Via b.daviesmd6605

COMPLAINT TO THE HEART OF THE SECRET LPS SOCIETY THAT MAKES AND CREATES DOCUMENTS TO BE USED FOR THE BENEFITS OF THE INEFFECTIVE SERVICERS.

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via b.daviesmd6605

SAME RESPONSES OBJECTIONS AND NO DOCUMENTS. IT IS THE GAME. HOPEFULLY WE CAN BREAK THIS GAME. WE ALL HAVE ERICA JOHNSON-SECKS DEPOSITION. JUST FOLLOW THE YELLOW BRICK ROAD.

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Obama readies steps to fight foreclosures, particularly for unemployed

By Renae Merle and Dina ElBoghdady
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, March 26, 2010

The Obama administration plans to overhaul how it is tackling the foreclosure crisis, in part by requiring lenders to temporarily slash or eliminate monthly mortgage payments for many borrowers who are unemployed, senior officials said Thursday.

At a House oversight committee hearing, keys represent foreclosed homes. The administration is planning new steps to fight foreclosures. (Brendan Hoffman/bloomberg News)

Banks and other lenders would have to reduce the payments to no more than 31 percent of a borrower’s income, which would typically be the amount of unemployment insurance, for three to six months. In some cases, administration officials said, a lender could allow a borrower to skip payments altogether.

The new push, which the White House is scheduled to announce Friday, takes direct aim at the major cause of the current wave of foreclosures: the spike in unemployment. While the initial mortgage crisis that erupted three years ago resulted from millions of risky home loans that went bad, more-recent defaults reflect the country’s economic downturn and the inability of jobless borrowers to keep paying.

The administration’s new push also seeks to more aggressively help borrowers who owe more on their mortgages than their properties are worth, offering financial incentives for the first time to lenders to cut the loan balances of such distressed homeowners. Those who are still current on their mortgages could get the chance to refinance on better terms into loans backed by the Federal Housing Administration.

The problem of “underwater” borrowers has bedeviled earlier administration efforts to address the mortgage crisis as home prices plunged.

Officials said the new initiatives will take effect over the next six months and be funded out of $50 billion previously allocated for foreclosure relief in the emergency bailout program for the financial system. No new taxpayer funds will be needed, the officials said.

The measures have been in the works for weeks, but President Obama is finally to release the details days after his watershed victory on health-care legislation. Following that bruising battle on Capitol Hill, his administration is now welcoming a chance to change the subject and turn its attention to the economy and, in particular, the plight of the unemployed — concerns that are paramount for many Americans.

The administration has been facing increasing pressure from lawmakers and housing advocates to overhaul its foreclosure prevention efforts. So far, fewer than 200,000 borrowers have received permanent loan modifications under its $75 billion marquee program, known as Making Home Affordable. In the meantime, there is a growing backlog of distressed borrowers awaiting help from their lenders, which threatens to undercut efforts to stabilize the housing market.

Challenges unmet

Assistant Treasury Secretary Herbert M. Allison Jr. told a House panel Thursday that “we did not fully envision the challenges that we would encounter” when the earlier program was launched.

The efforts have been hampered by the difficulty of helping unemployed homeowners, who struggled to qualify for the government’s mortgage relief plan. In requiring temporary relief for jobless borrowers, known as forbearance, officials are hoping to give them time to find a new job. Some will still need more assistance after the six-month period while others will ultimately lose their homes, administration officials said.

“We certainly support a forbearance opportunity for unemployed borrowers,” said John A. Courson, chief executive of the Mortgage Bankers Association. He said he had not seen full details of the program.

Four measures

In addition to mortgage relief for unemployed borrowers, the program features four other key elements, including several steps to address the growing population of borrowers who owe significantly more than their home is worth, according to officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the official announcement had not been made. Underwater borrowers now make up about a quarter of all homeowners, according to First American CoreLogic. Economists consider these homeowners at higher risk of default because they cannot sell or refinance their home when they run into financial troubles.

The first key element is that the government will provide financial incentives to lenders that cut the balance of a borrower’s mortgage. Banks and other lenders will be asked to reduce the principal owed on a loan if the amount is 15 percent more than their home is worth. The reduced amount would be set aside and forgiven by the lender over three years, as long as the homeowner remained current on the loan.

Until recently, administration officials had been reluctant to encourage lenders to cut the principal balance, worrying that this would encourage borrowers to become delinquent. But as federal regulators have struggled to make an impact on the foreclosure crisis, those qualms have weakened.

“We would prefer to see a required principal forgiveness program. But this is helpful,” said David Berenbaum, chief program officer for the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, a nonprofit housing group. “This is another tool that will help consumers weather the crisis.”

Second, the government will double the amount it pays to lenders that help modify second mortgages, such as piggyback loans, which enabled home buyers to put little or no money down, and home equity lines of credit.

These second mortgages are an added burden on struggling homeowners, especially when their total debt, as a result, is greater than their home value.

Federal officials have estimated that about half of all troubled homeowners have a second mortgage and last year launched a program to encourage lenders to restructure them. That effort has struggled to get off the ground.

Third, the new effort also increases the incentives paid to those lenders that find a way to avoid foreclosing on delinquent borrowers even if they can’t qualify for mortgage relief. For example, the administration is scheduled to launch a program next month encouraging lenders to have borrowers sell their homes for less than the mortgage balance in what is known as a short sale.

Fourth, the administration is increasingly turning to the Federal Housing Administration to help underwater borrowers who are still keeping up their payments. The aim is to help these borrowers refinance into a more affordable loan. The FHA will offer incentives to lenders that reduce the amount borrowers owe on their primary mortgages by at least 10 percent.

