    Federal Housing Finance Agency

Panel 2

  • Mr. Terry Edwards
    Executive Vice President
    Credit Portfolio Management, Fannie Mae
  • Mr. Donald Bisenius
    Executive Vice President
    Freddie Mac
  • Mr. Tom Deutsch
    Executive Director
    American Securitization Forum
  • Mr. Kurt Eggert
    Professor of Law
    Chapman University School of Law
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FL CLASS ACTION: VIOLATION OF WARN ACT “FORMER EMPLOYEES” MOWAT v. DJSP Enterprises

FL CLASS ACTION: VIOLATION OF WARN ACT “FORMER EMPLOYEES” MOWAT v. DJSP Enterprises

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

RENAE MOWAT, NIKKI MACK,
ARKLYNN RAHMING, and QUENNA HUMPHREY
individually
and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

DJSP ENTERPRISES, INC., a Florida Corporation, DJSP
ENTERPRISES, INC., a British Virgin Islands Company,
and LAW OFFICES OF DAVID J. STERN, P.A.,
DAVID J. STERN, individually,

Defendants.
______________________________________/

EXCERPT:

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Renae Mowat, Nikki Mack, Arklynn Rahming, and Quenna Humphrey individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, for their Complaint against Defendants, DJSP Enterprises, Inc., a Florida corporation, DJSP Enterprises, Inc., a British Virgin Islands Company, (collectively hereinafter referred to as “DJSP”), Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A., (“Stern, P.A.”) and David J. Stern (“Stern”) state as follows:

NATURE OF CASE

1) Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated former employees who worked for the Defendants in Plantation, Florida and who were terminated as a consequence of mass layoffs by the Defendants beginning on September 23, 2010 and who were not provided sixty (60) days advance written notice of the mass layoffs by Defendants as required by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq.
(“WARN Act”).

2) Plaintiffs and all similarly situated employees seek to recover back pay for each day of WARN Act violation and benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 2104.

3) This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1334 and 1367, as well as 29 U.S.C. §§ 2102, 2104(a)(5).

4) Venue over this matter is appropriate in this Court pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 2104(a)(5) because the acts constituting the violation of the WARN Act occurred, and the claims arose in this district. Venue is also proper under 28 U.S.C. §1391(a) and (b). The acts complained of occurred in the State of Florida and, at all relevant times, material hereto, the Defendants conducted business with and through the other named Defendants who also conducted business with and through the other Defendants and their subsidiaries and the named individual Defendant, David J. Stern, resides in this judicial district, and all of or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this action occurred in this judicial district.

Continue below…

DJSP1-main

[ipaper docId=44344153 access_key=key-3w8h3mofbv5qol72nua height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD2 Comments

WA STATE CLASS ACTION: “HAMP MODIFICATIONS” SOPER v. BANK OF AMERICA

WA STATE CLASS ACTION: “HAMP MODIFICATIONS” SOPER v. BANK OF AMERICA

COUNT I:

BREACH OF CONTRACT / BREACH OF DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING

COUNT II:

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL, IN THE ALTERNATIVE

COUNT III:

VIOLATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT,
RCW 19.86.010 ET SEQ

[ipaper docId=44324706 access_key=key-2hmeqvhev4ksjp3amyva height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

FL 4th DCA APPEALS COURT: “ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED” VALCARCEL v. CHASE BANK

FL 4th DCA APPEALS COURT: “ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED” VALCARCEL v. CHASE BANK

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

July Term 2010

CARMEN VALCARCEL and VICTOR VALCARCEL,
Appellants,
v.
CHASE BANK USA NA,
Appellee.

No. 4D10-379

[November 24, 2010]

TOWBIN SINGER, MICHELE, Associate Judge.

EXCERPTS:

The trial court granted the Valcarcels’ motion to dismiss as a sanction against Chase for sending a letter regarding the Valcarcels’ mortgage directly to the Valcarcels, rather than the Valcarcels’ lawyer. This mailing was a violation of rule 1.080(b), which requires service to be made upon a party’s attorney when he is represented by counsel.

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(b) provides in pertinent part: “(b) Involuntary Dismissal. Any party may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against that party for failure of an adverse party to comply with these rules or any order of court.” Rule 1.420(d) provides: “(d) Costs. Costs in any action dismissed under this rule shall be assessed and judgment for costs entered in that action.”

The trial court erred in denying the Valcarcels’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs based upon its finding that the order was not a judgment. Although the dismissal order was not an adjudication on the merits, the Valcarcels can nonetheless be considered the prevailing party. They are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees because the action against them was dismissed. We, therefore, reverse and remand to the trial court to determine the amount of attorney’s fees that should be awarded to the Valcarcels for both the trial and appellate proceedings.

Reversed and Remanded.

Valcarcel v Chase

[ipaper docId=44312420 access_key=key-oba0qz31mu3naz6701a height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD0 Comments

CA CLASS ACTION: FORSTER v. WELLS FARGO, AMERICA’S SERVICING COMPANY “Fraudulent Modification Practices”

CA CLASS ACTION: FORSTER v. WELLS FARGO, AMERICA’S SERVICING COMPANY “Fraudulent Modification Practices”

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Equitable Estoppel)

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Inducing Breach of Contract)

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Unjust Enrichment)

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violation of California Business & Professional Code 17200, et seq., Unlawful, Unfair, or Fraudulent Business Practices)

WELLS FARGO CA

[ipaper docId=44310085 access_key=key-19a2my72oaghv73lscz0 height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD8 Comments

[MUST READ] NOTICE OF RECORDED MERS et al REMOVAL

[MUST READ] NOTICE OF RECORDED MERS et al REMOVAL

Will leave the comments for you all if you wish on these recorded documents from public records.

