We are all now officially…how do you say this delicately?… Dead Beats now! OMG WTF!

Earthlings, this is not a rich, poor, black, white, hispanic, asian, gay, straight, sick soul issue etc. It’s simply because of a WALL STREET FRAUD THING! Banks are going to go bust and it’s going to hit them in their face!

Oh no I hope the GOP don’t read this one and get all shit faced like the last article because the word on the street is that they are selling these time bombs of things called notes to 3rd party collection agencies who can now come after you for a period of 20 years…Pro Se, Attorney’s make sure you name every single person in court and especially in Federal Bankruptcy Court or you will regret this later! It’s only common sense.

By DAVID STREITFELD Published: July 8, 2010

LOS ALTOS, Calif. — No need for tears, but the well-off are losing their master suites and saying goodbye to their wine cellars.

The housing bust that began among the working class in remote subdivisions and quickly progressed to the suburban middle class is striking the upper class in privileged enclaves like this one in Silicon Valley.

Whether it is their residence, a second home or a house bought as an investment, the rich have stopped paying the mortgage at a rate that greatly exceeds the rest of the population.

More than one in seven homeowners with loans in excess of a million dollars are seriously delinquent, according to data compiled for The New York Times by the real estate analytics firm CoreLogic.

By contrast, homeowners with less lavish housing are much more likely to keep writing checks to their lender. About one in 12 mortgages below the million-dollar mark is delinquent.

Though it is hard to prove, the CoreLogic data suggest that many of the well-to-do are purposely dumping their financially draining properties, just as they would any sour investment.

“The rich are different: they are more ruthless,” said Sam Khater, CoreLogic’s senior economist.

Five properties here in Los Altos were scheduled for foreclosure auctions in a recent issue of The Los Altos Town Crier, the weekly newspaper where local legal notices are posted. Four have unpaid mortgage debt of more than $1 million, with the highest amount $2.8 million.

Not so long ago, said Chris Redden, the paper’s advertising services director, “it was a surprise if we had one foreclosure a month.”

The sheriff in Cook County, Ill., is increasingly in demand to evict foreclosed owners in the upscale suburbs to the north and west of Chicago — like Wilmette, La Grange and Glencoe. The occupants are always gone by the time a deputy gets there, a spokesman said, but just barely.

In Las Vegas, Ken Lowman, a longtime agent for luxury properties, said four of the 11 sales he brokered in June were distressed properties.

“I’ve never seen the wealthy hit like this before,” Mr. Lowman said. “They made their plans based on the best of all possible scenarios — that their incomes would continue to grow, that real estate would never drop. Not many had a plan B.”

The defaulting owners, he said, often remain as long as they can. “They’re in denial,” he said.

Here in Los Altos, where the median home price of $1.5 million makes it one of the most exclusive towns in the country, several houses scheduled for auction were still occupied this week. The people who answered the door were reluctant to explain their circumstances in any detail.

At one house, where the lender was owed $1.3 million, there was a couch out front wrapped in plastic. A woman said she and her husband had lost their jobs and were moving in with relatives. At another house, the family said they were renters. A third family, whose mortgage is $1.6 million, said they would be moving this weekend.

At a vacant house with a pool, where the lender was seeking $1.27 million, a raft and a water gun lay abandoned on the entryway floor.

Lenders are fearful that many of the 11 million or so homeowners who owe more than their house is worth will walk away from them, especially if the real estate market begins to weaken again. The so-called strategic defaults have become a matter of intense debate in recent months.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two quasi-governmental mortgage finance companies that own most of the mortgages in America with a value of less than $500,000, are alternately pleading with distressed homeowners not to be bad citizens and brandishing a stick at them.

In a recent column on Freddie Mac’s Web site, the company’s executive vice president, Don Bisenius, acknowledged that walking away “might well be a good decision for certain borrowers” but argues that those who do it are trashing their communities.

Carol Pogash contributed reporting.

