2010 June | FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA

Archive | June, 2010

MOTION FOR DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT – FORECLOSURE CONSEQUENCES

MOTION FOR DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT – FORECLOSURE CONSEQUENCES

Thank you Richard Zaretsky, Esq., for putting this out for us to review!

This is rare but one can never be too certain…

Today I received a call from one of my blog readers asking me for help with a pleading he received months ago, that is now being scheduled for a hearing in August.  This is a prime example of why Strategic Defaults or just walking away from a property can be so dangerous.  The pleading is a Motion for Deficiency Judgment from a foreclosure judgment and sale that occurred but was (like most other foreclosure sales) acquired by the lender for a nominal bid.  I and many others have been writing about this forgotten liability of borrowers.

Now here is an example of just what we said would happen, happening:

Motion for Deficiency page 1

Motion for Deficiency page 2

How the deficiency judgment hearing proof is presented to the court is discussed in my previous article on Foreclosure Deficiency Judgments and my original Back to Basics article.  The essence is that a deficiency judgment to be issued must go through a hearing where the lender submits proof (evidence) of the value of the property. The borrower has the right to refute the values. Getting to the number works like this:

To figure get the balance of the monies the bank must go back to court to ask the court to award it a “Deficiency Judgment”.  The amount is what is in question and the amount is measured using various rules.  Let’s assume the bank bid $100.  The court is not going to say that the house was worth $100 and $324,900 is still owed.  For our assumption we will say that the property is worth $200,000 and the foreclosure judgment is for $325,000.  That means the court will ask for an appraisal of the property as of the day of the foreclosure sale and the judge will likely give it that value.  So it will be the appraisal value less the judgment amount which will equal the Deficiency Judgment.  If the appraisal is $250,000, the Deficiency Judgment would be $75,000.   Now if there was real bidding at the foreclosure sale the judge could consider that bidding and instead adopt the selling price under the competitive bidding process that occurred at the foreclosure sale.  Then the Deficiency Judgment would be the difference from the foreclosure judgment and the winning bid amount. If the competitive bid was $240,000, then the Deficiency Judgment would be $85,000.

Back to the real life person with his August hearing – we suggested that before he retain us to negotiate with the lender on the deficiency amount and terms as a possible settlement without going to court, he try it himself.  We also suggested he speak with a bankruptcy attorney as there may be some planning opportunities available for him before the judgment is entered – if the negotiations don’t work.

Remember, a money judgment – that is what a Deficiency Judgment is – gives the judgment holder broad powers to collect the money, including garnishment and attachment of assets (like bank accounts).  Fraudulent Transfer Acts in the various states will block or take back transfers made to “hide” money from creditors.  See the article at CNN Money.

Copyright 2010 Richard P. Zaretsky, Esq.

Be sure to contact your own attorney for your state laws, and always consult your own attorney on any legal decision you need to make.  This article is for information purposes and is not specific advice to any one reader.

Richard Zaretsky, Esq., RICHARD P. ZARETSKY P.A. ATTORNEYS AT LAW, 1655 PALM BEACH LAKES BLVD, SUITE 900, WEST PALM BEACH, FLORIDA 33401, PHONE 561 689 6660  RPZ99@Florida-Counsel.comFLORIDA BAR BOARD CERTIFIED IN REAL ESTATE LAW – We assist Brokers and Sellers with Short Sales and Modifications and Consult with Brokers and Sellers Nationwide!  Shortsales@Florida-Counsel.com New Website www.Florida-Counsel.com.

© 2010-12 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in deficiency judgement, deficiency judgment, foreclosure, foreclosures, lawsuit0 Comments

Introducing…KnowX

Introducing…KnowX

Via: Chink in the Amor

We’ve talked in the past about Dueling Databases and the havoc it can play in daily economic considerations.  We’ve seen the havoc which occurs when unrecorded assignments are allowed to have parity with assignments recorded at the courthouse.  We’ve also seen how important it is for interested third parties to be able to ascertain specific ownership.  We’ve seen how MERS is keeping a very private database and only allowing peeks into it when they deem it appropriate.  We’ve seen how you can’t rely on them for accurate information.

There is a persistent rumour circulating amongst the people who are in the trenches of this fight for the sanctity of law over corporotism.  It just won’t go away and it keeps popping its head up to the point now where I feel compelled to mention it.  So far,  there is no solid proof of it but we are looking.  It’s important information.  The rumour is that when the title company filed your paperwork from the purchase of your home,  they filed a duplicate set of paperwork for the MERS system which re-created you inside the MERS network.  In other words,  there are now two of you.  At least. Continue Reading

© 2010-12 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, knowx, MERS, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC.0 Comments

Trespassing, Breach of Contract Claim: DIXON v. MIDLAND MORTGAGE CO.

Trespassing, Breach of Contract Claim: DIXON v. MIDLAND MORTGAGE CO.

RON DIXON, As Conservator for Beatrice Jiggetts, Plaintiff,
v.
MIDLAND MORTGAGE CO., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 09-1789 (RWR).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

June 29, 2010.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RICHARD W. ROBERTS, District Judge.

Plaintiff Beatrice Jiggetts brings this action against the defendant, Midland Mortgage Company (“Midland”), alleging claims of trespass, conversion, and breach of contract arising out of Midland changing the locks and foreclosing on her home. Midland moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that its home entry was authorized because Jiggetts defaulted on her mortgage and abandoned her home, that the law of conversion applies to personal property and not real property, and that the complaint fails to allege the elements of a contract. Because conversion applies only to chattel, Midland’s motion to dismiss Jiggetts’s conversion claim will be granted. However, because the complaint amply states a cause of action for both trespass and breach of contract and Midland does not show it was authorized to enter Jiggetts’s home, Midland’s motion to dismiss Jiggetts’s trespass and breach of contract claims will be denied.

BACKGROUND

Jiggetts co-owned with Charles L. Chesley a single-family home located in Washington, D.C. (Compl. ¶ 4.) For the past several years, however, Jiggetts has lived in a nursing home because she suffers from dementia. While Jiggetts was in the nursing home, Chesley was to make the monthly mortgage payments on the property, but failed to do so. (Id. ¶ 5.) Thus, Midland chose to foreclose. (Id. ¶ 6.)