NOTE: It appears these were done by pro se individuals.

YOU MUST CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY.

REPEAT:

DO NOT try this without consulting an attorney.

Excerpt:

WHEREAS TRUSTOR/GRANTOR STATES AND DECLARES that, in recognition of certain pertinent facts not limited to the fact that the Mortgage contained NO SIGNATURES showing an acceptance of the document by any other party, the above-described Mortgage is, at best, an unconscionable contract and, for that reason alone, said, Mortgage is not an enforceable instrument; and since no other party signed th document, no party would have standing to assert that said party has been damaged in any way, or that a “default” occurred, or that a “breach” occurred; AND…

AND ANOTHER


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[VIDEO, RECORDING] GMAC MORTGAGE STEALS LA HOME

[VIDEO, RECORDING] GMAC MORTGAGE STEALS LA HOME

via: mlinc06

GMAC offers loan modification, accepts payments, and forecloses on homeowners, 5 months into the modification, despite GMAC representative admitting that homeowner was not at fault. Listen to the bank admit to missapplying payments, while foreclosing on Los Angeles, CA homeowners.


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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

[NYSC] STEVEN J BAUM PC UNABLE TO LOCATE WELLS FARGO AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE TRANSFER OF ANY LOAN DOCUMENTS

[NYSC] STEVEN J BAUM PC UNABLE TO LOCATE WELLS FARGO AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE TRANSFER OF ANY LOAN DOCUMENTS

SUPREME COURT – STATE OF NEW YORK
I.A.S. PART XXXVI SUFFOLK COUNTY

Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY:
STEVEN J. BAUM, P.C.

220 Northpointe Parkway, Suite G
Amherst, New York 14228

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

-against-

SUNNY ENG, SHIRLEY ENG, HTFC
CORPORATION
, JANE ENG,

DEFENDANTS’ ATTORNEY:
LAW OFFICES OF CRAIG D. ROBINS
Woodbury, New York 11797
Defendants. 180 Froehlich Farm Blvd.
……………………………………………………….. X

Excerpts:

The Court notes that the same law firm, Steven J. Baum, P.C., represented both HTFC and Wells Fargo as plaintiffs.

Moreover, Mr. Wider avers that “Jeffrey Stephan,” who purportedly executed the assignment as “Limited Signing Officer” of HTFC Corporation, has never been an employee of HTFC and that such person was never authorized to act as a “Limited Signing Officer” on behalf of HTFC for any purpose.

Wells Fargo does not have standing to maintain and prosecute this action to foreclose defendants’ mortgage. Plaintiffs have failed to come forward with any evidence to substantiate its claims herein or to raise a triable issue of fact. Indeed, the affirmation of plaintiffs attorney, sworn to September 8, 2010, reflects that plaintiff has been unable to locate any documents substantiating plaintiffs “belief’ that “its servicer had the authority to execute any and all documents attendant to the transfer of the loan.”

Continue below to see both the Decision, Assignment in question…

ENG COM

[ipaper docId=44232303 access_key=key-faynnigo46v0go85gbf height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD2 Comments

IL 7th Circuit Appeals Court: “WHERE’S THE NOTE” COGSWELL v. CITIFINANCIAL MORTGAGE

IL 7th Circuit Appeals Court: “WHERE’S THE NOTE” COGSWELL v. CITIFINANCIAL MORTGAGE

PATRICK L. COGSWELL and PATRICK M. O’FLAHERTY, doing business as THE PATRICK GROUP, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITIFINANCIAL MORTGAGE COMPANY, INCORPORATED, successor by merger to Associates Finance, Incorporated, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 08-2153.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 15, 2009. Decided October 5, 2010.

Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge.

CitiFinancial Mortgage assigned its interest in a mortgage to two investors—doing business as “The Patrick Group”—but never delivered the original or a copy of the underlying note. When The Patrick Group tried to foreclose on the mortgage in Illinois state court, its action was dismissed because it could not produce the note. After an unsuccessful appeal, The Patrick Group filed this breach-of-contract lawsuit against CitiFinancial. The suit was removed to federal court, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of CitiFinancial.

We reverse. The district court based its summary-judgment decision primarily on a determination that CitiFinancial never agreed to deliver the note as part of the parties’ agreement to transfer the mortgage. But whether they agreed on this term is a question of fact, and The Patrick Group presented enough evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that it was a part of the parties’ agreement. The district court’s alternative basis for summary judgment—that CitiFinancial’s alleged breach did not cause The Patrick Group’s damages—was also erroneous. Under the circumstances of this case, the causation question should have been resolved in The Patrick Group’s favor as a matter of law; the state trial and appellate courts rejected The Patrick Group’s foreclosure action because without a copy of the note, it could not prove it was the holder of the debt the mortgage secured.

<SNIP>

In short, as a matter of law, The Patrick Group’s damages were caused by CitiFinancial’s failure to deliver an original or a copy of the note secured by the mortgage.[5] The open factual question is whether the parties’ agreement required CitiFinancial to do so, and on this the evidence is disputed. We therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Continue reading below…

COGSWELL v. CITIFINACIAL

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SANCTIONS! STEVEN J. BAUM PC For Practice of Fraud, Deception, and Misrepresentation Upon the Court: FREDDIE MAC v. RAIA

SANCTIONS! STEVEN J. BAUM PC For Practice of Fraud, Deception, and Misrepresentation Upon the Court: FREDDIE MAC v. RAIA

GO HERE FOR PART 1:

NY Law Offices of Steven J. Baum P.C. may get sanctions for False Representations

Now the finale…

.