Continue reading at…WSJ

Banks Are Quietly Reestablishing Mortgages That Don’t Require Income Documentation

By Stephane Fitch, Forbes.com

July 8, 2010

All the rage during the peak of the housing boom, these mortgages went by names like “no-doc” (meaning no documentation of income required), “low-doc” or “stated-income” mortgages. In all cases, banks set aside their underwriting standards based on what borrowers could prove they were earning with pay stubs, tax returns and the like. Instead, lenders started trusting borrowers to “forecast” future income and underwrote loans based on those projections (using as a fallback the house itself as collateral).

In the height of the housing boom in 2006 and 2007, low-doc loans accounted for roughly 40% of newly issued mortgages in the U.S., according to mortgage-data firm FirstAmerican CoreLogic. University of Chicago assistant professor Amit Seru says that for subprime loans, the portion exceeded 50%.

Then came the housing collapse, with subprime loan defaults playing a leading role, particularly the low-doc “liar” variety. The delinquency rate for subprime loans reached 39% in early 2009, seven times the rate in 2005, according to LPS Applied Analytics.

Ashlyn Aiko Nelson, a public policy lecturer at Indiana University, studied the low-doc loan craze. She and two of her colleagues concluded that low-doc borrowers exaggerated their incomes by 15% to 19%. “Our sense was that investors knew that people were lying, but figured it was OK because house prices would keep going up and the homeowners could refinance,” says Nelson.

DinSFLA here: Again, who exaggerated their incomes? All of a sudden the consumer is in charge of the loan origination? Who exactly sent the file to the Underwriter? Surely not the unlicensed borrower who’s job is to broker loans!

The most outrageous types of no-doc lending disappeared entirely in 2009. Many mortgage pros say they’re unaware of banks making any low-doc loans in recent months. (A Forbes editor was, however, approached by a leading bank recently with an offer to refinance his home without documenting his income.)

Continue reading…….HERE

Hat Tip to a viewer for writing this as a post submission…

By: DinSFLA 7/8/2010

The Mortgage Foreclosure Maze: Securitization with a Twist

The cases and commentary, the blogs and discussions tend to focus on the legal details. Lawyers without
substantial knowledge of the securitization process attempt to shoehorn the resultant obfuscations into
often-arcane statutes and even more antiquated case law. The result is a bewildering array of conflicting
and confusing case law. Defendants “cannot see the forest for the trees”. This is the intended outcome:
the securitization process practiced by the numerous now defunct fly-by-night originator-securitizers
created a complex maze of internally contradictory documents that only a finance MBA can unravel.

So let us step back and focus on the bigger policy perspective and attendant questions commonly
asked—never definitively answered.

Why do servicers resist loan modifications when the clear economic consequences in terms of net
present value to the “lender” would appear to yield much better results than a foreclosure sale in a
distressed market, less costs of administration? Many focus upon the latter as the driver: the servicers
generate substantial fees in the foreclosure process. The government programs fix upon this aspect and
attempt to sway the servicers’ economic decision by offering a few thousand dollars for modification to
offset the benefits of foreclosure-related fees. But this has not worked—not at all. The reason is clear if
we step back two more steps.

At the inception, the securitizations were mass-produced models of complexity. They are a bewildering
assembly of “boiler plate” common to financings plus special twists that make each one a little different
from the next. These little twists make calculation of the specific payouts across dozens of the trusts
uncommonly difficult. Imagine a servicer with “rights” to service dozens of different trusts with complex
internal ladders of senior/junior tranches that drive re-allocation of payments from one group of
investor payees to another. These are often referred to as “waterfalls”. These waterfalls are driven by
“designed to fail” mortgage loans that go into default. The effect was intended, the triggers to default
were combinations of negative amortization, illusory teaser interest rates and last but not least a very
steep “cliff” that homeowners face when the current payment amounts hit a rest calculation 3-5 years after loan origination. Again the question arises as to why an originator would intentionally create a predictably defective loan. Again the answer lies buried among the boilerplate paragraphs in the seldom-read twists.