For those borrowers who have more than one mortgage on their house, the FHA will allow refinancing of the first loan only. The new loan and any second mortgage could not exceed 15 percent of the home’s value. This approach is meant to benefit not only borrowers but also lenders by allowing them to offload mortgages that might otherwise fail.

Only homeowners who are refinancing their main residence, have a credit score above 500 and can document their income are eligible.

Administration official say this refinancing program should not strain the FHA’s already weakened finances because the effort will be financed with up to $14 billion out of the federal bailout program.

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF
19 ^§11, 12 AND 15 OF THE                            DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL,
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

MAINE STATE RETIREMENT Individually and On Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC.; CWALT, INC., a Delaware corporation; CWMBS, INC., a Delaware corporation; CWABS, INC., a Delaware corporation; CWHEQ, INC., a Delaware corporation; COUNTRYWIDE CAPITAL MARKETS, COUNTRYWIDE SECURITIES CORPORATION-J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES If4c; DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES INC., BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC., BANC OF AMERICA SECURITIES LLC; UBS SECURITIES, LLC; MORGAN STANLEY & CO. INCORPORATED; EDWARD D. JONES & CO., L.P.; CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC.; GOLDMAN, SACHS & CO.; CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC; GREENWICH CAPITAL MARKETS, INC. A.K.A. RBS GREENWICH CAPITAL; BARCLAYS CAPITAL INC.; HSBC SECURITIES (USA); BNP PARIBAS SECURITIES CORP.; MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INCORPORATED; STANFORD L. KURLAND; DAVID A. SPECTOR; ERIC P. SIERACKI; N. JOSHUA ADLER; RANJIT KRIPALANI; JENNIFER S. SANDEFUR; DAVID A. SAMBOL,

Defendants

Continue below: Be patient this is a big file

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Following tip some people are working on:

“Deutsche Bank National Trust passed the certificate to the administator of the main trust Maples Finance Limited, You want to check out Indymac c1-1 Corp they are incorporated in Cayman Islands.”

This is where most of the Corporations are formed.

Maples Finance, which provides clients with a multi-jurisdictional legal and specialized management service from offices in Jersey, the British Virgin Islands and Dublin as well as the Cayman Islands. Maples Finance also provides management and administration services for Cayman Islands’ investment funds and Cayman Islands’ structured finance vehicles.

Maples Finance provides directives to structured finance vehicles which undertake a wide range of transactions including, loans and loan programmes, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), cashflow CDOs, securitizations and structured investment vehicles.

All of which have been issued to and are held by Maples Finance Limited, a licensed trust company incorporated in the Cayman Islands (in such capacity, the ” Trustee Share“), under the terms of a declaration of trust in favor of charitable purposes. The Issuer will not have any material assets other than the Collateral Securities and certain other eligible assets. The Collateral Securities and such other eligible assets will be pledged to the Trustee as security for the Issuer’s obligations under the Notes and the Indenture.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-fTt3cbNHo]

Pay attention or get an (F) for FORECLOSURE!

Nye Lavalle Said:

This may sound crude, but it’s the only analogy that’s easy for people and judges to understand.

A woman goes to a party or is promiscuous and sleeps with 6 men in a night or week. The following week she is pregnant. There is one man who is the best looking, strongest, best shape and richest of them all, so she wants him to be the father. Two other men who find out she’s pregnant claim paternity. NOW, before the age of DNA and computers and all, it was simply someone’s word and testimony against another.

However, with the advent o DNA testing and sequencing genes, we can tell who the father is. So, a judge would understand the following:

Judge, this has been a very promiscuous note. It’s gotten around (transfered, pledged, sold, assigned) quite a bit and it never used protection (recording in public records and indorsing note). After being with at least a dozen different partners, our note is now pregnant (ripe for pay off/liquidation).

The MOM (MERS, servicers) says Daddy #1 is the daddy, but the baby (original note) has blond hair and blue eyes judge and the mom and claimed dad are both dark hair and dark eyes so we’re suspicious.

Two dark hair and brown eyes men come forward and state: Judge we both slept with this woman during the time she claimed to be pregnant. Now, 3 different men have potential paternity.

NOW, THE ONLY WAY you can determine who the father (holder in due course) is to take blood samples (accounting, servicing, custody, and investor reports and data) from EACH MAN (servicer//transferee etc..) to see who’s DNA it was and all the others to determine the dad and who owes child support.

Unless you do the DNA (forensic analyses of all docs and records), it doesn;t matter what the bank lawyers, or servicers say, it what really transpired here!

Without seeing where that NOTE (not mortgage) came on and off anyones books; how it was endorsed and when; who has possession and custody and who negotiated the note and PAID for it, you’ll never be able to answer the age old question, “WHO’S YOUR DADDY?”

via Mandelman Matters

Well, woohoo! It’s been just a few weeks shy of one year since the Obama Administration announced its plan to help 1.5 million homeowners modify their second mortgages, and the program has actually done something I did not think was possible. It’s actually managed to help… no one!

Come on… that’s hard to do. I mean, even Bush’s Hope-4-Homeowners infamous debacle managed to modify one mortgage after six or so months. Sure, it was probably just an accident, but this is a big country. You’ve gotta’ think that no matter how stupid the government program is, one of whatever will simply slip through the cracks somehow. But in this case… no! As my Greek in-laws would say… Opah!

Wow. Someone deserves some sort of prize or at least a plaque of some distinction. Has this ever been achieved before in these United States, or anywhere else for that matter?