Jiggetts alleges that, on approximately July 16, 2009, her conservator, Ron Dixon, came to an agreement with Midland to postpone the foreclosure sale until August 19, 2009 in order to give Dixon an opportunity to secure a buyer for the house and avoid foreclosure. (Id. ¶ 10.) Midland then scheduled a foreclosure sale for August 19, 2009. (Id. ¶ 7.) During the last week of July, Dixon found a potential buyer and asked Chesley to prepare the property for the potential buyer’s visit. (Id. ¶ 11.) When Chesley arrived, he discovered that the locks on the property had been changed. (Id.) Chesley and Dixon contacted Midland, and Midland’s attorney told them that the deed of trust authorized Midland’s entry into the property. (Id.) Midland ultimately gave Dixon the combination to unlock the house. (Id. ¶ 12.)

Jiggetts brought suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia alleging that Midland’s entry into the property and alteration of the locks constituted trespass and conversion (id. ¶¶ 14-19) and a breach of contract. (Id. ¶¶ 21-24.) Midland removed this action to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and now moves to dismiss, arguing that it cannot be held liable for trespass because it had a superior possessory interest in the property, that the law of conversion applies to personal property only, and that Jiggetts has failed to state a claim for breach of contract.[ 1 ]

DISCUSSION

“`To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, acceptable as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”‘” Anderson v. Holder, 691 F. Supp. 2d 57, 61 (D.D.C. 2010) (brackets omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007))). A court considering a 12(b)(6) motion takes all factual assertions within the complaint as true and gives a plaintiff “`the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Id. (quoting Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). Those inferences, however, must be supported by the facts alleged, and merely asserting legal conclusions as facts will not suffice. Id. “[A] court `may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [a court] must take judicial notice.’” U.S. ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 2d 129, 133 (D.D.C. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). A document outside the complaint may be considered on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) if it is “referred to in the complaint and [is] integral to” the plaintiff’s claim. Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

I. TRESPASS CLAIM

Under District of Columbia law, “`[a] trespass is an unauthorized entry onto property that results in interference with the property owner’s possessory interest therein.’” Sarete, Inc. v. 1344 U St. Ltd. P’ship, 871 A.2d 480, 490 (D.C. 2005) (quoting Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 64A.02[1] at 64A-16 (Michael A. Wolf ed., 2000)). Jiggetts contends that Midland trespassed on her property when it entered her property and changed the locks. Midland does not dispute that it entered the property and changed the locks. Its sole argument against Jiggetts’s trespass claim is that its entry was lawful because Jiggetts abandoned the property. (Def.’s Mem. at 3-4.)

Midland’s argument is misguided, however. In the District of Columbia, abandonment is defined as an anticipatory breach wherein a tenant “`leaves the premises vacant with the avowed intention not to be bound by [the] lease.’” Jones v. Cain, 804 A.2d 322, 331 (D.C. 2001) (quoting Simpson v. Lee, 499 A.2d 889, 894 (D.C. 1985)). The complaint does not allege or concede facts reflecting that Jiggetts intended to abandon her property. Instead, the complaint reflects that Jiggetts had every intention of maintaining the monthly mortgage payments. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 5 (“While [Jiggetts was] in the nursing home, Chesley was supposed to be making the monthly mortgage payments on the subject property.”).) Moreover, while Midland claimed that the deed of trust authorized Midland to enter the property upon default (see id. ¶ 11), Midland has not presented any copy of the deed of trust mentioned in the complaint or any other agreement granting it the right to enter the property upon Jiggetts’s failure to make the mortgage payments. Because Jiggetts has pled that Midland entered her property without consent and changed the locks, preventing entry by the owners, and Midland has failed to show it was otherwise authorized to take that action, Midland’s motion to dismiss Jiggetts’s trespass claim will be denied.

II. CONVERSION CLAIM

Under District of Columbia law, conversion is defined as the “`intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.’” Edmonds v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 2d 196, 202 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Fed. Fire Protection Corp. v. J.A. Jones/Tompkins Builders, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 87, 92 n.3 (D.D.C. 2003)). A chattel is defined as “`[m]ovable or transferable property; personal property; . . . [or] a physical object . . . not the subject matter of real property.’” Doe ex rel. Doe v. Fed. Express Corp., 571 F. Supp. 2d 330, 333 (D. Conn. 2008) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)) (first alteration in original). Jiggetts argues that the defendant “converted [her] leasehold interest, in the subject property, to [its] own interest” by entering the property and changing the locks. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.) However, the leasehold interest in her home is the subject matter of real property and is not chattel, see District Of Columbia v. Place, 892 A.2d 1108, 1112 (D.C. 2006), and the law of conversion does not apply to real property. Midland’s motion to dismiss Jiggetts’s conversion claim will be granted.

III. BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM

A contract is formed when there is an offer, an acceptance, and valuable consideration, see Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 311 (D.C. 2000), and a contract can be made orally or in writing. See Ames v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., Civil Action No. 06-2039 (RMC), 2007 WL 1404443, at *2 (D.D.C. May 11, 2007). The complaint alleges that Midland “agreed to postpone the foreclosure until August 19, 2009, in order to allow [Dixon] to attempt to sell the property to avoid the foreclosure” and that the defendant breached an agreement when it entered the property and changed the locks. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 22.) Midland contends that the breach of contract claim must be dismissed because “plaintiff attaches no proof of such an agreement to the Complaint.” (Def.’s Mem. at 6.)