In the beginning, the trusts were constructed of ladders of “groups” of mortgage loans [promissory
notes] associated with “classes” of so-called mortgage-backed securities [“MBS”]. The various Classes
are commonly referred to as tranches—using finance terminology that usually referred to different
maturity classes in a conventional securitization pool. For example, a pool of “Group I” mortgage loans
were associated with a pool of “Class I” MBS. The two were theoretically matched: payments in from
homeowners were pooled and paid out to MBS investors. However, these “senior” Class I MBS payouts
were further “supported” by current payments received from mortgage loans associated with junior
classes of MBS. Some refer to this as “over-collateralization”. The investors themselves bought “notes”
issued by the special purpose vehicles [“SPVs”], which could either be affiliates of the originator/securitizer or the so-called trusts. The senior Class I MBS “notes” are payable as ARM investments with periodic payments set to match the full life of the associated mortgage loans. As noted above, the senior Class I MBS investors actually looked to forecast interest rates and the prospect of future payments out of all of the mortgage loans associated with the entire trust—all classes. In other words the senior investors’ returns are virtually guaranteed by all the payments of all the homeowners. There was little risk. These investors paid a premium for these senior classes to refect lack of risk due to over-collateralization, combined with an apparent solid expectation of rising interest rates. The underwriters set up these structures with a view to marketing. The underwriter could approach an investor and tout the safety of seniority and upside of interest rates. A guaranteed “IOU”. Although there were associated mortgage loans, these investors’ due diligence did not require investigation of the quality of the loans in the associated Group I mortgage loans. These investors looked to over-collateralization for payment. The MBS were marketed in this way. Nobody felt a need to look at the quality of these Group loans. That is why the worst loans, the predatory loans, the “air” loans [eg. falsified loans on non-existent condos located above the top story of a high rise] were concealed in the group I loan pool. The concealment was furthered by fairly consistent patterns of failure to file
“mortgage loan schedules” typically required by the securitization documents. These documents—
usually the Indenture—expressly provided for the filings of loan lists detailing aspects of the loans with
both Securities Exchange Commission [“SEC”] and (usually) the Delaware Secretary of State UCC
“financing statement” records. The failures to file loan lists—“missing loan schedules” are observable
from the docket of the SEC for every trust, in tandem with identification of the provision in the
Indentures where a “manually filed” exhibit is referenced. Any losses suffered by owners of these MBS
in 2007-2008 were due to unknowing panic sales or sales that were forced to meet margin requirements
elsewhere. There was no investor fraud associated with these senior classes.

Conversely, some investors in more junior classes received a different marketing pitch and product. For
argument’s sake, let’s say that the trust also included a pool of “Group III” mortgage loans. The Group III
loans are “salt of the earth” loans. These loans are straightforward 30 year fixed rate plain vanilla
conventional loans with no bells and whistles, good documentation, etc. [please note this is a premise
not necessarily a fact]. These Group III loans were superficially associated with junior Class III MBS. The
class III prospective buyers were directed by marketers to look to the associated “safe” mortgage loans
for recovery of investment—and interest. These investors either ignored, overlooked or were misdirected.
They did not take into account the impact of the over-collateralization benefits granted to the
senior Class I MBS holders. These investors needed to examine the quality of the toxic Group I loans that
purportedly supported the senior Class I holders. They did not. They did not even perform the due
diligence necessary to make the simplest of determinations—that in most cases the loan lists were
never filed with the government agencies that the SEC filings represented. These investors were the
teachers and other pension funds. The extent of the fraud on these investor managers was matched
only by their negligence/assumption of risk.

The foregoing sets the stage for the events 2007-8. The original toxic trusts began to really blossom in
2004. They took off. Massive outreach programs were launched to train mortgage loan broker personnel
how to aggressively market the Group I toxic and other loans to “anybody with a pulse”. They needed to
produce loans rapidly to feed the securitization and earn the tax-free SPV premiums. This is well-known.

By 2007, the earliest toxic loans were hitting the “cliff”—facing unsustainable dramatically higher
payment resets. Now the rest of the structure begins to kick in and the motivations of the then creators
and today’s servicers comes into focus.

The Group I loans that go into default cease current payments to the trust. However, the Class I MBS
investors MUST BE PAID. The waterfall kicks in. Current payments by Group III mortgage loan payers are,
in effect, diverted from paying Class III MBS teachers pensions to paying the holders of the Class I MBS
preferred “in the know” underwriter customers. The senior status of the Class I investors went into
effect. As the 2007-2008 debacle gains momentum, more group I mortgages fail and more current
payments are diverted from the Class III investors to Class I investors. Panic sets in and the entire MBS
structure comes under a cloud. In the know bottom feeders buy up Class I MBS for a fraction of their still
solid NPV. Class III investors are coming up short with worse times to come. These MBS sell for pennies.
These investors look to government buyout programs, insurance—anything to recoup.