I mean, I would venture to guess that if the government announced a program whereby a U.S. citizen was required to send in $100 in order to receive a bag of flaming dog poo on their front step, well… more than one bag would get delivered… maybe even more than one each month. Oh sure, the government would probably deliver the bag of flaming poo late and to the wrong address, but still.

The program was a part of the administration’s fabulously successful, $75 billion Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) that has done absolutely nothing to change the foreclosure crisis for the better, but even it claims 170,000 loan modifications. Deduct for lender lying, incompetent reporting and political puffery and that still leaves eighty or ninety thousand people that saved a couple of bucks on their mortgage payments at the very least, right?

According to a story in the Huffington Post, the plan was announced last April. Treasury released guidelines in August. And five weeks ago, Bank of America, the largest mortgage servicer in the country with three million seconds signed up. Five weeks ago. Stop it… they’ve been busy.

But wait… Bank of America’s spokesperson said a few days ago that the bank was STILL awaiting guidelines from Treasury before they would proceed to ignore them. A Treasury spokesperson responded by saying that the bank could technically begin the process now. To which the Bank of America spokesperson said: No we can’t. To which the Treasury’s spokesperson said back: Yes, you could… technically. To which Bank of America’s spokesperson replied: Your mother could… technically. To which Treasury’s spokesperson said: Yeah, well I know I am, but what are you? And then she ran off stage crying.

Last week, Vikram Pandit, who is Citigroup’s CEO and whose name sounds like a Bond villain set to take over the world by blowing a giant hole in the earth’s atmosphere, told a Congressional Oversight Panel why Citi has not yet signed up to participate in the program:

“We’ve said to the Treasury we’re willing to work with them as to what this program is. We have just seen the details. I think it’s prudent for us to go through that before we sign on.”

He’s right. Take your time, Vikram… or Vik… do you suppose it’s okay if I call him “Vik”? Don’t let anyone rush you into something that might save the U.S. economy. You just keep focused on how to continue to justify your job and pay out bonuses as you run a bank that should have been placed in receivership ages ago. We gave Citi $320 billion in loan guarantees last year, along with tens of billions in TARP funds, in case you have successfully suppressed the unpleasant memory of watching Timmy Geithner explaining the accounting shenanigans he’d come up with on television on Monday morning as he stood shoulder with someone from the Singapore Sovereign Wealth Fund. I haven’t, obviously.

RealtyTrac says there were 3 million homes lost to foreclosure, so figure closer to four, and RealtyTrac admits that this year could be worse. One reason is that so many distressed homeowners do in fact have second mortgages. The Obama Administration has estimated that “up to 50 percent of at-risk mortgages currently have second liens.” So, that’s a lot.

According to the Huffington Post, the fact sheet that came along with the administration’s April 28, 2009, announcement of the second lien program noted:

Second liens contribute to the number of American homeowners unable to afford their housing payments. Even where a first mortgage payment may be affordable, the addition of a second mortgage payment can increase monthly payments beyond affordable levels. In addition, second mortgages often complicate or prevent modification or refinancing of a first mortgage.

The Second Lien Program will help create a sustainably affordable mortgage payment for millions of homeowners who qualify for a first mortgage modification, yet still face challenges in affording their monthly payments because of a second mortgage.

According to Citi’s regulatory filings, about 42 percent of the bank’s second mortgages are now worth more than the underlying assets. See… plenty of time. Don’t jump into anything too quickly, Vik baby. Steady as she goes.
Okay, so it’s only been a year. We can’t expect miracles from Washington. They’re busy, and they have a lot more important things to do than deal with problems created by second mortgages.

In a totally unrelated story…
Here’s a congressional schedule from March 21, 2010:

A. H.R. 4840 – To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 1979 Cleveland Avenue in Columbus, Ohio, as the “Clarence D. Lumpkin Post Office”.

B. H.Res. 1174 – Supporting the goals and ideals of National Women’s History Month.

C. H.Res. 1075 – Commending the members of the Agri-business Development Teams of the National Guard for their efforts, together with personnel of the Department of Agriculture and the United States Agency for International Development, to modernize agriculture practices and increase food production in war-torn countries.

D. Up to twenty minutes of debate on a Ryan (R-WI) Unfunded Mandated Point of Order and possible postponed suspensions.

E. Up to twenty minutes of debate on an Earmark Point of Order.

F. Up to one hour of debate on the Rule to provide consideration for the Motion to Concur in the Senate Amendments to H.R. 3590 – Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act – and H.R. 4872 – Reconciliation Act of 2010.

G. Up to two hours of general debate on the Motion to Concur in the Senate Amendments to H.R. 3590 – Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act – and H.R. 4872 – Reconciliation Act of 2010.

See what I mean… they’re busy in Congress and certainly don’t need to be placed under additional pressure by the likes of us, American homeowners, who pay their salaries and hold back the urge to storm the proverbial castle every day… although admittedly most of us accomplish this by taking drugs like Adivan and Zanax. I, for example, have taken to taking ice baths until hypothermia sets in.

Nice job, Team Obama! You’ve really accomplished something here. What’s next? Come one… we want another government housing rescue plan to watch fail.

I know… I had suggested this when Hope-4-Homeowners was still around, but what would you think about a good old fashioned lottery… or wait… I know… you could hide five Golden Tickets in chocolate Wonky bars.

Whoever finds a Golden Ticket simply calls the government hotline, waits 4-6 hours on hold, and then someone from Housing and Urban Development shows up, pays off a neighbor’s home by mistake, and then sends you a 1099 for a half a million in loan forgiveness, taxable as ordinary income.

Oompa Loompa doompadee doo
I’ve got a government program for you
Oompa Loompa doompadah dee
If you’re underwater you’ll soon live in a tree!