Federal Home Loan Mtge. Corp.v Raia

2010 NY Slip Op 52003(U)
Decided on November 23, 2010
District Court Of Nassau County, First District
Fairgrieve, J.

Steven J. Baum, P.C., Attorneys for Petitioner, 220 Northpointe Parkway, Suite G, Amherst, New York 14228, 716-204-2400;

Jeffrey A. Seigel, Esq., Volunteer Lawyers Project, Attorneys for Respondent, One Helen Keller Way, Hempstead, New York 11550, 516-292-8299.

Scott Fairgrieve, J.

On January 5, 2010, Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. (“Wells Fargo”) was the successful bidder at the foreclosure sale of the subject premises known as 360 Stewart Avenue, Unit 1E, Garden City, New York. Wells Fargo received 220 shares of Stewart Franklin Owners Corp., as well as the proprietary lease previously owned by the Respondent, Paul Raia.

On March 12, 2010, Wells Fargo purportedly assigned its January 5, 2010 bid to Petitioner Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (“FHLMC”). However, the “Assignment of Bid” contains only the signature of Steven J. Baum, P.C., and there is no indication for which party the signature was made. Mr. Baum’s office claimed to have the authority to execute the document on behalf of FHLMC by way of a power of attorney attached to the petition. Baum’s office also claimed to have the same authority for Wells Fargo, although Baum’s office provides no evidence in support of that allegation.

EXCERPTS:

Baum has recently faced numerous standing issues concerning assignment, for which its cases were dismissed.

The opinion continues on to state that the “court’s inherent power to impose sanctions is particularly appropriate where fraud, deception, and misrepresentation has been practiced upon the Court.

The fraud perpetrated on the court here occurred when petitioner’s attorney swore that the petition had been read and that the contents of the petition were true to the deponent’s own knowledge. Sanctions may attach to attempts to deceive the court.

CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing, Steven J. Baum, P.C. must compensate Volunteer Lawyers Project in the amount of $14,532.50 for reasonable attorney’s fees and disbursements within 30 days of the date of this order. Further, this court imposes monetary sanctions in the amount of $5,000.00 on Steven J. Baum, P.C. payable to “Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection,” established pursuant to section 97-t of the State Finance Law, within 30 days of the date of this order. The clerk of the court is directed to give notice, pursuant to 130-1.3, to the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection concerning this award of sanctions.

So Ordered:

/s/ Hon. Scott Fairgrieve

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Continue reading below…

Federal Home Loan Mtge. Corp v RAIA

[ipaper docId=44103631 access_key=key-14p9mcjvljhm52vmp3nf height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD5 Comments

FL 3rd DCA Appeals Court: “Process Service” OPELLA vs. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC

FL 3rd DCA Appeals Court: “Process Service” OPELLA vs. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC

No. 3D09-2921
Lower Tribunal No. 09-12657
________________
Steven Ray Opella,
Appellant,

vs.
Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC.,
Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Thomas S. Wilson, Jr., Judge.

Steven Ray Opella, in proper person.
Popkin & Rosaler, Brian L. Rosaler, Richard P. Cohn and Deborah Posner,
(Deerfield Beach), for appellee.

Before GERSTEN, WELLS, and LAGOA, JJ.WELLS, Judge.

Steven Ray Opella appeals from a final summary judgment of foreclosure
entered in favor of Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC., claiming that he was never
served with process. Because the record unequivocally confirms that Opella was
neither served with process nor waived service, we reverse.

We also direct the clerk to forward a copy of this opinion to the Florida Bar for
consideration of conduct in violation of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.

OPELLA v. BAYVIEW

[ipaper docId=44090710 access_key=key-21vih0nl37kze5ce309q height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD3 Comments

Indiana Appeals Court Reversal: LACY-McKINNEY v. TAYLOR, BEAN& WHITAKER MORTGAGE CORPORATION

Indiana Appeals Court Reversal: LACY-McKINNEY v. TAYLOR, BEAN& WHITAKER MORTGAGE CORPORATION

FLORENCE R. LACY-MCKINNEY, Appellant-Defendant,
v.
TAYLOR, BEAN & WHITAKER MORTGAGE CORP., Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 71A03-0912-CV-587.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

November 19, 2010.

JOSEPH F. ZIELINSKI Indiana Legal Services, Inc. South Bend, Indiana, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT.

CRAIG D. DOYLE, MARK R. GALLIHER AMANDA J. MAXWELL Doyle Legal Corporation, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana, ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE.

OPINION

KIRSCH, Judge.

Florence R. Lacy-McKinney (“Lacy-McKinney”) appeals the trial court`s entry of summary judgment in favor of Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. (“Taylor-Bean”) on Taylor-Bean`s action to foreclose on Lacy-McKinney`s mortgage that was insured by the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”).[1] On appeal, Lacy-McKinney raises two issues that we restate as:

I. Whether a mortgagee`s compliance with federal mortgage servicing responsibilities is a condition precedent that may be raised as an affirmative defense to the foreclosure of an FHA-insured mortgage; and

II. Whether the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of Taylor-Bean on its mortgage foreclosure action against Lacy-McKinney.

We reverse and remand.

