It’s ironic that the ENTIRE WORLD views it this way…Yet there is a few as we know it, that just turn their heads completely to this massive fraud! Unreal…

Posted Jul 01, 2010 08:00am EDT by Aaron Task

Day one of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s two-day hearing on AIG derivatives contracts featured testimony from Joseph Cassano, the former head of AIG’s financial products unit. Goldman Sachs president Gary Cohn was also on the Hill.

Meanwhile, the Democrats are still trying to salvage the regulatory reform bill, with critical support from Senator Scott Brown (R-Mass.) reportedly still uncertain.

According to Howard Davidowitz of Davidowitz & Associates, what connects the hearings and the Reg reform debate is the lack of focus on the real underlying cause of the financial crisis: Fraud.

“It was a massive fraud… a gigantic Ponzi Scheme, a lie and a fraud,” Davidowitz says of Wall Street circa 2007. “The whole thing was a fraud and it gets back to the accountants valuing the assets incorrectly.”

Because accountants and auditors allowed Wall Street firms to carry assets at “completely fraudulent” valuations, he says the industry looked hugely profitable and was able to use borrowed funds to make leveraged bets on all sorts of esoteric instruments. “Their bonuses were based on profits they never made and the leverage they never could have gotten if the numbers were right – no one would’ve given them the money in their right mind,” Davidowitz says.

To date, the accounting and audit firms have escaped any serious repercussions from the credit crisis, a stark difference to the corporate “death sentence” that befell Arthur Anderson for its alleged role in the Enron scandal.

To Davidowitz, that’s perhaps the greatest outrage of all: “Where were the accountants?,” he asks. “They did nothing, checked nothing, agreed to everything” and collected millions in fees while “shaking hands with the CEO.”

Source: Yahoo Finance

by Thomas MacMillan | Jul 1, 2010 4:16 pm NewHavenIndependent

While working to earn votes in her pursuit of a state representative seat, Debra Hauser has been involved in another campaign—to save her East Rock home.

“My husband had a failed business,” Hauser said on Thursday afternoon, when asked about the circumstances of foreclosure proceedings against her. She said she has recently come to an agreement with her lender to pay back the money her family owes.

Hauser (pictured), a psychologist, is one of two Democrats running for New Haven’s only open state legislative seat, representing the 96th General Assembly district. The district includes parts of Hamden and parts of New Haven, including East Rock, Fair Haven, and Wooster Square. Her opponent for the Democratic nomination is East Rock Alderman Roland Lemar.

Foreclosure proceedings on her house at 396 Livingston St. (pictured) in East Rock were initiated in November 2009. Hauser’s lawyer, James Brownstein, stated on Thursday that a settlement with the bank had been reached, but that the final settlement paperwork has not yet been filed.

An online database lists the value of Hauser’s home and property at $631,890.

According to the foreclosure case file in the clerk’s office at Superior Court on Church Street, New Alliance Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings against Hauser in November 2009. The complaint lists Hauser, her husband Jack Hauser, and Connecticut Weight And Wellness, LLC as defendants. Jack Hauser is the principal of CT Weight And Wellness.

According to the complaint, the Hausers mortgaged their home for a $500,000 loan to CT Weight And Wellness in October 2007. By June 2009, they had defaulted on the mortgage. In October 2009, the bank sent a written demand for payment. When no payment was made, the bank filed for strict foreclosure and breach of contract against Jack Hauser and CT Weight and Wellness.

Marshal Peter Criscuolo earned $108.80 for serving the Hausers’ lawyer with foreclosure papers on Nov. 12, 2009.

Jack Hauser filed for bankruptcy on Nov. 30, 2009.

Over the next six months, lawyers for the Hausers and the bank traded repeated motions asking for information and objecting to the questions being asked. On April 26, in a filing by lawyers for New Alliance, the bank charged that “The Defendants are guilty of repeated vexatious and dilatory tactics, which have substantially delayed this action and forced the Plaintiff to incur unnecessary attorneys fees.”

The same document accused the Hausers of using a “dragnet method of requesting information in hopes of obtaining a defense.” The bank objected to what it characterized as overly broad discovery requests by the Hausers’ lawyer.