On a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff is not required to prove each element of her claim. Instead, she is merely required to plead facts that, if proven, would establish the elements of her claim. Moreover, while Jiggetts fails to plead facts reflecting that Midland breached an agreement to postpone the foreclosure sale because she does not allege that a foreclosure sale took place before August 19, 2009, Jiggetts’s complaint can be read to state a claim that Midland breached the parties’ mortgage agreement. The complaint refers generally to a contract and states that Midland breached an agreement by breaking into and changing the locks on the doors. (Compl. ¶ 22.) Further, Jiggetts’s opposition states that “[w]hen the Defendant changed the locks . . . without an order of the court to do so, it was a breach of their mortgage contract[.]” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 4.) Because a court is to grant the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences derived from the facts alleged, and the complaint — read in the light most favorable to Jiggetts — contains sufficient factual matter to state a claim for breach of the parties’ mortgage agreement, Midland’s motion to dismiss Jiggetts’s breach of contract claim will be denied.[ 2 ]

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Because conversion applies only to chattel, Midland’s motion to dismiss Jiggetts’s conversion claim will be granted. However, the complaint alleges a trespass and, read in the light most favorable to Jiggetts, a breach of contract claim. Thus, Midland’s motion to dismiss Jiggetts’s trespass and breach of contract claims will be denied. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Midland’s motion [5] to dismiss be, and hereby is, GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Jiggetts’s conversion claim is dismissed, but Midland’s motion is denied in all other respects.

1. Midland also argues that its motion should be granted because Jiggetts’s opposition brief was not timely filed. (Def. Midland Mortgage Co.’s Reply to Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) Although Jiggetts’s opposition was filed beyond the time prescribed by the local civil rules, the circumstances here support abiding by the general judicial preference for resolving disputes on their merits rather than dismissing them based on technicalities. See, e.g., Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2001).
2. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages on each of her claims (Compl. ¶¶ 16, 19, 24), which the defendant opposes. In the District of Columbia, “punitive damages are not available [w]here the basis of a complaint is . . . breach of contract[,]” Caston v. Butler, Civil Action No. 08-1656 (JDB), 2010 WL 2505591, at *1 (D.D.C. June 22, 2010) (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), unless the plaintiff alleges that the breach of contract “`merges with, and assumes the character of a willful tort[.]‘” Cambridge Holdings Group, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 357 F. Supp. 2d 89, 97 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1958)). Further, in order to recover punitive damages, “[plaintiff] must `prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the [defendant] committed a tortious act, and by clear and convincing evidence that the act was accompanied by conduct and a state of mind evincing malice or its equivalent.’” Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929, 938 (D.C. 1995)). The tortious act must be accompanied by “fraud, ill will, recklessness, wantonness, oppressiveness, wilful disregard of the plaintiff’s right, or other circumstances tending to aggravate the injury.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Jiggetts alleges that the defendant’s trespass was “willful, wanton, intentional, [and] malicious” (Compl. ¶ 15), and that her breach of contract claim “merges with and assumes the character of a willful tort.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Such allegations, if proven, could entitle her to punitive damages. Thus, defendant’s motion to dismiss Jiggetts’s punitive damages claim will be denied.

This copy provided by Leagle, Inc.

© 2010-12 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in breach of contract, foreclosure, foreclosures, trespassing1 Comment

Fannie wants to penalize. My “ARSE”…I have the solution!

Fannie wants to penalize. My “ARSE”…I have the solution!

By DinSFLA 6/30/2010

When Fannie Mae announced that she was going to start to penalize people who walk away from underwater mortgages it created a fire storm of angry individuals.

She said it would step up efforts to pursue deficiency judgment—seeking to recoup the difference between the loan balance and the net proceeds of the foreclosure sale—against so-called “strategic” defaulters in states where such suits are allowed. Fannie also will lengthen to seven years, from five, the amount of time borrowers who go through a foreclosure must wait before getting a new loan.

So here is my solution, grab a pen and write this down:

  • Homes have lost not a little but an enormous amount of it’s value up to 70% in some areas.
  • In my opinion it is going to take more than 7 years to see any hope in Real Estate stabilization.
  • Who wants to buy today when we read about possibly 8 million shadow foreclosures that will ultimately bring down the market further to dust?
  • We the tax payers are the owners so who the hell asked us if this is appropriate? Were any of us invited to this meeting and discuss this? Did we have a say in this like we never do? DISCLOSURES?
  • What about the possible millions that were denied a modification from no fault of their own? Oh but the Obama Administration admitted this too…too…too…late :( Who will be responsible for those who were improperly foreclosed on?
  • With the taxes and insurance sky rocketing, it only makes sense to rent for a while.
  • Deficiency Judgment? Do you realize what this little pot you stir will cause?? Hmmm think about it.
  • Credit who wants credit? We don’t even know where our own money is being used.
  • Who do we have to contact to foreclose on Your “arse” Fannie??? After all you are owned by us… Do not bite the hand that feeds you!

You see the threat really has no impact.

Trust is earned my friends and we have absolutely none at the moment.

The evil thing here is that instead of going after the true Run A Ways “the banks” who stole the cash you go after the ones who feed you and behind our back you feed them???

Image source: The Simpsons “Angry Mob”

© 2010-12 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in deficiency judgement, deficiency judgment, fannie mae, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, mortgage modification, non disclosure, shadow foreclosures, walk away1 Comment

Potentially ‘Thousands’ Of Homeowners Improperly Denied Obama Mortgage Modifications, Administration Admits

Potentially ‘Thousands’ Of Homeowners Improperly Denied Obama Mortgage Modifications, Administration Admits

Lets not act surprise…by now we all know ANYTHING the US GOVERNMENT touches turns to ___________!

Because these lying banksters get away with ________________! We should foreclose on their _____________and kick them to the curb! Get your stress out and fill in the blank!

WE are not fools and we do not believe one thing they say!

shahien@huffingtonpost.com | HuffPost Reporting
First Posted: 06-29-10 06:22 PM   |   Updated: 06-29-10 06:22 PM



Potentially “thousands” of troubled homeowners were denied opportunities to lower their monthly mortgage payments under the Obama administration’s signature foreclosure-prevention plan due to servicer errors and inadequate oversight by the Treasury Department, a government audit has found.

Mortgage servicers failed to comply with basic guidelines, used different criteria to evaluate borrowers, recorded error rates up to six times their established thresholds, and couldn’t provide evidence that potentially eligible homeowners had been solicited for the administration’s Home Affordable Modification Program, also known as HAMP.