At the time Taylor-Bean filed its complaint, the security interest in the subject mortgage was in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) “(solely as nominee for [Taylor-Bean] . . . and [Taylor-Bean`s] successors and assigns).” Appellant’s App. at 8. After MERS assigned the security interest to Taylor-Bean, Taylor-Bean filed an amended complaint. Lacy-McKinney initially argued that summary judgment in favor of Taylor-Bean must fail because Taylor-Bean had no interest in the Property at the time the original complaint was filed. Id. at 102-03. Lacy-McKinney does not raise this issue on appeal.

continue below…

[ipaper docId=44090700 access_key=key-6ibb3x2gq6zf7vuh0jp height=600 width=600 /]

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

NOW, There’s Issues With MERS “UNIQUE”, “INVALID” Mortgage Identification Numbers (MIN)

NOW, There’s Issues With MERS “UNIQUE”, “INVALID” Mortgage Identification Numbers (MIN)

Before you go down to read the “recent” affidavits to correct/invalidate a previous MIN from WAF to Bank of America.

You have to first read the following…

Every loan is assigned a unique Mortgage Identification Number (MIN) that follows the loan from registration to payoff. The MIN appears on the mortgage or deed of trust.

Process loans, not paperwork ,SVP William C. Hultman


In the mortgage sphere, the MERS Mortgage Identification Number (MIN) has been in use since 1997 and has been assigned to over 65 million loans. The MIN is a combination of a unique loan identifier for the originating lender plus the loan’s internal file number. It is available for residential, multifamily and commercial loans. It can attach to a mortgage as early as the application for a loan. The MIN is then used to track a loan throughout its life cycle, from application through monthly servicing activities until final loan payoff. It is used also used within the loss mitigation and Real Estate Owned (REO) processes. The MIN is well integrated within all facets of the real estate finance industry.

The adoption of a new, different, and/or conflicting numbering system would result in greater confusion, unnecessary system development costs, longer lead times for compliance and decreased transparency by making it more difficult for industry participants to track assets across multiple data and reporting systems. The real estate finance industry would be required to add the new asset number to all of its applications, databases, and file transfers between applications. In certain situations, a new asset number may have unintended consequences in the primary residential mortgage market. If a lender has to decide at the time of application whether to employ the MIN or some other loan numbering system based on the lender’s estimation that the borrower may not qualify for a conforming loan (loans meeting the criteria of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac) or governmental mortgage (loans meeting the criteria of FHA, VA, or the Rural Housing Service), then the Proposal could unintentionally steer applicants to particular loan types. Alternatively, if a lender starts down one path and then needs to re-key an application, the chances for error increase.

The MIN is the only universally accepted identifier for loans in the mortgage industry across the entire lifecycle of the loan. The major participants in the residential mortgage industry utilize the MIN. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae all utilize the MIN. MISMO encourages the SEC to adopt the MERS Mortgage Identification Number (MIN) as the primary loan identifier for real estate finance ABS.

MISMO response to SEC adopting MERS, Steve Gozdan Board of Directors 7/2010

Take notes:

  • These are 35 individual affidavits to correct invalid MERS MIN’S
  • Crystal Moore is in fact an employee of Nationwide Title Clearing and NOT MERS
  • Look at the parties involved.
  • What was the reason for this?

Way too many of these recorded for me to go through but these are 35 samples!

Min Correction by DinSFLA on Scribd

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD3 Comments

Battle of The Unauthorized Fraudulent Signature: DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY v. JP MORGAN, Ga: Court of Appeals 2010

Battle of The Unauthorized Fraudulent Signature: DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY v. JP MORGAN, Ga: Court of Appeals 2010

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY,
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N. A.

A10A1509.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Decided: November 19, 2010.

BARNES, Presiding Judge.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N. A. commenced this action against Deutsche Bank National Trust Company f/k/a Banker’s Trust Company after the two banks conducted competing foreclosure sales of certain real property in DeKalb County. JP Morgan’s claim of title to the property was predicated on a 2004 security deed, while Deutsche Bank’s claim of title was predicated on a 2001 security deed. The case turned on the legal effect of a notarized warranty deed recorded in 2003 and on whether JP Morgan was a bona fide purchaser for value based upon the warranty deed. The trial court granted summary judgment to JP Morgan, concluding that JP Morgan’s interest in the property was superior to and not subject to any interest held by Deutsche Bank. We conclude that the uncontroverted evidence shows that the 2003 warranty deed was not a forgery, but was signed by someone fraudulently assuming authority, and that JP Morgan was a bona fide purchaser for value entitled to take the property free of any outstanding security interest held by Deutsche Bank. Thus, we affirm.

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the undisputed facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, warrant judgment as a matter of law. Our review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo, and we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Consumer Solutions Fin. Svc. v. Heritage Bank, 300 Ga. App. 272 (684 SE2d 682) (2009). See OCGA § 9-11-56 (c); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991). Guided by these principles, we turn to the record in the present case.

This case involves a dispute over the tract of real property located at 275 Haas Avenue, Atlanta, Georgia 30316 in DeKalb County (the “Property”). The Property was conveyed to Rebecca Diaz by warranty deed recorded in September 2001. On the same date, Diaz executed and recorded a security deed encumbering the Property in favor of People’s Choice Home Loan, Inc. (the “2001 Security Deed”). IndyMac Bank, F. S. B. acquired the 2001 Security Deed by assignment.

In July 2003, a notarized warranty deed from “Indy Mac Bank, F. S. B.” to Diaz was recorded which purported to reconvey the Property to Diaz in fee simple (the “Warranty Deed”). The Warranty Deed was executed by an individual named Pamela Whales, who identified herself as an Assistant Vice President of IndyMac. The Warranty Deed was attested by two witnesses, one of whom was a notary public.