What do you get with a loan mod from HAMP?
A surprise trustee sale and a book of food stamps.
Why don’t you try simply walking away?
Or are you too programmed to obey?

You’ll have no
You’ll have no
You’ll have no
You’ll have no
You’ll have no high credit score!

(No more monthly bills either.)

Oompa Loompa Doompadee Dah
Don’t pay your mortgage, you won’t have to go far
You can rent down the street for much less.
Like the Oompa Oompa Loompas…

And end your distress!

Don’t just shoot it down out of hand… give it some time… consider it for a few days… set it out on the back porch and see if the cat licks it up. And if you still don’t think it’s worth a try, then what the heck… count me in for a $100 bag of flaming poo!

Come on… chant it with me… Yes we can. Yes we can.

Via Gawker.com click the the new SEC logo to see the news via 4closure 

On a 2nd note …Husbands and Wives check out who what your souless mates are doing while AWAY at a S.E.X.C. meeting!

 Captain Albert Innaurato, Can we get an investigation into their Mortgage to see whether FRAUD was involved? and you have to “learn” Sir there is no AGENCY that can help when the Lender does not want to HELP the victims to begin with! Please read my blog and you will understand.

WALL STREET, YOU MAY HAVE BLOOD ON YOUR HANDS NOW! FAMILY NEEDS to INVESTIGATE!

Mar 23, 2010 11:54 pm US/Eastern

Homeowners Facing Foreclosure Take Own Lives

Reporting
Walt Hunter

PHILADELPHIA (CBS 3) ?The foreclosure crisis in Philadelphia is now becoming a matter of life and death. Eyewitness News has learned that in the past month, two homeowners took their own lives before sheriff’s deputies arrived to tell them that they were being evicted.

On March 5, deputies arriving to post an eviction notice on Lynda Clark’s South Philadelphia home found she had hanged herself.

“It’s devastating for everyone. We’re not even family members and it’s just devastating to us,” Captain Albert Innaurato of the Philadelphia Sheriff’s Office said.

Less than three weeks later, owner Gregory Bellows shot and killed himself shortly before deputies arrived to evict him from his Roxborough home.

Court records show Clark, whose debt topped $100,000, lost her home at a Sheriff’s Sale last October. Bellows, owing more than $240,000, had his home sold at a Sheriff’s Sale in 2008.

While the numbers are clear, it most likely will never be known when the homeowner’s huge debts turned into despair.

“They really don’t understand that it’s imminent, it’s going to happen. Take some sort of proactive steps to stop it from happening,” foreclosure prevention director Darrel K. Stewart said.

The Philadelphia Sheriff’s Office wants those facing crises to know that help is available. They say that while eviction is heartbreaking, it does not have to end in tragedy.

“They have to learn from day one to be on top of it, there’s a lot of agencies and a lot of programs in place that can help them,” Innaurato said.

RELATED LINKS:

Philadelphia Unemployment Project

Making Home Affordable

Philadelphia Sheriff’s Office

HUD

Greater Philadelphia Urban Affairs Coalition

Foreclosure Prevention Resource Guide

(© MMX, CBS Broadcasting Inc. All Rights Reserved.)

Wed Mar 24, 2010 1:09pm IST
By David Lawder

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – Bank of America will on Wednesday announce plans to start forgiving mortgage loan principal for troubled homeowners who owe more than 120 percent of their home’s value or are battling ever-expanding “negative amortization” loans.

According to a summary of the program obtained by Reuters, Bank of America pledged to offer an “earned principal forgiveness” of up to 30 percent in two stages. The lender will first offer an interest-free forbearance of principal that the homeowner can turn into forgiven principal annually over five years, provided they stay current on their payments.

The forgiveness can allow a homeowner to bring the loan value back down to 100 percent of the home’s value over five years, according to the plan, confirmed by sources close to the matter.

The plan, to begin in May, is among the first by a U.S. mortgage lender that takes a systematic approach to reducing mortgage principal to tackle the thorny issue of preventing foreclosures when home values drop well below the amount owed.

A Bank of America spokesman declined comment.

Announcement of the program in Washington comes as U.S. lawmakers and housing advocates are becoming increasingly vocal about the need for principal writedowns in order to save homes on a large scale. Amid stubbornly high unemployment, homeowners are seen as more likely to simply abandon an unaffordable mortgage when they have no equity or are deep “underwater” on the loan.

The U.S. Treasury’s mortgage modification program has largely relied on reducing interest rates, and has been criticized for failing to address a steep and painful reduction in home values.

The announcement also will come two days after two Washington state residents sued Bank of America for allegedly reneging on a promise it made to modify troubled mortgages when it took $25 billion in taxpayer bailout money.

The lawsuit alleged that the lender has “seriously strung out, delayed and otherwised hindered” modifications because it had financial incentives to do so.

NEGATIVE AMORTIZATION LOANS TARGETED

Under the plan, Bank of America also will slash the principal balance on the worst of the high-risk mortgages written during the height of the housing boom, the so-called “payment option” adjustable rate mortgages that had a negative amortization feature that allowed the principal balance to grow.

On such loans that are delinquent and in danger of imminent default, the lender will announce that it will cut principal to as low as a 95 percent of the property’s value.

Bank of America lender also will expand its modification program to consider payment reductions on prime hybrid adjustable rate mortgages that have floating interest rates after two years and will extend its National Homeowner Retention Plan by six months until the end of 2012.

The bank expects to be operationally ready to start the earned principal reduction plan in May. It plans to identify mortgages that may be eligible for these programs and proactively contact homeowners to request documents to verify eligibility.