The disintegration of the group I mortgages accelerates as all approach reset and the economy tanks.
Homeowners lose long-held jobs and must relocate to find new jobs. Their homes are now well below
water, no matter what the original loan to value ratio. They abandon homes to the foreclosure mills.
This is a well known scenario. But the unanswered question remains: What happens to the growing
volumes of incoming foreclosure proceeds? Who gets these monies?

The answer to this seeming imponderable is found in the servicing agreements. The servicer deposits all
receipts from current payments and foreclosure proceeds into a “collection account”. Payments are
made as per the terms of the MBS to the MBS investors from this account. However, the twist is that the
payments to the junior MBS classes, such as the Class III MBS, can be sourced exclusively from current
mortgage loan payments after the re-allocation of payments to the senior Class I MBS. By EOY 2008,
70% of the early 2004 Group I loans have defaulted—no current payments made. This 70% shortfall in
receipts available to the Class I holders is “made up” by shifted funds from Class III holders. At the same
time as the servicer is short-paying the Class III holders, the servicer is literally swamped with incoming
proceeds of foreclosure from all Groups—worst being toxic Group I mortgage loans. The terms of the
trust do not allow the servicer to distribute the foreclosure proceeds. The foreclosure proceeds instead
cause the servicer’s “collection account” balance to grow exponentially. The terms of the servicing
agreement, not surprisingly, contemplate this easily foreseeable eventuality.

Under older less aggressive securitizations and escrow arrangements a common benefit to servicers and
banks alike was the ability to retain the income from investment of the collection account balance. In
the “old days” this balance typically arose from timing differences between escrowed insurance and real
estate tax receipts versus payments to insurers and county governments. However, the same rules were
applied to these trusts. The balance of the entire trust’s loan amounts outstanding was and is shrinking.
Simultaneously the servicer’s related “collection account” is burgeoning with foreclosure proceeds.
Theoretically these proceeds must be held intact until the amounts are called upon to make distributions in the distant future to the Class I senior MBS holders. So after the Class III salt of the earth payers have themselves failed or refinanced, the proceeds might be needed. The servicer is stuck with large cash surpluses in the collection account. Once again by careful forethought the servicing agreement provides that the servicer may invest the proceeds of the surplus [foreclosure proceeds] in some worthwhile investment of several types typically set out in the servicing agreement. But there is no oversight and only in years’ far in the future will failed or fraudulent investments be felt by the Class I investors for whose purported benefit these sums are maintained. However, the servicer is expressly entitled to retain the entire income stream from this collapsed structure.

This series of events explains why servicers are REALLY anxious to foreclose—even if the decision
appears from the outside to make no sense. It explains why servicers have paid large sums for the
“servicing rights”—which most unknowing souls believe relates primarily to skimming fees. The true
incentive for the servicer is control over the ever-growing pool of foreclosure proceeds—similar to a life
estate. This is the last step on a long trail of American tears. It appears superficially to be legal but for
the original deceptions. That is why the worst trusts were made by fly by nights and they conveniently
file for bankruptcy. By connecting the servicers today to the original trust structure planning, the
servicers be deprived of their ill gotten gains and justice be done. This cycle will repeat itself absent
intercession by government.

© 2010 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA

Scribd

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [103] as to AMC and grants Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [103] as to Ameriquest and Deutsche Bank, finding both Ameriquest and Deutsche Bank liable for rescission, statutory damages, and costs and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff is given until October 14, 2008, in which to submit supplemental briefing, consistent with this decision, on the appropriate damage calculations and how to properly unwind the transaction for rescission purposes.

Ameriquest and Deutsche Bank will have until October 25, 2008, in which to respond to 12 In Payton, the court concluded that statutory damages could not be imposed on the assignee because the violation was not apparent on its face, but that an award of attorney’s fees against the assignee was appropriate because the plaintiff had brought a successful action for rescission. 2003 WL 22349118, at *7-*8.