The Property subsequently was deeded to various parties but ultimately to an owner who, in April 2004, executed and recorded a security deed encumbering the Property in favor of OneWorld Mortgage Corporation (the “2004 Security Deed”). Washington Mutual Bank F. A. acquired the 2004 Security Deed by assignment.

In June 2004, IndyMac assigned the 2001 Security Deed to Deutsche Bank. That same month, Deutsche Bank foreclosed upon the Property pursuant to the power of sale provision contained in the 2001 Security Deed. Deutsche Bank was the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale.

In December 2005, Washington Mutual also foreclosed upon the Property pursuant to the power of sale provision contained in the 2004 Security Deed. Washington Mutual was the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale. Thereafter, Washington Mutual was closed by the federal Office of Thrift Supervision, and JP Morgan succeeded to Washington Mutual’s interest in the Property under the terms of a purchase and assumption agreement.

Following the competing foreclosure sales, JP Morgan brought this action against Deutsche Bank for declaratory relief and attorney fees, alleging that its interest in the Property was superior to and not subject to any interest held by Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank answered and counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that its interest in the Property was superior to and not subject to any interest held by JP Morgan.

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment on their declaratory judgment claims. JP Morgan argued that the 2001 Security Deed upon which Deutsche Bank predicated its interest in the Property had been canceled by the Warranty Deed as a matter of law. Alternatively, JP Morgan argued that the uncontroverted evidence showed that it qualified as a bona fide purchaser for value such that it was protected against any outstanding security interest in the Property held by Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank strongly disputed these arguments, contending that the Warranty Deed was facially irregular, had been forged, and failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for cancellation of a security deed. The trial court granted summary judgment to JP Morgan and denied it to Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank now appeals the trial court’s grant of JP Morgan’s motion for summary judgment.[1]

1. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of JP Morgan because the uncontroverted evidence shows that JP Morgan was afforded the protection of a bona fide purchaser for value, not subject to any outstanding security interest in the Property held by Deutsche Bank.

“To qualify as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, a party must have neither actual nor constructive notice of the matter at issue.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rolan v. Glass, 305 Ga. App. 217, 218 (1) (699 SE2d 428) (2010). “Notice sufficient to excite attention and put a party on inquiry shall be notice of everything to which it is afterwards found that such inquiry might have led.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Whiten v. Murray, 267 Ga. App. 417, 421 (2) (599 SE2d 346) (2004). “A purchaser of land is charged with constructive notice of the contents of a recorded instrument within its chain of title.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) VATACS Group v. HomeSide Lending, (2005). Furthermore, the grantee of a security interest in land and subsequent purchasers are entitled to rely upon a warranty deed that is regular on its face and duly recorded in ascertaining the chain of title. See Mabra v. Deutsche Bank & Trust Co. Americas, 277 Ga. App. 764, 767 (2) (627 SE2d 849) (2006), overruled in part on other grounds by Brock v. Yale Mtg. Corp., ___ Ga. ___ (2) (Case No. S10A0950, decided Oct. 4, 2010). 276 Ga. App. 386, 391 (2) (623 SE2d 534)

On motion for summary judgment, JP Morgan argued that it was entitled to protection as a good faith purchaser because the notarized, recorded Warranty Deed purported to transfer the Property back to Diaz, thereby extinguishing the 2001 Security Deed, and there was no reason to suspect a defect in the Warranty Deed calling into question the chain of title. In contrast, Deutsche Bank argued that JP Morgan was not entitled to such protection because the Warranty Deed was facially irregular in that it misidentified the grantor and failed to comply with OCGA § 14-5-7 (b).

We agree with JP Morgan and reject the arguments raised by Deutsche Bank. The Warranty Deed was regular on its face and duly recorded. See OCGA § 44-5-30 (“A deed to lands must be in writing, signed by the maker, and attested by at least two witnesses.”). See also OCGA § 44-2-21 (a) (4), (b) (one of two required attesting witnesses may be a notary public). Also, the Warranty Deed on its face was executed in a manner that conformed with OCGA § 14-5-7 (b), which provides:

Instruments executed by a corporation releasing a security agreement, when signed by one officer of the corporation or by an individual designated by the officers of the corporation by proper resolution, without the necessity of the corporation’s seal being attached, shall be conclusive evidence that said officer signing is duly authorized to execute and deliver the same.

The Warranty Deed appeared to be executed by an assistant vice president of IndyMac, and thus by an “officer of the corporation.” Moreover, the only interest that IndyMac held in the Property prior to execution of the Warranty Deed was its security interest arising from the 2001 Security Deed, and reconveyance of the Property by way of a warranty deed was a proper way to release that security interest. See Clements v. Weaver, 301 Ga. App. 430, 434 (2) (687 SE2d 602) (2009) (grantor of quitclaim deed estopped from asserting any interest in property conveyed); Southeast Timberlands v. Haiseal Timber, 224 Ga. App. 98, 102 (479 SE2d 443) (1996) (physical precedently only). The Warranty Deed, therefore, facially complied with OCGA § 14-5-7 (b) and would appear to anyone searching the county records to serve as “conclusive evidence” that execution of the deed had been authorized by IndyMac.

(a) In opposing summary judgment, Deutsche Bank argued that the Warranty Deed was facially irregular because it improperly identified the grantor as “Indy Mac Bank, F. S. B.” rather than “IndyMac Bank, F. S. B.” But “a mere misnomer of a corporation in a written instrument . . . is not material or vital in its consequences, if the identity of the corporation intended is clear or can be ascertained by proof.” (Citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Hawkins v. Turner, 166 Ga. App. 50, 51-52 (1) (303 SE2d 164) (1983). It cannot be said that the mere placement of an additional space in the corporate name (i.e., “Indy Mac” versus “IndyMac”) made the identity of the corporation unclear. As such, the misnomer did not render the Warranty Deed irregular on its face.