“I didn’t think they were dilatory,” said Brownstein, Hauser’s lawyer, on Thursday. The bank’s charges are standard rhetoric between lawyers, he said.

Hauser said she and her attorney cooperated fully with the foreclosure case.

On June 3, the judge granted the bank’s motion to default because of the Hausers’ failure to plead. Brownstein said on Thursday that the Hausers had not responded to the complaint with a plea because they had been on the verge of a settlement.

Continue…HERE

This Judge sees it exactly what it is:

LARRY A. JONES, J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)
LARRY A. JONES, J., DISSENTING:

{¶ 70} I respectfully dissent from my learned colleagues in the majority.
I believe there is evidence in the record to support reversal.

{¶ 71} In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jordan, Cuyahoga App. No. 91675,
2009-Ohio-1092, this court held that Civ.R. 17 is not applicable when the
plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the case, and thus does not have
standing to do so. Id. at 21, citing Northland Ins. Co. v. Illuminating Co.,
Ashtabula App. Nos. 2002-A-0058 and 2002-A-0066, 2004-Ohio-1529, at ¶17.

{¶ 72} In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Byrd, 178 Ohio App.3d 285,
2008-Ohio-4603, Wells Fargo, the plaintiff, filed a complaint for foreclosure on
January 23, 2007. Id. at ¶2. In Byrd, as in the case at bar, Wells Fargo
stated in the complaint that it was the holder and owner of the mortgage and
the Note. Id. Wells Fargo was assigned the Note and mortgage on March 2,
2007, after the complaint had been filed. Id. at ¶3. The Byrd court
concluded, “[u]nless a party has some real interest in the subject matter of
the action, that party will lack standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the
court.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶10.

{¶ 73} Here, MERS, as nominee, filed its complaint on May 21, 2004.
MERS filed an assignment on July 2, 2004, which was signed on May 26,
2004. The facts in this matter fit squarely with the facts in both the Byrd
and Jordan opinions. Byrd and Jordan held that a party must, at the time
of filing, have a bona fide interest in the litigation in order to invoke the
court’s jurisdiction. The only interest MERS had at the time of filing in this
case was its “nominee” status under the mortgage. MERS attempted to
correct this by an assignment of the Note after the date of filing the
complaint. However, MERS was never the Note holder. See, R.C.
1303.22(A); R.C. 1303.31.

{¶ 74} After the alleged assignment was signed, MERS was only a
nominal party. After the loan closed, and long before litigation commenced,
Bank One sold the loan to Fannie Mae. MERS did not bear the loss upon
default. In fact, MERS is not the beneficial owner of the Note and only
stands in the shoes as servicer. If the Property were to be sold at a sheriff’s
sale, MERS would have no right to determine the amount of the bid, nor
would it be able to take title.

{¶ 75} Appellants did not waive their right to argue standing, and
plaintiff filed the assignment after it filed the complaint. Indeed, appellee
admits that the Note was not assigned until May 26, 2004, five days after
MERS commenced suit.

{¶ 76} MERS did not maintain a bona fide interest in the real property
or litigation and is therefore not the real party in interest. Accordingly, I
would find MERS lacked standing and could not properly invoke jurisdiction.

{¶ 77} Accordingly, I would sustain appellants’ first assignment of error.

Appendix A

Appellants’ Assignments of Error:

I. “The trial court erred as a matter of law and to the prejudice of appellants in
finding that MERS maintained standing to properly invoke the trial court’s
jurisdiction.”

II. “The trial court erred as a matter of law and to the prejudice of appellants in
failing to conduct an independent review of the evidence as mandated under
Civ.R. 53 and therefore abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate’s
decision.”

III. “The trial court erred as a matter of law and to the prejudice of appellants in
granting judgment to MERS and against appellants on their counterclaims.”

IV. “The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in its
determination of the admissibility of evidence

Scribd

Most of us can make the assumption that instead of Mr. Gaupp place we might as well enter MERS in his place right?

The real issue with the case as stated is that DBNT magically appears!  Where is the assignment from Ameriquest to *them*??  (I’d like to see the signatures on the note!)