The errors are partly due to Treasury’s failure to issue specific guidelines for servicers to follow, and the administration’s lack of quality-control standards. Because servicers aren’t required to adhere to the same set of standards, there’s a risk that firms aren’t identifying practices “that may lead to inequitable treatment of borrowers or harm taxpayers through greater potential for fraud or waste,” according to a Thursday report by the Government Accountability Office.

But even if servicers were fraudulently modifying loans or improperly denying modifications to distressed homeowners, Treasury “has yet to establish specific consequences or penalties for noncompliance,” the GAO notes. The department has yet to fine any servicers for noncompliance, according to the report.

Already, “Treasury specifically allows some differences in how servicers evaluate borrowers… that could result in inconsistent outcomes for borrowers,” the report found.

The end result could be the “inequitable treatment” of struggling homeowners who were looking to an administration for help during the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. HAMP is the centerpiece of the administration’s $75 billion effort to stem the rising tide of foreclosures.

“I find it saddening and frustrating that none of these problems, which we among other people identified to Treasury over a year ago, have been meaningfully addressed,” said Diane E. Thompson, a lawyer with the National Consumer Law Center. “And as a result, we lost a major opportunity to stem the foreclosure crisis.”

Continue reading….here

© 2010-12 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in CONTROL FRAUD, corruption, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, foreclosures, hamp2 Comments

Mortgage Modifications: Why a Third Are Canceled

Mortgage Modifications: Why a Third Are Canceled

By Bendix Anderson Jun 29th 2010 @ 1:13PM

The federal government says foreclosure prevention has helped millions of people. But sometimes it seems hard to find a pundit or news story that mentions foreclosure prevention program without using the word “failed,” often in the headline.

Whom should you believe?

Government officials say 2.8 million homeowners at risk of foreclosure have had their home mortgages modified, lowering monthly payment by an average of about $500 since April 2009. But critics point out that not all of those modifications have lasted.

For example, of the 1.2 million trial modification started so far through the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), about a third, or 429,696, have been canceled, according to the latest reports. Many skeptics worry that foreclosure prevention has merely delayed foreclosure for millions of homeowners who are still likely to eventually lose their homes.
First, let’s look at the big number: the 2.8 million modifications claimed by the government. That includes the 1.2 million HAMP trial modifications, 400,000 modifications through the Federal Housing Administration, and another 1.2 million loan modifications negotiated by HOPE NOW, a national coalition including government-approved loan counselors, mortgage companies and investors.

Based partly on these modifications, officials are taking credit for stabilizing a collapsing housing market. “We already know that due to the Obama administration’s efforts, the housing market is significantly better than anyone predicted a year ago,” said Housing and Urban Development Secretary Shaun Donovan.

But that still leaves the question of the what happened to the close to half-a-million people who had their trial modifications canceled. They were kicked out of the program for a range of reasons: Some had mortgage payments already less than 31 percent of their income, missed trial payments or had incomplete or unverifiable documentation, according to Treasury officials.

According to a January statement by JPMorgan Chase, for every 100 trial modifications begun through the fall of 2009, a quarter had not paid as agreed. Another 29 borrowers did not submit all the required documents. “Many borrowers return forms missing key information (signatures, Social Security numbers, etc.) or do not return one of four required documents,” according to a statement from Chase. Another 13 out of a 100 borrowers are not eligible for HAMP but will qualify for another type of loan modification and 33 out of 100 borrowers are able to be underwritten for permanent HAMP modifications.

What happened to these people? How were they “helped?”

It now appears that about half of the borrowers that didn’t qualify for HAMP had their loans permanently modified anyway by their loan servicers under alternative programs, according to a survey of the eight biggest loan companies in the HAMP program. Another quarter of the canceled modifications were still awaiting action by the lenders, according to the survey. The remaining quarter of the canceled modifications ended in a variety of ways, ranging from a payment plan, a loan payoff, a bankruptcy filing to knock out heavy credit card debts, or a short sale. Only 7 percent had gone to foreclosure by the end of May.

And here’s another unexpected thing — 10 percent of the loans that had their modifications canceled are now current. The borrowers got out of foreclosure and kept their homes without any help from the program. It’s not clear from the report where these borrowers got the money to get up to date on their loans. Some may have had the money all along. Others borrowers who had lost income may have found new employment.

The survey results are a surprise for all the pundits, myself included, who thought loans that had their trial modifications canceled would be headed straight to foreclosure.

Of course, the future is still unclear for many borrowers who entered foreclosure-prevention programs. More than 400,000 borrowers still have unresolved HAMP trial modifications. Researchers and officials have also begun to track the hundreds of thousands of borrowers with permanent modifications, to see how many slip back into foreclosure, according The Associated Press.

Whatever you think of the federal plan to stop foreclosures, the last page of the latest government-issued Housing Scorecard report has some important numbers. In addition to the tally of temporary and permanent modifications, there’s the number of borrowers who are “underwater,” meaning they owe a larger balance on their home mortgage than the home is now worth: 11.3 million, according to First American CoreLogic. These people might not all give up their homes to foreclosure, but they are vulnerable to new economic shocks. The report also counts 2.4 million seriously delinquent loans, according to LPS-McDash and HUD. Finally, officials count 3.6 million vacant homes held off the market, according to the Census Bureau. Those homes will eventually have to be sold.

So, no matter what you think federal foreclosure prevention effort — and I think the feds are doing better than anyone gives them credit for — the housing market still faces huge challenges that won’t go away soon.
Source: Housing Watch

© 2010-12 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in foreclosure, foreclosures, hamp, mortgage modification0 Comments

Couple says bank at fault in foreclosure proceeding

Couple says bank at fault in foreclosure proceeding

I think this is the case for many of us who needed the HELOC when times got tough or for an emergency.

A dispute over a foreclosure is headed for trial.

By: Judy Wiff, Pierce County Herald Published June 29 2010

A dispute over a foreclosure is headed for trial.

A jury trial is set for March 16-17, 2011, in a case brought by Wells Fargo Bank against Deborah and John Sherman II, 434 Court St. North, Prescott. The bank claims the Shermans failed to make payments and now owe $384,236.