(b) Deutsche Bank also argued that the Warranty Deed failed to comply with OCGA § 14-5-7 (b) because the phrase “when signed by one officer of the corporation” should be construed as requiring the signature of the corporate president or vice president. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires that we look to the intention of the legislature. And in so doing, the literal meaning of the statute prevails unless such a construction would produce unreasonable or absurd consequences not contemplated by the legislature.” Johnson v. State, 267 Ga. 77, 78 (475 SE2d 595) (1996). The words of OCGA § 14-5-7 (b) are unambiguous and do not lead to an unreasonable or absurd result if taken literally: any officer of the corporation has authority to sign the instrument releasing the security interest. There is no basis from the language of the statute to limit that authority to a subset of corporate officers such as a president or vice president.

It is clear that the legislature knew how to specify such a limitation when it chose to do so. In OCGA § 14-5-7 (a),[2] the legislature imposed a limitation on the specific types of corporate officers who could execute instruments for real estate conveyances other than those releasing security agreements. Consequently, we must presume that the legislature’s failure to include similar limiting language in OCGA § 14-5-7 (b) “was a matter of considered choice.” Transp. Ins. Co. v. El Chico Restaurants, 271 Ga. 774, 776 (524 SE2d 486) (1999).

Deutsche Bank further argued that the Warranty Deed failed to comply with OCGA § 14-5-7 (b) because the statute should be construed as requiring the instrument to expressly state that it was “releasing a security agreement,” and the Warranty Deed did not contain such express language. But nothing in the plain language of OCGA § 14-5-7 (b) imposes an express language requirement, “and the judicial branch is not empowered to engraft such a [requirement] on to what the legislature has enacted.” (Citation omitted.) Kaminer v. Canas, 282 Ga. 830, 835 (1) (653 SE2d 691) (2007).

(c) Given the facial regularity of the recorded Warranty Deed, there was no reason to suspect that it might be defective in some manner or that there might be a problem in the chain of title resulting from the deed. Nothing in the Warranty Deed would have excited attention or put a party on inquiry that the 2001 Security Deed might remain in full force and effect. Accordingly, the original grantee of the 2004 Security Deed (OneWorld Mortgage Corporation) was entitled to rely upon the facially regular Warranty Deed and was afforded the protection of a bona fide purchaser of the Property, entitled to take the Property free of the 2001 Security Deed. See generally Farris v. Nationsbanc Mtg. Corp., 268 Ga. 769, 771 (2) (493 SE2d 143) (1997) (“A bona fide purchaser for value is protected against outstanding interests in land of which the purchaser has no notice.”). Because OneWorld Mortgage Corporation had the status of a bona fide purchaser, subsequent holders of the 2004 Security Deed were likewise afforded that status, including Washington Mutual (now JP Morgan). See OCGA § 23-1-19 (“If one without notice sells to one with notice, the latter shall be protected[.]”; Murray v. Johnson, 222 Ga. 788, 789 (3) (152 SE2d 739) (1966); Thompson v. Randall, 173 Ga. 696, 701 (161 SE 377) (1931). Consequently, summary judgment was appropriate to JP Morgan on the issue of its status as a bona fide purchaser for value.

2. In opposing summary judgment, Deutsche Bank contended that even if JP Morgan qualified as a bona fide purchaser for value, there was a genuine issue of material fact over whether the Warranty Deed constituted a forgery, and thus over whether JP Morgan acquired good title to the Property. JP Morgan responded that the uncontroverted evidence showed that the Warranty Deed did not constitute a common law forgery, which occurs when someone signs another person’s name, since the Warranty Deed was signed by a person using her own name but who fraudulently assumed authority to act on behalf of IndyMac. JP Morgan further maintained that its status as a bona fide purchaser for value protected it against any fraud (rather than forgery) that might have been involved in the execution of the Warranty Deed.

The dispute between the parties centered on the assertions contained in the affidavit of Yolanda Farrow, which was filed by Deutsche Bank in opposition to summary judgment (the “Farrow Affidavit”). Farrow averred that she was a records keeper formerly employed by IndyMac and currently employed at IndyMac’s successor bank. Farrow further averred that her office maintained the IndyMac personnel records in an electronic database; that she had personal knowledge of the maintenance and upkeep of those records; and that she had personally researched and examined the records database for the person identified in the Warranty Deed as Pamela Whales, Assistant Vice President. Based upon her review of the records database, Farrow opined that to the best of her knowledge and belief, no one by that name was an employee or agent of IndyMac when the Warranty Deed was executed. Deutsche Bank maintained that the Farrow Affidavit served as circumstantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact over whether the Warranty Deed was a forgery.

[W]e have . . . long recognized that a forged deed is a nullity and vests no title in a grantee. As such, even a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a forgery cannot acquire good title from a grantee in a forged deed, or those holding under such a grantee, because the grantee has no title to convey.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brock, ___ Ga. at ___ (2). See also Second Refuge Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ v. Lollar, 282 Ga. 721, 726-727 (3) (653 SE2d 462 (2007). In contrast, a bona fide purchaser is protected against fraud in the execution or cancellation of a security deed of which he or she is without notice. See Murray, 222 Ga. at 789 (4).

We conclude that the Farrow Affidavit filed by Deutsche Bank was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Warranty Deed was a forgery.