(Additional reporting by Joe Rauch in Charlotte; Editing by Lincoln Feast)

BIG Thanks to 4closurefraud.org for putting this out to the world.

Mr. Muckles lawsuit to stop every foreclosure. This is a must read to witness the precise description with supportive evidence of this perpetual fraud involving Wall Street.

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Here Mr. Davies points out some VERY IMPORTANT issues. This is NOT limited to OneWest/ IndyMac as we come to find out many of these “Non-Creditors” use almost the same verbiage over and over and over.

Take time to read this over because what you sign TODAY may not help you Tomorrow if you sign your rights away! Do NOT sign anything you do not understand and consult with an attorney ASAP. Mr. Davies is one highly intelligent man! Thank you for your fine work!

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I put enough into these figures as I do in the “real” unemployment numbers. While they try to count numbers, I count lives.

WASHINGTON – March 23, 2010 – How many foreclosed homes are really out there? No one can say for sure, but the number seems to be somewhere between 500,000 and 1 million.

To date, no one has been able to track the total number of properties owned by banks, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and mortgage investors. Here are a few approximations:

• Barclays Capital uses foreclosure data from mortgage securities to estimate that there are slightly more than 600,000 homes in the process of foreclosure.

• RealtyTrac, which examines public records, estimates the number is closer to 700,000.

• Independent housing economist Tom Lawler combines data from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Housing Administration, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and securitization trusts to conclude that there are actually about 500,000.

Source: The Wall Street Journal, James R. Hagerty (03/19/2010)

How about puting the many faces and families into this equation instead of trying to put emphasis on numbers! Try numbers on Illegal foreclosure, evicted shattered lives MAYBE?

From: b.daviesmd6605

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THIS IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE

InquiryBarComplaintForm

The Client Assistance program is called the Attorney Consumer Assistance Program (ACAP). ACAP is the department that handles client complaints and even can resolve some problems before a complaint is filed. Call the ACAP Hotline – 866/352-0707.

If any of you have any other states please feel free to link to comments and note the STATE. 

I really enjoy MR. BARNES work!

July 23, 2008

William Jeff Barnes, Esq. 1515 North Federal Highway
Atrium Building, Suite 300
Member of Florida and Colorado Bars Boca Raton, Florida 33432
Certified Mediator (Florida, Minnesota)
Certified Arbitrator (Florida) telephone: (561) 864-1067
telefax: (702) 804-8137
Ruth Barnes: International/Multilingual
Certified Mediator (Florida, Minnesota) e-mail: wjbarnes@cox.net
Certified Arbitrator (Florida)

July 2, 2008

VIA FAX AND MAIL
(954) 233-8333
Maria M. Solomon, Esq.
Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A.
801 South University Drive, Suite 500
Plantation, Florida 33324

Re: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Defendant (Key West, Florida): FORMAL STATUTORY

DEMAND TO DISMISS FORECLOSURE ACTION WITH PREJUDICE, CLEAR
TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY, REFUND MONIES PAID, AND FOR PAYMENT
OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO FLA.STAT. SEC. 57.105

Dear Ms. Solomon:
This letter is being provided to you, the Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A., and your client Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Plaintiff in the Action identified herein) as formal notice, pursuant to the matters herein and Fla.Stat. sec. 57.105, of this Firm’s client Defendant demand that you immediately and forthwith dismiss, with prejudice, that certain civil action styled Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Defendant et al., 16th Judicial Circuit Court Case No. 2007-CA-1120-K (Key West, Florida, hereafter referred to as the “Action”); to provide clear title to the real property the subject of the Action; for refund of all monies paid by Defendant incident to the alleged “loan” the subject of the Action; and for payment of attorneys’ fees and costs which are awardable under various Federal and state statutes violated by your filing of the Action. This letter is also being sent as formal notice of Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions (copy attached hereto) which will be filed and set for hearing unless, pursuant to Fla.Stat. sec. 57.105(4), within twenty-one (21) days of today, Defendant’s demands as set forth herein are not complied with in writing confirmed by fax receipt, by this Firm, of the July 2, 2008 57.105 demand and notice to Maria Solomon, Esq. re: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Defendant et al., page 2 of 3

necessary documents to legally effect the demands made herein. The facts supporting this demand and the attached Motion are as follows, which are admissions by you, as an agent of the Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A., in the Complaint which you filed:

(a) On or about August 22, 2007, you, as an agent and attorney of the Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A., caused a civil action for foreclosure and to “enforce loan documents” to be filed in the 16th Judicial Circuit in and for Monroe County, Florida, which has been assigned case number 2007-CA-1120-K;

(b) In paragraph “5.” of Count I of the Complaint, you affirmatively represent to the Court that “The Plaintiff owns and holds the Note and Mortgage”;

(c) In paragraph “4? of Count I, you affirmatively represent to the Court that the mortgage was “subsequently” assigned to the Plaintiff “by virtue of an assignment to be recorded” (that being some time in the future);

(d) In paragraph “20? of Count II, you affirmatively represent to the Court that “The Plaintiff is not presently in possession of the Note and Mortgage” and “the Plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain possession of the Note and Mortgage because THEIR whereabouts cannot be determined (original emphasis):

(e) In paragraph “22? of Count II, you affirmatively represent to the Court that “The Plaintiff will agree to the entry of a Final Judgment of Foreclosure wherein it will be required to indemnify and hold harmless the Defendant(s) [sic] Defendant, from any loss they [sic] may occur by reason of a claim by another person to enforce the lost Note and Mortgage.”;