According to the Shermans, they had a 10-year draw period on a line of credit, but when they went to withdraw funds, they found the bank had reduced the credit limit based on a “substantial decline” in the value of their property.

“The Shermans have never been behind on a payment and use the line of credit in the running of their business,” wrote their attorney as he challenged the foreclosure action.

Continue reading…here

© 2010-12 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in case, heloc0 Comments

VIDEO: DJSP Enterprises Chart 6/9/2010

VIDEO: DJSP Enterprises Chart 6/9/2010

DJSP Video Chart

The DJSP video chart is more than a chart to watch; iIt is a basic lesson in combining 15 minute charts with daily charts in technical analysis.

SOURCE: QualityStocks.net

© 2010-12 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in djsp enterprises, foreclosures, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., stock0 Comments

Wells Fargo forecloses during Modification Negotiations

Wells Fargo forecloses during Modification Negotiations

Jun. 29, 2010
Copyright © Las Vegas Review-Journal

Homeowner gets foreclosure reprieve

Company barred from evicting tenant while case is pending

By JOHN G. EDWARDS
LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL

Tyree Brown, the homeowner who complained that Wells Fargo Bank blindsided him with a foreclosure during loan modification negotiations, has won the first round in court.

District Court Judge Douglas Smith signed a preliminary injunction Wednesday, temporarily preventing the buyer from evicting Brown, his two sons and his fiancée from their northwest Las Vegas home.

JFS Management Group, which made the winning bid on the home at a February foreclosure sale, won’t be allowed to take over the house at 1840 Spring Summit Lane and “flip it” for a profit while the case is pending.

Brown and the buyer must negotiate a monthly payment amount or Smith will set the payment amount for them.

The case is unusual because Brown comes from a prominent family. His father, Joe Brown, president of law firm Jones Vargas, sat on the state community board at Wells Fargo Bank and was friends with Wells Fargo’s regional President Kirk Clausen.

Continue reading ….here


© 2010-12 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in Eviction, foreclosure, mortgage modification, wells fargo1 Comment

DJSP Enterprises – Kaplan Fox Investigates Possible Securities Laws Violations NYTIMES ARTICLE TO FOLLOW!

DJSP Enterprises – Kaplan Fox Investigates Possible Securities Laws Violations NYTIMES ARTICLE TO FOLLOW!

You DO NOT want to be on this firms radar…they investigate Corporate Fraud and this is the 2nd firm to launch an investigation against DJSP Enterprises.

New York – May 28, 2010 – Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP (www.kaplanfox.com) has been investigating DJSP Enterprises (“DSJP” or the “Company”) (Symbol: DJSP) for potential violations of the federal securities laws.  Investors who purchased Company securities since April 1, 2010 may be affected.

On May 28, 2010, DJSP plunged by $2.59, or 29.2%, to $6.28 after the real-estate foreclosure services company posted weaker-than-expected first-quarter results and warned investors of a full-year earnings shortfall.

DJSP said it had a first-quarter adjusted profit of 35 cents a share, which was a nickel below the Thomson Reuters average estimate.

DJSP said that in April one of its largest bank clients initiated a foreclosure system conversion that cut the number of foreclosures. Because of the foreclosure system conversion and the U.S. government’s steps to prevent foreclosures, DJSP said it expects full-year earnings of $1.29 to $1.36 a share, which is below consensus. Volume topped 3.13 million shares, compared to the 50-day average daily volume of 190,000.

If you purchased DJSP publicly traded securities and would like to discuss our investigation, please e-mail us at mail@kaplanfox.com or contact:

Frederic S. Fox
Joel B. Strauss
Donald R. Hall
Hae Sung Nam
Jeffrey P. Campisi
Pamela A. Mayer

KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
850 Third Avenue, 14th Floor
New York, New York 10022
(800) 290-1952
(212) 687-1980
Fax: (212) 687-7714
E-mail address: mail@kaplanfox.com

Laurence D. King
KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
350 Sansome Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, California  94104
(415) 772-4700
Fax:  (415) 772-4707
E-mail address: mail@kaplanfox.com

DinSFLA Here: —–>Heads Up! See Red Text!

According to www.seekingalpha.com’s contributor Glen Bradford on 5/28/2010 he states

“I listened into the conference call. Lowered guidance in most situations comes from future problems down the pipeline. That isn’t the case this time. Lowered guidance this time is just a temporary setback. Company prices should be a discount of their future earnings — and in this case, the discrepancy between price and value appears to be fairly large right now. The main points:

In the Q&A section, someone yelled at David Stern for not disclosing this setback through an 8-K earlier. In my opinion, taking all things into consideration, David Stern has been making the right judgment calls. The future for foreclosure processing is brighter than ever.

There is currently a rumor circulating suggesting that foreclosure processing is being pushed back another thirty (30) days for mid-summer election purposes.

David Stern has been getting phone calls from his customers on a daily basis to make sure that DJSP has the capacity to handle a future ramp up in capacity.

Two of their largest customers are merging, and in my opinion, this is going to make Q2 and maybe the beginning of Q3 temporarily weak. That said, I would argue that DJSP is incredibly likely to continue working with this new merged entity and get the backlog of foreclosures that they have built up.

Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) have been touring the facilities to make sure that DJSP has the capacity to ramp up processing.

They are in the process of picking up a second REO customer in my opinion, but the time that it takes to ramp up here might push those earnings into Q1 2011 at this point.

© 2010-12 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in djsp enterprises, investigation, Law Offices Of David J. Stern P.A., stock0 Comments

NEVADA is on a ROLL! ALOUA v. AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC, Dist. Court, D. Nevada 2010

NEVADA is on a ROLL! ALOUA v. AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC, Dist. Court, D. Nevada 2010

PIA MARIE T. CORDERO ALOUA, Plaintiff,
v.
AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC; LEHMAN BROTHERS BANK, FSB; QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORPORATION; Does I-X, inclusive, Defendants.

Case No. 2:09-CV-00207-KJD-RJJ.

United States District Court, D. Nevada.

June 23, 2010.