A recorded deed shall be admitted in evidence in any court without further proof unless the maker of the deed, one of his heirs, or the opposite party in the action files an affidavit that the deed is a forgery to the best of his knowledge and belief. Upon the filing of the affidavit, the genuineness of the alleged deed shall become an issue to be determined in the action.

OCGA § 44-2-23. While “forgery” is not defined in the statute, we have previously noted that the general principles espoused in the statute were “taken from the common law.” McArthur v. Morrison, 107 Ga. 796, 797 (34 SE 205)Intl. Indem. Co. v. Bakco Acceptance, 172 Ga. App. 28, 32 (2) (322 SE2d 78)Barron v. State, 12 Ga. App. 342, 348 (77 SE 214)Gilbert v. United States, 370 U. S. 650, 655-658 (II) (82 SC 1399, 8 LE2d 750) (1962) (discussing the common law of forgery); People v. Cunningham, 813 NE2d 891, 894-895 (N. Y. 2004) (same). On the other hand, (1899). Furthermore, we favor the construction of a statute in a manner that is in conformity with the common law, rather than in derogation of it. See (1984). Under the common law, a forgery occurs where one person signs the name of another person while holding out that signature to be the actual signature of the other person. See (1913) (“[T]o constitute forgery, the writing must purport to be the writing of another party than the person making it.“) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also

[w]here one executes an instrument purporting on its face to be executed by him as the agent of the principal, he is not guilty of forgery, although he has in fact no authority from such principal to execute the same. This is not the false making of the instrument, but merely a false and fraudulent assumption of authority.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ga. Cas. & Surety Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 210 F. Supp. 644, 656-657 (N. D. Ga. 1962), aff’d, Seaboard Surety Co. v. Ga. Cas. & Surety Co., 327 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1964) (applying Georgia law). This common law distinction between forgery and a fraudulent assumption of authority has been discussed and applied in several Georgia cases. See Morgan v. State, 77 Ga. App. 164, 165 (48 SE2d 115) (1948); Samples v. Milton County Bank, 34 Ga. App. 248, 250 (1) (129 SE 170) (1925); Barron, 12 Ga. App. at 347-350.

In the present case, the Farrow Affidavit merely asserted that Whales, the individual who signed the Warranty Deed, was not an employee or agent of IndyMac. It is undisputed that the individual signing the Warranty Deed was in fact Whales. Hence, the Farrow Affidavit alleged a fraudulent assumption of authority by Whales, not a forgery, under the common law. See Georgia Cas. & Surety Co., 210 F. Supp. at 656-657; Morgan, 77 Ga. App. at 165; Samples, 34 Ga. App. at 250 (1); Barron, 12 Ga. App. at 347-350.

Arguing for a contrary conclusion, Deutsche Bank maintained that the cases applying the Georgia common law of forgery which have addressed the doctrine of a “fraudulent assumption of authority” have involved an admitted agent with some authority to act on behalf of its principle, but who exceeded that authority. Deutsche Bank asserted that the present case is thus distinguishable, since the Farrow Affidavit reflected that Whales had no authority to act as an agent of IndyMac in any capacity or under any circumstances.

We are unpersuaded. Nothing in the language or reasoning of the cases applying the doctrine of fraudulent assumption of authority suggests that the doctrine should be limited in the manner espoused by Deutsche Bank. See Georgia Cas. & Surety Co., 210 F. Supp. at 656-657;Morgan, 77 Ga. App. at 165; Samples, 34 Ga. App. at 250 (1); Barron, 12 Ga. App. at 347-350. Indeed, in Georgia Cas. & Surety Co., 210 F. Supp. at 652, 656-657, the district court did not hesitate to apply the doctrine, even though the court found that the individuals who had executed the corporate documents were “purely intruders” with “no contract of employment existing nor even in contemplation,” who lacked any authority whatsoever to act on behalf of the corporation as officers or otherwise.

For these reasons, the trial court correctly rejected Deutsche Bank’s contention that there was evidence that the Warranty Deed had been forged. Because the Farrow Affidavit at best showed a fraudulent assumption of authority by Whales as signatory to the Warranty Deed, JP Morgan, as a bona fide purchaser, was protected against the fraudulent actions alleged by Deutsche Bank. See Murray, 222 Ga. at 789 (4).

3. In opposing summary judgment, Deutsche Bank also maintained that the Warranty Deed could not cause the 2001 Security Deed to be canceled because the Warranty Deed failed to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 44-14-67 (b) (2). That statute provides in pertinent part:

(b) In the case of a deed to secure debt which applies to real property, in order to authorize the clerk of superior court to show the original instrument as canceled of record, there shall be presented for recording:

. . .

(2) A conveyance from the record holder of the security deed, which conveyance is in the form of a quitclaim deed or other form of deed suitable for recording and which refers to the original security deed[.]

According to Deutsche Bank, the Warranty Deed did not authorize the clerk of the superior court to cancel the 2001 Security Deed because the Warranty Deed made no express reference to the 2001 Security Deed, as required by this statute. As such, Deutsche Bank argued that, as a matter of law, the Warranty Deed could not effectuate the cancellation of the 2001 Security Deed and thereby extinguish Deutsche Bank’s interest in the Property.

Deutsche Bank’s argument was predicated on the false assumption that OCGA § 44-14-67 (b) provides the exclusive means for the cancellation or extinguishment of a security deed. But as previously noted, a bona fide purchaser for value is entitled to take property free of any outstanding security interest of which the purchaser had no actual or constructive notice. See Farris, 268 Ga. at 771 (2). And it would produce an anomalous result to interpret Georgia’s recording statutes, including OCGA § 44-14-67 (b), in a manner that would defeat the interests of a bona fide purchaser for value. See Lionheart Legend v. Northwest Bank Minn. Nat. Assn., 253 Ga. App. 663, 667 (560 SE2d 120) (2002) (noting that Georgia’s recording acts are intended to protect bona fide purchasers for value). It follows that because JP Morgan was a bona fide purchaser for value, it was entitled to take the Property free of the 2001 Security Deed, separate and apart from the procedures for cancellation by the clerk of the superior court set forth in OCGA § 44-14-67.