(f) The Action thus inconsistently but affirmatively alleges, in Count I, that “Plaintiff owns and holds the Note and Mortgage” when in fact the admissions in Count II demonstrate, by the allegations of paragraphs “20? and “22? of the Complaint, that the Plaintiff DOES NOT and CANNOT legally establish possession or ownership of the Note or the Mortgage and that same is/are in the possession of an unknown party or parties;

(g) A copy of the Note is not even attached to the Complaint (only an alleged “ledger of loan”);

(h) By virtue of the admissions of the Plaintiff in paragraphs “20?, “21?, and “22? of the Complaint, the Plaintiff has actual knowledge that it never, at any time material, had possession of either the mortgage or the note as same were sold, assigned, or transferred as part of the single-transaction securitization process which resulted in the subject mortgage and/or note being sold as

July 2, 2008 57.105 demand and notice to Maria Solomon, Esq. re: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Defendant et al., page 3 of 3

parceled obligations and becoming part of one or more tranches within a special investment vehicle;

(i) that the Plaintiff cannot establish that the subject note or mortgage is owned or controlled by the Plaintiff “indenture trustee” for unnamed holders of a series of asset-backed bonds (a copy of which are not even attached to the Complaint);

(j) As a direct and proximate result of the transaction referred to in paragraph “h” above, the Plaintiff does not and cannot establish legal standing to even institute a foreclosure action;

(k) As such, the allegation by the Plaintiff in paragraph “5? of the Complaint constitutes matters which are completely devoid of factual or legal support and are thus “frivilous” within the meaning of Fla.Stat. sec. 57.105;

(l) As the primary and threshold issue of legal standing to institute the Action cannot be satisfied (which was known to you, the Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A., and the Plaintiff at the time that the Action was instituted), the Action is a patently frivilous claim within the meaning of Fla.Stat. sec 57.105 and the filing and prosecution thereof constitutes a fraud upon the Court.

Your client and your Firm are thus charged with actual notice of the filing of an frivilous claim, as you, your client, and the Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A. knew or should have known that the Action was both not supported by the material (and record) facts necessary to establish the claim for foreclosure and would not (and could not) be supported by the application of then-existing law to the material (and record) facts.

As such, this Firm has been directed to file and set for hearing, after the expiration of twenty-one (21) days from today (that being Thursday, July 24, 2008), the attached Motion for Sanctions and to seek attorneys’ fees from both your client and your Firm if the demands set forth herein for immediate dismissal of the Action with Prejudice, providing of clear title to the property the subject of the action, refund of all monies paid by Defendant in connection with the original “loan” the subject of the Action, and payment of all attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this demand are not complied with in writing by the close of business (5:00 p.m.) Wednesday, July 23, 2008.

Sincerely,

Jeff Barnes, Esq.

WJB/bhs
attachment (enclosed with mailed original)
copy to: Defendant (w/attachment)

Source: foreclosuredefensenationwide.com

Buyers better watch what they buy and the risk with Foreclosed homes like ours!  BID RIGGING from the comfort of your home?

Florida County To Add Online Bidding
Florida’s Broward County, home to Fort Lauderdale, which has the state’s third-highest foreclosure rate, is taking an innovative step to make selling foreclosed properties faster and easier.

Broward plans to introduce an online system where bidders can make offers on properties from anywhere in the world. The online system is expected to market as many as 1,000 homes a week, double the number sold at courthouse auctions, says Broward Clerk of Courts Howard C. Forman.

Participants must put down a deposit equal to 5 percent of the estimated high bid for each property they hope to buy. When all participants have entered their best bid on a property, the system will evaluate them and declare the highest bidder the winner.

Officials say the online auctions will speed up the process, allow staff to do other things, and potentially save thousands of dollars every month.

Source: South Florida Sun-Sentinel 903/22/2010)

Just how far that review would go is the subject of debate in the Senate.

The Valukas report found clear evidence that the New York Fed knew that Lehman was sending it garbage that it had no intention to market. In other words, the baskets of assets were created for the specific purpose of selling to the Fed for far more than they were worth.

Lehman knew it too: “No intention to market” was scrawled on one of the internal presentations about the assets. A separate bank, Citigroup, later characterized the assets as “bottom of the barrel” and “junk” when Lehman tried to push them their way, according to the report.

If Lehman hadn’t gone bankrupt anyway, the public would have no knowledge of this backdoor bailout. “It’s just fortuitous that we found out about this through a bankruptcy proceeding and a trustee that was willing to allow and pay for some digging,” said Grayson. “Do we really just have to hope for the best, that whenever the Fed does something wrong, we might someday find out about it?”

Geithner himself was aware that there was a gap between what Lehman claimed the assets were worth and what they were really worth. “The challenge for the Government, and for troubled firms like Lehman, was to reduce risk exposure, and the act of reducing risk by selling assets could result in ‘collateral damage’ by demonstrating weakness and exposing air’ in the marks,” Geithner said, according to the report.

The assets, called “Freedom CLOs”, were sold to the Fed’s “Primary Dealer Credit Facility,” according to the report.

Lehman immediately recognized the value of what the Fed had set up. A day after the PDCF was announced, an internal Lehman analysis suggested that “the new ‘Primary Dealer Credit Facility’ is a LOT bigger deal than it is being played to be.” The facility could be a used as “as a warehouse for all types of collateral, we should have plenty of flexibility to structure and rethink CLO/CDO structures.”

It was a get-out-of-debt scheme and could “serve as a ‘warehouse’ for short term securities [b]acked by corporate loans [and] “MAY BE THE ‘EXIT STRATEGY’ FUNDING SOURCE WE NEED TO GET NEW COMPETITION IN THE CORPORATE LOAN MARKET,” according to the Lehman analysis.