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, As Trustee of Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass Through Certificates, Series 2004-X3, Under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement Dated as of September 1, 2004, Without Recourse, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DAVID J. GAUPP, ALEXANDRA C. GAUPP, NATHAN PARTON and SPOUSE OF NATHAN PARTON, REBEKAH J. BARTON and SPOUSE OF REBEKAH J. BARTON, WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., and PARTIES IN POSSESSION,, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 0-272/09-0700.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Filed June 30, 2010.

Matthew E. Laughlin and Sarah K. Franklin of Davis Brown Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.

Charles R. Hannan, IV, Council Bluffs, for appellees David J. Gaupp and Alexandra C. Gaupp.

Aaron W. Rodenburg, Council Bluffs, for appellees G&G Properties and Troy Granger.

Brian D. Nolan of Nolan, Olson & Stryker, P.C., L.L.O., Omaha, Nebraska, for appellees Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Nathan Parton, Spouse of Nathan Parton, Rebekah J. Barton, and Spouse of Rebekah J. Barton.

Alexandra Gaupp, Council Bluffs, appellee pro se.

David Gaupp, Council Avenue, appellee pro se.

Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Danilson, JJ.

VOGEL, P.J.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In 2002, David Gaupp and Troy Granger formed a partnership, G & G Properties. On March 23, 2002, Gaupp and Granger purchased a duplex to use as a rental home for their partnership. Charles and Betty Bowes conveyed the property to “David J. Gaupp and Troy Granger” by warranty deed, which was recorded on April 9, 2002. On July 3, 2002, Gaupp, his wife, Alexandra Gaupp, and Granger conveyed the property to “G & G Properties” by warranty deed, which was recorded on September 24, 2002.

On December 8, 2003, Gaupp borrowed $162,000 from Ameriquest Mortgage Company (Ameriquest), which was evidenced by a promissory note and signed by Gaupp individually. In spite of the fact that Gaupp was not the titleholder of the property, the note purported to be secured by a mortgage on the property showing the borrower/mortgagor as “David J. Gaupp, married,” and bearing the signatures of “David J. Gaupp” and “Alexandra C. Gaupp,”^{[ 1 ]} but the acknowledgment is only as to “David J. Gaupp” and was notarized by a Nebraska notary public. The mortgage instrument was recorded on January 8, 2004. Ameriquest subsequently sold and assigned the mortgage to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank).

Although G & G Properties was the record titleholder of the property, the Gaupps and Granger subsequently executed two deeds regarding the property. On December 31, 2003, a “Corrected Warranty Deed” attempted to convey the property from “David J. Gaupp and Alexandra C. Gaupp” and “Troy S. Granger” to “David J. Gaupp and Alexandra C. Gaupp,” which was then recorded on January 8, 2004. On February 2, 2005, the Gaupps attempted to convey the real estate from “David J. Gaupp and Alexandra C. Gaupp” to “G & G Properties” by a quitclaim deed, which was recorded on July 28, 2005. In David Gaupp’s deposition testimony, he explained that these conveyances were done so that Granger’s name would not appear in the title, in an effort to keep Granger’s child support obligations from being a lien against the real estate.

In April 2006, G & G Properties agreed to sell the real estate. On May 5, 2006, “G & G Properties” conveyed the property to “Nathan D. Parton, a single person and Rebekah J. Barton, a single person” by warranty deed, which was recorded on May 19, 2006.^{[ 2 ]} In order to purchase the property, the Partons obtained a loan from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) that was secured by a mortgage on the real estate, which was recorded on May 19, 2006. G & G Properties received proceeds in the amount of $188,273.02 from the sale of the real estate.

At some point, Gaupp defaulted on the note held by Deutsche Bank. On January 30, 2007, Deutsche Bank filed a petition to foreclose its mortgage, seeking judgment in rem against the real estate in the amount of $154,147.19, plus attorney’s fees, costs, and interest, naming the Gaupps as defendants, parties in possession. On March 16, 2007, Deutsche Bank amended its petition to add the Partons and Wells Fargo as additional defendants. On November 1, 2007, the Partons filed a third-party complaint against G & G properties and Granger.