For these combined reasons, the trial court correctly concluded that the uncontroverted evidence of record showed that JP Morgan’s interest in the Property was superior to and not subject to any interest held by Deutsche Bank. The trial court, therefore, committed no error in granting summary judgment in favor of JP Morgan on its claim for a declaratory judgment.

Judgment affirmed. Blackwell, and Dillard, JJ., concur.

[1] Deutsche Bank does not appeal the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment.

[2] OCGA § 14-5-7 (a) provides:

Instruments executed by a corporation conveying an interest in real property, when signed by the president or vice-president and attested or countersigned by the secretary or an assistant secretary or the cashier or assistant cashier of the corporation, shall be conclusive evidence that the president or vice-president of the corporation executing the document does in fact occupy the official position indicated; that the signature of such officer subscribed thereto is genuine; and that the execution of the document on behalf of the corporation has been duly authorized. Any corporation may by proper resolution authorize the execution of such instruments by other officers of the corporation.

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Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment

DOCX Linda Green Had NO AUTHORITY To Sign For MERS 10/08-10/09

DOCX Linda Green Had NO AUTHORITY To Sign For MERS 10/08-10/09

SFF first posted this back on August 26, 2010.

Linda Green is/was an employee of DocX a subsidiary of Lender Processing Services located in Alpharetta, Georgia. Her signature was forged on key sensitive documents relating to county land records.

Below is a document that Shapiro & Fishman filed as a CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE.

What about the Satisfactions? In DOCX’s website they said:

“DOCX has built its solid reputation at not only managing large assignment projects, but satisfactions as well“.

  • Exactly how many documents were signed by Green’s name as VP for MERS between these dates?
  • Who do we contact to make this a nationwide recall alert like the recent “egg recall” containing salmonella?
  • Exactly who is being notified if there is any title issues on your homes?
  • Has there been a recall notice sent to County Recorders on this issue?
  • Are there more VP’s of MERS who had no authority to execute documents?

LPS DOCX LINDA GREEN SHAPIRO

[ipaper docId=44005903 access_key=key-28f23qvartvao40f2b0x height=600 width=600 /]

© 2010-17 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD8 Comments

Response to Request from John O’Brien (Essex, Mass. Co. Register of Deeds) to Mass. AG Martha Coakley to Investigate MERS

Response to Request from John O’Brien (Essex, Mass. Co. Register of Deeds) to Mass. AG Martha Coakley to Investigate MERS

In response to questions regarding the letter from Essex Co. (Mass.) Register of Deeds John O’Brien to the Hon. Martha Coakley, Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, MERS has not seen the letter nor have we been contacted by the Massachusetts attorney general. We will fully cooperate with any inquiries from appropriate authorities.

It is not the case that recording fees are somehow owed or outstanding. MERS pays recording fees when the mortgage is recorded. Fees are paid for a service performed, and if a document is eliminated because it is no longer necessary, no fee is due because there is nothing to record. In fact, MERS greatly reduces the workload of county recorders, resulting in lower operating expenses for the county recorder’s office. Moreover, it would be the borrower, and not the lender, who ultimately pays the costs of recording assignments, either directly or indirectly.

When servicing rights or promissory notes are sold for loans where MERS is not the mortgagee, the usual practice is for the seller to execute and record an instrument assigning the mortgage lien to the purchaser (commonly referred to as an “assignment”). In general, the primary reason assignments are recorded (in cases where MERS is not the mortgagee), stems from the need of servicers to be in the land records to fully administer the loan on behalf of the mortgage loan owner. In which case, the servicer will be assigned the mortgage lien (thus becoming the mortgagee) in order to receive the service of process related to that mortgage loan. When Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is the mortgagee (i.e., holds the legal title to the mortgage lien), there is no need for an assignment of the mortgage lien between its members because MERS remains the mortgagee holding legal title to the mortgage as the common agent for them. It is not the case that the assignments are now being done electronically through the MERS® System instead of being recorded in the land records. The need for an assignment is eliminated because title to the mortgage lien has been grounded in MERS. Moreover, transfers of mortgage notes and servicing rights are not recordable transactions (and have never been reflected in the land records) because they are not a conveyance of an interest in real property that is entitled to be recorded; only the transfer of the lien is a conveyance. The only reason servicers needed to appear in the county land records before MERS was so they could receive legal notices pertaining to the property. Now, MERS as their common agent receives the legal notices. The chain of title starts and stops with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the mortgagee. MERS, as the agent for the note-owner, holds legal title for the note-owner in the land records.

The use of MERS is in compliance with the statutory intent of the state recording acts. When MERS is the mortgagee, the mortgage is recorded at the county land records, thereby putting the public on notice that there is a lien on the property. The MERS® System also complements the county land records by providing additional information that was never intended to be recorded at the county level, namely the information about the mortgage loan servicer, and now, with the addition of MERS® InvestorID, the name of the investor.

Source: MERS

© 2010-17 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.



Posted in STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD2 Comments

GARY DUBIN LAW OFFICES FORECLOSURE DEFENSE HAWAII and CALIFORNIA
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Kenneth Eric Trent, www.ForeclosureDestroyer.com

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