But not one that Lehman felt like discussing with the public. “Given that the press has not focused (yet) on the Fed window in relation to the [Freedom] CLO, I’d suggest deleting the reference in the summary below,” CEO Dick Fuld wrote in an April 4, 2008 email uncovered by the report. “Press will be in attendance at the shareholder meeting and my concern is that volunteering this information would result in a story.”

Fuld has declared himself vindicated by the report.

The Fed won’t say how much more toxic “garbage” is in the Fed’s “warehouse” and that also concerns Grayson.

“The Fed’s balance sheet is a cartoon version of what’s actually inside,” said Grayson.
“We only get to basically do autopsies on the carcasses of the Fed’s failures, but what we don’t find out is when they show favoritism to companies that do not end up in bankruptcy.”

The Treasury didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment. Below is the relevant section of the report:

(c) In Addition to a Liquidity Backstop, Lehman Viewed the PDCF as an Outlet for Its Illiquid Positions
The PDCF not only provided Lehman with a ready response to those who speculated it would go the way of Bear Stearns, but also a potential vehicle to finance its illiquid corporate and real estate loans. A day after the PDCF became operational, Lehman personnel commented: “I think the new ‘Primary Dealer Credit Facility’ is a LOT bigger deal than it is being played to be . . . .” They mused that if Lehman could use the PDCF “as a warehouse for all types of collateral, we should have plenty of flexibility to structure and rethink CLO/CDO structures . . . .” Additionally, by viewing the PDCF as “available to serve as a ‘warehouse’ for short term securities [b]acked by corporate loans,” the facility “MAY BE THE ‘EXIT STRATEGY’ FUNDING SOURCE WE NEED TO GET NEW COMPETITION IN THE CORPORATE LOAN MARKET.”

Lehman did indeed create securitizations for the PDCF with a view toward treating the new facility as a “warehouse” for its illiquid leveraged loans. In March 2008, Lehman packaged 66 corporate loans to create the “Freedom CLO.” The transaction consisted of two tranches: a $2.26 billion senior note, priced at par, rated single A, and designed to be PDCF eligible, and an unrated $570 million equity tranche. The loans that Freedom “repackaged” included high?yield leveraged loans, which Lehman had difficulty moving off its books, and included unsecured loans to Countrywide Financial Corp.

Lehman did not intend to market its Freedom CLO, or other similar securitizations, to investors. Rather, Lehman created the CLOs exclusively to pledge to the PDCF. An internal presentation documenting the securitization process for Freedom and similar CLOs named “Spruce” and “Thalia,” noted that the “[r]epackage[d] portfolio of HY [high yield leveraged loans]” constituting the securitizations, “are not meant to be marketed.”

Handwriting from an unknown source underlines this sentence and notes at the margin: “No intention to market.”

Lehman may have also managed its disclosures to ensure that the public did not become aware that the CLOs were not created to be sold on the open market, but rather were intended solely to be pledged to the PDCF. An April 4, 2008 email containing edits to talking points concerning the Freedom CLO to be delivered by Fuld stated:

“Given that the press has not focused (yet) on the Fed window in relation to the [Freedom] CLO, I’d suggest deleting the reference in the summary below. Press will be in attendance at the shareholder meeting and my concern is that volunteering this information would result in a story.”

It is unclear, based solely on the e?mail, why a reference linking the FRBNY’s liquidity facility to the Freedom CLO was deleted. One explanation could be that Lehman did not want the public to learn that it had securitized illiquid loans exclusively to be pledged to the PDCF. Another reason may have been to hide the fact that Lehman needed to access the PDCF in the first place, given that accessing the securities dealers’ lender of last resort could have negative signaling implications.

The FRBNY was aware that Lehman viewed the PDCF not only as a liquidity backstop for financing quality assets, but also as a means to finance its illiquid assets. Describing a March 20, 2008 meeting between the FRBNY and Lehman’s senior management, FRBNY examiner Jan Voigts wrote that Lehman “intended to use the PDCF as both a backstop, and business opportunity.” With respect to the Freedom securitization in particular, Voigts wrote that Lehman saw the PDCF

as an opportunity to move illiquid assets into a securitization that would be PDCF eligible. They [Lehman] also noted they intended to create 2 or 3 additional PDCF eligible securitizations. We avoided comment on the securitization but noted the firm’s intention to use the PDCF as an opportunity to finance assets they could not finance elsewhere.

Thus, the FRBNY was aware that Lehman viewed the PDCF as an opportunity to finance its repackaged illiquid corporate loans. The Examiner’s investigation has not determined whether the FRBNY also understood that these Freedom-style securitizations were never intended for sale on the broader market.

In response to a question from FRBNY analyst Patricia Mosser on whether Voigts knew “if they [Lehman] intend to pledge to triparty or PDCF,”5359 Voigts replied that the Freedom CLO was “created with the PDCF in mind.”

According to internal Lehman documents, Lehman did in fact pledge the Freedom CLO to the PDCF. On three dates, March 24, 25 and 26, 2008, Lehman pledged the Freedom CLO to the FRBNY on an overnight basis, and received $2.13 billion for each transfer.5361 FRBNY discussions concerning the CLO’s underlying assets, however, took place on or around April 9, 20085362 — more than a week after the FRBNY began accepting the CLO.

UPDATE: Tyler Durden at Zero Hedge has been all over this scandal.

Get HuffPost Business On Twitter, Facebook, and Google Buzz! Know something we don’t? E-mail us at huffpostbiz@gmail.comsopping up junk loans that the investment bank couldn’t sell in the market, according to a report from court-appointed examiner Anton R. Valukas.