Case 1:05-cv-00389 Document 143 Filed 09/30/2008

Plaintiff’s calculation of damages and briefing on rescission. Finally, the Court denies
Defendants’ motion to strike portions of Plaintiff’s renewed motion for summary judgment [113]
as moot in light of the discussion above.

Scribd

Frankenstein real estate market – $3.5 trillion in commercial real estate debt and $10.3 trillion in residential real estate debt. Will we reach a 50 percent underwater market where 25 million Americans sit in homes worth less than their mortgage?

The real estate market has morphed into a beast that is largely sinking the overall economy into the ground.  If we combine the commercial real estate market ($3.5 trillion in debt) with residential outstanding mortgages ($10.3 trillion) we arrive at a figure that nears the annual GDP of our country.  What makes the figure even more troubling is the amount of leverage found in the real estate market.  Many of these loans will default yet banks are maintaining the notion that at some point par value will be reached; for many the par value scenario is the worst case they have mapped out, and this is highly optimistic.  We have created a real estate Frankenstein that now has a mind of its own and will do everything it can to stay afloat going forward, even at the expense of the real economy.  In fact, the real estate monster thinks it is the economy.

There is a flip side to housing values falling which seems to be ignored since most of the mainstream rhetoric is guided by the FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) experts.  The most obvious benefit is those looking to buy their first home don’t need to put themselves into so much debt that they risk their entire financial future for a home.  The next subtle change is the amount of money diverted from housing related spending to other sectors of the economy.  This last change will take time to sink into the overall economy but there is definitely a benefit of moving away from an economy highly dependent on Wall Street finance and real estate.

If we look at the current nationwide situation, the amount of distressed loans is stunning:

I think that the above disaster in distressed mortgages is causing very little reaction because we have somehow adapted to the current shocking situation.  Over 10 percent of all U.S. mortgages are at least one payment behind and another 4 percent are already in the process of foreclosure.  This figure is incredible given the entire mortgage market is made up of over 51 million active mortgages.  In 2007 if you were to tell someone that prices in California would fall by 50 percent (even 10 percent) many would have ignored you.  Now, it is standard practice for the market.

As a country we are much too reliant on real estate.  Commercial real estate is the next tragic saga in the RE bubble bursting with prices already falling by 42 percent.  At one point, CRE values in the U.S. were up to $6.5 trillion (now this was a rough generous estimate at the time).  Today, CRE values are down closer to $3 to $3.5 trillion; this is roughly the same amount of CRE loans outstanding.  This has pushed defaults through the roof:

The exponential rise is cause for serious concern.  There is little energy or political will to bailout the enormous CRE market.  This probably won’t stop the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury to game the system yet again and put taxpayers on the hook.  They created this massive monster and now want the public to fight it off with pitchforks.  The above chart is disturbing and the amount of bank failures we are seeing is directly related to the above trend.  Many smaller banks are deep in the trenches with CRE debt and much of this is now going bad.  How many strip malls do we really need?  Maybe having 20 Taco Bells in a one mile radius probably isn’t such a good idea.  Many of the commercial projects were built in the anticipation of sky high residential prices to justify their absurd underwriting expectations.  The above results have no excuse and are largely a reflection of massive delusional speculation in all things real estate.

Now that expectations are coming more into line and the fantasy world of Alt-A, subprime, and option ARM loans are behind us, most people have to qualify to get a loan with actual real income which many are now finding less of.  Banks lending virtually all government money, are now beholden to stricter (aka basic due diligence) in order to give out loans.  Yet if we look at the negative equity situation, the real estate monster grows scarier:

Over 20 million mortgage holders are underwater.  It is amazing that a few years ago, Deutsche Bank estimated that at the ultimate trough of the housing market, nearly half of all mortgages would be underwater.  This “doomsday” scenario seemed extremely farfetched.  Today, another 10 percent nationwide price decline would put us there.  Even without prices declining further, having 20 million Americans underwater is not a good sign going forward.  You figure over 7 million people are one payment behind or in foreclosure.  But what about the other 13 million?  This enormous group is basically a large cohort of renters but in a worse financial situation.  They are stuck.

Continue reading…DoctorHousingBubble