ORDER

KENT J. DAWSON, District Judge. Currently before the Court is Defendants Aurora Loan Services, LLC, and Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB’s Motion to Dismiss (#15).[1] Plaintiff Pia Marie T. Cordero Aloua filed a Response and Opposition (#18) to Defendants’ Motion on October 5, 2009, to which Defendants filed a Reply (#19) on October 20, 2009.

I. Background

Plaintiff financed the real property located at 116 Peachy Court in Las Vegas, Nevada (“subject property”) on or about the 5th day of July, 2007. At that time, Plaintiff executed an adjustable rate loan (“first loan”) in the principal amount of $768,987.00 and a fixed-rate balloon loan (“second loan”) in the principal amount of $144,185.00. Lehman Brothers, which changed its name to Aurora Bank on April 24, 2009, was the original lender, and Aurora Loan Services (“ALS”) was appointed as the loan servicer on August 16, 2007. Plaintiff’s first loan, which was placed in the sub-prime category, was financed based upon a yearly adjustable interest rate of 9.375% and was to be paid to Lehman Brothers by monthly payments beginning in September 2007. Plaintiff avers that the sub-prime designation of her loan, which led to higher fees and interest, was in error because Plaintiff had verifiable income and a credit score sufficient to qualify for the traditional prime rate. Defendants aver that Plaintiff defaulted on her loans in December 2007, leading to foreclosure proceedings which were ultimately completed on July 14, 2008 through Quality Loan Service Corporation (“QLS”), the appointed substitute trustee. ALS claims to have acquired title to the subject property through said foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff avers, however, that she did not default on her loans and that the foreclosure sale was carried out without serving the required notices and without giving Plaintiff the appropriate opportunity to avert the sale. On January 7, 2009, Plaintiff commenced this action in the District Court for Clark County, Nevada. The action was removed to this Court on February 2, 2009 on the basis of federal question and diversity jurisdiction. (See #1.) On September 2, 2009, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against all Defendants, alleging the following causes of action: (1) intentional misrepresentation; (2) negligence per se under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) and the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”); (3) negligence; (4) rescission under TILA; (5) wrongful foreclosure; and (6) quiet title. On September 21, 2009, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (#15). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss in part and denies it in part.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss

A court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citation omitted). In Iqbal, the Supreme Court recently clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, the Court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 1950. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. at 1949. Second, the Court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 1949. Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has “alleged—but not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

III. Analysis

A. Intentional Misrepresentation

Plaintiff alleges Defendants knowingly made false misrepresentations to Plaintiff, upon which Plaintiff justifiably relied to her detriment. To state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation in Nevada, a plaintiff must allege that (1) defendant made a false representation; (2) defendant knew or believed the representation to be false; (3) defendant intended to induce plaintiff to rely on the misrepresentation; and (4) plaintiff suffered damages as a result of his reliance. Bartmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 956 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Nev. 1998). Misrepresentation is a form of fraud where a false representation is relied on in fact. See Pacific Maxon, Inc. v. Wilson, 96 Nev. 867, 871 (Nev. 1980). Fraud has a stricter pleading standard under Rule 9, which requires a party to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). Pleading fraud with particularity requires “an account of the time, place, and specific content of the false representations, as well as the identities of the parties of the misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Morris v. Bank of Nev., 886 P.2d 454, 456 n.1 (Nev. 1994). The Ninth Circuit has held, however, that the stricter pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) “may be relaxed with respect to matters within the opposing party’s knowledge,” reasoning that “[i]n such situations, plaintiffs can not (sic) be expected to have personal knowledge of the relevant facts.” Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987); Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989). Even under this relaxed version of Rule 9(b), however, “a plaintiff who makes allegations on information and belief must state the factual basis for the belief.” Id. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knowingly concealed the true nature of her credit score and defrauded her by placing her loan in the sub-prime category to charge higher commissions. Plaintiff also alleges, among other things, that Defendants misrepresented the fees charged and paid in association with her loan, as well as her eligibility to participate in a loan modification program. Taking these assertions as true, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for fraud: Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intentionally misrepresented information to her, that she relied on these representations, and that she was damaged as a result.

B. Negligence per se

To state a claim for negligence per se, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he or she belongs to a class of persons that a statute was intended to protect; (2) defendant violated the relevant statute; (3) plaintiff’s injuries are the type against which the statute was intended to protect; (4) the violation was the legal cause of plaintiff’s injury; and (5) plaintiff suffered damages. See Anderson v. Baltrusaitus, 944 P.2d 797, 799 (Nev. 1997). Whether a particular statute establishes a standard of care in a negligence action is a question of law. Vega v. E. Courtyard Assocs., 24 P.3d 219, 221 (Nev. 2001). Plaintiff claims Defendants violated provisions of TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq., and RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., dealing with a lender’s disclosure duties. Defendants argue that the TILA claim is time barred because the statute of limitations has run. Section 1640(e) of TILA requires that claims be brought within one year of the date of the loan transaction. Interpreting this provision, the Ninth Circuit has held that while as a general rule the limitations period runs from the date the transaction is consummated, the doctrine of equitable tolling may, when appropriate, toll the limitations period until the borrower has had a reasonable opportunity to discover the facts giving rise to a TILA claim. King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit has also held that the equitable tolling analysis is a factual one: the finder of fact must determine whether equitable tolling will prevent unjust results or maintain the integrity of the relevant statute. Id. Because these factual questions are yet to be resolved, the Court is unable to say at this stage in the litigation whether the statute of limitations has run. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s TILA claim on statute of limitations grounds is denied. Moreover, after reviewing the Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff has adequately stated a TILA claim against Defendants. Plaintiff alleges Defendants (1) failed to disclose the identity of persons and entities who share the service fees and other charges for her loans; (2) failed to disclose the percentage of the loan amount paid to the nominal lender; and (3) failed to disclose relevant credit terms to enable Plaintiff to compare market rates and prevent unfair credit practices. (Dkt. #14, Compl. ¶ 26-28.) Taking these assertions as true, Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief under TILA. Plaintiff has failed, however, to sufficiently state a claim for negligence per se under RESPA. 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. As a general rule, RESPA does not create an express or implied private right of action. Collins v. FMHA-USDA, 105 F.3d 1366, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1997); Bamba v. Resource Bank, 568 F. Supp. 2d 32, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2008); Morrison v. Brookstone, 415 F. Supp. 2d 801, 806 (S.D. Ohio 2005); McWhorter v. Ford Consumer Fin. Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1064 (N.D. Ga. 1997). A limited exception to this rule exists: a private right of action exists under RESPA when a specific statutory provision mentions such a right. See Bloom v. Martin, 865 F. Supp. 1377, 1384-85 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Although Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated several provisions of RESPA, the only section she references with any specificity is § 2605. Accordingly, because this section of the statute does not provide a private right of action, Plaintiff’s claim for negligence per se under RESPA fails.