On October 21, 2008, the Partons and Wells Fargo filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that (1) the mortgage held by Deutsche Bank was invalid; and (2) the mortgage held by Deutsche Bank could not be foreclosed because the Partons were bona fide purchasers for value. On February 12, 2009, the district court issued its ruling finding that the Gaupps and Granger conveyed their interest in the property to G & G Properties on July 3, 2002, and when G & G Properties recorded the deed on September 24, 2002, it became the record titleholder. Gaupp did not have any interest in the property when he executed the mortgage in favor of Ameriquest/Deutsche Bank and after the mortgage was executed, Gaupp never obtained title to the property. G & G Properties did not convey the property to anyone prior to May 19, 2006, when the Partons purchased the property. As a result, the mortgage held by Deutsche Bank was “null and void.” The district court granted the Partons’ and Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the petition for foreclosure. Deutsche Bank appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; City of Johnston v. Christenson, 718 N.W.2d 290, 296 (Iowa 2006). Summary judgment should be granted when the entire record demonstrates there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3).

Thus, on review, we examine the record before the district court to decide whether any material fact is in dispute, and if not, whether the district court correctly applied the law. In considering the record, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment.

Shriver v. City of Okoboji, 567 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Iowa 1997) (internal citations and quotation omitted).

III. Analysis.

Deutsche Bank asserts that the district court erred in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The parties do not dispute that at the time Gaupp executed the promissory note and mortgage, he did not hold title to the property and that G & G Properties was the record titleholder. Deutsche Bank cannot avoid the fundamental principal that a party that has no interest in a particular piece of real property cannot validly mortgage that property. See, e.g., Lee v. Lee, 207 Iowa 882, 885, 223 N.W. 888, 890 (Iowa 1929) (holding a mortgage invalid because the mortgagor had no interest in the property at the time the mortgage was given); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 111, at 102-03 (2009) (discussing that “[o]ne who has no ownership interest in property has no right to mortgage it” and if one does so, the mortgage creates no interest in the property). At the time Gaupp obtained the loan from Ameriquest, he did not have any interest in the property and therefore, the mortgage instrument attempting to secure the promissory note was invalid.

Deutsche Bank argues that Gaupp acquired title to the property on December 31, 2003, when the Gaupps and Granger executed the “Corrected Warranty Deed,” which Deutsche Bank further argues resulted in the mortgage becoming valid.^{[ 3 ]} However, this argument fails because Gaupp did not acquire an interest in the property when the “Corrected Warranty Deed” was executed on December 31, 2003. On July 3, 2002, the Gaupps and Granger conveyed the property to G & G Properties. After this conveyance, Gaupp had no interest in the property and could not convey the property to anyone. See Iowa Code § 557.3 (2007) (“Every conveyance of real estate passes all the interest of the grantor therein, unless a contrary intent can be reasonably inferred from the terms used.”). After the July 3, 2002 conveyance, only G & G Properties was able to convey title to the property. Any such attempt by Gaupp to do so would be and was invalid as he was no longer the titleholder. Therefore, the attempts by the Gaupps and Granger to convey the property on December 31, 2003, and February 2, 2005, were not valid conveyances.^{[ 4 ]} Additionally, because the invalid conveyances were outside the chain of title, they were stray deeds when recorded. See William Stoebuck and Dale Whitman, The Law of Property § 11.11 (3^rd ed. 2000) (“The term `chain of title’ is a shorthand way of describing the collection of documents which one can find by the use of the ordinary techniques of title search.”); 1 C.J.S. Abstracts of Title § 15, at 320 n.8 (2009) (“Instrument executed by owner [that] is recorded before acquisition or after relinquishment of title by owner is outside chain of title . . . .”).^{[ 5 ]} Title remained with G & G Properties from July 3, 2002 until May 5, 2006, when G & G Properties conveyed its solely held interest in the property to the Partons. Therefore the chain of title went from G & G Properties to the Partons. Gaupp did not have title to the property when he executed the mortgage instrument now held by Deutsche Bank nor did he subsequently obtain title. We affirm the district court’s findings and ruling.

AFFIRMED.

This copy provided by Leagle, Inc.