Investment Banking NYTIMES.com

The Perks of Being a Goldman Kid

March 22, 2010, 6:18 am

<!– — Updated: 3:02 pm –>

Working for Goldman Sachs remains a well-paid family affair.

Last month, the blogosphere was atwitter with reports that Jonathan Blankfein, the son of Goldman chief executive Lloyd C. Blankfein, would be joining the firm when he graduates from Harvard this spring and that older son, Alex, was working at the company in a “capacity that isn’t clear.”

Gawker said that its item was based on a tipster, but the preliminary proxy that Goldman filed on Friday afternoon seems to confirm the tip.

Under the section “Certain Relationships and Other Transactions,” the filing notes that “a child” of Mr. Blankfein — the filing does not give any other details, including the child’s name or a role at the company — was a nonexecutive employee last year who made $155,000.

According to the filing, two other Goldman executives, general counsel Esta E. Stecher and chief financial officer David A. Viniar, also have children who work at Goldman, though as with Mr. Blankfein, the filing did not give the children’s names or their roles at the company.

But the filing did note that Ms. Stecher’s son made $200,000 last year and that Mr. Viniar’s stepdaughter made $225,000 last year. That’s a substantial increase from 2008, when the two children made $124,000 and $150,000, respectively, according to Goldman’s 2009 proxy.

– Michelle Leder

Go to Goldman Sachs Filing with the S.E.C. »

TAKE A STAND….MOVE YOUR MONEY!!

March 22 (Bloomberg) — Alan Greenspan, the master of monetary mumbo jumbo, leaned back in his chair and grew uncharacteristically forthright.

“If they’re too big to fail, they’re too big,” the former Federal Reserve chairman said when asked about the dangers of outsized financial institutions.

It was October 2009, and the man who helped make megabanks possible was sounding more like Teddy Roosevelt than the Maestro as he entertained what he called a radical solution.

“You know, break them up,” he told an audience at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. “In 1911, we broke up Standard Oil. So what happened? The individual parts became more valuable than the whole.”

Greenspan the bank buster crops up near the end of “13 Bankers,” Simon Johnson and James Kwak’s reasoned look at how Wall Street became what they call “the American oligarchy,” a group of megabanks whose economic power has given them political power. Unless these too-big-to-fail banks are broken up, they will trigger a second meltdown, the authors write.

“And when that crisis comes,” they say, “the government will face the same choice it faced in 2008: to bail out a banking system that has grown even larger and more concentrated, or to let it collapse and risk an economic disaster.”

The banks in their sights include Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. Though Wall Street may not like “13 Bankers,” the authors can’t be dismissed as populist rabble-rousers.

Cash for Favors

Johnson is an ex-chief economist for the International Monetary Fund who teaches at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Kwak is a former McKinsey & Co. consultant. In September 2008, they started the Baseline Scenario, a blog that became essential reading on the crisis. When they call Wall Street an oligarchy, they’re not speaking lightly.

Drawing parallels to the U.S. industrial trusts of the late 19th century and Russian businessmen who rose to economic dominance in the 1990s, the authors apply the term to any country where “well-connected business leaders trade cash and political support for favors from the government.”

Oligarchies weaken democracy and distort competition. The Wall Street bailouts boosted the clout of the survivors, making them bigger and enlarging their market shares in derivatives, new mortgages and new credit cards, the authors say.

Suicidal Risk-Taking

These megabanks emerged from the meltdown more opposed to regulation than ever, the authors say. If they get their way — and they will, judging from current congressional maneuvering over President Barack Obama’s proposed regulatory overhaul — Wall Street will retain its license to gamble with the taxpayer’s money. This isn’t good for anyone, including the banks themselves, which often feel compelled by competitive pressure to take suicidal risks.

“There is another choice,” they write: “the choice to finish the job that Roosevelt began a century ago, and to take a stand against concentrated financial power just as he took a stand against concentrated industrial power.”

Obama finds himself in the middle of a struggle that has coursed throughout U.S. history — the struggle between democracy and powerful banking interests. The book’s title alludes to one Friday last March when 13 of the nation’s most powerful bankers met with Obama at the White House amid a public furor over bailouts and bonuses.

The material that sets this book apart can be found at the beginning and end. Chapters three through six present an all- too-familiar, though meticulously researched, primer on how the economy became “financialized” over the past 30 years.

Regulatory Arbitrage

Crisis buffs won’t miss much if they skip ahead to the last chapter, where the authors debunk arguments that curbing the size of banks is too simplistic. A more complex approach, they say, would invite “regulatory arbitrage, such as reshuffling where assets are parked.”

They propose that no financial institution should be allowed to control or have an ownership interest in assets worth more than 4 percent of U.S. gross domestic product, or roughly $570 billion in assets today. A lower limit should be imposed on investment banks — effectively 2 percent of GDP, or roughly $285 billion, they say.

If hard caps sound unreasonable, consider this: These ceilings would affect only six banks, the authors say: Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup Inc., Wells Fargo & Co., Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.

“Saying that we cannot break up our largest banks is saying that our economic futures depend on these six companies,” they say. “That thought should frighten us into action.”

Though Jamie Dimon won’t like this (any more than John D. Rockefeller did), incremental regulatory changes and populist rhetoric about “banksters” are getting us nowhere. It’s time for practical solutions. This might be a place to start.

“13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown” is from Pantheon (304 pages, $26.95). To buy this book in North America, click here.

(James Pressley writes for Bloomberg News. The opinions expressed are his own.)

To contact the writer on the story: James Pressley in Brussels at jpressley@bloomberg.net.

Last Updated: March 21, 2010 20:00 EDT

By: Simon Johnson
The Baseline Scenario