C. Rescission

Plaintiff also alleges she is entitled to a rescission of the mortgage contract under TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1635. Plaintiff is incorrect. Section 1635 of TILA establishes that lenders must notify borrowers of their right to rescind and outlines the penalties for failure to comply with this requirement. Nonetheless, § 1635 expressly states that these provisions do not apply to “residential mortgage transactions.” A residential mortgage transaction is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) as a “transaction in which a mortgage . . . interest is created or retained against the consumer’s principal dwelling.” See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(24). This is precisely what Plaintiff’s mortgage contract entailed: the parties entered into a transaction in which Plaintiff attained financing from Defendants to acquire residential property. Because Plaintiff is not entitled to rescind the mortgage contract, her rescission claim under § 1635 fails as a matter of law and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff’s rescission claims.

D. Wrongful Foreclosure

Plaintiff also alleges wrongful foreclosure. “An action for the tort of wrongful foreclosure will lie if the trustor or mortgagor can establish that at the time the power of sale was exercised or the foreclosure occurred, no breach of condition or failure of performance existed on the mortgagor’s or trustor’s part which would have authorized the foreclosure or exercise of the power of sale.” Collins v. Union Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 662 P.2d 610, 623 (Nev. 1983). “The material issue of fact in a wrongful foreclosure claim is whether the trustor was in default when the power of sale was exercised.” Id. Here, Plaintiff affirmatively alleges that she was not in default of payment to the lender at the time the foreclosure occurred, and therefore, the representations as stated on the Notice of Default were false.[2] Taking these assertions as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure against Defendants. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claim.

E. Negligence against QLS

To bring a negligence claim in Nevada, a plaintiff must show that (1) defendant owed a duty of care to plaintiff; (2) defendant breached that duty; (3) defendant’s breach was the actual and proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) plaintiff was injured. Scialabba v. Brandise Constr., 921 P.2d 928, 930 (Nev. 1996). Liability based on negligence does not exist without a breach of duty. Bradshaw v. Blystone Equip. Co. of Nev., 386 P.2d 396, 397 (Nev. 1963). Plaintiff claims that Defendant QLS, “as trustee under the deed of trust, had a duty to Plaintiff to ensure that any party instructing it to conduct a foreclosure sale of the property actually owned and had rights under the note and deed of trust.” (See #14, Compl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant QLS’s failure to take the appropriate steps to comply with this duty was the actual and proximate cause of damages to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 33-39.) At this point, because Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful foreclosure remains, the Court also finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a claim for negligence.

F. Quiet Title

Finally, Plaintiff brings a claim of quiet title, arguing that because foreclosure was wrongful, Plaintiff remains the rightful owner of the subject property. Taking these assertions as true, Plaintiff has stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure against Defendants. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff’s quiet title claim.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (#15) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for intentional misrepresentation is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for negligence per se under TILA is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for negligence per se under RESPA is GRANTED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for negligence against QLS is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for rescission under TILA is GRANTED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful foreclosure is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for quiet title in DENIED.

[1] Defendant Quality Loan Service Corporation filed a Joinder (#22) to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss that is considered together with Defendant’s Motion herein. [2] If matters outside of the pleadings are submitted in conjunction with a motion to dismiss, Rule 12(b) grants courts discretion to either accept and consider, or to disregard such materials. See Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 193 n.3 (5th Cir.1988). A court exercises this discretion by examining whether the submitted material, and the resulting conversion from the Rule 12(b)(6) to the Rule 56 procedure, may facilitate disposing of the action. Id. at 193 n.3. If the court elects to convert the motion, “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Here, Defendants have attempted to provide evidence refuting Plaintiff’s no default claim, Plaintiff however, has not had an adequate opportunity to fully brief this issue. Accordingly, without opining whether Plaintiff’s claims may survive a summary judgment motion, the Court elects not to convert Defendants’ immediate Motion into one for summary judgment.

© 2010-12 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in aurora loan servicing, breach of contract, concealment, conspiracy, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, lehman brothers, respa, tila, truth in lending act, Violations0 Comments

Groves woman claims Bank Of America mistake led to foreclosure

Groves woman claims Bank Of America mistake led to foreclosure

Starting to sound like a broken record with these bank “mistakes”!

6/28/2010 12:55 PM By Kelly Holleran

A Groves woman has filed suit against a bank that she says failed to automatically withdraw mortgage payments from her account, causing her to face foreclosure and eviction.

Charlenee Renee Hardee claims she first learned of the foreclosure on her house when she received an eviction notice posted on her door.

According to the complaint filed June 17 in Jefferson County District Court, Hardee had set up automatic withdrawals with defendant Bank of America in December that were supposed to go toward paying off her mortgage.

However, she alleges Bank of America had not been withdrawing payments as scheduled, which Hardee claims she was unaware of until she received the eviction notice, the suit states.

“At that time, Plaintiff checked her bank statement and discovered that no payments had been taken out of her account and that there was sufficient balance to pay the deficiency,” the complaint says. “Plaintiff went to Defendant, Bank of America National Association, and attempted to bring the note current but Defendant, Bank of America National Association, declined to accept her payment because the house had already been sold in foreclosure.”

On April 10, Bank of America executed an appointment of a substitute trustee, who then held a truste’s sale on May 4 and conveyed the property to defendant Estatepro, Hardee claims.

However, before the sale, Estatepro failed to supply Hardee with the required 30-day notice of default or with the notice of foreclosure sale, although it asserts that the required notices were sent, according to the complaint.

It was not until after the sale that Hardee received the notice of eviction, the suit state.s

Hardee alleges breach of contract against Bank of America for its failure to automatically transfer payments from her account. She also claims Estatepro’s deed of the property constitutes an impermissible cloud on Hardee’s premises.

In her complaint, Hardee is asking the court to declare the foreclosure, sale of her property and deed invalid. She is also asking the court to enter an order declaring her to be the rightful owner of the property. She is seeking actual damages, judgment for breach of contract, attorney’s fees, costs and other relief the court deems just.

Bruce Gregory of the Gregory Law Firm in Port Neches will be representing her.

The case has been assigned to Judge Donald Floyd, 172nd District Court.

Jefferson County District Court case number: E187-098.

Source: SeTexasRecord.com

© 2010-12 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in bank of america, Eviction, foreclosure fraud, mistake0 Comments

DEUTSCHE BANK drops Foreclosure Case on Two Florida Candidates!

DEUTSCHE BANK drops Foreclosure Case on Two Florida Candidates!

What I want to now know is how this happened extremely fast when there is thousands trying to work out the same? In my recent post I wrote about this controversy in which I question the validity of Deutsche Bank’s standing

Foreclosure case against two Fla. candidates dropped

Deutsche Bank files, dismisses suit with Marco Rubio and David Rivera over mortgage

Katherine Concepcion • Staff Writer • June 28, 2010 Tallahassee.com

A 1,228-square foot home off Apalachee Parkway was the subject of recent controversy within the Florida political scene.

On June 14, the Deutsche Bank National Trust Company initiated a foreclosure filed in the Leon County Circuit Court against Marco Rubio and David Rivera, owners of the property in question. The lawsuit has since been dropped; a notice of voluntary dismissal and release of lis pendens was filed on June 23.

The Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson, who represented Deutsche Bank, declined to comment.
Rubio, former Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, is running for the Republican seat currently occupied by George LeMieux in the U.S. Senate. Rep. Rivera, who serves District 112 of the Florida House, is campaigning as a Republican Congressional candidate in Florida’s 25th District. The two men purchased the house for $135,000 in 2005. The property is currently under contract pending sale.

Rivera delivered a cashier’s check for $9,525 to the plaintiffs on Thursday, June 17, prompting Rubio spokesperson Alex Burgos, who did not return calls for comment, to issue a statement that the men “took action right away to get this [matter] resolved.”

Court records reveal a debt of around $136,000 on the property, including late charges and accumulated interest. Mortgage payments had not been made since February because of an alleged dispute over how the adjustable rate mortgage would be calculated once the interest-only period expired.

This is not the first financial battle Rubio has been embroiled in.

During his tenure as House speaker, Rubio was questioned about his failure to disclose receiving a $135,000 home-equity loan, and charging $16,000 in personal expenses, including grocery bills and car repairs, to a Florida GOP credit card.

Continue reading …

Scribd

RELATED STORY:

US Senate candidate MARCO RUBIO Facing Foreclosure…NOT SO FAST, Lets TAKE A LOOK!

© 2010-12 FORECLOSURE FRAUD | by DinSFLA. All rights reserved.
www.StopForeclosureFraud.com


DONATE

Posted in deutsche bank, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, investigation, law offices of Marshall C. Watson pa, lawsuit0 Comments

QUI TAM: MERS et al sued for FRAUD, Billions in Penalties

QUI TAM: MERS et al sued for FRAUD, Billions in Penalties

I am definitely confident on this one going far!

Mortgage registration firm sued for fraud, billions in penalties in Nevada, California

By Frank X. Mullen Jr. • June 25, 2010 RGJ.com

A Reno law firm has filed two lawsuits alleging fraud against a nationwide mortgage registration firm, and if those legal actions prevail, the firm and dozens of mortgage lenders could be liable to Nevada’s counties for billions of dollars in compensation and penalties.

Law partners Robert R. Hager and Treva J. Hearne, with Reno attorney Mark Mausert, have filed a case in Nevada and one in California against Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, which operates an electronic registry of mortgage loans in the United States. MERS serves as the mortgagee of record for lenders, investors and loan servicers in county land records, but doesn’t own any mortgages.

By using the firm’s names on deeds and other paperwork, the lenders are able to avoid county recording fees, according to the firm. MERS has no financial interest in the loans, but is listed as actual owner or surrogate for the owner on millions of deeds of trust, even as individual mortgages are repeatedly traded and packaged inside of mortgage pools.

The lawsuits argue that listing the firm as the owner of mortgages in which it has no interest in order to avoid filing fees and taxes that are legally required constitutes fraud.

“We look forward to holding these financial institutions and foreclosure mills responsible for their actions that have deprived the states and counties of much-needed revenue,” said Hager.

Karmela Lejarde, communications manager, for the Reston, Va.-based firm, noted that the attorneys general of two states declined to take on the cases as false claims suits pressed by the government, instead leaving the plaintiffs to pursue the civil suits in the court systems.

“The lawsuits are completely without merit,” Lejarde said. “…The suits were filed by the same lawyers who have brought countless lawsuits against MERS, and every single one of them has failed. The most recent (fraud case) actions are just the latest in a line of baseless claims.”

Christopher Peterson, a law professor and associate dean of the University of Utah Law School, has written articles and lectured about MERS’s activities. He said the firm being listed as proxy owner of more than half the nation’s mortgages is contrary to 200 years of American legal precedent.

Continue here…

Scribd

Part II

http://www.scribd.com/full/33679187?access_key=key-795n4c7e7xreprv28yr

Scribd

Part III

http://www.scribd.com/full/33679319?access_key=key-16v5sbgda4zf6ka6eox5

Scribd

RELATED STORY:

MERS Good Information Foreclosure Subprime Mortgage Lending and MERS, VP MERS, AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY

Posted in bank of america, Christopher Peterson, citimortgage, CONTROL FRAUD, foreclosure, foreclosure fraud, jpmorgan chase, MERS, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC., QUI TAM, wells fargo4 Comments

Advert
advertisement
Advertisment

Archives